Brown v. Canada (Attorney General), 2019 YKSC 21

SUPREME COURT OF YUKON Citation: Brown v. Canada (Attorney General) 2019 YKSC 21 Date: 20190515 S.C. No. 17-A0188 Registry: Whitehorse BETWEEN CHRISTOPHER BRENT BROWN (CHRIS RO-BRO) PETITIONER AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF CANADA, GOVERNMENT OF YUKON, GOVERNMENT OF ONTARIO, AND SUSAN KULIN RESPONDENTS Before Mr. Justice P. Kane Appearances: Christopher Brown Appearing on his own behalf Kelly McGill Counsel for the respondents, Government of Yukon and Susan Kulin REASONS FOR JUDGMENT INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] The Government of Yukon (“Yukon”) and Ms.

Kulin (the “Respondents”) by application dated May 28, 2018, seek an order striking out Mr. Brown’s Petition and dismissing this proceeding pursuant to Rules 20(26)(a),(

b) and (

d) of the Rules of Court of the Supreme Court of Yukon, O.I.C., 2009/65, (“ Rules of Court ”) as amended, on the following grounds: a. the Petition is a prohibited collateral attack of an Ontario court order requiring Mr. Brown to pay child support for his daughter, this order has not been appealed nor sought to be varied, is thereby an abuse of process and should therefore be struck out pursuant to Rule 20(26)(d); b. the allegations in the Petition pursuant to Rule 20(26)(

a) are vague, disclose no reasonable claim, lack particulars and do not plead material facts to support any recognizable cause of action; and c. this proceeding is vexatious pursuant to Rule 20(26)(

b) and exhibits characteristics of stereotypical vexatious litigation including collateral attack, hopeless proceedings, failure to honour court ordered obligations and advancing Organized Pseudo-Legal Commercial Argument (“OPCA”) litigation strategies which have been recognized as inherently vexatious. [ 2 ] Mr. Brown opposes the dismissal of his Petition. [ 3 ] Upon argument of the Respondents’ application to dismiss, Mr. Brown sought leave to amend the Notice of Application appended to his Petition.

The Respondents oppose the court granting leave to amend the appended Notice of Application on the grounds that: a. leave to amend a pleading should only be granted where the defect can be cured by amendment; and b. the proposed amended Notice of Application: i. does not address or cure the fact that the Petition is a collateral attack and therefore an abuse of process; ii. discloses no reasonable cause of action and is certain to fail; iii. fails to plead material facts to support its claims; and

iv. employs vexatious OPCA litigation techniques. [ 4 ] This Court granted Mr. Brown an extension of time to file responding material on June 28, 2018, as to the Respondents’ arguments that leave to amend the Notice of Application should be denied. [ 5 ] The amendments sought in the proposed amended Notice of Application overall are not significant.

The proposed amendments for the most part expand, clarify and correct details in the original Notice of Application annexed to the Petition. [ 6 ] Determination whether to grant leave to amend however requires consideration and determination of the Respondents’ central challenges as to the validity of this proceeding and whether it should be dismissed. The Court therefore will first determine the challenges to this proceeding as plead and depending on that result, then determine whether to grant leave to amend. The Proceeding [ 7 ] Mr. Brown commenced this proceeding on March 28, 2018, by way of Petition.

The Petition does not allege a cause of action, damages or facts. It merely attaches a lengthy Notice of Application as an appendix and Mr. Brown’s affidavit. [ 8 ] This proceeding against the Attorney General of Canada was dismissed without costs on May 17, 2018, on the consent of all named parties. [ 9 ] The Attorney General of Ontario filed no pleadings or response to this Petition, has not attorned to this jurisdiction and did not attend on argument. [ 10 ] The central underlying issue in this proceeding is quite simple. Mr. Brown opposes paying the court ordered child support for his daughter.

He seeks to have that child support order set aside and to have the legislative provisions enacted to enforce payment of court ordered child support declared invalid on the basis that such court ordered support and the legislative provisions to enforce that order allegedly breach his rights under Canadian legislation and international conventions. [ 11 ] Rather than appealing that court ordered child support or seek a variation thereof, Mr. Brown instead seeks invalidation of that child support order and legislation enacted to enforce payment thereof. Relief Sought [ 12 ] Mr.

Brown in his Notice of Application, seeks numerous remedies which include the following pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms,

Part 1 of the Constitution Act , 1982 (the “ Charter ”): a. relief and compensation for breach of his right to security of the person thus denying him equity as an Individual before the law, under s. 7 of the Charter ; b. a declaration that the Orders SC#17-B0053, MEP#2591 and the Ontario child support order 69/10 (the “Support Order”), are of no force or effect pursuant to s. 52 of the Charter ; c. the return of stolen property from the commencement of Orders SC#17-B0053, MEP#2591 and relief and compensation against unreasonable seizure of his property (money) as well as documented unlawful actions that were threatened against his Property (home/land) under s. 8 of the Charter ; and d. relief under s. 9 of the Charter against the documented, implied, arbitrary imprisonment pursuant to the Maintenance Enforcement Act (“ MEA ”), s. 145,. [13] Mr.

Brown in his Notice of Application seeks additional remedies including: a. relief and compensation for ignoring his evoked right of self-determination pursuant to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the “ ICCPR ”) and Article 1(1) of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the “ ICESCR ”) and not respecting that right under Article 1(3) of both covenants; b. relief and compensation for knowingly and unlawfully seizing money under orders SC #17-B0053, MEP #2591 and Ontario Superior Court Order 69/10 from his primary source of subsistence under the ICCPR and Article 1(2) of the ICESCR ; c. a declaration that s. 145 of the MEA , specifically imprisonment after 90 days of non payment, is of no force and effect under

Article 11 of the ICCPR ; d. relief and compensation for engaging in

an act aimed at the destruction of many of his fundamental human rights under Article 5(1) of the ICCPR and that the offending Acts, statutes and orders are not recognized or recognized to a lesser extent under Article 5(2); e. relief and compensation for ignoring his declaration of status as an “Individual” and holding him in servitude to a monarchy under the status of an incorporated person, in contravention of Articles 8(1) and 8(2) of the ICCPR . Such salary garnishment violates

Article 8.3(

a) of the ICCPR in obliging him to perform forced labour for the Yukon Maintenance Enforcement Program (the “MEP”) as they have threatened to extort every source of his income (subsistence) including that of his wife, which would constitute theft from her; f. relief and compensation for ignoring his right to security of the person, thus denying him of equity before the law under

Article 3 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (“ UDHR ”); g. relief and compensation for ignoring his declaration that he was not invoking his right to recognition as a person before the law under

Article 16 of the ICCPR and

Article 6 of the UDHR , but rather was evoking his right to recognition as an “Individual” (Natural Person) before the law under his full legal capacity;

h. relief and compensation for the arbitrary interference in his ability to maintain his family and home, pursuant to

Article 17 of the ICCPR and

Article 12 of the UDHR ; i. relief for the failure to recognize his rights pursuant to Articles 2(1) of the ICCPR and the ICESCR ; j. relief and compensation for impairing his right to enjoy and fully use his natural wealth under

Article 47 of the ICCPR and

Article 25 of the ICESCR ; k. relief under Canada’s obligation pursuant to s. 50 of the ICCPR ; l. relief and compensation for the documented threat of arbitrary deprivation of his property, contrary to Article 17(2) of the UDHR and consequently the ignorance of his right pursuant to Article 17(1) of the UDHR to own property alone and not in association with the corporations of Canada or Yukon; m. relief and compensation for interfering with his remuneration thus preventing he and his family from having an existence worthy of human dignity, contrary to Article 23(3) of the UDHR ; n. relief and compensation for ignoring his right to security of the person and threats against enjoyment of his property, contrary to s. 1(

a) of the Bill of Rights ; o. relief and compensation by declaring him to be a “verified income source”, thereby denying him his right of equality and protection before the law as an Individual pursuant to s. 1(

b) of the Bill of Rights ; p. relief and compensation for operating an unlawful seizure of his property under Acts and statutes, (namely the Yukon MEA , the Family Responsibility Act , and any act referenced within them that they claim to draw their force of law from) that do not expressly declare that they operate notwithstanding the Bill of Rights and are therefore in violation of s. 2 of the Bill of Rights ; q. relief and compensation against the respondent Ms.

Kulin for failing to respond, in support of the MEP claims, to his written communications, or disproving his claims but instead arbitrarily filing an unlawful civil action (the “Registration Order”) resulting in theft of his property.

As a result of which he filed this proceeding and is filing a complaint against her under Article 9(3) of the Declaration on the Rights and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (the “ DRRI ”); r. relief and compensation by way of his complaint being promptly reviewed and to obtain a decision in accordance with law including compensation due as there have been multiple violations of his fundamental rights and freedoms by these actions as well as the enforcement of the eventual decision and award, all without undue delay under Article 9(2) of the DRRI ; s. relief in the form of an effective remedy and protection from these violations of law, pursuant to Article 9(1) of the DRRI ; t. relief and compensation against Ms.

Kulin for threatening to and acting against his human and fundamental rights even though she will not be subjected to any adverse action or punishment for evoking her right not to do so, pursuant to

Article 10 of the DRRI ; u. relief and compensation for Canada’s failure to educate its law enforcement officers, namely Ms. Kulin, regarding human and fundamental rights guaranteed by

Article 15 of the DRRI ; v. relief and compensation in the amount of $2.5 million Canadian from both the Corporation of Yukon and the Corporation of Canada for the multiple above violations of his fundamental rights and freedoms as declared in this application; and w. relief and compensation in regards to Ms.

Kulin in the amount of $2 million for knowingly violating his above fundamental rights and freedoms, unless she too was a victim of Canada’s failure to educate individuals as to their fundamental rights, freedoms and international law; in which latter case, he seeks production of her affidavit expressing her heartfelt apology and a declaration that she, and other officers working in the MEP, should be required to participate in an educational program as the fundamental rights and freedoms of Canadians and her obligations towards such individuals. Family Responsibility Act [14] Mr.

Brown relies upon several of his affidavits or notices he sent to officials of the Yukon MEP including Ms.

Kulin in preparation for and to enhance his arguments in the Notice of Application, including: a. an Ontario Statement of Live Birth for Christopher Brent Brown, as to which he declares that he is no longer a child of that Province and assign all his fundamental rights to the security back from the Registrar General to himself; b. an Ontario Birth Certificate, which he alleges evidences the artificial person surety, CHRISTOPHER BRENT BROWN (Security of the Person) CUSIP number B 165805, registration number 79–05–024624; c. his online and published notice of his Canadian Claim of Recognition for Christopher–Brent: Ro-Bro (Christopher Brent Brown Ontario Statement of Life Birth Number 024624); and d. his February 6, 2018, one hundred and sixty-two paragraph “Canadian Claim of Recognition, Declaration of Understanding and Claim of Rights Affidavit of Truth”, which recites various sections of Canadian legislation such as the Charter , the Bill of Right s, the Code , provisions of international conventions together with his

interpretation thereof in support of his rights and freedoms and provides an address to which the recipient may reply should they disagree with his

interpretations of his rights therein. [15] In short, Mr. Brown asserts that his rights identified in the above legislation and international conventions ratified by Canada, supersede and invalidate:

a. the legislative requirements that he financially support his child; b. legislated remedies to enforce and recover arrears of court ordered child support; and c. the Support Order requiring him to pay child support, its registration in the Yukon as the Registration Order and that the challenged provisions of the MEA enabling enforcement of that court ordered child support, therefore be declared invalid and set aside. Background Ontario Support Order [16] Mr.

Brown commenced family law proceedings in the Ontario Superior Court in Woodstock, Ontario, in 2010 against H.L.V. regarding their daughter who was born on October 18, 2007. The issues in that family law proceeding included custody of their daughter and Mr. Brown’s obligation to pay child support. [17] Relevant to this application to dismiss this proceeding is the fact Mr.

Brown has not included the above court ordered recipient of the child support in this proceeding whose interests are directly in issue. [18] The Ontario Superior Court of Justice in the above family law proceeding granted a final order dated January 8, 2016, being the Support Order, pursuant to Minutes of Settlement signed by Mr. Brown and the mother on the same date. Pursuant to the Support Order: a. Mr. Brown and H.L.V. were granted joint custody of the child with the child to reside primarily with her mother; b. Mr. Brown received specified terms of access with the child; c. Mr.

Brown is required to pay $444 monthly child support to the mother in accordance with the Child Support Guidelines (Yukon table) based upon Mr. Brown’s 2014 then annual income of $50,724; d. Mr. Brown is required to contribute towards the child’s special and extraordinary expenses proportioned to their respective income levels pursuant to s. 7 of the Child Support Guidelines ; e. Mr. Brown owed child support arrears in the amount of $1,380 as of December 1, 2015; f. Mr.

Brown was again ordered to pay the mother the unpaid $3,000 costs awarded by the court on August 17, 2012; and g. the child support as ordered was to be enforced by the Ontario Director, Family Responsibility Office (“FRO”), with the amount owing and ordered to be paid to the Director for remittance to H.L.V. [19] Mr. Brown was represented by legal counsel at the time he signed the above Minutes of Settlement and consented to the Support Order.

His representation by legal counsel at the time impairs his pleading that Canada failed its alleged legal obligation to provide him with legal education as to such legal matters thereby entitling him to the relief sought in this proceeding. Yukon Enforcement [20] The Government of Yukon operates the MEP to facilitate enforcement of child and/or spousal support orders made by courts in the Yukon and elsewhere, including Ontario.

The Ontario equivalent of MEP is FRO. [21] The Yukon MEP on September 22, 2017 received a copy of the Support Order from and a request by FRO that the MEP assist to enforce the Support Order’s requirement that Mr. Brown pay the child support as ordered because he now resided in the Yukon. [22] Ms. Kulin was assigned this request from FRO in her capacity as an enforcement officer in the MEP office. The MEP internal file number assigned in this case is #2591, which Mr.

Brown seeks to have struck as part of the relief claimed. [23] MEP on September 22, 2017, sent the Support Order to the Supreme Court of Yukon, as required by s. 17 of the Interjurisdictional Support Orders Act , S.Y. 2001, c. 19 , (the “ ISO ”). Pursuant to s. 18(1) of the ISO , that Support Order must then be registered by the Yukon court, which occurred, including the opening of the Supreme Court of Yukon court file: No. S.C. No.: 17- B0053, which Mr. Brown seeks to have struck. [24] Upon registration in the Supreme Court of Yukon, that Support Order, pursuant to ss. 16 , 17 and 18(2) (

a) of the ISO , has the same effect as if it was a Yukon Support Order. [25] The court notes that Mr. Brown is entitled pursuant to s. 25 of the ISO to bring an application before a Yukon court to vary the Support Order so registered under s. 18 of the ISO . [26] Relevant to the issues before the Court is the fact that Mr.

Brown does not allege nor seek a declaration of constitutional invalidity of any provision of the ISO , which converted the Ontario Support Order into a Yukon Support Order. [27] Without argument or authority as to the constitutional validity of the ISO , or how the opening of a court file somehow constitutes harm, Mr. Brown seeks a declaration that the Yukon court file S.C. No. 17-B0053 be struck. [28] As a MEP employee, Ms. Kulin wrote to Mr.

Brown on October 6, 2017, notifying him that the Support Order had been registered with MEP and that he should commence paying the monthly child support ordered to MEP commencing September 1, 2017, as well as $2,091 of child support arrears owed under the Support Order. [29] Mr. Brown sent two registered documents to MEP on October 24 and 31, 2017, disputing his obligation to pay child support

based on his rights under the Charter and international conventions, unless MEP provided him with what he considered to be satisfactory evidence refuting his declared Charter and international convention rights. [30] In this first document, Mr.

Brown conditionally accepts that he is Christopher Brent Brown and that he owes $2,091 in child support “upon proof of claim” by MEP of numerous things including the following: a. that I am a “Person” and not a human being; b. that you know what a “Person” actually is, legally speaking; c. upon proof of claim that you know what THE TERRITORY OF THE YUKON actually is, legally speaking; and d. that the Canadian Government is in fact a de facto government, and even admits as such, which makes me a human being not lawfully obligated to comply with your acts and statues if I do not consent to do so, is that not true? [31] Mr.

Brown in this document then lists 26 questions he states MEP must prove as to whether it may enforce payment of child support as ordered. He quotes sections of the Charter and international covenants approved by Canada as to whether the Yukon MEP had authority to seize his assets, garnish his wages and cancel his driver’s license. The MEP October 6, 2017 letter to him refers to none of these remedies should he default in paying child support. [32] The questions he poses in this document include: a. Whether the debt MEP speaks of is a Civil or Criminal Matter? b.

Do you know the difference between Legal and Lawful? Illegal and Unlawful? c. Is the “maintenance enforcement program” MEP actually a separate, sub-contract company acting on behalf of the court? d. Your correspondence indicates “It is best for you and your family if you make your payment voluntarily.” Am I lawfully obligated to make payments to your company? Am I lawfully obligated to contract with you? Or do you need my consent to be able to take any legal action against me the human? [33] Mr.

Brown in this document then answers the questions posed, many of which are included as “statements of law” in his Notice of Application. [34] Mr. Brown in this document states that the October 6, 2016 letter of notice from MEP is written in legalese and not in English, which is the only language he communicates in and comprehends. Accordingly, he states he did not have full disclosure nor a full understanding of what he was contracting to do.

He further states that the Support Order was based on legislation written in a different language, which thereby makes that contract void on the issue and therefore unenforceable. [35] Mr. Brown concludes this document stating: a. MEP will have five days to respond by sworn affidavit with written proof of its claim and answer the 34 questions posed by him; b. he will pay the child support if MEP meets the above requirements; and c. if MEP fails to provide such evidence within those 5 days, it shall be deemed “General Acquiescence and acceptance of my claims … and estoppel will be in effect”. [36] Mr.

Brown then signs this document as “Christopher-Brent of the Family Ro-Bro” and directs MEP’s response and evidence be sent by registered mail to “Chris:Ro-Bro” at a post office number in the “Yukon Republic, On the Land of Canada.” [37] Mr. Brown, one week later on October 31, 2017, sent MEP a Notice of Non-Response Affidavit of Truth in which he declares that given MEP’s failure to respond and provide evidence within his 5-day limit, “estoppel is in effect and you [MEP] are contracted to accept my Claims as if you had made them yourself under Law.” [38] Mr.

Brown, in this second document, then provides more answers to his 34 questions listed in his initial document to MEP. His statements in this second document include that: a. MEP cannot prove that he is a person because it will not create Joinder by obtaining any identification from him because he is not lawfully required to present identification unless he has committed or is about to commit a crime; b.

Black’s Law Dictionary’s definition of a person is a corporation, a fictional being thereby necessitating MEP’s need for “Joinder” as a corporation cannot affect a human being; c. the Corporation of the Yukon Territory is a business and the acts and statues of the Canadian Government only apply to employees of the Corporation of Canada; d. as a human being, he is not lawfully obligated to comply with Government Acts and statues unless he consents thereto; e.

MEP of the Yukon Government is a sub-contracted company in the form of a “court bulking center” to which he has no legal obligation to make payments to or contract with and that without Joinder or consent, MEP cannot act upon him as a human being; f. the Support Order was written in a different language which makes that Contract void on the issue;

g. MEP is committing fraud on a daily basis and is destroying families with its unlawful crimes; and h. MEP is not lawfully allowed to garnishee his employment wages, as such wages are a primary means of subsistence for himself and his family. [39] The above documentation from Mr. Brown relates directly to his denial that he is a participant in the OPCA movement and whether this proceeding is an abuse of process, as addressed below. [40] Mr. Brown failed to pay the court-ordered child support to MEP.

MEP as a result on November 6, 2017, sent a garnishment order pursuant to the Yukon MEA to the Department of Finance of the Government of Yukon, which is Mr. Brown’s employer and the “identified income source,” not himself as he alleges. [41] That November 6, 2017 garnishment order is signed by Ms. Kulin. It states that MEP has authority pursuant to the Yukon MEA to garnish remuneration owed to Mr. Brown by any income source and directs the monthly deduction of the $444 of child support, plus 25% from his net income towards the then $1,029 support arrears, be forwarded to MEP. [42] Ms.

Kulin, on behalf of the Yukon Director of MEP, wrote to Mr. Brown on November 6, 2017 and attached the Garnishment Order. Ms. Kulin’s letter and the attached order advised that: a. MEP was empowered under the Yukon MEA to garnishee remunerations due to a respondent from any income source, including himself; and b. Mr. Brown was being served with the enclosed garnishment order to collect money he owed for family support. [43] Ms. Kulin sent a second letter on November 6, 2017 advising that the Garnishment Order had been served on the Government of Yukon, Department of Finance. In this letter Ms.

Kulin advised that: a. the garnishment order may be withdrawn if Mr. Brown provided a voluntary payment arrangement to MEP; and b. MEP could not change the amount of the Support Order but could negotiate repayment terms as to the accumulated arrears thereunder. [44] MEP received the first payment under the garnishment notice on November 23, 2017. The garnishment notice remained in place pursuant to which the monthly child support plus a stated amount towards arrears were forwarded to MEP up to and including May 2018. The amounts received were thereupon forwarded by MEP to FRO on behalf of and to the claimant.

Yukon Maintenance Enforcement Act (“ MEA” ) [45] The Yukon MEA contains enforcement provisions for the collection of court-ordered support made in the Yukon and in other jurisdictions, which would include Ontario. [46]

Section 2 of the Yukon MEA establishes a Director of Maintenance Enforcement who has the duty of enforcing maintenance orders filed in the Director’s Office.

The Director is granted power to commence and conduct a proceeding and take steps for the enforcement of maintenance orders directed to be paid to the Director for the benefit of the support claimant. [47] The person entitled to receive the maintenance payments pursuant to a maintenance or support order includes FRO and entitles it to file that maintenance order with the office of the Director as “claimant”, pursuant to ss. 1(1) and 3 of the Yukon MEA. [48] The MEP Director, pursuant to s. 5, is entitled to enforce the maintenance order filed with that office. [49] The person required by court order to pay support pursuant to s. 8 must remit payment to the Director who is thereupon required to forward payments received to the claimant. [50] The Yukon MEA Director under s. 13, may commence proceedings available to the support claimant including: a. under the Yukon Garnishee Act ( s. 14 ); b. registration of the maintenance order in the Yukon’s Land Title’s Office and sale of the property so charged ( s. 25 ); c. to obtain a writ of execution and sale of real or personal property pursuant to the Yukon Executions Act (ss. 23 to 26); d. for the appointment of a receiver (s. 27); e. to cause the defaulting payor to appear before a judge for a show cause hearing (s. 28); and f. for the imposition of a penalty under the Yukon MEA . [51] A maintenance order pursuant to s. 14 of the Yukon MEA may be enforced by a garnishment order issued by the Director requiring that an income source of the respondent deduct and forward the amount specified in the garnishment order of any remuneration due to the respondent. [52] The evidence is that the only enforcement remedy exercised was the garnishment of Mr.

Brown’s salary in accordance with the Support Order pursuant to s. 14 of the Yukon MEA , just as a claimant could have done under the Garnishee Act , R.S.Y. 2002, c. 100 (“ Garnishee Act ”).

[53] The MEA Director has not but could : a. commence proceedings to obtain a writ of execution against any property owned by Mr. Brown, which could lead to its disposition to satisfy the debt (s. 13 and ss. 23-26); b. cause Mr. Brown to attend a show cause hearing, which might expose him to possible imprison for up to 90 days if the court is satisfied he had the financial ability and had failed to pay the support ordered (s. 28); or c. serve Mr.

Brown with notice that failing his satisfactory compliance within 21 days, the Registrar of motor vehicles may be requested to suspend, cancel or restrict his operator’s licence (s. 29). [54] Mr. Brown seeks a declaration of constitutional invalidity of these potential remedies in sections 13, 14, 23 to 26, 28 and 29 of the Yukon MEA . [55] Following receipt from MEP of the notice of garnishment, Mr.

Brown by registered mail sent MEP copies of numerous documents on November 14, 2017, which include agreements, a power of attorney and PPSA security agreements, from and to himself and using variations of his name, including the following: a. Notice of Cease and Desist, Notice of Understanding, Clarity and Intent, in which he identifies himself as “Christopher- Brent:Ro-Bro©, the living, breathing human being, am the Administrator, Secured Party Creditor, and Beneficiary of the C’est Que Vie Trust Numbered CHRISTOPHER BRENT BROWN© Cusip number B165805”. Mr.

Brown in this document, as administrator of and as the secured party of the above trust, demands that MEP cease any action “against the Juristic Person CHRISTOPHER BRENT BROWN© or the use of the artwork CHRISTOPHER BRENT BROWN or any derivatives thereof” which violate the agreements enclosed. MEP had 10 days to withdraw the unlawful garnishment order containing his copyright, failing which he would bill MEP per violation; b.

Notice of Common Law Copyright/Security Agreement dated September 6, 2017, reserving copyrights to his name and variations thereof including CHRISTOPHER BRENT BROWN© to Christopher-Brent:Ro-Brown as a secured party; c. a September 6, 2017, 10-page security agreement for $10 billion between himself as debtor to Christopher-Brent Ro-Bro© as creditor, which conveys a security interest to himself in things such as his birth certificate, his social insurance account, his drivers’ licence, his passport, his bank accounts, all land and his personal property; d. an October 6, 2017 indemnity agreement from himself to his copyright self; e. a September 15, 2017 Power of Attorney from himself as debtor authorizing himself as Christopher-Brent:Ro-Bro as secured party to conduct all business, tax and legal affairs of himself as grantor of the power of attorney; f. a September 11, 2017 security agreement registered under the Personal Property Security Acts of Ontario and the Yukon of all his assets, from himself to Christopher-Brent of the family Ro-Bro; and g. confirmation of a September 4, 2017 registration under the U.S.

Uniform Commercial Code of a security agreement from himself of all of his assets to Christopher Brent Ro-Bro. [56] Mr. Brown had no intention of paying the child support he had consented to in the Support Order. He spent September 2017 preparing the above documentation in an attempt to distance and shield his income and assets against execution of the consent Support Order, which he now no longer wished to pay.

ANALYSIS [57] This proceeding was commenced by Petition which claims no remedies, relief or the grounds relied upon other than “regarding a constitutional question” as described in the attached Notice of Application. [58] The lengthy Notice of Application seeks the above numerous heads of relief which include several claims for damages and a request that specified legislation be declared constitutionally invalid. Petition Versus Statement of Claim [59] Pursuant to Rule 10(1)(a), (

b) and (

c) of the Rules of Court , a Petition shall be filed where: a. an application is authorized to be made to the court; b. the sole or principal question at issue is one of

interpretation of an Act , statute or regulation; and c. the petitioner is the only person who is interested in the relief claimed or there is no person against whom relief is sought. [60] Mr. Brown is not the only person interested in the relief claimed as the financial interests of the custodial mother are in issue. Significant damages in addition are sought against Ms. Kulin and the Government of Yukon. [61] As defined under Rule 1(13): a. an “action” means a proceeding commenced by statement of claim; b. a “proceeding” includes an action or originating application but does not refer to a petition; and

c. this proceeding was not commenced by application. [62] Rule 8(1) states that every proceeding shall be commenced by statement of claim, except where otherwise authorized underlegislation or the Rules of Court. [63] The above Rules of Court indicate that this proceeding should have been commenced by way of statement of claim. “Family Responsibility Act” and Rule 20(26) [64] The Court may order a pleading or petition to be struck out or amended on the ground that the proceeding as pled: a. discloses no reasonable claim; b. is vexatious; c. may prejudice or delay the fair trial or hearing of the proceeding; d. is otherwise an abuse of process; and e. the court may grant judgment or order the proceeding to be stayed or dismissed and the costs of the application to be paid asspecial costs. [65] In addition to the above relief, the Notice of Application states a declaration is sought that the “Maintenance Enforcement Act,Family Responsibilities Act” are constitutionally invalid.

The citation for such legislation is not indicated. [66] It is clear from the pleadings that the Maintenance Enforcement Act is the Yukon MEA. The “Family Responsibilities Act”however is not identifiable legislation. The Notice of Application contains no citation for that unidentified legislation nor cites anyspecific breach of his rights thereunder. Neither the Yukon nor Ontario has legislation entitled Family Responsibility Act, therebypreventing its further consideration Collateral Attack [67] Yukon and Ms.

Kulin submit this proceeding is an abuse of process for several reasons including the fact it constitutes acollateral attack of the order to pay child support. [68] Mr. Brown’s argument based upon the Charter, the Bill of Rights, the Criminal Code of Canada and international conventionsapproved by Canada, constitutes a collateral attack of the Support Order, which he consented and entered into while represented by legalcounsel, rather than appealing or seeking to vary the same. [69] This attack of the Support Order includes: a. Mr.

Brown’s request that such order be declared invalid; and b. that the legislated mechanisms to enforce that court ordered support obligation be declared invalid. [70] The Supreme Court in R. v. Wilson, (SCC), [1983] 2 S.C.R. 594 (“Wilson”), held that a court order standsunless set aside on appeal or lawfully quashed. Such order may not be attacked collaterally. A collateral attack is an attack made in aproceeding whose objective is the reversal, variation or notification of the order or judgment: Wilson, p. 599 and Grenon v.

Canada,(Attorney General), 2007 ABQB 403 (“Grenon”), para. 11. [71] The Supreme Court in Danyluk v. Ainsworth Technologies Inc., 2001 SCC 44 (“Danyluk”) paras. 18-20, discussed the need forfinality and stated: [18] The law rightly seeks a finality to litigation. To advance that objective, it requires litigants to put their best foot forward to establishthe truth of their allegations when first called upon to do so. A litigant, to use the vernacular, is only entitled to one bite at the cherry.

An issue, once decided, should not generally be re-litigated to the benefit of the losing party and the harassment of the winner. A personshould only be vexed once in the same cause. Duplicative litigation, potential inconsistent results, undue costs, and inconclusiveproceedings are to be avoided. [19] Finality is thus a compelling consideration and judicial decisions should generally be conclusive of the issues decided unless anduntil reversed on appeal. … [20] The law has developed a number of techniques to prevent abuse of the decision-making process.

One of the oldest is the doctrine ofestoppel per rem judicatem …. The bar extends both to the cause of action thus adjudicated …. as well as precluding relitigation of theconstituent issues or material facts necessarily embraced therein. … Another aspect of the judicial policy favouring finality is the ruleagainst collateral attack … [72] The Supreme Court in British Columbia (Workers’ Compensation Board) v. Figliola, 2011 SCC 52, (“WCB”) at para. 28,described the rule against collateral attack as follows:

[28] The rule against collateral attack simply attempts to protect the fairness and integrity of the justice system by preventing duplicate proceedings. It prevents a party from using an institutional detour to attack the validity of an order by seeking a different result from a different forum, rather than through the designated appellate or judicial review route… [73] As to the need for finality in litigation, the court in Grenon relied upon Danyluk in support of the principle that the specific object of the subsequent proceeding need not be the reversal, variation or notification of the order or judgment.

It is sufficient if the subsequent proceedings are aimed at bringing the judgment or order into question: Grenon , paras. 12-14 . [74] The court in Ernst & Young Inc. v.

Central Guaranty Trust Company , 2006 ABCA 337 (“ E&Y” ), held that the appropriate test as to collateral attack is not whether the claimant was trying to vary or nullify the prior order, but whether the raising of the particular issue would render a prior order which had not been appealed nonsensical: para. 50. [75] The rule against collateral attack extends to collateral attacks based on constitutional grounds, as in the present case: Carpenter Fishing Corp. v.

Canada , 2002 BCCA 611 , (“ Carpenter” ) para. 8 . [76] The father in Grenon submitted he did not intend to attack the divorce judgment or his child support obligation. He had argued before the Tax Court that the Income Tax Act breached his s. 15(1) Charter right to equal protection and treatment under the law as the recipient of child support was entitled to a deduction; however, he as payor was not entitled to a deduction. The court concluded that if the father was successful in this litigation, that conclusion would undermine his divorce decision which required him to pay child support.

The Court found that a proceeding seeking a decision that certain parts of the divorce judgment were arrived at in an unconstitutional manner, questions, or seeks to vary that judgment: Grenon , paras. 20, 26 and 27 . [77] A collateral attack occurs when a litigant commences a proceeding, including a constitutional challenge, which would have the result of burying, nullifying or rendering nonsensical an order or decision made in a prior proceeding involving that litigant.

The court in determining whether a proceeding is a collateral attack is not limited to the stated purpose of the subsequent proceeding and may examine the result of that proceeding.

The court in Grenon struck the proceeding as the collateral attack therein constituted an abuse of process: Grenon , paras. 28, 32 and 33 . [78] The rule against collateral attack attempts to protect the fairness and integrity of the justice system by preventing duplication of proceedings, namely preventing a party from using an institutional detour to attack the validity of an order by seeking a different result, from a different forum, rather than through the designated appellate or judicial review route: Meads v. Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 , para. 50 . [79] The Court in Wood v.

Yukon (Highways and Public Works) , 2016 YKSC 68 (“ Wood ”) , held that the action was the plaintiff’s attempt to appeal her alleged wrongful dismissal which she had no right to appeal.

Further, the Court found that the action was a collateral attack of the decision of the Yukon Workers Compensation Health and Safety Board Appeal Tribunal which had not been appealed and constituted a collateral attack of the decision of the Director of Human Rights to terminate the investigation of her complaint of discrimination: Wood , para. 41 . [80] The court in Wood concluded such collateral attacks constituted an abuse of process, as held in Willow where that court struck a claim which was a collateral attack of an administrative decision that is subject to appeal or judicial review, and although pled as “breaches of duty, failure to perform legal obligation, negligent supervision and torts”; the essential character of the complaint was the plaintiff’s belief he had been wronged by decisions which could be but were not challenged in a different forum: Wood , paras. 41-43 . [81] Mr.

Brown seeks that the Support Order be declared of no force and effect. That is a direct collateral attack. An appeal or variation of the Support Order are not available in this proceeding. [82] This Petition and Application is also a prohibited collateral attack of the Support Order in seeking to strike the legislated measures in the Yukon MEA to enforce that support ordered obligation.

An order requiring monthly payment that cannot be enforced is rendered meaningless. [83] The above direct and indirect collateral attacks of the Support Order are also improperly brought without making the beneficiary or payee of that order, whose rights are directly impacted, a party to this proceeding. [84] Based on the above jurisprudence and analysis, this proceeding should be dismissed as a prohibited collateral attack of the Support Order. [85] This proceeding has a number of additional problems, which this Court will now review.

International Conventions and Declarations [86] Amongst the numerous remedies sought, Mr. Brown’s attack of the Support Order, his request that the enforcement provisions of the Yukon MEA be declared invalid and his claims against Yukon and Ms. Kulin, are based upon the statement of his rights in Canadian legislation, namely the Charter , the Canadian Constitution , 1982 (the “ Constitution ”), the Bill of Rights and the Code, as well as several international conventions and declarations. [87] As to those international conventions and declarations, Mr.

Brown relies upon the above cited provisions as to rights in the ICCPR , the ICESCR , the UNHR and the DRRI . [88] Mr. Brown’s reliance upon his rights under Canadian legislation and in international conventions are presented in isolation and exclude reference to and the balancing of his rights with those of his dependent daughter and the mother payee under such legislation and

conventions. He ignores other relevant provisions in the conventions and incorrectly presents his stated rights therein as paramount overthose of his child and legislation dealing with her competing rights. [89] Mr. Brown relies upon the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Divito v. Canada (Public Safety and EmergencyPreparedness), 2013 SCC 47 (“Divito”), as to his rights in international conventions. [90] The appellant in Divito was extradited to the United States where he pleaded guilty to drug offences and was sentenced toprison. He applied to serve his American sentence in Canada.

The Minister pursuant to the International Transfer of Offenders Act, S.C.2004, c. 21 (“ITOA”), refused permission to return to Canada to serve the prison sentence here. [91] The appellant in Divito had applied unsuccessfully to the Federal Court and argued that, as a Canadian Citizen, the Ministerialdiscretion in the ITOA was unconstitutional and breached his s. 6 Charter mobility right to enter and remain in Canada. His applicationto that court was refused. [92] Mr.

Divito appealed unsuccessfully to the Supreme Court of Canada, which held that s. 6(1) of the Charter does not confer aright to Canadian citizens to serve their foreign sentences in Canada. [93] Mr. Divito at the Supreme Court argued that

Article 12 of the ICCPR, which prohibited arbitrarily preventing a person to entertheir country, permitted him serving his detention in Canada. [94] The Supreme Court determined that Mr. Divito’s past criminal activity justified the rejection of his request to return to Canada,thereby limiting his mobility rights under s. 6 of the Charter and

Article 12 of the ICCPR. [95] The Supreme Court in Divito stated: a. the Charter identified rights are to be defined generously in light of the interests the Charter was intended to protect: para. 19; b. Canada’s international obligations and relevant principles of international law are instructive in defining rights listed in theCharter, which should generally be presumed to provide protection at least as great as that afforded by similar provisions in internationalhuman rights documents which Canada has ratified: paras. 22-23; c. the international law inspiration for s. 6(1) of the Charter is generally considered to be

Article 12 of the ICCPR, which has beenratified by Canada. The rights accordingly protected by the ICCPR provide a minimum level of protection in interpreting the mobilityrights under the Charter. The right to enter Canada protected by s. 6(1) of the Charter should be interpreted in a way consistent with thebroad protection under international law: paras. 24, 25 and 27; d. the s. 6(1) mobility rights should be construed generously but not literally.

Canadian citizens lawfully incarcerated in a foreignjurisdiction cannot leave their prison to come to Canada, absent the foreign prisoner transfer provisions in the ITOA. That potentialtransfer does not create a constitutionally protected right to leave a foreign prison and enter Canada, nor impose a duty on Canadato permit all citizens to serve their foreign sentences in Canada.

The provisions of the ITOA, which make a transfer to Canada possible,do not as a result represent a breach of s. 6(1) of the Charter: para. 48. [96] The minority in Divito held that ensuring the security of Canada and the prevention of terrorism offences were pressingobjectives, which in some cases may be served by refusing a transfer based upon the factors listed in the ITOA, which were not arbitrary,unfair or irrational considerations.

The ITOA legislation therefore constituted a reasonable limit on the s. 6(1) Charter mobility right ofCanadian citizens incarcerated abroad pursuant to s. 1 of the Charter: paras. 74, 78 and 84. [97] Divito supports the principle that rights listed in the Charter or in international conventions approved by Canada may not beabsolute. Specifically, such rights may be qualified by legislation dealing with the rights or protection of the general public, sections ofthe public or may be protected under s. 1of the Charter. It is not therefore enough to only consider the articulated rights of Mr. Brown. [98] Mr.

Sin in the case of Sin v. Canada, 2016 FCA 16 (“Sin”), applied to immigrate as an investor to Canada under theImmigration and Refugee Protection Act (the “IRPA”). The government terminated his application. He sued the Crown for damages forterminating his application for permanent residence in Canada. The IRPA states there was no right of recourse against Canada if anapplication was terminated. He argued however that that prohibition against suit must be read in light of foreign investment treaties andtrade agreements, which Canada had signed. [99] The proceeding by Mr.

Sin, including the request for its pre-certification as a class action, was dismissed by the Federal Court,which he then appealed. [100] The court in Sin relied upon Baker v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), (SCC), [1999] 2S.C.R. 817(“Baker”). The Supreme Court of Canada in Baker, at para. 69, notes that Canada has ratified certain conventions andinternational instruments which recognize the importance of children’s rights and their best interests.

The Supreme Court then states thatinternational treaties and conventions are not part of Canadian law unless they have been implemented by statute and because theconvention in that case had not been implemented by Parliament; its provisions therefore had no direct application within Canadian law. [101] The above principle was reiterated in Kazemi Estate v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 2014 SCC 62 (“Kazemi”), wherein theSupreme Court, at para. 149, stated that an

article in a treaty ratified by Canada does not automatically transform that provision into aprinciple of fundamental justice, as Canada is a duellist system in respect of treaty and convention law. This means that, unless a treatyprovision expresses a rule of customary international law or a peremptory norm; such provision will only be binding in Canadian law if itis given effect through Canada’s domestic lawmaking process. The Supreme Court in Kazemi noted that the appellant in that case hadnot argued nor established that their

interpretation of the relevant International covenant they relied upon, reflects customaryinternational law or that it was incorporated into Canadian law through legislation.

[102] The Federal Court of Appeal in Sin , at para. 15 , concluded that Mr. Sin: a. did not argue that the Canada–Russia Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement treaties (“FIPA”) reflects customary international law; b. acknowledged FIPA had not been implemented by a statue department; and therefore concluded that: a. FIPA was not part of the domestic law of Canada; b. FIPA cannot amend

an act of Parliament; and c. the prohibition against suing Canada contained in the IRPA should not therefore be read in the light of the FIPA relied upon by the appellant. [103] The case of d’Abadie v. Her Majesty the Queen , 2018 ABQB 298 (“ d’Abadie ”) has a number of similarities to Mr. Brown’s proceeding. Mr. d’Abdie was stopped, questioned and charged for driving his motor vehicle without a license plate which simply carry a marking of “PRIVATE Non-Commercial Use Only”. [104] The Attorney General moved to strike the application as an abuse of process.

The court struck the proceeding. [105] Mr. d’Abadie sought: a. damages against the Receiver General regarding incidents where he was stopped in his vehicle by police and charged for driving without a license plate; b. acquittal of two Provincial Court charges; and c. an “Order to Safeguard Rights”, namely the right to enjoy his life, liberty, enjoyment of use of property and not be arbitrarily detained and damaged by the Crown. [106] Mr. d’Abadie argued that: a. he was free to ignore motor vehicle legislation because that is “slavery”; b. he was detained when stopped by police which breached his s. 10(

c) Charter right of habeas corpus and his Charter s. 7 right to liberty as he was not engaged in a crime; and c. the police seizure of his vehicle constituted theft of his property contrary to his property rights protected by s. 26 of the Charter and

Article 17 of the UDHR which states that everyone has the right to own property and not be arbitrarily deprived of that property. [107] Mr. d’Abadie, like Mr. Brown, applied to amend his Originating Application to correct the responding parties and add to the information therein.

The court denied leave to amend the Application in concluding his proceeding, with or without an amendment, was hopeless and was initiated and continued in bad faith because: a. the application was a prohibited collateral attack in a civil court of criminal proceedings: para. 39; b. the plaintiff sued the wronged parties in not suing the police who had stopped him; c. the plaintiff had failed to provide adequate particulars for the alleged breach of his Charter rights: paras. 37 and 41; d. the proceeding is based on futile and abusive OPCA concepts which have no legal meaning: para. 43; e. the plaintiffs alleged immunity from legislation is an erroneous OPCA concept lacking legal merit: paras. 44-46; and f. the plaintiff’s Application is an illegitimate attempt to set aside, to step outside of Canadian law and be exempt of penalties for engaging in illegal activity: para. 47. [108] Mr. d’Abadie argued that the UDHR , the ICCPR and the ICESCR are binding authorities, which supersede and restrict state authority through the Charter : d’Abadie , para. 49 . [109] Like Mr.

Brown, Mr. d’Abadie relied upon the Supreme Court’s statement in Divito , at para. 50 that: As a treaty to which Canada is a signatory, the [ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ] is binding.

As a result, the rights protected by the [ International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights ] provide a minimum level of protection in interpreting the mobility rights under the Charter . … [110] The court in d’Abadie stated the above statement does not mean the Supreme Court thereby concluded that the ICCPR has a supra-constitutional status, but instead that Canadian domestic law should be interpreted in compliance with Canadian endorsed international treaties: d’Abadie , para. 51 .

[111] The court in d’Abadie stated the Supreme Court in Divito was interpreting s. 6(1) of the Charter which states that every Canadian citizen has the right to enter, remain in and leave Canada and concluded that Canada therefore had explicitly implemented this “mobility right” in its domestic apparatus and that the Supreme Court looked to the ICCPR

Article 12 to better define what that right actually entailed. [112] The court in d‘Abadie concluded the ICCPR in itself means nothing and it is only because Canada enacted law that created a corresponding domestic right which implemented

Article 12 of the ICCPR , that such

Article 12 became relevant in Canadian courts: paras. 51-53. [113] The courts in Kazemi and Sin concluded that the provisions of international conventions approved by Canada relied upon were not established to constitute law in Canada as: a. the covenant provision had not been enacted into law by Parliament; and b. like Mr. Brown in the present case, Mr. Kazemi did not submit nor establish that the international treaty and provisions therein relied upon reflected customary international law. [114] As part of his “wheelbarrow deposit” of arguments in this case, Mr.

Brown made no submission as to which of the international conventions and declaration rights he relies upon have been enacted into law in Canada. [115] The Court concludes that: a. the rights to life, liberty and security of the person, as referenced in Articles 8, 9, 17.1 of the ICCPR , Articles 1.1 of the ICESCR and Articles 6, 9 and 12 of the UDHR , have been enacted into law in s. 7 of the Charter and s. 1(

a) of the Bill of Rights ; b. the rights against unreasonable seizure in s. 8 of the Charter and the right to enjoyment of property and not be deprived of it except by due process of law pursuant to s. 1(

a) of the Bill of Rights, enacts into Canadian law the rights to dispose of one’s wealth, to not be deprived of one’s means of subsistence and to fully enjoy one’s natural wealth pursuant to Articles 1.2 and 47 of the ICCPR and Articles 1.1 and 25 of the ICESCR , the right to pursue one’s economic development in

Article 1.1 of the ICESCR and to not be arbitrarily deprived of property in the UDHR ; and c. the rights to liberty and against arbitrary detention and imprisonment and the right to seek judicial relief where a Charter right has been infringed, as provided in ss. 7 , 9 and 24(1) of the Charter and s. 1(

a) of the Bill of Rights , enacts into Canadian law the rights to liberty and judicial relief in relation to detention as provided in Articles 9, 12 and 17(2) of the UNHR , 9.1 of the ICCPR and 9.1 to 9.5 of the DRRI . [116] The above Canadian enactments therefore, beyond any clarity provided by those international provisions, are the governing law of those subjects as to the issues in this case. Failure To Plead Material Facts As To Alleged Breaches of Conventions [117] Some of the provisions of the international conventions and declarations relied upon by Mr.

Brown have not been enacted into Canadian law, are not legally relevant or lack material facts to support such reliance and allegations. Instances thereof include the following: a. the Respondents do not rely on these international conventions; b. there are no allegations to support that Mr. Brown is in a state of slavery, servitude or compulsory labour; and c. Mr.

Brown has not been arrested or arbitrarily arrested without reason, been denied legal recognition as a person, nor is being subjected legally to discrimination or has suffered unlawful interference as to his privacy, his home or his family; thus rendering Articles 5, 8, 9, 16, 17.1 and 17.2 of the ICCPR and Articles 6 and 9 of the UDHR irrelevant in this case. [118] There are no facts alleged that: a. Mr. Brown’s right to dispose of his natural wealth is infringed by obligations arising from international economic cooperation; and b.

Canadian state governments have failed to enact legislation incorporating convention rights or exercised those rights in relation to Mr. Brown on a discriminatory basis or breached his right to have an adequate standard of living; thus rendering Articles 1.2, 2.1, 2.2 and 11 of the ICESCR irrelevant in this case. [119] There are no facts alleged in support of the bald allegations that: a. Mr. Brown has been denied the right to own property; b.

He is not receiving just remuneration in his employment; or c. his home or family has been subjected to arbitrary interference; thus rendering Articles 12, 17.1 and 23.3 of the UDHR irrelevant in this proceeding. [120] There are no allegations of fact to support the general allegations that Mr. Brown:

a. has been denied the right to complain to government officials; or b. has been denied an effective judicial hearing or remedy for rights he alleges violation of; thus rendering

Article 9 of the DRRI irrelevant to this proceeding. [121] There are no facts pleaded as to the alleged failure by the state to promote human rights through legislation, judicially and in education in Canada as required under Articles 14 and 15 of the DRRI ; thus rendering those provisions irrelevant to this proceeding. [122] The failure to plead material facts in support of the above alleged violations of international conventions contravenes the requirements of Rule 20(1), are intended to avoid Mr.

Brown’s legal obligation to pay child support, to delay or defeat the judicial enforcement thereof and are therefore struck. Competing Rights Under International Conventions [123] Mr. Brown in citing rights from international conventions and declarations as stated, ignores the rights of his daughter and that child’s mother as recipient payee of the child support ordered. [124] Recognition in international conventions and declarations of the child’s and mother’s competing rights and the corresponding obligations of Mr.

Brown to pay child support, contradicts his isolation of and dependence upon his rights regarding the Support Order and enforcement of that child support obligation. [125] The recognition in international conventions of Mr. Brown’s obligation to provide child support informs the court in its consideration of the contested provisions of the Yukon MEA . [126] The ICCPR states the following in its

preamble: The States Parties to the present Covenant, Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world, … Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms, Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present Covenant… (emphasis added). [127] Mr .

Brown omits to refer to and reconcile his rights with the following rights of his daughter and his parental duty recognized in the ICCPR :

Article 23 1.The family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to protection by society and the State. 4. States Parties to the present Covenant shall take appropriate steps to ensure equality of rights and responsibilities of spouses as to marriage, during marriage and at its dissolution. In the case of dissolution, provision shall be made for the necessary protection of any children.

Article 24

1. Every child shall have , without any discrimination as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, national or social origin, property or birth, the right to such measures of protection as are required by his status as a minor, on the part of his family , society and the State (emphasis added). [128] Food, clothing, accommodation and education are essential elements required by and for the protection of children. Mr. Brown agreed in the Support Order to financially contribute to the cost of these necessities.

The Divorce Act , the Ontario Family Law Act and the Yukon MEA are Canadian legislation which incorporate the above international convention rights of dependent children and the corresponding support obligations of their parents. [129] The Yukon MEA enforcement remedies are legislative tools to ensure Mr. Brown contributes towards the cost of these necessities in accordance with his daughter’s above internationally recognized rights. [130] The UDHR relied upon by Mr.

Brown states that every person has the right to a standard of living adequate for their wellbeing and the entitlement of children to special care and assistance and that they enjoy all social programs. That is the very care of this child that the Yukon MEA is intended to ensure is provided and not ignored. (emphasis added) [131] Mr. Brown further omits to mention and reconcile his obligations for his daughter as contained in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Children, (“ UNCRC ”) which Canada also ratified. That convention contains the following provisions:

Article 3 1. In all actions concerning children , whether undertaken by public or private social welfare institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities or legislative bodies , the best interests of the child shall be a primary consideration. 2. States Parties undertake to ensure the child with such protection and care as is necessary for his or her well-being, taking into account the rights and duties of his or her parents , legal guardians, or other individuals legally responsible for him or her, and, to this end, shall take all appropriate legislative and administrative measures.

Article 27 1. States Parties recognize the right of every child to a standard of living adequate for the child's physical, mental, spiritual, moral and social development . 2. The parent(

s) or others responsible for the child have the primary responsibility to secure , within their abilities and financial capacities, the conditions of living necessary for the child's development. … 4. States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to secure the recovery of maintenance for the child from the parents or other persons having financial responsibility for the child, both within the State Party and from abroad.

In particular, where the person having financial responsibility for the child lives in a State different from that of the child, States Parties shall promote the accession to international agreements or the conclusion of such agreements, as well as the making of other appropriate arrangements. (emphasis added) [132] The obligation under these international conventions and declarations requiring parents like Mr.

Brown to financially support their children have been enacted in Canada as indicated at the Federal, Provincial and Territorial levels. [133] The Yukon MEA and its remedies are the very kind of legislative action envisaged and required in Articles 3(1) and (2) and 27(4) of the UNCRC which thereby supports the challenged MEA provisions and enlightens the court’s

interpretation of Mr. Brown’s Charter rights as to the challenged sections. [134] The father in Curle v. Curle , 2014 ONSC 1077 , issued a civil claim against the mother in addition to their family law

proceeding. The court struck the civil proceeding as containing no reasonable cause of action and held the father was a vexatious litigant due to a list of enumerated vexatious traits including the numerous prior proceedings and ignoring adverse rulings, which were measures intended to wear down his opponent. Mr. Brown’s default in paying the Support Order is his attempt to breach and ignore the Support Order ruling. [135] Like Mr. Brown, Mr. Curle presented himself as a split/dual person and alleged that he had not waived his full legal and equitable title. He alleged, like Mr.

Brown, violation of his rights under international law including, the ICCPR , the UDHR and the United Nations Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action . [136] The court in dismissing the civil action held that the claim disclosed no cause of action as the family law issues of custody and property were governed by domestic statutory law such as the Children’s Law Reform Act or the Divorce Act and not by the common law or international law: para. 14. [137] Mr.

Brown’s reliance upon the selective sections from the ICCPR , the ICESCR , the UDHR and the DRRI misstate those as his absolute rights by omission and presents his rights as determinative. He fails to acknowledge and balance his rights with the rights of his daughter and his obligation to support that child as contained in the above conventions approved by Canada, which have been enacted into child support and child support enforcement legislation throughout Canada, as required in internal convents. [138] Mr.

Brown’s arguments based on the international convention provisions relied upon in seeking to set aside the Support Order and for a declaration of invalidity of the support enforcement provisions of the Yukon MEA are incorrect and have no legal merit.

Charter Rights [139] Sections 24(1) of the Charter and 52(1) of the Constitution Act form the basis to seek relief for an infringed Charter right. [140] Section 24(1) in the case of a breach or denial of a Charter right, entitles a person to seek a judicial remedy, which the court considers appropriate and just in the circumstances. [141] Section 24(1) relates to unconstitutional acts of government agents operating under lawful schemes. [142] Section 52(1) provides that the Constitution of Canada is the supreme law of this country and that any law that is inconsistent with the provisions of the Constitution is of no force and effect. [143] Section 52(1) relates not to actions by government agents but rather, if established, where a law violates the Charter , in which case the court shall so declare thereby rendering that law null and void: R. v.

Ferguson , 2008 SCC 6 , para. 35 . [144] The pleadings of Mr. Brown ignore this distinction between s. 24(1) of the Charter and s. 52(1) of the Constitution Act , 1982 . [145] The court in A.N.B. v.

Alberta (Minister of Human Services) , 2013 ABQB 97 (“ A.N.B. ”) , as to the rights under the Charter quote s. 1 of the Charter which states: The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society. (emphasis added) [146] The court in A.N.B. based on s. 1 , stated that Charter rights in Canada are not absolute as Mr.

Brown submits, and are subject to legal limitations and sanctions unless he can demonstrate those limitations are unconstitutional: A.N.B. , paras. 96 and 97 . [147] Mr. Brown’s challenges based upon his rights pursuant to the Charter , the Constitution and the Bill of Rights are incorrectly presented as absolute rights and ignore several qualifiers in such legislation, just as he did in his reliance upon rights in international conventions and declarations. [148] Mr.

Brown’s reliance upon the s. 7 Charter right to life, liberty and security of the person, states “except in accordance with the principles of natural justice”. [149] The right against seizure under s. 8 of the Charter relied upon, prohibits “unreasonable” seizure. [150] The s. 9 Charter right prohibits “unreasonable” detention or imprisonment. [151] The declaration of invalidity sought by Mr.

Brown of the potential remedies under ss. 23 to 26 and 28 of the MEA are governed by s. 52(1) . [152] There is no legal basis as claimed under s. 52(1) , to overturn the Support Order or its deposit in the opening of a Yukon court file. That court order and its filing in a new Yukon court file are not legislation, which is the subject of s. 52(1) . Yukon Maintenance Enforcement Act ( MEA ) [153] Mr. Brown seeks an order invalidating ss. 13, 14, 23 to 26, 28 and 29 of the Yukon MEA in reliance upon numerous provisions

in the Charter, the Bill of Rights, the ICCPR, the ICESCR and the DRRI. [154] The Yukon MEA contains provisions to prevent undue hardship. A court has jurisdiction under s. 32 to order a stay ofenforcement proceedings if satisfied that such proceedings would cause unjustifiable hardship on the payor.

Section 32 accordinglypermits protection of payors against unjustifiable hardship and balances the above enforcement remedies. [155] Mr. Brown does not seek a declaration of invalidity of the remedy to seek the appointment of a receiver under s. 27.

Ifappointed, a court would determine the receiver’s powers to realize against the debtor’s assets, which normally includes possession andsale thereof which is a similar result to execution for the benefit of a judgment creditor under the Execution Act. [156] It is relevant that recovery of court-ordered support arrears through the exercise of one of the Yukon MEA remedies in issue isfor the exclusive benefit of and payment to the support payee.

Monies recovered pursuant to these remedies are not for the benefit of orretained by the state and are not in payment of a fine or penalty imposed by the state. [157] Monies recovered are applied in satisfaction of a judgment made under child support legislation and not merely under the YukonMEA. [158] Mr.

Brown’s request for a declaration of invalidity of ss. 23 to 26, if successful, would result in claimants with a court orderedchild support, being unable to enforce that right through the Director, even though such creditor parent, like any other judgment creditor,could recover payment directly under the Yukon Garnishee Act and the Execution Act. There is no rationale justifying such aninequitable result through the use of the Charter, the Bill of Rights, or otherwise.

Garnishment of Wages [159] Section 24(1) accordingly is only relevant as to the garnishment under the Garnishee Act initiated by the Yukon MEP of aportion of Mr. Brown’s salary in payment of his court ordered child support. [160] Sections 13 and 14 of the Yukon MEA grant the MEP Director the right to seek garnishment for the same liability on behalf ofthe payee. Mr. Brown does not seek a declaration of invalidity of any provision of the Yukon Garnishee Act.

Any financial or rightsimpairment arising upon garnishment in this case arises pursuant to the Garnishee Act which is not challenged, which s. 13 of the YukonMEA makes available to the MEP Director’s office. Economic Interests Not Protected [161] A number of courts have determined that one’s economic interests are not protected by the Charter, including the s. 7 Charterright to life, liberty and security of the person which Mr. Brown relies upon: Siemens v. Manitoba (Attorney General), 2003 SCC 3,paras. 45 and 46; Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Attorney General), (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; Godbout v.

Longueuil(City), (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 844, para. 66; A & L Investments Limited v. Ontario (Minister of Housing) (1997), (ON CA), 152 D.L.R. (4th) 692 (O.N.C.A.), para. 29; United Taxi Drivers’ Fellowship of Southern Alberta v. Calgary (Cityof), 2002 ABCA 131, paras. 128, 143 to 145, 147 and 149; R. v. Werhun, (MB CA), [1991] 2 W.W.R. 344(M.B.C.A.); and d’Abadie v. Her Majesty the Queen, 2018 ABQB 298, para. 53. [162] The majority in B.C. Teachers’ Federation v.

Vancouver School District No. 39, 2003 BCCA 100, held that economic interests,including matters related to employment, are not interests which engage the life, liberty and security of the person provisions under s. 7of the Charter: Willow v. Chong, 2013 BCSC 1083 (“Willow”), para. 81. [163] The court in d’Abadie held there is no domestic right to property or economic activities and interests: para. 53. Garnishment and s. 7 of the Charter [164] In Gilliland v. Walker, [1985] 19 C.R.R. 340 (O.N. Prov Ct. (Fam.

Crt.)) (“Gilliland”), the respondent argued that the ordersought for child support under The Reciprocal Enforcement of Maintenance Orders Act, 1982, of Michigan infringed s. 7 of the Charteras it restricted his rights to the free use and enjoyment of his earnings, leading to an intrusion on his lifestyle. Mr. Brown makes thesame argument. [165] The Court in Gilliland acknowledged that the Charter infringed to a certain extent on the respondent’s s. 7 rights, but held thatthe proceedings resulting in the order complied with the principles of fundamental justice.

As a result, the mechanisms provided by theAct did not infringe his rights. [166] Similar garnishment provisions under the Alberta Maintenance Enforcement Act were found not to be constitutionally invalid inMillar v. Millar 2000 ABCA 100 (“Millar”) para. 10-16 and 18. [167] The debtor under a Manitoba maintenance order in Sen v. Sen, (MB KB), 87 Man.R. (2d) 237 (M.B.Q.B.) unsuccessfully challenged the constitutional validity of the Manitoba Family Maintenance Act pursuant to ss. 7, 9, 11(

c) and 13 of theCharter. The court held the Act did not breach the Charter and stated that legislation “provides a comprehensive and balancedprocedure” to ensure the payment of support such as the time frame in which the ability to pay is determined, the debtor’s opportunitiesto challenge the arrears and the opportunity to make arrangements to pay such arrears.

Sections 14, 20, 21, and 22 of the Yukon MEAcontain such measures. [168] The court in Sin concluded that had it found the IRPA legislation did breach Charter rights, it would have found those breachespermissible as being consistent with the principles of natural justice under s. 1 of the Charter. [169] The garnishment pursuant to ss. 13 and 14 of the Yukon MEA of a portion of Mr. Browns’ wages involve economic interestswhich are not Charter protected rights and constitute no Charter violation. His claims as a result of that garnishment is therefore

dismissed for these reasons. Execution and Charter s. 8 [170] Mr. Brown also alleges that the potential of filing execution as to any support arrears and the resulting possible sale of his realand personal property would violate his s. 8 Charter right against seizure of property. [171] The absence of Charter protection as to his economic interests based on the above jurisprudence applies equally to Mr. Brown’seconomic interest in the event of the execution against his real and personal property pursuant to ss. 23, 24, 25 and 26 of the Yukon MEAfor outstanding child support. [172] In Millar, the appellant like Mr.

Brown sought to have provisions of the Alberta Maintenance Enforcement Act declaredunconstitutional pursuant to multiple sections of the Charter, including the s. 8 right against seizure. [173] Although the Court of Appeal in Millar did not make a determination, it doubted that garnishment of wages under thatcomparable support legislation constituted “seizure” under s. 8 of the Charter and stated: [11]

Section 13 provides for the issuance of a continuing garnishee. Even adopting the broadest definition of the term "seizure", I doubtthat garnishment falls within its scope. In Thomson Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada (Director of Investigation & Research), (SCC), [1990] 1 S.C.R. 425 (S.C.C.) at p. 505, La Forest J. considered the nature of a seizure and stated: "... the essence of a seizure wasthe taking of a thing from a person by a public official without that person's consent". A continuing attachment or garnishee does notinvolve the taking of any "thing" from a person.

Rather, it is a court order which directs a third party who owes money to the judgmentdebtor to make the payment to the Court or, in this case, to the Director, rather than to the judgment debtor. [12] Moreover, it is doubtful whether s. 8 of the Charter applies to procedures adopted by the courts or by legislation for theenforcement of civil judgements, or tax assessments which, under the relevant legislation, have the effect of judgments. In TransGas Ltd.v. Mid-Plains Contractors Ltd. (1993), (SK CA), 101 D.L.R. (4th) 238 (Sask.

C.A.), the Saskatchewan Court ofAppeal refused to extend the protection of s. 8 of the Charter to a garnishee issued by Revenue Canada, pursuant to ss. 224(1.2) of theIncome Tax Act, S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 63, for the purpose of collecting taxes withheld by the debtor but not remitted. The debtor, Mid-Plains Contracting, was not involved in the proceedings. The validity of the legislation was attacked by TransGas, the holder of a fundestablished under the Builders Lien Act, s.s. 1984-85-86, c. B-7.1, and other creditors of Mid-Plains who invoked s. 8 of the Charter andthe distribution of legislative power.

The appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada was dismissed," substantially" for the reasons given byTallis J.A.: TransGas Ltd. v. Mid-Plains Contractors Ltd. (1994), (SCC), 120 D.L.R. (4th) 715 (S.C.C.), but it is notclear that s. 8 was considered by the Supreme Court. (Contra: see the British Columbia Court of Appeal in British Columbia (DeputySheriff, Victoria) v. Canada (1992), (BC CA), 90 D.L.R. (4th) 680 (B.C.

C.A.) at p. 692 where, in obiter, theB.C.C.A. commented that s. 8 applied to enforcement proceedings under the Income Tax Act.) (emphasis added) [174] The registration of a writ of execution against the real or personal property of a debtor similarly does not constitute taking thatproperty from Mr. Brown. If such property is sold under execution, that sale occurs as part of a legislated process to satisfy a courtdetermined debt owing by the judgment debtor and the payment thereof to the judgment creditor, not to the state.

The state as to s. 8 ofthe Charter is not seizing property or its proceeds for itself. [175] A potential execution against Mr. Brown’s property resulting in the seizure of his property in satisfaction of arrears of courtordered child support is authorized by the Yukon MEA and the Execution Act. Such seizure is reasonable in principle give

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