R. v. Blinn, 2018 NSPC 32

PROVINCIAL COURT OF NOVA SCOTIA Citation: R. v. Blinn , 2018 NSPC 32 Between: Her Majesty the Queen v. Paul Emile Blinn Restriction on Publication By court order made under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code , information that may identify the persons described in this decision as the complainants may not be published, broadcasted or transmitted in any manner. This decision complies with this restriction so that it can be published. Judge: The Honourable Judge Timothy D. Landry Decision July 31 st , 2018 Charges: 172.1(1)(

b) CC, 152 CC, 271 CC x 2 Counsel: David Curry, for the Crown Hugh Robichaud and Dildeep Bhatti, for the Defendant By the Court: [ 1 ] Paul Emile Blinn has entered guilty pleas in relation to four counts of Information number 723837, namely counts 3, 5, 7 and 9. Those counts read as follows: And furthermore, between the 1 st of August 2015 and the 21 st of August 2015, did by means of a telecommunication, communicate with G. D., a person who the accused believes is under the age of 16 years

Section 172.1(1)(

b) for the purpose of facilitating the commission of an offence with respect to G. D. under

Section 152 and 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada . (Case #2928876) And furthermore, between April 1 st 2008 and September 30 th 2010, at or near [identifying information redacted], Nova Scotia, did for a sexual purpose invite R. T. a person under the age of sixteen years to touch directly his body with a diaper contrary to

Section 152 of the Criminal Code of Canada . (Case #2928878) And furthermore, between April 1 st 2008 and September 30 th 2010, at or near [identifying information redacted], Nova Scotia, did commit a sexual assault on R. T. contrary to

section 271 of the Criminal code of Canada .( Case #2928880) And furthermore, between April 1 st 2010 and September 30 th 2012, at or near [identifying information redacted], Nova Scotia, did commit a sexual assault on B. D. contrary to

Section 271 of the Criminal Code of Canada . (Case #2928882) [ 2 ] In preparing for the sentencing, the Court has reviewed the written submissions of the Crown dated March 15 th , 2018, the

written submissions of the counsel for the accused dated March 14 th , 2018, the Pre-Sentence Report which was prepared October 5 th , 2017, the Comprehensive Forensic Sexual Behavior Pre-Sentence Assessment (hereinafter referred to as the Assessment), dated September 11 th , 2017, and also the Victim Impact Statements filed in relation to this matter. In addition, counsel provided the Court with additional comments in relation to the sentencing during the Court appearances of March 20 th , 2018 and July 9 th , 2018. Criminal Code Provisions Regarding Purposes and Principles of Sentencing [ 3 ] The relevant purposes and principles of sentencing are outlined at

section 718 to 718.2 of the Code and they are as follows: “718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community.” Sections 718.01 , 718.1 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code state as follows: “718.01 When a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person under the age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct.” 718.1 A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.2 A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender, and, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, (

i) evidence that the offence was motivated by bias, prejudice or hate based on race, national or ethnic origin, language, colour, religion, sex, age, mental or physical disability, sexual orientation, or gender identity or expression, or on any other similar factor, (ii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused the offender’s spouse or common-law partner, (ii.1) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a person under the age of eighteen years, (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim, (iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation, (iv) evidence that the offence was committed for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with a criminal organization, (

v) evidence that the offence was a terrorism offence, or (vi) evidence that the offence was committed while the offender was subject to a conditional sentence order made under

section 742.1 or released on parole, statutory release or unescorted temporary absence under the Corrections and Conditional Release Act shall be deemed to be aggravating circumstances; (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; (

c) where consecutive sentences are imposed, the combined sentence should not be unduly long or harsh; (

d) an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances; and (

e) all available sanctions, other than imprisonment, that are reasonable in the circumstances and consistent with the harm done to victims or to the community should be considered for all offenders, with particular attention to the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders.”

[ 4 ] The Crown in its submission, is asking the Court to impose a global sentence of one year in custody pursuant to an agreement reached between prior Crown counsel and Defence. The Crown is also seeking the following ancillary orders: a non-communication order pursuant to

Section 743.21(1) with respect to the three victims in this case; a

Section 109 mandatory Firearms Prohibition Order; a mandatory DNA Order under

Section 487.05(1) of the Code; a SOIRA Order for life pursuant to

Section 490.013(2.1) of the Code; and a 161 Order for a period of 10 years. The Defence is asking the Court to impose a Conditional Sentence Order of 18 to 24 months on the charges pursuant to Sections 172.l(1)(

b) and 152 Criminal Code and one day deemed served by the accused’s attendance in court for the sentencing on the

Section 271 Criminal Code charges in the event a Conditional Sentence Order is not available. The Defence is also suggesting that a period of probation of two to three years is appropriate. The Crown in its submission to the court of March 20, 2018, suggested that the court consider a federal sentence as the programming for the accused recommended by Dr. Connors was not available in a provincial institution. It is important to note however, that the Crown’s recommendation in this case is for a custodial sentence of one year.

The Pre-Sentence Report [ 5 ] A great deal of the matters dealt with in the Pre-Sentence Report were also covered in the Assessment of Dr. Angela Connors. What I will be covering as I summarize the Pre-Sentence Report, I will not be repeating when I review the Assessment. The Pre-Sentence Report confirms that Mr. Blinn is currently 38 years of age and that he has no prior criminal history of any kind. His upbringing appears to have been very positive. Of significance is the fact that it did not appear that he suffered any form of abuse while in his formative years and that he had very supportive parents.

The accused’s mother was interviewed for the purpose of the Pre- Sentence Report. She was not aware of the accused having any issues regarding substance abuse, mental health or anger management. She told the author of the report that she was surprised by these offences and she did not see the need for any further counselling for the accused. She confirmed that she continues to be supportive of Mr. Blinn. The report confirms that Mr. Blinn graduated from high school in 1998 and went on to complete a Bachelor of Science degree from Acadia University in 2002.

By all accounts, he was a very good student. [ 6 ] The accused’s work history essentially comprised of his work at the [identifying information redacted] where he was employed for approximately 20 years. Mr. Blinn began working there as a [identifying information redacted] and, by 28 years of age, [identifying information redacted]. The PSR confirms that, in August of 2015, he was suspended with pay from the [identifying information redacted] [identifying information redacted] and his employment was terminated in January of 2016.

He remained on Employment Insurance until July of 2016 when that expired and, since that time, he has been earning money by working for a neighbour. Given the fact that the accused continues to reside with his parents, they have been assisting him with financial expenses. [ 7 ] Under health and lifestyle, the accused appears to have benefited from good health and he is not on any medications. Mr. Blinn did advise the author of the report that he did seek out mental health services to assist him in dealing with the stress he was feeling after these charges had been laid against him.

Constable Gougeon, who was the investigating officer, expressed concerns that the accused should have supports in place to assist him in not re-offending. The comprehensive Forensic Sexual Behaviour Pre-Sentence Assessment [ 8 ] The Court has reviewed the Assessment and I will summarize parts of Dr. Connors’ findings in this decision. Throughout the Assessment, Doctor Connors uses the initials of the victims, those being G.T., B.D. and R. T.

Doctor Connors notes at page 1 of the Assessment, “the conclusion of this report is primarily designed to address the risk posed to public as well as rehabilitative potential and options.” It is noted in the Assessment that the accused spent two days at the Nova Scotia Hospital during which time he took

part in written testing, six hours of clinical interviews and the penile plethysmography. [ 9 ] The Court has spent a great deal of time studying the entirety of Doctor Connors’ Assessment. It is clear that, during the clinical interviews, much of Mr. Blinn’s personal history was discussed including his family history, educational history, employment history and intimate relationship history amongst other topics. From my reading of the Assessment, it appears that chronologically B.D. was first victimized by the accused followed by R.T. and G.T. At page 14 of Doctor Connors’ Assessment, she indicates “Mr.

Blinn also explained that R.T. must have been speaking to B.D., since R.T. asked him about B.D. wearing a diaper and ‘he would do anything [B.D.] had done, and that’s how we ended up with [R.T.] in a diaper.’ Mr. Blinn acknowledged that R.T. wore a diaper perhaps seven to eight times over a two year period in the presence of Mr. Blinn without concomitant soiling or changing”. Doctor Connors further noted at page 16 of the Assessment that “Mr.

Blinn also facilitated compliance through grooming techniques that included relationship building, physical contact (massage, play fighting), and exposure to pornography.” [ 10 ] Dr. Connors discussed with the accused the onset of the commission of these offences and she noted at the bottom of page 16 of the Assessment, top of page 17, “Mr. Blinn advised that he had ‘started having conversations about sex with teenagers I wouldn’t have had before’ shortly before his maternal grandmother died. Mr.

Blinn reported feeling close to his grandmother and struggling with her declining health, finally feeling overwhelmed when she died and unable to cope with how different his paternal grandmother was who moved in shortly thereafter (nor how quickly she declined). Mr. Blinn described becoming aware that ‘people can be here one day and not tomorrow, so [there’s] no point to be careful’.

He elaborated that he began to think ‘does it matter if I’m right or wrong’ and so ‘if that’s the direction we’re going’, he decided to ‘follow it and see what happens’ rather than put the brakes on his infractions with these boys”. [ 11 ] Under

summary and prognosis at page 23 the doctor noted, “In the current interview, Mr. Blinn was reasonably forthright about his actions in the index matters. While he appeared sincere that he would not engage in any similar actions in the future, he did not possess a clear plan as to how he was going to address his criminogenic variables. Furthermore, Mr. Blinn has become less stable since the index matters due to having lost his job, his livelihood, his pastimes, and largely his source for validating his identity which was closely tied to the world of the

[identifying information redacted] Mr. Blinn is in the process of rebuilding his life at present, which is in the beginning stages. Actuarial risk estimation shows little risk for violent offending in the future, in keeping with Mr. Blinn having largely been a pro-social individual in the past. In contrast, his risk for sexual re-offending is higher, estimated as close to that posed by the average sexual offender, with a number of dynamic criminogenic variables still active. As a result, it is recommended that Mr.

Blinn attend treatment designed to specifically target his sexual criminogenic risk variables, and that he observe restrictions appropriate to the knowledge that he use pastimes such as golf, bowling, and video games to develop trusting relationships with youth that he then exploited.” The doctor makes recommendations in the last two pages of her Assessment. As far as treatment is concerned, she recommends the FSBP Treatment Group which is a 30-week program offered in the Kentville region of Nova Scotia, (also available in the federal penitentiary system).

Doctor Connors also makes recommendations regarding the need to restrict Mr. Blinn’s contact with persons under the age of 16 and also makes recommendations that he continue to rebuild the structure in his life. Is a Conditional Sentence Order Available and Appropriate in This Case? [ 12 ] In order to determine if a Conditional Sentence Order is available in this case, the court needs to review the applicable criminal code provisions at the time that these offences where committed and also applicable case law.

With respect to count three, it is my conclusion that no mandatory minimum custodial sentence attaches to that offence. In the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision of R. vs. Hood , the court noted at paragraphs12 and 13: [12] “An Information sworn January 24, 2014 charged the appellant with six offences in relation to two of her former students, L.G. and J.L.

The charges, where L.G was the complainant, were telecommunication for the purpose of facilitating sexual exploitation (s. 172.1) and while in a position of trust, inviting him to touch her (s. 153), both between June 1, 2013 and September 30, 2013. [13] Where J.L. was the complainant, the charges were between March and June 2013: sexual assault on J.L. (s. 271); touching him for a sexual purpose (s. 151); communication with J.L. by telecommunication for the purpose of committing the offence of sexual exploitation (s. 172.1); and inviting J.L., a person under the age of sixteen, to touch her for a sexual purpose ( s. 152 )”.

The court in Hood went on to conclude at paragraph 156: “Therefore, we declare the mandatory one-year minimum sentences for all subject offences; namely sexual exploitation, sexual interference and luring [s. 172.1(1) (

a) and (

b) only] to be struck and rendered inoperative”. In relation to the 271 charges, my conclusion is that a Conditional Sentence Order is not available for both of those offences. I make this determination based on my review of the appropriate criminal code provisions that were in place at the time the 271 offences were committed. The applicable sections of the Criminal Code that I have reviewed to reach this conclusion are the wording of sections 742.1 , 271(1) and 152 (

b) of the Criminal Code from 2008 and 2010. In relation to both 271 charges, the Criminal Code did not mandate a minimum custodial sentence on the date of the offences. Regarding count five, the

section 152 offence, at the time that offence was committed there was a mandatory minimum of 45 days in custody. The Defence is asking the court to rule that the imposition of a mandatory minimum sentence, in this case, would be unfit and grossly disproportionate to the offence committed. Essentially the Defence is asking the court to rule that the imposition of the 45 day statutory minimum sentence for the 152 charge would offend

section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . Prior to making a ruling on that application, the court will examine whether or not a Conditional Sentence Order should be ordered in this case. At this stage of the decision I will assume that a mandatory minimum sentence is not mandated for the offence under

section 152 Criminal Code . [ 13 ] The court will now review whether or not a Conditional Sentence Order should be ordered in this case considering the provisions of s. 742.1 of the Criminal Code . The first consideration for the court to consider is whether or not the court would impose a sentence of less than two years custody. The sentence that the court will be imposing in this case will be a sentence of less than two years custody. The next provision under

section 742.1 of the code that the court must examine is whether serving the sentence in the community would endanger the safety of the community. The comments of the accused at page 14 of the Assessment, quoted at page eight of this decision, regarding how the abuse of R.T. began caused the court some concern. The accused appears to blame the victim. However, it is my conclusion that permitting the accused to serve his sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community. I make that conclusion based on the fact that the accused has no prior criminal history.

In addition, the accused has been released on bail conditions for approximately 33 months without incident. Finally, the totality of Dr. Connors’ Assessment, is in my view, relatively positive and I am satisfied that the risk of Mr. Blinn serving a sentence in the community could be managed under proper conditions.

The final consideration that the court has to consider is would the imposition of a Conditional Sentence Order in this case be consistent with the principles and purposes of sentencing outlined in s. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code ? [ 14 ] In order to determine if a Conditional Sentence Order would be consistent with the principles and purposes of sentencing, the

court must examine a number of different factors including the circumstances of the offences, personal circumstances of the offender andthe mitigating and aggravating factors. Pursuant to an agreement reached by counsel, the specific facts of the offences in this case areoutlined in a redacted Prosecutor’s Information Sheet which has been provided to the court and are also outlined at pages 13, 14 and 15of the assessment completed by Doctor Connors. I have carefully reviewed the facts in this case and I will not be repeating those facts inthis decision other than the facts that I have already eluded to. [15] The aggravating and mitigating factors in this case are as follows: (

a) The mitigating factors are: 1. The accused plead guilty and, therefore, the victims were spared the necessity of having to testify in Court. 2. The accused comes before the Court with no prior criminal history and, for the most

part in his life, has been a pro-socialindividual as outlined in both the Pre-Sentence Report and the assessment of Doctor Connors. It is not unusual for individuals coming before the court on these types of offences to have no prior criminal history. That fact was notedby the Supreme Court of Nova Scotia at page 2 of R. v. G.C.S. (NSSC) and by the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal atparagraph 17 of R. vs. Henderson (1992) (NS CA), 109 N.S.R. (2d) 349. (

b) The aggravating factors are: 1. The ages of the victims. G.T., R.T. and B.D. were very young when they were victimized by Mr. Blinn. Upon my review of theredacted Prosecutor’s Information Sheet and the Assessment, the victims appear to have been between the ages of 9 to 12 years of age. Pursuant to

Section 718.2(ii.1)(1) it is an aggravating factor if an individual is being sentenced for having abused a person under the ageof 18 years. 2. The offences in this case took place over a lengthy period of time and there were a number of incidents. 3. These crimes were committed when the accused was in a position of trust and that trust was breached. The accused used hisposition as the manager of the [identifying information redacted] and also [identifying information redacted] and also a golf coach togain the trust of not only the victims in this case but also the victims’ families. 4.

The accused used a number of grooming techniques in order to commit these offences against three separate victims. [16] The Nova Scotia Court of Appeal decision of R. v. E.M.W., 2011 NSCA 87, noted at paragraphs 41, 42, 43 and 44: 41. “Section 742.1 permits a conditional sentence where the term of imprisonment is under two years, and the sentencing judge“is satisfied that the service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would beconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2".

The judge said ‘I amsatisfied that Mr. [E.M.W.] presents no danger to the community.’ 42. But the judge was not satisfied that a conditional sentence would satisfy s. 742.1's other prerequisite. He said: ‘A man who sexually violates his own ten-year-old daughter in these circumstances cannot be allowed to serve his sentence bygoing to work, going out to the grocery store for a few hours on Saturday, watching television from his favourite chair and enjoying thefellowship of friends and family in his home.

A conditional sentence does not, in these circumstances, provide for punishment that is measured and thoughtful. It would, to put itsimply, be the kind of sentence that does not speak of justice and compassion but of weakness and naivete. When abuse of children is involved, punishment matters. When the abuser is a parent, punishment matters a lot. While therestrictions of a conditional sentence can indeed be punishment, there are times when they are no replacement for the sound of a shuttingjail cell’. 43. E.M.W.’s submission seizes on the judge’s concluding sentence.

His factum says: ‘It is submitted that by confining himself to the tool of federal imprisonment here because he felt that there was no substitute for thesound of a shutting jail cell, the trial judge made an error in principle. The choice of the sound of shutting federal jail cell disabled theCourt from setting the terms of any community supervision via probation’. 44.

E.M.W.’s submission assumes that the judge uttered a preference for incarceration, in principle, that conflicts with Parliament’spurpose for conditional sentencing. With respect, E.M.W pounces on the metaphor but dodges the reasoning. After careful considerationthe judge concluded that nothing less than E.M.W.’s incarceration would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles ofsentencing. That conclusion means that s. 742.1's prerequisite for a conditional sentence is not satisfied in E.M.W.’s case. The judge’sreference to a clanging cell door was not a freestanding pronouncement of law.

It just recapitulated, in the context of E.M.W.’s submission on s. 742.1, the judge’s earlier detailed application of sentencing principles to the circumstances of this case, ananalysis that in my view is unassailable on appeal”. [17] Judge Tufts in R. v. S.C.C. 2004 NSPC 41 was sentencing an individual who had pled guilty to one count under section 271(1)Criminal Code. The victim was his 11 year old step-son. Judge Tufts noted at paragraph 15: “I will now review those principles as they apply to the crimes of sexual assault against young children by persons in authority.

OurAppeal Court and those of other provinces have repeatedly stated that general deterrence and denunciation are the objectives to beemphasized in the offences of sexual assault against children. This is not to say that the other objectives are not important or are not to beconsidered, however, I believe that because of the view which our courts and our society takes of these crimes, which I will review later,these objectives must be the primary focus. A sentence which is unduly lenient can provide neither the necessary deterrence ordenunciation required to meet the fundamental purpose of sentencing - see R. v.

G.A.L. infra, para. 60”. Judge Tufts went on to outline at paragraph 50: “In my view, it is clear from the authorities cited above that the sentences for sexual assault against young children by a person inauthority attract a severe sentence. Certainly, in Ontario and in Nova Scotia, I believe Conditional Sentences are rare - see R. v. Bedard (ON CA), [2001], 158 C.C.C. (3d) 216; R. v. Cromin (ON CA), [2002] O.J. No. 354; R. v. D.R. (ON CA), [2003] O.J. No. 561; R. v. R.W.B. [2000] N.J. No. 59, which all emphasize this point”. [18] Justice Lynch in R. v.

G.H.E. 2017 NSSC 281 was sentencing an accused who had pled guilty to two counts under

section 151Criminal Code. The victims were the offender’s two daughters. Judge Lynch noted at paragraphs 47, 48 and 49 and 50: [47] “The other principle of sentencing is that it has to be tailored to the individual. I must look at protection of the public, deterrence anddenunciation, and rehabilitation. [48] Because the offences occurred before the amendments were made for a minimum sentence and the maximum of fourteen years, aconditional sentence is available as a sentence. The R. v.

Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, decision from the Supreme Court of Canada, outlinedwhat I am to consider when I am considering a conditional sentence. I have to first look at whether the appropriate range of sentence,which has to be less than two years, is within the range of appropriate sentences.

Then, if less than two years was within the range forthe sentence, I have to look at whether the offender is a danger to the safety of the community and whether a conditional sentence isconsistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing. [49] As I indicated, and counsel indicated, certainly there are sentences all over the place -- probation, conditional sentences andsentence ranges from six months to double digit terms of imprisonment. [50] In the R. v.

E.M.W., supra, case from our Court of Appeal, a conditional sentence was requested of the trial judge and the trialjudge gave two years, and that was upheld on appeal. In that case, the Court of Appeal reviewed many cases from three years suspendedsentence to six years in prison. They say that incarceration in the cases they reviewed were sometimes more, and sometimes less, thantwo years depending on the severity of the circumstances for sexual offences on children without intercourse”.

Justice Lynch went on to outline at paragraphs 61 and 62: “[61] In this case, the accused, clearly has started on the path and is well on his way on the path to rehabilitation, but that is only specificdeterrence and I have to consider general deterrence as well. [62] Leaving the accused in the community to run […] or leaving him in the community not to run […] would not send the message ofsociety’s revulsion of such conduct.

As I indicated, his conduct was a breach of trust, an exploitation of children, and a conditionalsentence is not consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing in s. 718 to s. 718.2 of the Criminal Code, and so Iwill not be granting a conditional sentence to the accused”.

[ 19 ] As noted by Justice Wright in R. v. Henry 2001 NSSC 87 at paragraph 2 : “Sentencing is one of the most difficult tasks to be carried out by a trial judge.” Each case must be decided on its own very specific circumstances, all the while considering the principles and purposes of sentencing. It is my conclusion based on the particular facts of this case including the nature of the offences, the age of the victims and the fact that the accused was in a position of trust at the time the offences were committed that a Conditional Sentence Order would not be consistent with the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in

section 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . This is a case where actual custody is necessary to send the appropriate message of denunciation and general deterrence. Others in the community need to know that committing offences of a sexual nature against very young children will attract significant sentences. The fact that the accused used his position at the [identifying information redacted] to groom these young victims was a significant breach of trust.

In my view, imposing a Conditional Sentence Order in this case would over-emphasize the principle of rehabilitation while under-emphasizing the principles of denunciation and general deterrence. Defence counsel has asked the court to consider the fact that the accused imposed restraint on his actions, suggesting that he did not put his own sexual self-gratification ahead of the interest of the victims. With all due respect, in my view, that does not diminish the moral blame worthiness of the accused in this matter.

At paragraph 74 of G.H.E. decision, supra Justice Lynch noted: “Both the crown and defence discussed the level of seriousness of the abuse and there are references in the case law to levels of sexual abuse. I am hopeful that we are past the days when the degree of penetration of the victims’ bodies determines the seriousness of the sexual assault or the abuse. The level of the violation of the victim’s sexual integrity is not determined by the degree of penetration.

Here, it was frequent and over a long period starting at a very young age, and included various forms of sexual abuse that were certainly a major violation of the older daughter’s sexual dignity”. [ 20 ] While the actions of the accused in this case could have been more serious, that does not diminish the fact that these offences have had a devastating effect on the victims. I have reviewed the Victim Impact Statements in this case and it is clear, based on my review of those Victim Impact Statements that the actions of Mr.

Blinn will have a profound impact on the victims and their families for a considerable period of time. [ 21 ] The court must impose a sentence that also considers and respects the principles of restraint and totality. [ 22 ] It is my conclusion, based on all factors in this case, that a global sentence of one year custody will be imposed. Each count will attract a sentence of three months and those sentences will be consecutive, one to the other, for a total custodial sentence of 12 months custody.

Given the sentence that the court has imposed, it is not necessary for this court to rule on whether or not a 45 day mandatory custodial sentence for the 152 offence, mandated by the Criminal Code when that offence took place, is contrary to

section 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms . The custodial sentence will be followed by a 36 month period of probation with terms to be outlined at the sentencing on July 31, 2018. In addition, pursuant to

Section 487.051(1) Criminal Code a DNA order will be issued, a

Section 743.21(1) Non-Communication Order with the three victims in this case with no exceptions will be issued by the court today as will a SOIRA Order for life pursuant to

Section 490.013(2.1) (

a) Criminal Code. I will sign a

section 161 Order for a period of 10 years and a

section 109, mandatory Firearms Prohibition Order, for a period of 10 years once I receive both from the Crown. The court must also impose Victim Fine Surcharge with respect to these matters in the amount of $200.00 per count and given the sentence that the court has imposed, I will grant two years to pay that Victim Fine Surcharge. Timothy D. Landry, JPC