R. v. Gowanlock Date:, 2012 BCPC 395

Citation: R. v. Gowanlock Date: 20121001 2012 BCPC 0395 File No: 154146-1 Registry: Victoria IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. JOSHUA GOWANLOCK RULING ON APPLICATION OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE E. C. BLAKE Counsel for the Crown: Mr. T. Stokes Counsel for the Defendant: Mr. R. Neary Place of Hearing: Victoria , B.C. Date of Hearing: August 29, 2012 Date of Judgment: October 1, 2012

INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] As the result of an incident which took place in Victoria on March 13, 2011, the accused Joshua Gowanlock was charged with the offence of assault causing bodily harm. [ 2 ] The Crown proceeded by way of

summary conviction and the matter first came on for trial on May 23, 2012. The trial began on that day but could not be concluded due to a lack of court time. A continuation date was fixed for August 29, 2012. In the intervening period, defence counsel served notice upon the Crown of an application to stay the proceedings for unreasonable delay, pursuant to s. 11(

b) of the Charter . [ 3 ] The Charter application was heard when the trial re-commenced on August 29, 2012. On that same day, I concluded that the application could not succeed. In somewhat unusual circumstances which I will explain in some detail momentarily, I advised the parties of my conclusion in

summary form only on that day, indicating that I would provide written reasons in due course. These are the written reasons. FACTUAL BACKGROUND [ 4 ] Mr. Gowanlock was arrested at the scene of the alleged assault in the early morning hours of March 13, 2011. He was alleged to have assaulted another young adult male after a brief verbal confrontation at bar closing time on a street in downtown Victoria. Within a matter of hours after his arrest, he was released on a police undertaking. [ 5 ] Apart from compelling his attendance at court to answer to the charge, the undertaking infringed upon Mr.

Gowanlock's liberty only to the extent of requiring that he abstain from contacting or communicating with the alleged victim of the assault. That person was unknown to Mr. Gowanlock except for the confrontation in the street at the time of the alleged offence. [ 6 ] The police undertaking required Mr. Gowanlock to make his first appearance in court on April 27, 2011. He did so. The information had been sworn that same morning. When Mr. Gowanlock made his first appearance he was provided with certain particulars concerning the alleged offence.

The matter was adjourned to June 1, 2011 so that he could review the particulars and retain legal counsel. [ 7 ] On May 30, 2011 Mr. Gowanlock formally retained Mr. Neary as his counsel. Mr. Neary had reviewed the particulars with his client before that date and determined that he required further disclosure from the Crown. While he awaited that disclosure, he arranged for an agent to attend court on Mr.

Gowanlock's behalf on June 1 st to adjourn the matter to the “timeline date” of July 26, 2011, in accordance with local practice. [ 8 ] Between June 1, 2011 and July 22, 2011 the Crown provided further disclosure to the defence and both sides filed arraignment reports with the trial scheduler. They agreed that one full day of trial would be required. Mr. Neary advised the trial scheduler in writing of his available dates.

He provided a list of 42 dates, beginning in mid-October 2011 and running sporadically through to the end of April 2012. [ 9 ] On July 22, 2012 the trial scheduler advised the parties that the trial date would be May 23, 2012. In the absence of any evidence to the contrary I assume that that was the first available date consistent with the dates suggested by defence counsel and the witness availability dates provided by the Crown. [ 10 ] On May 23, 2012 the parties attended court prepared to proceed with the trial. The Crown had all of its six witnesses available and Mr.

Gowanlock brought a witness to court by the name of Darcy MacDonald. [ 11 ] Unfortunately, the case did not immediately proceed to trial on the morning of May 23 rd . A criminal trial continuation had been scheduled into the same courtroom and it took priority. The continuation concluded early in the afternoon, leaving only two hours remaining in the court day for the Gowanlock trial. [ 12 ] After some discussion, I elected to commence the trial at about 2:30 p.m., even though it was obvious that it would not conclude that day.

It did not conclude and was adjourned for a continuation date to be fixed. [ 13 ] Very late in the afternoon of May 23, 2012 the trial scheduler became aware that court time had come available the very next day. The Crown indicated that it was available to continue but the defence was not. June 11, 2012 was suggested as an alternate possibility for continuation. The defence would have been prepared to proceed on that date, but one of the Crown witnesses was not available.

Various dates in late August were then proposed, and the parties fixed upon August 29 th as the continuation date. [ 14 ] The August 29 th continuation date began with the hearing of the delay application, even though witnesses were outside the courtroom waiting to give evidence.

That was hardly an ideal arrangement, but it was the best that could be done in the circumstances, having regard to the fact that the application had not been commenced until mid-July and counsel's summer schedules made it impossible to arrange time for hearing in advance of the continuation date itself. [ 15 ] Having heard the application, which included viva voce evidence from Mr. Gowanlock himself, I initially reserved my decision. I did so for several reasons. [ 16 ] First, I did not wish to inconvenience the witnesses, on a day which had already been foreshortened, by taking the time which I

felt was necessary to consider the arguments and to deliver a decision. [17] Second, it occurred to me that if the trial were allowed to proceed, certain of the arguments presented on the delay applicationmight be brought into clearer focus.

In that respect, I had in mind particularly the defence argument concerning the prejudice which hadallegedly arisen from the unavailability of the witness MacDonald on the resumption of the trial. [18] Third, I was of the view that if the trial proceeded through to its evidentiary conclusion it might conceivably be resolved in Mr.Gowanlock's favour on the merits, in which case the outcome of the Charter application would become academic.

There is considerablejurisprudence to the effect that in some circumstances a decision on the merits in a criminal case is preferable to a Charter-basedconclusion, and I considered that this might be such a situation. [19] I thus heard further evidence on August 29th. The Crown's case concluded and Mr. Gowanlock testified on his own behalf. The evidence concluded at about 4:00 p.m., indicating that counsel's time estimates were accurate and that they made good use of theavailable court time. Mr.

Neary then indicated to the court that despite the absence of the witness MacDonald he intended to close thedefence case. [20] During the lunch breaks and other periods of “down time” on August 29th, I had been considering the delay application and themanner in which the trial was unfolding. By the end of the day I had reached the conclusion that the application was without merit,although I elected not to say so immediately. I recognized, however, that in certain situations I might be obliged to do so without waitingany further, depending on how the trial progressed.

One of those situations arose when defence counsel spoke of closing his case in theabsence of the witness MacDonald. I realized the unfairness that might result if I were to allow the defence to make such a significanttactical decision without knowing my conclusion on the Charter application. So long as the delay issue remained a matter for a reserveddecision, defence counsel would naturally be operating on the assumption that the application could be successful, thus rendering thewitness' absence potentially irrelevant.

It occurred to me that counsel might see the witness' absence in an entirely different light once itbecame known that the application had already been deemed unsuccessful. [21] In the result, I advised Mr. Neary that the application was being dismissed with reasons to follow. I explained why I haddecided to alert the parties to my decision in so abrupt a fashion and I invited Mr. Neary to take further time to consider how he wished todeal with the witness' absence. I suggested that I would not rush him to make that decision at the very end of the court day, and the trialwas adjourned on that basis.

The defence had not closed its case. [22] The trial resumed two days later, on August 31, 2012. Defence counsel advised that he had received instructions not to delayproceedings any further by making application to adjourn and await the attendance of the witness. The defence closed its case and Iheard final submissions. [23] On September 17, 2012, I delivered oral reasons finding Mr. Gowanlock guilty of the offence of assault causing bodily harm. Itnow only remains for me to explain my reasons for dismissing the Charter application. THE LAW [24] In R. v.

Morin, (SCC), [1992] SCJ No. 25, at paragraph 31 Sopinka, J. (for the majority) set out the factorswhich the court should consider in analyzing an application made pursuant to s. 11(

b) of the Charter. 1. The length of the delay; 2. Waiver of time periods; 3. The reasons for the delay, including:

a) inherent time requirements of the case;

b) actions of the accused;

c) actions of the Crown;

d) limits on institutional resources; and

e) other reasons for the delay. 4. Prejudice to the accused. [25] I think it is fair to say that in the years since Morin was decided there has been some uncertainty about how to reconcile themajority and the minority decisions in that case. As a result of the decision of the decision of the British Columbia Court of Appeal in R.v. Guilbride, [2006] BCJ No. 2047 and then the Supreme Court of Canada's own decision in R. v. Godin, 2009 SCC 26 , [2009]SCJ No. 26, however, I am satisfied that the framework set out by Sopinka, J. must govern my considerations.

THE APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THIS CASE

a) The length of the delay [26] The first factor listed in Morin refers to the overall length of time which has passed between the swearing of the information andthe completion of the trial. It contemplates a quick,

summary form of analysis designed for “weeding out frivolous applications”: R. v.Lahiry, 2011 ONSC 6780 , [2011] OJ No. 5071 (SCJ). It is only in situations where the overall length of time appears to be ofsufficient length to call for an inquiry that the court should proceed to consider the other three listed factors: Morin, at para. 36. [27] In the present case, a period of about 16 months elapsed between the date of the swearing of the information (April 27, 2011)and the date upon which the application was heard (August 29, 2012).

The date upon which the application was heard was virtually thesame as the date upon which the evidentiary portion of the trial actually ended (August 31, 2012) and nothing turns upon that two-dayextension of time at the tail end of the process. [28] I have no doubt that a 16-month lapse of time is sufficient to trigger the full-scale inquiry into the reasonableness of the delay.

b) Waiver of Time Periods [29] There was no waiver of time periods in this case.

c) The Reasons for the Delay [30] This factor has been accurately described as being often “the most important and also the most difficult” of the factors to beconsidered: Lahiry, referred to above, at para. 7. It involves a careful scrutiny of the record of proceedings and other relevantinformation in order to determine, step by step, how the case proceeded from the time the information was sworn right through to theconclusion of the trial. [31] Each period, or step, in the proceeding is assigned a cause and a “weight”.

Depending on the underlying cause of delay, someperiods are said to “weigh against the Crown”, some “weigh against the accused”, and some are “neutral”. The accused obviouslycannot be heard to complain of delays for which he is responsible, nor of delays which are described as “neutral”.

Time periods whichare weighted against the Crown or are the result of inadequate resourcing, however, cannot justify delays that are otherwiseunreasonable. [32] In the present case, an initial period of approximately three months passed between the date upon which the information wassworn and the date when the trial date could be fixed. This is commonly referred to as the “intake period” and is generally assessed asbeing neutral in character. As Sopinka, J explained in Morin, at para. 42: [T]here are inherent requirements which are common to almost all cases.

The respondent has described such activities as “intakerequirements”. Whatever one wishes to call these requirements, they consist of activities such as retention of counsel, bail hearings,police and administration paperwork, disclosure, etc. All of these activities may or may not be necessary in a particular case but eachtakes some amount of time. As the number and complexity of these activities increase, so does the amount of delay that is reasonable. [33] The appropriate length of the intake period thus may be expected to vary from case to case.

At paragraph 19 of the Lahirydecision (referred to above), a drinking-driving case, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice commented at length on this sort of variationand referred to some general guidelines: The first period was from December 29, 2009 to March 3, 2010 during which the parties retained counsel, prepared disclosure, revieweddisclosure, met with the client, obtained instructions, conducted a pre-trial resolution meeting, and then appeared in court and stated onthe record that they were now “ready to set a trial date”. These activities are all necessary and beneficial, at the beginning of any case.

They are referred to as “the normal intake period” in the case law and they can vary in length, depending on the complexity of the case. In a simple

summary conviction drinking and driving case, like R. v. Morin, supra, at pp. 16-17 and 25-6, two months was held to bereasonable. Also see: R. v. Meisner (2003), 57 WCB (2d) 477 (OntSCJ) where Hill, J held that two months was a “normal intake period” in routinedrinking and driving cases. In a more complex indictable case of spousal assault and sexual assault, seven and a quarter months was heldto be a reasonable intake period. See: R. v. G(CR) (2005), (ON CA), 206 CCC (3d) 262 at pp. 265 and 270 (OntCA). Finally, in a very complex multiple accused police corruption and conspiracy case, R. v.

Schertzer et al, supra, at paras. 77-80, thecourt held that the neutral intake period extended for over eleven months. [34] The only British Columbia case which has been referred to me and which deals with this point is R. v. Turner 2012 BCSC 861. In that case, Grauer, J. held, at para. 30, that a three-month intake period in a

summary conviction drinking-driving offence was“reasonable” and “entirely consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada's approach”.

[ 35 ] In the present case, defence counsel briefly submitted that the three-month intake period was unreasonably long because it was attended by repeated requests of the Crown for disclosure. Counsel noted that even at the time when the dates were eventually fixed there remained outstanding requests for disclosure which the defence felt bound to place in abeyance for the time being in order to simply “get on with it”.

Defence counsel submits that as a result I should assess part of the intake period as being weighted against the Crown, rather than being a purely neutral factor as is usual. [ 36 ] I am unable to accept the defence submission on this point. The process of disclosure is quite often a dynamic and ongoing process. In the passage from Morin which I have quoted above, it is plainly recognized as such during the intake period. The reality is that a police investigation often does not end merely because an information has been sworn.

Witness statements may be provided to police officers long after the incident giving rise to the prosecution. Police notes on obscure aspects of the investigation, reasonably thought to be irrelevant, may turn out to be of significance to the defence and then must be disclosed, perhaps somewhat later than is ideal.

In short, any number of factors may cause the disclosure process to be protracted, and by no means all of these factors should be taken as suggesting unreasonable delay on the Crown's part. [ 37 ] Based on the limited information which I have before me in this case I am not prepared to conclude that the Crown was dilatory in its disclosure duties between April 27, 2011 and July 22, 2011.

As a result, in my view there is nothing in this case which requires that period to be re-assessed from its usual character of neutrality. [ 38 ] The defence then submits that the entire 10-month period between July 22, 2011 and May 23, 2012 should be characterized as institutional delay for which the accused should bear no responsibility.

I cannot entirely accept that submission either. [ 39 ] In the Morin decision, at paragraph 47 , Sopinka, J. described institutional delay as “the period that starts to run when the parties are ready for trial but the system cannot accommodate them.” Generally speaking, the period does not “start to run” on the very day that the fixing of the trial date occurs. As Sopinka, J. noted in Morin counsel on both sides of a criminal case require time to prepare for trial, and neither of them can be expected to devote their entire time to any single case.

In the Lahiry case, (referred to above) between paras. 27 and 31, Code, J. refers to the extensive case authority which supports the proposition that there is an initial period of time following the fixing of a trial date which is properly described as being preparatory on both sides and which is therefore classed as neutral in character rather than being designated as institutional delay. [ 40 ] Pursuing this line of reasoning for a moment, I think it is relevant to consider the list of available dates which defence counsel provided to the trial scheduler on July 20, 2011.

The first date on that list was October 12, 2011, a date three months into the future at the time that it was written. The Crown submits that that note from defence counsel supports the proposition that only the time after October 12, 2011, should be characterized as institutional delay, since it was only then that the defence was ready to go to trial. [ 41 ] In response, defence counsel submits that he placed the initial date of October 12, 2011, on his list of available dates only because he knew that the court could not possibly accommodate any earlier date.

He submits that he could have gone to trial earlier than the October date if earlier dates had been proposed. [ 42 ] I accept the Crown submission on this point. Even assuming that defence counsel is accurate in now maintaining that he had available dates earlier than October 12, 2011, the trial scheduler could not reasonably have been expected to draw that conclusion from the list provided. The only reasonable

interpretation of that list is that counsel's first available date was October 12, 2011 and that nothing earlier need be considered or suggested. Grauer, J dealt with this precise issue, and reached the same conclusion, at paragraph 41 of the Turner decision, a case to which I have already made reference. [ 43 ] The first period of institutional delay in this case, then, did not begin until October 12, 2011. The first trial date was May 23, 2012, about 7½ months later. [ 44 ] The adjournment on May 23, 2012 was entirely the result of an overcrowded docket.

Defence counsel submits, therefore, that the entire period thereafter, from May 23, 2012 until the end of August 2012, should be attributed to institutional delay. The Crown resists that conclusion. [ 45 ] Crown counsel makes two arguments. First, he refers to those authorities, such as R. v. Tran 2012 ONCA 18 and R. v.

Lepage 2012 BCSC 976 which suggest that the delay occasioned by the adjournment of a trial which does not complete on its first scheduled day may be weighted as “neutral” or “inherent” so long as the delay in obtaining a replacement date is not unreasonable, and may even be weighted entirely against the accused in certain circumstances.

The Crown then specifically submits, following Tran and Lepage , that the accused should bear at least some responsibility with respect to the three-month delay between May 23, 2012 and August 29, 2012, because his counsel appeared to increase his time estimate for trial when the prospect of an adjournment was discussed on the record in court on May 23, 2012, thus likely leading to a longer delay than might otherwise have occurred in obtaining a replacement date. [ 46 ] Second, the Crown submits that in any event the defence should bear some responsibility for the three-month delay after the May 23 rd adjournment because defence counsel was unable to take the trial scheduler up on her invitation to continue the trial on May 24 th , the very next day after the adjournment. [ 47 ] I do not accept either of the Crown's arguments on this point.

With respect to the first argument, I certainly do not quarrel with the general proposition advanced in Tran and Lepage that on occasion the delay which occurs as the result of an adjournment of a trial may be characterized as something other than institutional delay. Each case, however, must turn on its own particular facts. In the present case, the adjournment occurred for no other reason than the court's failure to honour its commitment to provide the accused with a full day of trial on the assigned day.

I fail to see how, in that situation, the delay which follows from the adjournment can be attributed to anything other than the lack of sufficient institutional resources. [ 48 ] Specifically, I do not see any merit to the argument that the accused extended the period of the delay by extending his estimate of the court time required for trial. I do agree that there were some loose words spoken during the course of the proceedings on May 23 rd , but overall I am of the view that defence counsel's time estimates have been remarkably accurate throughout this case. He

estimated a one-day trial from the outset, and a one-day trial it has turned out to be. I do not think that there is any benefit to amicroscopic analysis of the precise number of minutes involved in the completion of the trial, with or without the delay application. [49] With respect to the Crown's second argument, I need only refer once more to the comments made by Sopinka, J. in Morin,recognizing the reality that counsel normally have more than one client to accommodate.

In my view, it would be unreasonable indeed toconsider defence counsel's unavailability on the next day after the adjournment as a significant feature in the apportionment of reasons for delay in this case. The real reason for the delay after May 23rd was the crowded docket on the scheduled trial date; it would havebeen purely fortuitous if counsel had been available to continue the very next day. [50] In my view the period from May 23, 2012 to August 29, 2012, is attributable to institutional delay and nothing else.

Thus, Iconsider the extent of institutional delay in the entire case to be about 10½ months, being the period from October 12, 2011 to August29, 2012. That is barely outside the guideline period for institutional delay suggested in Morin It is interesting to note that in Morinitself, an institutional delay of about 12 months in a drinking-driving case was not considered sufficiently lengthy to give rise to Charterrelief. Plainly, the guidelines suggested in that case were not intended to operate in anything like the manner of precise time limitations.

d) Prejudice to the accused [51] The remaining issue concerns the extent of any prejudice suffered by Mr. Gowanlock as a result of the delay in proceeding totrial. [52] The most recent authoritative statement from the Supreme Court of Canada concerning the general issue of prejudice to theaccused in the context of a delayed trial proceeding is to be found in R. v. Godin, referred to above. At paragraphs 30 and 31 of that case,the Court said: 30 Prejudice in this context is concerned with the three interests of the accused that s. 11(

b) protects: liberty, as regards to pre-trialcustody or bail conditions; security of the person, in the sense of being free from the stress and cloud of suspicion that accompanies acriminal charge; and the right to make full answer and defence, insofar as delay can prejudice the ability of the defendant to leadevidence, cross-examine witnesses, or otherwise to raise a defence. See Morin, at pp. 801-803. 31 The question of prejudice cannot be considered separately from the length of the delay.

As Sopinka, J wrote in Morin, at p.801, evenin the absence of specific evidence of prejudice, “prejudice may be inferred from the length of the delay. The longer the delay the morelikely that such an inference will be drawn”. [53] In the present case, while the court process could hardly be called a “model of brevity” the passage of time was not so extendedas to lead to the inference, in the absence of specific proof, that the level of prejudice to Mr. Gowanlock must have been serious. [54] I accept that Mr.

Gowanlock experienced some level of stress and anxiety over the pending trial, exactly as he deposed in hisaffidavit on this application and as he confirmed in his viva voce testimony. I also accept that it is quite likely that his stress levelsincreased the longer the delay extended. There is no evidence, however, that his stress levels ever rose to the point where he sought anysort of professional help. [55] Likewise, the limited nature of Mr. Gowanlock's bail release terms do not lead to the inference that his liberty interests weresignificantly impugned while he awaited trial.

As I noted at the outset, apart from the requirement that he make himself available forcourt from time to time his movements were restricted only to the extent that he was prohibited from having contact with the complainantin the case, a person he did not know in any event. [56] There are, however, two specific aspects of prejudice which deserve more careful consideration. The first concerns theadditional legal expense incurred by Mr. Gowanlock as a result of the adjournment of his trial. He has deposed in his affidavit that theadditional legal expense amounts to $2,000 plus taxes and I accept that that is so.

I also accept that for a person of limited means, suchas Mr. Gowanlock, the additional expenditure is of considerable significance. [57] The case authorities are clear that additional legal expenses, as well as the elevation of other costs associated with the trialprocess, can be considered relevant under the general heading of “prejudice to the accused”: R. v. Delaronde, (SCC),[1997] 1 SCR 213; R. v. Royston, [1999] BCJ No. 1244 (SC); R. v. Thiara (BCPC unreported, Duncan Registry Number 19476, April26, 1999); R. v. Sasges [2006] BCJ No. 814 (PC); and R. v.

Poloni [2009] BCJ No. 1299 (SC). [58] In this case, however, it is somewhat less clear that there is a direct link between the passage of time and the increasedexpenditure incurred by the accused. It is certainly true that the adjournment of trial led to the final three-month delay before trial andalso led to defence counsel's request for additional fees from his client. But it is surely also likely the case that the request for additionalfees would have occurred even if the matter had only been adjourned for a week or two.

Logic would suggest that counsel's request foradditional legal fees was prompted by a recognition of the extra time involved in preparing for trial twice and attending court on twoseparate trial days. If that is so, the request for additional fees is not precisely a function of the extent of the delay; rather, its origin is tobe found in the fact of the adjournment itself.

I would think that there is many an accused person who finds himself obligated to payadditional legal fees because of an unforeseen adjournment of his trial, in circumstances where the Charter right to trial withoutunreasonable delay does not arise at all. [59] The second issue concerns the unavailability of the defence witness MacDonald on the second day of trial. In dealing with thisissue I make the following findings of fact: 1. Mr. MacDonald was an eyewitness to the alleged offence and was potentially an important defence witness;

2. Mr. MacDonald was present at the first day of trial and was prepared to testify on that occasion; 3. Mr. MacDonald was not present at the second day of trial; and 4. In the interval between the first day of trial and the second day of trial Mr. Gowanlock observed Mr.

MacDonald to become more involved with substance abuse than had previously been the case. [ 60 ] On the face of it, the unavailability of a potentially helpful witness on a second trial date is obviously a significantly prejudicial factor attributable to delay if the witness was available on the first date. [ 61 ] On the other hand, it is easy to overstate the significance of the matter in this particular case. It seems to me that Mr.

Gowanlock's main point is not that the witness had become inaccessible or physically unavailable to attend court by August 29, 2012, but rather that his reliability as a witness had diminished as a result of his growing dependence on drugs. I do not think I have anything like enough information to be able to accept the validity of that assessment, however. It may be true, but I am bound to say that I have heard many witnesses over the years who have substance abuse problems but who are nonetheless perfectly reliable and trustworthy witnesses. [ 62 ] I emphasize as well that Mr.

Gowanlock has not exactly lost contact with Mr. MacDonald. He testified on this application that Mr. MacDonald has been a personal friend of his for many years. The two of them were roommates until just a few months ago. He testified that although he does not now have a precise address for the witness, he knows that he still lives in Victoria, he knows generally what area of town he lives in, and he knows how to reach him by telephone. It appears to me that Mr.

Gowanlock has simply made the tactical choice not to attempt to secure the witness' attendance at court, either by means of a subpoena or by less formal means. [ 63 ] In my view, the end result of my analysis on this issue is that while some potential prejudice may have accrued to Mr. Gowanlock as a result of the delay in the trial between May and August 2012, it is exceedingly difficult to assess the extent of such prejudice.

CONCLUSION [ 64 ] Balancing all of the factors that I am required to consider, I have concluded that the overall pre-trial delay of 16 months in this case, comprised of 10½ months of institutional delay and 5½ months of “neutral” time, is not sufficiently long as to give rise to a Charter remedy. [ 65 ] The application is dismissed.

______________________________ The Honourable Judge E. C. Blake, Provincial Court of British Columbia