2021 NBCA 28, 2021 NBCA 28

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK R.J. APPELLANT 28-20-CA R.J. APPELANT - and - - et - P.J. RESPONDENT P.J. INTIMÉE R.J. v. P.J., 2021 NBCA 28 R.J. c.

P.J., 2021 NBCA 28 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice Baird The Honourable Justice French CORAM : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge Baird l’honorable juge French Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: February 20, 2020 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 20 février 2020 History of case: Decision under appeal: Unreported Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : inédite Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: February 17, 2021 Judgment rendered: May 27, 2021 Appel entendu : le 17 février 2021 Jugement rendu : le 27 mai 2021 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Green The Honourable Justice French Counsel at hearing: For the Appellant: Maria M. Conroy and Peter Short For the Respondent: Amanda McCordic Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Green l’honorable juge French Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Maria M.

Conroy et Peter Short Pour l’intimée : Amanda McCordic THE COURT The appeal is allowed in part. The appeal with respect to custody is dismissed. Parenting provisions are added. The appeal with respect to ss. 3 , 7 and 9 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines is allowed and is referred to the Court of Queen’s Bench, to be heard by a different judge of that court. Because the results are mixed, no costs are ordered. LA COUR L’appel est partiellement accueilli. L’appel portant sur la garde est rejeté. Des dispositions sont ajoutées sur les responsabilités parentales.

L’appel portant sur les art. 3 , 7 et 9 des Lignes directrices fédérales sur les pensions alimentaires pour enfants est accueilli et l’affaire est renvoyée à la Cour du Banc de la Reine pour y être entendue par un autre juge de ce tribunal. Compte tenu de l’issue mitigée, aucuns dépens ne sont adjugés. The judgment of the Court was delivered by

BAIRD, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] This appeal engages the provisions of s. 16 of the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2 nd Supp ) ( Act ). In November 2018, the mother filed a Petition for Divorce in which she requested joint custody of the three young children of the marriage, with their primary physical custody and the final decision-making authority to be with her. In her Petition, she stated that she had tried to work with the father, but co-parenting was difficult due to ineffective communication. She also sought an order for child support, retroactive to February 1, 2018.

The father filed an Answer and Counter-Petition in which he sought joint and shared custody, and a determination of the amount of child support to be paid. Following a hearing, a trial judge found that, despite the mother’s best efforts, co-parenting the children was difficult due to the fact the parents could not effectively communicate. He ordered joint custody, with the primary care of the children to be with the mother, and a

schedule of access and visitation to the father. [ 2 ] The father appeals the order, submitting the judge made numerous errors in fact and in law, and in mixed fact and law. He contends the judge failed to conduct a best interests of the child analysis, that he did not apply the maximum contact principle set out in s. 16(10) of the Act , and his credibility analysis was deficient because it ignored key evidence concerning the father’s parenting role prior to the separation. Further, the father submits the interim access

schedule granted him the custodial care of the children for at least 40% of the time; therefore, the judge should not have ordered child support under s. 3 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , SOR/97-175 ( Guidelines ), and he was instead required to conduct an analysis under s. 9 of the Guidelines . Finally, the father contends the judge misapplied s. 7 . II. Background [ 3 ] The parents met in 2005 and married in 2007. They separated on January 14, 2018. The decision directing judgment was rendered on February 20, 2020. There are three children born of the marriage: one in 2010, and twins in 2012.

The children were aged ten and eight at the time judgment was entered. [ 4 ] The mother laid much of the blame for the problems in the marriage on her mother-in-law, coupled with the father’s obsession over the constant maintenance of the house and grounds to the exclusion of time he could have spent with the children. The mother asked the father to vacate the marital home in January 2018, which he did. He testified he was blindsided and devastated by her decision.

In the immediate aftermath of the separation, he did not have a permanent residence, so he stayed with friends until he was granted Permanent Military Quarters (PMQ) in April. The mother had the primary care of the children in the marital home during the weeks immediately following the separation, and the father continued to have regular visits with them there. A voluntary

schedule of access and visitation was initiated once the father secured his PMQ in April. This

schedule represented what the father requested at the time. [ 5 ] The mother testified the father was convinced that, prior to the separation, she was having an affair with a co- worker, Mr. M. Mr. M. testified the relationship became romantic following the separation; however, his evidence concerning the date of cohabitation varied from that of the mother by several months. [ 6 ] The father maintains he has always been an active parent and partner. He says the involuntary access

schedule was imposed on him, and the judge simply continued the status quo . He argues the judge’s conclusion the mother was the primary caregiver prior to the separation was not borne out by the testimony, and her evidence concerning ineffective communication was contrived and self-serving to garner an advantage with the court in terms of custody. He seeks a reversal of the joint custody order, or, failing that, a new trial be ordered. III. Grounds of Appeal [ 7 ] There are seventeen grounds of appeal. They will be dealt with in context, due to the fact some of them overlap, and will not be discussed in their order of appearance in the Notice of Appeal. In sum, the father argues the judge:

1) erred when he did not consider the maximum contact principle; 2) erred when he found there were insurmountable communication issues between the parents, which acted as a bar to shared custody, and the judge placed too much weight on a letter the father sent to the mother post-separation in which he asked for reconciliation and promised he would make the changes she requested; 3) failed to consider, and weigh, critical evidence that contradicted the mother’s testimony, he made findings not supported by the evidence, and he ignored contradictory evidence of the father that showed they were able to make decisions concerning the children together; 4) made credibility findings which were not supported by the evidence, he made adverse credibility findings against the father, but not against the mother, and he placed too much weight on hearsay evidence, interpreting it in a manner prejudicial to the father, but charitable to the mother; 5) placed too much weight on the status quo ; 6) relied on inapplicable jurisprudence; 7) conflated communication under a joint custody regime with shared custody; and 8) failed

a) to order support under s. 9; and

b) to break down his analysis under s. 7 of the Guidelines , such that he erroneously ordered the daycare expenses be prorated on the gross amount. IV. Standard of Review [ 8 ] The standard of review in custody cases was set out by Larlee J.A. in P.R.H. v. M.E.L ., 2009 NBCA 18 , 343 N.B.R. (2d) 100 , at para. 8 . Generally, deference is the norm. This is so because the trier of fact is in the best position to assess the credibility and quality of the evidence. Credibility findings are reviewable on the palpable and overriding standard. [ 9 ] In Gillespie v. Gillespie , 2018 NBCA 22 , [2018] N.B.J.

No. 77 (QL) , Larlee J.A. concluded that a court may only overturn a trial judge’s findings of fact if they are the result of palpable and overriding error, and may only interfere with a discretionary order if it is founded on an error of law, an error in the application of the governing principles or a palpable and overriding error in the assessment of the evidence. See D.L.M. v. J.A.M ., 2008 NBCA 2 , 326 N.B.R. (2d) 111 , at paras.11-12; R.S.L. v. S.I.L. , 2013 NBCA 23 , 402 N.B.R. (2d) 199 , at para. 7 ; T.L. v. A.C. , 2013 NBCA 24 , 402 N.B.R. (2d) 373 , at para. 6 ; M.L.B. v.

W.R.P ., 2019 NBCA 63 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 211 (QL) , at paras. 22-26 ; D.G. v. M.G. , 2019 NBCA 69 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 281 (QL) , at paras. 4-5 . V. Analysis A. The maximum contact principle [ 10 ] One of the conditions of the order requires the parents to exchange a journal in which they record events in the children’s lives. If agreed, a common record of email communications is to be exchanged between them on matters concerning the children’s education, extracurricular activities and medical and dental issues.

The drop-off and pick-up at the daycare were arranged between the parents so they would not have to meet in person. The following access

schedule was ordered:

a) week #1: The father has physical custody from Friday after school to Monday morning, unless the Monday or the Friday is astatutory holiday, in which case, he has the children on that day;

b) week #2: The father has the children from Wednesday after school to Friday morning when he drops them off at daycare orschool;

c) Mother’s Day and Father’s Day are spent with the mother and father respectively;

d) Christmas, Easter and March break holidays are equally shared; and

e) on or before April 1st of each year, the father is to inform the mother of the ten additional days he wishes to have the childrenover the summer vacation period. [11] Section 16(10) of the Act, as it was prior to the amendments that came into effect on March 1, 2021, providedthat, in making an order for custody, a judge shall give effect to the principle that a child of the marriage should have as much contactwith each spouse as is consistent with the best interests of the child and, for that purpose, shall take into consideration the willingness ofthe person for whom custody is sought to facilitate such contact. [12] In Young v.

Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 S.C.R. 3, [1993] S.C.J. No. 112 (QL), McLachlin J., asshe then was, concluded that “Parliament has expressed its opinion that contact with each parent is valuable, and that the judge shouldensure that this contact is maximized” (para. 204 cited to QL). This principle reflects that following the marital breakdown, it is in achild’s best interests to have as much access as practicable to both parents, provided it is in the best interests of the child (see N.A.T. v.S.A.T., 2019 NBCA 87, [2019] N.B.J. No. 368 (QL)).

Further, access is not a parental right; it is the right of the child (Young, at para. 59cited to QL). See also B.P. v. A.T., 2014 NBCA 51, 423 N.B.R. (2d) 99. In Young, L’Heureux-Dubé J., dissenting in the result, wrote: Access rights exist in recognition of the fact that it is normally in the interests of the child to continue and foster the relationshipdeveloped with both parents prior to the divorce or separation. This being said, the right to access and the circumstances in which it takesplace must be perceived from the vantage point of the child.

Wherever the relationship to the non-custodial parent conflicts with the bestinterests of the child, the furtherance and protection of the child’s best interests must take priority over the desires and interests of theparent. [para. 60 cited to QL] [13] Custody cases are complex. L’Heureux-Dubé J. stated in Young the analysis must consider a “myriad” offactors, and it is holistic, because family dynamics vary from case to case. The assessment of a child’s best interests encompasses notonly his or her physical and economic well-being, but also his or her emotional, psychological, intellectual and moral well-being.

No twocases are the same, and a “cookie cutter” approach does an injustice to children, the family, and the administration of justice. These casesrequire a careful and thoughtful consideration of the evidence, the needs of the children, whether one party is attempting to “gainsay” theother, or whether fundamental assumptions about parenting and the parental roles and relationships are accurate or are skewed towards aself-serving result. At all times in the decision-making process, the spotlight must be on the child.

A custody decision is child-focused,and determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child. As L’Heureux-Dubé J. stated in Young,custody and access decisions should safeguard the child’s need for continuity of relationships, reflect the child’s, not the adult’s sense oftime, and take into account the law’s inability to supervise interpersonal relationships (para. 32 cited to QL). [14] In Gordon v. Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 27, [1996] S.C.J.

No. 52 (QL), La Forest andL’Heureux-Dubé JJ., in concurring reasons, write that the desirability of maintaining maximum contact between the child and his or herparents is an important factor, but a court must also balance such considerations as the child’s physical, emotional, social and economicneeds in light of the quality of the relationship he or she has with both parents, their ability to care for the child, and where the child is oldenough and mature enough, his or her wishes and preferences (para. 120). LaVigne J.A., in M.A.(L.)B. v. T.J.L., 2021 NBCA 5, 2021N.B.J.

No. 24 (QL), describes the consideration of this principle as “mandatory” (para. 56); however, as McLachlin J. stated in Gordon,it is not “absolute” (para. 24). [15] The father maintains the judge was singularly focused on his findings the parents could not “work together,” or“parent together,” and that the mother had no idea how the father was “parenting the children” (para. 146).

The judge found the father“provided no verification of his testimony,” and he gave no examples of situations or circumstances where the parents have workedtogether in the best interests of the children (para. 147); however, he did not refer to, nor does it appear he considered, the maximumcontact principle. His focus was on the lack of effective communication between the parents. The father submits this was an error in law.In my view, it was not.

I say this because, in the totality of the reasons, it is apparent the judge turned his mind to the children’s need tohave sustained and regular contact with their father. The

schedule of weekly access includes vacation time, which, as will be seen furtherin these reasons, coupled with other extra days, has provided the father with regular and meaningful contact with the children. Althoughnot specifically referred to in the reasons, the children have regular weekly access visits with their father, which total at least five out offourteen days, most statutory holidays, and additional vacation time. The result is that the amount of time the children spend in theirfather’s care is sufficient to persuade me the maximum contact principle was engaged, and I would therefore dismiss this ground ofappeal.

B. The insurmountable communication issues [16]

Section 16 of the Act requires that a judge, when making a custody order, shall take into consideration only thebest interests of the child of the marriage, as determined by reference to the condition, means, needs and other circumstances of the child. [17] Ineffective communication between the parents in this case was a significant issue for the trial judge. As theSupreme Court observed in Van de Perre v. Edwards, 2001 SCC 60, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 1014, the fact the parents do not communicate wellis but one consideration that should not eclipse the others.

Bastarache J. stated: “This discretion vested in the trial judge enables abalanced evaluation of the best interests of the child and permits courts to respond to the spectrum of factors which can both positivelyand negatively affect a child” (para. 13). The judge was required to consider the best interests of the children by comparing the criteria tothe facts of the case. The judge correctly referred to s. 16(8) of the Act. He was alive to the criteria because he listed those that are set outin s. 1 of the Family Services Act, S.N.B. 1980, c. F-2.2, as amended (F.S.A.). See J.A.D. v.

L.D.D., 2010 NBCA 69, 364 N.B.R. (2d)200, per Quigg J.A., where this Court approved the use of the best interests of the child criteria from s. 1 of the F.S.A. in divorce matters(para. 13). This is not an exhaustive list, however. See also Shaw v. Shaw (1997), (NB KB), 189 N.B.R. (2d) 84,[1997] N.B.J. No. 211 (QL). [18] Once the judge identified the proper legal principles, he proceeded with his analysis.

I agree the judge did notspecifically tie the criteria to the evidence, but it is clear he was alive to them, and the analysis reflects his concerns a shared custodyarrangement would not work for these children because the parents were not cooperating to ensure a seamless transition betweenhouseholds. There were ongoing issues concerning the exchange of clothing and personal effects as well as issues concerning thecommunications from school. See A.G. v. M.M., 2018 NBCA 60, [2018] N.B.J.

No. 274 (QL), where this Court stated that a decision canwithstand appellate scrutiny even though a judge has not discussed each of the factors enumerated in Gordon (para. 9). [19] On the best interests of the child test, L’Heureux-Dubé J. wrote in Young: Furthermore, it is significant that no other test has been broadly endorsed to replace it.

At the end of the day, the test has been describedas “the least detrimental available alternative for safeguarding the child’s growth and development” and most of the suggested guidelinesor presumptions are in fact designed to give content to the test in furtherance of the welfare of the child. (See Goldstein, Freud andSolnit, supra, at p. 53.

See also Mnookin, supra.) [para. 77 cited to QL] [20] She went further and added that the best interests of a child test includes not simply the right to be free ofdemonstrable harm; it acknowledges that a child has the right to the best possible arrangements in the circumstances of the parties.Determining what is in a child’s best interests in any given case is not a checkbox/total score type of assessment. It is an “open-ended”inquiry requiring a weighing and balancing of factors (see L.A.A. v. W.J.V., 2020 NBCA 1, [2020] N.B.J. No. 9 (QL), at paras. 14-15). InN.E.R. v.

J.D.M., 2011 NBCA 57, 377 N.B.R. (2d) 147, Quigg J.A. stated that deference is owed to a motion judge’s assessment of theevidence, determination of custody and all incidental terms; however, deference is not owed when reviewing a decision on a question oflaw (para. 10). [21] The willingness of a parent to communicate and cooperate with the other parent on matters affecting access hasto be considered, but it is not determinative of the issue.

The ability to effectively communicate is but one issue to consider when craftingcustody orders. “Communication issues and lack of cooperation for a couple caught in the turbulence of divorce should not be comparedto an impossible standard that does not exist in the most functional of families” (see A.J.U. v. G.S.U., 2015 ABQB 6, [2015] A.J. No. 70(QL), at para. 76). In Kanthasamy v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2015 SCC 61, [2015] 3 S.C.R. 909, Abella J. writes: “The‘best interests’ principle is ‘highly contextual’ because of the ‘multitude of factors that may impinge on the child’s best interest’” (para.35). It must therefore be applied in a manner responsive to each child’s particular age, capacity, needs and maturity (see A.C. v. Manitoba(Director of Child and Family Services), 2009 SCC 30, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 181, at para. 89).

The child’s level of development will guide itsprecise application in the context of the particular case. [22] The judge identified interpersonal problems between the parents that continued to exist and militated against anaccess

schedule that saw the children rotating from residence to residence on a weekly basis (see A.G., at para. 6). He crafted an orderthat, in his view, represented the least detrimental arrangement for the children. This is what he was required to do. The order was child-focused, not parent-focused.

[ 23 ] Following the separation, the father wrote a letter to the mother admitting he had spent too much time maintaining the house and the grounds and had ignored the situation with the mother-in-law. The admissibility of the letter was unsuccessfully challenged. At one point in his reasons, the judge refers to the letter but states he would not rely on it. Later in the decision, he refers to the letter again and uses it to bolster the mother’s assertion she was the primary caregiver.

The father submits this is but one example of internal inconsistencies in the reasons that were so palpable and overriding they call into question how the judge arrived at his conclusion. Although I agree there were contradictions in the reasons, I do not agree they rose to the level argued by the father. The judge made a passing reference to the letter, and from my perspective, it was used as part of the narrative, but it was not determinative of the result. [ 24 ] For the reasons stated, I see no error that would warrant appellate intervention, and I would dismiss this ground. C.

The judge failed to consider and weigh critical evidence [ 25 ] The father submits the judge erred when he ignored uncontradicted evidence that he and the mother had historically shared their caregiving roles and responsibilities, as well as the household chores, thus calling into question how the judge weighed the evidence. The father testified that:

a) both did the nighttime routines, which included bath time and reading bedtime stories;

b) he was the primary caregiver to the children on those nights the mother was required to work, and he cared for them on sick days when his

schedule allowed;

c) he assisted in meal preparation;

d) the mother had agreed they were both full-time parents;

e) they sold their home without the necessity of a court order;

f) they worked out an interim custody, access and child support arrangement without the necessity of a court order;

g) they do not argue in front of the children;

h) the mother has telephone access to the children every day when they are in their father’s care;

i) he has always provided an address and phone number to the mother and he testified he has no issues communicating with her; and

j) the children are permitted to call their father at any time. [ 26 ] In the father’s favour, the judge accepted as fact that:

a) the father oversaw bath time at night;

b) the mother was required to be at work by 7:15 in the morning, and the father got the children ready for daycare, he prepared their breakfasts and he transported them;

c) the parents shared and divided extracurricular activities because the older child was involved in different activities than the twins;

d) the father stayed home with the children on their sick days;

e) all three children love their parents and they want to spend time with their father;

f) the mother-in-law was the major source of discord; and

g) the father’s devotion to the home and the yard took time away from the children. [ 27 ] The judge also found, however, that:

a) the mother refuses to speak to the father, and she books extracurricular activities for the children without consulting him;

b) the parents do not work together;

c) the mother has no “perception” of the father’s relationship with the children;

d) the father provided no “basis” for his request for shared custody;

e) the mother intended to keep the children in daycare during the summer vacation period;

f) the father included the children in matters that should have been kept secret in the weeks following the separation;

g) the parents only communicate by email;

h) the mother would not agree to a permanent variation of the interim access schedule;

i) the mother would not change the

schedule from the existing five days out of fourteen days biweekly; and

j) the inability of the parents to work together to parent the children precluded a shared custody order at that time. [28] To me, these findings reveal the judge’s consideration of the evidence was comprehensive. In Van de Perre,Bastarache J. stated that, when preparing reasons in custody cases, a trial judge is expected to consider each of the factors under the bestinterests of the child test, in light of the evidence presented at trial; however, he or she is not obligated to discuss every piece of evidencein detail.

Because of this, he observed, it may appear a trial judge has stressed one factor over another, but this is inevitable in custodycases that are “heavily dependant on the particular factual circumstances at issue” (para. 10). He then referred to Gordon, whereMcLachlin J. found it was an error for a trial judge to refer to one factor in his or her custody analysis, to the exclusion of other relevantfactors. Bastarache J. states: As indicated in both Gordon and Hickey [v. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, [1999] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL)], theapproach to appellate review requires an indication of a material error.

If there is an indication that the trial judge did not considerrelevant factors or evidence, this might indicate that he did not properly weigh all of the factors. In such a case, an appellate court mayreview the evidence proffered at trial to determine if the trial judge ignored or misdirected himself with respect to relevant evidence.This being said, I repeat that omissions in the reasons will not necessarily mean that the appellate court has jurisdiction to review theevidence heard at trial. As stated in Van Mol (Guardian ad Litem of) v.

Ashmore (1999), 1999 BCCA 6 , 168 D.L.R. (4th) 637(B.C.C.A.), leave to appeal refused [2000] 1 S.C.R. vi, an omission is only a material error if it gives rise to the reasoned belief that thetrial judge must have forgotten, ignored or misconceived the evidence in a way that affected his conclusion. Without this reasoned belief,the appellate court cannot reconsider the evidence. [para. 15] [29] In Calvy v. Calvy, 2012 NBCA 47, 389 N.B.R. (2d) 329, Quigg J.A., relies on the reasoning expressed by theSupreme Court in R. v.

Walker, 2008 SCC 34, [2008] 2 S.C.R. 245, and applied by this Court in P.R.H. and N.E.R., when she states thatparties are entitled to know how and why a judge reached his or her decision; however, appellate courts should not interfere just becausea judge did a poor job of expressing himself or herself. It is sufficient for a judge to respond to the live issues, and the basis for the rulingmust be clear. This approach was also followed in T.L.M. v.

Department of Social Development (formerly the Minister of Family andCommunity Services), 2009 NBCA 8, 341 N.B.R. (2d) 33, at para. 13. [30] Considering the direction of the Supreme Court in the context of the evidence in this case, although I agree thejudge neither specifically referred to all the factors, nor recited all the evidence, an omission is only a material error if it gives rise to thereasoned belief the trial judge forgot, ignored or misconceived evidence in a way that affected his or her conclusion (Van de Perre, atpara. 15).

Viewed in context, one can discern how the judge arrived at his conclusion in this case, and, in my opinion, the omissions donot cross the threshold of being so manifest as to have tainted the result. I would dismiss this ground of appeal. D. The judge made credibility findings that were unsupported by the evidence and unbalanced and gave undue weight to hearsayevidence [31] Credibility findings are within the domain of the trier of fact and, as noted, are generally accorded deference byappellate courts (see Mills v. Mills, 2010 NBCA 20, 356 N.B.R. (2d) 351, at para. 11; LeBlanc v.

Fundy Drywall Ltd. and Allain, 2014NBCA 2, 414 N.B.R. (2d) 339, at para. 24; V.C. and J.C. v. The Minister of Social Development et al., 2015 NBCA 28, 435 N.B.R. (2d)205, at para. 20). This principle acknowledges that the trial judge is in the best position to observe the witnesses and to assess thereliability of their evidence. As the Supreme Court reminds us in H.L. v. Canada (Attorney General), 2005 SCC 25, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 401,a decision based on erroneous inferences of fact will not withstand appellate scrutiny. See also Gillis v. R., 2014 NBCA 58, 426 N.B.R.(2d) 1, at para. 76.

Appellate review of credibility findings is narrow. In the absence of palpable and overriding error, deference is

accorded (see F.H. v. McDougall, 2008 SCC 53, [2008] 3 S.C.R. 41, at paras. 70-73; J.N.C. v. R., 2013 NBCA 59, 409 N.B.R. (2d) 310,at para. 14). As stated by Bastarache and Abella JJ. in R. v. Gagnon, 2006 SCC 17, [2006] 1 S.C.R. 621, assessing credibility is not ascience. It is sometimes difficult for a judge to articulate with precision the complex intermingling of impressions that emerge afterwatching and listening to witnesses and to reconcile the various versions of events (para. 20). In Nowlan-Ward v. R., 2020 NBCA 41,[2020] N.B.J.

No. 133 (QL), this Court reiterated that the role of an appellate court is not to make fresh findings of credibility (para. 3). [32] It is legally wrong, however, for a trial judge to apply a stricter standard of scrutiny to the evidence of oneparty than what he or she applies to that of the other party (see Bright v. R., 2020 NBCA 79, [2020] N.B.J. No. 314 (QL), at para. 53).Generally, deference is owed to a trial judge’s assessment of evidence in custody matters. “This is so because the trial judge is in the bestposition to assess the credibility and the quality of the evidence” (see S.F.D. v.

M.T., 2019 NBCA 62, [2019] N.B.J. No. 203 (QL), atpara. 23). [33] In this case, the judge started his credibility analysis as follows: “Mr. [J.’s] concerns with his wife’s testimonyare focused more on the logic of the arguments and her reluctance to make any statements that would support his position rather than thecredibility of the witness, or the accuracy of her statements. Credibility should focus upon whether the facts presented are truthful and/oraccurate” (para. 125). The judge then concluded this portion of the decision by finding the mother was not a credible witness with respectto the date when Mr.

M. moved into her home, but he determined this fact alone would not necessarily discredit the rest of her evidence.I see nothing wrong with this conclusion. [34] The judge discussed an incident in the father’s home when he left the oldest child alone while he took thetwins to the adjacent park for ten minutes, saying he had asked a neighbour to watch him. The judge described the father’s explanation asincredible. The judge discussed other statements made by the father he also found implausible, such as:

a) the children were asking tospend more time with him;

b) the oldest boy ran away from his mother the first day he had access to the children; and

c) he was equallyparenting the children with the mother both before and following the separation. The judge disbelieved this evidence from the father. Heignored Mr. M.’s testimony concerning alleged issues with the first weekend access visit following the separation.

The father contendsthat evidence he is polite, and his text messages are respectful, was also ignored by the judge. [35] The reasonableness of evidence is determined in context; whether there are internal or external contradictionsor inconsistencies, whether a witness’s character has been impugned, the personality and demeanour, corroboration of a witness’stestimony, self-interest, powers of observation, recollection and capacity of expression are appropriate considerations, to name a few (seePassarello v. Passarello, [1998] O.J. No. 2792 (QL); G.D. v. M.D., 2005 NBQB 253, [2005] N.B.J. No. 314 (QL)).

In sum, if thereasons demonstrate the judge failed to consider important evidence that is contradictory, or they are insufficient in that they do not showhow, or on what basis, he or she did not accept the evidence of one party, or they are conclusory or based on conjecture and speculation,it is appropriate for an appellate court to interfere. It is not enough for a judge to simply refer to the jurisprudence. A judge is required toconduct an analysis in the context of the evidence so as to inform the parties of the basis for his or her conclusion that one party is morecredible.

In this case, the judge accepted the mother’s testimony. In doing so, although I agree he did not recite contradictory evidenceproffered by the father, he acted within his discretion. The judge could have referred to evidence that contradicted the mother’scontentions; however, it is my view that his failure to do so did not affect the result because, on the totality of the evidence, he was moreconcerned about the effect the parental relationship would have on the overall best interests of the children.

The fact the parents quibbledabout parenting strategies was overshadowed by his concerns that their ineffective communication would negatively affect the children,should a shared custody order issue. [36] On the hearsay issue, the father submits the judge accepted, without conducting the proper analysis of theadmissibility of the children’s out-of-court statements, the mother’s testimony about what the children say to her, but he rejected thefather’s evidence the oldest boy wants to spend more time with him. In R.B. v.

I.B., 2005 NBCA 38, 282 N.B.R. (2d) 358, Ryan J.A.wrote: One must not genuflect at the altar of hearsay. It is possible that some judges, in matters of family law, will permit excursion by counselinto the precarious quick sands of hearsay but it is never safe to unreservedly rely on such information in the place and stead of credibleevidence to the contrary. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Khan, (SCC), [1990] 2 S.C.R. 531, R. v. Smith, (SCC), [1992] 2S.C.R. 915 and R. v.

Starr, 2000 SCC 40 , [2000] 2 S.C.R. 144 concluded that courts must take a principled approach withrespect to hearsay. […] [paras. 11-12] [37] Generally, the traditional “state of mind” exception to the exclusion of hearsay provides a path to the

admissibility of a child’s out-of-court statement to a parent about custody or access. See Samuel v. Chrysler Credit Canada Ltd., 2007BCCA 431, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1922; Children’s Aid Society of Ottawa v. S.E., (ON SC), [2005] O.J. No. 2087 (QL). [38] Professor Rollie Thompson, in a refresher on child hearsay, published in Evidence in Family Law,

chapter 9, H.Niman, ed. (Toronto: Thompson Reuters, 2020), vol. 1, at 9:40.60.20, states that, where a party is seeking to admit hearsay, the “state ofmind” exception allows a court to consider expressions of views and preferences of children in child custody disputes.

He opines that thecourt need not resort to “complicated hearsay analysis under Khan to admit a child’s statements about his or her wishes and preferences,”as the “‘state of mind’ exception is available,” provided the requirements of the exception are met. [39] In my view, in this case, hearsay evidence of conversations the children had with their mother or their fatherwas admissible under both the “state of mind” exception and the principled approach. However, nothing turns on the judge’s reference tothese conversations. Although the judge mentions them briefly, his focus was elsewhere.

The weight that can be placed on a child’sviews depends on many factors, not the least of which are the age and level of maturity of the child, and the subject matter (see J.D. Payne & M.A. Payne, Canadian Family Law, 7th ed. (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2017), at pp. 618-625)). I would dismiss these grounds. E. The joint and shared custody analysis, the status quo and reliance on inapplicable jurisprudence [40] In this case, the father was seeking joint and shared custody, on a week on, week off basis.

The father assertsthe judge erred when he drew conclusions based on speculation, not grounded in the evidence, and he applied jurisprudence concerningcustody and access orders in a way that was not supported by the facts of this case. The judge found: The benefit of a shared custody arrangement is that, as much as possible, the children can move between the houses without any sense ofchange or difference between them. They know the rules of the home will be the same, their responsibilities and their duties will besimilar in each home.

They understand their parents are co-parenting- working together to ensure they have two parents that are raisingthem together. Mr. [J.] tells the Court he thinks Ms. [J]. is a good mother and he claims he is willing to communicate with her, but that she is unwillingto communicate with him. He is hopeful that, if the Court would order shared custody, the parents would find a way to work together. Inthis context, he believes shared custody should be possible.

He provided no verification for his testimony and he has not given anyexamples of situations or circumstances where the parents have worked together in the best interests of the children. He has not providedthe basis for the parents to maintain the shared custody arrangement he has requested.

To proceed in that fashion he seeks, the Courtwould have to defer the threshold decision- clearly not in the best interests of the boys as that is defined in the Family Services Act. [paras. 145 and 147] [41] In his reasons, the judge finds the “inability of this couple to work together to parent the children makes sharedcustody inappropriate at this time. There is no basis to assume that, if shared custody is established, the parties will suddenly begin tocommunicate in the best interests of the children” (para. 148).

The judge, properly, in my opinion, observed there are a multiplicity offactors to be considered when making a joint custody order with equal access. Focusing on the “parent’s circumstances,” the judgedescribed them as threshold factors. They include:

a) the working relationship between the parents;

b) the general housing circumstancesof the parents;

c) other “items” that might make shared parenting difficult or impossible;

d) situations where the parents do not reside inthe same city or town;

e) if there are housing problems;

f) employment impediments such as the requirement to drive a long-haul truck;

g) any physical or mental impediments; and

h) the “circumstances of the parties with each other.” It is the last of these “practicaldifficulties” that persuaded the judge a joint custody order with equal access was not appropriate in this case. [42] The judge referred to jurisprudence where shared custody orders were deemed inappropriate in high-conflictcases; however, as noted, he did not find this case to be one of high conflict. He discussed E.K.I. v. M.G.S., 2013 NBQB 274, 407 N.B.R.(2d) 392, a decision in which Walsh J. was asked to make a sole custody order on an interim basis. In my view, that case isdistinguishable for a number of reasons.

First, E.K.I. was a mobility case. Second, the factors that animate interim custody and accessorders are far different than those rendered at a final hearing (see Legault v. Rattray, (NB CA), [2003] N.B.J. No.442 (QL) (C.A.)). [43] In S.F.D. v. M.T., 2019 NBCA 62, [2019] N.B.J. No. 203 (QL), this Court wrote that “[j]oint custody ordersenable parents to equally participate in the major decisions that affect their children” (para. 50). However, in those cases where theparents are not able to effectively communicate, measures must be taken to ensure the children are insulated from their conflict.

Thisrequires the parents not only to have the ability to communicate in an effective manner, but also to cooperate in the decision-making

process. See also J.H. v. T.H ., 2017 NBCA 7 , [2017] N.B.J. No. 16 (QL) , at paras. 20 , 33; L.S. v. M.S ., 2019 NBCA 64 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 235 (QL) ; D.G. v. M.G . 2019 NBCA 69 , [2019] N.B.J.

No. 281 (QL) . [ 44 ] To support his conclusion a joint custody order with equal access was inappropriate, the judge referred to the mother’s evidence the children were prohibited from taking their personal property from their father’s residence (which the father denied), there was a problem involving rubber boots that had not been provided to one of the boys for a field trip, and there was an incident involving a letter from the school that remained in the child’s book bag, which resulted in the mother missing an event at the school. Given the ages of the children, these are legitimate concerns.

The children must be able to move effortlessly between the households. In a custodial arrangement where the children equally share their time between the two households, it is imperative the parents are able to meaningfully communicate with each other on a day-to-day basis, so as to ensure the children’s needs at school, their extracurricular needs and their social needs are met.

The judge characterized the marital relationship in this case as being “toxic.” No doubt, in the aftermath of the separation, the parents were not getting along; however, the evidence concerning high conflict was limited to a verbal argument in the garage of the marital home, post-separation, when the contents of the house were being divided. The mother’s evidence of conflict was as follows: Q: Now you wouldn’t characterize your relationship with Mr. [J.] as being high conflict, would you? A: As in like arguing or? Q: You wouldn’t characterize this as a relationship where you have a lot of conflict.

A: Well there is conflict because he is telling the kids not to tell me stuff, to keep secrets from their mother. Q: The kids are telling you that, right? A: That’s correct. Q. And that is the worst conflict that you would describe between the two of you? What the kids are telling you?

A: At this time, yes. [ 45 ] More importantly, in my opinion, the judge found the mother was the primary caregiver prior to the separation because she had historically made the children’s health and dental appointments, she sourced the daycares and made the arrangements, and she was the one responsible for enrolling the children in their extracurricular activities. [ 46 ] This case was heard and decided before the proclamation of the amendments to the Act that came into effect on March 1, 2021. Under those provisions, s. 16 has been extensively re-engineered.

Prior to the amendments, the Act provided no guidance with respect to the appropriate criteria to apply in a best interests of the child analysis. Under s. 16(3)(i), a court is now required to take into consideration the ability and willingness of each person in respect of whom the order would apply to communicate and cooperate with one another on matters affecting a child. Where family violence has been demonstrated, there are an additional seven factors. Past conduct has been expanded to include conduct that is relevant to parenting time, decision-making responsibility or contact under a contact order.

Custody and access orders have been replaced with parenting orders. Parenting orders set out parenting time, decision- making authority, the duration of the order and other conditions, if deemed necessary. [ 47 ] The amendments are intended to recognize that the family bonds a child develops with his or her parents should be preserved following a divorce judgment, if it is in the best interests of the child.

The replacement of the emotionally charged words, custody and access, with parenting orders and decision-making responsibilities acknowledges that the word, “custody,” carries with it the inflammatory connotation of property rights. Parents are now required to attempt resolution of their concerns and disputes through the use of mediation services, negotiation and collaborative law measures before proceeding with the adversarial judicial process. On March 1, 2021, the Province of New Brunswick proclaimed provisions in the Family Law Act , S.N.B. 2020, c. 23 , which mirror those set out in the Act .

As an aside, under the legislation that was in effect when this case was heard, parents in New Brunswick,

by operation of s. 129 of the F.S.A., presumptively had joint custody of their children, unless there was otherwise a separation agreementor a court order. [48] In crafting the custody order in this case, the judge found: “The parents must actively communicate to ensureserious issues are fully canvassed before a decision is made” (para. 150).

He compared the day-to-day decisions made by a custodialparent with those “decisions that could require reflection and discussion,” including what school a child will attend, whether in theEnglish or French immersion program, particular activities such as summer camps, special assistance at school, and orthodontics (para.155).

It goes without saying that all major decisions that affect a child’s life are decisions that should be taken by the parents together,unless the high level of conflict between the parents, or the presence of other exceptional circumstances, such as domestic violence,addiction issues, hostile and abusive conduct, inability to parent or dangerous behaviour towards the children, to name a few, wouldmake it impossible to do so. Those circumstances do not exist in this case. [49] In L.R.R. v. E.M., 2018 NBCA 2, [2018] N.B.J.

No. 2 (QL), Larlee J.A. concluded that courts will order jointcustody, even in high-conflict cases, when they are satisfied it is in the best interests of the child; however, it will not be appropriatewhen the communication is detrimental to the well-being of a child (para. 11). See R.W. v. H.W. (1995), (NB KB),158 N.B.R. (2d) 321, [1995] N.B.J. No. 112 (QL); Giri v. Wentges, 2009 ONCA 606, [2009] O.J. No. 5173 (QL); K.C.W.V. v. K.L.P.,2010 NBCA 70, 363 N.B.R. (2d) 351, as examples. There was no evidence the children’s well-being was in jeopardy in this case.

Thejudge correctly observed that a joint custody order with final decision-making authority granted to one parent is, in practical effect, adisguised sole custody regime (para. 154). Although the judge in this case did not grant final decision-making authority to the mother, hestated, in the event the parents could not agree, the services of a mediator should be engaged. [50] To be clear, the judge did not impose an obligation on the mother to keep the father informed of theappointments she makes for the children. He did not order her to consult with the father on all major decisions affecting the children.

Hediscussed decision-making authority in his reasons, but he did not flesh it out in the Judgment Following Hearing or Trial (Form 60A). Inher testimony, the mother indicated, and the judge found, that if the father were to be granted a role in major decision-making, a processshould be established in advance (paras. 153-154). In my opinion, in this case, there should have been specific parenting responsibilitiesset out in the order, so it was clear the father has the right to be consulted on, and to be an active participant in, all major decisionsconcerning the children.

Those decisions include health and dental care, education, summer camps, vacations, educational programs,religious participation and extracurricular activities. It is not unusual for a court to regulate these issues as part of a joint custody order, inan effort to ensure both parents continue to be actively engaged (see Muise v. Fox, 2013 NSSC 349, [2013] N.S.J. No. 571 (QL)).

I notethat these children are at an age where their views and preferences will become more relevant and important in the not-too-distant future. [51] The father testified the children have indicated they would like to spend more time with him. Given theircurrent ages, I would not interfere with the existing biweekly access

schedule during the school year, because, as stated, it gives thechildren at least five out of fourteen days of access visits with their father; however, I would apply Rule 62.21(1), only to vary the orderto incorporate specific parenting provisions that are set out in

Schedule “A” to these reasons. [52] In Young, McLachlin J. explained that the ultimate criterion for determining limits on access is the bestinterests of the child. In this case, the father has more summer vacation time than the mother, and when the children are not with him,they are in daycare. Generally, when courts consider summer access, depending on the ages of the children, regular access and visitationis suspended, and particular provisions are crafted to enable both the children and the parents to benefit from vacation time, free from theconstraints of the normal school schedule.

The father has a fully furnished house in the same community, the children each have theirown fully furnished bedrooms and the father is able to spend quality time with them. I would encourage the parents to ensure the summervacation time is structured in such a way that the children spend an equal amount of time with both. [53] I am unable to conclude the reasons demonstrate manifest error, nor do I conclude the judge significantlymisapprehended the legal principles with respect to shared access.

At best, he may have ignored some of the evidence; however, thaterror by itself was not palpable, nor was it overriding. In my opinion, his decision was within the ambit of reasonable solutions. I wouldallow this ground of appeal only in part, for the reasons stated. [54] The father also argues the judge erred by defaulting to the status quo access schedule. The judge did not referto this principle in his reasons, and I would not give effect to this complaint. Recently, the Court of Appeal for British Columbia inM.F.W. v. M.A.H., 2020 BCCA 284, [2020] B.C.J.

No. 1640 (QL), had occasion to review this principle in a high-conflict divorce wherechild custody was at stake. It is fair to say that, following Gordon, custody and access decisions are to be based on the best interests ofthe child. Historically, there was a notion that judges should attempt, when possible, to maintain the status quo. This principle remainsrelevant in matters where interim custody and access orders are made in the immediate aftermath of the separation.

As stated in Gordon,if there is a material change that bears on the best interests of a child, the court is required to embark on a fresh inquiry. The status quopresumption was abandoned by the Supreme Court in Young and Gordon. Courts are never bound by temporary, interim or finalarrangements that existed prior to trial or at a variation hearing (see also Gebert v. Wilson, 2015 SKCA 139, [2015] S.J. No. 652 (QL)).

[ 55 ] Before I leave this part of the decision, I consider it useful to draw the attention of the parents to the following excerpt of a decision written by Ryan J.A. In Fletcher v. Keilty , 2004 NBCA 34 , 269 N.B.R. (2d) 302 , he wrote, and I agree: Parenting […] is an equal sharing of more than mere physical growth, it is a maturing of equal responsibility to develop social and language skills, interests, respect for others and themselves, building confidences and most important, giving children regular and undivided attention.

The move to equality here is also a recognition of equal dignity, a family-law concept in theory if not always in practice. The theory is perfect; the practice is faulty. [para. 30] F. The analysis under ss. 3 , 7 and 9 of the Guidelines [ 56 ] The father maintains the judge erred by ordering him to pay the full Table amount of child support retroactive to December 1, 2018. The father submits the judge was required to determine the support payable under s. 9 , as it read prior to its amendment, since he argues the children’s access met the 40% threshold established under s. 9 . The preambular language and para. (

b) of s. 9 have since been amended to refer to “parenting time.” Under its previous version, s. 9 permitted a court to deviate from the basic s. 3 Table amount of child support, when it was determined a payor parent had a child in his or her care for more than 40% of the time. That version of s. 9 reads: Shared custody 9 Where a spouse exercises a right of access to, or has physical custody of, a child for not less than 40 per cent of the time over the course of a year, the amount of the child support order must be determined by taking into account (

a) the amounts set out in the applicable tables for each of the spouses; (

b) the increased costs of shared custody arrangements; and (

c) the conditions, means, needs and other circumstances of each spouse and of any child for whom support is sought. Garde partagée 9 Si un époux exerce son droit d’accès auprès d’un enfant, ou en a la garde physique, pendant au moins 40 % du temps au cours d’une année, le montant de l’ordonnance alimentaire est déterminé compte tenu :

a) des montants figurant dans les tables applicables à l’égard de chaque époux;

b) des coûts plus élevés associés à la garde partagée;

c) des ressources, des besoins et, d’une façon générale, de la situation de chaque époux et de tout enfant pour lequel une pension alimentaire est demandée. [ 57 ] The father argued s. 9 of the Guidelines applied, but the reasons are silent on this issue. As part of the first step of the analysis, the judge was to determine whether the father had the children in his care for at least 40% of the time. If so found, the judge was then required to conduct a full s. 9 analysis. In Contino v.

Leonelli-Contino , 2005 SCC 63 , [2005] 3 S.C.R. 217 , Bastarache J. set out the step-by-step approach. [ 58 ] The starting point is s. 9(a), which allows for a simple set-off of each parent’s Table amount under s. 3 for the number of children. Then, a court must examine the respective budgets to evaluate the spending patterns of the parents, based on child expense budgets and not speculation. Under s. 9(b), the preoccupation of the court should be the potential for the duplication of child related costs or disproportionate spending by one parent.

This requires each parent to provide evidence of the additional costs they incur for the children. Under s. 9(c), the court considers the ability of each parent to provide a similar standard of living in each household. The analysis is more complex, and it is arguably more time consuming; however, this is what the Supreme Court instructed. See G.F. v. J.A.C.F ., 2016 NBCA 21 , 449 N.B.R. (2d) 34 , at para. 14 ; J.C.M. v. M.J.M ., 2018 NBCA 42 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 158 (QL) , at para. 43 ; A.S.L. v. L.S.L ., 2020 NBCA 15 , [2020] N.B.J. No. 63 (QL) .

Before us, the parents agreed there was no record sufficient to determine if ss. 3 or 9 were applicable.

[ 59 ] The access

schedule implemented by the parents in June 2018 granted the children access with their father five days out of every fourteen days; however, they had additional vacation access, and statutory holiday access. Whether this access

schedule met the threshold of 40% was a live issue, therefore warranting an analysis under s. 9 of the Guidelines . As stated, the father sought such an analysis, but the judge failed to conduct it, without providing reasons. This was an error in law. G.

Section 7 expenses [ 60 ]

Section 7 of the Guidelines lists the types of expenses that are eligible for pro rata sharing. They include uninsured medical and dental expenses that exceed $100, the cost of health and dental insurance premiums for the children, certain extracurricular activities and child care expenses. These expenses are shared net of tax credits, subsidies and grants and third-party payments. In this case, the judge did not pro-rate the child care expenses, net of tax credits, nor did he fix the pro rata shares for the current year.

His reasoning was that the parents agreed they would share the daycare expenses in equal shares. This arrangement was made verbally between them after the separation and was based on a reduced child support payment as a quid pro quo . It was not a binding agreement.

The judge acknowledged the payment of $375 monthly was an “interim arrangement that would include funds that were somewhat like s. 7 Special and Extraordinary Expenses ” (para. 53), and he observed that the mother accepted that amount on the basis the father would pay half the gross amount of the daycare expenses, half of any sports and or other expenses, and he would open savings accounts for the children. In her Petition, the mother requested child support pursuant to s. 3 of the Guidelines , because the father was often late with his payments, and there was a problem with reimbursement for certain expenses.

Some of the expenses would not have been eligible under s. 7, in any event. The judge made the order retroactive to December 1, 2018, and, as a result, there are child support arrears outstanding; however, it is not clear whether those calculations considered the above arrangements. [ 61 ] We do not have sufficient information to do the calculations under ss. 3 , 7 and 9 of the Guidelines . The parties agree that these issues should be sent back.

I would refer this part of the decision for a hearing, and analysis; first, concerning whether, or not, the children’s access time with their father met the 40% threshold; second, for the receipt of further evidence concerning the financial contributions of each parent to the monthly expenses of the children following the separation date, to include a determination of quantum, and eligibility for reimbursement.

For the purposes of the s. 7 expenses, the analysis would include information concerning tax credits claimed, third party reimbursements for expenses and subsidies, along with proof of payment for the expenses that qualify for reimbursement. I would encourage the parents, however, to first attempt resolution using the services of a mediator, negotiator or other third party of their choice for this purpose. VI.

Finality [ 62 ] To conclude, I adopt the words of Bastarache J. in Van de Perre , where he writes: […] The narrow power of appellate review does not allow an appellate court to delve into all custody cases in the name of the best interests of the child where there is no material error as decided in Hickey . The Court of Appeal is not in a position to determine what it considers to be the correct conclusions from the evidence.

This is the role of the trial judge. […] [para. 12] [Emphasis in original.] [ 63 ] He adds: […] finality is not merely a social interest; rather, it is particularly important for the parties and children involved in custodial disputes. […] [para. 13] VII. Disposition [ 64 ] I would allow the appeal in part. I would dismiss the appeal with respect to custody. I would vary the access order to add parenting clauses as set out in

Schedule “A.” I would allow the appeal under ss. 3 , 7 and 9 of the Guidelines , and refer the retroactive child support analysis to the Court of Queen’s Bench to be heard by a different judge of that court. Because there has been a mixed result in this case, I would not order costs.

SCHEDULE “A”

ANNEXE « A » 1. The parents shall consult with each other on all major decisions concerning the children. If the parents cannot agree, they shall utilize the services of a mediator in the first instance prior to returning to court. 2. The mother shall notify the father of all medical, dental, and education appointments and events concerning the children so that he can participate. 3.

In the event the children are unable to attend school because of illness, school closures due to weather, or parent-teacher meetings, professional development days, and the mother is unable to care for them, the father shall be granted the opportunity to do so. 4. In addition to journal communication, the parents shall have the choice to consult with each other by telephone, text message or email. 1. Les parents se consulteront l’un l’autre sur toutes les décisions importantes concernant les enfants.

Si les parents n’arrivent pas à s’entendre, ils auront d’abord recours aux services d’un médiateur avant de s’adresser à nouveau aux tribunaux. 2. La mère informera le père de toutes les activités des enfants et de tous les rendez-vous d’ordre médical, dentaire et éducatif les concernant afin qu’il puisse y participer. 3.

Si les enfants ne peuvent aller à l’école en raison d’une maladie, de la fermeture de l’école en raison de conditions météorologiques, de réunions parents-professeurs ou de journées pédagogiques et que la mère n’est pas en mesure de s’occuper des enfants, elle offrira au père la possibilité de le faire. 4. En plus de la communication au moyen du journal, les parents sont libres de se consulter par téléphone, message texte ou courriel. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par L A JUGE BAIRD I. Introduction [1] Le présent appel porte sur les dispositions de l’ art. 16 de la

Loi sur le divorce , L.R.C. 1985, ch. 3 (2 e suppl .) (la Loi ). En novembre 2018, la mère a présenté une requête en divorce dans laquelle e lle sollicit ait la garde conjointe des trois jeunes enfants à charge, ainsi que leur garde physique principale et le pouvoir de prendre les décisions définitives à leur égard. Dans sa requête, elle affirme avoir essayé de collaborer avec le père, mais indique que le coparentage était difficile en raison d’une communication inefficace. Elle sollicite en outre une ordonnance d’entretien d’enfants rétroactive au 1 er février 2018.

Le père a déposé une réponse et demande reconventionnelle dans laquelle il demande la garde conjointe et partagée, ainsi qu’une détermination du montant de la prestation alimentaire pour enfants à payer. Après avoir instruit l’affaire, le juge de première instance a conclu que, malgré tous les efforts déployés par la mère, le coparentage se révélait difficile parce que les parents n’arrivaient pas à communiquer efficacement. Il a ordonné la garde conjointe tout en faisant de la mère la pourvoyeuse principale de soins des enfants et a établi un calendrier d’accès et de visites pour le père.

[2] Le père interjette appel de l’ordonnance et fait valoir que le juge a commis de nombreuses erreurs de droit et de fait et erreurs mixtes de droit et de fait. Il soutient que le juge n’a pas effectué d’analyse de l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant et n’a pas appliqué le principe du contact maximum énoncé au par. 16(10) de la Loi et que son analyse de la crédibilité était lacunaire, parce qu’il n’a pas tenu compte d’éléments de preuve cruciaux concernant le rôle parental joué par le père avant la séparation.

En outre, le père affirme que, comme le calendrier d’accès provisoire lui accordait la garde des enfants pendant au moins 40 % du temps, le juge n’était pas autorisé à ordonner une prestation alimentaire en application de l’ art. 3 des Lignes directrices fédérales sur les pensions alimentaires pour enfants (DORS/97-175 ), mais était plutôt tenu d’effectuer une analyse en application de l’art. 9 des Lignes directrices. Le père soutient enfin que le juge a appliqué l’art. 7 de façon erronée. II. Contexte [3] Les parents se sont rencontrés en 2005 et se sont mariés en 2007. Ils se sont séparés le 14 janvier 2018.

La décision prescrivant la remise d’un jugement a été rendue le 20 février 2020. Trois enfants sont issus du mariage : l’aîné est né en 2010 et des jumeaux sont nés en 2012. Les enfants étaient âgés de dix et de huit ans lorsque le jugement a été prononcé. [4] La mère impute à sa belle-mère la majeure

partie de la responsabilité pour les problèmes du couple, combinée à la fixation du père sur l’entretien constant de la maison et du terrain au détriment du temps qu’il aurait pu passer avec les enfants. La mère a demandé au père de quitter le foyer familial en janvier 2018, ce qu’il a fait. Il a témoigné avoir été pris au dépourvu et bouleversé par sa décision. Aussitôt après la séparation, comme il n’avait pas de résidence permanente, il est allé rester chez des amis jusqu’à ce qu’il obtienne un logement familial pour militaire permanent en avril.

La mère était la pourvoyeuse principale de soins des enfants dans le foyer matrimonial dans les semaines qui ont suivi la séparation et le père a continué de les y visiter régulièrement. Un calendrier d’accès et de visite volontaire a été initié lorsque le père a obtenu son logement pour militaire en avril. Ce calendrier représentait ce que demandait le père à ce moment. [5] La mère a témoigné que le père était persuadé du fait que, avant leur séparation, elle entretenait une liaison avec un collègue de travail, M . M.

Ce dernier a témoigné que leur relation avait pris une tournure romantique après la séparation, mais son témoignage et celui de la mère diffèrent de plusieurs mois par rapport à la date du début de leur cohabitation. [6] Le père affirme avoir toujours été un parent et un conjoint actif. Il dit que le calendrier d’accès involontaire lui a été imposé et que le juge a simplement maintenu le statu quo.

Il fait valoir que la conclusion du juge selon laquelle la mère était la pourvoyeuse principale de soins des enfants avant la séparation n’est pas étayée par la preuve et que son témoignage sur l’inefficac it é de leur communication était inventé et intéressé dans le but d’obtenir la faveur de la cour en matière de garde. Il demande que l’ordonnance de garde conjointe soit infirmée ou, à défaut, que la tenue d’un nouveau procès soit ordonnée. III. Moyens d’appel [7] Il y a dix-sept moyens d’appel.

Je les examinerai dans leur contexte et non dans l’ordre dans lequel ils sont présentés dans l’avis d’appel, en raison du chevauchement existant entre certains d’entre eux.

En résumé, voici ce que le père reproche au juge : 1) il a commis une erreur en ne tenant pas compte du principe du contact maximum; 2) il a commis une erreur en concluant qu’il existait des problèmes de communication insurmontables entre les parents, problèmes qui faisaient obstacle à la garde partagée, et en accordant trop de poids à une lettre que le père avait envoyée à la mère à la suite de la séparation dans laquelle il tentait de se réconcilier et promettait qu’il changerait ce qu’elle lui demandait de changer; 3) il a omis de considérer et d’apprécier des éléments de preuve cruciaux qui contredisaient le témoignage de la mère, a tiré des conclusions non étayées par la preuve et n’a pas tenu compte du témoignage contradictoire du père qui démontrait qu’ils étaient capables de prendre ensemble des décisions concernant leurs enfants; 4) il a tiré des conclusions sur la crédibilité qui n’étaient pas étayées par la preuve, a tiré des conclusions défavorables sur la

crédibilité du père, mais pas de la mère, et a accordé trop de poids à la preuve par ouï-dire en l’interprétant d’une manière préjudiciable pour le père, mais favorable pour la mère; 5) il a accordé trop d’importance au statu quo; 6) il s’est appuyé sur de la jurisprudence qui ne s’applique pas; 7) il a confondu la communication requise sous un régime de garde conjointe avec celle requise sous un régime de garde partagée; 8) il a omis

a) de rendre une ordonnance alimentaire conforme à l’art. 9 et

b) de ventiler l’analyse qu’il a effectuée au regard de l’art. 7 des Lignes directrices, de sorte qu’il a ordonné à tort que les frais de garde soient calculés au pro rata sur le montant brut. IV. Norme de contrôle [8] La norme de contrôle applicable dans le cadre d’un appel portant sur la garde d’enfants a été énoncée par la juge Larlee dans P.R.H. c. M.E.L . , 2009 NBCA 18 , 343 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 100 , au par. 8 . La norme est généralement la déférence. Il en est ainsi parce que le juge des faits est dans la meilleure position pour évaluer la crédibilité et la qualité des témoignages.

Les conclusions sur la crédibilité sont examinées selon la norme de l’erreur manifeste et dominante. [9] Dans Gillespie c. Gillespie , 2018 NBCA 22 , [2018] N.B.J. No. 77 (QL) , la juge Larlee a conclu qu’une cour ne peut infirmer une conclusion de fait du juge du procès que si celle-ci résulte d’une erreur manifeste et dominante, et qu’elle ne peut modifier une ordonnance discrétionnaire que si celle-ci est fondée sur une erreur de droit, une erreur dans l’application des principes directeurs ou une erreur manifeste et dominante dans l’appréciation de la preuve. Voir D.L.M. c.

J.A.M . , 2008 NBCA 2 , 326 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 111 , aux par. 11 et 12 ; R.S.L. c. S.I.L. , 2013 NBCA 23 , 402 R.N.-B. (2 e ) 199 , au par. 7 ; T.L. c. A.C. , 2013 NBCA 24 , 402 R.N-.B. (2 e ) 373 , au par. 6 ; M.L.B. c. W.R.P ., 2019 NBCA 63 , [2019] A.N.-B. n o 211 (QL) , aux par. 22 à 26 ; D.G. c. M.G. , 2019 NBCA 69 , [2019] A.N.-B. n o 281 (QL) , aux par. 4 et 5 . V. Analyse A. Le principe du contact maximum [10] L’une des conditions de l’ordonnance enjoint aux parents d’échanger un journal dans lequel ils consignent les événements de la vie des enfants.

S’ils en conviennent, ils partagent en outre un dossier commun contenant les courriers électroniques qui concernent l’éducation et les activités parascolaires des enfants, ainsi que des questions d’ordre médical et dentaire. Les parents ont pris des mesures pour déposer et prendre leurs enfants au service de garde de sorte qu’ils ne se rencontrent pas en personne. Voici le calendrier d’accès qui a été ordonné :

a) Semaine n o 1 : Le père a la garde physique à partir du vendredi après l’école jusqu’au lundi matin, à moins que le lundi ou le vendredi soit un jour férié, auquel ca s il a la garde des enfants ce jour férié;

b) Semaine n o 2 : Le père a la garde des enfants à partir du mercredi après l’école jusqu’à ce qu’il les dépose au service de garde ou à l’école le vendredi matin;

c) Le jour de la fête des Mères et celui de la fête des Pères sont passés avec la mère et le père, respectivement;

d) Les congés de Noël et de Pâques et le congé de mars sont partagés de façon égale;

e) Au plus tard le 1 er avril de chaque année, le père informe la mère de dix jours supplémentaires pendant lesquels il souhaite avoir la garde des enfants pendant les vacances d’été.

[11] Le paragraphe 16(10) de la Loi, dans sa version antérieure aux modifications qui sont entrées en vigueur le 1er mars 2021, prévoyait que, en rendant une ordonnance de garde, le tribunal applique le principe selon lequel l’enfant à charge doitavoir avec chaque époux le plus de contact compatible avec son propre intérêt et, à cette fin, tient compte du fait que la personne pour quila garde est demandée est disposée ou non à faciliter le contact. [12] Dans Young c.

Young, (SCC), [1993] 4 R.C.S. 3, [1993] A.C.S. no 112 (QL), la jugeMcLachlin (tel était alors son titre) a conclu que « [le législateur] a souligné l’importance qu’il accorde au contact avec chacun desparents et à la nécessité pour le juge de veiller à sa maximisation » (par. 204 avec renvoi à QL). Ce principe reflète le fait que, à la suitede l’échec du mariage, il est dans l’intérêt supérieur de l’enfant d’avoir le plus de contact possible avec ses deux parents, à la condition que ce soit dans son intérêt supérieur (voir N.A.T. c. S.A.T., 2019 NBCA 87, [2019] A.N.-B. no 368 (QL)).

En outre, l’accès n’est pas un droit du parent, mais de l’enfant (Young, au par. 59, avec renvoi à QL). Voir aussi B.P. c. A.T., 2014 NBCA 51, 423 R.N.-B. (2e) 99.Voici ce qu’écrit à ce sujet la juge L’Heureux-Dubé, dissidente quant au résultat, dans l’arrêt Young : Les droits d’accès existent en reconnaissance du fait qu’il est normalement dans l’intérêt de l’enfant de poursuivre et de développer larelation qu’il a établie avec l’un et l’autre de ses parents avant le divorce ou la séparation.

Cela dit, le droit d’accès et les circonstancesdans lesquelles il s’exerce doivent être envisagés du point de vue privilégié de l’enfant. Dès que la relation avec le parent qui n’a pas lagarde entre en conflit avec le meilleur intérêt de l’enfant, la poursuite et la protection de cet intérêt doivent donc avoir préséance sur lesdésirs et l’intérêt du parent. [par. 60, avec renvoi à QL] [13] Les dossiers de garde d’enfants sont complexes.

Dans l’arrêt Young, la juge L’Heureux-Dubé affirme quel’analyse doit tenir compte d’une « myriade » de facteurs et apprécier la situation dans son ensemble, puisque la dynamique familiale estdifférente d’une situation à l’autre. L’appréciation de l’intérêt de l’enfant ne s’intéresse pas uniquement à son bien-être physique etéconomique, mais aussi à son bien-être sur les plans émotif, psychologique, intellectuel et moral. Il n’existe pas deux affaires identiques;adopter une approche unique ne rend donc justice ni aux enfants, ni à la famille, ni à l’administration de la justice.

Ces affaires exigent unexamen prudent et rigoureux de la preuve, des besoins des enfants, de la question de savoir si l’une des parties tente de [TRADUCTION]« contredire » l’autre, ou de celle de déterminer si les hypothèses fondamentales au sujet du parentage et des relations et des rôlesparentaux sont exactes ou si elles sont orientées vers un résultat intéressé. En tout temps dans le processus décisionnel, l’attention doitêtre dirigée vers l’enfant.

Une décision statuant sur la garde d’enfants est centrée sur les intérêts de l’enfant et déterminée en fonction deses ressources, de ses besoins et de sa situation générale. Comme l’écrit la juge L’Heureux-Dubé dans l’arrêt Young, les décisions enmatière de garde et d’accès doivent voir à satisfaire le besoin de continuité de la relation de l’enfant, refléter la notion du temps del’enfant et non celle de l’adulte et tenir compte de l’incapacité pour le droit de surveiller les rapports interpersonnels (par. 32, avec renvoià QL). [14] Dans Gordon c.

Goertz, (SCC), [1996] 2 R.C.S. 27, [1996] A.C.S. no 52 (QL), les jugesLa Forest et L’Heureux-Dubé, auteurs de motifs concurrents, affirment que l’opportunité de favoriser un contact maximum entre l’enfantet ses deux parents est un facteur important, mais le tribunal doit en outre pondérer des facteurs comme les besoins physiques, affectifs,sociaux et économiques de l’enfant, à la lumière de la qualité de la relation que celui-ci entretient avec ses deux parents, de la capacitérespective de ces derniers de veiller à son intérêt et, si l’enfant est suffisamment âgé et mûr, de son désir et de ses préférences (par. 120).

Dans l’arrêt M.A.(L.)B. c. T.J.L., 2021 NBCA 5, 2021 A.N.-B. no 24 (QL), la juge LaVigne décrit l’examen de ce principe comme« impératif » (par. 56); mais, comme le dit la juge McLachlin dans l’arrêt Gordon, il n’est pas « absolu » (par. 24). [15] Le père soutient que le juge était particulièrement concentré sur ses conclusions selon lesquelles les parents nepouvaient pas [TRADUCTION| « collaborer », ou [TRADUCTION] « exercer ensemble leurs responsabilités parentales », et que la mèren’avait aucune idée de la façon dont le père [TRADUCTION] « exerçait ses responsabilités parentales » (par. 146).

Le juge a conclu quele père [TRADUCTION] « n’a fourni aucune corroboration de son témoignage » et n’a donné aucun exemple de situations où les parentsavaient travaillé ensemble dans l’intérêt supérieur des enfants (par. 147); il n’a toutefois fait aucune mention du principe du contactmaximum, et il ne semble pas en avoir tenu compte. Il s’est concentré sur l’inefficacité de la communication entre les parents. Le pèresoutient qu’il s’agit là d’une erreur de droit. J’estime que ce n’est pas le cas.

Je suis de cet avis parce que, lorsque l’on considère lesmotifs dans leur ensemble, il est évident que le juge a songé au besoin des enfants d’avoir des contacts soutenus et réguliers avec leurpère. Le calendrier d’accès hebdomadaire comprend des périodes de vacances qui, comme nous le verrons, conjuguées à d’autresjournées supplémentaires, permettent au père d’avoir des contacts réguliers et valables avec ses enfants.

Bien que le juge ne l’ait passpécifiquement mentionné dans ses motifs, le père dispose de visites hebdomadaires régulières avec ses enfants, pendant au moins cinqjours sur quatorze, plus la plupart des jours fériés et davantage de temps pendant les vacances. Il en résulte que le temps passé par lesenfants aux soins de leur père est suffisant pour me convaincre que le principe du contact maximum a été pris en compte. Parconséquent, je suis d’avis de rejeter ce moyen d’appel. B. Les insurmontables problèmes de communication

[16] L’article 16 de la Loi prescrit au tribunal qui rend une ordonnance de garde de ne tenir compte que de l’intérêtde l’enfant à charge, défini en fonction de ses ressources, de ses besoins et, d’une façon générale, de sa situation. [17] La question de l’inefficacité de la communication entre les parents en l’espèce a revêtu pour le juge depremière instance une grande importance. Comme l’observe la Cour suprême dans Van de Perre c. Edwards, 2001 CSC 60, [2001]2 R.C.S. 1014, le fait que les parents connaissent des enjeux sur le plan de la communication n’est qu’un facteur qui ne devrait paséclipser les autres.

Voici ce que dit le juge Bastarache : « Grâce à ce pouvoir discrétionnaire, le juge de première instance peut procéderà une appréciation pondérée de l’intérêt de l’enfant et prendre en considération l’éventail des facteurs positifs et négatifs pouvant letoucher » (par. 13). Le juge avait l’obligation de tenir compte de l’intérêt des enfants en appréciant ces facteurs par rapport aux faits del’affaire. Le juge renvoie à juste

titre au par. 16(8) de la Loi. Il était au courant des facteurs puisqu’il a énuméré ceux énoncés à l’art. 1 dela

Loi sur les services à la famille, L.N.-B. 1980, ch. F-2.2, dans sa version modifiée. Voir J.A.D. c. L.D.D., 2010 NBCA 69, 364 R.N.-B. (2e) 200, où notre Cour, sous la plume de la juge Quigg, approuve le recours aux critères énoncés dans la définition du terme « intérêtsupérieur de l’enfant » que l’on trouve à l’art. 1 de la

Loi sur les services à la famille dans les affaires de divorce (par. 13). Cette liste n’est toutefois pas exhaustive. Voir aussi Shaw c. Shaw (1997), (NB KB), 189 R.N.-B. (2e) 84, [1997] A.N.-B. no 211 (QL). [18] Après avoir indiqué les principes juridiques applicables, le juge a procédé à son analyse.

Je conviens que lejuge n’a pas expressément fait le lien entre les facteurs et la preuve, mais il ressort clairement de sa décision qu’il en était bien conscient,et l’analyse traduit ses préoccupations selon lesquelles ces enfants ne bénéficieraient pas d’arrangements de garde partagée, car lesparents ne coopéraient pas pour assurer une transition harmonieuse entre les foyers. Le dossier révèle des difficultés persistantesconcernant

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