r v. JOSHUA JORDAN LALONDE-LAUZON, 2021 QCCQ 4617

R. c. Lalonde-Lauzon 2021 QCCQ 4617 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF Montreal Criminal and Penal Division N o : 500-01-213367-201 DATE: March 25, 2021 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE MANLIO DEL NEGRO J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Prosecutor v.

JOSHUA JORDAN LALONDE-LAUZON Accused ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ON JUDICIAL INTERIM RELEASE [1] ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Jordan Joshua Lalonde-Lauzon (the accused), is charged with three counts of possession for the purposes of trafficking of various controlled substances inscribed in

Schedule 1 of the Controlled Drugs and Substance Act . [ 2 ] It is alleged that he and the Co-co-accused Adrian Jones-Berry were involved in trafficking controlled substances. I. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [ 3 ] The police obtained information from three coded sources who provided them with information about the involvement of the accused in the trafficking and possession for the purposes of trafficking of various controlled substances. [ 4 ] Source (

A) did not provide any information regarding the accused. [ 5 ] Source (

B) did not provide any information regarding the accused. [ 6 ] Source (

C) provided a substantial amount of information to his handler regarding the participation of the accused in the drug trade. [ 7 ] The profile of this informant can be summarized as follows: he only recently began collaborating with the Montreal police force. He has provided little information of any value to the police since he began collaborating with them.

However, according to the police, the information he has provided thus far appears to be reliable; he has obtained compensation from the police for information that he provided that led to the arrest of suspects and also to the discovery of controlled substances. [ 8 ] The conclusion drawn by the police is that they deem him to be a credible source as the information he provided was accurate.

Furthermore, this source does not have any prior convictions relating to perjury or for giving false evidence. [ 9 ] In order to corroborate the information they received from this source, the police began a surveillance protocol regarding the accused which, to some extent, corroborated the information received by the forgoing sources. [ 10 ] The surveillance protocol established by the police together with the information they obtained from their databases served to corroborate the information provided by above-mentioned sources but more particularly the information provided by source (C). II.

THE INFORMATION OBTAINED FROM THE POLICE DATABASES [ 11 ] Source (

C) identified the accused as “JOJO" who, according to the police, corresponded to the accused Mr. Joshua Jordan Lalonde-Lauzon. [ 12 ] The informant provided information that JOJO was using a cellphone, which was not linked to him following the verification of various databases. [ 13 ] Based on the identity of the accused, the police were able to connect several Highway Safety Code infractions to him since 2019.

[ 14 ] Also, two vehicles were linked to him: an Infinity Q50, licence plate number [...] and also a Chevrolet Malibu, licence plate number [...]. [ 15 ] The owner of these vehicles was determined to be Jennifer Nicholson-Rooze, residing at 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West, in Roxboro, Quebec. [ 16 ] A database check revealed that on April 3, 2020, Ms. Nicholson-Rooze and the accused were intercepted by the police while riding in an Infinity Q50 licence [...]. [ 17 ] Informant (

C) informed his handlers that the accused was selling drugs from the parking lot of a (Couche-Tard convenience store) located at 32 nd Avenue corner of Prevost Street in Lachine and also at 1800 Sunnybrooke Street (Provi-soir convenience store) and that the person whom he described as JOJO possibly lived in the vicinity of the Provi-soir on Sunnybrooke. [ 18 ] The police noted that the home at 10,312, Blvd.

Gouin West, is situated approximately 30 minutes driving distance to the convenience store on Sunnybrooke Street. [ 19 ] At that point of their investigation, the police database searches did not link the accused to the home situated at 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West (home of Ms. Nicholson-Rooze). III.

POLICE SURVEILLANCE PROTOCOL [ 20 ] On November 9, 2020, the accused was seen engaging in a rapid hand-to-hand exchange with this co-accused Adrian Jones- Berry at 685 32 nd Avenue, Lachine. [ 21 ] Afterwards, he is seen getting into the Infinity Q50. [ 22 ] Shortly after, the police noticed the Chevrolet Malibu driven by Ms. Nicholson-Rooze, pull-up next to the accused. Shortly thereafter, both vehicles departed.

a) THE SURVEILLANCE OF 10,321, BLVD. GOUIN WEST IN ROXBORO [ 23 ] On November 20, 2020, the Malibu and Infinity are seen parked at 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West. [ 24 ] The accused is seen making quick hand-to-hand exchanges while he is in the Infinity directly in front of the residence situated at 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West. [ 25 ] He is also observed travelling to Lachine later in the day and meeting an unknown individual and his co-accused Jones-Berry. Regarding these observations, the police mention that his behaviour appeared to be compatible with someone supplying substances to consumers of illicit substances.

b) SURVEILLANCE-NOVEMBER 26, 2020 [ 26 ] The accused is seen driving the Infinity and Malibu, occasionally making short contacts with unknown individuals in what appeared to be exchanges of illicit substances at the parking lot of the Provi-soir convenience store on Sunnybrooke.

c) SURVEILLANCE- DECEMBER 2, 2020 [ 27 ] The accused is observed making short-quick exchanges with individuals at the Provi-soir on Sunnybrooke and then returning to 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West.

d) SURVEILLANCE-DECEMBER 3, 2020 [ 28 ] The accused is seen driving both the Infinity and Malibu throughout the day and making short-quick contacts with six individuals in circumstances compatible with the trafficking of controlled substances. He is also seen exiting and returning to 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West throughout the day.

e) SURVEILLANCE-DECEMBER 4, 2020 [ 29 ] The accused is observed driving the Infinity and Malibu, making two short contacts compatible with controlled substances transactions. He is also seen driving to the Provi-soir on Sunnybrooke and other parking lots where he is observed making several short- quick contacts with unknown individuals who are seen entering and exiting the vehicle he was driving. [ 30 ] The Crown’s theory is that the accused was personally involved in the daily operations of street-level trafficking of controlled

substances and also acting as a supplier of illicit substances to different drug dealers and particularly his co-accused Jones-Berry. Following these observations, several warrants were issued for the search of the home situated at 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West, Roxboro, and the two vehicles the accused was seen driving during the surveillance namely the Chevrolet Malibu [...] and the Infinity Q50, licence [...]. [ 31 ] The search of 10,312, Blvd.

Gouin West, revealed the following; (AS SUMMARIZED BY THE POLICE FILE BUT NOT TRANSLATED): • balance numérique contaminée et fonctionnelle; • 118.5 grammes d’Héroïne; • 11.5 grammes de Fentanyl mauves; • 5.8 grammes de Crystal meth; • 1 gramme d’Amphétamines mauves; • certificat de naissance au nom de Joshua Jordan Lalonde-Lauzon; • passeport canadien expiré de Joshua Jordan Lalonde-Lauzon; • machine à compter l’argent; • $3,180 argent canadien. [ 32 ] The above mentioned controlled substances were found in the kitchen cabinet next to the stove. During the search, the officers also searched the Infinity Q50.

In the vehicle, the officers found two cellphones whose visible phone numbers did not correspond with the information provided by source (C). Also, no illicit substances were found in the vehicle. IV. THE SITUATION OF THE ACCUSED [ 33 ] The accused is 25 years old, it appears that he sometimes resides with his girlfriend Ms. Nicholson-Rooze at 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West, Roxboro. Ms. Nicholson-Rooze spoke with the police during and after the execution of the search warrant of her home. The statement she made to the police can be summarized as follows: • She resides at 10,312, Blvd. Gouin West.

She is not the owner of her home but rather a tenant; • Her monthly rent is $1,600; • She is currently on a leave of absence from work; • Her fiancé, the accused, uses her apartment occasionally as a “pied-à-terre” and that he does not live there permanently because he also resides elsewhere at times; • She is in not involved in trafficking of illicit substances; • She occasionally consumes cannabis with her boyfriend, the accused; • She is currently undergoing a methadone program consisting of 30mg doses per day; • She stated that the sum of money found in her home during the search ($3,000) belonged to her; • She confirmed that the cash-counting machine found next to the Christmas tree also belonged to her. [ 34 ] That being said, it is important to note that no substances were found in the possession of the accused nor the vehicles he was driving following his arrest.

The accused has been involved in intimate relationship with Ms. Nicholson-Rooze since 2017.

For the time being, he is not gainfully employed. [ 35 ] During his testimony, he openly admitted his alcohol abuse and substance abuse of “Speed.” He testified that he is willing to undergo therapy and enrol in an adult education program which will enable him to complete his high school leaving certificate should the Court grant him bail. [ 36 ] Since his arrest, his family has secured an appointment with a psychologist to address some of his issues should he be released from custody and also have arranged for him to enroll in school in order to complete his high-school diploma. [ 37 ] The accused testified with enthusiasm about his eagerness to quick-start a new

chapter in his life should he be released from custody. [ 38 ] The accused has a criminal record for theft under $5,000 in 2017 and for simple possession of illicit substances in 2017 and 2018. Also, as a juvenile, he was placed on probation in 2013 for charges relating to uttering threats and for carrying a concealed weapon. [ 39 ] In the past, the accused has never been sentenced to a term of imprisonment. Also, he is currently not on probation.

V. THE POSITION OF THE PROSECUTION [40] The Crown objects to the accused’s release from custody on the secondary and tertiary grounds provided by section 515 (10) b)

c) of the criminal Code. [41] Moreover, from a legal perspective, the accused bears the burden, by virtue of section 515 (6) Viii) d), to show cause why hisdetention in custody is not justified. The onus is therefore to show cause why he should not be detained on the secondary groundprovided by section 515 (10) (

b) or the tertiary ground provided by section 515 (10) (

c) of the Criminal Code. [42] Let it be clear, the accused is facing serious criminal charges that are punishable by life in jail; [43] Furthermore, Fentanyl, one of the controlled substances he is alleged to have had in his possession for the purposes of trafficking has now supplanted Heroine as the deadliest of the illegal substances.[2] [44] If convicted, the accused inevitably faces a severe sentence of incarceration. VI. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK [45] Parliament recently provided some guidance with respect to how to interpret the sections in

Part XVI of the code in a 2019amendment that expressed its “Principals and Considerations” which establishes the principle of restraint in making decisions for bail and instructs judges about considering the release of the accused as a primary consideration in bail.[3] See

section 493.1 Criminal Code. VII. DISCUSSION [46]

Section 11 (

e) of the Charter provides that any person charged with an offence has the right not to be denied reasonable bailwithout a just cause. The right to bail under

section 11 (

e) of the Charter includes the presumption of innocence. [47] The default position, as per the Supreme Court of Canada, is that the accused should be released at the earliest opportunity andon the least onerous terms available in the circumstances, R. v. Zora, 2020 SCC 14, at paragraph 1; R. v. Myers, 2019 SCC 18, atparagraph 1; R. c. Antic, 2017 SCC 27, at paragraphs 29 and 67 (d).

Detention in custody is the exception and should be regarded as theoption of last resort.[4] [48] In Antic, the Supreme Court of Canada set out the proper approach to the Criminal Code bail provisions when it addressed theoveruse of cash bails and sureties.

In Zora, the Supreme Court of Canada built upon the Antic framework and provided guidance to bailcourt judges, such as myself, on non-monetary conditions of bail and the serious consequences which flow from their breach. [49] In Myers, Chief Justice Wagner outlined in paragraph 1 that: …., The right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause is an essential element of an enlightened criminal justice system.

Itentrenches the effect of the presumption of innocence at the pre-trial stage of the criminal trial process and safeguards the liberty ofaccused persons. [50] From Antic[5], again per the now Chief Justice Wagner, we are instructed that: The right not to be denied reasonable bail without just cause is an essential element of an enlightened criminal justice system.

Itentrenches the effect of the presumption of innocence at the pre-trial stage of the criminal trial process and safeguards the liberty ofaccused persons.[6] The “ladder principle” [that is L-a-d-d-e-r, principle], which is codified in s. 515 (3) of the Code, requires a justice or a judge to imposethe least onerous form of release on an accused unless the Crown shows why that should not be the case.[7] [51] I am reminded of the powerful dissent in R. v. Hall, 2002 SCC 64, at 467: At the heart of a free and democratic society is the liberty of its subjects.

Liberty lost is never regained and can never be fullycompensated for; therefore, where the potential exists for the loss of freedom for even a day, we, as a free and democratic society, mustplace the highest emphasis on ensuring that our system of justice minimizes the chances of an unwarranted denial of liberty. [52] In Zora[8], at paragraphs 67 and 68, we are taught that: Revocation under s. 524 ensures that those who do not follow bail conditions can be arrested to reassess whether, and on whatconditions, they should be released into the community, where it becomes apparent that the accused will not or cannot abide by theconditions originally set.

Revocation provides the court with greater flexibility in determining whether, despite a contravention of bail,the accused has shown cause that they should be released again either on the same conditions or different conditions (see, e.g., R. v.Badgerow, 2010 ONCA 236, 260 O.A.C. 273, at para. 36; R. v. T.J.J., 2011 BCPC 155, at paras. 57-59 ; R. v. Mehan, 2016BCCA 129, 386 B.C.A.C. 1). Conditions can be revised to address the risk of further breaches while ensuring the accused can reasonablycomply.

If detention is the proportionate result for the accused’s breach of bail then revocation under s. 524 is the appropriate avenue. Bailrevocation was the process designed for determining whether a person’s risk factors are such that their failure to abide by bail conditions

means they ought to be detained rather than released on different conditions. Revocation can therefore address negligent and careless breaches of bail conditions without creating additional criminal liability. While revocation carries the threat of detention and should be sought only when the negative impacts that can arise from detention are justified, it can address risks arising from breaches of bail conditions without adding offences against the administration of justice to the criminal record of the accused. VIII. THE ANALYSIS OF THE SECONDARY AND THE TERTIARY GROUNDS A. THE SECONDARY GROUND [ 53 ] Section 515 (10) (

b) of the Criminal Code states that the detention is justified on the secondary ground when it is necessary for the protection or safety of the public “having regard to all the circumstances including any substantial likelihood that the accused will, if released from custody, commit a criminal offence or interfere with the administration of justice.” [ 54 ] In this context, a “substantial likelihood” means “a probability of certain conduct, not a mere possibility.

And the probability must be substantial, in other words, significantly likely. [9] [ 55 ] In this case, the Crown submits that the accused was deeply involved in trafficking of very addictive and dangerous controlled substances.

Also, the Crown argues that the accused not only sold controlled substances to others, but that his involvement was fairly high-up in the distribution hierarchy and was also responsible for directing others to engage in drug trafficking. [ 56 ] With deference, I do not agree with the prosecution’s submission that the accused was an important player in the distribution hierarchy or that he directed others to engage in drug trafficking.

To accept this reasoning would be conjectural and speculative based on the evidence I heard during the judicial interim release hearing. [ 57 ] This evidence, in my view, is not sufficiently compelling to infer this theory. [ 58 ] I accept, however, that a compelling case has been made that the accused was involved in a relatively low-level operation of street trafficking of controlled substances. [ 59 ] I am also not prepared to conclude that the accused was accumulating substantial profits from his activities and therefore believe that he does not have a strong motive to continue doing so if he is released from custody with a structured exit plan. [ 60 ] In R. v.

Tully [10] , the Ontario Superior Court of Justice addresses secondary ground concerns as follows: " the relevant question is not whether secondary ground concerns exist, but whether they can be adequately addressed by the proposed release plan, having regard to all of the relevant factors.

The applicant does not have to show that he is unlikely to ever reoffend under any circumstances or for all time, but only to establish that the risk of his reoffending in a way that would jeopardize public safety can be reduced to tolerable levels during the time he would be on bail by the restrictions and supervision he would be under and provided in the bail order. [ 61 ] In this case, the proposed exit plan is very strict and would require the accused to remain in his mother’s home at all times with few exceptions and to be in the company of a surety when not in his residence. [ 62 ] The concern that the accused will continue trafficking in controlled substances is mitigated by the testimony of his mother who was prepared to take the responsibility that her son remain at home with her at all times except for some exceptions.

Furthermore, he will nonetheless be required to be accompanied at all times by a surety when he leaves his mother’s home for specific, predetermined, limited exceptions. Should he not comply with the conditions of his bail, his mother testified that she would contact the police to advise them that her son is not abiding with the conditions of his bail. Based on what I was able to observe, I am ready to accept that his mother is a credible, reliable witness.

CONCLUSION ON THE SECONDARY GROUND [ 63 ] While it may be possible for the accused to commit further offences if released, the proposed plan, which includes being at his mother’s home at all times except and, in the presence of responsible adults, satisfies me that there is not a substantial likelihood that he will do so. [ 64 ] Consequently, the accused has therefore met his onus on the secondary ground. B. THE TERTIARY GROUND THE NATURE OF THE INQUIRY [ 65 ] Section 515 (10) (

c) provides that detention is justified on the tertiary ground if it is necessary to “maintain confidence in the administration of justice, having regard to all the circumstances.” Public confidence refers to the perception of reasonable members of the community who are informed about the philosophy behind the bail provisions in the Code, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case. It does not take into account the perceptions of those prone to emotional reactions, those who do not have

knowledge of the circumstances of the case or who disagree with society’s fundamental values . [11] [ 66 ] In St-Cloud , Judge Wagner noted that the “public” are reasonable, well-informed members of the community, but not legal experts with in-debt knowledge of our criminal justice system. [12] [ 67 ] It is important to note that the application of the tertiary ground is not limited to exceptional circumstances, to “unexplained” crimes or to certain types of crimes. To the contrary, the prosecution can rely on section 515 (10) (

c) for any type of crime but it must prove-except in the cases provided by section 515 (6)—that the detention of the accused is justified to maintain confidence in the administration of justice. [13] [ 68 ] This being said, I instruct myself accordingly to consider each of the four circumstances described by section 515 (10) (

c) and consider their combined effect in a balancing exercise to decide whether or not the detention of the accused is justified. [ 69 ] I also instruct myself accordingly during this balancing exercise that in Canadian Criminal law, release of the accused is the cardinal rule and not the exception. [ 70 ] In St-Cloud , judge Wagner summarized the essential principles that must guide judges in the application of section 515 (10) (

c) as follows: [14] • Section 515(10) (

c) Cr. C. does not create a residual ground for detention that applies only where the first two grounds for detention ((

a) and (

b) are not satisfied. It is a distinct ground that itself provides a basis for ordering the pre-trial detention of an accused. • Section 515(10) (

c) Cr. C. must not be interpreted narrowly (or applied sparingly) and should not be applied only in rare cases or exceptional circumstances or only to certain types of crimes. • The four circumstances listed in s. 515(10) (

c) Cr. C. are not exhaustive. • A court must not order detention automatically even where the four listed circumstances support such a result. • The court must instead consider all the circumstances of each case, paying particular attention to the four listed circumstances. • The question whether a crime is “unexplainable” or “unexplained” is not a criterion that should guide the analysis. • No single circumstance is determinative.

The justice must consider the combined effect of all the circumstances of each case to determine whether detention is justified. • This involves balancing all the relevant circumstances. At the end of this balancing exercise, the ultimate question to be asked by the court is whether detention is necessary to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

This is the test to be met under s. 515(10) ( c ). • To answer this question, the court must adopt the perspective of the “public”, that is, the perspective of a reasonable person who is properly informed about the philosophy of the legislative provisions, Charter values and the actual circumstances of the case.

However, this person is not a legal expert and is not able to appreciate the subtleties of the various defences that are available to the accused. • This reasonable person’s confidence in the administration of justice may be undermined not only if a court declines to order detention where detention is justified having regard to the circumstances of the case, but also if it orders detention where detention is not justified. [ 71 ] The tertiary ground is conceptually distinct from the primary and secondary grounds.

The latter relate to an assessment of the probability that the accused will behave in a certain way, that is, fail to attend court or commit further offences. The tertiary ground is not concerned with predictions about the accused’s behavior but, rather, with public perception. Having proper regard for the views of reasonable members of the public while disregarding views that may be based on purely emotional reactions or misunderstandings is not an easy task . [15] Furthermore, there is not necessarily a direct correlation between detention and the maintenance of public confidence.

In some cases, detaining an accused without justification will undermine public confidence: St-Cloud. [16] [ 72 ] Not all factors favour detention in this case. As mentioned above, based on the evidence I heard, the alleged criminality involved low level, street trafficking of controlled substances. [ 73 ] That being said, no evidence of a structured, sophisticated, lucrative enterprise was put forth by the Crown.

With the evidence I heard, the position of the accused is clearly, as is often said colloquially “being at the bottom of the ladder”. [ 74 ] It should also be borne in mind that in terms of the strength of the Crown’s case that no controlled substances were found in the possession of the accused or in the vehicle he was driving at the time of his arrest. [ 75 ] Also, no evidence corroborating that trafficking in controlled substances was found in the possession of the accused or the vehicle he was driving.

For example, no drug paraphernalia, accounting ledgers, sums of money or other material evidence that would lead one to believe that somehow the accused was actively involved in the trafficking of controlled substances. [ 76 ] To the contrary, when the police arrested the accused in the Infinity Q50 in the parking lot of the Provi-soir, another individual had just entered his vehicle as a passenger. The subsequent search of the accused, his vehicle, his passenger M.T.P. did not reveal, even remotely, that trafficking in controlled substances had taken place. [ 77 ] The police also searched the vehicle (M.T.

P) had exited from before entering the vehicle driven by the accused and the driver (A.

A) of that vehicle was also detained for investigative purposes. The search of the driver and vehicle didn’t reveal anything and both

M.T.P and A.A were immediately released. IX. THE FOUR CIRCUMSTANCES DESCRIBED IN SECTION 515 (10) (C) 1. THE APPARENT STRENGTH OF THE PROCECTION’S CASE: [ 78 ] While it is true that the accused was seen going to and leaving the address at 10,312 Blvd. Gouin West, the evidence tendered reveals that his name did not appear on the lease.

Furthermore, the statement made by his fiancé Miss Nicholson-Rooze, who was bound by the lease of the premises, took responsibility for the cash found in her home ($3,000) stating that it belonged to her and the cash counter found near the Christmas tree also belonged to her. [ 79 ] Interestingly, she also informed the investigators that she is currently on the Methadone program, a 30 mg dose per day, which may lead to the inference that, at some point in her life, she may have been a user or is still a user of illicit substances similar to the substances found in her home. [ 80 ] That said, the evidence tendered this far does not link any of the illicit substances found at the above-mentioned address to the accused by corroborative evidence such as fingerprints and/or DNA. [ 81 ] While it is true that the accused’s birth certificate and expired passports were found in Ms.

Nicholson’s-Rooze residence, I am mindful of Ms. Nicholson’s-Rooze statement stating that her residence was simply a “pied-à-terre” for the accused and that he did not live there permanently. [ 82 ] I am also mindful of the legal notion involving possession of the substances. Defined by section 4 (3) of the Criminal code the issue of possession will undoubtedly be vigorously contested by the accused. The evidence tendered by the Crown is not an open and shut case and, as I’ve mentioned above, the accused is presumed innocent of all the charges. In

summary, the evidence is not weak but it is not overwhelming either. 2. THE GRAVITY IN THE OFFENCE: [ 83 ] The objective gravity of the offences is punishable by life in jail. [ 84 ] I agree with the comments of Judge Manon Lavoie of the Superior Court of Quebec in the case of Lights v. R . [17] : …, la gravité subjective des infractions est également importante en raison de la nature et de la quantité des stupéfiants.

En effet, la Cour d’appel du Québec dans l’arrêt Fortin a établi que l’héroïne est la drogue la plus nocive sur le marché. [ 85 ] At paragraph 63 of this judgment she makes the following comment regarding fentanyl: “Quant au Fentanyl, il est maintenant l’opioïde le plus puissant. Il s’agit d’une drogue très addictive et dangereuse. Il est de 25 à 50 fois plus puissant que l’héroïne. Une dose minuscule, mélangée à d’autres substances, peut être mortelle. Une dose aussi petite que 2mg peut constituer une dose fatale ”. [18] [ 86 ] This been said, in the case of Samir Ouati c.

R. [19] , judge Boucher of the Superior Court of Quebec decided that cases involving fentanyl should not inevitably lead to a denial of bail: …la détention n’est pas automatiquement nécessaire en matière de trafic de fentanyl. La gravité de cette infraction n’est pas un facteur déterminant en soi ( R. c. Vaillancourt , 2018 QCCA 1061 ; R. c. Friensen , 2017 BCSC 1391 ). 3.

THE CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING THE COMMISSION OF THE OFFENCES, INCLUDING WHETHER A FIREARM WAS USED: [ 87 ] I have discussed the circumstances surrounding the commission of this offence above and I will reiterate that the evidence points to a low-level street operation entirely inconsistent with a sophisticated, organized operation. [ 88 ] This factor, in my view, does not favour detention. 4.

THE FACT THAT THE ACCUSED IS LIABLE, ON CONVICTION, FOR A POTENTIALLY LENGTHY TERM OF IMPRISONMENT: [ 89 ] As for the fourth factor, there is no doubt that, if convicted, the accused is facing a fairly severe term of imprisonment considering the nature of the controlled substances, the quantities and the variety of substances involved.

It is well known that sentencing is highly individualized process where ranges of sentences are established but not binding on the courts. [ 90 ] Considering this concept, I am uncertain of the potential sentence that will be levied on the accused should he be found guilty or plead guilty to the charges. But, overwhelmingly, the courts focus for such offences prioritize the principals of deterrence both (individual and general) and denunciation.

The principle of proportionality is also important. [ 91 ] I refer the parties to an interesting article: A Bad Deal: British Columbia’s Emphasis on Deterrence and Increasing Prison Sentences for Street-Level Fentanyl Traffickers. [20]

[ 92 ] In this article, the author puts forth a range of sentences for trafficking and for street level trafficking of fentanyl to be 18-36 months range based on the British Columbia Court of Appeal decision of Smith . [ 93 ] The author also discusses the enhanced need for deterrence in fentanyl trafficking cases.

This said, other illicit substances of considerable dangerousness were also found which would tend to aggravate the accused’s position on sentencing. [ 94 ] Although the accused may be facing a potentially severe sentence, I am not prepared to conclude that such a sentence would be so overwhelming that it would preclude the possibility of obtaining bail in this case. Consequently, this factor, in my view, does not favour detention. [ 95 ] Section 515 (10) (

c) of the Criminal code requires the Court to have regard “ To all the circumstances .” [ 96 ] This brings me to address the proposed release plan of the accused. [ 97 ] As I’ve mentioned before, Ms.

Katherine Lalonde, the accused’s mother testified during the bail hearing. [ 98 ] While it is true that her son has not lived with her since 2016, they have nonetheless kept in touch over the years. [ 99 ] The accused has been in custody since December 15, 2020, and since that time his family has undertaken considerable efforts in planning an exit plan for the accused should he be released from custody. [ 100 ] The release plan includes steps taken on behalf of the accused to complete his education, obtain psychological counselling to address his emotional issues and arrangements have been made for him to enter therapy for his addiction issues. [ 101 ] I was made aware of the limited financial resources available to his mother who has also been on sick leave from her job and has recently experienced some challenging financial issues.

In order to survive, she was forced to collapse her RRSP plan just to make ends meet. Despite these financial difficulties, she nonetheless put forth an offer of a $5,000 (five thousand dollars) cash deposit as a surety for her son’s bail. [ 102 ] Furthermore, she has also offered to undertake a $5,000 surety for her son in order to guarantee that her son will respect the conditions the Court would deem necessary in the circumstances. [ 103 ] Ms.

Lalonde has three other children living with her—all of whom are full-time students while maintaining a part-time employment to support themselves. [ 104 ] The testimony of Ms. Lalonde has reassured the Court that she will be a good guardian of her son’s behaviour should he be released from custody. [ 105 ] The accused’s biological father also travelled from Ottawa to testify and offer support to his son. [ 106 ] Mr.

Lauzon is gainfully employed and even if he has been separated from the accused’s mother before he was even born, he testified to having maintained a close, supportive relationship with his son over the years. [ 107 ] In terms of guarantees he is prepared to offer, he pledged to undertake a $5,000 surety for his son, should the Court decide to grant him bail. [ 108 ] Therefore, and for all of the foregoing reasons, I am satisfied that the accused has met his burden on the tertiary ground as well. [ 109 ] CONSEQUENTLY , the accused has discharged himself successfully on both the secondary and tertiary grounds of his onus to show the Court why he should be released from custody. [ 110 ] THE COURT THEREFORE ORDERS that the accused be released from custody on the following terms: 1) Be released from wherever he is detained into the care of his mother Ms.

Katherine Lalonde; 2) Remain in his mother’s residence at all times 24/24, 7 days per week subject to the following exceptions:

a) While attending or travelling to or from a scheduled appointment with a medical professional, therapist, dentist, and lawyer or to attend school, provided he is in the company of his mother at all time;

b) While attending or travelling to or from a Court appointment, provided he is in the company of his mother;

c) For any medical emergency, provided he is in the company of his mother. 3) He is not to possess any weapon as defined by the Criminal Code , including any firearm, ammunition, explosives or prohibited or restricted devices; 4) He is not to possess any non-medically prescribed drugs, including cannabis.

It is forbidden for him to consume any alcoholic beverages; 5) He is not to be in personal possession of any electronic device that is capable of transmitting written, audio or video communications, including, but not limited to, telephones, smartphones, computers or use of the Internet (except for the purpose of pursuing his studies); 6) He is not to have any direct or indirect communication with his co-accused Adrian Jones-Berry except through counsel for the purpose of preparing his defence.

[ 111 ] In accordance with the principles established by Antic and in view of the limited financial resources available to his mother, the cash bail will be limited to an amount of $3,000 despite Mrs. Lalonde offer to deposit the amount of $5,000. [ 112 ] She will also sign a personal undertaking in the amount of $5,000. She is hereby specifically designated by the Court to be a suitable guarantor for her son. [ 113 ] Mr. Lauzon, his father, will sign a personal undertaking in the amount of $5,000.

He is hereby specifically designated by the Court to be a suitable guarantor for his son’s case. ________________________________ MANLIO DEL NEGRO, J.C.Q. Me Justine Lavallée For the prosecution Me Morgane Laloum For the accused Date of hearing: Le 19 et 25 mars 2021