2013 QCCA 1454, 2013 QCCA 1454

Droit de la famille — 132328 2013 QCCA 1454 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL N o : 500-09-023837-131 (500-12-315424-121) MINUTES OF THE HEARING DATE: August 26, 2013 THE HONOURABLE MADAM JUSTICE MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A. PETITIONER ATTORNEY G. D. Mtre Anna Colarusso KAPERONIS & COLARUSSO RESPONDENT ATTORNEY N. N. Mtre Raffaele Mastromonaco RAFFAELE MASTROMONACO, AVOCAT MOTION FOR LEAVE TO APPEAL FROM A JUDGMENT RENDERED ON JULY 26, 2013 BY THE HONOURABLE GARY D. D. MORRISSON OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, DISTRICT OF MONTREAL (Art. 29 and 511 C.C.P. )

Clerk: Asma Berrak Court Room : RC.18 HEARING 10 h 41: Beginning of the hearing. Identification of the parties. 10 h 43: Submission by Mtre Colarusso. 10 h 57: Submission by Mtre Mastromonaco. 11 h 06: Reply by Mtre Colarusso. 11 h 11: Suspension of the hearing 11 h 37: Resumption of the hearing. 11 h 37: Judgment - see page 3. 11 h 45: Conclusion of the hearing. Asma Berrak Clerk JUDGMENT [ 1 ] I am seized with a motion for leave to appeal of a judgment rendered on July 26 th 2013 by Justice Gary D.D.

Morrisson of the Superior Court, district of Montreal, on a motion for provisional measures and child support after an inquiry and hearing that lasted four days. [ 2 ] For the following reasons, I refuse the permission to appeal and I dismiss the motion without costs. [ 3 ] While presented under

section 26 Code of Civil Procedure (CCP), the motion has to be decided under sections 29 and 511 of the CCP. [ 4 ] In family cases, trial judges' decisions are to be given considerable deference. As stated by Gonthier, J. for the Supreme Court of Canada in M. (M.E.) v. L. (P.) : Before going on to analyze the circumstances of this case, I feel it is worth emphasizing the deference that must be accorded to the discretionary power of the trial judge under art. 559 C.C.Q. Clearly this principle is general in application, but it assumes even greater importance in family law for two reasons.

The situation arising where a family is in the process of dissolving is unique. First, financial matters must be dealt with quickly so as to avoid exhausting the parties' resources and allow them to start their lives anew. Second, this is an area where the parties have generally not kept documents that would provide evidence of each one's contribution. Oral evidence is thus of first importance, and assessing the credibility of witnesses is very much the function of the trial judge.

In a proceeding involving a compensatory allowance, a trial judge's error must be obvious for an appellate court to intervene. [1] (my emphasis) [ 5 ] The standard of appellate review is thus stringent and a Court of appeal will not reverse or modify a judgment unless it is vitiated by an error of law which, by its nature, affected the issue of the dispute or by a palpable and overriding error of fact (i.e. a substantial and

manifest error in the evaluation of the evidence, including the credibility of the witnesses). The appellant (or the person who is presenting the motion) bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of such errors and cannot simply ask the Court to reassess the evidence and substitute its own opinion for that of the trial judge. [ 6 ] Appellate courts show a high degree of deference to credibility assessment by a first judge. In a recent judgment, my colleague Mr. Justice Pierre J.

Dalphond, wrote: [6] En effet, je lui souligne que la Cour Suprême du Canada enseigne que les cours d'appel doivent faire preuve de retenue à l'égard des conclusions factuelles tirées par les juges du procès. [ 7 ] Cela est encore plus vrai lorsque le juge du procès précise un partage des responsabilités parentales, un exercice qui implique une évaluation du meilleur intérêt de l'enfant et de divers facteurs essentiellement factuels. La décision implique donc l'exercice d'une certaine discrétion. C'est pourquoi les cours d'appel doivent faire l'objet d'une très grande retenue : Van de Perre c.

Edwards , 2001 CSC 60 , [2001] 2 R.C.S. 1014 [2] . [7] I also refer to a decision rendered by my colleague Mr.

Justice Yves-Marie Morissette (on May 27th, 2013) : [1] Le jugement contre lequel la requérante souhaite se pourvoir est un jugement interlocutoire en matière de divorce et l’on sait, depuis les arrêts Droit de la famille — 121718 et Droit de la famille — 123147 , qu’un tel jugement n’est appelable que sur permission, conformément aux règles de droit commun, soit celles des articles 29 et 511 du Code de procédure civile. [2] Déjà, longtemps avant cet arrêt Droit de la famille — 121718 , la Cour était très réticente à se saisir d’un appel portant sur des mesures provisoires prononcées en matière familiale par la Cour supérieure.

Un ouvrage de doctrine fréquemment cité dit à ce sujet et avec raison que « [la Cour d’appel] n’intervient que si le premier juge s’est mal dirigé en droit ou a rendu une décision tout à fait déraisonnable eu égard à son caractère temporaire et interlocutoire ». Cette norme jurisprudentielle s’inscrit d’ailleurs dans le droit sillage d’un arrêt de la Cour suprême du Canada, Hickey c.

Hickey [3] . (References omitted) [ 8 ] In the present case, the applicant has failed to convince me that the judge would have made an error in law or a palpable and overriding error of fact. [ 9 ] In those circumstances, the sayings of our Court in Droit de la famille – 123147 [4] apply - I refer particularly to paragraph 4 of that decision : [4] In Elgner, the Ontario Court of Appeal noted further that reasons of sound judicial policy suggest that interim appeals in family matters should generally be discouraged because, in the words of Gillese, J.A., they "cause the parties additional expense, emotional anguish and delay". (Reference omitted) [ 10 ] Moreover, in my opinion, the applicant has failed to demonstrate that the pursuit of justice, within the meaning of

article 511 CCP requires that leave be granted. FOR THESE REASONS, I: [ 11 ] DISMISS the motion for permission to appeal without costs. MARIE ST-PIERRE, J.A.