2015 QCCA 348, 2015 QCCA 348

Adoption — 152 2015 QCCA 348 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-08-000436-149 (525-43-006500-124) (525-43-006502-120) DATE: February 25, 2015 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. CLAUDE C. GAGNON, J.A. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. Nº 525-43-006500-124 A APPELLANT – Applicant v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC RESPONDENT – Intervener and Y, child D, father E, mother IMPLEADED PARTIES – Impleaded parties Nº 525-43-006502-120 A APPELLANT – Applicant v.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF QUEBEC RESPONDENT – Intervener and X, child B, father C, mother IMPLEADED PARTIES – Impleaded parties JUDGMENT * [ 1 ] THE COURT: On the appeal from the judgment of the Court of Quebec, Youth Division, District A (the Honourable Madam Justice Ann-Marie Jones), rendered on December 16, 2013, that dismissed the appellant's motions for adoption of the impleaded parties X and Y; [ 2 ] For the reasons of Bich J.A., with which Gagnon and Schrager JJ.A. concur: [ 3 ] DISMISSES the appeal, without costs. MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A. CLAUDE C. GAGNON, J.A. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. Mtre Mark J. Gruszczynski

GRUSZCZYNSKI, ROMOFF For the appellant Mtre Nathalie Fiset DIRECTION GÉNÉRALES DES AFFAIRES JURIDIQUES ET LÉGISLATIVES BERNARD, ROY (JUSTICE-QUÉBEC) For the respondent, Attorney General of Quebec Date of hearing: September 11, 2014 REASONS OF BICH, J.A. [ 4 ] The appeal raises various questions regarding the adoption of foreign nationals of full age who have been on Quebec soil for several years, having settled here in violation of immigration laws when they were minors. I.

CONTEXT [ 5 ] In October of 2012, the appellant, a Canadian citizen domiciled in Quebec, began legal proceedings before the Court of Quebec to adopt her two nephews, the impleaded parties X and Y. Both are originally from Saint Vincent and the Grenadines where they lived with their grandparents (the appellant's parents) from the time of their birth [1] or soon after, until July of 2009. That is when they came to Canada as tourists, [2] with a letter from their parents authorizing them to visit their aunt.

Their stay, which was ostensibly meant to last only one month to give the grandparents a bit of a break, was extended. In fact, the two young men (who were 16 and 14 years old at the time) never went back to their country of origin. The appellant failed to take the necessary steps to regularize their situation with the immigration authorities, and they remained in Canada illegally, in semi-hiding, as described in the following paragraph of the trial judgment: [13] Les personnes majeures habitent avec la requérante depuis leur arrivée au Canada.

Cependant, n'ayant pas de statut de résidents permanents au Canada, ils n'ont ni carte d'assurance maladie ni carte d'assurance sociale et n'ont jamais été inscrits à l'école. Leur scolarisation s'est limitée à suivre des cours de français, d'anglais et de mathématiques, du lundi au vendredi de 18 heures à 20 heures, à l'Association A. [ 6 ] According to her testimony at trial, after spending time with her nephews for a few weeks and developing a great deal of affection for them, the appellant formed the plan to adopt them, as they had long been abandoned and had no contact with their parents.

This plan also took into account the ever-increasing inability of the aged and sickly grandparents to care for the two teenagers. When the appellant saw that she got on well with them, she decided to take responsibility for their care, having always contributed to it by sending them money or clothing during their childhood. [ 7 ] The appellant then consulted a lawyer, [3] who counselled her in the manner to implement her plan to adopt. [ 8 ] In April of 2010, the appellant obtained consent to adoption from her nephews' parents.

The consent was not acted upon immediately, and it was only in the fall of 2012 that steps were taken in this regard. In the meantime, the appellant claims that she continued to care for her nephews as if they were her own sons, and they, for their part, considered her to be like a mother. [ 9 ] In October of 2012, pursuant to art. 545 of the Civil Code of Quebec (“ C.C.Q. ”), the appellant asked to adopt X, the eldest, who attained the age of majority on […], 2011 (file 525-43-006502-120).

She also sought an order of placement for the adoption of Y, who was still a minor, pursuant to art. 566 C.C.Q . [4] (file 525-43-006500-124). Concurrently, on November 1, 2012, Y brought a motion before the Superior Court seeking simple emancipation to [ translation ] “establish his own domicile in Quebec” (“ établir son propre domicile au Québec ”). [5] This motion refers to the proceedings taken by the appellant to have Y placed for adoption.

The Superior Court ordered his emancipation on November 20, 2012. [ 10 ] Because Y was of full age when the adoption applications were finally heard by the trial judge on March 25, 2013, [6] the motion for a placement order was transformed into an application for the adoption of a person of full age. [7] II. JUDGMENT, APPEAL AND GROUNDS OF APPEAL [ 11 ] On December 16, 2013, the trial judge dismissed the appellant's motions. In her view, the children were in Canada illegally and could not have their domicile or even their residence here, within the meaning of arts. 75 ff. C.C.Q .

Moreover, there was nothing that truly tied them to Quebec. That being the case, the provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec regarding the local adoption of children, including children of full age ( art. 545 C.C.Q. ), did not apply. Because the appellant had not complied with the rules of international adoption provided in arts. 563 ff. C.C.Q ., her application was dismissed.

In the alternative, the judge deemed that, in any event, the adoption application did not comply with art. 545 C.C.Q . because the appellant had not [ translation ] “acted in the best interests of her nephews because she kept them with her in Canada without legal status, thereby depriving them of their right to an education and the right to work” (“ veillé au meilleur intérêt de ses neveux alors qu'en les gardant auprès d'elle sans statut au Canada, elle les privait du droit à l'éducation et du droit d'occuper un emploi ”). [8] [ 12 ] Basically, the trial judge saw in the manner in which the appellant acted a strategy to circumvent Canada's and Quebec's immigration laws.

* * [ 13 ] The appellant appeals the judgment. She argues that the judge committed a number of errors in her analysis of the provisions of immigration laws and failed to consider, among other things, that X and Y might be authorized to stay in Canada and obtain permanent residence on humanitarian grounds under applicable programmes. [9] [ 14 ] The appellant also argues that the judge erred by allowing immigration laws to take precedence over the provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec concerning domicile and residence. She therefore erred in finding that X and Y are neither domiciled nor residing in Quebec.

Finally, she incorrectly considered the situation to be an international adoption instead of the local adoption that it is, and more specifically an adoption that complies with art. 545 C.C.Q. , as acknowledged in E.M.V.D. , [10] where steps similar to those taken here were given favourable treatment by the court. [11] [ 15 ] The respondent, for its part, argues that until the children were of full age, they were domiciled with their tutors (likely their parents in this case) i.e. in Saint Vincent.

They are in fact still domiciled there because [ translation ] “attaining full age did not change their domicile as they are on Quebec soil illegally” (“ l'atteinte de la majorité n'a pas pour effet de changer [leur] domicile puisqu'ils sont illégalement en sol québécois ”). [12] The mere fact that they are physically present in Quebec does not result in a change of domicile, which is a question of law, not of fact. [ 16 ] Moreover, the respondent argues that even if the Court were to recognize that the children are domiciled in Quebec, their adoption could only take place in compliance with: (1) the rules regarding consent to and eligibility for adoption in force in Saint Vincent (art. 3092 C.C.Q. ); and (2) the requirements of arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q. , [13] which cannot be evaded by the mere passage of time.

The appellant, however, did not adduce evidence of Saint Vincent law with respect to consent and eligibility nor comply with arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q. , and the judge therefore had no choice but to dismiss her application. The Court should similarly dismiss the appeal. Finally, and regardless of the rules of international adoption, if the case were considered under art. 545 C.C.Q. , it would be apparent that the condition set out under the first paragraph of that provision is not met because the appellant did not stand in loco parentis towards her nephews.

Counsel for the respondent added at the hearing that she took no position on whether the second paragraph applies. III. ANALYSIS [ 17 ] Although, with all due respect, I do not share the trial judge's opinion on the determination of the children's domicile or the application of arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q. to persons who are now of full age, I nevertheless find, as she did, that there is no cause to grant the adoption sought by the appellant. A.

Domicile and immigration [ 18 ] The question of the children's domicile is a crucial one since, if their domicile is foreign, the rules governing their eligibility for adoption and the necessary consent are those of the foreign law referred to in art. 3092 C.C.Q. (it being understood that jurisdiction of the Quebec courts would then be justified under art. 3147 C.C.Q. because the appellant, who brought the adoption application, is domiciled in Quebec). [ 19 ] The principal provisions of the Civil Code of Quebec concerning the notions of domicile and residence are as follows: [14] 75 .

Le domicile d'une personne, quant à l'exercice de ses droits civils, est au lieu de son principal établissement. 75 . The domicile of a person, for the exercise of his civil rights, is at the place of his principal establishment. 76 . Le changement de domicile s'opère par le fait d'établir sa résidence dans un autre lieu, avec l'intention d'en faire son principal établissement. La preuve de l'intention résulte des déclarations de la personne et des circonstances. 76 . Change of domicile is effected by a person establishing his residence in another place with the intention of making it his principal establishment.

The proof of such intention results from the declarations of the person and from the circumstances of the case. 77 . La résidence d'une personne est le lieu où elle demeure de façon habituelle; en cas de pluralité de résidences, on considère, pour l'établissement du domicile, celle qui a le caractère principal. 77 . The residence of a person is the place where he ordinarily resides; if a person has more than one residence, his principal residence is considered in establishing his domicile. 78 . La personne dont on ne peut établir le domicile avec certitude est réputée domiciliée au lieu de sa résidence.

À défaut de résidence, elle est réputée domiciliée au lieu où elle se trouve ou, s'il est inconnu, au lieu de son dernier domicile connu. 78 . A person whose domicile cannot be determined with certainty is deemed to be domiciled at the place of his residence. A person who has no residence is deemed to be domiciled at the place where he lives or, if that is unknown, at the place of his last known domicile. [...] (...)

80 . Le mineur non émancipé a son domicile chez son tuteur. Lorsque les père et mère exercent la tutelle mais n'ont pas de domicile commun, le mineur est présumé domicilié chez celui de ses parents avec lequel il réside habituellement, à moins que le tribunal n'ait autrement fixé le domicile de l'enfant. 80 . An unemancipated minor is domiciled with his tutor.

Where the father and mother exercise the tutorship but have no common domicile, the minor is presumed to be domiciled with the parent with whom he usually resides unless the court has fixed the domicile of the child elsewhere. [ 20 ] Art. 171 C.C.Q. must also be considered: 171 . Le mineur émancipé peut établir son propre domicile; il cesse d'être sous l'autorité de ses père et mère. 171 .

An emancipated minor may establish his own domicile, and he ceases to be under the authority of his father and mother. [ 21 ] According to the judge, the appellant's nephews, who were in Quebec in violation of federal and provincial legislative provisions on immigration, could not be domiciled in Quebec, that is, they could not have their principal establishment here within the meaning of art. 75 C.C.Q .: [51] Le terme « principal établissement » s'entend comme l'ensemble des éléments qui rattachent la personne à un lieu donné.

Ces éléments sont, entre autres, la famille, la propriété, le travail, les études, etc. [References omitted.] [52] Or, dans les présents dossiers, rien ne rattache les personnes majeures au Québec si ce n'est le fait que leur tante y habite. Leur famille est à St-Vincent-et-les-Grenadines, ils n'ont pas de propriété ni de biens au Québec, ils n'y occupent pas un emploi et ne sont pas étudiants au Québec.

Il ne reste donc que leur volonté de s'établir au Québec, ce qui n'est pas suffisant pour élire domicile. [53] Qui plus est, les personnes majeures ne peuvent être considérées comme résidents du Québec puisque bien qu’elles se trouvent sur le territoire, elles n’ont aucun statut et ne peuvent par conséquent y exercer leurs droits civils ou y établir le lieu de leur principal établissement. [ 22 ] The judge also excluded the application of art. 78 C.C.Q. , deeming that [ translation ] “a person cannot take up residence in Quebec without complying with immigration rules” (“ [u]ne personne ne peut pas élire domicile au Québec sans respecter les règles en matière d'immigration ”). [15] [ 23 ] The reasons underlying this comment are, perhaps, understandable.

With respect, however, the statement appears to be too broad and I cannot subscribe to it. [ 24 ] Determining where the appellant's nephews are domiciled would have been simple had the issue been raised when they were still minors. Indeed, minor children are by law domiciled with their tutor (first para. of art. 80 C.C.Q. ) or with the parent with whom they usually reside (second para. of art. 80) or where the court has fixed their domicile (second para., in fine , of art. 80).

The domicile of the minor is thus governed by a legal and absolute presumption that may even result in a legal fiction, in the case where the minor does not, in fact, ordinarily reside at the place indicated by this provision; the presumption and fiction will cease to have effect when the child attains full age. [ 25 ] In this case, the appellant was not and has never been her nephews' tutor, as they were not entrusted to her in this capacity. It may be supposed (although the evidence is silent on this point) that their parents (or grandparents) were their tutors; no judgment had otherwise fixed their domicile.

Therefore, when they were minors (subject to the emancipation of one of them), they were not domiciled with the appellant but rather, as a matter of law, in Saint Vincent, despite their physical presence in Quebec. [ 26 ] This means that if the appellant had initiated adoption proceedings in 2010, for example, she would have been obliged to comply with arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q . (adoption by a person domiciled in Quebec of children domiciled outside Quebec, specifically Saint Vincent) and with art. 3092 C.C.Q. (designation of the law governing consent to and eligibility for adoption – in this case, the law of Saint Vincent). [ 27 ] Now that they are of full age, and since the emancipation of the youngest, the children are by law domiciled “at the place of [their] principal establishment”, in accordance with art. 75 C.C.Q . (“ au lieu de [leur] principal établissement ”).

When they attained full age (or were emancipated), they ceased to be subject to the legal regime of art. 80 C.C.Q. , which establishes domicile according to the situation of a third party ( i.e. parent or tutor, subject to a court decision), and became subject to the legal regime of art. 75 C.C.Q. , which establishes domicile according to their personal circumstances.

The question before us, then, does not concern a change of domicile governed by art. 76 C.C.Q . [ 28 ] That being the case, what is the place of the principal establishment of the children within the meaning of art. 75 C.C.Q ., and therefore their domicile? As this Court stated in Thérien c.

Pellerin , [16] per Baudouin, J.A., this [ translation ] “complex notion (...) groups together two elements, the first of which is volitional (the intention to make a place one's principal establishment) and the second material, constituted by a set of actions and behaviours giving effect to this intention” (“ notion complexe […] regroupe deux éléments, soit, d'une part, un élément volitif (l'intention de faire d'un endroit son principal établissement) et, d'autre part, un élément matériel constitué par un ensemble de gestes et de comportements permettant de concrétiser cette intention ”). [ 29 ] We know that the trial judge did not feel that either of these elements was present: in her opinion, although the appellant's nephews are physically in Quebec, they do not have property, jobs, or lawful occupations, and their intention to settle here – while recognized –, cannot suffice since they are at risk of being deported at any moment given their status (or lack thereof) under immigration

laws. [ 30 ] It is undeniable that having a family, job and assets in the place where a person usually lives and is physically present will normally allow confirmation that such place is that person's principal establishment and that he or she has the appropriate intention. These criteria are not, however, absolute and exclusive. If they were, they would indicate that in law the appellant's nephews, who are not domiciled in Quebec according to the trial judgment, are also not domiciled in Saint Vincent, the only other possible state with which they have ties.

Indeed, not only are they not physically in that country and have not been for several years, but they also do not study or work there, own property, or have any intention of returning. Their intention, rather, is to settle permanently in Quebec, where they live. Admittedly, they have family in Saint Vincent, [17] but the evidence reveals that this family consists of no one other than their grandparents (whose present condition is unknown) and their parents, who have abandoned them. [ 31 ] I am not inclined to reach such conclusion.

For the purposes of the Civil Code of Quebec , a person necessarily has a domicile, in other words a principal establishment, and if that person does not have a domicile, the Code will attribute one by presumption (see infra ). [ 32 ] Moreover, I am of the view that, in ruling on the question of domicile, the trial judge employed criteria that, while commonly used, are ill-adapted to the situation of the appellant's nephews.

The analysis that must be performed for the purposes of art. 75 C.C.Q . is necessarily contextual, but no weight was given here to the very unique circumstances of the case, which cannot be summed up by the mere observation that the children violated immigration laws by remaining in Quebec after their visitor status had expired. [ 33 ] With the utmost respect, the trial judgment, while distinguishing domicile and residence, appears to ignore art. 77 C.C.Q ., which I cite again for greater convenience: 77 .

La résidence d'une personne est le lieu où elle demeure de façon habituelle ; en cas de pluralité de résidences, on considère, pour l'établissement du domicile, celle qui a le caractère principal. 77 . The residence of a person is the place where he ordinarily resides ; if a person has more than one residence, his principal residence is considered in establishing his domicile. [Emphasis added.] [ 34 ] According to case law and commentary, residence is a fact-based notion. Residence is of great importance when determining an individual's domicile because, practically speaking, it is a strong indicator thereof.

Of course, a person may have several residences, while he or she may have only one domicile. A person may even be domiciled where he or she does not ordinarily reside (see art. 79, for instance). The fact remains, however, that domicile and residence – or at least, domicile and principal residence, according to art. 77 C.C.Q. – quite often coincide . [18] [ 35 ] In the case of a person of full age, domicile, for the purposes of art. 75 C.C.Q. , [19] is indeed primarily determined on the basis of residence.

To determine a person’s residence, art. 77 C.C.Q . requires a consideration of where that person “ordinarily resides” (“ demeure de façon habituelle ”), an expression implying a certain level of stability or referring to long-lasting establishment, and excluding occasional stays (holidays, business trips, passing through, and so on). [20] How does this apply to the appellant's nephews? [ 36 ] In this case, there is one answer only: they ordinarily reside in Quebec (specifically Town

A) and have done so for five years (four at the time of the adoption trial); the eldest has lived here of his own accord since August of 2011 and the youngest since his emancipation in November of 2012. They have family here (the appellant, their aunt), with whom they live full-time, and it is where they keep their few belongings.

They do not attend a regular school, but they do go to a centre where they receive educational instruction (French classes, among others) to assist their integration. [ 37 ] Furthermore, and this is the volitional element, they intend to make Quebec their place of ordinary residence, their principal establishment. This intention, which is not contested, coincides with their actions. The trial judge found this intention to be insufficient, but she did not deny its existence.

In fact, she acknowledged it. [ 38 ] Therefore, on the basis of these two elements (volitional and material), it can be concluded that, with respect to exercising their civil rights, the appellant's nephews are truly domiciled in Quebec, their sole place of residence, which is also their principal establishment and where they live their lives. Again, the situation would have been different had they been minors whose domicile was dependant on the purely legal criteria set out under art. 80 C.C.Q .

But they are now persons of full age, whose domicile is determined according to art. 75 C.C.Q. , which requires a consideration of material and intentional elements that are not relevant for the purposes of art. 80 C.C.Q . [ 39 ] I would add that, even if the question were to be considered from the perspective of art. 76 C.C.Q . (change of domicile), my conclusion would be the same. The evidence has established on a balance of probabilities the material and volitional elements that coincide here. From this point of view, the situation of the appellant's nephews is different from that of the parties in Winnycka v.

Orischuk , [21] a case that addressed the conditions for a change of domicile under the former art. 80 of the Civil Code of Lower Canada (currently art. 76 C.C.Q .). In that judgment, the Court found that persons (of full age) who had left Poland with the firm intention of never returning were nevertheless still domiciled there at the time of their marriage. That case concerned a transitional situation where the parties, who wanted to leave Poland after the Second World War, settled in Austria for a time in 1948, pending their emigration to France or Canada.

While in Austria, they married, but without a prenuptial contract. Soon thereafter, they settled in Canada. The issue required a determination of their matrimonial regime. Since that issue would be resolved by the law of their domicile at the time of their marriage, this domicile required identification. The Court found that, although the parties were physically in Austria at the relevant time, they were not domiciled in that country because they were merely passing through with no intention of settling there, planning instead to leave [ translation ] “as soon as they could” [22] (which they did).

They were therefore still domiciled in Poland, as their change of domicile had not been completed. The Court ruled that it is not enough to actually abandon one's domicile of origin to change it; it is necessary to settle in another place that is intended to be the principal establishment. When the parties wed in Austria, they had neither settled there nor intended to do so.

[ 40 ] The same approach had been taken by the Supreme Court of Canada in Trottier v. Rajotte : [23] Before proceeding to discuss the facts, it, perhaps, ought to be added that a domicile of origin is not lost by the fact of the domiciled person having left the country in which he was so domiciled with the intention of never returning.

It is essential that he shall have acquired a new domicile, that is to say, that he shall in fact have taken up residence in some other country with the fixed, settled determination of making it his principal place of residence, not for some particular purpose, but indefinitely. [24] [ 41 ] That being the case, the Supreme Court found that a couple from Quebec who married in 1928 in the United States, where they had resided for work (5 and 6 years respectively), had not established their domicile there because they failed to show that this was their “permanent residence ‘general and indefinite in its future contemplation’ ”. [25] It bears saying that the evidence was thin, as the Court, per Duff, J., [26] pointed out.

Indeed, nothing was known of the husband's living conditions (at the time, his domicile determined that of his wife): “Had he a house?” asked the Court. “Was he living in lodgings? Had he anything in the nature of permanent employment?”.

Moreover, the Court added, the husband's testimony did not establish “that he had a fixed settled intention to make his permanent residence either at Bristol or in the state of Connecticut”. [27] [ 42 ] I do not know that such factual situation would lead to the same conclusion today (not to mention the issue of the wife's domicile) or that we would have the same evidentiary requirements (by comparison, see Droit de la famille – 647 ) [28] .

In any event, the situation here is very different. [ 43 ] Since attaining full age in 2011, the eldest of the appellant's nephews has chosen to permanently establish himself in Quebec , where he has lived for several years. The youngest has done the same since his emancipation in 2012.

Unlike the spouses Winnycka and Oryschuk or Rajotte, who did not intend to settle in the country where they married, the intention of both children is firm and clear: they do not intend to be passing through, and while they understand the precariousness of their status with respect to immigration laws, they intend to stay here and do what must be done to this end.

They do not intend to return to Saint Vincent, where they no longer have any ties (aside from their biological ties to parents who abandoned them and grandparents who can no longer care for them). [ 44 ] That said, if I were to conclude, for the purposes of either art. 75 or even 76 C.C.Q. , that the children's true intention is impossible to ascertain or that, because of the lack of stable connecting factors (employment, studies, assets, etc.), their principal establishment cannot be determined with sufficient certainty, I would then turn to 78 C.C.Q. , [29] which I cite again: 78 .

La personne dont on ne peut établir le domicile avec certitude est réputée domiciliée au lieu de sa résidence. À défaut de résidence, elle est réputée domiciliée au lieu où elle se trouve ou, s'il est inconnu, au lieu de son dernier domicile connu. 78 . A person whose domicile cannot be determined with certainty is deemed to be domiciled at the place of his residence.

A person who has no residence is deemed to be domiciled at the place where he lives or, if that is unknown, at the place of his last known domicile. [ 45 ] This provision sets out three presumptions that are absolute, and thus irrebuttable (as indicated by the use of the word “deemed”, in accordance with paragraph 2 of art. 2847 C.C.Q. ). These presumptions apply in a cascading manner: First presumption: if the domicile cannot be determined with certainty, a person is deemed to be domiciled at his place of residence (within the meaning of art. 77 C.C.Q. ).

Second presumption: a person who has no residence is deemed to be domiciled at the place where he lives.

Third presumption: if the place where the person lives is unknown, he is deemed to reside at the place of his last known domicile. [ 46 ] In the present case, we may rely on the first presumption: the children reside in Quebec, where, in fact, they “ demeure[nt] de façon habituelle ” (“the place where they ordinarily reside”) within the meaning of art. 77 C.C.Q. , which makes it their domicile, according to the first paragraph of art. 78 C.C.Q. [ 47 ] If, however, for any reason, I were to conclude that the children cannot be considered to be ordinarily residing in Quebec, I could still not conclude that they reside in Saint Vincent, where they have not lived for many years, where they have never returned and do not intend to return, and where they have nothing left of their old life except the biological ties referred to earlier. [30] And if they reside neither in Quebec nor in Saint Vincent, the second presumption then comes into play: “a person who has no residence is deemed to be domiciled at the place where he lives” (“ au lieu où [il] se trouve ”), according to art. 78 C.C.Q.

There is no doubt that the appellant's nephews live in Town A, Quebec. [ 48 ] Because the place where they live is not unknown, the third presumption does not come into play. [ 49 ] In short, whether through art. 75 C.C.Q. or the first or second presumption stated in art. 78 C.C.Q. , the children are domiciled in Quebec. [ 50 ] In this context, what significance should be given to the fact that they are in Quebec illegally?

I am not convinced that, for the purposes of the Civil Code of Quebec and the exercise of the rights flowing therefrom, immigration laws can automatically and without further consideration preclude the establishment of a domicile in the province, or negate the absolute presumptions of art. 78 C.C.Q . [ 51 ] This is not to say that immigration laws have nothing to do with the determination of a person's residence or domicile or with the assessment of a person's intention to remain in one place or another. It is a factor to be considered. For the purposes of arts. 75 ff.

C.C.Q ., however, and the exercise of rights under the Civil Code of Quebec , it cannot be the sole criterion and certainly not in itself a determining factor.

[ 52 ] From this point of view, I agree entirely with the following comments of Professor Goubau: 317.– Le domicile, contrairement à la résidence, « a un effet de centralisation juridique ». Sa portée n'est cependant pas absolue puisque le « principal établissement », dont traite l'

article 75 C.c.Q. , ne vaut que pour le droit civ il. Il a ses caractères propres , ce qui oblige à le distinguer des domiciles spéciaux prévus par la loi, notamment par le droit statutaire. ... [31] [Emphasis added.] [ 53 ] And further on: (…) Les tribunaux sont beaucoup plus réservés en ce qui a trait à l'acquisition du statut d'immigrant, distinguant soigneusement statut civil et statut politique (voir Trahan c. Vézina , précité, note 60; Cicchillitti c. Hormaza , précité, note 48; Feltrinelli c. Barzini , précité, note 44 et Droit de la famille – 2032 , précité note 61).

Si le fait d'être sous le coup d'une ordonnance de déportation n'emporte pas, pour la personne concernée, la perte de son domicile, le fait d'avoir obtenu le statut d'immigrant n'emporte pas non plus, en soi, l'intention de s'établir au Canada de façon permanente. [32] [ 54 ] Combining these two extracts and taking them one step further, I find that the fact that a person has not obtained immigrant status in Canada or has an irregular status under immigration laws does not necessarily mean that it is impossible to establish a domicile in Quebec for the purposes of the Civil Code of Quebec and in the absence of a legislative provision to the contrary.

Specifically, this fact alone cannot prevent the application of art. 78 C.C.Q. [ 55 ] In short, determining domicile within the meaning of arts. 75 ff. C.C.Q. does not depend upon immigration laws, which do not take precedence. [ 56 ] This statement does not contradict the judgments rendered by this Court, which has already indicated on a few occasions that, in law, the wrongful removal of a child prevents a change of domicile. [33] First, those judgments address the situation of minor children.

Second, the “wrongful removal” in question is that which is initiated by one parent without the knowledge or consent of the other. This has nothing to do with the present situation.

The appellant's nephews, who are of full age, came to Canada with their parents' consent, which they no longer require to stay in this country. [ 57 ] That being the case, I find that despite their irregular status in Canada, and whether the issue of domicile is considered under art. 75 or 78 C.C.Q. , the children are domiciled in Quebec, where they firmly intend to stay (the volitional element is therefore present and predominant in the context), where they have their one and only residence, and where they live, with their meagre belongings and what is left of their family.

It is where they lead their lives, and for several years now. [ 58 ] Because the appellant herself is also domiciled in Quebec, the adoption of her nephews, as persons of full age , should therefore be governed by art. 545 C.C.Q . (that is, under Quebec local law), not by arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q. or Saint Vincent law. I make this statement conditionally, however, because, before going any further, the following arguments, made by the respondent, warrant consideration. B.

Article 3092 C.C.Q. and application of articles 563 to 565 C.C.Q. [ 59 ] According to the respondent, even if the children are domiciled in Quebec, art. 545 C.C.Q . is not applicable. The appellant deliberately postponed the adoption proceedings, which she could have instituted much earlier (as early as the spring of 2010), when her nephews were still minors and had been living with her for over six months.

It would be inappropriate to let her benefit from a strategy devised to circumvent art. 3092 C.C.Q . (a public order provision that must be interpreted as determining the child's domicile when a minor) and arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q. (mandatory provisions also). The passage of time alone cannot allow the appellant (and indirectly, her nephews) to benefit from a regime that would not have applied had she acted with diligence.

In support of this submission, the respondent submits Droit de la famille – 3403 [34] and other judgments to the same effect. [ 60 ] How should this situation be resolved? [ 61 ] With respect to the adoption of minor children domiciled outside Quebec by persons domiciled in Quebec, the case law supports the respondent's position. First, the regime set out under arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q . applies and the law of the child's domicile of origin governs the conditions for consent to and eligibility for adoption, as provided in art. 3092 C.C.Q .

Second, as long as children are minors, even if their domicile is moved to Quebec, the law of their domicile of origin governs consent to and eligibility for adoption. This was the decision reached by this Court in Droit de la famille – 3403 to stop parties from seeking to avoid the regime established by arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q. , which aim to protect children, fight child trafficking or prevent their being taken in an improper or abusive manner from their country and family of origin. [ 62 ] The facts of that judgment are as follows.

Moroccan authorities entrusted the adopters with four children and gave their permission to bring them back to Quebec, which the adopters did. Some years later, the parents sought an order for placement for adoption of the as-yet minor children under the Quebec provisions governing local adoption. The Court wrote: [40] Les adoptants prétendent que les enfants sont maintenant domiciliés au Québec et qu'en conséquence on doit ignorer les règles particulières applicables à l'adoption des enfants domiciliés à l'étranger ( art. 563 à 566 C.c.Q. ).

Selon eux, les autorités marocaines, en leur confiant les enfants, ont consenti au changement de leur domicile. De plus, l'

article 80 C.c.Q. prévoit que les enfants mineurs sont domiciliés chez leur tuteur. (…) [43] Il me paraît incontestable que les enfants sont domiciliés au Québec . Ils y vivent en permanence et, pour l'exercice de leurs droits civils et politiques, on ne pourrait certes leur opposer l'absence de domicile au Québec. Je ne comprends pas la prétention de l'intimé à l'effet que ces enfants, vivant au Québec et détenant la citoyenneté canadienne (pour deux d'entre eux), continueraient jusqu'à la fin de

leurs jours à être domiciliés au Maroc. Cela étant, peut-on tenir compte de ce domicile actuel pour les fins de leur adoption ? (…) [45] Il est indéniable que la question du domicile des enfants ne se poserait pas si les procédures en adoption avaient immédiatement suivi leur arrivée au Canada . [46]

Le passage du temps (près de 11 ans depuis l'arrivée de la première enfant) suffit-il à lui seul à modifier les conditions d'admissibilité à l'adoption ? (…) [50] Le couple Q...-C... a entrepris ses procédures d'adoption dans ce cadre et on ne saurait faire échec à ces règles mises en place pour la protection des enfants en invoquant le passage du temps ou, encore, la nomination d'un tuteur. [51] Je ne suis donc pas d'avis qu'on puisse invoquer le domicile actuel des enfants pour prétendre que l'adoption doive se faire en ignorant les règles relatives à l'adoption internationale . [35] [Emphasis added.] [ 63 ] The respondent invites us to apply these principles by extension to children of full age.

This would mean that, even though the appellant's nephews are now domiciled in Quebec, the mere passage of time would not exempt them from the rules prescribed by the Civil Code of Quebec in matters of international adoption.

Articles 3092 and 563 to 565 C.C.Q. should instead be applied as if the adoption proceedings had been brought after their arrival in Quebec, while they were minors and, for the purposes of these provisions, still domiciled in Saint Vincent. [ 64 ] In other words, according to the respondent, if the appellant had commenced the adoption process sooner, when her nephews were minors and still domiciled in Saint Vincent, [36] she would have had to comply with art. 3092 C.C.Q. She would then also have had to comply with the requirements of arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q .

She must still do so and cannot now fall back on the (substantive) rules respecting Quebec local adoption (art. 545 C.C.Q. ) and thereby benefit from the fact that she deliberately postponed bringing her applications, so that they now concern persons who are of full age. [ 65 ] The submission is interesting. [ 66 ] However, I am not convinced. I find it impossible to ignore the fact that the children, i.e. the prospective adoptees, are persons of full age .

The respondent’s logic retains all its force in the case of minor children, as the Court has acknowledged, but it is less convincing when persons of full age are at issue. [ 67 ] First, with respect, the idea that the law of the eventual adoptee's domicile of origin , as indicated by art. 3092 C.C.Q. , should always apply appears incongruous in the case of persons of full age.

If the eventual adoptee of full age is domiciled in Quebec, as is the eventual adopter, there is no reason to refer to conflict of laws rules, even if the foreign law could have applied when the future adoptee was still a minor. [ 68 ] Moreover, the rationale for the regime set out under arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q . regarding minor persons (the protection of children, the fight against child trafficking or uprooting) does not apply to persons of full age, who are presumed to be their own masters and capable of promoting and protecting their own interest.

Far be it for this Court to say that we must not fight the trafficking of persons of full age or the possible commercialization of their adoption, but these issues will not be solved through the application of arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q . [ 69 ] Indeed the respondent's submission meets with a second obstacle: arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q . were not designed with persons of full age in mind and the mechanisms set out therein are not adapted to their situation. [ 70 ] First, arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q. were inspired by the provisions of the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption , which concerns only children under the age of eighteen. [37] Second, and more particularly, nor can art. 563 C.C.Q. be applied to persons of full age, since that would oblige the adopter to refer to a body certified under the Youth Protection Act [38] (a statute that applies only to those who are under eighteen [39] ), except if the situation is the subject of a specific order (during the period in question, this is Order number 2005-019 of the Minister of Health and Social Services dated 21 December 2005 , which also refers to the Youth Protection Act and establishes a process that concerns only minor children.) As for art. 565 C.C.Q. , its very wording reinforces the idea that the provision does not apply to children of full age.

It addresses orders for placement, which may be issued only with respect to minor children only ( art. 566 C.C.Q. ). It also refers to the Convention on Protection of Children , which, as we know, concerns only minor children.

It would be dangerous to find that the provision nevertheless applies to children of full age. [ 71 ] In short, I do not see how persons of full age can be artificially subject to the requirements of arts. 563 to 565 C.C.Q . [ 72 ] For all these reasons, I find that the respondent's arguments, while justified in the case of minor children, are without merit with respect to persons of full age. [ 73 ] I therefore conclude that, because the children and their adopter are domiciled in Quebec, the adoption of the former by the latter falls under art. 545 C.C.Q . C.

Article 545 C.C.Q . and adoption of children of full age [ 74 ]

Article 543, which applies to entire

chapter on adoption, and art. 545 C.C.Q . provide that:

543. L'adoption ne peut avoir lieu que dans l'intérêt de l'enfant et aux conditions prévues par la loi. Elle ne peut avoir lieu pour confirmer une filiation déjà établie par le sang. 543. No adoption may take place except in the interest of the child and on the conditions prescribed by law. No adoption may take place for the purpose of confirming filiation already established by blood. 545. Une personne majeure ne peut être adoptée que par ceux qui, alors qu'elle était mineure, remplissaient auprès d'elle le rôle de parent.

Toutefois, le tribunal peut, dans l'intérêt de l'adopté, passer outre à cette exigence. 545. No person of full age may be adopted except by the persons who stood in loco parentis towards him when he was a minor. The court, however, may dispense with this requirement in the interest of the person to be adopted. [ 75 ] Does the situation of the appellant and her nephews meet the criteria for the adoption of a person of full age under the first paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q. ?

If not, is there cause to dispense with the requirement and apply the second paragraph? [ 76 ] Professor Alain Roy has summarized the state of the law regarding the adoption of persons of full age as follows: [40] 19. Généralités – Puisqu'elle vise principalement à offrir un milieu de vie à l'enfant, on conçoit généralement l'adoption comme une démarche qui ne s'applique qu'aux seuls enfants mineurs. Or, le Code civil envisage également l'adoption d'une personne majeure. Évidemment, les règles relatives à l'adoption du majeur se distinguent de celles qui s'appliquent à l'adoption du mineur .

D'abord, l'ouverture du dossier d'adoption du majeur ne dépend nullement du consentement des parents biologiques, encore moins d'une déclaration judiciaire d'admissibilité à l'adoption. Il ne saurait non plus être question de soumettre le majeur à une ordonnance de placement préalable. Compte tenu des conditions imposées par le Code civil, on ne saurait cependant assimiler l'adoption du majeur à un acte de pure volonté entre l'enfant et ses adoptants . 20.

Adoption de fait durant la minorité – Outre les exigences de nature procédurale qui encadre l'adoption du majeur, le législateur pose une condition particulière au premier alinéa de l'

article 545 C.c.Q. : une personne majeure ne peut être adoptée que par ceux qui, alors qu'elle était mineure, remplissaient déjà auprès d'elle le rôle de parent . La loi ne permet donc l'adoption d'un majeur qu'à la condition que son « adoption de fait » , selon l'expression autrefois utilisée dans le Code civil, ait eu lieu durant sa minorité . L'« adoption de fait » peut se définir par la prise en charge économique, physique, morale et psychologique de l'éducation d'une personne et par l'exercice factuel de toutes les obligations reliées au rôle parental .

Cette définition s'accompagne toutefois d'un critère additionnel : l'adoption de fait par l'éventuel adoptant n'est possible que si les parents d'origine n'ont pas assumé leurs responsabilités parentales durant la minorité de l'enfant. Pour réussir dans sa démarche, le requérant doit faire la preuve d'un désengagement parental manifeste. Tel sera le cas, par exemple, si le parent d'origine a abandonné l'enfant durant la minorité ou s'il s'en est complètement désintéressé. (…) 21. Intérêt de l'enfant majeur – Le respect des prescriptions du premier alinéa de l'

article 545 C.c.Q. n'oblige nullement le tribunal à accueillir la requête en adoption du majeur. Après avoir constaté l'« adoption de fait » au sens ci-dessus décrit, le tribunal devra évaluer le bien-fondé de la demande à la lumière du critère du meilleur intérêt de l'enfant . Comme l'affirme la Cour d'appel : Le législateur a voulu éviter que, par automatisme, le tribunal doive rendre un jugement d'adoption par la seule constatation d'une adoption de fait.

Ce rempart discrétionnaire que représente l'intérêt de la personne majeure, constitue un mode de contrôle par lequel le tribunal pourra mesurer le caractère sérieux de la demande et prévenir les abus possibles. […] En privilégiant une approche subjective, le tribunal évaluera la motivation et l'effet recherché selon les normes de la raisonnabilité.

Le facteur prépondérant, dans l'évaluation de la motivation et de l'effet recherché, résidera dans la qualité et la durée des rapports entre les adoptants et la personne majeure qui constitueront des indices précieux susceptibles d'éclairer le tribunal en regard de l'intérêt de l'adopté. En s'en remettant au critère de l'intérêt de l'enfant, le tribunal pourra donc rejeter tout projet d'adoption dont la finalité première n'est pas d'attribuer au majeur une filiation à travers laquelle il pourra s'identifier et s'épanouir .

Ainsi a-t-on déjà rejeté la demande en adoption d'une fille majeure par le couple qui, durant son adolescence, avait assumé auprès d'elle le rôle de famille d'accueil. Bien qu'il se soit dit satisfait du critère de l'« adoption de fait », le tribunal a estimé que l'enfant cherchait d'abord et avant tout à régler ses comptes avec sa mère biologique. Enceinte d'un enfant, la majeure entendait d'abord, par l'adoption, priver sa mère biologique du statut de grand- mère. 22.

Pouvoir discrétionnaire du tribunal – Conscient des besoins fondamentaux auxquels l'adoption peut répondre, le législateur permet au tribunal de passer outre à la condition de l'« adoption de fait », dans la mesure où l'intérêt du majeur le justifie. Prévue au deuxième alinéa de l'

article 545 C.c.Q. , cette disposition revêt un caractère d'exception et doit conséquemment faire l'objet d'une interprétation restrictive . En général, les tribunaux se prévaudront de la mesure d'exception afin de combler le vide parental dont pourrait souffrir le majeur . Ainsi, l'adoption d'un majeur arrivé seul au Canada à l'âge de 22 ans et n'ayant plus de relations avec les membres de sa famille d'origine restés en Roumanie fut-elle prononcée en faveur de l'homme qui l'avait pris en charge et qui avait contribué à l'éloigner de « personnes dont l'influence lui était dommageable ».

En outre, un tribunal a déjà jugé qu'il était dans l'intérêt d'un enfant majeur, né de parents inconnus et ayant vécu sa minorité dans une multitude de familles d'accueil, d'être adopté par l'homme qu'il considérait maintenant comme son père et qui était en quelque sorte responsable de son développement socioaffectif. Dans une autre affaire, la Cour a accepté de faire droit à la demande présentée par un homme souffrant d'un cancer, désireux d'adopter la fille majeure de sa conjointe à l'égard de qui il n'avait pourtant pas assumé de responsabilités parentales dans le passé.

La Cour s'est prévalue de la discrétion que lui accorde le législateur pour prononcer l'adoption post mortem , en raison des liens significatifs qui s'étaient établis entre l'enfant et

l'adoptant au cours des dernières années de sa vie. On a également admis la requête en adoption d'un majeur de 21 ans par le nouveau conjoint de sa mère, bien que l'adopté (dont l'acte de naissance ne faisait état d'aucune filiation paternelle) n'ait connu ce dernier qu'à l'âge de 17 ans. Le tribunal a fait droit à la requête après avoir constaté que les deux autres enfants mineurs de la mère avaient déjà été adoptés par le requérant et qu'un troisième enfant était né de leur relation commune.

Aux dires du juge, l'adoption représentait le seul moyen d'assurer au majeur une « égalité filiale » avec ses frères et sœurs mineurs. (...) Si le tribunal peut déroger à la condition relative à l'« adoption de fait » pour des raisons qui relèvent de l'attachement, des sentiments et des besoins identitaires, il ne pourrait cependant s'y soustraire pour des considérations de nature économique . Celui qui, par exemple, voudrait adopter un enfant majeur dans le but de lui procurer les avantages résultant de son régime de pension, échouera dans sa demande.

On ne saurait non plus recourir à l'exception prévue au second alinéa de l'

article 545 C.c.Q. pour sanctionner la volonté d'un enfant de répudier un parent dont il ne veut plus ou dont il ne serait pas suffisamment fier. Comme l'écrit très justement la juge Nicole Bernier, « [l]'adoption est un moyen d'établissement d'une filiation et non un moyen pour un enfant de choisir le parent qui convient le plus à ses critères ou à ses caprices. […] L'enfant, même devenu majeur, demeure l'enfant de ses parents.

Le choix de sa filiation ne lui revient pas. [References omitted, emphasis added.] [ 77 ] How do these principles apply to the situation before us? [ 78 ] Given the evidence in the record, the conclusion is obvious: the appellant did not stand in loco parentis towards her nephews within the meaning of art. 545 C.C.Q ., as interpreted by the courts and commentators, and it is not in their interest that they be adopted by their aunt. [ 79 ] On the first point, we note that the period during which the children lived with the aunt as minor children was, overall, quite short.

Admittedly, the length of that period may not be determinative, but it is indicative of the nature of the relationship between the appellant and her nephews. In most cases regarding the adoption of persons of full age, the prospective adopter stood in loco parentis towards the child from the time he or she was very young [41] or over a relatively long period of time. [42] The time factor is important because, in a situation such as this, it influences the establishment of the parent-child relationship.

Obviously, it is not always necessary for the “ de facto adoption” to have lasted very long, but, in the present case, the relatively short duration of the alleged relationship must be considered.

I will not say more on the subject as there are other reasons that justify refusing the adoption. [ 80 ] Given the purpose of art. 545 C.C.Q. , the quality of the relationship between the would-be adopter and the child is a defining element indicating whether one person has stood (or not) in loco parentis towards another, prior to his attaining the age of majority. [ 81 ] The appellant, it is true, has housed her nephews since 2009 and has provided for their needs, in part. But can this be called a “ de facto adoption”?

Can we say – and on this point, I agree with the trial judge – that she acted in loco parentis towards them when she left them in a legal no-man's-land ever since they came to Canada, living in semi-hiding as I said earlier, marginalizing them from a real education, access to health care, and the possibility of finding employment (legal employment, that is), leaving them constantly at risk of deportation because of their irregular situation in this country? [ 82 ] Moreover, and more importantly, evidence of a parental relationship between the appellant and her nephews is distressingly thin: a reading of the testimony of all those concerned reveals the actual paucity of evidence on this matter.

The appellant may assert that “our relationship is like mother and son” [43] and that their relationship is “very excellent and close”, [44] the children may respectively assert that “she's like a mother” [45] or that “she has been like a mother to me”, [46] but these general statements are particularly lacking in substance. No details are provided. There is nothing, or barely anything, said about the daily life of the interested parties, what they have done together, the concrete ways in which the appellant has behaved toward her nephews, what she did to provide for their needs, and so on.

The appellant was given every chance to present evidence on the subject but did not meet the burden that was hers. [ 83 ] The evidence does not demonstrate that, aside from offering her nephews a measure of financial support (limited, in fact), the appellant took charge of their moral, psychological, or educational needs, while exercising all the obligations that arise from being a parent, to paraphrase Professor Roy. It cannot reasonably be concluded that the appellant stood in loco parentis towards her nephews, a role that is not limited to housing and feeding.

Needless to say, the fact that she is the aunt of the children, in and of itself, is not sufficient to establish the parental relationship required by the first paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q. [ 84 ] That being the case, this provision does not permit the adoption. [ 85 ] Be that as it may, the children have acted in good faith and find themselves the unwilling victims of a deplorable situation – some might say in a hornet's nest. Is it therefore appropriate to bypass the first paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q . and apply the second? [ 86 ] This question must be answered in the negative.

The evidence has not shown that it would be in the interest of the children to be adopted by the appellant. [ 87 ] In Droit de la famille – 2015 , [47] this Court stated the following about what is now the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q .: Même si une personne majeure possède la capacité juridique et est affranchie de toute autorité parentale, le législateur a estimé souhaitable que le critère de l'intérêt soit retenu dans l'examen judiciaire d'une demande d'adoption la concernant. Comme nous l'avons précédemment exposé, le texte de l'article 595 est clair.

Il précise que l'adoption d'un enfant, qui inclut la personne majeure, ne peut se réaliser que dans le respect de son intérêt. De plus, l'article 597, alinéa 2 réintroduit expressément le concept de l'intérêt de l'adopté majeur dans le contexte particulier où il n'aurait pas été adopté de fait par les adoptants pendant sa minorité. Dès lors, l'intérêt peut être généralement substitué à une condition expresse fixée par la loi.

Le législateur a voulu éviter que, par automatisme, le tribunal doive rendre un jugement d'adoption par la seule constatation d'une adoption de fait. Ce rempart discrétionnaire, que représente l'intérêt de la personne majeure, constitue un mode de contrôle par lequel le Tribunal pourra mesurer le caractère sérieux de la demande et prévenir les abus possibles (adoption de fait réalisée dans l'année précédant la majorité, considérations financières, etc.).

Évidemment, l'examen judiciaire de l'intérêt de la personne majeure ne sera pas envisagé de la même manière que celui devant gouverner l'adoption de l'enfant mineur. En privilégiant une approche subjective, le Tribunal évaluera la motivation et l'effet recherché selon la norme de la raisonnabilité.

Le facteur prépondérant, dans l'évaluation de la motivation et de l'effet recherché, résidera dans la qualité et la durée des rapports entre les adoptants et la personne majeure qui constitueront des indices précieux susceptibles d'éclairer le Tribunal en regard de l'intérêt de l'adopté. [48] [ 88 ] And the Court concluded that, in the circumstances, there was such an interest: Conséquemment, le juge de première instance s'est correctement dirigé en considérant que l'intérêt de la personne majeure devait présider à la décision de faire droit ou de refuser une requête en adoption.

Cependant, nous estimons erronée la détermination voulant que, dans les circonstances particulières de cette affaire, l'adoption n'était pas dans l'intérêt de la personne majeure.

La volonté ferme de T..., le désir sincère exprimé par les adoptants, la concrétisation d'une adoption de fait réalisée par 15 années continues au cours desquelles l'éducation de T..., ses besoins matériels et affectifs ont été entièrement comblés par les adoptants, le désintéressement manifesté par le père biologique, révèlent, sans ambiguïté, que la requête en adoption devait être accordée. [49] [ 89 ] What of this case? [ 90 ] The only interest raised by the appellant in her factum is the following: 70.

Despite their low level of economic establishment, the said children's best interests were better cared for and protected in Quebec than the poverty and despair they faced in St. Vincent. [ 91 ] First, the “poverty and despair” in question were not proven: we can glean from the evidence that the grandparents who were taking care of X and Y before they came to Canada were not well-off since the appellant offered them occasional financial help, but nothing more is known.

At the hearing, counsel for the appellant and her nephews, while attempting to describe the situation of his clients, spoke of “family assistance in times of crisis”. That is not impossible, but it would have been necessary to demonstrate that this crisis could only be resolved by the adoption of the children, in their own interest, by the appellant.

This was not done. [ 92 ] Second, the very fact that Canada offers possibilities and advantages that, it is assumed, are not available in Saint Vincent cannot be considered an element that, in itself, suffices to establish the impleaded parties' interest to bypass the requirement under the first paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q . [ 93 ] These are not reasons that [ translation ] “arise from attachment, or feelings and needs related to identity” (“ qui relèvent de l'attachement, des sentiments et des besoins identitaires ”). [50] These are not the reasons submitted in support of the adoption application, and the skeletal evidence adduced on the matter at trial does not sustain an inference that this would be the case. [ 94 ] Moreover, I underline that it is appellant who created the predicament that the children now find themselves in and that has prevented them from having a normal life since coming to Canada.

Even though other choices were open to her, [51] she chose to leave her nephews in an illegal situation that will not be solved by adoption alone, as the trial judge correctly explained. [ 95 ] Ultimately, what basically appears from the record is that the interest of the children can be reduced to a single element: it would be preferable for them to remain in Canada. [ 96 ] Indeed, their situation can be summed up as follows: with the agreement of their parents and grandparents, they came to Quebec when they were 14 and 16 years old, respectively, and have resided here ever since.

As imperfect as the situation may be, their lives are here and here only. Can we envisage their forcible return to Saint Vincent when they have not been back there for five years, have no real connection with the place, claim to no longer have any contact with their parents, and have grandparents only, whose relatively precarious situation is not likely to have improved over time? Of course, they are now of full age and are assumed to be capable of providing for themselves, but this hypothesis appears quite cruel: they have no education, no money, no professional qualifications, etc.

How are they to fend for themselves? As I stated earlier, they are the victims of the strategy chosen by the appellant and the bad advice upon which she appears to have relied. That being the case, even though there was no bad faith, she placed her nephews in a difficult situation. By wanting to help them, she has harmed them. [ 97 ] This, however, does not permit the application of the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q .

The children may have an interest in remaining in Canada under the circumstances, but this interest alone has little or nothing to do with filiation, parenthood, identity or feelings, or, for that matter, with the institution of adoption itself. In other words, their interest in remaining in Canada or avoiding deportation should not be confused with their interest in being adopted. [ 98 ] Nor can their desire to be adopted by the appellant justify the adoption.

If the only requirement to obtain adoption as a person of full age was consent, then there would be a total absence of judicial control over such adoptions, and filiation would risk becoming an amorphous if not volatile legal institution. Clearly, that is not what the legislature intended, and this justifies a restrictive

interpretation of the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q . [52] Adoption, as a means of establishing filiation and a matter of public order which cannot be the subject of a transaction (art. 2632 C.C.Q. ), cannot become a simple act of will; such will cannot be confused with the interest of the prospective adoptee pursuant to the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q.

This provision is not an invitation to transform adoption into an act of pure will between the child of full age and the adopter, according to their discretionary appreciation of the former's interest. [ 99 ] In my opinion, the children's situation is in no way comparable to those found in the (rare) judgments related to the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q . [ 100 ] For instance, in Adoption (En matière d’) , [53] a young man had lived with the petitioner, his mother's new spouse, for about four years, since the age of 17. The trial judge wrote:

[7] Force est de constater que la présente situation ne correspond pas au critère défini à l’art. 545 C.c.Q. soit que le requérant aitrempli auprès de X le rôle de parent alors qu’il était mineur puisque ce n’est que depuis l’âge de dix-sept (17) ans que le Requérant jouece rôle auprès de X. [8] L’intérêt de X justifie-t-il de passer outre cette exigence? [9] La Cour d’Appel du Québec dans Droit de la famille-2015 (QC CA), [1994] R.J.Q. 1520, discute del’intérêt d’un adopté majeur en ces termes : (...) [10] Le Tribunal constate que les deux (2) autres enfants mineurs de la mère ont été adoptés par le Requérant.

De plus, un (1)enfant est né de l’union entre le Requérant et la mère de X.

Refuser l’adoption équivaudrait à faire de X le seul des six (6) enfants quin’a pas légalement de père. [11] X a maintenant vingt et un (21) ans et a exprimé clairement sa volonté d’être adopté par le Requérant avec qui il a développéune relation père-fils depuis les quatre (4) dernières années où ils vivent ensemble. [12] Bien que la période pendant laquelle cette relation s’est développée puisse paraître courte, on ne peut en nier l’existence et laqualité. [13] C’est pourquoi le Tribunal estime qu’il est dans l’intérêt de X de passer outre à l’exigence de l’art. 545 du C.c.Q. [101] Another example is Droit de la famille – 3402.[54] That case concerned the adoption of a fifty-year old person, without anyfamily, heavily handicapped, and permanently hospitalized.

The adopter, a volunteer where the future adoptee resided, met the latter in1993, gradually built a very close and loving relationship with her, taking care of her, visiting her, and even being named curator to herperson and property.

Considering the adopted child's interest and the completely disinterested nature of the adopter's actions, the judgeallowed the adoption under the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q. [102] In Droit de la famille – 2256,[55] a case that resembles the one before us, the judge ordered the adoption of a person of full ageby a person who had not acted in loco parentis within the meaning of the first paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q. The adoptee had lived awayfrom his parents since he was 16 years old.

He emigrated to Canada in 1992 when he was 21 years old, and the following year hebefriended the adopter, who offered him advice and support, actively saw to his education and training, helped him materially, and hadhim as a guest in his house. The parents of the adoptee did not oppose the adoption.

According to the judge, the evidence revealed thatthe subjective interest of the adoptee was in keeping with the application of the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q. [103] In Adoption – 09212,[56] the judge allowed the adoption of a child of full age pursuant to the second paragraph of art. 545C.C.Q., stating: [39] La Cour doit d'abord, en regard de la situation qui lui est soumise, apprécier si le requérant a rempli auprès de l’enfant devenuemajeure le rôle de parent au cours de sa minorité. [40] La preuve révèle que c'est depuis l'âge de quinze (15) ans que la personne majeure connaît le requérant. [41] Les liens sont cependant significatifs et leurs sentiments réciproques.

La personne majeure n'étant pas pourvue d'une filiationpaternelle, elle a retrouvé chez le conjoint de sa mère ce lien paternel qui lui manquait. [42] Le requérant a su répondre à ses besoins particulièrement au plan affectif et éducatif. Il la considère comme sa fille. [43] De plus, il nous faut aussi apprécier au

chapitre de l'intérêt de la personne majeure concernée que la précarité de la santé de samère fait en sorte que la présence du requérant auprès d'elle lui apporte le soutien et le réconfort qu'on est en droit de s'attendre d'un pèreen pareilles circonstances. [44] Même si la preuve soumise ne rencontre pas nécessairement l'exigence édictée au premier alinéa de l'article 545 du Code civildu Québec à savoir que le requérant a rempli auprès de la personne majeure, pendant sa minorité le rôle de parent, l'appréciation del'intérêt de la personne majeure permet de conclure que l'adoption de celle-ci par le requérant répond à son intérêt, ce tel que permis par le 2e alinéa de ce même article. [Emphasis added.] [104] These cases clearly illustrate the comments of the Court in Droit de la famille – 2015,[57] where it was decided that [translation]“the overriding factor in assessing the motivation and result sought will be the quality and length of the relationship between the adoptersand the person of full age, which will be invaluable indicators capable of enlightening the judge with regard to the interest of the adoptedchild” (“[l]e facteur prépondérant, dans l'évaluation de la motivation et de l'effet recherché, résidera dans la qualité et la durée desrapports entre les adoptants et la personne majeure qui constitueront des indices précieux susceptibles d'éclairer le Tribunal en regardde l'intérêt de l'adopté”).

In the present case, as previously discussed, the evidence has not established on a balance of probabilities thetrue nature or quality of the relationship between the appellant and her nephews. Despite their interest in remaining in Canada, it isimpossible to conclude that their adoption by the appellant would be appropriate, as its sole objective, if we are to accept the argumentsof appellant's counsel, appears to be to facilitate the regularization of their immigration situation. IV. CONCLUSION [105] In short:

- In accordance with arts. 75 and 78 C.C.Q. and for the purposes of exercising the rights arising from this Code , the children, persons of full age, are domiciled in Quebec, notwithstanding that their presence in Canada is contrary to immigration laws. - Since the appellant is also domiciled in Quebec, her application must be considered to be a local adoption application, governed by art. 545 C.C.Q. , not by arts. 3092 and 563 to 565 C.C.Q. - The condition set out under the first paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q . is not met (the appellant did not stand in loco parentis towards her nephews while they were minor children); - There is no reason to bypass this condition and apply the second paragraph of art. 545 C.C.Q. since the interest of the children, within the meaning of this provision, does not command it. [ 106 ] For all of these reasons, I find that the appeal must be dismissed, but without costs, in light of the nature of the case. [ 107 ] It is, however, necessary to point out that the circumstances in which the two children have been unwittingly placed would certainly authorize Canadian immigration authorities to let them remain in Quebec on obvious humanitarian grounds and regularize their situation.

MARIE-FRANCE BICH, J.A.