G.W. v. S.H. Date:, 2016 BCPC 266

Citation: G.W. v. S.H. Date: 20160830 2016 BCPC 266 File No: 1547845 Registry: Prince George IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: G.W . APPLICANT AND: S.H . RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE S.K. KEYES Appearing on their own behalf: G.W . Appearing on their own behalf: S.H . Place of Hearing: Prince George , B.C.

Date of Hearing: July 20, 2016 Date of Judgment: August 30, 2016 [ 1 ] G.W. and S.H. are the parents of G.T.W., born [omitted for publication]. While G.T.W. has resided primarily with his mother since his birth, the parties have had informal arrangements under which G.W. has spent significant time with G.T.W. since his birth.

Both parties filed Applications with the Provincial Court, but the Application before me was brought by S.H. who seeks a determination, firstly, as to whether G.W. is a guardian of G.T.W. and secondly, as to parenting or contact time, allocation of parenting responsibility and primary residence. [ 2 ] S.H. takes the position that G.W. is not a guardian and that she is the only guardian and should therefore have all parenting responsibilities and primary residence with respect to G.T.W..

She is willing to permit G.W. to have contact time with G.T.W. as provided in the current Interim Order (one weekend per month) on the condition that he not consume alcohol or non-prescription drugs within 24 hours in advance or during contact time with G.T.W.. G.W. says he should be found to be a guardian and that he seeks more extensive parenting time with G.T.W. than S.H. has permitted recently.

He agrees that G.T.W.’s primary residence should be with S.H. and that she should have parenting responsibility, but he seeks some parental responsibility also. [ 3 ] Although time with a child can be ordered whether the party is a guardian or not, only guardians can exercise parental responsibilities and parenting time. Therefore, I will address the issue of guardianship first. GUARDIANSHIP [ 4 ]

Section 39 of the Family Law Act provides that: Parents are generally guardians 39

(1) While a child's parents are living together and after the child's parents separate, each parent of the child is the child's guardian.

(2) Despite subsection (1), an agreement or order made after separation or when the parents are about to separate may provide that a parent is not the child's guardian.

(3) A parent who has never resided with his or her child is not the child's guardian unless one of the following applies: (

a) section 30 [parentage if other arrangement] applies and the person is a parent under that section; (

b) the parent and all of the child's guardians make an agreement providing that the parent is also a guardian; (

c) the parent regularly cares for the child.

(4) If a child's guardian and a person who is not the child's guardian marry or enter into a marriage-like relationship, the person does not become a guardian of that child by reason only of the marriage or marriage-like relationship. [ 5 ] Section 39(1) refers to the parents of a child both being guardians of the child while living together and after they separate. There is no definition of “living together”; that is, the

section does not specify whether living together means in that the parties are in a marriage relationship, or a common law relationship, or a sexual relationship, or as roommates. Indeed, subsection 4 specifies that a marriage or marriage-like relationship between a guardian and a non-guardian of the child will not make the non-guardian a guardian. [ 6 ] I infer from that subsection that it is not the nature of the relationship between the parents of a child that matters; rather, what matters is whether the parent lives with the child , whether before or after separation.

I find some support in that view from subsection (3) which specifies that a parent who never resided with the child is not a guardian unless one of the enumerated exceptions applies. Thus, even if parents live together before and after the birth of the child, if they have never lived with the child, they will not be guardians. Such a situation could occur if, for instance, a child was removed from the parents at birth by child protection authorities.

I find that the significant determination, therefore, before moving on to whether an exception applies, is whether the parent resided with the child before or after the separation of the parents - not whether the parent resided with the other parent, nor whether the relationship between the parents was an intimate one or not. [ 7 ] In the case at bar, the parties do not disagree that their relationship after G.T.W. was born was intimate on occasion (they conceived and lost another pregnancy after G.T.W.’s birth) but S.H. maintains that they were not “in a relationship” and therefore G.W. is not a guardian.

S.H. admits that G.W. did reside in the same home with her and G.T.W. for a period of time after G.T.W.’s birth. She says he lived in the basement suite of a residence on [omitted for publication] Crescent from December 13, 2006 to May 27, 2007, a period of 5.5 months, as a roommate. [ 8 ] S.H. points to her security deposit payout with [omitted for publication] Property Management showing her as the sole tenant of that property in support of her argument that they were not a couple.

She also points to a letter she wrote dated January 31, 2007 seeking to renew her childcare subsidy claiming G.W. was a roommate and lived downstairs in a basement suite and claiming that she had given him a “break” on child support while he was taking his apprenticeship.

She also suggested to G.W., and he agreed, that they had not filed their Income Taxes as a couple, but he said that was because she wanted to continue receiving benefits and subsidies that would not be available to her if she declared that they were a couple. [ 9 ] I find all of these letters written by S.H. are as self-serving now as they were when they were written. It was to S.H.’s advantage to create documents asserting that G.W. was a roommate, regardless of the actual situation, given the financial advantages to her of doing so. Now such documents are submitted in self-serving support of another purpose.

I find they do not constitute

corroboration of the proposition S.H. wishes to assert. [10] G.W. maintains that they were working on their relationship and at times lived together as a couple, at various residences, but inparticular during the period of time in Prince George that they both resided in a home on [omitted for publication] Crescent. Hemaintains that he and S.H. were, in fact, sleeping together and that he lived upstairs with her and G.T.W.. He says that there was no“basement suite” since there was no kitchen downstairs; all there was in the basement was a bedroom, bathroom and living room.

Hesays S.H. bought him a “foosball” table for Christmas that year and it was placed in the basement. His evidence about the nature of thebasement is corroborated by S.H.’s mother, Mrs.

J.H., who described the downstairs as having a bedroom and a bathroom and a sharedentrance with no door between the upstairs and downstairs. [11] Although, in my view, the nature of the relationship between the parties while they lived in the [omitted for publication]Crescent residence is not determinative of the issue of guardianship in any way, I accept G.W.’s evidence regarding the nature of therelationship as an on again, off again intimate relationship over several years. I also accept his evidence that he lived upstairs togetherwith S.H. and G.T.W. at the residence on [omitted for publication] Crescent.

It is not necessary, on my reading of

section 39 of the FLAto determine the degree of intimacy of the parties during that period. I find that G.W. resided with his son during for 5.5 months on[omitted for publication] Crescent in Prince George and that alone is sufficient to render him a guardian of G.T.W. under s.39(1) of theFLA. [12] However, even if I were not satisfied of G.W.’s guardianship on the basis of that residency, I find that G.W. has met theexception found in s.39(3)(

c) because I find he has regularly cared for G.T.W. over the years. My reasons are as follows. [13] G.W. says he is a guardian because he has cared for G.T.W. extensively since his birth. He said when he resided in PrinceGeorge in the same residence as S.H. and G.T.W. and when they lived separately, he took care of G.T.W. during his two week rotationsin town from camp. He says he typically provided care for G.T.W. during his two weeks in town when home from his camp job and hastaken G.T.W. for overnights of a week or longer duration on many occasions.

He says he has always maintained a bedroom, toys andclothes for G.T.W. in his residence and put G.T.W. on his extended health and dental plans without request from S.H.. He testified thatS.H. is a great mother to G.T.W. and he has always respected her wishes. [14] S.H. admits that G.W. cared for G.T.W. over the years whenever he was back in town from his employment out of town incamp. Sometimes G.W. cared for G.T.W. during the day while she worked, instead of her taking G.T.W. to daycare, and sometimes itwas overnight care for several days or a week.

She testified that in the years G.W. worked at [omitted for publication] Mine, he was onlyin town for 50% or the time, so she estimated that G.W. had G.T.W. about 25% of the time in total; in other words, when G.W. was intown, he had G.T.W. half the time. S.H. said as long as he resided in the same city, the

schedule was flexible and informal. Nevertheless, S.H. controlled when and where G.W. spent time with G.T.W., particularly when she had concerns about G.W.’ssubstance abuse. [15] I have considered the case of A.A.A.M. v. Provincial Director of Adoption, 2015 BCCA 220, in which our Court of Appealconsidered the meaning or “Regularly cares for the child” in s. 39(3)(c). In that case, the biological father had exercised very limitedaccess to the child because the child was in the care of the Ministry for Child and Family Development (MCFD) and that limited accesswas all that MCFD would permit.

The access in question began as short supervised visits monthly, expanded to unsupervised visits ofthree overnights duration monthly, but then ceased after the trial began and did not resume for approximately two years. The Court ofAppeal found that it was inherently unfair to decide that the father should not be a guardian on the basis that his contact with the childhad been limited, when it was the party seeking to oppose guardianship that had chosen to limit the access (para. 67). [16] I find these remarks to be helpful with respect to the case at bar.

It is clear on the evidence that G.W. has cared for G.T.W. onhis own, daily, weekly and overnight, for extensive periods ever since G.T.W. was a very small baby, whenever S.H. permitted it. It isclear from the evidence that S.H. chose to rely on G.W. to care for G.T.W. instead of taking him to day-care when G.W. was in town andit suited S.H.. While the parties did not have a set schedule, I find that it is not necessary to have a fixed

schedule to come within themeaning of “Regularly cares for the child” under s. 39(3)(c). S.H. cannot now be heard to say that because the

schedule she dictated wasnot a fixed schedule, G.W. should not be a guardian. I find that G.W. is a guardian under s. 39(3)(

c) of the FLA. [17] Although S.H. did not specifically argue that G.W.’s guardianship of G.T.W. should be terminated, that was, presumably,because she took the position that G.W. was not a guardian in the first place. Given my finding that G.W. is in fact a guardian under s.39(1) and s. 39(3)(c), I will address the question of whether G.W.’s guardianship should be terminated. [18] S.H. expressed grave concerns about G.W.’s parenting ability, in support of her submission that he should not be a guardian ofG.T.W..

She pointed to his excessive consumption of alcohol and her concern that G.W. has, occasionally, not exerted adequatesupervision over G.T.W. as reasons that he should not be a guardian. With respect to the alcohol issue, she complains that one day whenshe went to pick up G.T.W. from a visit with his father, he was playing a drinking game called “beer pong” (using water, not an alcoholicbeverage) with his cousins.

She also complains that in 2012 (four years ago) G.W. failed to get G.T.W. to school on time because he washungover, and on another occasion he was vomiting when she went to pick up G.T.W. and she believed that was the result of overconsumption of alcohol the previous night. She believes he smelled of alcohol on one occasion after a visit with G.T.W.. [19] S.H. says G.T.W. did not like to visit his father when there were drinking parties, and was refusing to go to visits, which waswhy she restricted his visits.

However, after visits were reinstated by Court order, along with a provision requiring that G.W. notconsume alcohol in this visits, S.H. says that G.T.W. has been much more comfortable. [20] G.W. says that he did develop a problem with alcohol after a work place accident in 2012, but he attended counselling and nowhas that problem under control. He says that on the occasion when he was vomiting it was due to an adverse reaction to his painmedications, not from over consumption of alcohol.

In any event, he is willing to abide by an order, should the court impose it, that henot consume alcohol during his parenting time with G.T.W.. He says he has in fact abided by that condition, despite S.H.’s reservations. [21] The circumstances under which it is appropriate to terminate guardianship were dealt with by Mr. Justice Punnett in J.W.K. v.E.K, 2014 BCSC 1635 , as follows:

[23] In D. v. D ., 2013 BCPC 135 , Judge Merrick said that it will rarely be in a child’s best interests to terminate guardianship and thereby turn a parent from a guardian into a person with contact. Where there are concerns about one guardian’s parenting capacity, the court should first consider whether a reallocation of parenting responsibilities can eliminate any risk to the child’s best interests arising from the parent’s continued guardianship. If so, the court should refuse to terminate.

This approach allows the child to safely retain the benefit of a meaningful and significant relationship with their parent. [ 22 ] Mr. Justice Punnet also commented that: [34] Also consistent with this view is the fact that a guardian who has no parental responsibilities still has legal rights under the FLA that confirm and promote their involvement in their child’s life. As the trial judge noted, only a guardian can challenge an application to relocate. This is not an insignificant right.

In addition if a child’s guardian dies and the surviving parent is not a guardian, they do not automatically become a guardian but must apply for an appointment. Also, s. 49 of the FLA allows a guardian to apply to a court for directions respecting an issue affecting a child. Only a guardian can make such an application. A parent who is not a guardian, but with contact, has no legal right to challenge the other parent’s actions in court. As a result I conclude that even without parental responsibilities, guardianship still has a meaningful legal status.

Additionally, as noted earlier, it has a symbolic status: a guardian is seen as playing a “parental” role in a child’s life, even when not exercising parental responsibilities. [ 23 ] In that case Mr. Justice Punnet was dealing with an appeal of a decision to terminate the guardianship of a father who was addicted to drugs and who withdrew from contact with them while in the throes of addiction.

The Court in that case found that it was not proper to terminate his guardianship when “it appears that the imposition of terms for the father’s parenting time can address any concerns that might exist if he does relapse when exercising parenting time.” (para. 43) [ 24 ] I am not satisfied that permitting G.T.W. to chum around with his step siblings at the “Crash to Pass Derby” constitutes neglect at all, much less neglect sufficient to deprive him of guardianship rights.

I note that J.H., S.H.’s mother, was the person who actually observed G.T.W. at the “Crash to Pass Derby” and she testified that while she thought the boys were running around more freely than she thought was good for them, she also admitted that there was never a time during G.W.’s care of G.T.W. that she thought G.T.W. was unsafe. In my experience of country fairs, carnivals and other such rural entertainment, children G.T.W.’s age run happily unsupervised throughout the fairgrounds and have a wonderful time.

They know where to find their parents and the community is sufficiently small that everyone knows each other and if the children run into trouble, adult community members are swift to bring them to their parents. [ 25 ] Similarly, I find that G.W.’s alcohol consumption is not a basis to terminate his guardianship of G.T.W., particularly since any concerns with respect to alcohol consumption can be dealt with by conduct orders. G.W. has always maintained a close and loving relationship with G.T.W. and there is a strong bond between them, despite S.H.’s reservations.

I note that S.H. has in fact left G.T.W. in G.W.’s care for extensive periods of time throughout G.T.W.’s life despite the fact that G.W. has always consumed alcohol. I also note that her restrictions on G.T.W.’s time with his father seem to coincide more from the establishment of her new domestic arrangements and G.W.’s marriage, than from G.W.’s alcohol consumption problems. PARENTING RESPONSIBILITIES [ 26 ] As I mentioned earlier in these reasons, G.W. is of the view that S.H. is an excellent mother to G.T.W., and that she should obviously have parenting responsibilities.

However, he would like to have some participation in parenting decisions for G.T.W.. I am of the view that it is appropriate that the parties share parenting responsibilities, bearing in mind that G.T.W. has always lived primarily with S.H.. All parenting responsibilities will be shared except that S.H. will make decisions about where G.T.W. will reside and go to school. Each parent will make the day to day decisions affecting G.T.W. and have day to day care, control and supervision of G.T.W., including decisions with respect to medical care, while exercising parenting time with G.T.W..

Each parent has the right to request and receive from third parties, such as schools or doctors, information regarding G.T.W.’s health, education or any other information. PARENTING TIME [ 27 ] G.W. agrees that G.T.W. should reside primarily with his mother, but he seeks more parenting time with him than he has been receiving recently. S.H. argued that difficulties with arranging visits had everything to do with G.W.’s failure to give her the notice she demanded, which was no less than 7 days.

S.H. complained that as a result of a lack of sufficient notice, G.T.W. had visits with his father irregularly, which distressed him. She said that G.T.W. likes structure and predictability. Since regular scheduled visits have been reinstated by Court order, G.T.W. has been happy and excited about the visits, because he can plan for them and look forward to them.

It seems obvious that regularly scheduled visits that G.T.W. can count on are in G.T.W.’s best interest and are most workable by the parties, given how far the parties live from one another. [ 28 ] However, despite the fact that S.H. agreed that the scheduled visit regime has been better for G.T.W., she nevertheless wants to revert to the 7 days’ notice regime, but with the requirement that G.W. give 2 weeks’ notice of the time and place of exchange.

In addition to the obvious logical hurdles involved in a requirement that dates and places be arranged two weeks in advance of visits that need only be scheduled one week in advance, the difficulty is that S.H. has already testified that this arrangement did not work and was not good for G.T.W.. I therefore conclude that her submission is not made in good faith.

It seems to me S.H. may be seeking this arrangement precisely because it does not work, but will give her plausible deniability for refusing to permit G.T.W. and his father to have time together. [ 29 ] G.W. points out that although he and G.T.W. enjoy the weekend visits, the distance from Prince George to Smithers means that much of the visit is spent driving. He also points out that unless the parties meet somewhere in between, he has to drive more than 10 hours continuously (From Smithers to Prince George and back) each way to transport G.T.W.. The current order provides that the parties meet part way.

He seeks, therefore, to have the visits take place on long weekends wherever possible, and to have the order provide that the parties meet part way. [ 30 ] I find that it is clearly in G.T.W.’s best interest that he can be confident that he will have overnight visits with his father on a regular basis. Given the distance between the home communities that parenting time cannot, unfortunately, occur every week or every other week, but it is reasonable that as a minimum, G.T.W. will have weekend parenting time with his father once per month, to occur on

each long weekend, if that month has a long weekend. For months without statutory holidays, the visit will take place on the third weekend of the month, unless the parties agree to a different weekend. Given the interim order that was made in July with respect to summer parenting time, the September 2016 visit will not occur on the long weekend, but will occur on the third weekend of the month. [ 31 ] For December, March, July and August, when the longer school vacations occur, the regular visits will not occur, and instead the

schedule will be as follows: 1. Christmas: Each party have one week parenting time with G.T.W. during Christmas vacation, with G.T.W. spending the week including Christmas day itself with G.W. in odd years and with S.H. in even years. In December 2016 the transfer from S.H. to G.W. will occur on December 26, unless the parties otherwise agree. 2. Spring break: the parties will split spring break evenly between them, with S.H. having the first portion of spring break in even years and G.W. having the first portion of spring break in odd years, unless the parties otherwise agree. 3.

Summer vacation: the parties will alternate parenting time one week on, one week off, commencing with S.H. in even years and G.W. in odd years, unless the parties otherwise agree. [ 32 ] I have considered G.W.’s submission with respect travel arrangements. If G.W. is obliged to do all of the travel, there will be a significant impact on the duration and quality of G.T.W.’s time with his father.

Assuming G.W. leaves Smithers after work, a 5 hour trip each way for G.W. means that he will have to arrive later in Prince George to pick up G.T.W. and that G.T.W. will arrive in Smithers much later at night, and will have to leave Smithers that much earlier for G.W. to get home at a reasonable hour, not to mention the inherent danger to G.T.W. and G.W., due to exhaustion, if G.W. is required to drive 10 hours on each side of every visit. [ 33 ] I recognise that the travel involved will be a burden on both parties, but for the reasons noted above, it is in G.T.W.’s best interest that both parties share the burden of the travel.

I therefore order that the transfer place will be Fraser Lake, unless the parties agree on another location. [ 34 ] G.W. also visits Prince George periodically and would like to be able to visit G.T.W. when he does. S.H. testified that she lives 45 minutes out of town and cannot just drop things without notice. She also testified that G.T.W. has many activities and dates with friends. She says that she is not adverse to G.T.W. seeking his father when he comes to town, but she seeks 7 days’ notice of any requested parenting visits. In my view 7 days’ notice for visits is unreasonable and unrealistic.

G.T.W. should not be deprived of the opportunity to visit his father just because his visits to Prince George are not scheduled more than a week in advance. Impromptu visits to Prince George are just that: impromptu. [ 35 ] G.W. says he is willing to attend to S.H.’s residence to pick up and drop off G.T.W. when he is visiting in Prince George, so this should alleviate any concerns that S.H. has regarding transportation. I order that G.W. may exercise parenting time in Prince George with G.T.W. on 2 days’ notice to S.H..

G.W. is to pick up and drop off G.T.W. from his home in Prince George unless the parties otherwise agree. [ 36 ] With respect to telephone or skype access, each parent may have telephone or skype (if available) visits with G.T.W. while he is with the other parent, no more than once per day, in the evening.

If G.T.W. will be outside of cell phone service, the parent exercising parenting time must inform the other parent by text of that fact and for how long G.T.W. will be out of cell service, and arrange for G.T.W. to telephone that parent within one day of returning to a cell service area. [ 37 ] S.H. expressed concern about G.W.’s drinking, and G.W. has agreed to abide by an order that he not consume alcohol during his parenting time with G.T.W.. [ 38 ] S.H. testified that G.T.W. was distressed after visits when G.W. had been drinking and expressed reluctance to visit, but since regular visits have been re-established, along with a no alcohol provision, G.T.W. has been much happier after visits.

G.W. testified that their last visit was excellent and G.T.W. said he wished to have additional time with his father. It would appear that G.W. is abiding by the court order that he not drink alcohol and that G.T.W. is much more comfortable as a result. I find that it is in G.T.W.’s best interest that G.W. not consume alcohol during his parenting time with G.T.W. and I make that order. [ 39 ] S.H. testified that she was concerned that G.T.W. was troubled by drinking parties in G.W.’s home and that this behaviour is a bad example for him and shows very poor judgement on the part of G.W..

The existing court order provides, on a without prejudice basis, that G.W. must not allow any other person to be under the influence of alcohol or non-prescription drugs during his visits with G.T.W.. G.W. complained that the result of this provision is that he cannot take G.T.W. camping or to almost any social event because other people may be drinking. [ 40 ] I note that included among the photographs in evidence at the trial is one which shows S.H. seated on G.W.’s knee at a campfire, in the company of G.T.W. as a baby and several other persons.

Many of the persons in that photograph have bottles or cans of beer in their hands or at their feet. I see nothing untoward about the behaviour of the persons in that photograph nor did I hear any evidence to that effect.

Clearly the responsible consumption of alcohol is a part of everyday life in this country and S.H. does not question her own judgement in doing so in G.T.W.’s presence. [ 41 ] I find that such a provision as sought will be extremely difficult if not impossible to comply with in any pubic setting, given that G.W. has no ability to control the consumption of alcohol by others, nor whether they are under the influence of alcohol or substances.

For instance, what if G.W. takes G.T.W. camping and someone at the next campsite drinks a beer, or comes to the campsite having visited the local pub, or smelling of marijuana? What if they go to the “Crash to Pass Derby” and someone comes into the stands after visiting the beer garden? Should G.W. be obliged to pack up G.T.W. and leave? I think not. [ 42 ] It seems to me that if G.W. is remaining sober while he exercises parenting time with G.T.W. that will be a sufficient safeguard against G.T.W. being improperly influenced or troubled by other persons in the vicinity who are consuming alcohol.

I decline to make an order that G.W. must not allow others to be under the influence of alcohol or drugs during his parenting time, and that provision in the

interim order dated October 29, 2015 is cancelled. [ 43 ] S.H. has requested that all communication between the parties be by text message and that seems a reasonable way to manage communication. It has the advantage of clarity and that a record of all communication and the date and time it was made will be available to the parties. I therefore order that all communication between the parties be by text. [ 44 ] S.H. advised the court that she no longer seeks a protection order. Her application for a protection order is therefore dismissed. [ 45 ] In

summary, for the reasons given above, I make the following orders: 1. This Court is satisfied that S.H. and G.W. are the guardians of G.T.W., born [omitted for publication], under S. 39(1) of the Family Law Act . 2. G.T.W. will have overnight weekend parenting time with his father once per month, to occur on each long weekend, if that month has a long weekend. For months without statutory holidays, the visit will take place on the third weekend of the month, unless the parties agree to a different weekend.

The September 2016 visit will not occur on the long weekend, but will occur on the third weekend of the month. 3. For December, March, July and August, when the longer school vacations occur, the regular visits will not occur, and instead the

schedule will be as follows: a. Christmas: Each party have one week parenting time with G.T.W. during Christmas vacation, with G.T.W. spending the week including Christmas day itself with G.W. in odd years and with S.H. in even years. In December 2016 the transfer from S.H. to G.W. will occur on December 26, unless the parties otherwise agree. b. Spring break: the parties will split spring break evenly between them, with S.H. having the first portion of spring break in even years and G.W. having the first portion of spring break in odd years, unless the parties otherwise agree. c.

Summer vacation: the parties will alternate parenting time one week on, one week off, commencing with S.H. in even years and G.W. in odd years, unless the parties otherwise agree. 4. The meeting place for the transfer of G.T.W. to G.W. when G.W.’s parenting time takes place in Smithers, will be Fraser Lake, unless the parties agree on another location. Each party is responsible for attending to Fraser Lake for pick up or drop off. 5. G.W. may exercise parenting time in Prince George with G.T.W. on 2 days’ notice to S.H..

G.W. is to pick up and drop off G.T.W. from his home in Prince George unless the parties otherwise agree. 6. Each parent may have telephone visits with G.T.W. while he is with the other parent, no more than once per day, in the evening. If G.T.W. will be outside of cell phone service, the parent exercising parenting time must inform the other parent by text of that fact and for how long G.T.W. will be out of cell service, and arrange for G.T.W. to telephone that parent within one day of returning to a cell service area. 7. G.W. must not consume alcohol during his parenting time with G.T.W.. 8.

All communication between the parties will be by text message. 9. S.H.’s application for a protection order is dismissed. ________________________ S.K. Keyes Provincial Court Judge