R. v. Campbell, 2011 ONCJ 593

COURT FILE No.: Toronto Region DATE: 2011·11·17 Citation: R. v. Campbell , 2011 ONCJ 593 ONTARIO COURT OF JUSTICE BETWEEN: HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN — AND — MICHEAL CAMPBELL Before Justice Andrea Tuck-Jackson Heard on September 15, November 4, 16, 2011 Reasons for Judgment released on November 17, 2011 Mr. M. Wilson ........................................................................................................... for the Crown Mr. R. Calahan ............................................................................ for the accused Micheal Campbell TUCK-JACKSON J.: I.

Overview [ 1 ] Twenty-eight-year-old Micheal Campbell appears before me for sentencing in relation to two counts of breaking and entering into a dwelling house and stealing a quantity of property therein. These offences represent Mr. Campbell’s 25 th and 26 th findings of guilt for “break and enter and commit” offences since 2000. By way of sentence, Mr. Wilson on behalf of the Crown, seeks a global sentence in the range of five to six years, less credit for pre-trial detention, to be served concurrent to any custodial sentence currently in effect. Mr.

Calahan, on behalf of the defence, seeks a global sentence of four years, less credit for pre-trial detention. To date, Mr. Campbell has served just under seven months by way of pre-trial detention. The credit which ought to be attached to this period of pre-trial detention will be discussed herein. II. Circumstances of the Offences [ 2 ] Late in the morning of January 29, 2010, Mr. Campbell attended at unit 523, 100 Rowena Drive, Toronto, a residential apartment building. The unit in question was occupied by Mr. Salahuddin Saadat and his family, though they were not home at the time.

Using an unknown instrument, Mr. Campbell pried his way into the unit through the front door. Once inside, and after ransacking the master bedroom, Mr. Campbell removed a 32” LCD television valued at $550, an iPod Nano valued at $152.99, an iPod Touch valued at $198 and a laptop valued at $475. He then left the unit, taking the property with him. None of this property has been recovered. In addition to the loss in property, totalling $1,375.99, Mr. Campbell caused approximately $200 in damage to the unit’s door. I have had the benefit of reading a Victim Impact Statement prepared by Mr. Saadat.

It appears at Tab 3 of the materials marked as Ex. 1 during the sentencing proceedings. It notes that not only did Mr. Campbell’s actions leave monetary scars as a result of partial coverage afforded by the relevant insurer, but also they disturbed Mr. Saadat and his family emotionally. It is particularly telling that, as a result of this incident, Mr. Saadat and his family hide their valuables in corners of the rooms each morning as they head out, fearing that they will again be victimized by this type of intrusive behaviour. [ 3 ] The second incident occurred almost 15 months later.

During the day on April 12, 2011, Mr. Campbell pried open the front door of unit 1610 at 420 Mill Road, Toronto. This unit was occupied by Debbie Moroney and her daughter, Kaitlyn Moroney, though neither was home at the time of the incident. After ransacking the unit, Mr. Campbell made off with two laptop computers, one valued at $789.98 and the other at $299.99, a television valued at $399.99, a camera valued at $120, two rings, one valued at $3,000 and the other at $1,500, three watches, one valued at $200, the second at $150 and the third at $200, and a quantity of lingerie valued at $75.

The total value of the items taken amounted to $6,734.96. None of the property has been recovered. The Victim Impact Statement of Debbie Moroney appears at Tab 5 of Ex. 1. It discloses that she has felt unsettled in her home, wondering if the offence was a targeted or random intrusion. She describes the vulnerability and inconvenience which resulted as she waited for the door to her unit to be replaced.

The sense of invasiveness into her personal space is well-summarized by the following excerpt: I felt the many emotions one feels in this situation ranging from shock, nausea, fear, anger and disgust but mostly I felt that my personal space had been violated. It took many weeks for me to feel comfortable enough to sleep in my own bed because just the thought of this

person being in my room touching my clothing left me feeling sick to my stomach and I even considered moving because I did not know if I would ever feel safe in my own home again! [ 4 ] Ms. Moroney’s daughter also prepared a Victim Impact Statement. It appears at Tab 6 of Ex. 1. It reflects that the loss of her computer was highly inconvenient as she was in the midst of completing assignments and preparing for exams. She found it “creepy” that the intruder had stolen her items of lingerie. The encroachment upon her home has undermined her confidence in the building’s safety. [ 5 ] Mr.

Campbell’s motive for committing these crimes is of concern. He advised the probation officer who prepared his Pre-Sentence Report, marked as Ex. 2 in these proceedings, that he has an uncontrollable impulse to steal which he describes as an attitude or orientation that is deeply embedded in his thoughts, feelings and behaviour. It is part of his lifestyle. When asked to list how he spends his leisure time, he cited “committing crime” as an example.

As he put it to the probation officer, “I feel like I am a loser, but when I am doing it I feel like a kid who is opening a Kinder chocolate egg…I feel a thrill that I can not resist. I don’t think I can stop.” III. Circumstances of the Offender [ 6 ] Micheal Campbell comes before the Court has a relatively young repeat offender. He will turn 29 near the end of this week. His criminal record is reproduced at Tab 7 of Ex. 1. Having regard to the parties’ positions as to sentence, it merits a detailed review. [ 7 ] Mr. Campbell’s Youth Court Record is comprised of 23 entries.

Of these, 15 are property-related offences. His first of three entries for breaking and entering into a place and therein committing the offence of theft dates back to 2000. Mr. Campbell’s first adult entries on his criminal record arise in June of 2001 at which time he was convicted of, inter alia , six counts of the very same offence of “break and enter and commit”. Indeed, as an adult, Mr. Campbell has been convicted 21 times for these offences. In addition to these, Mr. Campbell has 26 entries for various offences, including other property-related crimes. To summarize, Mr.

Campbell has been sentenced in relation a total of 24 counts of breaking and entering into a place and therein committing the offence of theft over the past 11 years. His most recent sentencing for this offence occurred on September 23, 2011 in relation to an April 20, 2011 offence perpetrated upon a residential unit where the occupant lost $6,000 worth of property. Madam Justice Marshall of this Court, after entertaining a joint submission, imposed a custodial sentence of two years less one day, followed by probation for three years. Prior to that conviction, Mr.

Campbell was sentenced to two years in custody for committing a single count of an offence under ¶ 348(1)(

b) of the Criminal Code on two different occasions, once in June 2005 and once in November 2005. In relation to the sentence imposed in November 2005, it was for three counts of “break and enter and commit”. Mr. Campbell received a sentence of two years per count, each sentence to be served concurrent to the other. [ 8 ] I have had the benefit of reading the Pre-Sentence Report which was prepared in this matter in relation to Mr. Campbell. I have also heard from Mr. Campbell who testified at these proceedings. Those two sources of information reveal the following. [ 9 ] Mr.

Campbell’s parents separated when he was about two years of age. He has five half-siblings. He has resided primarily with his mother, who, until recently, worked as a general labourer, and sometimes he lived with his maternal grandparents. I understand that his grandmother, who has been an important person in his life, passed away last year. He described a “generally distant” relationship with his father who played no role in Mr. Campbell’s life until he was 11. His father maintains employment as a truck driver and in home renovations. His mother no longer works, now receiving O.D.S.P. [ 10 ] Mr.

Campbell described his childhood as “problematic”. As of the age of six, he was stealing, fighting and ran away from home. The police grew to know him as a result of his mother’s reporting him as missing. Mr. Campbell believes that he was diagnosed as having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder. He recalls receiving counselling for hyperactivity and between the ages of eight and 11 was prescribed Ritalin. Gradually his mother lost a sense of control over his behaviour. By the age of 12, Mr. Campbell began to come into conflict with the criminal law.

He began to use illicit drugs when he was 14 and quit school that same year. Frustrated by his behaviour, his mother kicked him out of their home. It is clear from Ex. 2 that Mr. Campbell continues to hold somewhat acrimonious feelings towards his mother, in part because he resents her decision to force him from their home when he was so young. [ 11 ] More recently, Mr. Campbell has been involved in a six-year common law relationship. He regards it as very positive in nature and hopes to reunite with his partner upon his release from custody. They have no children together. However, Mr.

Campbell does have a son from a previous relationship in relation to whom he has very little contact. [ 12 ] As noted above, Mr. Campbell left school when he was 14. This early departure was attributable, in part, to the interruptions in his studies resulting from his intermittent periods of incarceration. Over the ensuing years he has, while in custody, completed all but one credit required to receive his grade 12 diploma. He ultimately hopes to complete his certification to become an electrician. As for employment history, his bouts of incarceration have rendered it difficult for him to secure steady work.

He has gained some experience in the skilled trades and has worked for his father in the area of home renovations for up to four months at a time. Upon his release from custody, he hopes to renew this employment relationship. [ 13 ] With respect to substance abuse, Mr. Campbell indicated that for a period of nine years ending in 2008, he was heavily addicted to cocaine. This does not mean that Mr. Campbell was drug-free during the period when the offences before me for sentencing were committed. Up until his arrest in this matter, he apparently continued to use marijuana daily.

Indeed, he began to smoke marijuana at the age of 14. It appears as though it is a form of self-medication. He has no desire to stop smoking it as it calms him down. He denied having any issues with alcohol use in his life to the author of Ex. 2, notwithstanding that records maintained by Probation and Parole indicated that previously he had reported heavy alcohol use. [ 14 ] As summarized above, Mr. Campbell believes he was diagnosed as a child with A.D.H.D. He advised the author of Ex. 2 that he believes that, about two-and-a-half years ago, he was diagnosed with schizophrenia. Mr.

Campbell’s institutional file shows diagnoses for Hallucinations (not otherwise specified), Adjustment Disorder with Dysphoria and Substance Abuse issues. While detained in relation to the offences before the Court, he has been receiving medication. Mr. Campbell advised the author of the Pre-Sentence

Report that while in custody, he complies with prescribed treatment, including medications. I understand from Mr. Campbell that he iscurrently taking medication for schizophrenia, anxiety and depression. He self-recognizes that when he stops taking his medication heloses control. He described himself to the author of Ex. 2 as someone who “freaks out”, “gets angry” and “commits new offences” whenoff medication. He further advised the author of Ex. 2 that he does not know why he stops his medical treatment once released back intothe community.

He added that he will not see doctors and will not take his medication and that, in the result, he will probably resort tohis criminal activity, as he has in the past. When he testified before me, he presented a different explanation as to why he does not takemedication once released from custody. It has nothing to do with an attitudinal issue. Instead it has more to do with his lacking an OHIPcard, something he has not had for ten years. Without it, he cannot access a doctor who can prescribe the necessary medication. It wasunclear to the Court why this issue was not discussed with the probation officer.

Assuming that this explanation is credible, I am left towonder whether his attitude nonetheless explains why, over the course of ten years, he has not taken the necessary steps to secure anOHIP card. [15] With respect to Mr. Campbell’s prospects for rehabilitation, he acknowledged to the author of the Pre-Sentence Reportthat he often does not follow through with his plans to better himself. This observation arose in the context of his interest in pursuingcertification as an electrician upon his re-entry into the community.

I also noted that while he expressed a desire to pursue substanceabuse counselling, Probation records indicate that, in the past, he has failed to attend substance abuse counselling. Further, he expressed adesire to meet positive friends after his release from custody, but admitted to the author of Ex. 2 that he has always reconnected withnegative people who facilitate his negative lifestyle and criminal activity. He further stated that he will probably, upon release into thecommunity, resort to criminal activity as he has in the past. [16] Mr.

Campbell appears to understand that the very behaviour which repeatedly brings him to Court is wrong. He indicatedto the author of Ex. 2 that he understands the seriousness of his behaviour. He also appears remarkably insightful as to its potentialcauses and the means by which it can be brought under control. What Mr. Campbell appears to lack is a willingness to make this happen. IV. Relevant Sentencing Principles [17]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing an adult offender is to contribute,along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing justsanctions that have certain objectives. [18] It is common ground between the parties that the relevant sentencing objectives in this case are to denounce Mr.Campbell’s unlawful conduct and to deter both him and like-minded individuals from engaging in such conduct.

Those sentencingprinciples must inform the nature and length of the sentence I impose in this case. I will now turn to a brief discussion of each of thosesentencing objectives and how they apply to this case. [19] The objective of denunciation requires that a sentence communicate society’s condemnation of the offender’s conduct.This concept was best explained by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. C.A.M., (SCC), [1996] S.C.J.

No. 28 at ¶ 81: In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct should bepunished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. As Lord Justice Lawtonstated in R. v. Sargeant (1974), 60 Cr. App.

R. 74, at p. 77: “society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particular types ofcrime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentences they pass”. [20] The Supreme Court went on to explain: The relevance of both retribution and denunciation as goals of sentencing underscores that our criminal justice system is not simply avast system of negative penalties designed to prevent objectively harmful conduct by increasing the cost the offender must bear incommitting an enumerated offence. Our criminal law is also a system of values.

A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply themeans by which these values are communicated. In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour,judicial sentences should also be imposed in a manner which positively instils the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadiansas expressed by the Criminal Code. [21] By reason of its purpose, denunciation necessarily focuses on the impugned conduct and not the circumstances of theoffender.

However, the focus cannot simply be on the delict which satisfies the elements of the offence: instead, to be meaningful, theinquiry must consider the context of the offence. For example, in this case the Court must consider that the offences were committed inresidential units, as opposed to a commercial setting. [22] The objective of a deterrent sentence is its operational value. A sentence focused on general deterrence operates todiscourage like-minded members of the community from engaging in the proscribed conduct.

The objective of specific deterrence is to discourage the particular offender before the Court for sentencing from re-offending. As noted in Sentencing, 7th Ed. by Clayton Ruby,et al. at page 7, § 1.21, “the assumption underlying deterrence as a goal of sentencing is that the threat or example of punishmentdiscourages crime.” I have been mindful, however, that the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5 , [2000]S.C.J.

No. 6 has cautioned against over-reliance on deterrence as a principle of sentencing, and has recognized that the deterrent value ofsentencing is speculative. [23] The sentence that I impose must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of theoffender. The latter factor takes into account the offender’s moral blameworthiness, including what motivated him to commit theoffences. Having regard to Mr. Campbell’s explanation for his crimes, namely an intense desire to steal, I have concluded that the moralblameworthiness for his offences is high.

In the absence of a credible and otherwise appropriate evidentiary foundation on the point, I amunable to conclude that there is a direct causal connection between his criminal conduct and the mental health challenges he appears toface such that the degree of moral blameworthiness would be diminished. V.

Summary of Aggravating & Mitigating Factors

[ 24 ] Counsel for the parties have proposed a range of sentence. I agree that a fit and just sentence that would meet all of the relevant sentencing principles falls somewhere within the proposed range. Where within that range the sentence ought to fall is, in part, a function of the aggravating and mitigating factors presented by the circumstances of the offence and of the offender. Aggravating factors are those that push the appropriate sentence towards the higher end of the range. Mitigating factors are those that push the appropriate sentence towards the lower end of the range. [ 25 ] I will begin with a

summary of the aggravating factors:

(1) The offences were perpetrated upon residential locations. An individual’s residence is a setting where, on any objective standard, there is a high expectation of privacy. Any encroachment upon same by an intruder seeking to benefit from a theft must be regarded as serious by the Courts;

(2) The impact upon the victims in this case was significant. All incurred considerable financial losses, inconvenience, and a sense of intrusion upon their sense of personal security has been clearly felt;

(3) The offences were not the product of an impulsive act. Instead, they were the product of careful planning. Mr. Campbell took steps to ensure that the occupants of the residences were not at home, thereby minimizing the chance of his being caught in the act. In the case of the break-in of the Moroney residence, Mr. Campbell placed a small piece of paper over the peep hole in the door of the unit across the hall, thereby ensuring that its occupant could not be a witness to the event;

(4) Mr. Campbell has a very lengthy and related criminal record. As summarized above, these offences amount to his 25 th and 26 th findings of guilt for “break and enter and commit” offences. Highly punitive sentences, including custodial terms of two years for individual counts of these offences, have had no deterrent effect upon him in the past. Further, he has been unresponsive to sentences of community supervision for the same offences; and

(5) By his own account, Mr. Campbell seems unwilling and/or unable to resist a criminal lifestyle or take the steps towards completing counselling and/or treatment such that he can manage the temptation of returning to that lifestyle. Put simply, at the present time, Mr. Campbell’s prospects for rehabilitation are extremely poor. [ 26 ] I will now turn to the mitigating factors:

(1) Mr. Campbell has accepted responsibility for his actions. That acceptance finds expression in his plea of guilt and in his comments to the author of the Pre-Sentence Report. By pleading guilty at this juncture, he has saved the victims the ordeal of having to come and testify at possibly as many as two proceedings;

(2) Mr. Campbell has experienced a very difficult childhood. He has been deprived of a degree of support, both financial and emotional, that many young people take for granted. It is discouraging that he was forced out of his home at the youthful age of 14, particularly when he had needs that warranted additional support, both at home and from the community;

(3) It is clear that Mr. Campbell is suffering from a number of mental health diagnoses which have not been the subject of sustained treatment and/or monitoring. Mr. Campbell claims to be amenable to treatment for these issues. Indeed, in his final words to the Court, he appeared to be making a plea for help in this regard. The live issue is whether or not his amenability to treatment will continue once he returns to the community. It may be that stability in this aspect of his life might contribute to stability in other aspects of his life, thereby reducing his risk of recidivism; and

(4) Mr. Campbell has served approximately seven months by way of pre-trial detention in relation to these offences in a secure detention facility. In accordance with § 719(3) of the Criminal Code , I may consider this time in custody as a factor that mitigates sentence. The credit that ought to be accorded this period of pre-trial detention merits further discussion. [ 27 ] Mr. Campbell was charged with both offences after February 22, 2010, the date in relation to which the regime regarding credit for pre-trial detention, as set out in § 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code , came into effect.

That regime provides that I must limit any credit for pre-trial detention to a maximum of one day for each day spent in custody unless “circumstances justify” credit to a maximum of one and one-half days for each day spent in custody. However, where the offender was ordered detained in custody at his or her bail hearing primarily because of a previous conviction, I cannot depart from a 1:1 credit, even where otherwise, the circumstances would justify such a departure. [ 28 ] In light of the fact that Mr.

Campbell committed the January 2010 offence prior to the effective date of this amendment to the Code , and that his involvement in the offence was discoverable prior to February 22, 2010, both counsel, ostensibly out of fairness to the accused, have suggested that I attach no credit for pre-trial detention to the April 2011 offence and attribute all of it to the January 2010 offence, applying a ratio of 2:1, in accordance with the common practice in existence prior to the impugned amendment.

That would mean that I could take into account the equivalent of 14 months in custody served by way of pre-trial detention. [ 29 ] I have given this request serious consideration, particularly because it is a joint request. However, in the absence of a successful application for some form of declaratory relief under § 52 of the Constitution Act, 1982 , I have concluded that I have no authority to depart from the will of Parliament, as expressed by § 719(3) and (3.1) of the Criminal Code . No such application has been brought and I am given to understand that Mr.

Campbell does not wish to take the opportunity to bring such an application. [ 30 ] That brings me to the next issue. In the circumstances of this case, do I have a discretion to consider the appropriateness of enhanced credit for pre-trial detention? The combined effect of § 719(3.1) and 515(9.1) of the Criminal Code is such that Mr. Campbell cannot pass through the gateway to enhanced credit unless I am first satisfied that the Justice of the Peace who presided at Mr. Campbell’s bail hearing did not conclude that Mr. Campbell be detained in custody primarily because of a previous conviction.

In my view, the Crown bears the burden of demonstrating that the jurist did detain primarily on the basis of a previous conviction. If there is any ambiguity as to the basis of detention, that ambiguity must operate in favour of the defence.

[31] How, then, do I ascertain the basis upon which the presiding Justice of Peace made the detention order? The Informationhas not been endorsed to reflect that the primary basis for detention was Mr. Campbell’s criminal record. This is unfortunate given that ifthis was, indeed, the basis for the detention order, § 515(9.1) imposes a positive duty upon the jurist presiding at the bail hearing tomake a written endorsement to this effect. I can only assume that this directive was enacted to facilitate the very inquiry that I am makingat this time.

While a failure to comply with this sub-section might amount to an error in law, it does not, in my respectful view, operate toprevent the Crown from demonstrating that the gateway to enhanced credit is closed. By the same token, while there is a duty to providereasons for detention provided for in § 515(5) of the Code, a detention order will not be vitiated by a failure to give reasons, even thoughsuch an omission will constitute an error in law. See: R. v. Baker (1973), (BC SC), 13 C.C.C. (2d) 340 (B.C. S.C.).

Itis clear that Parliament intended that offenders who were detained in custody primarily by reason of a previous conviction not have anopportunity to seek enhanced credit, even where otherwise, the circumstances might justify it. It is noteworthy that § 719(3.1) does notappear to restrict the means by which the Crown can establish that the gateway to enhanced credit is closed. This brings me to the secondavenue of inquiry as to the basis of the detention order in this case. Yesterday we took the time to listen to the entirety of the audiorecorded proceedings at Mr. Campbell’s bail hearing.

After listening to the tape, counsel for both parties agreed that it was clear fromthe reasons given by the presiding Justice of the Peace that he had ordered Mr. Campbell’s detention primarily because of his lengthyand related criminal record. I agree with their assessment. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the gateway to enhanced credit is closed and,further, I will credit Mr. Campbell’s pre-trial detention applying a factor of 1:1. [32] Finally, I wish to note that I have been provided with a series of cases for their precedential value as to the appropriaterange of sentence. As indicated in ¶ 718.2 (

b) of the Criminal Code, the Court must be mindful that any sentence I impose be similar tosentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. I have reviewed and considered thosedecisions with the principle of parity in mind. VI. Conclusion [33] The gravity of these offences is high. They represent an intrusion upon residences where the impact upon their occupantshas been significant. The need to denounce such conduct is high. To date, Mr. Campbell has been undeterred by both custodial andcommunity-based sentences. Unless Mr.

Campbell takes some drastic steps to change his affinity for a criminal lifestyle, he will have noprospect for rehabilitation. Having balanced the various aggravating and mitigating factors outlined above, I have concluded that Mr.Campbell will be sentenced to two-and-a-half years or thirty months per count, less credit for pre-trial detention. Mr. Campbell needs tounderstand that successive behaviour of this nature will be met with successively greater punitive sentences. [34] Counsel appear to be ad idem that consecutive sentences are appropriate in this case. I agree.

There is no temporal orfactual connection between the two offences in relation to which I must pass sentence. Mr. Campbell is in the midst of serving acustodial sentence of two years, less a day, for one count of break and enter and commit with an offence date of April 20, 2011. Crowncounsel is content that the sentence I impose today be served concurrent to that sentence. I agree that this is appropriate and in keepingwith the totality principle and the principle of restraint. [35] Accordingly, I am sentencing Mr. Campbell to five years in custody, less credit for pre-trial detention.

Seven months ofpre-trial detention will be deducted from the January 2010 count. Accordingly, in relation to the January 2010 count, Mr. Campbell issentenced to 23 months in custody. In relation to the April 2011 count, he is sentenced to 30 months in custody, to be served consecutiveto the first sentence. The global sentence of 53 months in custody shall be served concurrent to any other sentence currently in effect. [36] These offences are categorized by the Criminal Code as “primary presumptive” offences for the purposes of myconsideration as to whether Mr.

Campbell ought to be ordered to provide a sample of his DNA to the appropriate authorities.Accordingly, there is a presumption in favour of the order unless Mr. Campbell satisfies me that the impact of such an order on hisprivacy and security interests would be grossly disproportionate to the public interest in the protection of society and the properadministration of justice to be achieved through early detection, arrest and conviction of offences. Having regard to Mr.

Campbell’slengthy history of committing offences identical to those that bring him currently before the Court, the public interest in ensuring that anorder is made is high. Further, having regard to the fact that Mr. Campbell’s DNA is already on the databank, his privacy interests arediminished. I am not satisfied that the presumption in favour of making the order has been rebutted. Accordingly, I am ordering Mr.Campbell to provide a sample of his DNA in relation to each offence.

Once it is confirmed by the authorities that his DNA is already inthe databank, he will simply be processed in furtherance of the order and no actual sample will be taken from him. [37] Mr. Campbell presents as interested in receiving treatment for certain psychological and psychiatric challenges which heappears to have. In order for such treatment to be meaningful, there must first be an accurate and reliable diagnosis. Accordingly, I amrecommending that Mr.

Campbell be fully assessed for schizophrenia, anxiety, depression, personality disorders and Attention DeficitHyperactivity Disorder, in addition to substance abuse issues. I would certainly hope that the results of such assessments willthoughtfully inform any decision regarding where Mr. Campbell ought to be serving his sentence within the penitentiary system. [38] Given that Mr. Campbell has not been employed for a very long time, the Victim Fine Surcharge is waived. Released: November 17, 2011 Signed: “Justice A. Tuck-Jackson”