2024 QCCS 326, 2024 QCCS 326

Droit de la famille — 24125 2024 QCCS 326 SUPERIOR COURT CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF montreal No.: 500-12-319524-132 DATE: February 1, 2024 _____________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE LOUIS CHARETTE, J.S.C. _____________________________________________________________________ P. B. Plaintiff v. C. D. Defendant X and REVENU QUEBEC Impleaded Parties _____________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT _____________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The parties were divorced by judgment dated January 11, 2016, which homologated their Consent to Judgment on Accessory Measures. Pursuant to

section 18 of the Consent to Judgment, C. D. undertook to pay child support for their youngest child X, who remained a minor at the time, in the amount of $389.69 per month which has since been indexed annually. [ 2 ] Defendant seeks the retroactive cancellation of the child support and reimbursement of sums paid since December 15, 2020, arguing that X reached adult age in March 2021, stopped attending school as of December 14, 2020 and began working. [ 3 ] Plaintiff consents to the cancellation of the child support because X is no longer dependent, but she contests the claim for reimbursement.

Although X is an impleaded party and received service of the Application she chose not to attend the hearing. [ 4 ] The issue is therefore whether Plaintiff should be ordered to reimburse Defendant the sums paid in child support since December 15, 2020.

Legal Principles [ 5 ] Section 17 (4) of the Divorce Act provides that the Court may modify an order for child support if a material change in the resources, needs or situation of one of the ex-spouses or child of full age has occurred since the initial order was issued. [1] [ 6 ] The fact that a child of full age becomes financially autonomous constitutes such a material change.

Whether an adult child remains dependent on his parents has evolved over time to take into account the reality of the child’s financial circumstances. [2] The jurisprudence generally recognizes that a child of full age who is attending school remains a dependant. [3] The fact that a child has completed her studies does not necessarily entail that she is no longer dependent as she must be given the opportunity to integrate the workforce. [4] [ 7 ] The analysis must take into account: 1. The child’s financial means; 2.

Whether the child has taken all necessary measures to ensure his or her own financial independence; 3. The reasons which may affect or prevent the child from gaining financial independence, including a physical or intellectual inability; 4. Other financial resources, including full- or part-time employment. [5]

[ 8 ] The cancellation of child support may generally not be retroactive to a date prior to the service of the application for modification of the support. [6] Such a retroactive modification of child support already paid should only be ordered in exceptional circumstances. [7] More particularly, because the right to child support belongs to the child, the reimbursement of child support paid in excess may cause a prejudice to the child and should therefore only be ordered in case of bad faith or fraud. [8] [ 9 ] The Court of Appeal has considered this issue on a number of occasions.

For example, in Droit de la famille – 09754 , [9] it held as follows: [66] Ces principes n’ont pas d’application lorsque le débiteur de la pension alimentaire pour enfants s’est montré « trop généreux » et qu’il réclame subséquemment le remboursement des sommes payées en sus de ce qu’il aurait dû verser.

Une telle obligation de rembourser pourrait causer un préjudice aux enfants puisque, dans le futur, le parent gardien pourrait être privé des sommes nécessaires à leurs besoins. [ 10 ] More recently, in Droit de la famille – 13675 , [10] the Court stated as follows: [41] D’une part, les sommes versées par l’appelant (293,54 $ par mois) ont été utilisées, du moins en partie, pour le bénéfice de son fils.

D’autre part, la jurisprudence a établi le principe suivant lequel le débiteur alimentaire ne peut, règle générale, faire annuler de façon rétroactive l’obligation alimentaire qu’il a exécutée avant la date de la signification de la requête, sauf en cas de fraude du créancier alimentaire. La raison est simple. Les sommes versées à

titre de pension alimentaire ne servent pas à faire des économies et, la plupart du temps, elles ont été dépensées. Obliger le créancier alimentaire à rembourser ces sommes aurait souvent comme effet de le placer dans une situation financière précaire. [ 11 ] Finally, the author Michel Tétrault summarizes the state of the law on the issue as follows: Il n’est que normal que le débiteur soit aussi diligent que le créancier lorsqu’il est question d’une demande de rétroactivité et que dans les deux cas on s’attarde au fardeau que l’on demande à la personne d’assumer.

Ainsi, en matière d’annulation d’arrérages, sauf les cas de fraude ou de mauvaise foi ou en cas de défaut du créancier alimentaire de respecter une ordonnance de la Cour d’aviser le débiteur alimentaire, il y aura rarement remboursement de la part du créancier alimentaire si l’obligation alimentaire a déjà été exécutée, souvent à cause du fardeau financier que cela lui occasionnerait, du retard du débiteur à entreprendre les procédures ou encore du fait qu’il ne s’est pas plaint de cet état de fait pendant une période de temps significative.

La Cour d’appel réitère dans l’arrêt Droit de la famille - 101052 que l’annulation rétroactive de la pension alimentaire constitue l’exception et qu’il appartient au débiteur alimentaire de faire diligence pour obtenir le remboursement des sommes payées en trop. […] Le principe retenu par la jurisprudence est donc qu’en matière de pension alimentaire, si l’annulation est rétroactive, le créancier alimentaire n’a pas à rembourser les sommes perçues en trop surtout si la pension a été versée au bénéfice des enfants qui seraient pénalisés par une ordonnance de remboursement.

Ce principe n’est pas applicable dans les cas de fraude, notamment si le parent gardien a omis d’informer le parent non gardien que l’enfant majeur n’était plus à charge ou que l’époux s’était remarié. [11] [References omitted] Discussion [ 12 ] Pursuant to the Consent to Judgment, Plaintiff was granted custody of X, and Defendant was granted rights of access. [12] Although Defendant had the duty to keep informed of X’s extracurricular activities, Plaintiff was required to provide Defendant with her school report cards as soon as possible following their reception. [ 13 ] X attended A College on a full-time basis for the fall 2020 session (August 31, to December 14, 2020), Winter 2021 session (January 27 to May 26, 2021) and Fall 2021 session (August 23 to December 8, 2021). [13] [ 14 ] On this basis, contrary to Defendant’s argument, if he is entitled to the reimbursement of child support paid, it would be as of December 9, 2021, and not December 15, 2020. [ 15 ] The issue nonetheless remains whether Plaintiff should be ordered to reimburse the child support received. [ 16 ] Neither Plaintiff nor X advised Defendant when the latter interrupted her studies in December 2021. [ 17 ] The evidence is silent as to what contact Defendant had with X up to November 2022 or what measures he took to verify whether she was still attending school.

However, in November 2022, he learned that she was no longer studying and X admitted so when they had the opportunity to speak. [ 18 ] Defendant immediately reached out to Plaintiff and requested that she take the necessary measures to put an end to the child support which Plaintiff undertook to do. Despite several weeks, Plaintiff did not take such measures. [ 19 ] Defendant therefore filed his application on April 19, 2023.

A safeguard order suspending the child support was issued on May 24, 2023, and remains in force. [14] [ 20 ] Plaintiff was aware that she was to provide Defendant with their daughter’s report cards but never did so therefore failing to respect her obligation pursuant to the Divorce Judgment and Consent to Judgment. She confirmed that although she was aware that X was no longer in school, she never advised Defendant. She considered the child support as his contribution to special expenses which Defendant had not contributed to since the divorce.

However, she also admits that, contrary to the terms of the Consent to Judgment, she

did not advise, however, Defendant of special expenses or did she seek their reimbursement. [15] [ 21 ] This conduct illustrates her bad faith in dealing with Defendant.

Not only did she not advise him that their daughter was no longer in school, she continued to accept the child support in payment of special expenses which she was not entitled to receive. [ 22 ] However, Defendant’s own conduct must be taken into account. [ 23 ] Although he had to be aware of the fact that his daughter had reached adult age in March 2021, he did not demonstrate that he took any measures to verify whether she was still attending school or working. As the debtor of the child support obligation, when he received no school report cards, he had an obligation to inform himself.

This constitutes a contributory fault. [ 24 ] Under the circumstances, Plaintiff must reimburse Defendant the sums received in child support of X but only as of December 2022. [ 25 ] Finally, the Court notes that should X return to school and be dependant on her parents, child support may be reinstated. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 26 ] GRANTS in

part C. D.’s Application to Modify Accessory Measures, Cancellation of Child Support and Safeguard Order dated April 19, 2023; [ 27 ] CANCELS C. D.’s obligation to pay to P. B. the child support for the benefit of X retroactively to December 1, 2022; [ 28 ] ORDERS P. B. to reimburse C. D. the child support received from December 1, 2022, to May 24, 2023; [ 29 ] Without judicial costs given the nature of the matter. __________________________________ LOUIS charette, j.S.C. P. B. Me Manuela Santos Me Manuela Santos avocate inc. Lawyer for Defendant Hearing date: January 19, 2024