2023 NBCA 94, 2023 NBCA 94

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D’APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK 1-23-CA CANADIAN UNION OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES, LOCAL 1655, APPELLANT SYNDICAT CANADIEN DE LA FONCTION PUBLIQUE,

SECTION LOCALE 1655, APPELANT - and - - et - CANADIAN BLOOD SERVICES RESPONDENT SOCIÉTÉ CANADIENNE DU SANG INTIMÉE Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1655 v. Canadian Blood Services, 2023 NBCA 94 CORAM: The Honourable Justice French The Honourable Justice LaVigne The Honourable Justice LeBlond Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique,

section locale 1655 c. Société canadienne du sang, 2023 NBCA 94 CORAM : l’honorable juge French l’honorable juge LaVigne l’honorable juge LeBlond Appeal from a decision of the Court of King’s Bench: October 13, 2022 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc du Roi : le 13 octobre 2022 History of Case: Historique de la cause : Decision under appeal: 2022 NBKB 244 Décision frappée d’appel : 2022 NBBR 244 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: None Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : Aucune Appeal heard: April 28, 2023 Appel entendu : le 28 avril 2023 Judgment rendered: October 26, 2023 Jugement rendu : le 26 octobre 2023

Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice French Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice LaVigne The Honourable Justice LeBlond Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Samuel LeBlanc For the respondent: Sasha D. Morisset Motifs de jugement : l’honorable juge French Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge LaVigne l’honorable juge LeBlond Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Samuel LeBlanc Pour l’intimée : Sasha D. Morisset THE COURT The appeal is allowed, the application judge’s decision is set aside, and the arbitrator’s decision is reinstated.

The respondent is ordered to pay costs of $2,500 for the proceedings in the Court of King’s Bench and $2,500 on appeal. [ 1 ] LA COUR L’appel est accueilli, la décision du juge saisi de la requête est annulée et la décision de l’arbitre est rétablie. L’intimée est condamnée à verser des dépens de 2 500 $ à l’égard de l’instance devant la Cour du Banc du Roi et de 2 500 $ en appel. The judgment of the Court was delivered by FRENCH, J.A. I.

Introduction and Overview [1] This appeal relates to a grievance filed by the Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 1655 (“CUPE”) against Canadian Blood Services (“CBS”) that claims “guarantees” to provide a minimum number of hours of work “are not being met on a bi-weekly basis as clearly defined in the Memorandum of Understanding found on page 50 of the current Collective Agreement” (underlining added).

The Collective Agreement applies to approximately 30 part-time employees, 16 of whom hold positions guaranteed under the MOU. [ 2 ] CUPE maintains the MOU imposes two distinct obligations on CBS, one of which must be met on a bi- weekly basis. Firstly, it requires CBS to

schedule the 16 employees to their guaranteed minimum hours of work on a bi-weekly basis (if there is sufficient available work that permits it to do so) before assigning any “remaining available work” to the other part-time employees, who do not hold a guaranteed position. Secondly, the MOU requires CBS to pay the 16 employees their guaranteed minimum hours of work if they are not scheduled to work the minimum hours (through no fault of the employee). CUPE acknowledges this second

obligation is to be determined over a six-week averaging period. [ 3 ] CBS contends that both obligations are subject to a six-week averaging period. Thus, the grievance targets CBS’s position that it can

schedule “remaining work” to the other part-time employees, before scheduling the 16 guaranteed positions to their minimum hours of work on a bi-weekly basis, provided it meets the guaranteed minimum hours averaged over a six-week period. [ 4 ] Simply stated, the MOU provides that each of the 16 identified positions has a “minimum” number of hours of work “ on a bi-weekly basis .” Seven positions have a “minimum of” 65 hours “worked on a bi-weekly basis,” two have a “minimum of” 50 hours, and seven have a “minimum of” 45 hours (MOU, paragraphs 1 and 2).

Additionally, the MOU provides: 1. in paragraph 3, the positions are based on a six-week averaging and, if the employee is not scheduled to the guaranteed minimum hours (through no fault of the employee), he or she will be paid for those hours; and 2. in paragraph 4, after the “guaranteed positions have been scheduled to their commitment ,” CBS shall “schedule remaining available work” according to provisions of the Collective Agreement (underlining added). [ 5 ] In essence, CBS contends the six-week averaging, provided for in paragraph 3, is clearly intended to govern both its scheduling and payment obligations.

CUPE maintains there is no intent to have the six-week averaging apply to CBS’s obligation to

schedule the minimum hours of work on a bi-weekly basis before scheduling any remaining available work to the other part-time employees (as provided in paragraphs 1, 2 and 4). [ 6 ] The arbitrator who heard the grievance made two declarations regarding the

interpretation of the MOU. Consistent with the common

interpretation advanced by both CUPE and CBS, h e declared that if an employee is not scheduled to work the guaranteed minimum hours on a six-week averaging period (through no fault of the employee), CBS is obliged to pay the minimum hours. [ 7 ] Second, in relation to the disputed scheduling obligation, the arbitrator declared that the guaranteed employees “ must be scheduled to their commitment on a bi-weekly basis before any available hours of work are scheduled to the FTE’s , unless operational reasons make it impossible to do so” (underlining added).

The reference to FTE’s is to the part-time employees who do not hold one of the 16 positions guaranteed under the MOU. [ 8 ] CBS applied to the Court of King’s Bench for judicial review of the arbitrator’s decision, asking that the award be quashed, in its entirety. The application asserts the arbitrator erred in law by: (1) failing to reasonably apply the plain language rule in interpreting the MOU; (2) failing to consider extrinsic evidence, including of past practice, to assist in the

interpretation of the MOU; and (3) in the alternative, by finding that there was no ambiguity in the MOU, past practice should have been considered and CUPE should have been estopped from grieving. [ 9 ] The application judge decided the arbitrator had failed to properly apply the plain language rule and, as a result, he quashed the decision as unreasonable and ordered a new hearing. [ 10 ] CUPE appealed to this Court.

It maintains the application judge misapplied the standard of review and he failed to consider each of the reasons offered by the arbitrator for his decision. [ 11 ] I would allow the appeal, set aside the application judge’s decision, and reinstate the arbitrator’s decision for the reasons that follow. II. Context [ 12 ] CBS was established, in the late 1990s, to provide blood collection services, which it does in all provinces

except Québec. [ 13 ] It has operated in New Brunswick since at least 1999. Previously, similar services were provided in the province by the Canadian Red Cross. Many of the Red Cross employees were taken into CBS once it began operations here. This succession is reflected in the MOU, which refers to a Letter of Understanding and a Memorandum of Settlement that were agreed to in 1996.

Whether the genesis of the MOU is these agreements, or it is otherwise from the time of the Red Cross, is not clear from the record; however , it was acknowledged the MOU has existed since at least 2000, in substantially its present form, albeit with minor modifications made in the initial years. [ 14 ] Presently, CBS maintains permanent facilities in Saint John and Moncton. Each week, the clinic in Saint John collects whole blood, as well as plasma and platelets, and the clinic in Moncton collects whole blood. [ 15 ] CBS also holds mobile blood collection clinics at temporary sites throughout the province.

These clinics are operated out of the Saint John facility, and a team of employees travels from Saint John to operate them, for usually between 1 to 3 days. The team includes donor care associates and drivers. [ 16 ] At the time of the arbitration hearing, CBS employed 24 donor care associates (17 in Saint John and 7 in Moncton), of whom 12 in Saint John held “guaranteed” positions under the MOU (5 with 65 hours bi-weekly and 7 with 45 hours bi- weekly). Of seven drivers employed in New Brunswick, 4 in Saint John held “guaranteed” positions (2 with 65 hours bi-weekly and 2 of 50 hours bi-weekly). A.

The Provisions of the Collective Agreement [ 17 ] The MOU relates to the Collective Agreement that governed from January 2016 to December 2018 (the “Collective Agreement”). It applies to donor care associates and drivers involved in the blood collection clinics. CBS was and is party to other Collective Agreements that apply to other personnel. [ 18 ] The provisions of the Collective Agreement are relevant to an

interpretation of the MOU, and those that are key were addressed by the arbitrator in his reasons for decision. [ 19 ] The Collective Agreement defines four categories of employee: (1) “Regular Full Time Employee”; (2) “Probationary Employee”; (3) “Regular Part-time Employee”; and (4) “Temporary Employee.” [ 20 ] Regular part-time employees are defined in a manner that contrasts them with regular full-time employees. [ 21 ] A regular full-time employee is an employee who is regularly scheduled to work a minimum of 75 hours bi- weekly and who has been approved for permanent employment after completing a probationary period.

The Collective Agreement expressly requires CBS to pay a full-time employee for “seventy-five (75) hours in a bi-weekly period if, through no means attributable to her, she has been scheduled by [CBS] to work less than seventy-five (75) hours in a bi-weekly period” (Article 14.01 c)). This is similar to the obligation to pay the guaranteed hours under paragraph 3 of the MOU. [ 22 ] A regular part-time employee is a person “who is regularly scheduled to work less than the hours of a regular full-time employee on a continuous and recurring basis.” [ 23 ] The hours of regular part-time employees are addressed in

Article 6.06, titled, “Regular Part-Time Employees’ Defined FTE.” It provides that they “ shall be assigned a defined Ful l Time Equivalent (FTE) at the time of hire.” For instance, a part- time employee who is assigned a .5 FTE has one-half the 75 regularly scheduled bi-weekly hours of a full-time employee (or 37.5 hours).

Article 6.06 provides that the “ defined FTE shall be averaged over a six (6) week period” and CBS “may reduce a regular part- time employee’s defined FTE.”

[ 24 ] In relation to scheduling,

Article 6.06

f) states that “[a]fter all regular part-time employees have been scheduled to their defined FTE ” [ underlining added], any additional hours of work are to be distributed to the part-time employees (1) based on their seniority (Article 14.01 d)), and (2) subject to the requirements enumerated in

Article 6.06

f) i), ii), iii) and iv). Thus, after the part- time employees have been “scheduled to their defined FTE ,” any additional work is distributed based on their seniority, subject only to the requirements enumerated in

Article 6.06 f). [ 25 ] These and other conditions regarding FTEs are set out in

Article 6.06 as follows:

a) The defined FTE shall be averaged over a six (6) week period.

b) The number of regular part-time positions and the defined FTE’s shall be determined by [CBS].

c) All leaves of absences with or without pay shall count towards the defined FTE.

d) The defined FTE for regular part-time employees shall be noted in such employees’ employment offer letters.

e) Regular part-time employees must commit to be available to work as scheduled by [CBS] except as provided by any other provision of the Collective Agreement.

f) After all regular part-time employees have been scheduled to their defined FTE , [CBS] shall

schedule remaining available work amongst regular part-time employees in accordance with

Article 14.01d) and by classification and department separately at each site subject to : i. an employee’s availability, training, qualifications, and ability, and; ii. all other regular full-time employees remaining current and competent, and; iii. ensuring minimum levels of francophone clinic staff, and; iv. there being no overtime thereby created. An employee who is scheduled to work hours that conflict with any hours of an available shift as described above shall not be considered available for the purposes of 6.12 (f) (

i) above.

g) Notwithstanding the above, [CBS] may reduce a regular part-time employee’s defined FTE and such reductions shall be done in the reverse order of seniority by classification in the affected department separately at each site. […] [Emphasis added] [ 26 ] Regular part-time employees are commonly referred to as “FTEs.” Indeed, this is how the arbitrator referred to them when he declared that the guaranteed employees “must be scheduled to their commitment on a bi-weekly basis before any available hours of work are scheduled to the FTE’s.” [ 27 ] Lastly, t he scheduling of hours of work for all employees, including full-time and part-time employees (with a defined FTE), is addressed in

Article 14.01, titled, “Hours of Work.” It is here that the issue of seniority is brought into scheduling:

a) Hours of work for regular full-time shall be a total of seventy-five (75) hours to be scheduled over a two (2) week period , exclusive of unpaid meal breaks and inclusive of rest periods.

b) Unless otherwise specified , hours of work for regular part-time and temporary employees are less than those for regular full-time employees […]

c) A regular full-time employee shall be paid for seventy-five (75) hours in a bi-weekly period if, through no means attributable to her, she has been scheduled by [CBS] to work less than seventy-five (75) hours in a bi-weekly period .

d) Qualified and available part-time employees shall have their hours distributed on the basis of seniority within their classification , subject to all other-than-regular-full-time employees remaining current and competent and there being no overtime thereby created.

e) There shall be no scheduled shifts of less than four (4) hours. [Emphasis added] B.

The Provisions of the MOU [ 28 ] The MOU is identified in the table of contents to the Collective Agreement (at page 50) as “MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING RE: POSITIONS.” The MOU (or, more precisely, another MOU with identical terms) was identified in the prior Collective Agreement (for January 2012 to December 2015) as “MEMORANDUM OF UNDERSTANDING RE: GUARANTEE[D] HOURS FOR PART-TIME.” This change might have been to recognize the decision of an arbitrator made in 2014, which will be discussed further below. [ 29 ] Before addressing the MOU, I should mention it is not the only document listed in the t able of contents to the Collective Agreement that applies to part-time employees who participate in the blood collection clinics.

Another is a Letter of Agreement that provides a commitment by CBS to certain drivers and their scheduling: Whereas the parties have recognized the need for additional driver positions for the Moncton Satellite Site, the Employer agrees that no Saint John driver shall be laid off or suffer a reduction in pay or have his/her hours of work reduced as a result of the Employer utilizing drivers in the Moncton Satellite Site.

A Saint John Driver shall not be used if the use of such Driver would result in overtime when a Moncton Driver is available to work at straight time. [ 30 ] Finally, the MOU provides, in its entirety: The parties, Canadian Blood Services, New Brunswick Centre, Saint John, New Brunswick, hereinafter called the “Employer”, and the C.U.P.E. Local 1655, hereinafter called the “Union”, hereby agree on the following: 1.

Canadian Blood Services has posted five (5) part-time clinic assistant positions, and two (2) part-time driver positions, with a minimum of sixty-five (65) hours each worked on a bi-weekly basis , inclusive of all regular and worked premium hours, not otherwise excluded in the collective agreement. 2.

Seven (7) part-time clinic assistant positions have been posted with a minimum of forty-five (45) hours of work on a bi- weekly basis, and two (2) driver positions with a minimum of fifty (50) hours of work on a bi-weekly basis ; inclusive of all regular and worked premium hours not otherwise excluded in the collective agreement[.]

3. All guaranteed, part-time, positions are based on a six (6) week averaging period. Employees filling these positions will be paid their guaranteed hours of work if, through no means attributable to them, they have been scheduled by the Employer to work less than their guaranteed hours of work . 4. After all employees with guaranteed positions have been scheduled to their commitment, the Employer shall

schedule remaining available work in accordance with

Article 14.01 and 6.12 f). 5. All casual employees, as of July 10, 2000, who were not successful in obtaining a part-time position with guaranteed minimum hours of work, have been offered part-time status, with no guarantee of hours. 6. Employees who have accepted part-time positions understand and agree that they are obligated to work their scheduled hours of work, subject to reasonable requests for changes as approved by the Manager, Clinic Services.

For part time employees with guaranteed hours, any such changes that cause a reduction in the employee’s working hours will invalidate the six (6) week averaging guarantee. 7.

Employees who did not bid into guaranteed positions who are more senior than those that did, will have their hours of work reduced and the Letter of Understanding dated July 5, 1996; and Memorandum of Settlement (Paragraph 4), dated December 6, 1996 will not apply. [Emphasis added] C. 2014 Arbitration Decision re: the MOU [ 31 ] The decision of the arbitrator at issue in this appeal is not the first to determine a grievance filed by CUPE regarding the MOU.

In 2014, another arbitrator rejected CBS’s view that the MOU applied specifically to the employees who held the 16 positions identified, not the positions themselves. CBS had maintained that it did not need to fill a position after one had been vacated. The arbitrator accepted CUPE’s view that the MOU guaranteed a fixed number of positions, which, if vacated, had to be filled. [ 32 ] The 2014 decision is raised for two reasons.

First, the arbitrator referred to it in his reasons for decision in this case, including the observations made regarding the interrelationship between the terms of the MOU and the Collective Agreement then in existence. Second, CBS maintained, before the application judge, that the arbitrator’s consideration of the 2014 decision was irrelevant to the

interpretation of the MOU. The application judge agreed; he concluded the arbitrator’s consideration of it was “unhelpful and a distraction,” suggesting it contributed to rendering an unreasonable decision. D. Adjudication of the Grievance [ 33 ] There were two grievances before the arbitrator.

The first, filed by CUPE in March 2020, alleges “the guarantees are not being met on a bi-weekly basis as clearly defined in the memorandum of understanding.” The second, filed by CUPE and an employee, alleges CBS “is in violation of article’s 6.06 f), 14.01 d), and the MOU found on page 50 of the Collective Agreement as per scheduling of hours by seniority.” [ 34 ] The hearing of both grievances took place over four days. The arbitrator’s reasons for decision address the two grievances separately.

Although not consolidated in these reasons, both grievances required consideration of substantially the same provisions of the Collective Agreement and the MOU. This ought to be kept in mind when reading the arbitrator’s reasons for decision in light of the live issues, evidence, and submissions of the parties. [ 35 ] The arbitrator denied the second grievance, stating, “[t]he simple fact that hours were allocated to employees with less seniority is not sufficient to” meet the burden required to prove the alleged loss of hours.

This decision was not challenged. [ 36 ] In response to the grievance that claimed the MOU required CBS to

schedule any available work to the guaranteed employees on a bi-weekly basis before scheduling any remaining work to the FTEs, the arbitrator stated the following in his reasons for decision:

As we all know, the primary rule governing the

interpretation of a collective agreement is that the parties’ intentions are normally foundin the ordinary or plain meaning of the language in which they have expressed themselves. In this case, for the following reasons, areading of the plain language used by the parties favours the Union’s

interpretation of the MOU that the guaranteed hourlyhours should be met on a bi-weekly basis and that the six-week averaging period only comes into play when, for operationalreasons, the Employer is not able to meet the bi-weekly commitments. Operational reasons include, for example, lack of work hoursbecause clinics have had to be cancelled, the fact that an employee does not have the necessary qualifications or that there is a need toensure the presence of bilingual staff. It could also include the limits to scheduling that are set out in

article 14.02 of the collectiveagreement. In other words, if the hours are available on a bi-weekly basis and unless operational reasons render it impossible, theEmployer should meet the hourly commitments on a bi-weekly basis. [...] Therefore, my

interpretation of the MOU is as follows: employees with guaranteed hours, as set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of theMOU, must be scheduled to their commitment on a bi-weekly basis before any hours of work are scheduled to the FTE’s, unlessoperational reasons make this impossible. However, the Employer will be obligated to pay the guaranteed hours, if through no faultattributable to the employee, it has been unable to

schedule him or her to his or her guaranteed hours on a six (6) week averaging period.[Emphasis added; paras. 55-59] E. Judicial Review − CBS’s Challenge to the Arbitrator’s Decision [37] In its application for judicial review, CBS asserted the arbitrator erred in law: 1. by failing to reasonably apply the plain language rule in interpreting the guaranteed hour provisions of the MOU; 2. by failing to take into account extrinsic evidence to assist him in his

interpretation of the guaranteed hour provisions of the MOU;and 3. in the alternative, by finding that there was no ambiguity in the guaranteed hour provisions of the MOU, such that past practiceshould have been considered and CUPE should have been estopped from grieving. [38] The application judge accepted CBS’s contention that the arbitrator failed to properly apply the plain languagerule, and thereby rendered an unreasonable decision: The Applicant argues that much like the case of Canadian Union of Public Employees, Local 79, when the guaranteed hours provisionsare read together, paragraph 3 of the MOU aids the

interpretation of paragraphs 1 and 2, to provide that all guaranteed bi-weekly hoursare averaged over a six-week period. The Applicant submits that the MOU is clear that paragraphs 1 and 2 are qualified by paragraph 3,such that the bi-weekly guaranteed hours are based on this six-week averaging period. Likewise, the Applicant submits that paragraph 4explains how remaining hours, over and beyond the commitment to employees with guaranteed positions, are then distributed, asparagraph 4 is also qualified and relates to the preceding three paragraphs.

The Applicant correctly notes that in relation to guaranteed hour provisions contained in a collective agreement, the arbitration board inSaskatchewan Government v. Saskatchewan Government Employees’ Union, (SK LA) confirmed that while theseforms of guarantees may exist in collective agreements, the provisions must be explicit[.] […] In my view, in light of the jurisprudential necessity of explicitness and clarity of provisions that provide for guaranteed hours,[the arbitrator] was obliged to read the guaranteed hour provisions in the MOU together.

In my view, [the arbitrator] was requiredto read paragraphs 1 and 2 of the MOU in conjunction with paragraph 3 to reach a reasonable

interpretation. In my view, when read as a

whole, the bi-weekly guarantees provided to employees through paragraphs 1 and 2 are expressly qualified by the clear wording of paragraph 3, such that a six-week averaging period applies to all guaranteed positions. Likewise, paragraph 4 of the MOU explains how the remaining hours, over and beyond the commitment to employees with guaranteed positions, are then distributed, as paragraph 4 is also qualified and relates to the preceding three paragraphs. In my view, [the arbitrator] failed to read the guaranteed hour provisions in the MOU together , and in their plain and whole context .

In that regard, I am satisfied that [the arbitrator]’s conclusion – that the six-week averaging provision only applies when CBS cannot meet the bi-weekly hour requirements due to “operational reasons” – is unreasonable and must be quashed. In my view, [the arbitrator]’s failure to apply the “plain language”

interpretation rule on its merits when interpreting the guaranteed hour provisions in the MOU rendered the Decision to be one (

a) not based on an internally coherent and rational chain of analysis and (

b) not justified in relation to the facts and law that constrained [the arbitrator]. Accordingly, the Decision is unreasonable and must be quashed. In light of my finding on the failure of [the arbitrator] to reasonably apply the “plain language”

interpretation rule in interpreting the guaranteed hour provisions in the MOU, I need not address the other issues raised in the Application or in the submissions made by the parties. [Emphasis added; paras. 63-64 and 67-69] III.

Grounds of Appeal [ 39 ] CUPE submits the application judge erred in law, or in mixed fact and law, by: 1. applying the incorrect standard of review or misapplying the appropriate standard of review to the arbitration decision ; and 2. failing to test each of the reasons given in the arbitration decision for reasonableness. [ 40 ] Although the first ground includes the assertion that the application judge applied the “incorrect standard of review,” the essence of CUPE’s submission is that , despite having properly identified reasonableness as the appropriate standard of review, the judge misapplied that standard by effectively undertaking a correctness review, contrary to the principles set out by the Supreme Court in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.

Vavilov , 2019 SCC 65 , [2019] 4 S.C.R. 653 . There is no suggestion he intentionally applied a correctness standard, nor is there any dispute that the arbitrator’s decision is to be reviewed for reasonableness. IV. Standard of Review [ 41 ] To assess whether the application judge misapplied the reasonableness standard of review , it is necessary for this Court to “step into the shoes” of the judge and focus on the reasonableness of the arbitrator’s decision (see Agraira v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness ), 2013 SCC 36 , [2013] 2 S.C.R. 559 , at paras. 45-46 ; Ayangma v.

Université de Moncton, Moncton Campus et al. , 2019 NBCA 73 , [2019] N.B.J. No. 292 (QL) , at para. 14 ). [ 42 ] This stated, it is important to highlight that the focus on the reasonableness of the arbitrator’s decision is rooted in and guided by the assertions of error advanced by CBS in its application for judicial review. V. Analysis A.

Did the Application Judge Misapply the Reasonableness Standard of Review? [ 43 ] CBS’s application for judicial review asserts t he a rbitrator’s interpretative analysis failed to (1) reasonably apply the plain language rule , and (2) take into account extrinsic evidence, including evidence of past practice. Its alternative request for relief, based on estoppel, will be addressed at the end of these reasons.

(1) Did the arbitrator fail to reasonably apply the plain language rule? [ 44 ] CBS acknowledges the arbitrator correctly summarized the interpretative principles to be applied. It contends his misapplication of them resulted in an unreasonable decision. [ 45 ] Before this Court, CBS argued the fatal flaw in the overarching logic of the arbitrator’s interpretative analysis stems from improperly reading words into the MOU.

Additional arguments challenging the arbitrator’s interpretative analysis include reliance on the application judge’s determination that the arbitrator failed to read the provisions of the MOU together and, in essence, disregarded some provisions and overemphasized others .

CBS also asserts the arbitrator’s analysis was tainted by his consideration of the 2014 decision regarding the MOU by another arbitrator. [ 46 ] A reasonable decision is one that is internally coherent and follows a rational chain of analysis and that is justifiable in relation to the facts and law that constrained the decision-maker ( Vavilov , para. 85 ). [ 47 ] A decision may be said to be internally coherent and follow a rational chain of analysis where it is possible to trace the decision maker’s reasoning without encountering any fatal flaws in the overarching logic and the conclusion is capable of flowing from the decision maker’s analysis ( Vavilov , paras. 102-103 ). [ 48 ] A decision is justifiable in relation to the facts and law if it reflects the evidentiary record and accords with applicable legal principles, such as, in this case but not limited to, the modern approach to statutory

interpretation. [ 49 ] I will address first the application judge’s determination that the arbitrator failed to read the provisions of the MOU together. (

a) Did the arbitrator fail to read the provisions of the MOU together, in context, or did he disregard some provisions and overemphasize others? [ 50 ] I n my view, t he arbitrator considered the operative provisions of the MOU in the context of the entire MOU, the terms of the Collective Agreement and the established surrounding circumstances. Each is explicitly addressed in his reasons for decision. [ 51 ] Hence, the determination that the arbitrator read paragraphs in isolation, that he failed to read them together, in context, or that he disregarded some provisions and overemphasized others, is an inference or conclusion drawn from comparing the arbitrator’s

interpretation of the MOU to another, preferred

interpretation. The judge stated: In my view […] [the arbitrator] was obliged to read the guaranteed hour provisions in the MOU together. In my view, [the arbitrator] was required to read paragraphs 1 and 2 of the MOU in conjunction with paragraph 3 to reach a reasonable

interpretation. In my view, when read as a whole, the bi-weekly guarantees provided to employees through paragraphs 1 and 2 are expressly qualified by the clear wording of paragraph 3, such that a six-week averaging period applies to all guaranteed positions. Likewise, paragraph 4 of the MOU explains how the remaining hours, over and beyond the commitment to employees with guaranteed positions, are then distributed, as paragraph 4 is also qualified and relates to the preceding three paragraphs. [Emphasis added; para. 67] [ 52 ] I agree with CUPE’s submission that such reasoning, whether intentional or not, derives from the judge’s own

interpretation of the MOU, and it reflects an application of the reasonableness standard of review that the Supreme Court in Vavilov cautions against: It follows that the focus of reasonableness review must be on the decision actually made by the decision maker, including both the decision maker’s reasoning process and the outcome. The role of courts in these circumstances is to review , and they are, at least as a general rule, to refrain from deciding the issue themselves. Accordingly, a court applying the reasonableness standard does not ask what

decision it would have made in place of that of the administrative decision maker, attempt to ascertain the “range” of possible conclusions that would have been open to the decision maker, conduct a de novo analysis or seek to determine the “correct” solution to the problem. The Federal Court of Appeal noted in Delios v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FCA 117 , 472 N.R. 171 , that, “as reviewing judges, we do not make our own yardstick and then use that yardstick to measure what the administrator did”: at para. 28; see also Ryan , at paras. 50-51.

Instead, the reviewing court must consider only whether the decision made by the administrative decision maker – including both the rationale for the decision and the outcome to which it led – was unreasonable. [Emphasis in original; para. 83] [ 53 ] As the Supreme Court explained, an arbitrator’s decision is not to be reviewed by making one’s “own yardstick and then us[ing] that yardstick to measure” the decision. [ 54 ] Additionally, there is otherwise no basis in these circumstances for concluding the arbitrator failed to consider the MOU provisions together or in context.

It might be otherwise if this were a case where only one possible

interpretation existed, and the arbitrator’s decision was thereby constrained, and any other

interpretation rendered unjustifiable. [ 55 ] While I accept CUPE’s submission that the arbitrator’s decision is not unreasonable for the reasons set out by the application judge, CBS’s application for judicial review challenges the reasonableness of the arbitrator’s decision for other reasons and it contends he failed to address its ground that the grievance was estopped. It is necessary to address these submissions. (

b) Did the arbitrator improperly read words into the MOU or consider the 2014 decision? [ 56 ] CBS emphatically maintains that reading the words “operational reasons” into the MOU represents a fatal flaw in the arbitrator’s analysis. [ 57 ] The arbitrator’s disposition of the grievance declared that the 16 positions guaranteed by the MOU “must be scheduled to their commitment on a bi-weekly basis before any available hours of work are scheduled to the FTEs, unless operational reasons make it impossible to do so ” (underlining added).

CBS submits this determination is highly restrictive, and the words impose a standard of impossibility on its affairs. What is less clear is how these words, or the concept behind them, impermissibly impaired his analysis. [ 58 ] To address CBS’s assertion, it is necessary to consider the arbitrator’s intended use of the notion of “operational reasons” in relation to the disputed issue and the position of the parties.

It is also necessary to view it in the context of the arbitrator’s interpretative analysis. [ 59 ] Although CBS characterizes the interpretative issue as being whether the hours of work for the guaranteed positions should be calculated on a bi-weekly basis, or on a six-weeks averaging period, the interpretative issue is more nuanced. [ 60 ] CUPE’s grievance challenged CBS’s position that the six-week averaging provision applied to qualify the commitment that (1) the 16 guaranteed positions had “a minimum of [xx] hours of work on a bi-weekly basis” (paras. 1 and 2) and (2) the FTEs would be scheduled any “remaining available work” after all “guaranteed positions have been scheduled to their commitment” (para. 4).

To be clear, CBS does not dispute that the guaranteed positions must be scheduled to their commitment in priority to the FTEs being assigned any remaining work. Its position is simply that this obligation is subject to, what it argues are, the crystal-clear words of the six-week averaging provision. [ 61 ] In advancing the grievance, CUPE maintained quite simply that available work had to be scheduled on a bi- weekly basis before any remaining work could be scheduled to FTEs.

CUPE accepted that CBS’s obligation to pay the guaranteed minimum hours of work, if not scheduled, was subject to the six-week averaging period. This was not in issue. CUPE’s position was that the spirit and intent of the MOU was for CBS to

schedule the guaranteed positions, if possible , to their minimum hours of work on a bi-weekly basis. [ 62 ] To recognize that CBS’s obligation to

schedule bi-weekly should be interpreted reasonably, that there would be circumstances when CBS “is not able to meet the bi-weekly commitments,” the arbitrator chose to use the words “operational reasons.” The words “operational requirements” are used in the Collective Agreement, in

Article 14.02, entitled, “Scheduling,” which is

reproduced in his reasons for decision. He explained what he intended by the words “operational reasons,” and it is apparent he did not attribute to them a hard definition, nor did he intend them to be used or incorporated as a term of art. They reflect a reasonable limit on CBS’s duty to

schedule on a bi-weekly basis, consistent with the position taken by CUPE. As he explained in his reasons: […] Operational reasons include, for example, lack of work hours because clinics have had to be cancelled, the fact that an employee does not have the necessary qualifications or that there is a need to ensure the presence of bilingual staff. It could also include the limits to scheduling that are set out in

article 14.02 of the collective agreement. In other words, if the hours are available on a bi-weekly basis and unless operational reasons render it impossible, the Employer should meet the hourly commitments on a bi-weekly basis. [Emphasis added; para. 55]. [ 63 ] I do not agree this is an impermissible reading of words into the MOU, let alone one that amounts to a fatal flaw or otherwise renders his decision unreasonable. [ 64 ] This is especially so when considered in relation to the rest of his interpretative analysis. The qualification of the obligation was only a small part of the puzzle relating to whether the six-week averaging provision qualified the obligation to

schedule bi-weekly and to not

schedule FTEs until that “commitment” had been scheduled. [ 65 ] The arbitrator canvassed thoroughly the provisions in the MOU and the Collective Agreement related to scheduling. The key obligations in the MOU are: • The guaranteed positions have either “a minimum of [xx] hours each worked on a bi-weekly basis” (para. 1) or “a minimum of [xx] hours of work on a bi-weekly basis” (para. 2). • “All guaranteed, part-time, positions are based on a six-week averaging period.

Employees filling these positions will be paid their guaranteed hours of work if, through no means attributable to them, they have been scheduled by [CBS] to work less than their guaranteed hours of work ” (emphasis added; para. 3). • “After all employees with guaranteed positions, have been scheduled to their commitment ,” [CBS] shall

schedule remaining available work to FTEs in accordance with

article 14.01 and 6.12 f) (emphasis added; para. 4). [ 66 ] The obligation to pay contained in paragraph 3 of the MOU is similar to the obligation owed to full-time employees, under

Article 14.01 c), which is independent of scheduling considerations: A regular full-time employee shall be paid for seventy-five (75) hours in a bi-weekly period if, through no means attributable to her, she has been scheduled by [CBS] to work less than seventy-five (75) hours in a bi-weekly period. [ 67 ] The obligation in paragraph 4 to

schedule “ remaining available work” is similar to the obligation in

Article 6.06 f): After all regular part-time employees have been scheduled to their defined FTE, [CBS] shall

schedule remaining available work amongst regular part-time employees [by seniority and subject to the conditions of 6.06

f) i)-iv)] [ 68 ] As well, the arbitrator considered the interrelationship between the bi-weekly scheduling described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the MOU, the scheduling of time to FTEs in paragraph 4, and the provisions of the Collective Agreement incorporated by reference into scheduling under paragraph 4 of the MOU.

Attention is drawn to the distinction between the words used: the right of a guaranteed position to be “paid their guaranteed hours of work” (para. 3); the inability of CBS to assign work to FTEs until the guaranteed positions “have been scheduled to their commitment” (para. 4); and the requirement, a fter part-time employees have been scheduled to their “defined FTE,” for remaining work to be assigned by seniority.

[ 69 ] Similarly, he considered the 2014 decision of another arbitrator as part of the surrounding circumstances known to both parties. In that case, the arbitrator commented on the relationship between the scheduling provisions of the MOU and those in the Collective Agreement that are referred to in the MOU.

He clearly recognized, and he expressly stated, that the 2014 decision dealt with different issues. [ 70 ] CUPE argued that CBS’s overly simplistic reading of the first sentence in paragraph 3, is out of context and it rendered the reference to the 16 guaranteed positions having minimum hours of work, on a bi-weekly basis, meaningless for all purposes under the MOU. [ 71 ] In the end, the arbitrator concluded in relation to the disputed

interpretation: Therefore, my

interpretation of the MOU is as follows: employees with guaranteed hours, as set out in paragraphs 1 and 2 of the MOU, must be scheduled to their commitment on a bi-weekly basis before any hours of work are scheduled to the FTE’s, unless operational reasons make this impossible. However, the Employer will be obligated to pay the guaranteed hours, if through no fault attributable to the employee, it has been unable to

schedule him or her to his or her guaranteed hours on a six (6) week averaging period. [para. 59] [ 72 ] In

summary, based on a reading of the MOU in its entirety, including the provisions of the Collective Agreement incorporated by reference into it, the Collective Agreement as a whole, and the surrounding circumstances, the arbitrator decided the intent was for CBS to

schedule the guaranteed positions to their commitment on a bi-weekly basis, and not subject to the six- week provision. Having done so, he addressed reasonable limits on that obligation using the words “operational reasons.” This is not a reading of words into a document that distorted the required analysis.

(2) Did the arbitrator fail to take into account extrinsic evidence to assist him in his

interpretation of the MOU? [ 73 ] CBS submits the MOU is ambiguous and the arbitrator failed to consider extrinsic evidence, including of past practice, that was available to aid in the interpretative analysis. [ 74 ] Rejecting CBS’s position regarding the need to consider extrinsic evidence and past practice, the arbitrator explained: In his closing arguments, counsel for the Employer referred to the use of a purposive approach as a tool for the

interpretation of a potential ambiguity in the contractual language. I agree that, if a provision of a collective agreement is amenable to more than one plausible

interpretation or in the case where a literal reading would produce a result that is contrary to the parties’ purpose and intent, a purposive approach to construing the agreement may be appropriate. However, since I have concluded that there is no potential ambiguity in the wording of the agreement and since the

interpretation I have offered does not produce a result that is contrary to the parties’ purpose and intent, I do not believe that it is necessary to go any further on this argument . I would add though that if I had adopted a purposive approach my conclusion would not have been different.

It is clear, from the evidence, that the purpose of the guaranteed hours is to give employees an assurance that in this variable workplace they will get a minimal number of hours assigned to them on a two-week basis and, if for operational reasons, this is not possible they will nevertheless, be paid their guaranteed hours over a six-week averaging period, whether they work them or not. I understand that the Employer’s intention in accepting to create these positions with guaranteed hours was to be able to retain the employees.

The best way to attain this objective is for the Employer to endeavour to respect the guarantees on a two-week basis. I understand that the nature of the Employer’s operations might during some weeks make the attainment of this objective impossible. That is why the six week averaging period was integrated into the process. It ensures that employees will not be losing any money if this is the case. The Employer also referred in closing arguments to its past practice.

However, since I have concluded that there is a clear preponderance in favour of a meaning of the collective agreement there is no need to refer to this extrinsic evidence. [ 75 ] Before this Court, CBS submits the arbitrator’s error, in finding there was no ambiguity, is evident from the conflicting

interpretations offered by CBS and CUPE.

[ 76 ] The arbitrator’s rationale for rejecting the submission that there was ambiguity is plain on the face of his decision. After considering the plain words of the MOU, in the context of the Collective Agreement and surrounding circumstances, he rejected CBS’s broad reading of the six-week averaging provision (in the first sentence of paragraph 3), and concluded it was not a plausible

interpretation. [ 77 ] However, even if that assessment could be said to be flawed, which view I do not hold, the arbitrator explained, albeit briefly, how he would have come to the same conclusion. [ 78 ] There is no identified fatal error in his reasoning and there is no basis upon which to conclude his decision in this regard is unreasonable. B.

Should CBS’s Application for Judicial Review be Allowed on its Alternate Claim for Relief Based on Estoppel? [ 79 ] In its application for judicial review, CBS claims, in the alternative, that past practice should have been considered as an estoppel to CUPE’s grievance.

It contends the arbitrator failed by not addressing this claim. [ 80 ] In its submissions in the proceedings below, and before this Court, CUPE maintained there is no factual basis to support an estoppel and this is clearly reflected in the findings of the arbitrator. [ 81 ] While the arbitrator expressly addressed whether extrinsic evidence and past practice should have been considered to assist in the

interpretation of the MOU, he did not expressly address CBS’s contention that the evidence of past practice established estoppel as a discrete basis upon which to deny the grievance. [ 82 ] Establishing an estoppel in the form of past practice requires clear and cogent evidence of an unambiguous and long-standing practice that is inconsistent with the clear provisions of a Collective Agreement and to which the grieving party agreed or acquiesced. [ 83 ] While CBS asserts it has been scheduling based on a six-week average for some time, as the arbitrator’s reasons for decision indicate the evidence led by CBS was limited, if not equivocal, and it was contradicted by clear, unchallenged evidence from CUPE’s witnesses that its members only became aware of CBS’s conduct in 2019.

There is no evidence on the record to justify a finding that CUPE members knew that CBS had not been, as it now claims, scheduling on a bi-weekly basis for a very long time, in an open and notorious way, to which CUPE would have agreed or acquiesced. [ 84 ] According to CBS, its practice of averaging its scheduling of guaranteed employees over a six-week period is also evidenced by the fact that, in a prior round of negotiations, CUPE wanted to remove the six-week averaging.

This, too, was evidence addressed in the arbitrator’s reasons for decision; however, as noted, CUPE acknowledged when it brought the grievance that the MOU requires the six-week averaging to apply to CBS’s obligation to pay the guaranteed employees if they are not scheduled to work the minimum hours.

Thus, an effort to remove the six-week averaging is not persuasive evidence that CUPE knew the employees were not being scheduled on a bi-weekly basis before 2019. [ 85 ] CBS does not rely on evidence that the arbitrator misapprehended the evidence nor, for that matter, has it identified clear evidence that would establish an estoppel. The arbitrator recognized both the evidence upon which CBS sought to rely and CBS’s position regarding estoppel.

While it might have been preferable for him to expressly reject the estoppel argument when he rejected CBS’s position regarding extrinsic evidence and past practice, it is clear from reading his reasons for decision as a whole that he did not consider there to be any basis for such a claim. [ 86 ] I see no principled basis to refer this issue back to the arbitrator. VI. Disposition

[ 87 ] For these reasons, I would allow the appeal, set aside the application judge’s decision and reinstate the arbitrator’s decision. I would order CBS to pay costs of $2,500 for the proceedings in the Court of King’s Bench and $2,500 on appeal. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LE JUGE FRENCH I. Introduction et aperçu [1] Le présent appel porte sur un grief déposé par le Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique,

section locale 1655 (le SCFP) contre la Société canadienne du sang (la SCS) dans lequel il est allégué que les [TRADUCTION] « garanties » d’attribution d’un nombre minimum d’heures de travail [TRADUCTION] « par période de deux semaines ne sont pas respectées, comme le prévoit clairement le protocole d’entente se trouvant à la page 50 de la convention collective en vigueur » (soulignement ajouté).

La convention collective s’applique à environ 30 employés à temps partiel, dont 16 sont titulaires de postes visés par les garanties prévues dans le protocole d’entente. [2] Le SCFP soutient que le protocole d’entente impose deux obligations distinctes à la SCS, dont l’une doit être remplie aux deux semaines.

Premièrement, le protocole d’entente impose à la SCS l’obligation d’attribuer aux 16 employés le nombre minimum d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti par période de deux semaines (pourvu qu’il y ait suffisamment de travail à effectuer) avant d’attribuer tout [TRADUCTION] « travail à effectuer restant » aux autres employés à temps partiel, qui ne sont pas titulaires d’un poste visé par les garanties.

Deuxièmement, le protocole d’entente impose à la SCS l’obligation de rémunérer les 16 employés pour le nombre minimum d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti s’ils ne se voient pas attribuer le nombre minimum d’heures de travail (sans faute imputable à l’employé). Le SCFP reconnaît que cette deuxième obligation doit être remplie au cours d’une période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines. [3] La SCS soutient que les deux obligations sont assujetties à une période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines.

Par conséquent, le grief vise la position de la SCS selon laquelle elle peut attribuer le [TRADUCTION] « travail restant » aux autres employés à temps partiel avant d’attribuer aux 16 titulaires de postes visés par les garanties le nombre minimum d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti par période de deux semaines, à condition de leur attribuer le nombre minimum d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti au cours d’une période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines. [4] Dit simplement, le protocole d’entente prévoit un nombre [TRADUCTION] « minimum » d’heures de travail [TRADUCTION] « par période de deux semaines » pour chacun des 16 postes indiqués.

Sept postes comportent un [TRADUCTION] « minimum de » 65 heures [TRADUCTION] « de travail par période de deux semaines », deux comportent un [TRADUCTION] « minimum de » 50 heures de travail, et sept comportent un [TRADUCTION] « minimum » de 45 heures de travail (protocole d’entente, par. 1 et 2).

Le protocole d’entende prévoit en outre ce qui suit : 1. les postes sont assujettis à une période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines et, si l’employé ne se voit pas attribuer le nombre minimum d’heures de travail qui lui est garanti (sans faute imputable à l’employé), il sera rémunéré pour ce nombre d’heures de travail (par. 3); 2. après que les [TRADUCTION] « titulaires de postes visés par les garanties se sont vu attribuer le nombre d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti », la SCS [TRADUCTION] « attribue le travail à effectuer restant » conformément aux dispositions de la convention collective (par. 4) (soulignement ajouté). [5] Essentiellement, la SCS fait valoir que la période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines, prévue au par. 3, a manifestement pour objet de régir ses obligations tant en matière d’établissement des horaires que de rémunération.

Le SCFP soutient qu’il n’est pas prévu que la période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines s’applique à l’obligation de la SCS d’attribuer le nombre minimum d’heures de travail par période de deux semaines avant d’attribuer tout travail à effectuer restant aux autres employés à temps partiel (comme le prévoient les par. 1, 2 et 4).

[6] L’arbitre qui a entendu le grief a fait deux déclarations concernant l’interprétation du protocole d’entente.

De manière conforme à l’interprétation commune avancée par le SCFP et la SCS, il a déclaré que, si un employé ne se voit pas attribuer le nombre minimum d’heures de travail qui lui est garanti au cours d’une période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines (sans faute imputable à l’employé), la SCS doit le rémunérer le nombre minimum d’heures de travail. [7] Deuxièmement, en ce qui concerne l’obligation contestée en matière d’établissement des horaires, l’arbitre a déclaré que les employés titulaires de postes visés par les garanties [TRADUCTION] « doivent se voir attribuer le nombre d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti par période de deux semaines avant que toute heure de travail à effectuer soit attribuée aux employés équivalents temps plein , à moins qu’il soit impossible de le faire pour des raisons opérationnelles » (soulignement ajouté).

Les employés équivalents temps plein sont les employés à temps partiel qui ne sont pas titulaires d’un des 16 postes visés par les garanties prévues dans le protocole d’entente. [8] La SCS a déposé devant la Cour du Banc du Roi une requête en révision judiciaire de la décision de l’arbitre par laquelle elle sollicitait l’annulation de la sentence arbitrale dans son ensemble.

Dans sa requête, la SCS soutient que l’arbitre a c ommis les erreurs de droit suivantes : (1) il a omis d’appliquer de façon raisonnable la règle du libellé clair dans son interprétation du protocole d’entente; (2) il a omis de tenir compte de la preuve extrinsèque, dont la preuve relative aux pratiques antérieures, pour l’aider à interpréter le protocole d’entente; et (3) subsidiairement, en concluant que le protocole d’entente ne comportait aucune ambiguïté, il aurait dû tenir compte des pratiques antérieures et le SCFP aurait dû être préclus de déposer un grief. [9] Le juge saisi de la requête a conclu que l’arbitre n’avait pas appliqué correctement la règle du libellé clair et, par conséquent, il a annulé la décision, qu’il a jugée déraisonnable, et ordonné la tenue d’une nouvelle audience. [10] Le SCFP a interjeté appel devant notre Cour.

Il soutient que le juge saisi de la requête a mal appliqué la norme de contrôle et omis de tenir compte de chacun des motifs énoncés par l’arbitre à l’appui de sa décision. [11] Je suis d’avis d’accueillir l’appel, d’annuler la décision du juge saisi de la requête et de rétablir la décision de l’arbitre pour les motifs qui suivent. II. Contexte [12] La SCS a été établie à la fin des années 1990 afin d’offrir des services de collecte de sang, services qui sont offerts dans toutes les provinces sauf le Québec. [13] Elle exerce ses activités au Nouveau-Brunswick depuis au moins l’an 1999.

Avant cette date, des services semblables étaient offerts dans la province par la Croix-Rouge canadienne. De nombreux employés de la Croix-Rouge se sont joints à la SCS lorsque cette dernière a commencé à exercer ses activités dans la province. On peut constater cette succession dans le protocole d’entente, qui fait référence à une lettre d’entente et à un mémoire d’entente qui ont été conclus en 1996.

Il ne ressort pas clairement du dossier si le protocole d’entente tire son origine de ces ententes ou s’il remonte à l’époque de la Croix-Rouge; toutefois, il a été reconnu que le protocole d’entente existe depuis au moins l’an 2000, sensiblement dans sa forme actuelle, sauf pour quelques modifications mineures apportées au cours des premières années. [14] À l’heure actuelle, la SCS dispose de centres de collecte permanents à Saint John et à Moncton.

Chaque semaine, le centre de Saint John collecte du sang total, du plasma et des plaquettes, et le centre de Moncton collecte du sang total. [15] La SCS organise aussi des collectes itinérantes à des sites temporaires un peu partout dans la province. Ces collectes sont gérées par le centre de Saint John, et une équipe d’employés voyage à partir de Saint John pour les assurer, habituellement pour une durée d’un à trois jours.

Cette équipe comprend des agents de collecte et des conducteurs. [16] Au moment de la tenue de l’audience d’arbitrage, 24 agents de collecte étaient employés par la SCS (17 à Saint John et sept à Moncton), desquels 12 à Saint John étaient titulaires de postes [TRADUCTION] « visés par les garanties » prévues dans le protocole d’entente (cinq avec 65 heures de travail par période de deux semaines et sept avec 45 heures de travail par période de deux semaines). Des sept conducteurs employés au Nouveau-Brunswick, quatre à Saint John étaient titulaires de

postes [TRADUCTION] « visés par les garanties » (deux avec 65 heures de travail par période de deux semaines et deux avec 50 heures de travail par période de deux semaines). A. Dispositions de la convention collective [17] Le protocole d’entente se rapporte à la convention collective qui était en vigueur de janvier 2016 à décembre 2018 (la convention collective). Il s’applique aux agents de collecte et aux conducteurs qui assurent les collectes. La SCS était

partie à d’autres conventions collectives s’appliquant à d’autres employés, et elle l’est toujours. [18] Les dispositions de la convention collective sont pertinentes lorsqu’il s’agit d’interpréter le protocole d’entente, et les dispositions clés ont été traitées par l’arbitre dans ses motifs de décision. [19] La convention collective définit quatre catégories d’employés : (1) [TRADUCTION] « employé à temps plein régulier »; (2) [TRADUCTION] « employé à l’essai »; (3) [TRADUCTION] « employé à temps partiel régulier »; (4) [TRADUCTION] « employé temporaire ». [20] L’employé à temps partiel régulier est défini de manière à le différencier de l’employé à temps plein régulier. [21] L’employé à temps plein régulier est un employé qui se voit régulièrement attribuer un minimum de 75 heures de travail par période de deux semaines et qui a été approuvé en vue d’un emploi permanent après avoir terminé une période d’essai.

La convention collective impose expressément à la SCS l’obligation de rémunérer l’employé à temps plein [TRADUCTION] « 75 heures de travail par période de deux semaines si, sans faute qui lui est imputable, il s’est vu attribuer moins de 75 heures de travail par période de deux semaines par [la SCS] » (par. 14.01c)).

Cette obligation est semblable à l’obligation de rémunérer l’employé le nombre d’heures de travail garanti prévue au par. 3 du protocole d’entente. [22] L’employé à temps partiel régulier est une personne [TRADUCTION] « qui se voit régulièrement attribuer moins d’heures de travail qu’un employé à temps plein régulier sur une base régulière et récurrente ». [23] L’article 6.06, intitulé [TRADUCTION] « ETP défini des employés à temps partiel réguliers », traite du nombre d’heures de travail des employés à temps partiel réguliers. Cet

article prévoit qu’ils [TRADUCTION] « se voient attribuer un équivalent temps plein (ETP) défini au moment de l’embauche ». Par exemple, l’employé à temps partiel qui se voit attribuer un ETP de 0,5 dispose de la moitié des 75 heures de travail régulièrement attribuées à l’employé à temps plein par période de deux semaines (soit 37,5 heures).

L’article 6.06 prévoit que [TRADUCTION] « la moyenne de l’ETP défini est calculée sur une période de six semaines » et que la SCS [TRADUCTION] « peut réduire l’ETP défini d’un employé à temps partiel régulier ». [24] En ce qui concerne l’établissement des horaires, le par. 6.06f) précise que, [TRADUCTION] « [a]près que tous les employés à temps partiel réguliers se sont vu attribuer les heures correspondant à leur ETP défini » (soulignement ajouté), les heures de travail additionnelles doivent être attribuées aux employés à temps partiel (1) en fonction de leur ancienneté (par. 14.01d)), et (2) sous réserve des critères énoncés aux al. 6.06f) i., ii., iii. et iv.

Par conséquent, une fois que les employés à temps partiel se sont vu [TRADUCTION] « attribuer les heures correspondant à leur ETP défini », les heures de travail additionnelles sont attribuées en fonction de l’ancienneté, sous réserve uniquement des critères énoncés au par. 6.06f). [25] Ces conditions et d’autres conditions concernant les équivalents temps plein sont énoncées à l’art. 6.06 : [TRADUCTION] […]

a) La moyenne de l’ETP défini est calculée sur une période de six semaines.

b) Le nombre de postes à temps plein réguliers et les ETP définis sont déterminés par [la SCS].

c) Tout congé payé ou non payé est compris dans l’ETP défini.

d) L’ETP défini des employés à temps partiel réguliers est indiqué dans leur lettre d’offre d’emploi.

e) Les employés à temps partiel réguliers doivent s’engager à être disponibles pour travailler selon l’horaire fixé par [la SCS], sauf disposition contraire de la convention collective.

f) Une fois que tous les employés à temps partiel réguliers se sont vu attribuer les heures correspondant à leur ETP défini , [la SCS] attribue le travail à effectuer restant entre les employés à temps partiel réguliers conformément au par. 14.01d) et selon la classification et le service, séparément pour chaque centre, sous réserve des critères suivants : i. la disponibilité, la formation, la qualification et l’aptitude de l’employé; ii. les autres employés à temps plein réguliers demeurent à jour et compétents; iii. le maintien d’un nombre minimum d’employés francophones dans les centres; iv. aucune heure supplémentaire n’est ainsi créée.

L’employé qui se voit attribuer des heures de travail qui sont incompatibles avec les heures d’un quart de travail à effectuer tel que décrit ci-dessus n’est pas considéré comme disponible pour les fins de l’alinéa 6.12f) i.

g) Malgré ce qui précède, [la SCS] peut réduire l’ETP défini d’un employé à temps partiel régulier et cette réduction se fait dans l’ordre inverse d’ancienneté , selon la classification dans le service touché, séparément pour chaque centre. […] [Soulignement et gras ajoutés.] [26] Les employés à temps partiel réguliers sont communément appelés des [TRADUCTION] « employés équivalents temps plein ».

En effet, c’est ainsi que l’arbitre les a appelés lorsqu’il a déclaré que les employés titulaires de postes visés par les garanties [TRADUCTION] « doivent se voir attribuer le nombre d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti par période de deux semaines avant que des heures de travail à effectuer soient attribuées aux employés équivalents temps plein ». [27] Finalement, l’art. 14.01, intitulé [TRADUCTION] « Heures de travail », traite de l’attribution des heures de travail pour tous les employés, y compris les employés à temps plein et à temps partiel (avec un ETP défini). C’est à cet

article que la question de l’ancienneté entre en jeu dans l’établissement des horaires : [TRADUCTION]

a) Le nombre d’heures de travail des employés à temps plein réguliers est de 75 heures réparties sur une période de deux semaines , à l’exclusion des pauses-repas non payées, mais y compris les périodes de repos.

b) Sauf indication contraire , les heures de travail des employés à temps partiel réguliers et des employés temporaires sont inférieures à celles des employés à temps plein réguliers. […]

c) L’employé à temps plein régulier est rémunéré 75 heures de travail par période de deux semaines si, sans faute qui lui est

imputable, il s’est vu attribuer moins de 75 heures de travail par période de deux semaines par [la SCS].

d) Les employés à temps partiel qualifiés et disponibles doivent se voir attribuer leur nombre d’heures de travail selon l’ancienneté dans leur classification , à condition que tous les employés autres que les employés à temps plein réguliers demeurent à jour et compétents et qu’aucune heure supplémentaire ne soit ainsi créée.

e) Aucun quart de travail de moins de quatre heures n’est attribué. [S oulignement et gras ajoutés.] B. Dispositions du protocole d’entente [28] Le protocole d’entente est appelé [TRADUCTION] « PROTOCOLE D’ENTENTE – OBJET : POSTES » dans la table des matières de la convention collective (à la page 50). Le protocole d’entente (ou, plus précisément, un autre protocole d’entente aux clauses identiques) était appelé [TRADUCTION] « PROTOCOLE D’ENTENTE – OBJET : HEURES DE TRAVAIL GARANTIES POUR LES EMPLOYÉS À TEMPS PARTIEL » dans la convention collective antérieure (en vigueur de janvier 2012 à décembre 2015).

Cette modification peut avoir été apportée dans le but de reconnaître la décision d’un arbitre rendue en 2014, décision sur laquelle nous reviendrons ci-après. [29] Avant de traiter du protocole d’entente, je devrais mentionner qu’il ne s’agit pas du seul document énoncé dans la table des matières de la convention collective qui s’applique aux employés à temps partiel assurant les collectes de sang.

Il y a aussi une lettre d’entente dans laquelle la SCS s’engage à l’égard de certains conducteurs et de leurs horaires de travail : [TRADUCTION] Attendu que les parties ont reconnu le besoin d’ajouter des postes de conducteur pour le point de service satellite de Moncton, l’employeur convient qu’aucun conducteur de Saint John ne sera licencié ou verra sa paie ou ses heures de travail réduites en raison de l’affectation par l’employeur de conducteurs dans le point de service satellite de Moncton.

On ne doit pas avoir recours à un conducteur de Saint John si cette affectation entraîne des heures supplémentaires et qu’un conducteur de Moncton est disponible pour travailler à temps normal. [30] Finalement, voici le libellé complet du protocole d’entente : [TRADUCTION] Les parties, la Société canadienne du sang, centre du Nouveau-Brunswick, Saint John, Nouveau-Brunswick, ci-après l’employeur, et le SCFP,

section locale 1655, ci-après le syndicat, conviennent de ce qui suit : 1. La Société canadienne du sang a affiché cinq postes d’aide de collecte à temps partiel et deux postes de conducteur à temps partiel, comportant chacun un minimum de 65 heures de travail par période de deux semaines , y compris toute heure normale de travail et toute heure de travail à taux majoré qui n’est pas par ailleurs exclue de la convention collective. 2.

Ont été affichés sept postes d’aide de collecte à temps partiel comportant un minimum de 45 heures de travail par période de deux semaines et deux postes de conducteur comportant un minimum de 50 heures de travail par période de deux semaines , y compris toute heure normale de travail et toute heure de travail à taux majoré qui n’est pas par ailleurs exclue de la convention collective[.] 3. Tous les postes à temps partiel visés par les garanties sont assujettis à une période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines.

Les employés qui pourvoient ces postes seront rémunérés le nombre d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti si, sans faute qui leur est imputable, ils se sont vu attribuer par l’employeur un nombre d’heures de travail inférieur au nombre d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti.

4. Une fois que tous les employés titulaires de postes visés par les garanties se sont vu attribuer le nombre d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti, l’employeur attribue le travail à effectuer restant conformément à l’article 14.01 et au paragraphe 6.12f). 5. Tous les employés temporaires qui, en date du 10 juillet 2000, n’ont pas réussi à obtenir un poste à temps partiel comportant un nombre minimum d’heures de travail garanti se sont vu offrir le statut d’employé à temps partiel, sans heures de travail garanties. 6.

Les employés qui ont accepté des postes à temps partiel comprennent et conviennent qu’ils sont tenus d’effectuer les heures de travail qui leur sont attribuées, sous réserve de demandes de modification raisonnables approuvées par la directrice des services de la gestion des collectes. En ce qui concerne les employées à temps partiel avec des heures de travail garanties, toute modification ci- visée entraînant une réduction de leur nombre d’heures de travail aura pour effet d’annuler la garantie relative à la période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines. 7.

Les employés qui n’ont pas posé leur candidature à des postes visés par les garanties et qui possèdent plus d’ancienneté que ceux qui ont posé leur candidature verront leurs heures de travail réduites, et la lettre d’entente datée du 5 juillet 1996 ainsi que le mémoire d’entente (paragraphe 4) daté du 6 décembre 1996 ne s’appliqueront pas. [Soulignement et gras ajoutés.] C. Décision arbitrale de 2014 concernant le protocole d’entente [31] La décision de l’arbitre qui fait l’objet du présent appel n’est pas la première décision à trancher un grief déposé par le SCFP concernant le protocole d’entente.

En 2014, un autre arbitre a rejeté l’opinion de la SCS selon laquelle le protocole d’entente s’appliquait précisément aux employés titulaires des 16 postes indiqués et non aux postes en soi. La SCS avait soutenu qu’elle n’était pas tenue de pourvoir un poste devenu vacant. L’arbitre a retenu l’opinion du SCFP selon laquelle le protocole d’entente garantissait un nombre fixe de postes et que, si un poste devenait vacant, il devait être pourvu. [32] La décision de 2014 est soulevée pour deux raisons.

Premièrement, l’arbitre y a fait référence dans ses motifs de décision dans la présente affaire, y compris dans ses observations formulées à l’égard de la corrélation entre les clauses du protocole d’entente et celles de la convention collective alors en vigueur. Deuxièmement, la SCS a prétendu, devant le juge saisi de la requête, que l’examen par l’arbitre de la décision de 2014 n’était pas pertinent lorsqu’il s’agit d’interpréter le protocole d’entente.

Le juge saisi de la requête a souscrit à sa prétention; il a conclu que l’examen par l’arbitre de la décision était [TRADUCTION] « inutile et une distraction », laissant entendre que cet examen avait contribué à faire de sa décision une décision déraisonnable. D. Arbitrage du grief [33] L’arbitre était saisi de deux griefs. Le premier, déposé par le SCFP en mars 2020, allègue que [TRADUCTION] « les garanties [d’attribution d’un nombre minimum d’heures de travail] par période de deux semaines qui sont clairement prévues dans le protocole d’entente ne sont pas respectées ».

Le deuxième, déposé par le SCFP et un employé, allègue que la SCS [TRADUCTION] « a violé les paragraphes 6.06f) et 14.01d) ainsi que le protocole d’entente se trouvant à la page 50 de la convention collective relativement à l’attribution des heures de travail en fonction de l’ancienneté ». [34] L’audition des deux griefs a duré quatre jours. Les motifs de décision de l’arbitre traitent des deux griefs séparément. Bien qu’ils n’aient pas été fusionnés dans ces motifs, les deux griefs exigeaient l’examen d’essentiellement les mêmes dispositions de la convention collective et du protocole d’entente.

Il y a lieu de garder ce fait à l’esprit lors de la lecture des motifs de décision de l’arbitre à la lumière des questions réelles, de la preuve et des mémoires des parties. [35] L’arbitre a rejeté le deuxième grief, déclarant que [TRADUCTION] « [l]e simple fait que des heures de travail étaient attribuées à des employés ayant moins d’ancienneté ne permet pas de » s’acquitter du fardeau requis pour prouver la perte d’heures de travail alléguée.

Cette décision n’est pas contestée. [36] En réponse au grief voulant que le protocole d’entente imposât à la SCS l’obligation d’attribuer tout travail à effectuer aux employés titulaires de postes visés par les garanties par période de deux semaines avant d’attribuer tout travail

restant aux employés équivalents temps plein, l’arbitre a déclaré ce qui suit dans ses motifs de décision : [TRADUCTION] Comme nous le savons tous, la règle fondamentale régissant l’interprétation d’une convention collective veut que les intentions des parties se trouvent habituellement dans le sens ordinaire des mots qu’elles ont employés.

En l’espèce, pour les motifs qui suivent, le sens ordinaire du libellé clair employé par les parties favorise l’interprétation par le syndicat du protocole d’entente selon laquelle les heures de travail garanties doivent être attribuées par période de deux semaines et que la période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines n’entre en jeu que lorsque l’employeur, pour des raisons opérationnelles, n’est pas en mesure d’attribuer le nombre d’heures de travail garanti par période de deux semaines .

Constituent des raisons opérationnelles notamment le manque d’heures de travail en raison de l’annulation de collectes, le fait qu’un employé ne possède pas les qualifications nécessaires ou le besoin d’assurer la présence d’employés bilingues. Elles peuvent aussi comprendre les restrictions relatives à l’établissement des horaires qui sont énoncées à l’article 14.02 de la convention collective.

En d’autres mots, si les heures de travail doivent être effectuées pendant une période de deux semaines, l’employeur doit, à moins qu’il soit impossible de le faire pour des raisons opérationnelles, attribuer le nombre d’heures de travail garanti par période de deux semaines. [...] Par conséquent, mon interprétation du protocole d’entente est la suivante : les employés ayant des heures de travail garanties, tel qu’il est prévu aux paragraphes 1 et 2 du protocole d’entente, doivent se voir attribuer le nombre d’heures de travail qui leur est garanti par période de deux semaines avant que des heures de travail soient attribuées aux employés équivalents temps plein, à moins qu’il soit impossible de le faire pour des raisons opérationnelles.

Toutefois, l’employeur sera tenu de rémunérer l’employé le nombre d’heures de travail qui lui est garanti si, sans faute imputable à l’employé, il n’a pas été en mesure de lui attribuer ce nombre d’heures de travail au cours d’une période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines. [Soulignement et gras ajoutés; par. 55 à 59] E.

Révision judiciaire – Contestation par la SCS de la décision de l’arbitre [37] Dans sa requête en révision judiciaire, la SCS soutient que l’arbitre a commis les erreurs de droit suivantes : 1. il a omis d’appliquer de façon raisonnable la règle du libellé clair dans son interprétation des dispositions du protocole d’entente relatives aux heures de travail garanties; 2. il a omis de tenir compte de la preuve extrinsèque pour l’aider à interpréter les dispositions du protocole d’entente relatives aux heures de travail garanties; 3. subsidiairement, en concluant que les dispositions du protocole d’entente relatives aux heures de travail garanties ne comportaient aucune ambiguïté, il aurait dû tenir compte des pratiques antérieures et le SCFP aurait dû être préclus de déposer un grief. [38] Le juge saisi de la requête a retenu la prétention de la SCS selon laquelle l’arbitre n’a pas appliqué correctement la règle du libellé clair et a de ce fait rendu une décision déraisonnable : [TRADUCTION] La requérante fait valoir que, tout comme dans l’affaire Syndicat canadien de la fonction publique,

section locale 79, lorsque les dispositions relatives aux heures de travail garanties sont interprétées dans leur ensemble, le paragraphe 3 du protocole d’entente aide à interpréter les paragraphes 1 et 2 et permet de conclure que la moyenne des heures de travail garanties par période de deux semaines est calculée sur une période de six semaines.

La requérante soutient qu’il ressort clairement du protocole d’entente que les paragraphes 1 et 2 sont nuancés par le paragraphe 3 et, par conséquent, les heures de travail garanties par période de deux semaines sont assujetties à cette période de calcul de la moyenne de six semaines. En outre, elle soutient que le paragraphe 4 explique la façon dont les heures de travail restantes, en sus du nombre d’heures de travail garanti aux employés titulaires de postes visés par les garanties, sont par la suite attribuées, puisque le paragraphe 4 est aussi nuancé et se rapporte aux trois paragraphes précédents.

La requérante souligne à juste

titre que, en ce qui concerne les dispositions relatives aux heures de travail garanties contenues dans uneconvention collective, le conseil d’arbitrage dans Saskatchewan (Government) c.

Saskatchewan Government Employees’ Union, (SK LA), a confirmé que, bien que ces formes de garanties puissent exister dans des conventions collectives, lesdispositions doivent être explicites[.] […] À mon avis, au regard de la nécessité jurisprudentielle à ce que les dispositions relatives aux heures de travail garanties soientexplicites et claires, [l’arbitre] était tenu d’interpréter les dispositions du protocole d’entente relatives aux heures de travailgaranties dans leur ensemble.

À mon avis, [l’arbitre] était tenu d’interpréter les paragraphes 1 et 2 du protocole d’entente de concertavec le paragraphe 3 pour parvenir à une interprétation raisonnable. À mon avis, interprétées dans leur ensemble, les garanties[d’attribution d’un nombre minimum d’heures de travail] par période de deux semaines accordées aux employés par lesparagraphes 1 et 2 sont expressément nuancées par le libellé clair du paragraphe 3, de sorte que la période de calcul de lamoyenne de six semaines s’applique à tous les postes visés par les garanties.

En outre, le paragraphe 4 du protocole d’ententeexplique la façon dont les heures de travail restantes, en sus du nombre d’heures de travail garanti aux employés titulaires depostes visés par les garanties, sont par la suite attribuées, puisque le p

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