R. v. Tremblay, 2022 BCPC 210

Citation: R. v. Tremblay 2022 BCPC 210 Date: 20220706 File No: 179797-1 Registry: Victoria IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. DUSTIN PIERRE TREMBLAY ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE L. MROZINSKI Counsel for the Crown: P. Weir Counsel for the Accused: C. Sutton Place of Hearing: Victoria, B.C. Date of Hearing: June 20, 2022 Date of Judgment: July 6, 2022

[ 1 ] THE COURT: So, Mr. Tremblay, I will just note for the record you are here today for sentencing on three firearms offences.

At the trial of this matter, I found you guilty on one count of the possession of a firearm without licence or authorization, contrary to s. 91(1) of the Criminal Code ; one count of occupying a vehicle knowing there was a prohibited firearm in the vehicle, contrary to s. 94(1) of the Criminal Code ; and finally, one count of possession of a loaded prohibited firearm without being the holder of a licence or registration, contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] The facts on which I found you guilty, Mr. Tremblay, are neither lengthy nor complicated. They are, for the most part, admitted.

That is largely due to the fact that most of the trial consisted of a voir dire on the admissibility of the firearm found on your person. Following the voir dire , I declined to exclude the evidence obtained by police, and that evidence, as well as some minimal facts from the voir dire , are admitted at trial. The rest of the evidence is composed of two admissions of fact. For the purposes of this sentencing, at least, the salient facts are as follows. [ 3 ] In the evening of May 7, 2020, while patting you down during roadside stop here in Victoria, Constable Kayiatos found on your person a loaded gun.

Specifically, it was located in the left front pocket of your pants. The weapon is a small derringer brand firearm, easily concealable yet capable of causing death or severe injury. The gun entered into evidence in this trial was loaded with two .22 calibre shells.

It was, as set out in one of the admissions of fact, fully functioning and a prohibited firearm as defined in the Criminal Code . [ 4 ] Also admitted in one of the two admissions of fact entered into the trial of this matter is that you possessed neither an authorization or a licence under which you were permitted to possess that firearm nor did you possess a registration certificate for the firearm. [ 5 ] Although not relevant to the charges on which you are being sentenced here today, Mr. Tremblay, it is nonetheless notable that on that same evening of May 7, 2020, Mr.

Summerville [phonetic], the tow truck operator, towed your Silverado truck from the scene of the roadside stop to a storage facility. Once parked, Mr. Summerville entered your vehicle to search for insurance papers and in a pouch in the back of the driver's seat he located a vial containing 40 rounds of .22 calibre ammunition. Mr.

Summerville secured that vial and turned it over to police on May 8, 2020. [ 6 ] Both the .22 calibre bullets discovered in the derringer firearm and seized by police on May 7, 2020, as well as the 40 founds of .22 calibre ammunition contained in the vial are "ammunition capable of being discharged in the prohibited firearm", contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code . [ 7 ] The issue in this sentencing hearing, Mr.

Tremblay, concerns the form of custodial sentence that this court should impose in order to address these offences in a manner that meets the purposes and principles of sentencing set out in s. 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code . The Crown has submitted three authorities in support of its sentencing position, which is a custodial sentence of 24 months less a day. [ 8 ] On your behalf, Ms. Sutton seeks a conditional sentence order of two years less a day.

Both agree that whatever custodial sentence I impose should be followed by a two-year probationary order focusing on your rehabilitation and, of course, dissuading you from reoffending as best that order could. [ 9 ] Mr. Tremblay, you are before the court aged 38 with a criminal record now but one that post-dates these offences. I agree with your counsel that in these circumstances you are to be sentenced for these offences as a first time offender.

You are also an Indigenous offender of Metis background, although I have no additional information concerning your Indigenous background or the manner in which it may have contributed to these offences. [ 10 ] In submissions on your behalf, counsel indicates that you suffer from a number of physical conditions, some of which are severe and painful. You self-medicate and suffer from a drug abuse disorder in any event. Certainly your offending behaviour is attributed at least in part to drug use.

Still, counsel submits on your behalf in this sentencing that the weapon found on you was one your friend had left in your vehicle which you simply put in your pocket. [ 11 ] I find this difficult to believe, Mr. Tremblay, and I do not have to accept that submission. In some regards, it does not matter. You had the gun in your possession, it was loaded, it was not argued at trial that you were unaware it was loaded. You obviously knew you had no licence to possess this or any other weapon. [ 12 ] The fact that you seek to minimize your responsibility on sentencing is, in my view, troubling.

Of course, you pled not guilty to these charges and you are entitled to maintain that plea. It is not a factor one way or the other on sentencing. [ 13 ] At the same time, you cannot be credited with expressing remorse about these offences and I find your effort to minimize your involvement in these offences also signals a lack of remorse.

Neither of those factors bode well for your prospects of rehabilitation. [ 14 ] As I said during submissions on this sentencing hearing, I find it somewhat troubling that once police had felt the weapon in your pocket you neglected at least to caution the officer it might be dangerous. I accept counsel's submissions that you did what you did to avoid a charge. That is understandable, I suppose from a certain prospective, but aside from carrying the loaded weapon, itself a dangerous act, you did put the officer potentially at least in harm's way.

I am loathe to, and I do not call this an aggravating factor on sentence, but I think it is something you should consider from time to time as you reflect on these offences. [ 15 ] Aside from these circumstances, I understand from your own comments to the court that you are a father. Whatever parenthood you may have engaged in to date, I do not know. I do know that at the time of sentencing at least, your thoughts were with your child and your hope of spending time with that child in the near future. [ 16 ] The key factor emphasized by your counsel in this sentencing hearing, Mr.

Tremblay, aside from your Indigenous status, is that

you have been accepted for treatment at the therapeutic recovery centre in Saanich. Ms. Dolan from the Therapeutic Recovery Centreprovided confirmation, indeed, of your acceptance. Additionally, Ms. Dolan advised the court the centre looked forward to working withyou on your long term addiction disorder with a view to addressing the intergenerational trauma experienced by so many Indigenousoffenders. That is the sort of counselling that TRC appears particularly adept at providing. [17] Mr.

Tremblay, you also indicated in your comments to the court that recovery would be good for you and by that I accept that atsome level you are ready for treatment, though not yet ready to fully accept responsibility for these offences. [18] In addition to considering the circumstances of the offence and the offender, the court will typically consider impact on anyvictim or victims arising out of an offence. Here there are no actual victims but as the case authorities made clear, the proliferation ofillegal weaponry is of increasing concern to Canadian courts.

The possession of such weapons in circumstances such as at issue here posedire consequences for us all, including police. [19] The nature of the offence, the circumstances of the offender, are critical factors that must be considered in arriving at a fitsentence. At s. 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code, Parliament has set out the principles and objectives of sentencing that apply in everycase.

Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, alongwith crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing justsanctions that have one or more of a number of objectives.

Those include to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims orto the community that is caused by unlawful conduct, to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences, to separateoffenders from society where necessary, to assist in rehabilitating offenders, to provide reparations for harm done to the victims or to thecommunity, and to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders and an acknowledgement of the harm done to the victims or to thecommunity. Not every objective applies in every case.

Some sentences may attract but a few, others nearly all. [20] The question is, what sentencing objectives are necessary to import into a sentence in a given case in order to meet thefundamental purpose of sentencing, in order to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just,peaceful and safe society. [21] In the cases of offences, particularly those contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code, the paramount sentencing objectives arepublic safety, general and specific deterrence, as well as denunciation. That, Mr.

Tremblay, is because of the inherently dangerous natureof the offence as captured by s. 95(1), among others. [22] That inherent danger can either be tempered or exacerbated by an offender's role in the offence, a reflection itself of the offender'smoral culpability. In R. v. Holt 2015 BCCA 302 , [2015] B.C.J. No. 1482 the court quotes from the following passage of theCourt of Appeal in R. v. Nur at paragraph 51 and 52 which sets out the kind of conduct captured particularly by s. 95(1): The scope of s. 95 is best understood by considering the range of potential offenders caught by that section.

At one end of the spectrumstands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade. By anyreasonable measure, this person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public. At the otherend of the spectrum stands the otherwise law-abiding responsible gun owner who has possession of an unloaded restricted or prohibitedfirearm, but with readily accessible ammunition stored nearby.

That person has a licence and registration certificate for the firearm, butknowingly possesses the firearm at . . . [that] place that falls outside of the terms of that licence. That person’s conduct may well poselittle, if any, risk to others. I would characterize that misconduct as more in the nature of a regulatory offence. [23] And it continues: There is no doubt that the vast majority of persons charged under s. 95 fall at the true crime end of the spectrum. Most guns that are thesubject matter of a s. 95 charge exist entirely outside of the regulatory scheme established under the Firearms Act.

Most people chargedunder s. 95 would never think of applying for a licence and, were they to apply, would never obtain a licence or a registration certificate.Furthermore, the vast majority of s. 95 charges arise in situations where the possession of the firearm is directly connected to criminalactivity and/or poses some other immediate danger to other persons. [24] In addition to the sentencing objectives, every sentencing judge must be mindful of the fundamental principle of sentencingwhich is proportionality.

That is, that the sentence must reflect the moral culpability of the offender as well as the seriousness of theoffence. The principle of proportionality requires consideration in this case both of the nature of the offence and your responsibility forthis offence, Mr. Tremblay, or your role at the time. There are few factors limiting your moral culpability for these offences, Mr.Tremblay, but for your indigeneity.

Even without any evidence, such as a Gladue report outlining how your Indigenous statuscontributed to your offending behaviour, it is on its own a factor that lessens the moral culpability in the Indigenous offender. [25] On the other hand, as the cases the Crown submits in the sentencing demonstrate, these offences are grave and appear tocommand significant sentences. [26] The Crown relies on three such cases. I have considered these cases and while I find them instructive, I find I also agree withdefence counsel that they are not strictly on point.

At issue in each is the range of sentence for these kinds of offences when the Crownhas proceeded by indictment. I do not disagree with Mr. Weir for the Crown that as a general rule the way in which the Crown proceedsshould not, other than its impact on the availability of certain sentences, necessarily govern a court's sentencing decisions. [27] I agree, also, that whether these cases proceeded by indictment changes nothing about the sentencing objectives discussed.

Iaccept the primary sentencing objectives must be the safety of the public as well as deterrence and denunciation. [28] At the same time, it is the case that the focus of the analysis in each of the cases submitted by the Crown is on the appropriaterange of sentence which the courts have determined should start at 30 months. In each of the cases the courts ultimately determined thatthe sentence had to be at least 30 months, with some being higher, and as such a CSO was not available. Each case holds that it is only inthe exceptional case that a sentencing court judge should go below the low end of the range.

It follows that it is not strictly correct to findthese cases stand for the proposition that a conditional sentence order, even where the Crown has proceeded summarily, is only available

in an exceptional case. A CSO is manifestly available here, as the Crown has proceeded summarily.

It is a sentencing option open to the court and one the court must consider in the ordinary course. [ 29 ] The test to be applied, in my view, is not whether this is an exceptional case justifying a CSO but whether a fit sentence in this case, given these circumstances, is a CSO as opposed to real jail time. [ 30 ] Having said all this, I will note however briefly that the defendants in each of the Crown's authorities submitted for this sentencing received significant real jail time because of the sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence despite some significant mitigating factors. [ 31 ] In R. v.

Holt , for example, our Court of Appeal upheld a sentence appeal by the Crown substituting a sentence of 18 months for 30 months for the offence of possession of an unlicensed, loaded restricted firearm, with a concurrent sentence of one year for being in a vehicle knowing the firearm was present. [ 32 ] Mr. Holt was, at the time of sentencing, 66 years of age with no criminal record. He lived primarily on CPP and social assistance, basically at the margins of society. He suffered from drug addiction. At the time of the offence Mr.

Holt was driving in a vehicle in which was located a loaded .22 calibre revolver and a box containing 43 cartridges capable of being discharged in the gun. Aggravating factors in that case included that Mr. Holt was found with the gun in a heavily populated area, that it was in a backpack and readily accessible, that Mr. Holt had consumed alcohol and crack cocaine, and that the firearm had never been registered in Canada nor had Mr. Holt ever had a licence for it. [ 33 ] Here it can be fairly said that you, Mr. Tremblay, were carrying a loaded gun in a vehicle in a reasonably heavily populated urban area.

The gun was loaded and readily accessible for use in your front pants pocket. As in Holt , you had no licence and at the time of the offence at least, no criminal record. So there are a number of parallels between your case and that of Mr. Holt, an older gentleman, with no record, who nonetheless received a long custodial sentence. [ 34 ] In R. v. Kachuol , 2017 BCCA 1591 the Court of Appeal again granted a Crown sentence appeal by substituting a three year custodial sentence for a conditional sentence imposed by the sentencing judge. Mr.

Kachuol, age 23 at the time of the offence, was also travelling in a vehicle with a loaded gun at the ready. The sentencing judge granted Mr. Kachuol a CSO, thus going well below the low end of the range for sentencing for these types of offences when the Crown proceeds by indictment. It was in error, the reviewing court found, to have characterized Mr. Kachuol's possession as anything other than at the criminal end of the spectrum.

He was, as I say, ultimately sentenced to three years of imprisonment despite a number of significant mitigating factors. [ 35 ] On this point, the court writes at paragraph 29 that: Mr. Kachuol's possession of the loaded prohibited handgun in a moving car, strategically placed for ready access and entirely outside of the regulatory framework, posed a real and immediate danger to those in his orbit. The risk was increased by his consumption of alcohol and the urban environment in which he possessed the "crime gun".

Other aggravating factors, such as his prior criminal record and firearms prohibition, were also present. Given the serious nature of his offence, his degree of moral culpability and the paramountcy of deterrence and denunciation, and despite his positive personal attributes and rehabilitative prospects, a sentence below the bottom end of the "criminal range" established in Holt cannot be justified. Mr.

Kachuol's case was not exceptionally unique or even favourably distinguishable from Nur or Holt in any material sense. [ 36 ] It follows that the conditional sentence the judge imposed was unfit. [ 37 ] On the one hand, Mr. Tremblay, you will appreciate that unlike Mr. Kachuol, you have effectively come before the court as a first time offender on these offences, nor is there any evidence you were under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the material time. On the other hand, there are far fewer mitigating factors in your case than Mr. Kachuol's. [ 38 ] Finally, in R. v.

Padda , 2019 BCCA 351 the court dismissed a sentence appeal on a sentence of 30 months for one count of possessing a prohibited firearm loaded with ammunition, contrary to s. 95(1) of the Code . In doing so, the court held that a 30-month sentence is at the bottom end of the range for a s. 95(1) offence of "a true crime nature". It ruled further that the sentencing judge could depart from that range if the offender's circumstances were exceptional so as to warrant a departure from the general range.

The various mitigating factors in Padda were highly significant yet did not serve to outweigh the other sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation. The facts in Padda are, mind you, slightly more egregious than here, in that Mr. Padda pointed a loaded firearm at an employee, if only in jest. Mitigating circumstances included his impressive personal story, clear evidence of remorse, and a solid commitment to rehabilitation. [ 39 ] In considering the kinds of cases that have attracted a conditional sentence order where a real custodial sentence would otherwise be fit, the court discusses R. v.

Sellars , 2018 BCCA 195 and R. v. Schneider , 2019 BCCA 310 . Sellars is a case involving a conviction for s. 95(1) firearms offence and at paragraph 29 of Padda , the court writes as follows: In Sellars , as the judge here noted at para. 41, the Aboriginal offender’s moral blameworthiness was reduced by factors outlined in his Gladue report. Mr. Sellars had been pressured and socialised into a gang and introduced to substance abuse at a young age. In spite of these circumstances, Mr.

Sellars took “exceptional rehabilitative steps,” coming to grips with his substance abuse and disassociating from the people involved in his old lifestyle . . . On appeal, this Court found the sentencing court’s suspension of sentence to be unfit, but imposed a conditional sentence order of two years less a day in its place. [ 40 ] In Schneider , the court writes at paragraph 30 of Padda at the time of the offence, Mr.

Schneider was chronically homeless, had a sad history of alcohol and drug abuse, addiction that had started early in childhood, had been repeatedly sexually abused by a person he trusted and in a position of authority. He committed the offence while smoking heroin. An undercover officer had initiated the purpose of $20 worth of heroin and despite his long term drug addiction, Mr. Schneider had engaged in extraordinary rehabilitative efforts. [ 41 ] In contrast, the court continues at paragraph 31 of Padda , Mr. Padda was mature, responsible, with means. In effect, he had no

business buying the gun or storing the gun, much less brandishing it about and pointing it at his employees, whatever his state of intoxication. The Court of Appeal agreed that Mr.

Padda's personal circumstances fell far short of exceptional circumstances. [ 42 ] Assuming without deciding that these cases do not require this court to find exceptional circumstances before imposing a CSO, they signal without doubt that the gravity of these offences, possessing a loaded firearm in a vehicle without any licence or registration, in a manner that is, frankly, only consistent with criminal conduct, and certainly far from any regulatory framework, will always outweigh other sentencing objectives, such as rehabilitation, even where the offender is absolutely, clearly committed to rehabilitation, even where they are clearly remorseful, and even where it is clear they are unlikely to ever reoffend again.

The cases in which a CSO has been found to be fit are cases in which the moral blameworthiness of the offender is significantly reduced because of the sheer number of Gladue factors present on the record. [ 43 ] In this instance, with no guidance from a Gladue report, for example, I can glean at least some Gladue factors. These would be separation from community, often the cause of a lack of background information. I would include the evidence of a drug abused disorder. That, too, is sadly a common Gladue factor.

There may be any number of other factors present and these could, perhaps, explain the offending behaviour or at least the extent to which the Gladue factors contributed to these offences at your age, Mr. Tremblay. [ 44 ] Even without that knowledge I am prepared to accept that your moral responsibility for these offences must be considered to be somewhat diminished by reason of your Indigenous status. [ 45 ] In determining whether a CSO would be a fit sentence, I note, as I said earlier, it is an available sentence in a

summary proceeding. I must also ask whether you could serve a CSO safely in the community, Mr. Tremblay, and though I am not entirely certain that is the case, I will accept it as more likely than not. [ 46 ] It is the last part of the test for a CSO that causes me the greatest concern in your case. To grant a CSO, when the preceding two factors are satisfied, I must be certain it meets the purposes and principles of sentencing. I have identified those earlier in these reasons. The sentencing objectives that meet these purposes, at least in this case, militate against a CSO.

Even accepting, as I must, that a CSO can meet the sentencing objectives of deterrence and denunciation, it cannot in every case. To find a CSO proposed in this case, one that sees you spending a considerable amount of time at the Therapeutic Recovery Centre is a fit sentence is to favour your rehabilitation over and above these other sentencing objectives. It is to place primacy on the sentencing objectives of rehabilitation in a case where the offender signals little or no remorse and minimizes his role in the offending behaviour. [ 47 ] Mr. Tremblay, you are being sentenced for serious offences.

The carrying of a loaded gun at the ready in a motor vehicle in the urban area poses a serious risk of danger to the public. It is conduct that must be denounced in the strongest possible terms. Deterrence, both specific and general, are important sentencing objectives that cannot lightly be set aside no matter the strength of your current commitment to treatment. [ 48 ] The mitigating factors in this case, as well as the factors that reduce your moral culpability, are not sufficient to outweigh these objectives. [ 49 ] Mr. Tremblay, as you have heard Ms.

Dolan tell the court, treatment at the TRC can be available after you serve your sentence. If you are minded to engage in treatment, it will be available to you. At this juncture, however, in my view a CSO is not a fit sentence. [ 50 ] For these reasons, I intend to impose a sentence of imprisonment. The Crown seeks a sentence of two years less a day. It is, in general, a fit sentence for these three offences, however, I do accept some decrease in your moral culpability, Mr. Tremblay, given the Gladue factors.

While I do not in this case consider those factors sufficient to ground a CSO they should serve to reduce your sentence to some degree. [ 51 ] Given the Gladue factors, combined with the seriousness of the offences, I find a fit sentence is a global sentence of 18 months' duration. [ 52 ] Mr.

Tremblay, for the offences in this case, as I say, I intend to sentence you to a global sentence of 18 months' in duration. [ 53 ] On Counts 1 and 2, Madam Clerk, the sentences will be 12 months each count, to be served concurrently with one another. [ 54 ] On Count 3, the count contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code , the count will be 18 months, also to be served concurrently with the sentences on Counts 1 and 2. [ 55 ] I will express that sentence in days as being a sentence of 540 days. I will stand to be corrected, but as I understand it, you have as of today been in custody for 64 days. [ 56 ] CNSL P.

WEIR: Your Honour, my friend and I -- [ 57 ] THE COURT: Okay. [ 58 ] CNSL P. WEIR: -- both came up with 73 days -- [ 59 ] THE COURT: Oh, 73. [ 60 ] CNSL P. WEIR: -- which equates to 110 -- [ 61 ] THE COURT: A hundred and ten credit. Okay. So I will express the sentence as a sentence of 540 days and you have now been in custody for 73 real days, when -- you are entitled, therefore, to credit in the amount of 110 days. I will have Madam Clerk deduct the 110 days from the sentence I am imposing. That leaves you 430 days to serve on these offences.

[ 62 ] I have indicated earlier, Mr. Tremblay, that it was agreed among counsel that in addition to the sentence that I impose today there would be a probation order. So your sentence would be followed by a probation order for a period of two years and I intend to impose that as well. [ 63 ] Following the termination or the expiration of your custodial sentence, you will serve a period of probation for two years. I will set out the conditions of the probation order now, Mr. Tremblay. [ 64 ] I appreciate that I have gone on at some length on the sentencing reasons.

You have probably heard a sentence that you were hoping not to get but I do have to cover off the conditions of the probation order, and for your own convenience, I need to confirm with you whether or not you understand those conditions and whether or not you agree to comply with those conditions. [ 65 ] So I will ask you, Mr. Tremblay, are you ready to hear this information now? [ 66 ] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [ 67 ] THE COURT: Okay. So this is a two year probationary order. The conditions are as follows. You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour, attend at court when required to do so by the court.

You must also notify the court or a probation officer in advance of any change of your address and promptly of any change of employment or occupation. [ 68 ] Within two business days' of your release from custody, you will report in person to the Victoria Community Corrections office at 836 Courtney Street in Victoria, British Columbia. I will set the telephone number out. It is 250-387-6321. But the requirement is in- person reporting within two business days' of your release from custody and thereafter as directed by the probation officer. [ 69 ] Mr.

Tremblay, when you report, you must advise that probation officer of the address where you are staying or living, as well as your telephone number if you have one. You cannot change that address or that telephone number during the period of probation without first notifying your probation officer. [ 70 ] Mr. Tremblay, you will attend at, participate in and successfully complete any intake assessment, counselling or program as may be directed by your probation officer.

That counselling or programming should include programming or counselling for alcohol and drug abuse disorder. [ 71 ] You must not possess directly or indirectly any weapons defined by the Criminal Code , including any firearms and ammunition, crossbows or prohibited weapons, restricted weapons, devices or explosive substances; anything used, designed to be used or intended for use in causing death or injury to any person or to threaten or intimidate any person; any imitation of all of the above, including any compressed air guns or BB guns or pellet guns; and any related authorizations, licences and registration certificates, and you must not apply for any of those. [ 72 ] The offence contrary to s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code calls for a mandatory s. 109 firearms prohibition.

The Crown seeks a restriction for 10 years and I accept that is appropriate in the case. [ 73 ] For a period of 10 years from your release from custody you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, other than a prohibited firearm or a restricted firearm, and any crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, and explosive substance.

That begins as of today and ends not earlier than 10 years' after the date of your release from custody. [ 74 ] You are also prohibited from possessing any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, and prohibited ammunition for life. [ 75 ] So that is the s. 109 order which is mandatory under the Criminal Code . [ 76 ] I will return to the probation order, Mr. Tremblay. There is the mandatory conditions of keeping the peace. You know, you have to report within two days' of your release. You know you have to provide your residence and your telephone number.

You need to take counselling, and you are banned from possessing those firearms and weapons that I have set out. [ 77 ] Do you understand the conditions of the probation order, Mr. Tremblay? [ 78 ] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [ 79 ] THE COURT: Do you agree to comply with those conditions, Mr. Tremblay? [ 80 ] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [ 81 ] THE COURT: All right. I am obliged to advise you that if you are to breach a condition of your probation order, you should know that a warrant for your arrest could be issued and you could find yourself detained in custody until the matter is dealt with.

Do you understand that? [ 82 ] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [ 83 ] THE COURT: And if you have any concerns about the condition of the order, if you are having trouble complying with any of the conditions, rather than breaching, Mr. Tremblay, you have an option, and that is to come back into court, talk to a judge about the condition with your concerns in mind. I do not know what the outcome will be but that is an option rather than breaching. Do you understand that as well? [ 84 ] THE ACCUSED: Yes. [ 85 ] THE COURT: All right. So I am going to dispense with your signature on the order, Mr. Tremblay.

In addition, I will indicate

on the record that the order does not have to be read out to you again, given your comments on the record, but I expect the probation officer will go over it with you once you are released from custody, and you also get a copy of the order as well, Mr. Tremblay. So you will have a written copy of what we set out. [ 86 ] That leaves the victim impact surcharge, Ms. Sutton? [ 87 ] CNSL C. SUTTON: Yes, Your Honour. I'm going to ask Your Honour not to impose it. [ 88 ] THE COURT: Yeah. I am going to waive the victim impact surcharge, Mr.

Tremblay, firstly because I have sentenced you to a significant period of time in custody and I know that it would work an undue hardship on you, in all of the circumstances. So that is waived. [ 89 ] Anything else? [ 90 ] CNSL P. WEIR: Your Honour, I'd ask for forfeiture of the firearm and ammunition, please. [ 91 ] THE COURT: All right. Is there -- [ 92 ] CNSL C. SUTTON: No, it should -- [ 93 ] THE COURT: -- any order to -- [ 94 ] CNSL P. WEIR: I don't have one to pass up, Your Honour. [ 95 ] THE COURT: Okay. Okay, all right. Yes, I will grant that. That is not disputed. [96] CNSL P.

WEIR: Thank you. [97] THE COURT: That is fine. All right, thank you. (REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED)