B.F. v. J.A.L.F., 2019 BCPC 240

Citation: B.F. v. J.A.L.F. 2019 BCPC 240 Date: 20190930 File No: 16903 Registry: [omitted for publication] IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: B.F. APPLICANT AND: J.A.L.F. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE S.D. FRAME Counsel for the Applicant: D. Komori Counsel for the Respondent: J. Grover Counsel for the Ministry of Child, Youth and Mental Health: C. Le Beau Place of Hearing: [omitted for publication] , B.C. Date of Hearing: July 30, 2019 Date of Judgment: September 30, 2019

[1] There are three applications before me filed by B.F. The first is for disclosure of the Michael Koehn, Mindteams Solutions Inc.,Mental Health Services records respecting J.A.L.F. The second application is for the records of Dr. Edit Pusztai, also relating to J.A.L.F.as well as clinical records J.A.L.F. has in her possession. He seeks, in that case, all consultation reports and clinical records for the pastseven years. [2] The third application is with respect to the Child and Youth Mental Health records for T.R.F., the biological son of the parties,born [omitted for publication].

The application originally included the records of their daughter S.F. as well but that is abandoned. [3] B.F. requires these records in one instance to address J.A.L.F.’s outstanding claim for spousal support and to challenge herparenting capacity; and in the other instance to meet the allegations arising from parenting issues and parenting time with respect toT.R.F. [4] J.A.L.F. opposes the production of these records because of the context of these proceedings, not the least of which was a four-day hearing where she sought a production order in 2018, culminating in my Reasons for Judgment of January 2019.

J.A.L.F. says thatB.F. has been abusive of her privacy rights and would publicly disclose these records if they were provided to him. Additionally, sheclaims a right to privacy over her counselling records. J.A.L.F. sees these applications as another attempt to manipulate and control hergiven the history of abuse and domestic violence that she has alleged. [5] There are two prior consent orders for police and the Ministry of Child and Family Development records which she believesprovide adequate disclosure to B.F. Finally, Mr. Grover argued that J.A.L.F. has not yet set any hearing for her spousal claim.

There is aconcurrent Supreme Court proceeding underway. While J.A.L.F. is not prepared to abandon the provincial court application for spousalsupport, she has no current intentions of setting it for hearing. [6] T.R.F. was not served with this application and presumably does not know that it is being heard. His counselling records areintensely private but the only voice for him before me is that of Ms. Egyed, through Ms. Le Beau. Ms.

Egyed is with the Ministry ofChild and Youth Mental Health. [7] The Ministry of Child and Youth Mental Health is opposed to the production of these records because B.F. is not prepared touse them in the best interests of T.R.F. He has misused private information previously, including that of his older daughter S.F., and has ahistory of publicly posting personal information regarding J.A.L.F. While Ms. Le Beau acknowledged that these records might berelevant to parenting time and that Ms.

Egyed has testified T.R.F. told her things that would not support B.F. in his quest for parentingtime, she submits that the information can be provided to court without the disclosure of T.R.F.’s records. She argued that T.R.F. has aright and expectation of privacy of his records and the harm caused by the disclosure of those records would exceed any relevance to theproceedings. [8] Both Mr. Grover and Ms. Le Beau argued that B.F. brings these applications from a parent-focused rather than child-focusedapproach to this proceeding. THE LAW [9] Mr. Komori provided the decision of A.M. v.

Ryan, (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R. 157, which dealt with theproduction of medical records for damages in a civil suit by a sexual assault plaintiff. The Supreme Court of Canada adopted theWigmore test which factors are as follows:

a) The communication must originate in a confidence that they will not be disclosed;

b) The element of confidentiality must be essential to the full and satisfactory maintenance of the relation between the parties;

c) The relation must be one which in the opinion of the community ought to be sedulously fostered; and

d) The injury that would inure to the relation by the disclosure of the communications must be greater than the benefit therebygained for the correct disposal of the action. [10] The Supreme Court of Canada also found at paragraph 30: [30] As noted, the common law must develop in a way that reflects emerging Charter values. It follows that the factors balancedunder the fourth part of the test for privilege should be updated to reflect relevant Charter values. One such value is the interest affirmedby s. 8 of the Charter of each person in privacy.

Another is the right of every person embodied in s. 15 of the Charter to equal treatmentand benefit of the law. A rule of privilege which fails to protect confidential doctor/patient communications in the context of an actionarising out of sexual assault perpetuates the disadvantage felt by victims of sexual assault, often women. The intimate nature of sexualassault heightens the privacy concerns of the victim and may increase, if automatic disclosure is the rule, the difficulty of obtainingredress for the wrong.

The victim of a sexual assault is thus placed in a disadvantaged position as compared with the victim of a differentwrong. The result may be that the victim of sexual assault does not obtain the equal benefit of the law to which s. 15 of the Charterentitles her. She is doubly victimized, initially by the sexual assault and later by the price she must pay to claim redress -- redress whichin some cases may be part of her program of therapy.

These are factors which may properly be considered in determining the interestsserved by an order for protection from disclosure of confidential patient-psychiatrist communications in sexual assault cases. [11] The same can be said for circumstances such as family law proceedings where domestic violence is alleged. The balance in suchfamily law cases must be between the privacy interest and the interest in full disclosure to ensure the protection of the best interests ofthe children.

Just as in a sexual assault case, domestic violence cases also doubly victimize a victim or alleged victim where where thevictim claims redress. Just as in Ryan, these are factors properly considered in determining those interests served by protectingconfidential patient/psychiatrist or counsellor communications in domestic violence cases.

[12] Mr. Grover does not dispute that Ryan is the applicable test but has also provided me with Gorse v. Straker, 2010 BCSC 119, 2010 B.C.S.C. 119, H.V.G. v. L.E.T., 2017 BCSC 791 , 2017 B.C.S.C. 791, Kalsi v. Kalsi, 2009 BCSC 513 ,2009 B.C.S.C. 513, and L.C.T. v. R.K., 2013 BCSC 1437 , 2013 B.C.S.C. 1437. The Gorse decision, which was a motor vehicleaccident claim where medical records were sought, considered Halliday and Jones orders.

It stands for the well-established propositionthat there is no obligation on a third party to produce irrelevant documents in a proceeding, and therefore the assessment must begin witha review of the pleadings to determine what is in issue. Providing that the production sought is relevant, the court then must determinewhether a Jones order will result in inappropriate production and disclosure of irrelevant or privileged documents, or whether a Hallidayorder is required.

It is clear that the applicant seeking the production must satisfy the court that the documents are not for a fishingexpedition but actually relate to a matter in issue; and that they are not for an improper purpose. [13] H.V.G. v. L.E.T. was a case involving imputation of income. Amongst the other documents sought, the claimant wanted thecomplete and unredacted medical records from the respondent’s psychiatrist. The respondent had reduced his workload in the previousyear which would impact spousal and child support.

The parties had been separated for approximately two years when the respondenthad been advised to reduce his workload. However, he had been in a therapeutic relationship with his psychiatrist for approximately 10years. The respondent claimed the records were not relevant and were privileged. [14] The respondent had sought an additional expert opinion which he relied upon and said the disclosure made through thatadditional report was sufficient disclosure. The court found a nexus between the respondent’s historic depression and his present inabilityto work full time.

The court also found that there were factors related to his condition and his ability to parent that had to be taken intoconsideration in the best interests of the children. [15] Having determined that the psychiatric records should be produced to some extent, the court then determined that what wasrelevant for disclosure were the conclusions reached, the treatment recommendations and whether those recommendations werecomplied with. In other words, none of the discussions between psychiatrists and the respondent were subject to disclosure.

The courtalso concluded that there was no need for the disclosure to go back to the inception of the psychiatric relationship and limited productionto the two years prior to separation. The order ultimately made was for disclosure of the records in the specified time frame to counselfor the respondent who was then to redact everything that did not contain a conclusion, recommendation for treatment, or notations withrespect to compliance with treatment recommendations.

In other words, the relevance component was tightly contained to diagnosis,prognosis, treatment and compliance. [16] Kalsi was a matrimonial dispute where Mr. Kalsi sought the medical records of Mrs. Kalsi on the basis that he claimed Mrs.Kalsi was emotionally unstable and incapable of looking after the children. On the other hand, Mr. Kalsi had no difficulty with Mrs.Kalsi being a full time parent of their shared children in all the years of their marriage until he learned of her infidelity. The court foundno benefit to invading her privacy or to open her medical records to Mr. Kalsi. In that case, Ms.

Kalsi was not alleging that she wasincapable of working or that she had any health condition that would render her incapable of working. In the end result, the courtquestioned Mr. Kalsi’s motive in requiring production of those documents and declined to produce them. J.A.L.F. has voiced the sameconcern with respect to production of both her records and those of T.R.F. She too has had the care of the children during the relationshipand after it ended, as well. [17] In L.C.T. v.

R.K., the applicant mother sought production of numerous records including all records of every counsellor,therapist, psychiatrist or psychologist whom the father had communicated with in the past 10 years as well as any journals, notes anddiaries that the respondent father had made, among several other documents sought. There were allegations of sexualisation in thebehaviour of the children made by the mother. There were also disclosures made by the oldest daughter concerning the father.

Findingthat the application for production of these records was based on sparse evidence and would intrude into an intensely private domain, thecourt declined to order production of the records. [18] In a case such as this, to the extent that records are to be produced, it must be in a Halliday order. In other words, the documentswould first go to Mr. Grover to assess for disclosure of only those documents which are relevant to the proceedings. Mr.

Grover wouldthen redact everything from those records that does not contain the conclusion or diagnosis, recommendation for treatment or notationswith respect to compliance with those recommendations. The first question, though, is whether they ought to be produced at all. BACKGROUND [19] As I have indicated, the Ministry of Child and Family Development has been involved with this family due to allegations ofdomestic violence. The children have either seen, heard or been exposed to this violence. The police have also been involved.

Therecords of Ministry of Child and Family Development, as well as the police records have been disclosed pursuant to consent orders. [20] The family was referred to Child and Youth Mental Health because of the domestic violence. Ms. Egyed commenced workingwith the parents and completed a comprehensive report on the functioning of the family. [21] At the hearing that commenced in July 2018 for the protection order, B.F. made allegations about J.A.L.F.’s mental healthissues which were not substantiated. He also alleged that she had suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of some caraccidents.

This is conceded by J.A.L.F. This occurred during the course of their relationship and poses no surprise to B.F. [22] B.F. has alleged deeper more concerning mental health problems which J.A.L.F. met with a report debunking his theories. Theevidence at the protection hearing also did not support his allegations. In my decision, I found that B.F. was attempting to cast J.A.L.F. ina negative and unbalanced light to further advance his manipulation and control of her as well as the proceedings.

This relates to thebalance of injury and relevance as well as the issue of improper purpose. [23] It should be noted the outcome of the hearing before me was a protection order with respect to S.F.; a conduct order withrespect to J.A.L.F. and B.F.; and restricted parenting time to T.R.F. for B.F. [24] Apart from those orders, I ordered that B.F. enrol in parenting counselling and provide confirmation of attendance to the courtnot later than May 31, 2019. I also ordered that B.F. attend a mental health assessment before any further parenting time of T.R.F. or any

review of the protection order with S.F. may be revisited. [ 25 ] In May 2019, Mr. Komori filed confirmation that B.F. was enrolled in Mind Over Madder. B.F. also testified that he has taken more than one parenting course since that decision. Evidence was not provided and would be relevant to setting any further hearings for parenting time. Finally, B.F. said that he has an appointment to see a mental health professional in September.

This was after he gave fairly evasive evidence about his attempts to see a medical health professional, but his doctor declined to make such a referral. [ 26 ] The first three tests set out in Ryan are easily met in this case. It is the fourth, being whether the disclosure of the communications is a greater benefit than the injury that would follow from such a disclosure. First there is the issue of relevance. [ 27 ] J.A.L.F. does seek spousal support in her pleadings but has not set it for trial or for an interim application.

Arguably, if the issue of spousal support were set for trial or for a hearing for a final order on spousal support, the issue of J.A.L.F.’s ability to work is relevant; but that would not necessarily lead to production of her records. [ 28 ] Both parties have made allegations about the parenting capacity of the other parent. Given the nature of the allegations between the parties, J.A.L.F.’s records relating to her parenting capacity would be relevant. [ 29 ] B.F. is seeking greater parenting time with T.R.F.

His main concern that he as a parent be aware of T.R.F.’s mental health diagnosis falls under the heading of parenting responsibilities which flow from the parenting rights and obligations these parties are seeking. Arguably, the documents sought may be relevant. [ 30 ] Based on the issues that are before the court on the pleadings, it is arguable that the documents sought are relevant. The issue to be considered then is whether the injury to the relationship would be greater than the prejudice if the documents are not disclosed.

MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS OF J.A.L.F. [ 31 ] As I said, J.A.L.F. has an application for spousal support before the court. However, it has not been set for hearing. Furthermore, there is a Supreme Court proceeding with respect to the division of their assets and presumably resolution of their debts. It is often the case that spousal support is addressed in the division of assets. That would not be within the purview of this court. [ 32 ] B.F. would like to see all of the issues before the Supreme Court but J.A.L.F. has opposed moving spousal support issues to that court.

So long as spousal support is sought in the Provincial Court, it is within the jurisdiction of the Provincial Court to address a final order. That, though, would be counterproductive to a resolution of the Supreme Court proceedings. It may also be subsumed by any resolution in the Supreme Court. [ 33 ] Any interim hearing would be appropriate in Provincial Court to address spousal support pending the outcome of the Supreme Court proceedings. That is particularly so until someone has made an application to have all matters heard in the Supreme Court and that application has been determined.

If an interim order is sought, it will be in the nature of rough justice and will not be meant to address all of the long term and encompassing issues between the parties. The court will not delve into whether or not there is a future capacity to work and will not make findings about the current capacity to work in a way that would bind the hands of the trial judge. It would not be appropriate to order production of these records in that context. [ 34 ] Disclosure of the mental health records would not be necessary for an interim order for spousal support.

I am not satisfied that the issue of spousal support is appropriate for the Provincial Court in this case. The parties will have to make a firm and committed decision or application to the court before it is appropriate to disclose any records relating to a final order for spousal support. [ 35 ] B.F. argues that the documents requested are relevant not only to an issue of spousal support but to J.A.L.F.’s parenting capacity. He argued that because J.A.L.F. disclosed parts of her psychiatric report, she has waived privilege. [ 36 ] J.A.L.F. opposes production of her records from Mr.

Koehn at Mindsteams Solutions Inc. and from Dr. Pusztai because of the harm it will do to her relationship with each of those mental health care providers. J.A.L.F. argued that clinical and counselling records are not produced or producible as a matter of right whether they are in her possession or not. Her privacy concerns must be protected in order to protect those relationships. [ 37 ] In addition, she argued that B.F. is seeking records back to 2012. It is too far-reaching given that they lived together until 2017.

Furthermore, it is not disputed that J.A.L.F. suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result of accidents that occurred during the course of their relationship. [ 38 ] The police and the Ministry of Child and Family Development records have already been produced. No s. 211 report for parenting capacity has been sought by B.F. (nor by J.A.L.F.) and the children have been in J.A.L.F.’s care since the cohabitation ended in 2017. [ 39 ] J.A.L.F. said that she did not know if she could continue with her counselling if B.F. had access to her records.

She was in three accidents, an abusive relationship, and required the assistance of the Ministry of Child and Family Development to get her to a safe place. Mr. Grover argued that B.F. should not be able to control and victimize J.A.L.F. any longer. [ 40 ] Additionally, B.F. cannot be trusted with private and personal information even though disclosure is bound by litigation privilege and cannot be shared with anyone beyond his own counsel. For instance, B.F. posted on social medial for all to see that J.A.L.F. had vomited at a social engagement at their home.

He argued that it was a call for help and did not say she was the one who vomited. This was neither entirely truthful nor an adequate explanation. J.A.L.F. said that the vomiting was a result of her stress over the party but that is certainly not the impression that B.F. left. Even if he were believed that he posted the incident on social media to get assistance in clean up, demonstrates that he was more interested in attracting attention to his plight than he was in assisting his partner through her difficulty.

While the initial post by B.F. does not specifically blame J.A.L.F. for the vomit, the persistent posts that followed and the innuendo contained in all of them reveal an absence of discretion or empathy.

[ 41 ] B.F. also claimed that disclosing J.A.L.F.’s PTSD on social media was not violating her privacy. He claimed she was very open about it. What he does not appreciate is that it is her condition, her personal information and her privacy. It is not his to share as he pleases but to share only with her express permission. [ 42 ] Mr. Grover argued that confidentiality is at the heart of counselling. J.A.L.F. is not only concerned that her privacy would be invaded but that B.F. would use the information to further badger her.

She is also concerned that he would broadcast the information to his family, the community and the public. Her experience with him doing so includes broadcasting to those same parties the information regarding her prior miscarriages as well as her PTSD. [ 43 ] Ms. Le Beau also argued that B.F. has also posted personal information about J.A.L.F.’s post-traumatic stress disorder. While Ms.

Le Beau was making submissions with respect to the production of T.R.F.’s records, this is an important consideration in determining whether J.A.L.F.’s records ought to be disclosed. [ 44 ] Much of the information B.F. seeks in order to address parenting capacity can be met with a s. 211 report. It would have to be a full capacity report. That full capacity report could disclose to any assigned trial judge dealing with the final issue of parenting capacity whether it is necessary to produce J.A.L.F.’s mental health records. [ 45 ] The children have been residing with J.A.L.F. since the separation.

They have been under the review of the Ministry of Child and Family Development. Disclosure of police and MCFD records have been made. The balance between relevant disclosure and privacy is tipped very heavily in the favour of privacy, particularly given the history of these parties. [ 46 ] The allegations in this case of abuse, manipulation and control are profound. While parenting capacity and spousal support are very much in issue, there are a number of other sources available that would not result in violating the deepest confidence J.A.L.F. has with Michael Koehn and Dr. Pusztai.

She is on Persons with Disability and had to complete forms with Dr. Pusztai. She has also attached to her affidavit filed in these proceedings a note from Dr. Pustzai addressing B.F.’s unfounded allegation that she suffers from a multiple personality disorder. That evidence is available to B.F. Ms.

Egyed has prepared a report on her assessment of the family which is also evidence available to B.F. [ 47 ] There is evidence that B.F. seeks these records for an improper purpose and very significant evidence that he will abuse the information he receives. [ 48 ] Even if either of the parties set the issue of spousal support for final determination in this court, there has been more than adequate evidence produced regarding J.A.L.F.’s mental health. A parenting capacity report is more appropriate to addressing the outstanding capacity issues of each of the parties.

Even in the context of a final order for spousal support, ordering production of J.A.L.F.’s mental health records would so seriously damage her relationship not only with Dr. Pusztai and with Mr. Koehn that it cannot tip the balance in favour of disclosure to B.F. I dismiss his applications with respect to all of J.A.L.F.’s records. MENTAL HEALTH RECORDS OF T.R.F. [ 49 ] B.F. testified that he needed the records of his son’s mental health clinicians for two purposes. One is that as a concerned parent he needs to know the diagnosis of his child. This was thoroughly challenged by B.F.’s response to Ms.

Le Beau in cross examination when she asked whether he would pursue this application if he knew it would cause emotional harm to T.R.F. B.F.’s response was that he would not withdraw the application even if he knew that to be the case. [ 50 ] He is also seeking greater parenting time with T.R.F. He believes these records are necessary to advance that case. [ 51 ] Dr. Locke has already prepared a report with respect to T.R.F. and B.F. has that report. [ 52 ] Ms. Egyed gave evidence regarding the difficulty she had in coaxing T.R.F. to talk about his difficulties.

She opposed the production of his mental health records not only because of their sensitive and confidential nature but because of the troubling circumstances of this family. [ 53 ] When Ms. Egyed began seeing T.R.F. individually, she assured him that his records were confidential but that the parties might make an application to court for production of those records. She promised him that she would do her best to protect his confidentiality. [ 54 ] Ms. Egyed described T.R.F. as being in such distress that it was difficult to treat him.

Over time, she built rapport with him to the point that he could tell her what was bothering him at home, with his parents, at school and with his friends. She described him as kind, sensitive, inquisitive and curious. He experiences deep emotions and is confused and overwhelmed when he experiences those emotions. Ms. Egyed said he needs safety, stability and security to sift through, name and express what he is feeling. [ 55 ] Ms. Egyed has described periods of time when T.R.F. has been wetting and soiling his bed, incidents at school and daycare, and incidents of self-harm.

He has described to her that he wants to kill himself and that he thinks daily about dying. This latter issue has abated over the last sessions she has had with him. It remains concerning as do his ongoing behaviours. [ 56 ] T.R.F. has expressed to Ms. Egyed that he also does not know which of his parents to believe because he does not know who is telling the truth and he does not want to be in the middle. Ms.

Egyed is particularly concerned that if these records are disclosed, T.R.F. will realize his relationship with her is no longer private and he will “completely shut down”. [ 57 ] T.R.F. has insisted on bringing his mother into some of his sessions. Ms. Egyed suggested to him he might want to share with his father like he does with his mother. He has refused to have his father come to the sessions or share information with him. He has also refused to let Ms. Egyed share information with B.F.

T.R.F. has expressed to her that he is concerned that if his dad does learn what is discussed, he will question T.R.F. about it. [ 58 ] Ms. Egyed said that T.R.F. tells her his father talks about matters concerning the court case. He has made disparaging remarks

about J.A.L.F. On the other hand, his mother will not talk to him about the court case. T.R.F. has come to the sessions explaining to Ms. Egyed that he is very worried and anxious. He will come home from visits with his father and cry for hours, is inconsolable or withdrawn. [ 59 ] Ms. Egyed is also concerned that B.F. will use T.R.F.’s private information publicly. She cites the issue with S.F.’s journal as an example. B.F. has insisted that this was not a journal. However, the concerning component is that he scanned copies of the journal entries and sent them to Ms.

Egyed, to a social worker and to a supervisor. S.F. was aware that he had the journal entries, said that they were dated, asked him not to hand out the information and asked that he return the entries to her. He went against her wishes and shared those very private entries and then refused to return his copies to her. [ 60 ] Ms. Egyed said that B.F. has also demonstrated that he perseverates and exaggerates information to pursue his personal agenda. She cited the first session she had with him where he only talked about J.A.L.F. and her very personal information for two hours.

The session was supposed to be about B.F. Ms. Egyed found this concerning. She also described that B.F. can hold the child’s views and needs central for a short time but, as soon as he is triggered, goes off on a tangent focusing on what he believes actually happened as opposed to how his child experienced that moment. [ 61 ] Ms. Egyed is also concerned that B.F. diagnoses without expertise or support. Examples of this are found in his diagnosis of J.A.L.F. having a multiple personality disorder. He also told Ms. Egyed that S.F. is psychotic, bipolar, and has schizophrenia.

He has also determined that T.R.F. has autism. It is a fact that T.R.F. is being assessed to determine if he is on the spectrum, but he has not yet received any such diagnosis. [ 62 ] I agree with Ms. Le Beau that B.F. is not prepared to act in the best interests of his child and puts his interests first. That, I agree, is determinative of this question. His misuse of sensitive, personal information of other members of his family in the past strongly suggests he would misuse this information. He would at least question the veracity of the information and would question T.R.F. about it.

T.R.F. has already expressed this concern. [ 63 ] T.R.F. is a complex child with many concerning symptoms. It is important that his privacy concerns be protected. The mental health records of a child do not belong to the parties. They belong to the child. They should only be disclosed where it is in the best interests of the child to do so. They should not be disclosed only or mostly so that one party gain any advantage over the other. [ 64 ] The mental health records of a child enjoy the same confidentiality and privilege as the mental health records of an adult.

There are obviously exceptions both in child protection cases and family law cases. Those exceptions are typically found in the original referral for the mental health assessment or treatment and the purposes behind that referral. For instance, a child may be referred for a mental health assessment in the context of a child protection proceeding. In those cases, it should be made clear to the child that the assessment and what is discussed in the sessions are for use in court.

The same can be said when one party refers the child for a mental health assessment or treatment where allegations are made against the other party in the context of a family law proceeding. There are also broader ranges of relevance and necessity encompassed when younger children are sent for mental health assessments regardless of the context.

However, where a child is old enough to express a desire for confidentiality and enters into a counselling psychiatric relationship on the understanding that his sessions will remain confidential, then those records must be guarded as sedulously, or indeed jealously, as those records of any adult. [ 65 ] There is adequate evidence available to the parties to address any of the relevant issues before the court without invading this intensely private realm of safety for T.R.F. While the records appear to be relevant, they are not necessary.

In considering the balance of the injury to T.R.F. and his relationship with his mental health caregivers against the prejudice to B.F. in not disclosing those records, the balance weighs entirely in favour of T.R.F.’s confidentiality. I dismiss B.F.’s application for those records. ____________________________ S.D. Frame Provincial Court Judge