Shiels v. Shiels, 2015 BCSC 1060

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Citation: Shiels v. Shiels, 2015 BCSC 1060 Date: 20150619 Docket: F950328 Registry: Vancouver Between: Russell John Shiels Claimant And Janice Lee Shiels Respondent Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Butler Reasons for Judgment Counsel for the Claimant: Pamela J. RowlandsCounsel for the Respondent: James A.

BerringerPlace and Date of Hearing: Vancouver, B.C.April 13 and May 6, 2015Place and Date of Judgment: Vancouver, B.C.June 19, 2015 [1] The claimant, Russell Shiels, applies to terminate his obligation to pay spousal support to his former wife, the respondent,Janice Shiels. [2] The parties were married for 16 1/2 years and separated in March 1995. At the time of their separation, Mr. Shiels was 40 yearsof age and Ms. Shiels was 41. They cohabited for a period of about two years prior to marriage. Accordingly, the duration of therelationship was in the range of 18 1/2 years.

The parties have one daughter who is now 34 years old and self-supporting. [3] This is the fourth time the parties have litigated the issue of spousal support. As a result of these applications, Mr. Shiels haspaid spousal support to his former wife for approximately 20 years. Mr. Shiels’ application to terminate payment of spousal support isgranted for the reasons that follow. Background [4] The orders and reasons for judgment from the past litigation conveniently set out the background to this litigation. [5] The parties appeared before Mr. Justice Lysyk in 1997 for a two-day

summary trial. On August 21, 1997, in reasons forjudgment indexed as Shiels v. Shiels, [1997] B.C.J. No. 1924, , Lysyk J. divided the family assets equally and eachparty received about $700,000 in assets. Mr. Shiels was also ordered to pay child support for the parties’ daughter. Mr. Shiels’ incomewas fixed at $289,339.51 for purposes of the Federal Child Support Guidelines, SOR/97-175. [6] Mr. Justice Lysyk also ordered Mr. Shiels to pay $5,000 per month in spousal support until July 31, 1998 and $2,500 per monththereafter.

Further, he specified that either party could seek a review of the spousal support order after one year. At that time, Ms. Shielshad just finished a course to upgrade her employability. The reasons are silent on the issue of duration of the spousal support but state atpara. 37: [37] I am of the view that the order now made for spousal maintenance ought to be reviewable on the application of either party on orafter August 1, 1998.

By that date, [the daughter] will have completed high school, the matrimonial home will have been sold (or, if stillunsold, its market value ascertainable with reasonable precision) and the wife’s employment situation clarified. Also, the level of herfuture investment income from monies obtained under this judgment can be more accurately estimated. [7] In 2001, Ms. Shiels applied to increase the amount of spousal support she received. Ms. Shiels, who was 46 years old at thetime of the application, was employed as a legal secretary and was earning $30,800 per year. Mr.

Shiels’ income had dropped toapproximately $150,000 but it was expected to increase to its former level in subsequent years. He applied to terminate the spousalsupport. The application proceeded as a review as contemplated by the Lysyk decision. In reasons for judgment issued on April 27, 2001and indexed as Shiels v. Shiels, 2001 BCSC 634, Oppal J. thoroughly reviewed the parties’ circumstances and ordered Mr. Shiels to payongoing spousal support in the amount of $1,500 per month. He stated as follows at para. 25:

[25] In this case there is no doubt that Mrs. Shiels is the product of a traditional marriage…. She has retrained herself, is fully employed and possesses sufficient assets from the marriage. However, her standard of living must according to the law be brought into closer line with the standard of living enjoyed by Mr. Shiels. She clearly is not as well off as Mr. Shiels. The parties have widely different earning capacities.

While it is agreed that she is not entitled to an equal standard of living, she is entitled to a reasonable standard of living which must bear some relationship to the standard of living she enjoyed while she was married. She is therefore entitled to spousal maintenance. [ 8 ] The reasons for judgment of Oppal J. are silent with respect to the duration of spousal support. The reasons are also silent regarding future review or variation applications. [ 9 ] A second application to terminate spousal support was brought by Mr. Shiels in November 2009. There are no reasons for judgment available from that application.

Mr. Justice Leask ordered Mr. Shiels to pay $1,200 per month in spousal support from December 1, 2009 up to and including July 1, 2011, following which the support payments were to revert to $1,500 per month. The order provided that either party could apply to vary the order based on changed circumstances arising after December of 2009 (the “2009 Order”). Mr. Shiels’ Financial and Personal Circumstances [ 10 ] Throughout the marriage and in subsequent years, Mr. Shiels worked for Atlantic Contractors Ltd. (“Atlantic”), a family business owned equally by Mr. Shiels and his brother. Mr.

Shiels’ brother worked as a firefighter and was a silent partner who did no work for Atlantic. Mr. Shiels was the general manager and ran the business after the death of his father in 1988. The company acted as a site preparation contractor for commercial real estate development projects. It built foundations for warehouses and office buildings in industrial parks. It had a small focused client base. One of its key clients, Canada Lands Inc. closed down its Vancouver office in 2009.

This had a significant impact on Atlantic because it had been involved in development of a large site for Canada Lands Inc. for more than 20 years. It completed its work on that site in 2012 and had no remaining work from the client. As of 2011, with the loss of its major client and no other clients of significance, Atlantic was losing money. [ 11 ] Mr. Shiels deposed that in 2011 he had two options: 1) pursue new business; or 2) shut down Atlantic. In order to pursue new business he would have been required to make a considerable capital investment. He described the prospect of doing that as an “all in” bet.

He decided against making that wager and elected instead to wind up Atlantic. In 2013, the company conducted no business. However, some income was generated through the sale of its equipment by auction. The last piece of equipment was sold in July 2014 and the only asset of the company remaining is the sum of $20,645 in its bank account. [ 12 ] Mr. Shiels started a new relationship in 1998 and was married in 2004. He and his second wife are still together. She did secretarial work for Atlantic until 2012 and this allowed for some income splitting.

They purchased a ten-acre property in Langley in 1999 which they sold in 2011. The substantial equity in that property, approximately $1.8 million, was used in part to purchase the new home. In addition, $450,000 was invested in Atlantic during its final years. [ 13 ] Mr. Shiels’ income has varied greatly over the years. From the information filed in this proceeding which includes some earlier affidavits, his income for support purposes has been: 2006 – $715,605 2007 – $134,590 (after a large capital loss) 2008 – $455,359 2011 – $100,898 2012 – $ 41,499 2013 – $146,016 2014 – $144,299 [ 14 ] Mr.

Shiels’ income in 2013 and 2014 came entirely from asset depletion. This included the redemption of his Atlantic shares which was made possible by the sale of the company’s equipment. In addition, in 2014 he cashed in some of his RRSPs. He has received no employment income since 2012. [ 15 ] Mr. Shiels and his wife own a home which was purchased in 2013 for $960,000. At present the liability on the mortgage which also secures a line of credit is $386,755. His net worth on the Form F8 Financial Statement is about $1.07 million. He has no pension but has about $300,000 in RRSPs.

He also has four cars valued at $235,000. [ 16 ] This application was adjourned in part to have Mr. Shiels provide further evidence regarding his financial situation as well as that of his second wife. She has not been employed since she last worked for Atlantic in 2012. She has an RRSP valued at approximately $142,000 and her other assets and liabilities are all held jointly with Mr. Shiels. [ 17 ] Mr. Shiels recently turned 60 years old. His lifestyle for many years was unhealthy and stressful. This included working long hours and smoking heavily.

He had a heart attack in 2001, and presently has a number of health concerns. He suffers from arthritis and high cholesterol. His wife also has health concerns. [ 18 ] Mr. Shiels does not plan to return to work. He worked in the family business from the age of 16 until his retirement. He has a grade 12 education but no certificates, diplomas, or degrees. His computer skills are very limited, as his business was run on a “manual system” rather than a computerized system.

He says he does not have marketable skills for the modern construction business. [ 19 ] He and his wife plan to continue to deplete their assets to support themselves in retirement. In his recent affidavit he deposes:

I anticipate paying for my and my wife’s expenses by selling assets and cashing in RRSP’s. For instance, I may sell my 1964 Corvette. I have been cashing in RRSP’s on a fairly regular basis, and anticipate continuing to do so. I also used my Line of Credit account to pay for expenses. My wife also has some RRSP’s which she will likely be cashing in over the course of time to pay for our household expenses. I also have some investments which I will be selling over the course of time.

When our financial assets are more significantly depleted, we will likely sell our house and down-size, which will free up additional funds for living. Ms. Shiels’ Financial and Personal Circumstances [ 20 ] Ms. Shiels worked as a legal secretary until 2007. She was 53 years old at the time. She left work to care for her elderly mother who passed away in late 2008. After the death of her mother, Ms. Shiels did not return to work. [ 21 ] In 2007 her annual income was approximately $38,000.

She says she does not have the qualifications required to be competitive in the job market and accordingly, she has not been looking for employment. In addition, she says she suffers from depression, although she provided almost no information regarding that condition. Her income at the present time, aside from spousal support, is limited to $6,348 in annual Canada Pension Plan income, which she started to receive when she turned 60 and approximately $5,000 in dividend income, which she re-invests. [ 22 ] Ms. Shiels’ Form F8 Financial Statement indicates that she has net assets of $957,663.

This includes her condominium which has an assessed value of $411,000 and RRSPs of approximately $485,000. She has no debt. Position of the Parties [ 23 ] Mr. Shiels says that his retirement and sale of Atlantic’s assets amounts to a material change of circumstances. His income has fallen from more than $150,000 annually to virtually nothing. In these new circumstances he is now unable to pay spousal support. In addition, he says that he has satisfied any obligation to provide compensatory spousal support, as he has now paid support for 20 years which exceeds the duration of the marriage.

It is also longer than the high end of the range for duration of support as set out in the Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines (“ SSAG ”). [ 24 ] Mr. Shiels denies the suggestion that he structured his finances and the timing of this application solely to bolster proof of a material change of circumstances. He notes that he has made all spousal support payments and has always obeyed court orders to pay support. Further, he denies the suggestion he took early retirement in order to avoid his spousal support obligations.

He says the decision to wind up the business of Atlantic was reasonable given the company’s prospects, his personal finances, medical condition, and stage of life. [ 25 ] Ms. Shiels argues that voluntary early retirement cannot be relied upon as a change in circumstances. She says Mr. Shiels retired in 2012 at the age of 57 from a job which paid him a significant income. There is no basis upon which this move could be described as anything but a voluntary retirement. Accordingly, Mr. Shiels is intentionally underemployed.

She argues that income should be imputed to him and that his medical conditions do not prevent him from working. In support of this argument, she notes that Mr. Shiels has an extravagant lifestyle with substantial annual expenditures. She says his retirement plan makes no sense unless he has assets held in the names of others or is planning to go back to work. [ 26 ] At the initial hearing of the application, Ms. Shiels also argued that Mr. Shiels made inadequate disclosure regarding his financial situation, and in particular, that of his second wife. [ 27 ] In response to the suggestion that Mr.

Shiels has fulfilled any obligation to provide spousal support given the duration of support, she says that the SSAG are only useful as a guide when both duration and amount are considered. She notes that the SSAG did not yet exist when the initial order for support was made. Here, Mr. Shiels never paid an amount of support which is within the range set out in the SSAG for someone with his income.

Finally, she stresses that this was a traditional marriage and she was disadvantaged by the role she took in the marriage, and that disadvantage remains a significant issue on this application. [ 28 ] These circumstances raise two issues for determination: 1. Has Mr. Shiels established a material change in circumstances? 2. Should spousal support be cancelled or varied? Analysis 1. Has Mr. Shiels established a material change in circumstances? [ 29 ] The order of Lysyk J. following trial in 1997 contemplated review applications.

However, the 2009 Order of Leask J. limited further applications for changes in spousal support to variations based on material changes in circumstances. The issue on this application is whether Mr. Shiels has established a material change of circumstances since the 2009 Order. That order was made pursuant to the Divorce Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. 3 (2nd Supp.). Accordingly, pursuant to s. 17(4.1), Mr. Shiels must show that “a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the … last variation order”.

Of course, before a change is material it must be significant, unforeseen in the sense that it was not considered at the time of the previous order, and of a continuing nature. [ 30 ] On the information before this court, it is apparent that the 2009 Order was not made in contemplation of Mr. Shiels’

retirement. There is also no doubt that his retirement and the attendant reduction in annual employment income from more than$150,000 to no income whatsoever are significant changes in his circumstances. Further, if the retirement is legitimate, the change incircumstances is likely to be of a continuing nature. Accordingly, the substantial issue here is whether Mr. Shiels’ retirement was early orpremature, such that he is intentionally underemployed. [31] It is evident from the affidavit evidence and counsel’s submissions that there is a great deal of mistrust between the parties.

Thefact the parties have litigated the issue of spousal support on four occasions over the span of 18 years is a testament to the level ofconflict between them. Ms. Shiels asks this court to infer the existence of an improper motive for retirement, in part on the basis that Mr.Shiels has already applied three times to terminate spousal support. She says that Mr. Shiels has made it abundantly clear to other familymembers that he resents having to pay spousal support. The evidence of the parties’ daughter provides some support for this view. [32] In Szczerbaniwicz v. Szczerbaniwicz, 2010 BCSC 421, Mr.

Justice Punnet canvassed the jurisprudence regarding variation ofspousal support where a payor spouse has voluntarily retired. There are no principles of general application, as the success of a variationapplication depends on the individual circumstances of the case. However, the case law provides guidance on how to approach thequestion. Mr. Justice Punnet, at para. 22, referred to the decision in Vennels v. Vennels (1993), (BC SC), 76 B.C.L.R.(2d) 69 (S.C.) at paras. 31 and 34: Retirement of a payor under a maintenance order usually results in a significant reduction of income; that is so in this case.

Courts are notguided by legislation to enquire into the circumstances of retirement. Courts have no power to compel people to work. However, courtsshould, in the interests of justice, refuse to consider a reduced income resulting from retirement, to be a material change in circumstancesjustifying a variation of a support order, where a payor spouse has intentionally put him or herself out of the money in order to frustrate amaintenance order.

Any such deliberate self-induced impecuniosity constitutes deceit. *** … When voluntary retirement is advanced as a reason for seeking a reduction in maintenance, a court must consider the circumstances ofthe retirement carefully and ensure that the payor has not been prompted by deceit to avoid support orders. [33] Accordingly, the first step is to carefully examine the circumstances of Mr. Shiels’ retirement. He explained the decision towind up Atlantic. The company worked in a specialized niche and primarily for one client on a single large project.

The project isfinished and the client is no longer doing work in British Columbia. He decided not to make the capital investment required to pursuenew clientele and business opportunities. He said this was in part because of his age and concerns about his and his wife’s health. Inaddition to Mr. Shiels’ evidence, his accountant provided an affidavit which confirmed the steps taken to liquidate assets and wind upAtlantic in an orderly way over the last few years. [34] There is no evidence contrary to Mr. Shiels’ assertions.

I adjourned the hearing of the application and required him to producefurther documentation regarding Atlantic’s finances and his wife’s financial situation. Nothing in that material contradicts Mr. Shiels’evidence. Ms. Shiels did not seek to cross-examine Mr. Shiels on his affidavit evidence. There is no direct evidence to suggest that thedecision to wind up the company was ill-advised or unjustified. In that regard, Mr.

Shiels’ brother as an equal shareholder may haveopposed the winding up of the company, if proceeding in that fashion did not make good business sense. [35] The only way I could determine that Mr. Shiels’ decision to wind up Atlantic and retire was prompted by deceit to avoid supportobligations, would be by way of inference from all of the evidence. Ms.

Shiels makes three principal arguments in that regard: 1) Mr.Shiels has consistently attempted to reduce or terminate his support obligation; 2) he has a lavish lifestyle which cannot be supported onhis limited assets; and 3) he structured his affairs and timed this application to take advantage of the situation he created. I will considereach of these submissions and indicate what, if any, inferences are available from all of the evidence. 1) Attempts to reduce or terminate spousal support [36] Over the years since separation, Mr. Shiels has attempted to eliminate or reduce his spousal support obligation.

However, he hasnot done so in an improper way. He brought applications seeking to reduce his support obligation but always continued to pay support asordered by the court. The litigious nature of the relationship worked both ways: one of his applications to reduce support was brought inresponse to Ms. Shiels’ application to increase support. Prior to the winding up of Atlantic, Mr. Shiels always worked full time and inmany years earned a significant income.

In other words, he does not have a history of intentional underemployment to avoid supportobligations. [37] There is a difference between wrongfully ignoring court ordered support obligations and putting forward an arguable legalposition to limit those obligations. Mr. Shiels has done the latter. I am also not able to conclude that the history of the litigation supportsan inference that Mr. Shiels pestered Ms. Shiels with a series of meritless applications. The first review was invited by the decision ofLysyk J.

The 2009 application was brought eight years after the decision of Oppal J. and the present application was brought more thanfive years after his last attempt to reduce spousal support. [38] In short, the litigation history and Mr. Shiels’ wish to limit or end his support payments do not provide a strong basis fromwhich to draw an inference of deceit or improper intentions about retirement. 2) Lavish lifestyle and missing financial information [39] Mr. Shiels’ Form F8 Financial Statement shows annual expenses of approximately $120,000. This includes more than $30,000annually for housing costs.

The adjournment of the application was prompted by my concern as to how Mr. Shiels could fund hislifestyle after retirement without additional income or assets beyond those shown in his financial disclosure. Ms. Shiels arguedpersuasively that, based on his financial disclosure, Mr. Shiels’ proposed retirement plan was unrealistic. She says the proper inferenceto draw is that Mr. Shiels either has hidden assets or will return to work if the application is successful. In other words, the material isintentionally misleading.

[40] The additional material produced by Mr. Shiels and his wife confirmed the financial circumstances that he presented to thecourt. He does not have a pension, nor any income, and expects to fund his retirement by depletion of the family assets. His wife does nothave assets of any significance other than her RRSP which was disclosed in the original application material. Given his wife’s financialsituation, it is not possible to conclude that Mr. Shiels diverted income or assets to her in order to mislead the court and to avoid hissupport obligation. While I may question Mr.

Shiels’ retirement planning, in the sense that asset depletion has significant risks over time,I cannot conclude that he has any hidden plan to return to work. 3) Mr. Shiels structured his affairs and timed this application to take advantage of the situation hecreated [41] Ms. Shiels raises the concern that this application was brought after Mr. Shiels’ retired and Atlantic was wound up. She saysthis puts her in a difficult position. The retirement is a fait accompli and it may be difficult for the court to second-guess a decisionwhich has already been made. That is certainly true.

However, a payor spouse who retires without knowing in advance if the retirementwill amount to a material change in circumstances faces a risk that he will be required to go back to work or significantly deplete hisretirement savings. [42] Mr. Shiels likely brought this application after receiving legal advice, and did so at a time when he thought it might succeed.There is nothing improper about doing so. It is significant that the application to terminate spousal support was brought more than twoyears after Mr. Shiels last received employment income.

He did not immediately stop making spousal support payments upon retirement.Rather, he continued to make those payments out of money he was receiving through asset depletion. While this might be seen as anattempt to manipulate the results of this application, it can also be seen as his acknowledgment of a continued obligation to pay spousalsupport up to this time. [43] Having regard to all of the circumstances, I cannot infer that Mr. Shiels was motivated by deceit or an improper purpose. Theevidence supports his assertion that Atlantic was wound up for legitimate business reasons.

While the parties have had a great deal ofconflict over the payment of spousal support, I cannot infer from that fact alone that Mr. Shiels retired to avoid his spousal supportobligation. Mr. Shiels has now made adequate disclosure and there is no basis for me to conclude that he has structured his financialaffairs in a way to avoid continued payment of spousal support. [44] I conclude that Mr. Shiels’ decision to close down the family construction business and retire was made for the reasons heasserted: it was an appropriate time to shut down the business of Atlantic. Further, given Mr.

Shiels’ training and skills, as well as hispersonal circumstances, his decision to retire was not unreasonable. In these circumstances, I conclude that Mr. Shiels has established amaterial change of circumstances. 2. Should spousal support be cancelled or varied? [45] The existence of a material change does not end the matter. I must still consider if income should be imputed to Mr. Shiels andwhether, based on the parties’ incomes, he should continue to pay spousal support. This also requires consideration as to whether Ms.Shiels has a continued entitlement to support.

Imputation of income [46] The decision in Szczerbaniwicz is instructive as to the proper approach to a situation where the payor spouse was found to beavoiding his support obligations. Mr. Justice Punnett summarized the law in that regard at paras. 26 and 27 and noted that even where aspouse has retired without an improper motivation, the court must still consider whether to impute income: [26] … [I]f the court finds that a party’s retirement was motivated by the desire to avoid a maintenance obligation, it will most likelyimpute income.

Even if the party’s motivation was not to avoid maintenance, the court will likely impute income so long as the party hasthe ability to earn an income. [27] If the retirement is not voluntary because of economic circumstances, medical reasons, or an employer’s actions and the payor isunable to work, the court will tend to reduce the maintenance payable; otherwise, if the payor is still capable of earning an income, hisapplication to terminate or vary spousal support will likely fail: Bentley v. Bentley, (Ont. S.C.J.); Bullock v.

Bullock,2007 BCSC 318, 36 R.F.L. (6th) 150 at para. 7. [47] The court in Szczerbaniwicz was highly critical of the payor husband, as his actions might force the wife to withdraw herpension entitlement much earlier than anticipated, which would significantly impact her ability to fund her retirement. The facts in thatcase are very different from the present circumstances. The parties separated after a 31-year relationship. They had very few familyassets to be divided. The husband held a senior position in the military and earned $118,000 annually.

The husband was 52 years oldwhen he retired, and was entitled to work several more years before reaching the mandatory retirement age of 60. Following separation,he repeatedly failed to make support payments. The wife had been out of the workforce for many years during their marriage, andultimately found work which paid $31,000 annually. In these circumstances the court imputed $90,000 in income to the husband andordered spousal support to continue at the mid-range, with the ability to seek a review when he reached age 60. [48] I have already concluded that Mr. Shiels’ retirement decision was not unreasonable.

It did not make business or financial senseto continue Atlantic’s business. Further, Mr. Shiels’ decision not to look for work in the construction field appears reasonable given hisage, education, work experience, computer skills, and health concerns. Any income which could be imputed to him in thesecircumstances would have to be based on pension or RRSP income combined with low or minimum wage part-time work. Given themodest RRSP holdings and lack of any pension other than CPP, the income imputed to him would be $25,000 at most. [49] If I were to impute that income to him, I would have to consider Ms.

Shiels’ financial situation. It is immediately evident thatthere is little difference between her financial situation and his. She retired at the age of 53 for health and family reasons. Like Mr.

Shiels, it appears that her health conditions would not prevent her from working in a part-time position. However, that would also have to be at a low or minimum wage position given her employment history and skills and the fact she has been out of the workforce for eight years. Of course, her decision to retire was voluntary. On the other hand, her investment income would be higher than Mr.

Shiels’, as she has done a better job of putting money aside for retirement. [ 50 ] Given the rough equality of their financial situations and earning abilities, there is no income differential on which to base a spousal support payment. Continued Entitlement [ 51 ] Pursuant to s. 17(7) of the Divorce Act , when ordering a variation the court must consider the same factors which are considered when determining entitlement to support.

These include recognition of the economic advantages or disadvantages arising from the marriage, apportionment of the consequences arising from childcare, relieving economic hardship arising from the breakdown of the marriage, and the promotion of economic self-sufficiency. [ 52 ] The spousal support orders which have been made in this action were based on a compensatory entitlement. The marriage was traditional; Ms. Shiels undertook the childcare duties and was economically disadvantaged as a result. The parties were fortunate and had significant family assets which were divided equally.

They were relatively young when they separated, and Ms. Shiels was able to retrain and attain a level of economic self-sufficiency. The 2001 order of Oppal J. and the 2009 Order were based on the recognition that Ms. Shiels was still at a relative economic disadvantage. As Oppal J. stated at para. 25, while Ms.

Shiels “… is not entitled to an equal standard of living, she is entitled to a reasonable standard of living which must bear some relationship to the standard of living she enjoyed while she was married.” [ 53 ] The result of the division of assets and the orders which have been made over the years is as anticipated and is in accordance with the intent of the spousal support provisions in the Divorce Act . While Mr. Shiels enjoyed a higher standard of living, given the level of income he earned in the years subsequent to the marriage, Ms.

Shiels received sufficient assets from the division of family property to put her in a reasonable financial position. With the income she earned following retraining and the spousal support she received, she was able to support herself and prepare for retirement. In that regard she has done a better job than Mr. Shiels. [ 54 ] I agree with Ms. Shiels that the duration guideline in the SSAG is not of great assistance this long after the separation, when it is considered separately without regard to the amount of support. However, in the circumstances of this case, the fact Mr.

Shiels has paid spousal support for 20 years, which is longer than the high end of the duration range in the SSAG , provides limited additional support for the conclusion I have reached. Mr. Shiels’ obligation to pay spousal support on a compensatory basis has been satisfied. Ms. Shiels has no further entitlement to support.

Summary [ 55 ] The winding up of Atlantic and Mr. Shiels’ retirement is a material change of circumstances. His decision not to seek new employment in the construction field is not unreasonable, and was not made for any improper motive. The parties’ financial positions are now very similar. The value of their respective assets is almost identical. They have each taken early retirement and their current prospects for employment are similar. Mr. and Ms. Shiels both have limited income and will be required to support their retirement from their savings. [ 56 ] In

summary, there is no basis on which to find an entitlement to continued spousal support. Mr. Shiels’ application is granted. The obligation to pay spousal support is terminated effective the date of these reasons for judgment. [ 57 ] Mr. Shiels was successful on the application and is entitled to costs. However, those will be limited to a single half day application. The continuation of the application was caused by the deficiency in financial disclosure by Mr. Shiels and so there will be no costs for that additional appearance. He is entitled to costs at Scale B. “Butler J.”