J.H. v. D.G., 2023 BCPC 209

Citation: J.H. v. D.G. 2023 BCPC 209 Date: 20230630 File No: 18202 Registry: Quesnel IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: J.H. APPLICANT AND: D.G. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J.T. DOULIS Counsel for the Applicant: No appearance by counsel or party Appearing on his own behalf: D.G. Place of Hearing: Quesnel , B.C.

Date of Hearing: May 1, 2023 Date of Judgment: June 30, 2023 INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] D.T.G. (or “D.G.”) is before the court for the eleventh time in less than two years trying to enforce his court-ordered parenting time with his daughter C. Despite D.G.’s protests, J.L.H. (or “J.H.”) relocated C. from her home in Quesnel, to Prince George. D.G. says she ignores his attempts to contact her to arrange parenting time with C. and disregards court orders unless they are to her benefit.

D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Application about Enforcement and his January 11, 2023 Application for Order Prohibiting the Relocation of a Child came before me for hearing on May 1, 2023. J.H. did not attend court on that date, nor did she attend the pre-trial conference on April 19, 2023. Satisfied that J.H. was duly notified of the court dates, I proceeded with the trial in her absence. ISSUES [ 2 ] The issues before the court are as follows: 1. Has J.H. breached the existing parenting-time orders? 2. If J.H. has breached these orders, what is the appropriate remedy? 3.

Has J.H. otherwise breached Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 Order? 4. Should the court prohibit J.H. from removing C. from Quesnel? PROCEDURAL HISTORY AND BACKGROUND FACTS [ 3 ] As J.H. declined to participate in these court proceedings, I have only D.G.’s uncontested evidence and the court record with respect to the matters before the court. [ 4 ] D.G. is [omitted for publication] years old, having been born on [omitted for publication]. He is the youngest of three children born to A.W.G. (or “A.G.”) and G.G. Both of his parents are now deceased.

D.G.’s older brother is C.G. and his sister is L.G. [ 5 ] D.G. was born and raised in Quesnel. He has lived there his entire life. He attended [omitted for publication] School and [omitted for publication] School. [ 6 ] D.G. works for [omitted for publication] (“D.”) as a planer-feeder man. D. is a large sawmill located between [omitted for publication], BC. D.G. has worked for D. for 31 years and is close to retiring. He works ten hours per day, Monday to Thursday. He does not work on Friday, Saturday or Sunday. [ 7 ] In August or September 2016, D.G. met J.H. on an on-line dating site.

J.H. was born [omitted for publication]. At the time, J.H. had two children: K.R.M, born [omitted for publication] (or “K.”); and V.G.M., born [omitted for publication] (or “V.”). K.’s father, W.M., is deceased. V.’s father is S.M., who lives in Prince George, BC.

J.H.’s mother is J.M.H., who also lives in Prince George. [ 8 ] Around the time she met D.G., J.H. was embroiled in litigation with her mother J.M.H. with respect to K., and with S.M. with respect to V. (See Prince George Court Files 1752258 and 1659064 and Quesnel Court File 17392). [ 9 ] Approximately two months after D.G. began dating her, J.H. told him that her two roommates walked out on her and that she could not afford the rent on her own. At the time, J.H. was residing in a mobile home on the Hart Highway in Prince George. [ 10 ] D.G. invited J.H. to move in with him.

At the time, he resided in a mobile home he had purchased in 2006. The mobile home was located in the [omitted for publication], at [omitted for publication] (the “E.S. Residence”), Quesnel, BC. I gather that by 2016, the residence was fully paid for. J.H. moved in with D.G. in late November or early December 2016. They entered into a rental agreement in which J.H. agreed to pay a certain proportion of the household expenses.

I gather the purpose of this agreement was to ensure J.H. could continue to receive social assistance benefits as a single parent. [ 11 ] Because of J.H.’s litigation with their other caregivers, it is not entirely clear to me whether V. and K. resided with J.H. and D.G. full time, part time, or intermittently. [ 12 ] When she moved in with D.G., J.H. was unemployed. She told the court on June 27, 2022, that she had not worked outside the home in years. J.H. survived on social-assistance benefits before, during and after her relationship with D.G.

D.G. says that J.H. is not disabled and believes at one time she worked in Prince George as a dog groomer; otherwise, he is not aware of J.H. engaging in any particular occupation. Her Financial Statement filed on June 2, 2016 in court file 164064, and on April 16, 2021 in these proceedings, corroborate that J.H.’s income has been primarily social assistance, government benefits, and child support from the fathers of her children. [ 13 ] J.H. attached to her Form 4 Financial Statements (File 18202) incomplete Income Tax and Benefit Returns (“ITR”) for 2020, 2019 and 2018.

She indicates that in each of those years she was a widow who resided at [omitted for publication], BC. J.H. does not disclose in any of these ITRs that she was living in a common-law relationship. She declared her total income for 2020 to be $38,595.30, consisting of $15,624 from social assistance, $2,971.20 from Canada Pension Plan (“CPP”), and $20,000 in taxable income from some unidentified source. J.H. did not provide copies of any tax slips (T3, T4, T5) relevant to her ITR.

I gather the CPP income was a death benefit J.H. received from K.’s father’s estate, and the $20,000 was the Canada Emergency Response Benefit (“CERB”). In her April 16,

2021 Financial Statement, J.H. says she received an annual income of $19,781.64, consisting of $6,091.92 from a CPP pension income and $13,689.72 from social assistance. She admits to receiving only $620 in child support, giving her a total income of $20,401.64 for spousal support. J.H.’s 2019 ITR indicates she earned a total income of $15,067.75, consisting of $2,915.76 from CPP, and $12,151.99 from social assistance.

J.H.’s 2018 ITR indicates she earned a total of $15,263.37, consisting of $2,850.24 from CPP, and $12,413.13 from social assistance. [ 14 ] D.G. says that when they began cohabitating, J.H. agreed they would not have any children from their relationship. J.H. had two children from two previous relationships and told him she was taking birth control pills. D.G. believed that at 47, as he then was, he was too old to start a family. [ 15 ] Six to eight months after J.H. moved in with D.G., he ended their relationship.

D.G. said he did so because although J.H. received income from multiple sources, including a rent subsidy, she did not contribute financially to their living expenses or accommodations. She routinely drove D.G.’s truck rather than her own, as her vehicle had mechanical deficits. She did this even when she was subject to a driving prohibition which Judge Brecknell imposed as a result of her Motor Vehicle Act conviction on June 15, 2016, for driving while prohibited on Prince George Court File 42642-1. [ 16 ] D.G. says that when working, he left his wallet in his vehicle.

He discovered J.H. had taken his bankcard from his wallet and was using it without his knowledge or permission. This came to his attention when his payment for his vehicle insurance could not be processed because he had insufficient funds in his account. When he confronted her about the missing money, J.H. said “your money is my money”. D.G. balked at this suggestion. It was not his intention to become J.H.’s “sugar daddy” and felt she was taking advantage of him. [ 17 ] J.H. left D.G.’s residence and moved in with S.M. D.G. said he received a telephone call from the RCMP in the middle of the night.

An officer told him to come and pick up J.H. because she had been assaulted by S.M. I understand that by this time, S.M. had relocated to Quesnel as well. J.H. says at the time he assaulted her, S.M. was intoxicated on drugs. She told Judge Mulder in the June 27, 2022 hearing that S.M. “had a very big problem with drugs” which is why she had ended their relationship. D.G. brought J.H. home with him and they rekindled their relationship. [ 18 ] After moving back in with D.G., J.H. stopped using birth control. She did not disclose this fact to D.G. until she was four and one-half months pregnant.

C. was born on [omitted for publication]. Although he had not planned on becoming a father, D.G. was delighted to have C. in his life. [ 19 ] D.G. ended his relationship permanently with J.H. in late 2019. He did so upon learning J.H. had defrauded his elderly father (A.G.) who was suffering from dementia. Because of A.G.’s deteriorating health, D.G. and J.H. would often go to his home and help him out. A.G. resided in his own mobile home located in the [omitted for publication] not far from D.G.’s residence. It came to D.G.’s attention that A.G.’s credit-card statement indicated he owed CIBC $13,000.

D.G. knew his father rarely used his credit card. A.G. confused his credit-card statement with his bank-account statement. [ 20 ] D.G. began investigating the charges on A.G.’s credit card. D.G. learned that J.H. had taken A.G.’s credit-card information and used it to make multiple on-line purchases from Amazon, including a cell phone. This merchandise was delivered to her home address. She had even arranged to pay her father’s Saskatchewan motor vehicle insurance with A.G.’s credit card. D.G. was aware his father had no idea of how to make online purchases, nor did he know anyone in Saskatchewan.

J.H.s’ father, A.W., lived in Saskatchewan before he too relocated to Quesnel. D.G. confronted J.H. with the fraudulent transactions and advised her he intended to report it to the police. In a pre-emptive strike, J.H. went immediately to the Quesnel RCMP and falsely claimed that D.G. assaulted her. D.G. was forced to “disprove” her allegations of family violence, which he eventually succeeded in doing. J.H. continued to deny using A.G.’s credit card even though it was obvious from the nature of the purchases that she had done so.

J.H. was never charged with fraud; she continued to deny liability and did not reimburse A.G. for any of the charges. However, J.H.’s father A.W. offered to repay the credit-card charges for his Saskatchewan motor-vehicle insurance. A.G. died on March 12, 2022. [ 21 ] D.G. ended his relationship with J.H. in November or December of 2019. He moved out of the E.S. Residence to give J.H. time to relocate. D.G. moved in with his father, who increasingly needed ongoing assistance. It was three years before J.H. moved out of the E.S.

Residence. [ 22 ] Initially, J.H. facilitated D.G.’s parenting time with C. whenever he requested it. She did not attempt to restrict his parenting time in any way. This accommodation ended after J.H. learned D.G. began dating his current partner and fiancée, K.W. [ 23 ] D.G. and K.W. have been a couple now for two years. They met on December 23, 2020. K.W. works in [omitted for publication] at the [omitted for publication] in Quesnel, BC. D.G. and K.W. purchased a house together at [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC, where they currently reside.

In August 2021, when D.G. took C. to show her his new home, J.H. refused him all further contact with C. [ 24 ] On July 8, 2020, J.H. filed an Application to Obtain an Order in these Proceedings (Court File 18202). At the time, she was represented by legal counsel Mr. K. Thomson. She sought orders for guardianship, parenting time, allocation of parenting responsibilities and child support for all three of her children. She also sought spousal support and the following “conduct orders”: 1.

Pursuant to s. 225 of the FLA , the parties will communicate with each other only by text messages and emails with the exception that once a week D.G. can attend at J.H.’s residence or other agreed upon location, at a time agreed in writing by both parties, for the sole purpose of D.G. having supervised parenting time with C. · 2. Pursuant to s. 226 of the FLA , D.G. shall pay the pad rental fee, all utilities, insurance premiums, and taxes for the former family residence having a street address of [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC as long as J.H. continues to reside there. 3.

Pursuant to s. 227 of the FLA , D.G. shall not evict J.H. from, or in any other manner whatsoever cause J.H. to cease to reside at, the former family residence.

4. Pursuant to ss. 226 and 227 of the FLA , if J.H. cannot continue to reside at the former family residence, D.G. shall subside J.H.’s .rent in an amount equal to the pad rental fee charged at the former family residence as well as all utilities, insurance premiums, and taxes for J.H.’s new residence. [ 25 ] D.G. filed a Reply on August 25, 2020, Court Electronic Information System (“CEIS”) 3. He sought an order for guardianship, parenting time, allocation of parenting responsibilities, and a paternity test.

Judge Galbraith ordered the paternity test on January 8, 2021 (CEIS 7), which confirmed D.G. was C.’s biological father. D.G. filed an amended Reply and Counterclaim on March 31, 2021, seeking an order that both parties were guardians of C. (CEIS 13). [ 26 ] The first appearance of Court File 18202 with respect to CEIS 1 and 3 was set for September 23, 2020 (CEIS 4). On that date, Judge Gove adjourned the applications to October 14, 2020, when it came before Judge Galbraith. He granted D.G.’s request for a paternity test for C.

The parties were to have the test completed by November 27, 2020. [ 27 ] On December 15, 2020, this matter came back before Judge Galbraith. D.G. was represented by legal counsel Mr. D. Frappier; J.H. was represented by her legal counsel Mr. K. Thomson. Judge Galbraith adjourned the matter to the Judicial Case Manager to

schedule a three-day trial. [ 28 ] On March 24, 2021, this matter came before Judge L. Thomas for a pre-trial conference. Both parties were represented by their respective legal counsel. Judge Thomas ordered J.H. and D.G. each file with the court registry and deliver to the other a Form 4 Financial Statement, with all attachments, before April 7, 2021.

Judge Thomas further ordered that J.H. and D.G. provide each other will-say statements and a witness list by April 7, 2021. [ 29 ] Both parties filed Form 4 Financial Statements: D.G. on April 1, 2021 (CEIS 15), and J.H. on April 16, 2021 (CEIS 16). [ 30 ] J.H.’s Application to Obtain an Order (CEIS 1) and D.G.’s Amended Reply and Counterclaim (CEIS 13) came before Judge Becknell for trial for the April 21, 22, 23, 2021 assize in the Quesnel Provincial Court. D.G. appeared in person and self-represented; J.H. appeared in person and represented by her legal counsel Mr. K. Thomson.

D.G. identified his issues as follows: a. D.G. wanted J.H. to vacate the E.S. Residence. They had been separated for a year and one-half, and D.G. had been paying the utilities and pad rental and maintenance during that period; b. D.G. wanted specified parenting time with C.; and c. D.G. was agreeable to paying J.H. Guideline child support for C. [ 31 ] D.G. opposed J.H.’s application for spousal support on the basis that throughout the relationship she received social assistance as a single parent, and, in any event, she had lived in the E.S. Residence since they had separated, at his expense.

Those expenses included the pad rental, house insurance, hydro, natural gas, and maintenance. D.G. estimated the market rent for the E.S. Residence was $1,200 per month. [ 32 ] Mr. Thomson, on J.H.’s behalf, represented to the court: a. There was very little difference between the parties’ respective positions. J.H. was largely agreeing with D.G.’s position and if they had a 30-minute discussion, they could likely resolve all the outstanding issues and avoid a three-day trial; b. J.H. agreed to move out of the mobile home [the E.S. Residence]. J.H. understands the cost to D.G. to maintain her in the E.S.

Residence far outweighs any spousal support or child support to which she may be entitled. All J.H. is looking for is a transition period and some interim spousal support in order to move out of the E.S. Residence and allow D.G. to move in; c. J.H. acknowledges that her claim for child support is only with respect to C. J.H. already receives child support for K. from her biological father’s estate and for V. from his father S.M. J.H. was prepared to adjourn the issue of child support for K. and V. as against D.G. generally, while J.H. deals with that issue with their primary guardians; d.

J.H. acknowledges that she and D.G. are both C.’s guardians; and e. J.H. anticipates the issues of child support for J.H.’s older children (K. and V.) and spousal support will be adjourned generally. [ 33 ] Judge Brecknell adjourned the commencement of the trial on CEIS 1 and 3 to April 22, 2021, to afford the parties an opportunity to negotiate a resolution of the issues. On April 22, 2021, Mr. Thomson, on behalf of J.H., advised the court the parties had been quite successful in resolving all the issues except for the issue of spousal support.

He did not believe more than a one-half day hearing was required with respect to that issue. At Mr. Thomson’s request, Judge Brecknell adjourned the matter to April 23, 2021. [ 34 ] On April 23, 2021, Mr. Thomson presented Judge Brecknell with a signed interim without prejudice consent order (CEIS 17). Judge Brecknell ordered: 1. The Court is satisfied that J.H. and D.G. are the guardians of the Child [C.R.L.G.], born [omitted for publication] under s. 39(1) of the Family Law Act (FLA). 2. D.G. is found to be a resident of British Columbia and is found to have a gross annual income of $85,134.71. 3.

D.G. will pay to J.H. the sum of $814.27 per month for the support of the Child with payments made bi-weekly in the amount of $375.82 commencing on April 23, 2021, and continuing on every second Friday thereafter, for as long as the Child is eligible for support under the FLA or until further Court order. 4. For as long as the Child is eligible to receive child support, the parties will exchange: (

a) copies of their respective income tax returns

for the previous year, including all attachments, not later than May 1st each year; and (

b) copies of any Notice of Assessment or Reassessment provided to them by Canada Revenue Agency, immediately upon receipt. 5. Parental Responsibilities for the Child are to be allocated as follows: (

a) In the event of the death of a guardian, the surviving guardian will be the only guardian of the Child; (

b) Each guardian will have the obligation to advise the other guardian of any matters of a significant nature affecting the Child; (

c) Each guardian will have the obligation to discuss with the other guardian any significant decisions that have to be made concerning the Child, including significant decisions about the health (except emergency decisions), education, religious instruction and general welfare; (

d) The guardians will have the obligation to discuss significant decisions with each other and the obligation to try to reach agreement on those decisions; (

e) In the event that the guardians cannot reach agreement on a significant decision despite their best efforts, the guardian with the majority of parenting time with the child will be entitled to make those decisions and the other guardian will have the right to apply for directions on any decision the guardian consider contrary to the best interests of the child, under s. 49 of the FLA; and (

f) Each guardian will have the right to obtain information concerning the child directly from third parties, including but not limited to teachers, counsellors, medical professionals, and third-party caregivers. 6. J.H. will have the majority of the parenting time with the Child. 7. D.G., when he is working the afternoon shift, which currently lasts from 4:30 pm to 3:00 am, will have parenting time with the Child two days each week on any of Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, or Thursday for ½ hour to 1 hour between 12:00 pm and 3:00 pm commencing April 26, 2021 or otherwise as agreed by the guardians in writing. 8.

D.G. will have parenting time with the Child for four hours on each Saturday or otherwise as agreed by the guardians in writing. 9. D.G. will have additional parenting time at dates and times agreed between the guardians. 10. J.H. will vacate the former family residence, having a street address of [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC no later than August 1, 2021 unless otherwise agreed by the parties. 11.

Pursuant to s. 226 of the FLA, D.G. will continue to make payments respecting pad fees, gas, electricity and other expenses relating to the maintenance of the former family residence while J.H. continues to occupy the former family residence. [ 35 ] Judge Brecknell adjourned generally all other matters not covered by the Consent Order, including the issue of spousal support and child support for K. and V. These matters have never been revived. [ 36 ] On April 23, 2021, C. was only [omitted for publication] years old.

Although D.G. said that he had significant parenting time with C. immediately following his separation from J.H. in late 2019, he had only limited parenting time with C. since Christmas 2020. D.G. met his current partner on December 23, 2020. He says when J.H. learned of their relationship, she began refusing D.G. all parenting time with C. The April 23, 2021 Order was intended to increase D.G.’s parenting time incrementally, given C. was only [omitted for publication] years old and had not seen her father for several months. This did not happen.

Instead, J.H. insisted she supervise D.G.’s parenting time, even in his own home. [ 37 ] On July 19, 2021, D.G. filed an Application About Enforcement (CEIS 18) of Judge Brecknell’s April 23, 2021 parenting-time order (CEIS 17). D.G. complained that J.H. was refusing to facilitate his parenting time as set out in the April 23, 2021 Order. D.G.’s July 19, 2021 Application (CEIS 18) came before Judge Brecknell for hearing on July 28, 2021.

On that date, Judge Brecknell directed D.G. file an affidavit setting out his missed parenting time and any other topics set out in the order made April 23, 2021. [ 38 ] On August 3, 2021, D.G. filed An Amended Application About Enforcement (CEIS 20) of Judge M. Brecknell’s April 23, 2021 Order (CEIS 18) for parenting time and vacant possession of [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC. In this amended application, D.G. stated that he had not had parenting time on June 26, 28, 30, 2021, or on July 3, 10, 17, 21, 24, 26, 28, 31, 2021.

Moreover, J.H. had not moved out of his residence at [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC, [omitted for publication] on August 1, 2021. [ 39 ] D.G.’s Application About Enforcement as amended (CEIS 20) came before me for hearing on August 25, 2021. D.G. was present and self-represented. J.H. was present in person and represented by her legal counsel Mr. K. Thomson. I adjourned the matter to the Judicial Case Manager to

schedule a 1.5 hour in-person hearing regarding interim parenting time for D.G. [ 40 ] On November 30, 2021, D.G.’s Enforcement Application (CEIS 20) came before Judge Mengering for hearing. Both parties were present in person. D.G. was self-represented; J.H. was represented by legal counsel, Ms. K. Surcess. Judge Mengering adjourned the matter to the Judicial Case Manager to

schedule a two-hour hearing of D.G.’s amended Enforcement Application (CEIS 20). Judge Mengering ordered: (

a) the parties exchange relevant and witness lists at least seven days in advance of the hearing date; and (

b) the parties work collaboratively towards parenting time to ensure D.G. gets his parenting time. [ 41 ] On December 31, 2021, the Judicial Case Manager scheduled D.G.’s Enforcement Application (CEIS 20) for a two-hour hearing on March 25, 2022, in Quesnel Provincial Court. [ 42 ] On March 25, 2022, D.G.’s Enforcement Application (CEIS 20) came before Judge Purewal for hearing. The court adjourned the matter to May 9, 2022, at which time it came back before Judge Brecknell. Both parties appeared self-represented. At J.H.’s request, Judge Brecknell adjourned the matter to June 2, 2022, to give her an opportunity have legal aid appoint her a new lawyer. On June 2,

2022, D.G. appeared before Judge Brecknell self-represented. J.H. did not appear in person, or by counsel or agent. Judge Brecknell adjourned the hearing of D.G.’s Enforcement Application (CEIS 20) to June 27, 2022. Judge Brecknell directed the Quesnel Court Registry to send a notice to both parties confirming the June 27, 2022 hearing date. On June 2, 2022, the court registry emailed both parties a notice of the June 27, 2022 hearing date. [ 43 ] On June 27, 2022, D.G.’s Enforcement Application (CEIS 30) came before Judge Mulder for hearing. D.G. and J.H. appeared in person and self-represented.

During the hearing, J.H. advised the court that she wanted to move to Prince George. Judge Mulder advised her there was no application before the court to relocate C. to Prince George. J.H. acknowledged this to be the case and blamed Ms. Surcess for not having filed the relocation application. With respect to finding a residence in Prince George, J.H. told Judge Mulder, “Honestly, I haven’t really looked hard because I was told I needed to get it approved by the court and go through the court process before I could even think about moving”. [ 44 ] D.G. advised the court that in addition to paying to J.H.

Guideline child support for C., he was also paying the pad rental, utilities, maintenance and other attendant expenses for the E.S. Residence. On two occasions he offered to give J.H. the E.S. Residence if she paid the transfer fees. She declined the offer – twice. J.H. preferred to remain in the E.S. Residence without any cost to her and continue to have D.G. pay all the attendant expenses. D.G. also complained that J.H. had significantly diminished the market value of the E.S.

Residence because the walls were now grimy from her cigarette and marijuana smoke. [ 45 ] At the June 27, 2022 hearing, D.G. complained that J.H. was still denying him parenting time with C. unless she supervised it, even in his own home. By the time of Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 Order, D.G. was again having very limited parenting time with C. J.H. simply refused to comply with Judge Brecknell’s April 23, 2021 Order. D.G. was once again forced into a position where his parenting time with C. would have to increase incrementally in order for them to re-establish their relationship.

By this time, C. was [omitted for publication] years old. [ 46 ] At the conclusion of the June 27, 2022 hearing, Judge Mulder reserved his decision. On July 12, 2022, D.G. attended court self- represented; J.H. attended in person and represented by Ms. H. Zetzsche, acting as duty counsel. Judge Mulder ordered (CEIS 35) that: 1. Paragraph 8 of the order of Judge Brecknell made April 23, 2021 is cancelled. 2. D.G. shall have parenting time with the Child [C.R.L.G.] on Saturday, July 16, 2022 from 1:00 PM-3:00 PM and Sunday July 17, 2022 from 1:00 PM-3:00 PM. 3.

D.G. shall have parenting time with the Child every Saturday from 11:00 AM to 3:00 PM. 4. D.G.'s parenting time is not to be supervised by J.H. or any other person. 5. The Parties shall exchange the child at J.H. residence. 6. D.G. shall advise J.H. if he is unable to exercise any of the Saturday scheduled parenting times at least 24 hours in advance. 7. Pursuant to Section 230(2)(b)(

i) of the Family Law Act , J.H. shall pay to D.G. the sum of $6000, representing 12 monthly instances of failing to comply with paragraph 10 of the order of Judge Brecknell made April 23, 2022 to compensate for expenses reasonable and necessarily incurred as a result of the non compliance by J.H. 8. The $6000 shall be paid by equal monthly payments of $500/month, commencing August 1, 2022. 9. Paragraph 11 of the order of Judge Brecknell made April 23, 2021 is cancelled. 10.

Pursuant to s. 226 of the Family Law Act J.H. shall pay the pad fees, gas, electricity and other expenses relating to the maintenance of the residence at [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC for so long as she continues to reside at that residence. 11. J.H. will vacate the residence at [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC, on or before October 1, 2022. [ 47 ] J.H. did not vacate the E.S.

Residence by October 1, 2022, nor did she not comply with Judge Mulder’s order to pay the pad fees, gas, electricity and other expenses relating to the maintenance of the residence. [ 48 ] J.H. made only one payment of $500 to D.G. pursuant to Terms 7 and 8 of Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 Order. [ 49 ] In late November 2022, J.H. relocated C. to Prince George without notice to D.G. or permission of the court. Having done so, she then refused D.G. any further parenting time with C.

D.G. has not seen C. since November 26, 2022. [ 50 ] On December 28, 2022, D.G. filed an Application About Enforcement (CEIS 36) of Judge Mulder’s Order (CEIS 35). He served J.H. with a copy of his application via email on December 28, 2022, and filed a Certificate of Service (CEIS 37) attesting to that effect. [ 51 ] J.H. did not file a response to D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Application (CEIS 36). [ 52 ] On January 11, 2023, D.G.’s Application About Enforcement (CEIS 36) came before Judge Mulder in the Quesnel Provincial Court. Both parties attended self-represented. J.H. sought an adjournment.

Judge Mulder granted J.H.’s adjournment request to give her time to formulate and file a response. J.H. admitted she had moved to Prince George and blamed Ms. H. Zetzsche for not filing the requisite application for relocation. I pause to note that Ms. Zetzsche was not acting as her legal counsel when J.H. moved C. to Prince George. [ 53 ] Judge Mulder strongly urged J.H. to comply with the current parenting-time order. Judge Mulder warned J.H. that if she denied D.G. court-ordered parenting time without good reason, she could be fined or assessed a penalty and D.G. may be awarded compensatory parenting time.

Judge Mulder further warned J.H. that the court would treat harshly any further breaches without justification. The matter

was adjourned to the Judicial Case Manager to

schedule a half-day hearing. [ 54 ] On January 11, 2023, D.G. filed an Application for Order Prohibiting the Relocation of a Child (CEIS 38). Also on that date, D.G. filed an Affidavit (CEIS 39) in support of his December 28, 2022 Application About Enforcement (CEIS 36), and an Affidavit (CEIS 40) in support of his January 11, 2023 Application for Order Prohibiting the Relocation of a Child (CEIS 38).

D.G. served these documents on J.H. by email and filed Certificates of Service (CEIS 41) attesting to that effect. [ 55 ] J.H. did not file a response to D.G.’s January 11, 2023 Application (CEIS 38). [ 56 ] On January 25, 2023, J.H. filed a Requisition (CEIS 43) with the Quesnel Court Registry seeking copies of D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Enforcement Application, D.G.’s January 11, 2023 Non-Relocation Application, and his two January 11, 2023 Affidavits (CEIS 39 and 40). [ 57 ] D.G.’s Applications (CEIS 36 and 38) came before Judge Mulder on January 25, 2023, for a subsequent appearance.

D.G. appeared self-represented. J.H. appeared represented by Ms. H. Zetzsche acting as duty counsel. At the January 25, 2023, court appearance, Ms. Zetzsche advised the court on J.H.’s behalf: a. J.H. is still waiting for legal aid to appoint her legal counsel, but there is a dearth of legal aid lawyers locally who were accepting legal aid appointments; b. There was little prejudice to D.G. with respect to his application to prohibit J.H. relocating C. to Prince George, given his parenting time was on Saturdays. D.G.’s parenting time could still be facilitated on Saturdays; c.

The increased costs of D.G. exercising parenting time could be managed by the parties transitioning C. in [omitted for publication]. Alternatively, J.H. is willing to transition C. between households by D.G. picking C. up in Prince George at the beginning of his parenting time and J.H. picking up C. in Quesnel at the end of D.G.’s parenting time and the recommencement of her parenting time; d. J.H.’s source of income was biweekly child support in the amount of $375 she receives from D.G., social assistance, and the Canada Child Care Benefit.

She makes no mention of the CPP benefits she receives for K. or child support she receives from S.M. for V. [ 58 ] Judge Mulder adjourned D.G.’s applications (CEIS 36 and 38) to the Judicial Case Manager to: (

a) schedule a half-day hearing for D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Application about Enforcement (CEIS 36), and (

b) for a subsequent appearance of D.G.’s January 11, 2023 Non-Relocation Application (CEIS 38) to give J.H. time to obtain legal counsel with respect to D.G.’s January 11, 2023 Application Prohibiting the Relocation of a Child (CEIS 38). [ 59 ] Also on January 25, 2023, at the court’s direction, J.H. filed a Notice of Change of Address with the Quesnel Court Registry indicating her address for delivery was [omitted for publication], Prince George, BC, [omitted for publication], email [omitted for publication] and her telephone number was [omitted for publication]. [ 60 ] On February 16, 2023, the Quesnel Court Registry provided the parties with a Scheduling Notice (CEIS 44), that D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Enforcement Application (CEIS 36) and January 11, 2023 Non-Relocation Application (CEIS 38) were scheduled for hearing in Quesnel Provincial Court on May 1, 2023. [ 61 ] On April 12, 2023, Quesnel Court Registry provided the parties with Notice of a Hearing or Conference (CEIS 45) and instructions on how to attend remotely (CEIS 46).

The notices directed the parties to attend before the Quesnel Provincial Court on April 19, 2023, at 9:00 a.m., for a trial preparation conference. The notices were sent to: D.G. [omitted for publication], Quesnel BC [omitted for publication] (Respondent) D.G. Email: [omitted for publication] (Respondent) J.H. [omitted for publication], Prince George BC [omitted for publication] (Applicant) J.H.

Email: [omitted for publication] (Applicant) [ 62 ] On April 19, 2023, D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Enforcement Application (CEIS 36) and D.G.’s January 11, 2023 Non-Relocation Application (CEIS 38) came before me for a pre-trial conference. D.G. appeared in person and self-represented. J.H. did not appear in person, or by counsel or agent. D.G. informed the Court that notwithstanding Judge Mulder’s admonition to J.H. on January 11, 2023, J.H. continued to withhold C. from him.

He still had not seen C. since November 26, 2022. [ 63 ] I confirmed D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Application and January 11, 2023 Application (CEIS 38) would proceed to hearing on the May 1 – May 4, 2023 family assize in Quesnel Provincial Court, second only to a Child, Family, and Community Service Act (“ CFCSA ”) presentation hearing. [ 64 ] On May 1, 2023, the CFCSA hearing did not proceed. The court called the matters of D.G.’s December 28, 2022 Enforcement Application (CEIS 36) and D.G.’s January 11, 2023 Non-Relocation Application (CEIS 38). D.G. appeared in person with his witness.

J.H. did not appear in person, or by counsel or agent. The court commenced the hearing. The court clerk called the file and paged the parties. At my direction the court clerk telephoned J.H. in court. The court clerk dialed [omitted for publication] , which is the telephone number J.H. provided on her Notice of Change of Address filed January 25, 2023 (CEIS 42). This was also the same and only telephone number D.G. had for J.H. The court clerk left a message advising J.H. that her matter was proceeding and if she wished to participate, she was to call the court at the number provided.

I stood down court until 11:17 a.m. When the court reconvened, J.H. had still not appeared in person, or by counsel or agent. She had not contacted the court or court registry in any manner. By this date, J.H. had not filed with the Quesnel Provincial Court Registry any response or affidavit with respect to D.G.’s applications (CEIS 36 and 38). I directed the hearing of these matters proceed in her absence.

[ 65 ] At the conclusion of the trial, I reserved my decision. On May 3, 2023, I made the order which is attached to these Reasons for Judgment. Issue #1: Has J.H. breached the existing parenting-time orders? LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BREACHES OF PARENTING-TIME ORDERS [ 66 ] Parties must abide by court orders. As the applicant, D.G. bears the burden of establishing there has been a denial of parenting time.

Once he has met this threshold burden, the onus shifts to J.H. to show that a denial was not wrongful. [ 67 ] Division 5 of the Family Law Act sets out the applicable statutory framework for parenting-time issues before this Court. For ease of reference, I have set out the relevant sections below: Division 5 — Compliance Respecting Parenting Time or Contact with a Child Denial of parenting time or contact 61

(1) An application under this

section may be made only (

a) by a person entitled under an agreement or order to parenting time or contact with a child, and (

b) within 12 months after the person was denied parenting time or contact with a child.

(2) If satisfied that an applicant has been wrongfully denied parenting time or contact with a child by a child's guardian, the court on application may make an order to do one or more of the following: (

a) require the parties to participate in family dispute resolution; (

b) require one or more parties or, without the consent of the child's guardian, the child, to attend counselling, specified services or programs; (

c) specify a period of time during which the applicant may exercise compensatory parenting time or contact with the child; (

d) require the guardian to reimburse the applicant for expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred by the applicant as a result of the denial, including travel expenses, lost wages and child care expenses; (

e) require that the transfer of the child from one party to another be supervised by another person named in the order; (

f) if the court is satisfied that the guardian may not comply with an order made under this section, order that guardian to (

i) give security in any form the court directs, or (ii) report to the court, or to a person named by the court, at the time and in the manner specified by the court; (

g) require the guardian to pay (

i) an amount not exceeding $5 000 to or for the benefit of the applicant or a child whose interests were affected by the denial, or (ii) a fine not exceeding $5 000.

(3) If the court makes an order under subsection (2) (a), (

b) or (e), the court may allocate among the parties, or require one party alone to pay, the fees relating to the family dispute resolution, counselling, service, program or transfer. [ 68 ] Section 62(1) permits reasonable denials, with the best interests of the children being the only consideration: A.N. v. A.M.N. , 2021 BCSC 2228 , at para. 17 .

Section 62 reads: When denial is not wrongful 62

(1) For the purposes of

section 61 [ denial of parenting time or contact ], a denial of parenting time or contact with a child is not wrongful in any of the following circumstances: (

a) the guardian reasonably believed the child might suffer family violence if the parenting time or contact with the child were exercised; (

b) the guardian reasonably believed the applicant was impaired by drugs or alcohol at the time the parenting time or contact with the child was to be exercised; (

c) the child was suffering from an illness when the parenting time or contact with the child was to be exercised and the guardian has a written statement, by a medical practitioner or nurse practitioner, indicating that it was not appropriate that the parenting time or contact with the child be exercised; (

d) in the 12-month period before the denial, the applicant failed repeatedly and without reasonable notice or excuse to exercise parenting time or contact with the child; (

e) the applicant (

i) informed the guardian, before the parenting time or contact with the child was to be exercised, that it was not going to be exercised,

and (ii) did not subsequently give reasonable notice to the guardian that the applicant intended to exercise the parenting time or contact with the child after all; (

f) other circumstances the court considers to be sufficient justification for the denial.

(2) If, on an application under

section 61 , the court finds that parenting time or contact with a child was denied, but was not wrongfully denied, the court may make an order specifying a period of time during which the applicant may exercise compensatory parenting time or contact with the child. . . . [ 69 ]

Section 231 of the Family Law Act also imbues the court with powers to order extraordinary remedies necessary to enforce and secure a party’s compliance with court orders made under the Family Law Act : Kanta v. Kanta , 2017 BCSC 2321 , at para. 19 .

Section 231 reads: Extraordinary remedies 231

(1) This

section applies if (

a) a person fails to comply with an order made under this Act, and (

b) the court is satisfied that no other order under this Act will be sufficient to secure the person's compliance.

(2) Subject to

section 188 [ enforcing orders respecting protection ], the court may make an order that a person be imprisoned for a term of no more than 30 days.

(3) For the purposes of subsection (2), (

a) a person must first be given a reasonable opportunity to explain his or her non-compliance and show why an order under this

section should not be made, (

b) for the purpose of bringing a person before the court to show why an order for imprisonment should not be made, the court may issue a warrant for the person's arrest, and (

c) imprisonment of a person under this

section does not discharge any duties of the person owing under an order made under this Act.

(4) If satisfied under

section 61 [ denial of parenting time or contact ] that a person has been wrongfully denied parenting time or contact with a child by the child's guardian, a court may make an order requiring a police officer to apprehend the child and take the child to the person.

(5) If satisfied that a person having contact with a child has wrongfully withheld the child from a guardian of the child, a court may make an order requiring a police officer to apprehend the child and take the child to the guardian.

(6) For the purpose of locating and apprehending a child in accordance with an order made under subsection (4) or (5), a police officer may enter and search any place he or she has reasonable and probable grounds for believing the child to be. [ 70 ] On the evidence before me, I conclude that J.H. has deliberately, wrongfully and repeatedly denied D.G.’s court-ordered parenting time with C. over a prolonged period. Specifically: a.

J.H. has breached Term 9 of Judge Brecknell’s April 23, 2022 Order which provides that D.G. would have additional parenting time with C. at such time and dates as the parties may agree. J.H. simply refuses to respond to his telephone calls or messages, which makes it impossible for him to arrange parenting time; b. J.H. has breached Term 2 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order by wrongfully denying D.G. his court-ordered parenting time with C. on Saturday, July 16, 2022; and c.

J.H. has breached Term 3 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order by wrongfully denying D.G. his court-ordered parenting time with C. from November 27, 2022, to May 1, 2023 inclusive; and d. J.H.’s breaches of this Court’s parenting-time orders are ongoing. BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD [ 71 ] Having found J.H. has breached the parenting-time orders, I must consider an appropriate remedy. In doing so, I must focus on C. and her best interests. The overarching consideration in determining issues of parenting arrangements is the best interests of the child.

The relevant statutory provisions are set out in s. 37 of the Family Law Act which states: Best interests of child 37

(1) In making an agreement or order under this Part respecting guardianship, parenting arrangements or contact with a child, the parties and the court must consider the best interests of the child only.

(2) To determine what is in the best interests of a child, all of the child's needs and circumstances must be considered, including the

following: (

a) the child's health and emotional well-being; (

b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them; (

c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life; (

d) the history of the child's care; (

e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development; (

f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities, parentingtime or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities; (

g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed toward thechild or another family member; (

h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her ability to carefor the child and meet the child's needs; (

i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child, includingwhether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other family members; (

j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being.

(3) An agreement or order is not in the best interests of a child unless it protects, to the greatest extent possible, the child's physical,psychological and emotional safety, security and well-being.

(4) In making an order under this Part, a court may consider a person's conduct only if it substantially affects a factor set out insubsection (2), and only to the extent that it affects that factor. [72] In analyzing the child’s best interests, the court should consider all of the factors under s. 37, but such factors are non-exhaustive:Pozzobon v. Pozzobon, 2013 BCSC 1226 , at para. 30. (

a) the child’s health and emotional well-being [73] D.G. testified that C. is ordinarily a happy and healthy little girl. I have no reason to believe otherwise. (

b) the child's views, unless it would be inappropriate to consider them [74] C. is [omitted for publication] years old and it is inappropriate to consider her views. In his January 11, 2023 Affidavit, D.G.attached a series of text messages exchanged with J.H. in December 2022. It is clear that D.G. is attempting to arrange to exercise hisSaturday parenting time and J.H. purports to justify denying him parenting time because it does not accord with C.’s wishes.

J.H. claimsC. is feeling miserable and does not want to go with her father and she is not going “drag her and [force] her kicking and screaming andupset”. [75] D.G.’s parenting time is not subject to C.’s whim and fancy. C. is [omitted for publication] years old and it is inappropriate toconsider her views on parenting arrangements. (

c) the nature and strength of the relationships between the child and significant persons in the child's life [76] The evidence before me suggests that C. has a close and loving relationship with D.G. and J.H. and a positive relationship withother members of their respective households. (

d) the history of the child's care [77] C. has lived primarily with her mother since J.H. and D.G. separated on November 9, 2019 (see CEIS 13). Post-separation, C.has had parenting time with both parents. I assume C. also has a close relationship with her half-siblings K. and V. As D.G. does notwork on the weekends, he is free to spend a considerable amount of time with C. I have no reason to believe that C. does not enjoy herparenting time with D.G. (

e) the child's need for stability, given the child's age and stage of development [78] Given C.’s young age, she has a greater need for stability than an older child. In my view, it is destabilizing for J.H. tocontinually deny C. parenting time with her father. It is not in C.’s best interest to allow her, at this young age, to dictate when or whereshe has parenting time with her mother or father. (

f) the ability of each person who is a guardian or seeks guardianship of the child, or who has or seeks parental responsibilities,parenting time or contact with the child, to exercise his or her responsibilities [79] I am satisfied that D.G. is a competent parent who is more than capable of exercising his parenting responsibilities. He isgainfully employed and able to provide C. with the necessaries of life. He is not reluctant to pay child support. I find D.G. is sincere inhis professed love and caring for C. I have not been made aware of D.G. having any physical, emotional or psychological deficits whichwould impair his ability to parent C.

[80] As J.H. has not participated in this trial, I cannot assess her parental capacity, but have no reason to believe she is not generally aloving and nurturing parent to C. [81] I note J.H.’s principal source of income is monies she receives from social assistance, government benefits and child support.

Herdecision to remain out of the workforce deprives her opportunities for upward financial mobility that comes with gainful employment.Her choices make it challenging for J.H. to secure adequate housing and provide her family with residential and financial stability andthe necessaries of life. [82] An important parenting responsibility is to foster a nurturing and loving relationship between C. and both her guardians. I amsatisfied that D.G. is committed to supporting C.’s relationship with her mother.

I am not satisfied that J.H. is similarly committed tosupporting C.’s relationship with her father. [83] Another important parenting responsibility is developing a child’s moral compass. In Bell v. Kirk (1986), (BCCA), at para. 18, McLachlin J.A. (as she then was) suggested that in determining the best interests of the child, the court is entitled “toconsider a parent’s propensity for honesty or dishonesty and a parent’s social responsibility.” Section 37(4) of the Family Law Act holds: 37 . . .

(4) In making an order under this Part, a court may consider a person's conduct only if it substantially affects a factor set out insubsection (2), and only to the extent that it affects that factor. [84] D.G. describes J.H.’s history of dishonesty, which includes fraud, making false allegations, and disregarding court orders. I ammindful I do not have J.H.’s response to these allegations; however, she chose not to participate in the trial. Her impugned conduct istroublesome. It has the potential to wreak havoc in C.’s life. J.H.’s misconduct was the reason D.G. ended their relationship – twice. It isnot only destabilizing, it makes J.H. a poor role model for a child. (

g) the impact of any family violence on the child's safety, security or well-being, whether the family violence is directed towardthe child or another family member [85] I am aware of only three alleged incidents of family violence:

(1) S.M. assaulting J.H.;

(2) S.M. assaulting D.G. when D.G.insisted J.H. give him a key to the E.S. Residence when she changed the locks; and

(3) J.H.’s false allegations to the police that D.G.assaulted her, made immediately after D.G. informed J.H. of his intention to report her fraudulent activities. I gather the police acceptedthat J.H.’s complaint was made for an ulterior purpose and no charges ensued. (

h) whether the actions of a person responsible for family violence indicate that the person may be impaired in his or her abilityto care for the child and meet the child's needs [86] I do not see why S.M. needs to have any dealings with D.G. His history of family violence is a significant concern to C.’s securityand well-being. However, I do not have sufficient information about C.’s current living situation at this time to determine the degree ofrisk. (

i) the appropriateness of an arrangement that would require the child's guardians to cooperate on issues affecting the child,including whether requiring cooperation would increase any risks to the safety, security or well-being of the child or other familymembers [87] In my view there ought to be no risk to C.’s safety, security or wellbeing attributable to J.H. and D.G. sharing parenting time withand parenting responsibilities for C. There may be some risk as a result of J.H.’s ongoing relationship with S.M., the degree of which isunknown. I can see no reason why D.G. and J.H. cannot communicate with the other with reasonable civility. (

j) any civil or criminal proceeding relevant to the child's safety, security or well-being [88] The only other proceedings of which I am aware is J.H.’s ongoing family law proceedings with S.M. and J.M.H. These arerelevant to C.’s safety, security and well-being, when they impact where and how and with whom J.H. chooses to live. Issue #2: What is the appropriate remedy for J.H.’s breaches of the parenting-time orders [89] J.H. began denying D.G. parenting time with C. in December 2020. It took until April 23, 2021, before he could obtain a courtorder requiring her to facilitate D.G.’s parenting time.

Within two months of Judge Brecknell’s pronouncement of the April 23, 2021Order (CEIS 17), J.H. began denying D.G.’s court-ordered parenting time with C. It took D.G. over a year to have the matter come backbefore the court to address the breaches. When J.H. breached Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 Order, it took D.G. until May 1, 2023, tohave the matter heard. J.H. sought and obtained adjournments in hope the Legal Services Society could appoint her legal counsel. Igather this has not happened. It is noteworthy that D.G. has been self-represented throughout these proceedings.

J.H. has generally hadthe benefit of experienced legal aid family law lawyers or duty counsel. My review of the court record, however, does not indicate D.G.has any special ability to navigate the family law proceedings self-represented. Typically, his filed documents are handwritten andrudimentary. I see no reason why J.H. could not participate in these proceedings self-represented as she did in the June 27, 2022 hearing. [90] J.H.’s wilful breaches of the parenting orders warrants judicial censure, in form of a monetary penalty and make-up parentingtime.

Anything less would bring the administration of justice in family law proceedings into disrepute. [91] I find D.G. is entitled to 100 hours of compensatory parenting time as a result of J.H. wrongfully denying him parenting timewith C. [92] Pursuant to s. 61(2)(

c) of the Family Law Act, D.G. may exercise compensatory parenting time with C. at dates and times agreedupon between the parties or by further court order.

[ 93 ] Pursuant to s. 61(2)(

g) of the Family Law Act, J.H. will pay to D.G. a penalty in the amount of $2,500 (the "Penalty'') for wrongfully denying D.G. court-ordered parenting time with C. [ 94 ] Commencing July 1, 2023, D.G. is entitled to deduct $150 per month from the monies he pays to J.H. for child support for C. until the Penalty is paid in full. [ 95 ] I recognize that making any order for D.G. to have compensatory parenting time which is subject to J.H.’s agreement is meaningless if she simply refuses to communicate with him or cooperate.

For this reason, I will remain seized of this matter and will monitor its progress. [ 96 ] I recognize that it is equally meaningless for the court to impose a monetary penalty that J.H. will ignore with impunity, as is her habit. For this reason, I am ordering that commencing July 1, 2023, D.G. is entitled to deduct $150 per month from the monies he pays to J.H. for child support for C. until the $2,500 penalty is paid in full. Because child support is the right of the child, I further order that D.G. will use the penalty monies he deducts from child support for C.'s benefit as he deems appropriate.

CONCLUSION ON D.G.’S JANUARY 11, 2023 APPLICATION TO PROHIBIT RELOCATION (CEIS 38) [ 97 ] D.G.'s January 22, 2023 Application for an Order Prohibiting the Relocation of a Child (CEIS 38) is adjourned to the Judicial Case Manager to fix a date for a continuation of the hearing before Judge Doulis. In the interim, despite J.H.’s wilful misconduct, I am not going to order J.H. return C. to reside in Quesnel pending this future court date. WHAT IS D.G.’S PARENTING TIME WITH C. GOING FORWARD? [ 98 ] D.G. has asked this Court to address the issue of his ongoing parenting time with C.

His ability to negotiate a reasonable parenting-time arrangement with J.H. is frustrated by her unwillingness or refusal to recognize C.’s right to have parenting time with her father, or to abide by any agreement or court order. [ 99 ] I agree D.G.’s parenting time with C. ought to be incrementally increased to include overnights. She is now [omitted for publication] years old, soon to be [omitted for publication]. There is no need to restrict D.G.’s parenting time to four hours on Saturday. In any event, it is unworkable where C. lives primarily with her mother in Prince George and D.G. resides in Quesnel.

In the past, an order giving D.G. additional parenting time as agreed between the parties has had little effect. As C. will likely start [omitted for publication] this fall, it makes sense that D.G.’s parenting time occur on the weekend when he is not working and she is not in [omitted for publication]. [ 100 ] The parties can transition C. between the two households as J.H. suggested at the January 25, 2023 court appearance.

D.G. can drive to Prince George at the commencement of his parenting time to pick up C. and J.H. can drive to Quesnel and pick C. up for the recommencement of her parenting time. [ 101 ] I make the following orders with respect to D.G.’s ongoing parenting time: a. Term 3 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order is terminated as of May 3, 2023, and replaced with this parenting time order; b. Term 9 of Judge Brecknell's April 23, 2021 Order is terminated as of May 3, 2023, and replaced with this order; c. D.G. will have the following parenting time with C.: i.

From May 6, 2023, to June 10, 2023, inclusive, D.G. will have parenting time with C. every Saturday from 11:00 a.m. to 5:00 p.m.; ii. From June 17, 2023, to July 22, 2023, inclusive, D.G. will have parenting time with C. every Saturday from 9:00 a.m. to Sunday at 1:00 p.m.; iii. Commencing July 28, 2023, and continuing until further court order, D.G. will have parenting time with C. every weekend commencing at 9:00 a.m. on Friday and ending at 1:00 p.m. on Sunday; iv. D.G. will have reasonable electronic parenting time with C. when C. is in J.H.’s care; d.

D.G.'s parenting time with C. is not subject to the wishes of J.H. or C.; e. D.G. will have additional parenting time with C. at dates and times as agreed between the guardians; f. D.G. will pick up C. for her parenting time at Tim Horton's restaurant at 6720 John Hart Hwy, Prince George, BC V2K 3A6, or such other location in Prince George the parties may agree; and g. J.H. will pick up C. at the end of D.G.'s parenting time with C. at the West Fraser Timber Park in Quesnel, BC, or such other place as the parties may agree.

POLICE ENFORCEMENT [ 102 ] I recognize that a police enforcement provision is an order of last resort. Given J.H.’s history of breaching court orders and the breach of Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 Order is ongoing, I believe we are at the last resort and I make the following orders pursuant to s. 231 of the Family Law Act : a. Pursuant to Rule 182(1)(

a) of the Provincial Court Family Rules , J.H. is to be served by a member of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police with a copy of this order, including its appendices, on or before May 6, 2023, or so soon thereafter as can be arranged;

b. Upon being satisfied that J.H. has wrongfully denied D.G. parenting time with the child, C.R.L.G., born [omitted for publication],this court orders under s. 231(4) of the Family Law Act that a police officer apprehend C.R.L.G. and take her to D.G.; c. Upon being satisfied that J.H. has wrongfully withheld the child, C.R.L.G., [omitted for publication], from D.G., this court ordersunder s. 231(5) of the Family Law Act that a police officer apprehend C.R.L.G. and take her to D.G.; and d.

For the purpose of locating and apprehending C.R.L.G. in accordance with this order, under s. 231(6) of the Family Law Act a policeofficer may enter and search any place they have reasonable and probable grounds for believing the child C.R.L.G. to be. Issue #3: Has J.H. otherwise breached Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 Order? LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR BREACHES OF CONDUCT ORDERS MADE UNDER THE FAMILY LAW ACT [103] Terms 10 and 11 of Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 order were made pursuant to ss. 222 and 226 of the Family Law Act.

Section222 states: Division 5 — Orders Respecting Conduct Purposes for which orders respecting conduct may be made 222 At any time during a proceeding or on the making of an order under this Act, the court may make an order under this Division forone or more of the following purposes: (

a) to facilitate the settlement of a family law dispute or of an issue that may become the subject of a family law dispute; (

b) to manage behaviours that might frustrate the resolution of a family law dispute by an agreement or order; (

c) to prevent misuse of the court process; (

d) to facilitate arrangements pending final determination of a family law dispute. Orders respecting residence 226 A court may make an order to do one or more of the following: (

a) require a party to make payments respecting rent, mortgage, specified utilities, taxes, insurance and other expenses related to aresidence; (

b) prohibit a party from terminating specified utilities for a residence; (

c) require a specified person to supervise the removal of personal belongings, by another person, from a residence. [104] In Quigg v. Quigg, 2018 BCSC 853 , Justice Sharma states at para. 60 that “Section 227 is based on this Court’s inpersonam jurisdiction over a litigant.” It gives the court very broad powers to make an order that a party “do or not do anything, as thecourt considers appropriate, in relation to a purpose referred to in

Section 222”.

Section 227 of the Family Law Act reads: Other orders respecting conduct 227 A court may make an order requiring a party to do one or more of the following: (

a) give security in any form the court directs; (

b) report to the court, or to a person named by the court, at the time and in the manner specified by the court; (

c) do or not do anything, as the court considers appropriate, in relation to a purpose referred to in

section 222 [purposes for which ordersrespecting conduct may be made]. [105] I find that J.H. has breached Term 10 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order by failing or refusing to pay the pad fee, gas,electricity and other expenses relating to the maintenance of the residence at [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC, for so long as shecontinued to reside in that residence. [106] I find J.H. has breached Term 11 of Judge Mulder’s conduct order made pursuant to s. 222 of the Family Law Act requiring her to“vacate the residence at [omitted for publication], Quesnel BC, on or before October 1, 2022.” [107]

Section 228 of the Family Law Act sets out the consequences of breaching a conduct order made under Division 5 - Ordersrespecting conduct. It reads: Enforcing orders respecting conduct 228

(1) If a party fails to comply with an order made under this Division, the court may do one or more of the following: (

a) make a further order under this Division; (

b) draw an inference that is adverse to the party, and make an order based on the inference; (

c) make an order requiring the party to pay

(

i) the other party for all or part of the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred as a result of the non-compliance, including fees and expenses related to family dispute resolution, (ii) an amount not exceeding $5 000 to or for the benefit of the other party, or a spouse or child whose interests were affected by the non- compliance, or (iii) a fine not exceeding $5 000; (

d) make any other order the court considers necessary to secure compliance. . . . REMEDY TO THE BREACHES TO CONDUCT ORDERS [ 108 ] D.G. is entitled to ask the court for a remedy for J.H.’s failing or refusing to pay the pad fee, gas, electricity and other expenses relating to the maintenance of the residence at [omitted for publication], Quesnel, BC, from July 12, 2022, until she vacated the residence in November 2022.

I am adjourning the assessment of the amount of money owing to D.G. as a result of J.H.’s breach of Term 10 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order, to a review of this matter on a date to be fixed by the Judicial Case Manager after October 31, 2023. BREACHES OF PENALTY ORDERS [ 109 ] I find that J.H. has failed or refused to comply with Terms 8 and 9 of Judge Mulder’s July 12, 2022 Order requiring her to compensate D.G. for the expenses he incurred as a result of J.H. failing to vacate the E.S.

Residence by August 1, 2021. [ 110 ] Terms 7 and 8 of Judge Mulder’s order were made pursuant to s. 230 of the Family Law Act , which is applicable where no other provision of the Family Law Act provides an effective remedy to enforce the order. It states: Enforcing orders generally 230

(1) Subject to

section 188 [enforcing orders respecting protection] , an order under this

section may be made only if no other provision of this Act applies for the purposes of enforcing an order made under this Act.

(2) For the purposes of enforcing an order made under this Act, the court on application by a party may make an order to do one or more of the following: (

a) require a party to give security in any form the court directs; (

b) require a party to pay (

i) the other party for all or part of the expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred as a result of the party's actions, including fees and expenses related to family dispute resolution, (ii) an amount not exceeding $5 000 to or for the benefit of the other party, or a spouse or child whose interests were affected by the party's actions, or (iii) a fine not exceeding $5 000. [ 111 ] There is $5,500 outstanding on the debt (the "Debt") Judge Mulder ordered (Terms 7 and 8) J.H. pay to D.G. for breaching Terms 10 and 11 of Judge Becknell's April 23, 2021 Order.

J.H. has breached and continues to breach Terms 7 and 8 of Judge Mulder's July 12, 2022 Order by failing to pay to D.G. $500 per month towards the satisfaction of the debt. [ 112 ] I am ordering that commencing August 1, 2023, D.G. is entitled to deduct up to $300 per month from the monies he pays to J.H. for child support for C. until the debt is paid in full. In making this order, I have not lost sight of the fact that child support is the right of the child. I am aware that courts do not generally allow a payor parent to deduct from child support monies attributable to a family debt.

I am not permitting D.G. to deduct from child support monies he paid to third-party creditors for debts accrued during the currency of his relationship with J.H. I am permitting him to offset from the monies he pays to J.H. for ongoing child support a portion of the monies Judge Mulder ordered she pay to D.G. post-separation. After a trial on the merits, Judge Mulder ordered J.H. pay $6,000 to D.G. to compensate D.G. for his continuing to pay the entire expenses for the E.S. Residence, which J.H. continued to occupy contrary to Judge Brecknell’s April 23, 2021 Order.

I understand the $6,000 was significantly less than the amount D.G. actually paid for these post- separation expenditures. Judge Mulder ordered J.H. pay the $6,000 debt to D.G. at the rate of $500 per month. I assume Judge Mulder concluded J.H. could afford this expenditure. I have only permitted D.G. to offset from child support $300 per month. If this presents an undue hardship for J.H., she can apply to have it varied. Issue #4: Should the court prohibit J.H. from removing C. from Quesnel?

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR AN ORDER PROHIBITING THE RELOCATION OF A CHILD [ 113 ] Under s. 65 of the Family Law Act , “Relocation” is defined as follows: Definition and application 65

(1) In this Division, "relocation" means a change in the location of the residence of a child or child's guardian that can reasonably be expected to have a significant impact on the child's relationship with

(

a) a guardian, or (

b) one or more other persons having a significant role in the child's life.

(2) This Division applies if (

a) a child's guardian plans to relocate himself or herself or the child, or both, and (

b) a written agreement or an order respecting parenting arrangements or contact with the child applies to the child. [114] If there is no prior agreement or order for parenting time, Division 2, s. 46, of the Family Law Act applies. It reads: Changes to child's residence if no agreement or order 46

(1) This

section applies if all of the following circumstances exist: (

a) no written agreement or order respecting parenting arrangements applies in respect of a child; (

b) an application is made for an order described in section 45 (1) (

a) or (b) [orders respecting parenting arrangements]; (

c) the child's guardian plans to change the location of that child's residence and the change can reasonably be expected to have asignificant impact on that child's relationship with another guardian.

(2) To determine the parenting arrangements that would be in the best interests of the child in the circumstances set out in subsection (1)of this section, the court (

a) must consider, in addition to the factors set out in section 37 (2) [best interests of child], the reasons for the change in the location ofthe child's residence, and (

b) must not consider whether the guardian who is planning to move would do so without the child. [115] I must consider if the move from Quesnel to Prince George resulted in a significant impact on C.’s relationship with her father:D.L.R.A. v. S.K.C., 2018 BCSC 147, at paras. 86-94. A relevant, but not determinative, factor in assessing impact is the proximitybetween the two locations and the distance and time it takes to travel between them.

In D.L.R.A., Justice Morellato emphasized the focusis on the effect of distance and travel time on the child's relationship with the parent and the extended family who have not moved that isimportant. For example, in Berry v. Berry, 2013 BCSC 1095, the court found that a change in residence between Surrey and NorthVancouver was not a relocation, but rather a change in residence within the Lower Mainland and between communities that are withincommuting distance of each other. I do not doubt there are some people who travel between Quesnel and Prince George to work.

Still, Ido not find Quesnel and Prince George comparable to the Lower Mainland megalopolis. [116] In late November 2022, J.H. relocated C. to Prince George without notice to D.G. or permission of the court. Having done so, sherefused to allow D.G. to have any further parenting time with C. He has not seen C. since November 26, 2022. [117] Prince George is approximately 122 kilometres from Quesnel. This is not a formidable distance, but it is significant in ageographical region where winter tires are mandatory from October 1 to April 30.

Still, the cessation of D.G.’s parenting time was notinevitable or unavoidable. It was not the distance and travel time between the two communities, but rather J.H.’s conduct that hasfrustrated D.G.’s parenting time with C. Since she has relocated to Prince George, J.H. chooses to deny D.G. parenting time as she seesfit. So whether the disruption in D.G.’s parenting time with C. ought to have occurred, it did. I conclude that J.H.’s relocation of C.’sresidence had, and has, a significant impact on C.’s relationship with her father, and s. 65 is satisfied.

NOTICE OF RELOCATION [118] A guardian who seeks to relocate must comply with the formal notice requirement set out in s. 66 of the Family Law Act beforesuch relocation is permitted: Gill v. Kaur, 2023 BCSC 178 , at para.

Section 66 states: Notice of relocation 66

(1) Subject to subsection (2), a child's guardian who plans to relocate himself or herself or a child, or both, must give to all otherguardians and persons having contact with the child at least 60 days' written notice of (

a) the date of the relocation, and (

b) the name of the proposed location.

(2) The court may grant an exemption from all or part of the requirement to give notice under subsection (1) if satisfied that (

a) notice cannot be given without incurring a risk of family violence by another guardian or the person having contact with the child, or (

b) there is no ongoing relationship between the child and the other guardian or the person having contact with the child.

(3) An application for an exemption under subsection (2) may be made in the absence of any other party. [119] Where a guardian has unilaterally removed a child from one jurisdiction without the consent of the other guardians, the courtgenerally orders the child be returned to the child’s habitual residence: Gill v. Kaur, at para. 17, citing Roman-Manarovici v.Manarovici, 2022 BCSC 1159 . Justice Kent, in Roman-Manarovici, cites (at para. 13) the following passage from Shortridge-

Tsuchiya v. Tsuchiya, 2010 BCCA 61: [68] It is not the case that a parent's only rights to custody of, and/or access to, their children are defined by court order. At common law,and under [the now Family Law Act] the mother and father of a child who are living together are the joint guardians of the child withjoint rights and obligations in relation to the child. If one parent unilaterally removes the child from the jurisdiction without theknowledge or consent of the other parent, this amounts to a wrongful taking of the child and a breach of the other parent’s rights as jointcustodial parent. . . . [120]

Section 67 of the Family Law Act provides that, if notice is required and given, the guardians must use their best efforts to attemptto resolve the issues relating to the proposed relocation. It reads: Resolving issues arising from relocation 67

(1) If notice is required under

section 66 [notice of relocation], after the notice is given and before the date of the relocation, thechild's guardians and the persons having contact with the child must use their best efforts to cooperate with one another for the purposeof resolving any issues relating to the proposed relocation.

(2) Nothing in subsection (1) prevents (

a) a guardian from making an application under

section 69 [orders respecting relocation], or (

b) a person having contact with the child from making an application under

section 59 [orders respecting contact] or 60 [changing,suspending or terminating orders respecting contact], as applicable, for the purpose of maintaining the relationship between the childand a person having contact with the child if relocation occurs. [121] On the evidence before me, I conclude that J.H. failed to take any steps to engage with D.G. or to use best efforts to cooperatewith him for the purposes relating to her proposed relocation to Prince George. Child may be relocated unless guardian objects 68 If a child's guardian gives notice under

section 66 [notice of relocation] that the guardian plans to relocate the child, the relocationmay occur on or after the date set out in the notice unless another guardian of the child, within 30 days after receiving the notice, files anapplication for an order to prohibit the relocation. [122] In C.H.S.L. v. D.C.L., 2022 BCSC 2419 , Master Hughes states: [30] The purpose of s. 68 is to give the relocating parent notice of any objection in a timely manner, in advance of the move, in order toallow that parent to plan accordingly.

If the parent knows that there will be an objection, they can plan to delay the move until theapplication is determined. If there is no objection, the parent knows that they are free to continue with their plans, including dealing withlogistics such as finding a new residence, planning the physical move of their belongings, terminating current employment, seeking newemployment, enrolling the child in a new school and extracurricular activities, arranging child care, etc.

The fact that the move occurredsome three months later than originally planned is not an impediment and is specifically contemplated in s. 68. [123] D.G. filed his Application for Order Prohibiting the Relocation of a Child (CEIS 38) on January 11, 2023, the day he learned incourt that J.H. had relocated to Prince George, taking C. with her. [124] Where there is an order in place addressing parenting time, the general rule is that s. 69 in Division 6 of the Family Law Actapplies. It reads: Orders respecting relocation 69

(1) In this section, "relocating guardian" means a guardian who plans to relocate a child.

(2) On application by a guardian, a court may make an order permitting or prohibiting the relocation of a child by the relocatingguardian.

(3) Despite section 37 (1) [best interests of child], the court, in making an order under this section, must consider, in addition to thefactors set out in section 37 (2), the factors set out in subsection (4) (

a) of this section.

(4) If an application is made under this

section and the relocating guardian and another guardian do not have substantially equalparenting time with the child, (

a) the relocating guardian must satisfy the court that (

i) the proposed relocation is made in good faith, and (ii) the relocating guardian has proposed reasonable and workable arrangements to preserve the relationship between the child and thechild's other guardians, persons who are entitled to contact with the child, and other persons who have a significant role in the child's life,and (

b) on the court being satisfied of the factors referred to in paragraph (a), the relocation must be considered to be in the best interests ofthe child unless another guardian satisfies the court otherwise.

(5) If an application is made under this

section and the relocating guardian and another guardian have substantially equal parenting timewith the child, the relocating guardian must satisfy the court

(

a) of the factors described in subsection (4) (a), and (

b) that the relocation is in the best interests of the child.

(6) For the purposes of determining if the proposed relocation is made in good faith, the court must consider all relevant factors,including the following: (

a) the reasons for the proposed relocation; (

b) whether the proposed relocation is likely to enhance the general quality of life of the child and, if applicable, of the relocatingguardian, including increasing emotional well-being or financial or educational opportunities; (

c) whether notice was given under

section 66 [notice of relocation]; (

d) any restrictions on relocation contained in a written agreement or an order.

(7) In determining whether to make an order under this section, the court must not consider whether a guardian would still relocate if thechild's relocation were not permitted. [125] I must assess whether the reloca

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