R. v. Lamothe, 2011 QCCA 1499

Bordo c. R. 2011 QCCA 1499 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OFMONTREAL No: 500-10-004972-111 (450-01-065500-105) (455-01-008141-073 SEQ. ACC. 003) DATE: AUGUST 18, 2011 PRESIDING: THE HONOURABLE ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. BRIAN BORDO PETITIONER - Accused v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT - Prosecutrix JUDGMENT [1] I have before me an application by Brian Bordo under subsection 679(3) Cr.

C. to be released from custody during theconduct of his appeal against conviction and his motion to appeal his sentence, the latter of which has been deferred to the panel of theCourt hearing his appeal against conviction. [2] Mr. Bordo was found guilty by a jury of the Superior Court, at which the Honourable Mr.

Justice Yves Tardif presided, ofsix counts in an indictment relating to conspiracy to produce cannabis,[1] conspiracy to traffic in cannabis,[2] production of cannabis,[3]two counts of possession of cannabis for the purpose of trafficking,[4] and production of cannabis for the benefit of a criminalorganization.[5] [3] Mr. Bordo was tried together with four others who were also found guilty of a variety of drug related offences, namely,Werner Kyling, Benoît Gagnon, Martin Castilloux and Gilles Couture. The trial judge sentenced Messrs.

Kyling, Bordo, Gagnon,Castilloux and Couture to a total term of imprisonment of seven years, ten months after having deducted two months for their pre-trialdetention. He further specified in respect of each of them that they would have to serve one-half of their sentences for production ofcannabis for the benefit of a criminal organization (three years) that formed part of the total term of imprisonment of seven years and tenmonths. [4] The trial judge sentenced Mr. Gagnon to a term of imprisonment of three years, ten months after having also deducted twomonths for his pre-trial detention.

He further specified that Mr. Gagnon would have to serve one half of his sentence for production ofcannabis for the benefit of a criminal organization (two years). [5] Subsection 679(3) Cr. C. places the burden on an applicant to show that the appeal is not frivolous, that he will surrenderhimself into custody in accordance with the order, and that his detention is not necessary in the public interest. [6] Both Mr. Kyling and Mr. Gagnon have presented similar motions to the one now before me. My colleague Bich, J.A.dismissed that of Mr. Kyling[6] and granted that of Mr.

Gagnon.[7] She concluded that the first two conditions of subsection 679(3) Cr.C. were satisfied in each of their cases. That is a conclusion with which I agree, and which the Crown does not put in issue in itsopposition to Mr. Bordo's motion being granted. [7] Rather, the only issue before me is whether Mr. Bordo has satisfied the third condition relating to whether or not hisdetention is necessary in the public interest. [8] In rejecting the contention of Mr. Kyling, Bich, J.A. said this after explaining why the first two conditions of subsection679(3) Cr.

C. had been met: [7] Cependant, la demande de l'appelant ne remplit pas la troisième des conditions prescrites par l'article 679, paragr. (3), C.cr., saremise en liberté s'avérant contraire à l'intérêt public, principalement au regard de la confiance des justiciables dans le système de justice.Comme le rappelle la Cour dans Patel c. R. : Public confidence in our system of justice is an essential element of the "public interest" contemplated by s. 679: R. v. Lamothe (1990), (QC CA), 58 C.C.C. (3d) 530 (Que. C.A.); R. v. Perron (1989), (QC CA), 51 C.C.C. (3d) 518 (Que.C.A.); R. v.

Perron, C.A.M. (QC CA), 500-10-000009-900, April 11, 1990, McCarthy J.A.; R. v. Lachapelle, C.A.M.500-10-000018-802, January 29, 1980, Lamer J.A. (now C.J.C.); R. v. McGuire, [1984] J.Q. no 186, C.A.M. 500-10-000148-849, MonetJ.A.

Reasonable members of the public, appreciative of their own stake in a secure and fair system of justice, readily understand that thesevalues require judicial interim release in appropriate cases, even if the appellant was at first instance convicted of a serious crime andtherefore faces a lengthy sentence if his appeal is dismissed. Each case will depend on its own circumstances. Courts across the country have time and again emphasized the profound importance with respect to interim release, of the distinctionbetween an accused awaiting his trial and an appellant who has already been convicted.

Under our system of justice, the former ispresumed innocent; the latter, guilty. In Perron (supra, at p. 5), McCarthy, J.A. cites with approval the following words of Lamer J.A. in Lachapelle (supra): Un juge qui décide avant procès de l'élargissement d'un prévenu peut toujours tenir compte de la qualité de la preuve que la Couronneprétend pouvoir offrir ou, le cas échéant, a effectivement présentée à charge lors de l'enquête préliminaire.

Sa décision cependant tiendranécessairement compte du fait que, outre la présomption d'innocence dont jouit l'accusé, il lui sera toujours loisible d'offrir une défenseen réponse aux preuves qu'offrira la Couronne. [Emphasis added.] In Demyen (1975), (SK CA), 26 C.C.C. (2d) 324 (Sask. C.A.), at p. 326, Chief Justice Culliton, for the Court, stated: I think it can be said that the release of a prisoner convicted of a serious crime involving violence to the person pending the determinationof his appeal is a matter of real concern to the public.

I think it can be said, as well, that the public does not take the same view to therelease of an accused while awaiting trial. This is understandable, as in the latter instance the accused is presumed to be innocent, whilein the former he is a convicted criminal. [Emphasis added.] This principle was reaffirmed by Tallis J. (as he then was) in R. v. Kingwatsiak (1976), (NWT CA), 31 C.C.C. (2d)213 (N.W.T.S.C.), at p. 218: The public does not take the same view with respect to the release of a convicted person as compared to the release of an accused who isawaiting trial.

In the latter case the accused is presumed to be innocent while in the former he is a convicted criminal. Where the crime, as in this case, is for one of the most serious offences known to our law, and the sentence is a very long one, theappellant is not entitled to his release simply because he was free pending trial, or because his grounds of appeal, though weak, are notfrivolous. More is required to satisfy the additional and mandatory test of "public interest".

The appellant has not persuaded us that he passes that test. [8] Bref, la présomption d'innocence ne joue pas au stade de la présente demande de remise en liberté et il faut tenir compte de cechangement de paradigme même si l'appel est sérieux, tout comme il faut tenir compte de la présomption de validité des jugements et dela nécessité d'appliquer ces derniers.

C'est une personne coupable (et non plus une personne présumée innocente, comme en premièreinstance) qui demande à être libérée provisoirement et c'est dans cette perspective que doit être examinée la requête. [9] L'appelant, en l'espèce, a été déclaré coupable de crimes graves et, au nombre de ceux-ci se trouve une condamnation rattachée àson association avec une organisation criminelle dont il aurait été le leader, et non pas un simple troupier, ainsi que le constate lejugement sur la peine.

Cette peine, d'ailleurs, est lourde (8 ans, dont sont soustraits deux mois de détention présentencielle) et montrebien la gravité de l'affaire. Il n'y a guère de circonstances atténuantes dans la situation de l'appelant et l'on a affaire ici à un homme deplus de 60 ans, qui devait être conscient de ce qu'il faisait. [10] L'appelant a par ailleurs un casier judiciaire qui, s'il n'est pas récent, doit néanmoins être considéré.

La dernière infraction qu'on yconstate, sauf celles de l'espèce, date de 1993 (trafic de marijuana); toutes les autres (dont une tentative de meurtre, en 1967, qui n'a pasempêché sa libération conditionnelle en 1971) remontent à la période 1967 à 1973.

Il reste que ce casier judiciaire montre que l'appelant,s'il paraît avoir renoncé au crime pendant d'assez longues périodes, n'a pas hésité à y recourir à d'autres moments, ce qui n'est pas bénin. [11] Il est vrai, et c'est l'élément le plus positif du dossier, que l'appelant a été en liberté pendant toutes les procédures de premièreinstance (et antérieurement dans le cadre des procédures d'extradition) et qu'il semble avoir respecté les conditions qui lui ont étéimposées.

Le ministère public a tenté d'établir que tel n'était pas le cas et qu'il avait au contraire, pendant son procès, violé au moins l'unede ces conditions en rencontrant un individu, criminel d'habitude, dont il ne pouvait ignorer le lourd casier judiciaire. Les élémentsprésentés au soutien de cette prétention sont plus ou moins convaincants, cependant, et il n'en sera donc pas tenu compte. [9] As we can see, what weighed heavily against Mr.

Kyling was his status as a "leader" in the conspiracy, the gravity of thecrimes for which he had been found guilty, his prior criminal record and the duration of his sentence. [10] Bich, J.A. distinguished the case of Mr. Gagnon from that of Mr.

Kyling, however, in this manner: [8] À la différence de celle qu'a présentée le co-appelant Kyling, cependant, la demande de l'appelant, dans le présent dossier, remplitaussi la troisième condition prescrite par l'article 679, paragr. (3), sa remise en liberté ne s'avérant pas contraire à l'intérêt public. [9] Bien qu'il ait été déclaré coupable de crimes graves et ne bénéficie plus de la présomption d'innocence, la situation de l'appelantest telle que sa remise en liberté n'est pas de nature à choquer le public ni à lui faire perdre confiance dans notre système de justice.

Cetteremise en liberté n'est pas non plus de nature à mettre en péril la sécurité du public. Il vaut de répéter ici que l'appelant a été en liberté aucours des six dernières années et qu'il s'est en tous points conformé aux conditions qui lui ont été imposées. Il est sans antécédentsjudiciaires (sauf pour les infractions en cause dans la présente instance), il a un emploi stable et il est soutien de famille. Il a sans douteété associé à une organisation criminelle, mais ne la dirigeait pas (encore là, à la différence du co-appelant Kyling), ce qui explique sansdoute en bonne

partie la différence entre la peine qui lui a été imposée (trois ans et dix mois) et celle qui a été imposée à M. Kyling (septans et dix mois). [11] Where then does Mr. Bordo fit into this spectrum?

[ 12 ] Like Mr. Kyling, Mr. Bordo received the same sentence of seven years, ten months for the commission of the same six serious offences. Unlike Mr. Kyling, however, he has no prior criminal record. Like Mr. Gagnon, he unfailingly respected the conditions of his release from detention for a lengthy period prior to trial until the imposition of the sentence of imprisonment. Against this fact, however, the sentence Mr. Bordo received is twice as long as that of Mr. Gagnon. [ 13 ] At the hearing, counsel for the Crown was asked to justify on what basis the trial judge treated Messrs.

Bordo, Castilloux and Couture in the same manner as Mr. Kyling insofar as their sentences were concerned.

He referred to the extensive production of cannabis and the considerable value of same, as reflected in the following extract from the sentencing judgment: [115] La Couronne plaide que Bordo, Castilloux et Couture ont produit 6650 plants soit : - 3800 plants au 1532, chemin Beaulac - 1800 plants au 1178, chemin St-Armand - 650 plants sur le chemin Chevalier - 200 plants chez Royce Bordo - 200 plants dans des poches de jute derrière la résidence de Bordo [116] Ceci est cohérent avec la preuve montrant que, le 25 octobre 2004, Castilloux achète et prend possession de plusieurs douzaines de bacs qu'il apporte chez Bordo.

Lors d'une entrée subreptice faite le lendemain, la police trouve à cet endroit 79 bacs, dont 59 sont remplis de cannabis. [117] Si un plant produit, comme l'affirme l'expert Ducasse, 10 onces de cannabis et qu'une livre de cannabis se vend 1300 $, la valeur monétaire produite s'élevait donc à 5 402 800 $. [118] La défense prétend qu'il faut plutôt retenir le chiffre de quatre onces par plant comme l'a déjà affirmé l'enquêteur principal au dossier, le sergent-détective Fournier. [119] Sur cette question, la Cour accorde plus de poids à Ducasse qu'à Fournier.

En effet, Ducasse a été reconnu témoin expert alors que Fournier ne l'a pas été. [120] À tout événement, s'il fallait retenir la proposition de la défense, la valeur monétaire s'élèverait à 2 161 120 $. On en conviendra, il ne s'agit pas d'une mince somme. [References to exhibits omitted] [ 14 ] The quantities produced by Mr. Kyling and their value, on the other hand, were considerably less prodigious than that Messrs.

Bordo, Castilloux and Couture achieved: [121] Dans le cas de Kyling et Gagnon, la Couronne plaide qu'ils ont produit 133 livres de cannabis pour une valeur de 173 000 $. [122] Pour en arriver à ce total, elle tient compte des 44,5 livres trouvées dans deux barils chez Kyling le 8 juin 2005, 10 livres envoyées chez la soeur de Gagnon, 21 livres chez Brian Bordo, 7 livres et 14 livres ailleurs ainsi que 60 plants derrière le garage qui représentent 37 livres. [123] Quant à ces quantités, la défense plaide qu'il y a dédoublement dans certains cas. [124] À tout événement, si la Cour devait retenir 100 livres, la valeur monétaire se chiffrerait alors à 130 000 $. [References to exhibits omitted] [ 15 ] At pages 6 – 25 inclusively of his judgment, under paragraph [10], the trial judge reproduced a lengthy

summary of the evidence adduced at trial that led to the conviction of Messrs. Bordo, Castilloux and Couture, the accuracy of which, he noted, the three accused did not seriously challenge. [8] At the hearing before me, counsel for Mr. Bordo did not contend that any of the facts on which the trial judge relied in this respect were inaccurate. The gravity of these facts speaks for itself.

Their consequences for the public in terms of making illegally produced controlled substances in massive quantities available for public consumption should not be underestimated, nor can the fact that the three individuals in question did so purely for profit. [ 16 ] I appreciate that the appeal against conviction may result in a new trial being ordered, especially since the curative provisions of subparagraph 686(1)(b)(iii) Cr. C. may not be available to the Crown if some of Mr. Bordo's grounds of appeal were to succeed.

It may be as well that the deferral of the sentence appeal to the panel hearing the appeal against conviction will result in a lesser sentence being imposed if the appeal against conviction fails. Nevertheless, the factual basis on which Mr.

Bordo was convicted and sentenced is not the main focus of his appeal. [ 17 ] I acknowledge the apparent seriousness of several of the grounds of appeal. [ 18 ] In my view, however, public confidence in the judicial system would be undermined if someone found beyond a reasonable doubt by members of a jury to have been involved in the events described in the sentencing judgment were to be released pending the hearing of the appeals against conviction and sentence. This is all the more so since the existence of those events and the implication of Mr.

Bordo in them is not a main feature of the appeal against conviction. [ 19 ] Mr. Bordo's motion is accordingly dismissed.

ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. Mtre Jean-Marc Bénard For the petitioner Mtre Denis Gallant For the respondent Date of hearing: August 10, 2011