S.B. v. N.L. Date:, 2013 BCPC 233

Citation: S.B. v. N.L. Date: 20130829 2013 BCPC 0233 File No: 15554 Registry: Quesnel IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: S. B. APPLICANT AND: N. L. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE R. D. MORGAN Counsel for the Applicant: Mr. Petrisor Counsel for the Respondent: Ms. Schmidt Place of Hearing: Quesnel , B.C.

Date of Hearing: Aug. 21, 23, 26, 28, 2013 Date of Judgment: August 29, 2013 [ 1 ] This is a relocation case. The case raises the question of what effect the late filing of an application for an order prohibiting relocation (after the 30 day time limit set out in S. 68 of the Family Law Act ) will have on the court's authority and responsibilities under

section 69 of the Act, regarding a 'best interests of the children' analysis. It also raises the issue as to the requisite proof of delivery of the

section 66 notice. [ 2 ] The parties are the biological parents of their three children, and reside in Quesnel, B.C. The father was 20 years old and the mother was 18 years old when they discovered the mother was pregnant with their now 10 year old twins. Their third child is 7 years old. The parties were married June 18, 2005 and separated on September 5, 2011. On November 29, 2011 the parties entered into a Separation Agreement that was fairly comprehensive notwithstanding it was not drafted by lawyer.

The Separation Agreement was filed in Provincial Court on October 2, 2012. [ 3 ] Pursuant to the Agreement, the parties share custody with the mother having primary residence. It is expressly noted in the 2011 Agreement that the mother may relocate with the children anywhere in BC or Alberta to further her education. However, there is also an unfiled document dated July 30, 2012 signed by the parties wherein it is stated: As of today, the Separation Agreement signed in November of 2011 remains null and void in regards to all matters within it. Renegotiation relating to these matters shall take place upon [N.

L.’s] return to her residence in Quesnel, BC, Canada three weeks from today. Child support ($800 biweekly) will remain the same until her return as well as the mortgage payment ($1160/month). [ 4 ] The mother deposes there have been several subsequent discussions regarding her relocating with the children in September 2013 for the purposes of continuing with her education to become a school counsellor.

The mother says she has now taken all the courses towards her degree that she can while living in Quesnel BC, and she needs to transfer to a degree granting university. [ 5 ] The mother applied to UBC in Vancouver and also to the University of Northern British Columbia in Prince George.

She recalls that in September 2012 the father voiced his opposition to the idea of her moving with the children to Vancouver, but deposes he did not voice opposition to her moving with the children to Prince George, which is located approximately 115 kilometres from Quesnel. [ 6 ] At a family case conference held May 9, 2013 in relation to the father's December 21, 2012 application to reduce, and establish an end date, for spousal support, the mother again brought up the pending move.

She advised the father at that time that she had been provisionally accepted at the University of Northern British Columbia. [ 7 ] Although the mother was also formally accepted to UBC (Vancouver), she accepted the formal offer to attend UNBC (Prince George). She had her lawyer write a letter dated May 31, 2013 to the father giving notice pursuant to

section 66 of the Family Law Act of her intent to relocate with the children on September 1, 2013. In that letter the mother requested the father provide her with his proposals regarding parenting time. [ 8 ] The mother was not advised of the father's opposition to her relocation to Prince George until his lawyer sent a letter to her lawyer dated July 26, 2013. [ 9 ] The father did not file an application pursuant to

section 68 of the Family Law Act for an order prohibiting her relocating with the children, until July 29, 2013, some 59 days after formal notice under

section 66 was sent by regular mail to him, and 29 days over the statutory limit set out in

section 68. [ 10 ] I pause here to comment on the compressed nature of these proceedings. The relocation issue was first brought before the court on a family list day on August 21, 2013. Court time was made available on August 23, 2013, in an effort to have the matter decided prior to the September 4th start of the children's school. On August 23 the effect of missing the

section 68 time limit was raised by the court, and the matter was adjourned to Monday, August 26 allow counsel to prepare submissions. [ 11 ] On August 26 the father filed an affidavit wherein he stated, among other things, that “I do not recall ever receiving a copy of the letter [the S. 66 notice] attached as Exhibit B to Nicole's affidavit sworn July 31, 2013. I do not think I would forget receiving it.” This was the first time that the mother, or her counsel, had heard the father say he had not received the notice.

The matter was adjourned to August 28 to allow time for the mother to prepare a response to the father’s affidavit. The parties were advised that August 28 would be the last court time that could be made available prior to the start of the children's school year and that they should be prepared to argue and provide final submissions on not only the notice issue but also on issues relating to a best interests analysis. I thank both Ms. Schmidt Q.C., counsel for the mother, and Mr.

Petrisor, counsel for the father, for doing did a very admirable job in re-arranging their schedules and compiling the appropriate affidavits on short notice. [ 12 ] The mother argues the father’s late assertion that he did not receive the

section 66 notice should be rejected. She notes the father does not say he did not receive the notice but only that he does not recall receiving the notice. The mother, through her counsel’s legal assistant’s affidavit, points out the letter was mailed to both the father’s addresses and to date has not been returned as undelivered. [ 13 ] It was noted that the father received the mother's July 31, 2013 affidavit wherein, at paragraph 12, the mother specifically referred to the letter of notice and, at paragraph 13 emphasized that the father had failed to reply to it.

The letter of notice was attached as an Exhibit to that affidavit. The mother notes the father did not say he had not received the notice until after the court raised the issue on August 23. The mother emphasizes that even then, the father did not say he did not receive the letter until the next court appearance on August 26. The mother points out that the father had filed an earlier affidavit on August 21, 2013 in reply to the mother's July 31,

2013 affidavit but, although specifically referring to most of the paragraphs in the mother's affidavit, did not reply and was silent in regards to, her paragraphs 12 and 13 regarding the notice. [ 14 ] Counsel for the father points out that

section 68 refers to a time limit of 30 days after the notice was received . In this case the father says he did not receive the notice. Issues relating to the Notice [ 15 ] This case raises the question of what proof of delivery or service of the

section 66 notice is required. The degree of proof of delivery that will be required will be informed by what the potential repercussions of missing the

section 68 time limit may be. [ 16 ] Consequently, I must first determine what the potential repercussions of missing the

section 68 thirty day time period may be. In so doing, a consideration of the interplay between

section 68 and

section 69 of the Family Law Act is required. [ 17 ] Finally, after informing myself of the above, I will determine whether in this case delivery of the

section 66 notice has been established. The Law: [ 18 ] The relevant sections of the Family Law Act are as follows:

Section 66 Notice of relocation 66

(1) Subject to subsection (2), a child's guardian who plans to relocate himself or herself or a child, or both, must give to all other guardians and persons having contact with the child at least 60 days written notice of (

a) The date of the relocation, and (

b) The name of the proposed location.

(2) The court may grant an exemption from all or part of the requirement to give notice under subsection (1) if satisfied that (

a) Notice cannot be given without incurring a risk of family violence by another guardian or a person having contact with the child, or (

b) There is no ongoing relationship between the child and the other guardian or the person having contact with the child.

(3) An application for an exemption under subsection (2) may be made in the absence of any other party.

Section 67 Resolving issues arising from relocation 67

(1) If notice is required under

section 66, after the notice is given and before the date of the relocation, the child's guardians and the persons having contact with the child must use their best efforts to cooperate with one another for the purpose of resolving any issues relating to the proposed relocation.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents (

a) a guardian from making an application under

section 69, or (

b) A person having contact with the child from making an application under

section 59 or 60, as applicable, for the purpose of maintaining the relationship between the child and a person having contact with the child if relocation occurs.

Section 68 Child may be relocated unless guardian objects 68 If the child's guardian gives notice under

section 66 that the guardian plans to relocate the child, the relocation may occur on or after the date set out in the notice unless another guardian of the child, within 30 days after receiving the notice, files an application for an order to prohibit the relocation.

Section 69 Orders respecting relocation 69 (1) in this section, "relocating guardian" means a guardian who plans to relocate a child.

(2) On application by a guardian, a court may make an order permitting or prohibiting the relocation of a child by the relocating guardian.

(3) Despite section 37 (1) [best interests of child], the court, in making an order under this section, must consider, in addition to the factors set out in section 37 (2), the factors set out in subsection (4) (

a) of this section.

(4) If an application is made under this

section and the relocating guardian and another guardian do not have substantially equal parenting time with the child, (

a) the relocating guardian must satisfy the court that (

i) the proposed relocation is made in good faith, and (ii) the relocating guardian has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the relationship between the child and the child's other guardians, persons who are entitled to contact with the child, and other persons who have a significant role in the child's life, and (

b) On the court being satisfied of the factors referred to in paragraph (a), the relocation must be considered to be in the best interests of the child unless another guardian satisfies the court otherwise.

(5) If an application is made under this

section and the relocating guardian and another guardian have substantially equal parenting time with the child, the relocating guardian must satisfy the court (

a) of the factors described in subsection(4) (a), and (

b) That the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

(6) For the purposes of determining if the proposed relocation is made in good faith, the court must consider all relevant factors, including the following: (

a) The reasons for the proposed relocation; (

b) whether the proposed relocation is likely to enhance the general quality of life of the child and, if applicable, of the relocating guardian, including increasing emotional well-being or financial or educational opportunities; (

c) Whether notice was given under

section 66; (

d) Any restrictions on relocation contained in a written separation agreement or an order.

(7) In determining whether to make an order under this section, the court must not consider whether a Guardian would still relocate if the child's relocation were not permitted. Analysis of the S. 68 Notice Period Issue: [ 19 ] In cases where proper

section 66 notice of a relocation has been given and an application for an order to prohibit the relocation is filed after the 30 day time period set out in

section 68 has expired, the relocation may occur without an order unless an order is obtained to prohibit the relocation. [ 20 ] Given the clear and unambiguous wording of section 69 (2), the court continues to have the authority to issue an order prohibiting the relocation notwithstanding the application was filed after the 30 day time limit. However, considerations regarding giving effect to the intent behind

section 68 will mandate a determination of whether the court should exercise its jurisdiction in situations where the 30 days has expired before the filing of the objection. [ 21 ] In regards to the intent of

section 68, the explanation provided by the Ministry of Justice as set out in the Annotated Family Law Act found in the CLE Family Law Act Transition Guide reads as follows:

Section 68 allows a move to occur unless an application is filed objecting to the move within 30 days after notice is given. This eliminates the need for a moving guardian to wait the entire 60 days before planning the move if another guardian does not object to the move, by requiring the other guardian to raise their objection within 30 days. The parties would then have some time to resolve the dispute before the intended moved date. This

section balances the needs of an objecting guardian to have sufficient time to object and the needs of the moving guardian to make plans for the move. [ 22 ] To give effect to the goal of

section 68, and to allow guardians to properly plan for relocations, I am of the opinion the court should give full recognition to the 30 day time limit set out by the legislature. However, there will be situations where it will be clear a full best interests analysis pursuant to section 69 (3) should be undertaken, notwithstanding the

section 68 application to prohibit relocation was filed after the 30 day limit. [ 23 ] To address the tension between the goal of

section 68 and a possible desirability for a full section 69 (3) analysis, it seems appropriate to be guided by the following. [ 24 ] To allow a full hearing of an application to prohibit relocation that was filed after the 30 day time limit, the court will consider the reasonableness of the explanation for the late filing of the objection, the length of delay in filing, and the degree to which the relocating guardian would be prejudiced by allowing the late filed application to be heard.

The degree of prejudice will relate to, among other things, the date of the proposed relocation and the planning already undertaken. In the absence of a reasonable explanation, the court should require cogent and compelling evidence indicating relocation is not in the children's best interests. This should be a significant test to meet, and not simply a road bump that would nullify the intent of the legislature. [ 25 ] Given that the possible repercussions for filing an objection after the

section 68 time limit has expired include being unable to satisfy the court that a section 69 (3) hearing should take place, there should also be proof of delivery of the

section 66 notice. That proof could, of course, be the admission of receipt by the other party. However, there will be cases, like the one at bar, where receipt of mailed notice is denied. Consequently, it would be a best practice to have the notice served personally. Also, given the high number of self represented persons in Family Court, it would also be a best practice to include in the notice a clear reference to the 30 day time limit to file an objection.

In my view, the best scenario would be a requirement in the Family Law Act Rules that the notice be served in an approved form that includes specific reference to the time limit. [ 26 ] In the case before me the father says he did not receive the notice, and there is no proof of delivery to the father. Although I find the notice was properly mailed to him, I am not able to conclude the notice ever reached the father. Consequently, it is appropriate that I proceed to a full section 69 (3) analysis.

Relocation analysis pursuant to section 69 (3) [ 27 ] It is appropriate to comment on the effect of the filed Separation Agreement wherein a move with the children was contemplated for educational purposes.

Given the particular circumstances of this case, those including the father relying on an alleged Variation Agreement that the mother argues is invalid, (dealt with later in these reasons) I have elected to proceed by way of the analysis pursuant to s. 69(3) without deciding whether the November 11, 2011 Agreement is, or is not, determinative of the matter. [ 28 ] Given the November 29, 2011 Separation Agreement was filed as an order in the BC Provincial Court on October 2, 2012,

section 65 of the Family Law Act makes clear I am to be guided by the sections of the legislation set out in Division 6 (set out above).

[ 29 ] The parties agree that they do not have substantially equal parenting time and that the primary residence of the children is with the mother. Consequently, section 69 (4) applies. That

section requires the mother to satisfy the court that the proposed relocation is made in good faith and that she has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the relationship between the child and the child's other guardians, and persons who are entitled to contact with the child, and other persons who have a significant role in the child's life.

If the mother establishes the above, then the court is required to conclude the relocation is in the best interests of the children unless the father satisfies the court otherwise. [ 30 ] I have no problem concluding the mother's proposed relocation is made in good faith. Section 69 (6) sets out specific factors the court must consider in addition to all other relevant factors in determining if the proposed relocation is made in good faith. Those factors include the following: (

a) The reasons for the proposed relocation: In this case there is ample evidence of ongoing discussions regarding the mother’s intent to move for educational purposes. There is also the November 29, 2011 Separation Agreement, filed as an order on October 2, 2012 wherein the parties agreed the mother may relocate with the children anywhere in BC or Alberta to further her education. That the mother may have made a comment in regards to some additional distance between her and the father's new common-law spouse not being, from the mother’s viewpoint, necessarily a bad thing, does not change the primary motivation for the move being for educational purposes. (

b) Whether the proposed relocation is likely to enhance the general quality of life of the child and, if applicable, of the relocating guardian, including increasing emotional well-being or financial or educational opportunities: In this case the move is necessary for the mother's educational opportunities. She has gone as far as she can in her chosen field while living in Quesnel, and to pursue her goal of becoming employed as a school counsellor she needs to take further University education available only outside of Quesnel.

The mother's goal is to become self-supporting and to earn enough income to enhance the quality of her life and the children's lives. She says she cannot do that by continuing to work as a waitress as she does now. The mother says she is currently reliant on the father's child support and spousal support, and she says the current arrears of approximately $25,000 proves this is not a reliable source of income. The father has a live application before the court to obtain an order reducing, and setting an end date for, the spousal support he pays to the mother.

I find that, given the mother is already well on her way in her education and has thereby proven she is serious about her education, that there is no reason to doubt she will successfully complete her education. When she completes her education it will likely result in an enhanced general quality of life for her and the children. (

c) Whether notice was given under

section 66: Although it was not proven that the notice was received by the father, I find that the mother did, in good faith, through her counsel, send to the father appropriate notice pursuant to

section 66. (

d) Any restrictions on relocation contained in a written agreement or an order: In this case the only agreement filed as an order expressly states the parties agree to the mother's relocation with the children for educational purposes. The father relies on the document dated July 30, 2012, referred to above, that purports to be an agreement that the November 2011 separation agreement is to be considered “null and void.” In reply the mother points out that this document not filed as an order. She also provides convincing evidence upon which I conclude that her claim she signed the document under duress is valid.

That evidence includes evidence that she signed the document in the late evening of July 30, 2012 which was the evening before her planned trip with the children to California on July 31, 2012. The mother provided proof of her purchased airline tickets for her and the children. She had previously provided to the father a ‘Consent for International Travel with One Legal Guardian’ form to be signed by the father.

By way of a series of text messages between the parties commencing 11:15 AM on July 30, 2013 the mother has established that the father refused to sign the Consent for Travel form unless the mother signed the variation agreement drafted by the father. The text messages include the mother stating “I don't want to sign anything until I get back.” The father replied “Well, I want an answer, I don't want to wait. I want to figure it out and sign before you leave.” The mother replied “No. I want a chance to talk to a lawyer.

U r [sic] just trying to screw me over.” To which the father replied "Well, then I'm not going be do [sic] inclined to give u [sic] the letter.” The text string continues in the same vein. I find the document was signed under duress and I give no weight to it. [ 31 ] I also find the mother has proposed, and exhibited, a willingness to develop reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the relationship between the children and the father and other important persons in the children's lives.

The mother's immediate family were of great assistance to her while she and the children lived in Quesnel, and have offered to continue to be of assistance to her and the children in Prince George. For example, the mother's mother has agreed to travel up from California to reside with the mother and the children near the end of September to assist them in their transition. The mother's grandmother has agreed to live with the mother and children in the early part of September to assist with the early transition.

The mother's father and grandfather have also promised their support to assist the mother in any way they can. The mothers family who live in Quesnel are able to offer this assistance given that the mother's proposed move is to a location which is only approximately 115 km away and, given it is primarily highway driving, only approximately 80 min. driving time. [ 32 ] The mother has also initiated communication in the past with the paternal grandmother regarding contact with the children.

As evidenced in a string of e-mail correspondence, there appears to be a cordial and cooperative relationship between them with respect to arranging contact with the children. [ 33 ] The mother has also requested the father provide his proposals as to what changes in parenting time he thinks would be appropriate. The current arrangement is the father has parenting time every second weekend and as otherwise agreed.

She is willing to do her share of the travel to ensure the children's time with their father continues as it presently is. [ 34 ] Given the above, I find the proposed relocation is made in good faith, and I am satisfied the mother will ensure the preservation

of the children's relationships with their father and significant others. Consequently, the onus shifts to the father to show that the relocation is not in the children's best interests. [ 35 ] Although the father provided some evidence in his affidavit of isolated conduct on the mother's part that reflects unfavourably on her, I find that the evidence of negative conduct deposed to by both parties is in

part indicative of the stress the parties were going through during the early stages of the breakup of their marriage, in part related to their ongoing court proceedings, and in final part relates to their currently strained ability to communicate and get along with each other, and with new partners, as opposed to being relevant to relocation concerns.

It may well be that some distance may result in a lessening of tensions. [ 36 ] I note that since the parties’ separation, the mother has had primary residence and care of the children, and, for practically all of the children's lives, was the parent who primarily provided their day-to-day care. I hasten to add that this is not to suggest the father was not a fully involved and loving parent. I accept that there were periods of time when the children were young that the father provided primary care.

However, it is clear that the parties, when they were together, adopted so-called traditional roles, wherein the father was the primary wage earner and the mother the primary care provider. The father did, at all times including the present, an admirable job at finding employment. He had the courage and motivation to go to where the work was. This necessarily often took him out of town for work. This means he was unable to spend as much time providing as much direct day to day care for his children as the mother.

I note that at no time prior to the father's July 29, 2013, application did he apply for primary residence, nor is there any indication he would have, but for the mother's relocation. I find this fact, and the overall history of the children’s care, is consistent with the father's relocation concerns being external to the mother's ability to care for the children. [ 37 ] In regards to external concerns, I note the relocation in this case involves a move from Quesnel BC to Prince George BC and involves a distance of only approximately 115 km.

The father has a large and close extended family, many of whom have sat through these proceedings. The father is concerned the children, if relocated, would miss out on the benefits associated with a close knit large extended family. However, I note that not only does the father's extended family live in Quesnel, so does many of the mother's extended family.

It is reasonable to expect the mother will be motivated to come back to Quesnel regularly for visits, resulting in additional opportunities for parenting time with the father, and contact with extended family, beyond the time that may be specifically ordered if relocation occurs.

It is also reasonable to expect that the father and extended family would take the opportunity, when they are in Prince George, to arrange additional parenting and contact time with the children. [ 38 ] Regarding the views of the children, given their ages – the twins are almost 10 and the youngest is 7 - it is appropriate, especially in regards to the two oldest, to consider their children's views. The mother’s un-contradicted evidence is that the children are excited about the proposed move, and they are approaching it with optimism and minimal apprehension.

There is no suggestion in the evidence before me that they would prefer to no longer live primarily with their mother in order to stay in Quesnel. [ 39 ] In regards to the children's health, one of the older children has been diagnosed by a Prince George paediatrician as having ADHD. The paediatrician prescribed Ritalin. The father does not agree with the diagnosis or the treatment and allows the 10-year-old to determine whether or not he will take his medication. I understand the father's concerns given general public commentary about alleged over-prescription of Ritalin for active children.

However, even if Ritalin was, or is, in fact over-prescribed, something that I have no knowledge of, that does not lead to a conclusion that all prescriptions for Ritalin are unnecessary. It is fair to question medical professionals and to obtain a second opinion. To date the father has not obtained a second opinion or met with the prescribing paediatrician. I do not accept any suggestion that the father is being effectively blocked by the mother from speaking with his children's health, or, for that matter, educational professionals.

The father is a guardian of the children under the Family Law Act and has every right to speak to the professionals involved in his children's lives. I do accept the father’s assertion that the mother has been, at least at times, lax in her efforts to communicate with him regarding the children's health and educational welfare.

I encourage both parents to become more responsible in adhering to their joint legal obligations as guardians to communicate with each other regarding the health and welfare of the children. [ 40 ] In regards to the children’s education, the father has a valid concern about the high number of ‘lates’ recorded on the children’s report cards. The mother’s answer that one of the children is hard to awaken is unsatisfactory. Not only is it reasonable to conclude that the children are embarrassed at disrupting the class with their late arrivals.

It is also reasonable to conclude the last minute scrambles to get out the door and off to school, and everything associated with them, makes school less of the positive experience all parents hope it will be for their children.

That said, I note the children’s report cards in other respects are generally positive, and there is evidence of the mother attending the parent teacher interviews and the father not attending. [ 41 ] After consideration of not only the above, but of all of the evidence presented, even though I may have not expressly commented directly on all of it in these reasons, I have concluded the father has not established that the proposed relocation is not in the children's best interests. [ 42 ] Although I recognize that in these types of cases there are strongly held views that result in correspondingly strong disappointment, I encourage the parties to now cooperate to ensure the children enjoy lots of parenting time with their father and lots of contact with extended family. [ 43 ] I take the opportunity to make clear in the following order that the parties are both guardians of the children.

ORDER: 1. By operation of section 39 (1) of the Family Law Act , the parties are guardians of the children.

2. Pursuant to the Separation Agreement dated November 29, 2011, and filed in Provincial Court of B.C. on October 2, 2012, the mother has primary residence of the children. 3. The mother is permitted to relocate with the children to Prince George, BC, such relocation expected to occur in early September 2013. 4. The father will have reasonable and generous parenting time as agreed between the parties and, unless otherwise agreed, his parenting time will specifically include: (

a) alternating weekends from Friday evening to Sunday evening and extended to include any statutory or non-instructional days that fall on the Friday immediately prior to, or the Monday immediately following his scheduled weekend. The father’s first weekend will commence Friday, September 13, 2013. (

b) For the 2013 Christmas holidays, the father will pick the children up on Saturday, December 28 th and drop the children off on Sunday January 5 th . Commencing in 2014 the parties will share the Christmas holidays approximately equally, with the exchanges to take place at 2 p.m. December 27 th . The father will have parenting time for the first half of Christmas holidays on even numbered years. (

c) For school spring breaks the father’s parenting time will be from the 1 st Monday until the 2 nd Friday; (

d) For the Easter holiday, the parties will alternate each year, with the father having parenting time on odd numbered years. For 2014, given the mother will have the children over Easter, the father’s weekend parenting time is adjusted so that he will have the first two weekends in April, and the weekend after the Easter weekend, then continue on an alternating basis. (

e) For school summer vacation, the parties will equally share parenting time in approximately two week blocks, or as otherwise agreed. On any year the parties cannot agree on specific dates, the father will have the children from July 1 to July 15 and from August 1 st to August 15 th . 5. The mother will make her best efforts to facilitate the father's request for additional parenting time any time the father is in Prince George and any time the mother is in Quesnel; 6.

The mother will ensure ongoing regular contact between the children and extended family and others who are important in the children's lives, specifically including but not limited to the children's paternal and maternal grandparents; 7. Unless otherwise agreed, the father’s pick up of the children will occur in Prince George at the Pine Centre Mall, and the mother’s pick up of the children will occur in Quesnel at the Safeway parking lot. Unless otherwise agreed, all pickups and drop-offs will occur at 5. p.m. Counsel for the mother will draft the Order. __________________________________ R. D.

Morgan Provincial Court Judge