2020 QCCQ 520, 2020 QCCQ 520

Li c. Canadian International Financing Inc. 2020 QCCQ 520 COURT OF QUÉBEC Administrative and Appellate Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUÉBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL Civil Division No: 500-80-039851-192 DATE: February 4, 2020 ______________________________________________________________________ PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE DANIEL BOURGEOIS J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ Ying Jia LI Applicant v. CANADIAN INTERNATIONAL FINANCING INC.

Mehrzad PEYROW Shireen PEYROW -and- Pamela RISVANIS Respondents ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT (Applications for leave to appeal decisions of the Régie du logement and to dismiss an application for leave to appeal decision of the Régie du logement, to impose sanctions for abuse of procedure, and to declare Ying Jia Li a quarrelsome litigant s. 91 of the Act respecting the Régie du logement, [1] arts. 51 to 55 and 168 Code of Civil Procedure ) ______________________________________________________________________ JB4529 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The Court has before it an application for leave to appeal decisions of the Régie du logement (“Régie”) by the Applicant, Mr.

Ying Jia Li (“Li”), [2] and an application to dismiss the application for leave to appeal by the Respondents, Canadian International Financing Inc., Mehrzad Peyrow, Shireen Peyrow and Pamela Risvanis.

The Respondents also ask that the application for leave to appeal be declared abusive under arts. 51 et seq. of the Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”). [ 2 ] Last, the Respondents seek an order declaring the Applicant Li a quarrelsome litigant to prohibit him from instituting a judicial application before the Court of Quebec without the authorization of the chief justice. [ 3 ] The Court has decided to render a single decision for all of these proceedings, as they are all closely related and all arise from the same facts.

Context and history of THE proceEding [ 4 ] For ease of reference, the Tribunal refers to a table produced by the Respondents, which sets out and identifies the results of the various hearings which took place before the Régie, filed as Exhibit 1 and attached to the present judgment. [ 5 ] As appears from the Application for leave to appeal six decisions of the Régie du logement, Li identified the following decisions by the Régie as those for which he seeks leave to appeal: 1 File number: 416018 1.1 Decision 416018 31 20180823G rendered by Commissioner Linda BOUCHER on Aug. 7, 2019 condemns me to pay $50 plus interests and $84 court costs.

Permits the Respondent to withdraw other allegations. Dismisses the rest. 1.2 Decision 416018 31 20180823T rendered by Commissioner Ronald Charbonneau on Oct. 4, 2019 maintains previous decision.

2 File number: 430897 2.1 Decision 430897 31 20181024G rendered by Commissioner Linda BOUCHER on Aug. 7, 2019 dismisses my application and amendments to: 2.1.1 condemns the respondent to pay punitive damage $14,000; 2.1.2 fine the respondents because they violated many laws including

article 1904(exact money than rent, >=$125) of CCQ, 112.1(eviction and harass, >=$5,800),

article 114(knows to be false, >=$250),

article 115(officer, director, employee or agent) of Act respecting the Régie du logement; 2.1.3 get 88 receipts from the respondents; 2.1.4 get the bylaw from the respondents; 2.1.5 pay related fees. 3 File number: 439738 3.1 Decision 439738 31 20190124G rendered by Commissioner Luce De Palma on Apr. 18, 2019 condemns me to pay $916 plus interests and $85 court costs.

Dismisses the rest. 3.2 Decision 439738 31 20190124T rendered by Commissioner Linda BOUCHER on Aug. 7, 2019 maintains previous decision. 3.3 Decision 439738 31 20190124T rendered by Commissioner Ronald Charbonneau on Oct. 4, 2019 maintains previous decision. [Reproduced in full] [ 6 ] Li’s criticisms regarding the three files are summarized in his application for leave to appeal as follows: 1 File number 416018 1.1 The application 2574524 filed with RDL by the respondents on Aug. 23, 2018 violated

article 6(requirements of good faith) of Civil Code of Quebec,

article 114 (knows to be false) and

article 115 (officer, director, employee or agent) of the Act. This application stated: … 1.2 The hearing on Jul. 25, 2019 did not respect

article 10(language) and

article 23(full and equal, public and fair hearing) of Charter of human rights and freedoms,

article 9.6(impartially) and

article 63(impartial assistance) of Act respecting the Régie du logement,

article 24(must adjourn) of Rules of procedure of the Régie du logement. … 1.3 Decision 416018 31 20180823G rendered by Commissioner Linda BOUCHER on Aug. 7, 2019 did not respect

article 2803(assert a right shall prove the facts) and 2804(more probable than its non-existence) of Civil Code . … 1.4 The hearing on Sep. 20, 2019 did not respect

article 26(must refrain from attending the hearing) of Rules of procedure of the Régie du logement. … 1.5 Decision 416018 31 20180823T rendered by Commissioner Ronald Charbonneau on Oct. 4, 2019 did not respect

article 89(reason considered sufficient) of the Act and

article 2(rules of law) of Code of ethics of the Commissioners of the Régie du lodgement. This decision put RDL above the laws. The decisions from illegal hearing were not “reason considered sufficient”. Therefore, this decision did not respect the aforesaid laws. … 2 File number: 430897 2.1 The hearing on Jul. 25, 2019 did not respect

article 10(language) and

article 23(full and equal, public and fair hearing) of Charter of human rights and freedoms,

article 9.6(impartially) and

article 63(impartial assistance) of Act respecting the Régie du logement,

article 24(must adjourn) of Rules of procedure of the Régie du logement. The details are same to 1.2. Additionally, my amendment filed with RDL and sent to the respondent through email on Jul. 23, 2019 was not heard because of respondents’ objection. I had informed the respondents that there would be an amendment in rush on Jul. 12, 2019, because I was waiting for the English translation from RDL to make the amendment. … 2.2 Decision 430897 31 20181024G rendered by Commissioner Linda BOUCHER on Aug. 7, 2019 did not respect

article 2804(more

probable than its non-existence) of Civil Code of Quebec , This decision omitted: … 3 File number: 439738 3.1 The application 2677150 filed with RDL by the respondents on Jan. 24, 2019 violated

article 6(requirements of good faith) of Civil Code of Quebec »

article 114 (knows to be false) and

article 115 (officer, director, employee or agent) of the Act This application stated: … 3.2 The hearing on Mar. 6, 2019

article 10(language) and

article 23(full and equal, public and fair hearing) of Charter of human rights and freedoms,

article 9.6(impartially) and

article 63(impartial assistance) of Act respecting the Régie du logement. … 3.3 Decision 439738 31 20190124G rendered by Commissioner Luce De Palma on Apr. 18, 2019 did not respect 2804(more probable than its non-existence) of Civil Code of Quebec . … 3.4 The hearing on Jul. 25, 2019 did not respect

article 10(language) and

article 23(full and equal, public and fair hearing) of Charter of human rights and freedoms,

article 9.6(impartially) and

article 63(impartial assistance) of Act respecting the Régie du logement,

article 24(must … 3.5 Decision 439738 31 20190124T rendered by Commissioner Linda BOUCHER on Aug. 7, 2019 did not respect 2804(more probable than its non-existence) of Civil Code of Quebec and

article 89 (omitted to adjudicate or beyond the application) of the Act. … 3.6 The hearing on Sep. 20, 2019 did not respect

article 26(must refrain from attending the hearing) of Rules of procedure of the Régie du lodgement. The details are same to 1.4. … 3.7 Decision 439738 31 20190124T rendered by Commissioner Ronald Charbonneau on Oct. 4, 2019 did not respect

article 89(reason considered sufficient) of the Act and

article 2(rules of law) of Code of ethics of the Commissioners of the Régie du logement. The details are same to 1.5. 4 The respondents violated

article 72(representation), 114{knows to be false), 115(officer, director, employee or agent) of the Act. The public records from Registraire des entreprises Quebec showed that Canadian International Financing Inc.(CIF) had no salaried employee. But Ms. Pamela Risvanis represented CIF as an employee at ail hearings. Therefore, they violated the aforesaid laws. If this appeal is heard at the Court of Quebec, if possible, I will require the tax officers from CRA and/or Revenu Quebec as witness to clarify CIF and Ms.

Pamela Risvanis's employment relations. [Reproduced in full] [ 7 ] In their application to dismiss the application for leave to appeal, to impose sanctions for abuse of procedure and to declare Li a quarrelsome litigant, the Respondents submit the following: C. Recovery of a Debt of Less Than $15,000 … 7. The sole objects of the Demands in Court files #416018 and #430897 are the recovery of debts of less than $15,000.00 which are contemplated in

section 73 of the Act Respecting the Régie du Logement, 8. In Court file #416018, Respondent Canadian International Financing (hereinafter “CIF”) desisted from its application of resiliation of lease on the basis of frequent late payment of rent, therefore the only remaining demand was a request to condemn the Li to pay $50.00 representing NSF fees paid by Respondent for Li’s returned cheque, the whole as more fully appears from copy of an extract in Court file #416018, communicated herewith as Exhibit R-2; 9.

In Court file #430897, Li filed an Application against CIF requesting it they be condemned to pay the sum of $7,000.00 in damages which was later amended to $14,000.00, the whole as more fully appears from copy of an extract in Court file #430897, communicated herewith as Exhibit R-3; 10. Li’s Application was dismissed, as it more fully appears from par. 2 of the Judgment rendered on August 29 th , 2019, in Court file #430897 (Exhibit R- 3); 11.

Therefore, Li’s Application, insofar as it concerns the judgments rendered in Court files #416018 and #430897, should be dismissed as said files are of strictly monetary nature and under the threshold of the jurisdiction of the Court of Québec in matters of recovery of small claims, and thus cannot be the object of an application for permission to appeal;

D. Li is Attempting to Retry the Facts … 13. Li’s Application makes no mention of how the “matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Québec” in accordance with

Article 91 of the Act Respecting the Régie du Logement and merely mechanically repeats the same allegations set out in Li’s previous Régie applications; 14. In fact, no controversy in the jurisprudence is even alleged and this matter is one of private interest only; 15. Li alleges that he was prevented from presenting all of his evidence because CIF objected and said objection was granted, further illustrating that Li simply disagrees with the decisions rendered in absence of demonstration of any error; 16.

Li’s Application seeks the Court’s re-appreciation of the proof offered before the Régie, namely the evaluation of the credibility of the parties, as well as the possibility to offer additional proof before this Court, which is not the role of this Honourable Court; 17. The decisions of the Régie are all motivated as the Commissioners explained their reasoning in the application of the relevant law and Li’s Application does not disclose any apparent weakness in the Judgments but rather raises arguments to differently interpret the proof offered; 18.

Li’s Application is thus doomed to fail and has no chance of success as it merely constitutes yet another attempt to retry the facts and satisfies none of the criteria set forth by caselaw to permit an appeal of a decision of the Régie; E. There is no “Lien de Droit' Between Li and Respondents Mehrzad Peyrow, Shireen Peyrow and Pamela Risvanis 19. Respondents Mehrzad Peyrow, Shireen Peyrow and Pamela Risvanis (hereinafter “Extra-Contractual Respondents”) were never parties to any of the judgments mentioned in Li’s Application; 20.

Li, for no apparent reason, added the Extra-Contractual Respondents as Respondents in the present proceeding while there are no allegations whatsoever in Li’s Application that could militate in favor of a judgment against them; 21. In fact, Li’s Amendment to add the Extra-Contractual Respondents as defendants was already refused on July 25 th , 2019, the whole as more fully appears from copy of a judgment dated August 29 ,h , 2019 (Exhibit R-3); 22.

Furthermore, it is clear and obvious that Li has no recourse against the Extra- Contractual Respondents at the Régie as the Régie doesn’t even have jurisdiction to hear applications concerning extra-contractual obligations, and no extra-contractual fault is even alleged by Petitioner; 23. Li’s Application is thus completely unfounded at law insofar as it concerns Extra-Contractual Respondents as there is no “lien de droit' between Li and the Extra-Contractual Respondents; 24.

The Extra-Contractual Respondents have no raison d’être as parties in the present proceedings and clearly Li added them as Respondents as some kind of byzantine revenge tactic, and his abuse of procedure must be sanctioned by this Honourable Court; F. Li’s Procedural Abuse 25. Li’s Application, on its very face, is sufficient to illustrate the abusive manner in which Li conducted himself throughout the eight (8) hearings at the Régie for the above-mentioned files, which included: a. Making numerous requests for postponement of his own applications; b.

Making several frivolous motions for recusation with no legal basis at all; c. Systematically filing applications for revocation of judgment for every judgment rendered in the three (3) above-mentioned files, including one for every decision dismissing his applications for revocation of judgment, for a total of six (6) applications for revocation of judgment; d. Repeating the same allegations umpteen times in his applications for revocation of judgment even though the Court informed him that said allegations were not relevant; 26.

Li’s numerous applications for revocation of judgment and repeated motions for recusation, along with his Application for Damages in Court file #430897 and Li’s Application in the present Court file, ail illustrate Li’s blatant disregard for the authority of the Court’s decisions as res judicata; 27. Respondents thus petition this Honourable Court to declare that Li’s Application is abusive and dismiss same, with costs and extra- judicial fees; 28.

Li’s incessant propensity to petition the Régie and now this Honourable Court has forced Respondents to engage counsel and unnecessarily incur extrajudicial fees for the drafting, notification and presentation in Court of the present Application as well as the contestation of Li’s Application, fees which are estimated at five thousand dollars ($5,000.00), sauf à parfaire, the whole as more fully appears from copy of a pro-forma invoice, communicated herewith as Exhibit R-5; 29. In fact, CIF has no choice but to engage counsel to defend itself before this Honourable Court in accordance with

article 87 of the Code of Civil Procedure;

G. Li is a Quarrelsome Litigant 30. Ever since CIF’s Demande Relative au Non-Paiement du Loyer in August 2018, Li has been multiplying vexatious proceedings against not only CIF, but its representatives personally, as well as the Administrative Judges themselves by accusing them of bias and unethical behaviour; 31.

Li has systematically filed applications for revocation of judgment for every judgment rendered against him, including three (3) applications for revocation in the same Court file #439738, the whole as more fully appears from copy of an extract in Court file #439738, communicated herewith as Exhibit R-4; 32. Moreover, Li, by his own admission, filed two (2) revocations of judgment before receiving the English translation of the judgment.

Li has repeatedly stated that he didn’t understand the French versions of the judgment, and thus filed applications in revocation without understanding the content of the judgments he was attempting to revoke; 33. With all due respect to Li, it is his own responsibility to attempt to understand the judgments rendered in French, and there is no shortage of bilingual people on the island of Montreal who could have explained the content of said judgments to him; 34.

In fact, three (3) of Li’s applications for revocation of judgment were dismissed and he desisted himself of the other three (3) at the hearing of November 14 th , 2019 (Exhibits P-1, P-2, P-3 and P-4); 35. One is hard-pressed to find, in Li’s Application, allegations and issues that are new and have not already been analyzed, discussed and decided upon by at least two

(2) Administrative Judges; 36. Li’s Application is therefore nothing but the relentless regurgitation of matters already decided upon, the whole as more fully appears from Li’s Application; 37. Li has incessantly repeated and continues to repeat the same inventive and/or inappropriate arguments via additional proceedings that seek the same resuit despite numerous previous failed attempts, and said arguments border on irrational; 38.

Li is intending to further pursue a claim or pleading that is clearly unfounded, and is engaged in and intends to be engaged in continued procedure that is excessive, unreasonable, vexatious and quarrelsome and which causes great prejudice to the Respondents; 39. For example, on page 7 of Li’s Application, it is clear by Li’s own admission that he intends to engage in further procedural abuse, where he states: If this appeal is heard at the Court of Quebec, if possible, I will require the tax officers from CRA and/or Revenue Quebec as witness to clarify CIF and Ms.

Pamela Risvanis’s employment relations; and thus notwithstanding the clarity of the Régie judgments regarding the irrelevance of this information; [Reproduced in full] [ 8 ] Applicant Li replied to the above by filing with the Court an amendment to his application (Defendense statement to dismiss … ( sic )) in two pleadings, i.e., the amendments of November 29, 2019, and his reply filed on December 4, 2019, the day of the hearing. THE APPLICATION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL [ 9 ]

Section 91 of the Act respecting the Régie du logement (“the Act”) states: 91. An appeal lies, on leave of a judge of the Court of Québec, from decisions of the Régie du logement when the matter at issue is one which ought to be submitted to the Court of Québec . … [Emphasis added] [ 10 ] The criteria to be applied in application of this provision are well known. For the Court to grant leave, it must be convinced that the proposed issues are serious, new, controversial or of general interest.

More precisely, leave will be granted only if there is an apparent weakness in the decision; a gross or manifest error in the appreciation of facts; a contravention to natural justice or insufficient reasons. It is not sufficient for the Court to conclude that the Régie committed an error, it must also be convinced that the issues meet the above mentioned criteria. [ 11 ] Li has the burden of convincing the Court that the issues he raises “ought to be submitted to the Court of Québec”. This burden is both one of fact and of law. [ 12 ] My colleague, the Honorable Scott Hughes, J.C.Q., in Zhang c .

Kaufmann, [3] summarized the jurisprudence of the Court of Quebec with respect to leave to appeal: [12] The jurisprudence of the Court of Québec is clear. No leave to appeal should be granted when: a. A party simply disagrees with the decisions rendered in absence of demonstration of any error: Colin c. Amato, 2011 QCCQ 15077 : [9] Par ailleurs, le Tribunal est d'avis que, sur le fond, la requête ne soulève aucune question d'intérêt pour la Cour du Québec en raison

de l'absence de moyen invoqué à son soutien. Il est insuffisant de soulever comme question le caractère déraisonnable de l'appréciation factuelle de la preuve par la RÉGIE sans l'appuyer de moyen qui, minimalement, explique en quoi l'appréciation de la preuve serait erronée. … Parisien c. Immo 2125 St-Marc ltée, 2010 11916: [15] La requête pour permission d'appeler ne révèle aucune question d'intérêt pour la Cour du Québec. Elle ne soulève que l'expression d'un simple désaccord avec la décision de la RÉGIE et ne vise qu'à soumettre à nouveau des arguments qui ont été rejetés de façon claire et intelligible. b.

When the appeal is simply an attempt to re-examine the evidence in first instance: Gagné c. Coopérative l'Arc-en-ciel , 2010 QCCQ 8965 : [25] Une permission d'appeler d'une décision de la Régie du logement à la Cour du Québec ne sera pas accordée si elle ne vise qu'à reprendre une preuve factuelle, simplement parce qu'une des parties est insatisfaite de l'appréciation des témoignages. [26] Une demande qui vise essentiellement une révision de l'appréciation générale de la qualité ou de la suffisance de la preuve ne suffira pas pour obtenir une autorisation d'appeler. c.

When the object of the appeal is nothing more then to re-evaluate the credibility of witnesses: Biron c. Maheux, 2011 QCCQ 7429 : [14] Il s'agit d'une question d'appréciation de la crédibilité des parties et pour le Tribunal la requête des locataires-requérants a pour seul but de faire apprécier la preuve par la Cour du Québec en espérant que celle-ci en arrivera à une conclusion différente de celle à laquelle en est arrivée la Régie du logement. Willie Coutu ltée c.

Bosquet, 2011 QCCQ 4096 : [35] Le Tribunal constate qu’il est devant une situation où il est manifeste que les moyens d'appel sont essentiellement factuels et visent à obtenir que la Cour du Québec substitue son appréciation à celle de la Régie sur une preuve contradictoire dont l'évaluation dépend largement d'une appréciation de la crédibilité des témoins, domaine qui, sauf erreur manifeste et dominante, est du ressort de la Régie. d. When the object of the appeal concerns only the private interest of the parties: Lachance c.

Fortin , 2011 QCCQ 4344 : [8] La question présentée par les locataires n'est pas d' intérêt général, mais d'intérêt privé. De plus, il ne s'agit pas d'une question nouvelle ou controversée, puisqu'il est reconnu que l'appel ne peut servir comme d'un moyen d'obtenir une deuxième chance afin de présenter une meilleure preuve. Il relève de l'obligation de chaque

partie de se préparer adéquatement à une audience et les tribunaux ne peuvent pallier à un manque de diligence. » [ 13 ] The Court has reviewed the following decisions in each of the following files: File 416018 Decision by Commissioner Linda Boucher, dated August 7, 2019; Decision by Commissioner Ronald Charbonneau, dated October 4, 2019; File 430897 Decision by Commissioner Linda Boucher, dated August 29, 2019; Decision by Commissioner Luce De Palma, dated April 18, 2019; File 439738 Decision by Commissioner Linda Boucher, dated August 7, 2019; Decision by Commissioner Ronald Charbonneau, dated October 4, 2019; [ 14 ] After analyzing the above decisions and reading Mr Li’s complaints and grievances, the Court concludes that Li has raised no issues that ought to be submitted to the Court of Quebec. [ 15 ] In fact, Li has established no error in the above decisions and his appeal is simply an attempt to re-examine the evidence. [ 16 ] For the above reasons, the Court has no choice but to dismiss the application for leave to appeal the above decisions.

The application to dismiss, to IMPOSE sanctionS FOR abuse of procedure, and to declare Li A quarrelsome litigant [ 17 ] The Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”) states the following with respect to the power of the Court to impose sanctions for abuse of procedure: 51. The courts may, at any time, on an application and even on their own initiative, declare that a judicial application or a pleading is abusive.

Regardless of intent, the abuse of procedure may consist in a judicial application or pleading that is clearly unfounded, frivolous or intended to delay or in conduct that is vexatious or quarrelsome. It may also consist in a use of procedure that is excessive or unreasonable or that causes prejudice to another person, or attempts to defeat the ends of justice, particularly if it operates to restrict another person’s freedom of expression in public debate. 53.

If there has been an abuse of procedure, the court may dismiss the judicial application or reject a pleading, strike out a conclusion or require that it be amended, terminate or refuse to allow an examination, or cancel a subpoena.

If there has been or if there appears to have been an abuse of procedure, the court, if it considers it appropriate, may do one or more of the following: (1) impose conditions on any further steps in the judicial application or on the pleading; (2) require undertakings from the party concerned with respect to the orderly conduct of the proceeding; (3) stay the proceeding for the period it determines; (4) recommend that the chief justice or chief judge order special case management; or (5) order the party that initiated the judicial application or presented the pleading to pay the other party, under pain of dismissal of the application or rejection of the pleading, a provision for costs, if the circumstances so warrant and if the court notes that, without such assistance, that other party’s financial situation would likely prevent it from effectively conducting its case. 54.

On ruling on whether a judicial application or pleading, including one presented under this division, is abusive, the court may order a provision for costs to be reimbursed, order a party to pay, in addition to legal costs, damages for any injury suffered by another party, including to cover the professional fees and disbursements incurred by that other party, or award punitive damages if warranted by the circumstances.

If the amount of the damages is not admitted or cannot be easily calculated at the time the application or pleading is declared abusive, the court may summarily determine the amount within the time and subject to the conditions it specifies or, in the case of the Court of Appeal, refer the matter back to the court of first instance for a decision. 55.

If an abuse of procedure results from a party’s quarrelsomeness, the court may, in addition to other measures, prohibit the party from instituting a judicial application or presenting a pleading in an ongoing proceeding except with the authorization of and subject to the conditions determined by the chief justice or the chief judge. [ 18 ] According to authors Denis Ferland and Benoit Emery, before the remedies under art. 51 C.C.P. can be applied, the pleading must be found to be frivolous or abusive, beyond a merely fragile right of action. [4] [ 19 ] In 2741-8854 Québec inc . c.

Restaurant King Ouest inc. , [5] the Court of Appeal stated the following on the notion of abuse found under art. 51 C.C.P.: [26] Pour l’essentiel, le libellé de l’article 51 C.p.c. reprend celui de l’article 54.1 a. C.p.c. , à l’exception des termes « sans égard à l’intention » ajoutés à la suite d’une certaine controverse jurisprudentielle . Tout comme son prédécesseur, l’article 51 C.p.c . vise une panoplie de situations qui « peu[vent] résulter/may consist » en un abus, au sens de cette disposition. Le spectre est large.

On peut concevoir, à l’une extrémité, l’acte de procédure, introduit de bonne foi ou sans malveillance ou témérité, mais qui s’avère néanmoins « manifestement mal fondé », et, à l’autre extrémité, la « poursuite-bâillon » d’un justiciable qui ne vise qu’à limiter la liberté d’expression de l’autre

partie ou, encore, une utilisation excessive et déraisonnable par un plaideur de la procédure, caractérisée par la quérulence.

Entre ces extrémités du spectre, on peut y voir, par exemple, une action frivole ou encore vexatoire, ou même l’action manifestement mal fondée qui, sans intention malicieuse, constitue néanmoins une faute civile. [27] Ainsi, dans une perspective de droit privé et de cohérence législative, le qualificatif d’« abus » employé à l’article 51 C.p.c. pour décrire l’acte de procédure « manifestement mal fondé », en l’absence de toute faute justifiant une responsabilité civile, peut étonner, en plus d’être source de confusion.

En raison du langage législatif adopté, la notion d’abus est dorénavant élargie, à certains égards, à des concepts qui, autrefois - et même encore aujourd’hui si l’on pense, entre autres, à l’article 365 C.p.c. -, n’étaient pas considérés à ce titre. [28] On peut par contre réconcilier, à tout le moins en partie, cette approche législative avec les principes de droit privé si l’on reconnaît que les articles 51 et s.

C.p.c. ne créent pas un régime de responsabilité sans faute et que seul le type d’abus décrit à l’article 51 C.p.c. qui dénote un comportement fautif peut justifier la responsabilité civile et la condamnation à des dommages-intérêts du justiciable. [29] Les faits de l’espèce en sont un bon exemple. La juge de première instance ne qualifie pas les requérantes de plaideurs vexatoires ou quérulents, pas plus qu’elle indique qu’elles auraient fait preuve d’un comportement déraisonnable devant le tribunal.

Elle n’écrit pas qu’elles ont fait preuve de mauvaise foi ou de témérité en intentant leur demande en justice ou, encore, que leur utilisation de la procédure est excessive. En aucun temps n’utilise-t-elle le qualificatif abusif pour décrire la procédure ou le comportement des requérantes.

Elle conclut simplement, sur la base des faits allégués à la demande introductive d’instance et des pièces additionnelles au soutien des requêtes en rejet des intimées, que l’action des requérantes est « vouée à l’échec » et, à ce seul titre, on infère qu’elle constitue un « abus » au sens de l’article 51 C.p.c . vu le langage législatif retenu à cette disposition. L’« abus » relevé par la juge donne lieu au rejet de la demande en justice, conformément à l’article 53 C.p.c. , mais non à des dommages-intérêts contre les requérantes.

En l’absence de comportement fautif, au sens du droit privé, une telle sanction, bien que prévue à l’article 54 C.p.c. , ne pouvait être ordonnée. Notons que les intimées n’avaient pas formulé une telle demande, qu’elles n’auraient de toute façon pas été légitimement en droit de faire. [30] Ceci étant dit, l’article 51 C.p.c. ne porte désormais plus à controverse. L’abus, au sens de cette disposition, « peut résulter/may result » d’une demande en justice qui, sans être malveillante ni faite de mauvaise foi ou témérité, demeure néanmoins vouée à l’échec.

Sans être intentionnelle, la demande manifestement non fondée peut être néanmoins fautive ou non, mais ce caractère fautif n’est pas la seule mesure de l’« abus » au sens de cette disposition. … [34] Il est vrai que la logique législative sous-jacente à la décision d’assujettir à une permission l’appel d’un jugement rejetant une demande en justice « abusive » au sens de l’article 51 C.p.c. s’explique plus difficilement lorsque l’« abus » résulte exclusivement d’un acte de procédure « manifestement mal fondé/clearly unfounded », sans qu’on puisse par ailleurs y voir une faute civile.

Elle conduit également à reconnaître des modalités d’appel différentes, selon que le tribunal rejette, d’une part, une demande en justice manifestement non fondée, en l’absence non seulement d’une intention malicieuse, mais également de toute faute civile, en vertu de l’article 51 C.p.c. - appel sur permission -, et, d’autre part, une demande non fondée en droit, même en tenant les faits pour avérés selon l’article 168, al. 2 C.p.c. - appel de plein droit. [ 20 ] The Respondents claim that the fact that the Applicant Li is practically seeking the systematic revocation of the Régie’s decisions constitutes abuse.

They submit that all the proceedings instituted by Li “are doomed to fail and they have no chance to success”. [ 21 ] In Genest c. Belisle , [6] the Honourable Gary D.D. Morrison, J.S.C., stated the following: [43] Dans les cas de réclamation pour abus de procédure, le défi des tribunaux est de faire la distinction entre l’exercice légitime du droit fondamental d’agir en justice pour faire valoir ses droits et le comportement inacceptable d’agir de mauvaise foi devant les tribunaux de manière à nuire à une autre

partie ou avec témérité pour faire avancer une cause manifestement mal fondée, frivole ou dilatoire. [44] Ce qui est envisagé par l’article 51 et suivants C.P.C. n’est pas l’abus de droit sur le fond du litige, mais uniquement l’abus de procédure lié à la contestation judiciaire, soit au moment du dépôt des procédures, soit au cours des procédures. Seul l’abus de procédure pourrait donner lieu à une réclamation d’honoraires extrajudiciaires des avocats. [ 22 ] In Syndicat des copropriétaires du 90, rue du Minervois c.

Habitations Bouladier inc. , [7] the Honourable Marie-Josée Bédard J.S.C. described the applicable legal parameters: [29] Les articles 51 à 54 C.p.c. accordent aux tribunaux le pouvoir de sanctionner un abus de procédure. [30] L’article 51 C.p.c. prévoit le pouvoir de sanctionner l’abus de procédure et définit les divers types d’abus envisagés : 51. Application - Les tribunaux peuvent à tout moment, sur demande et même d’office, déclarer qu’une demande en justice ou un autre acte de procédure est abusif.

Abus- L’abus peut résulter, sans égard à l’intention, d’une demande en justice ou d’un autre acte de procédure manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire, ou d’un comportement vexatoire ou quérulent.

Il peut aussi résulter de l’utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui ou encore du détournement des fins de la justice, entre autres si cela a pour effet de limiter la liberté d’expression d’autrui dans le contexte de débats publics. [31] L’abus peut être déclaré sans égard à l’intention de son auteur et donc même en l’absence de mauvaise foi de sa part et le caractère manifestement mal fondé ou frivole du recours doit s’établir en examinant l’ensemble du dossier, y incluant les pièces produites et les interrogatoires tenus, à la lumière de la théorie de la cause de l’auteur de la procédure. [32] Dans Pyrioux c. 9251-7796 Québec inc. [ Pyrioux ], le juge Dufresne, qui s’exprimait au nom de la Cour, a par ailleurs noté qu’on doit retrouver un élément blâmable : [26] […] Avant de conclure qu’un acte de procédure ou une demande en justice est abusif, on doit y déceler la présence d’un élément blâmable[8].

Enfin, il peut y avoir abus d’ester en justice sans que l’auteur de l’abus soit de mauvaise foi[9]. [33] Dans Trudel c. Laurin , la cour d’appel a traité comme suit du test de la « témérité » à appliquer pour déterminer s’il y a abus du droit d’ester en justice : [20] La notion d’abus du droit d’ester en justice est désormais bien circonscrite. En 2007, dans l’arrêt Royal Lepage [8], le juge Dalphond précisait que cette notion ne se limite pas aux cas de mauvaise foi et qu’elle comprend également ceux où une

partie fait preuve de «témérité», c’est-à-dire qu’elle prend l’initiative d’une procédure «alors qu’une personne raisonnable et prudente, placée dans les circonstances connues de [cette partie] conclurait à l’inexistence d'un fondement pour cette procédure» [9]. Plus récemment, en 2011, la Cour d’appel concluait que la connotation particulière des termes [10] employés au deuxième alinéa de l’article 54.1 de l’ancien Code de procédure civile implique aussi une conduite blâmable et, par conséquent, un élément de faute [11] . Ainsi, le constat d’un comportement fautif peut être ce qui permet de conclure qu’un acte de procédure est manifestement mal fondé au sens de cet

article 54.1. a.C.p.c. Mais la témérité suffit. […] [Emphase ajoutée] [34] Discutant du concept de témérité, le juge Dalphond qui s’exprimait au nom de la Cour d’appel dans Royal Lepage commercial inc . c. 109650 Canada Ltd a énoncé que le critère de la personne raisonnable et prudente placée dans les mêmes circonstances est un critère objectif.

Il a aussi rappelé que la fragilité d’un recours ne suffit pas pour le déclarer abusif. [35] La Cour d’appel a aussi souligné à plus d’une reprise la prudence dont doit faire preuve le tribunal avant de rejeter une demande en justice à un stade précoce et indiqué, notamment dans Pyrioux , que la demande en rejet n’a pas pour objet de court-circuiter une demande en justice recevable :

[21] La Cour a eu l’occasion de tracer à maintes reprises les contours du pouvoir des tribunaux de sanctionner les abus de procédure. Il semble bien qu’il faille y revenir. Cette fois, pour préciser que l’article 54.1 a.C.p.c. n’est pas un raccourci pour court-circuiter le processus judiciaire. L’objectif visé par cette disposition n’est pas de mettre fin prématurément à une demande en justice, par ailleurs recevable.

La tentation est particulièrement grande en ces temps où les délais pour qu’une affaire soit entendue au fond sont parfois très longs, mais il faut résister à celle-ci, à moins qu’il ne soit patent, sans qu’une preuve élaborée soit administrée, que la demande en justice ou l’acte de procédure est abusif ou paraît l’être . [36] La Cour d’appel a aussi rappelé à plus d’une reprise que le doute doit jouer en faveur du demandeur. [Citations omitted] [ 23 ] Here, the analysis of the proceedings instituted by Li reveals, at the very least, that he truly does not understand the law because the grounds raised in their support are so disparate, if not incongruous. [ 24 ] As stated above, however, the fragility of a proceeding is insufficient on its own to declare it abusive. [ 25 ] This matter may be distinguished from Khoury c.

Byer , [8] submitted by counsel for the Respondents, because in that matter, my colleague, the Honourable Céline Gervais of the Court of Québec, was dealing with much more serious facts committed by the tenants. [ 26 ] The Court thus concludes that, at this point, it is not possible to declare the proceedings as being abusive.

However, the Applicant Li’s future conduct may certainly be reassessed at the proper time and place if, where necessary, he should decide to continue his contestations or institute new proceedings based on the same grounds. [ 27 ] Moreover, and for the same reasons, the Court finds that the evidence does not establish that this is a case of “extreme” abuse or a quarrelsome litigant, even though Li’s actions are borderline acceptable.

FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: DISMISSES the application for leave to appeal, WITHOUT costs; DISMISSES the application to dismiss an application for leave to appeal, to sanction an abuse of procedure, and to declare Ying Jia Li a quarrelsome litigant, WITHOUT costs. __________________________________ DANIEL BOURGEOIS J.C.Q. Mr. Ying Jia Li Unrepresented Applicant Mtre Rachelle Urtnowski-Morin CHOUEKE LEGAL INC. Counsel for the Respondents Date of hearing: December 4, 2019