2015 NBCA 63, 2015 NBCA 63

COURT OF APPEAL OF COUR D'APPEL DU NEW BRUNSWICK NOUVEAU-BRUNSWICK MICHAEL KENNETH BLACK APPELLANT 85-14-CA MICHAEL KENNETH BLACK APPELANT - and - - et - BONNIE JEANNE BLACK RESPONDENT BONNIE JEANNE BLACK INTIMÉE Black v. Black, 2015 NBCA 63 Black c.

Black, 2015 NBCA 63 CORAM: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg The Honourable Justice Baird CORAM : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg l’honorable juge Baird Appeal from a decision of the Court of Queen’s Bench: June 16, 2014 Appel d’une décision de la Cour du Banc de la Reine : le 16 juin 2014 History of case: Decision under appeal: 2014 NBQB 153 Preliminary or incidental proceedings: N/A Historique de la cause : Décision frappée d’appel : 2014 NBBR 153 Procédures préliminaires ou accessoires : s.o.

Appeal heard: June 10, 2015 Judgment rendered: October 15, 2015 Appel entendu : le 10 juin 2015 Jugement rendu : le 15 octobre 2015 Reasons for judgment by: The Honourable Justice Baird Concurred in by: The Honourable Justice Larlee The Honourable Justice Quigg Counsel at hearing: For the appellant: Marie-Claude Bélanger-Richard, Q.C. For the respondent: Robert N. Charman Motifs de jugement: l’honorable juge Baird Souscrivent aux motifs : l’honorable juge Larlee l’honorable juge Quigg Avocats à l’audience : Pour l’appelant : Marie-Claude Bélanger-Richard, c.r. Pour l’intimée : Robert N.

Charman THE COURT The appeal is allowed in part. LA COUR L’appel est accueilli, en partie. The following is the judgment delivered by BAIRD, J.A. I. Introduction [ 1 ] The appellant, Michael Kenneth Black, appeals an order for variation of spousal support in favor of his ex- wife Bonnie Jean Black, rendered by a judge of the Court of Queen’s Bench, pursuant to s. 17 of the Divorce Act , R.S.C. 1985, c. 3 (2nd

Supp.) (the “Act”). Mr. Black requests that the decision be reversed in part on five grounds. II. Background and Nature of Proceedings [2] Mr. and Mrs. Black were married for eight years and four months prior to their separation in 2003. There wasno cohabitation prior to their marriage and there were no children of the marriage. This is characterized as a short term, non-traditionalmarriage. Mrs. Black became ill in 2000 and withdrew from the workforce. The parties executed a domestic contract on August 25,2004, which regulated their financial matters, and Mr.

Black agreed to pay non time-limited spousal support in the amount of $750monthly, in addition to Blue Cross health insurance premiums for the benefit of Mrs. Black. On September 7, 2004, a Divorce Orderissued which included corollary relief imported from the domestic contract: specifically, paragraphs 6 and 7. [3] The domestic contract required a mandatory review of spousal support four years from the date it wasexecuted and also provided the parties would exchange proof of their income each year. Further provisions obligated Mrs.

Black toinform her former husband “immediately” of any changes she experienced in her income, and Mr. Black had the right to request medicalreports from her health care professionals on an annual basis, “in order to seek confirmation of the wife’s ongoing health status and herability to seek and retain employment”. Notably, neither party requested the four-year review hearing, nor did they exchange thefinancial information. [4] On separation, Mr. Black owned and operated an unincorporated construction business. The business paidhealth insurance premiums on behalf of Mrs. Black.

The domestic contract stipulated that the “[h]usband, through his business, shallcontinue to pay the costs of said plan to the benefit of the wife on a monthly basis for so long as he has an obligation to pay spousalsupport to the wife” (para. 7(b)). The estimated health care premium at that time was $333 per month; it has since increased to $514 permonth. The contract also provided that should Mr. Black cease to operate the business, which parenthetically is the case, he would“personally pay for the costs of this plan”. Mr.

Black’s business failed in October 2011, at which time he filed a petition for bankruptcy.Records indicate that his debts totaled $663,544.29, and his bank accounts were frozen. On the advice of his former legal counsel, hestopped making the required payments to Blue Cross, and delayed paying his spousal support, thereby placing Mrs. Black’s healthbenefits in jeopardy. [5] On December 20, 2011, Mrs. Black filed a Notice of Motion seeking ex parte relief, or, in the alternative, anabridgement of time for the hearing of the motion requiring Mr.

Black to “comply with paragraphs 6 and 7 of the attached DomesticContract to the said Court Order so that the applicant continues to receive Spousal Support and Health and Dental coverage until thismatter is [heard] in full”. In addition, the Notice of Motion requested contempt relief, an order varying her support payments pursuant tos. 17 of the Act, an order requiring Mr. Black to pay “the full cost of medical expenses for the applicant/respondent which occurs to hernow, in the future and for the rest of her life”, an order for suit money, and costs on a solicitor-client basis. In response, Mr.

Blackrequested a review and termination of spousal support no later than July 1, 2013, on the basis his financial situation had changed. In thealternative, he sought a variation of spousal support in view of the “material change of circumstances”, and he wanted his supportobligation terminated on a given date. III. Motion Judge’s Findings [6] In his 84-page decision, the motion judge accepted Mrs.

Black’s testimony concerning her medical condition.He found she had been diagnosed with a “major depressive disorder” and fibromyalgia in 2000, resulting in her withdrawal from theworkplace, and that she qualified for disability benefits in the amount of approximately $9,000 per annum. She now suffers from osteo-arthritis, has mobility issues which interfere with her everyday life, and was recently diagnosed with a conversion disorder that causes herto lose consciousness from time to time. The above findings were supported by medical reports, which formed part of the evidence.

Fromthe financial statements, the motion judge concluded Mrs. Black’s living expenses increased post-separation, and that she had a shortterm gambling problem which commenced post-separation in 2006. In addition, Mrs. Black lent a friend $10,000, which was never re-paid, and finally, she declared personal bankruptcy in 2007. [7] The motion judge examined Mr. Black’s employment history, noting he operated an unincorporatedconstruction business during the marriage, and that Mrs. Black provided unpaid book-keeping and administrative assistance to thebusiness prior to the separation.

The business ceased operations in 2011, and at the time of the hearing, Mr. Black was still discharginghis indebtedness to the trustee in bankruptcy. The motion judge examined the parties’ incomes and expenses from 2002 to the date of thehearing. There was no discussion of what, if any, expenses Mr. Black shares with his current spouse; however, there was a briefreference in the reasons to Chamberlain v. Chamberlain, 2002 NBCA 12, 247 N.B.R. (2d) 258, and Hersey v. Hersey (1993), (NB CA), 135 N.B.R. (2d) 67, [1993] N.B.J.

No. 278 (C.A.) (QL), two decisions that discuss the relevance of sharedexpenses in spousal support variation hearings, but which the motion judge did not analyse.

IV. Motion Judge’s Analysis and Decision [8] The motion judge declined to conduct a review of spousal support on the basis the “parameters and purpose”of the review were not specified by the parties in s. 6(

d) of the domestic contract (see Leskun v. Leskun, 2006 SCC 25, [2006] 1 S.C.R.920). He then turned to paragraph 6(e)(iv) of the domestic contract, which provided for an automatic review of spousal support in the“event another material change in circumstances occurs”, including a change in the payee’s health condition or a material “substantial”change in the payor’s financial circumstances. The motion judge found the requisite material change in circumstances contemplated inWillick v. Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3 S.C.R. 670, [1994] S.C.J. No. 94 (QL), and Hickey v. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, [1999] S.C.J.

No. 9 (QL) existed. He determined Mrs. Black had ongoing financial need and Mr. Black hadthe ability to pay. He noted the ages of the parties, and concluded Mrs. Black had suffered negative economic consequences arising fromthe marriage and its breakdown, as she no longer had the benefit of Mr. Black’s earning potential. He referred to the Spousal SupportAdvisory Guidelines (the “Guidelines”), and extended the spousal support payments in the “unique circumstances of this case” on thebasis Mrs.

Black should be “compensated for her involvement in the marriage as it relates to the respondent’s business and hercontribution towards household management”. He acknowledged the “compensatory approach may have somewhat dwindled”, butconcluded Mrs. Black was totally dependent on her husband for the last two years of cohabitation, and that she continued to haveeconomic need.

He then turned his attention to the medical insurance premiums and found they qualified as spousal support, relying on s.60 of the Income Tax Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1. (5th supp.). [9] Regarding the issue of contempt, the motion judge concluded Mr. Black did not intend to “bring theadministration of justice into disrepute” and declined to make an order. He accepted that Mr.

Black’s decision to terminate spousalsupport and to delay the payment of health insurance premiums was on the advice of his previous counsel, and there was no mala fides.Finally, he declined to order solicitor-client costs on the grounds that Mr. Black’s action in “context of his entire actions do not meet thistest for solicitor client [costs]”. He declined to order suit money; however, he ordered Mr. Black to pay costs in the amount of $6,000 onthe basis of his conduct.

He concluded he had jurisdiction to vary the quantum of spousal support pursuant to s. 17 of the Act and heincreased the payment to $1,000 monthly for an indefinite duration, and added the cost of the health premiums for a total spousal supportaward of $1,514 monthly. V. Grounds of Appeal [10] Against the above background, Mr.

Black appeals on the following grounds alleging the motion judge erred inlaw and in fact: 1. in concluding there was a material change in circumstances with regard to the Appellant’s income despite the temporary andunsustainable nature of the change; 2. in concluding that a variation order regarding spousal support was required to relieve the Respondent’s economic hardship related tothe marriage despite any hardship being caused by the Respondent’s negligent spending; 3. in increasing the spousal support payable to the Respondent to [$1,000] per month plus the cost of medical coverage and awardingthis increased spousal support for an indefinite duration; 4. in not terminating the spousal support payable to the Respondent; and 5. in considering the Appellant’s conduct in awarding [$6,000] in costs to the Respondent.

VI. Standard of Appellate Review [11] In LeBlanc v. LeBlanc, 2013 NBCA 22, 401 N.B.R. (2d) 334, our Court, per Larlee J.A., set out the guidingprinciples for appellate review. Generally, a judge’s decision must be given considerable deference, unless the decision or order is theproduct of an error of law, an error of principle, or there has been a misapprehension of the evidence (MacDonald v. MacDonald, 2011NBCA 25, 372 N.B.R. (2d) 179, leave to appeal refused, [2011] S.C.C.A. No. 237 (QL), at para. 7). [12] As noted in Bourque v.

Bourque, 2004 NBCA 60, 274 N.B.R. (2d) 72, a judge’s decision is not owed deferencein cases where the “reasons disclose an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or that the award is clearlywrong” (para. 10). Furthermore, in J.A.D. v. L.D.D, 2010 NBCA 69, 364 N.B.R. (2d) 200, the Court stated no deference is owed to ahearing judge’s decision “with respect to a question of law”, including the identification of the proper test to be applied (para. 9). Withrespect to spousal support awards, in B.P. v.

A.T., 2014 NBCA 51, 423 N.B.R. (2d) 99, Larlee J.A., writing for the Court, stated: The standard of review in spousal support cases is set out in Milton v. Milton, 2008 NBCA 87, 338 N.B.R. (2d) 300. We will onlyinterfere with a support order when there has been an error in principle, a significant misapprehension of the evidence, or the award isclearly wrong: Hickey v. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 518, [1999] S.C.J. No. 9 (QL), at para. 11 and J.P. v. R.R., atpara. 27.

In short with respect to both issues, absent error, we cannot re-try the case. [para. 12] [13] For the reasons that follow, I find the motion judge made reversible errors in principle, the award is clearlywrong, and I would allow the appeal in part. A.

Review or variation [14] In this decision, I will address the different standards to be applied in review and variation hearings, the modelsof support as they apply in variation motions, and finally, what the Guidelines exceptions provide when the marriage is of short durationand the recipient spouse is disabled. [15] Review hearings carry different evidentiary burdens than variation hearings pursuant to s. 17 of the Act.

InLeskun, the Supreme Court cautioned judges not to order reviews of final spousal support orders unless there is an essential issuerequiring review, and only when the terms of the review have been “tightly delimited” in the original order for corollary relief. Therationale for this instruction is grounded in the prohibition against re-litigation of a decided issue. [16] On a review hearing, “nobody bears an onus to show changed circumstances” (Leskun, para. 39). The recipientspouse should present evidence of his/her efforts to achieve self-sufficiency, and the motion judge can then modify or terminate theorder.

On a variation hearing, however, the moving party bears the onus to satisfy the threshold requirement of material changestipulated in s. 17 of the Act. These are important distinctions that govern how a hearing judge must approach motions to vary spousalsupport. These distinctions are also of importance to the parties, as, arguably, on a review, it is contemplated that support would continueabsent any change towards economic self-sufficiency by the recipient spouse.

On a variation hearing, the hearing judge has broaderlatitude in the scope of evidence he/she will receive to conduct the analysis set out in s. 17 of the Act. Hence, it is of critical importancefor the hearing judge to identify the jurisdictional basis for the decision, i.e. whether the case falls under the compensatory or non-compensatory model of support. In the case at bar, both parties sought a variation of the corollary relief order, thus, both had an onus toprovide proof of material change.

The court must have been satisfied “[t]his means a change, such that, if known at the time, wouldlikely have resulted in different terms” (Willick, per Sopinka J. at para. 21). [17] In G.(L.) v. B.(G.), (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370, [1995] S.C.J. No. 72 (QL), the Supreme Courtrefined what it meant by “foreseeable” change, stating the fact a change was objectively foreseeable does not necessarily mean it wassubjectively contemplated by the parties at the time of the original order.

The Court went further in Hickey when it stated that thesufficiency of the change must be examined in light of the overall financial situation of the parties. The Court added that whethermaterial change has been demonstrated depends on the actual circumstances of the parties at the time of the order, and requirescontinuity. The threshold requirement remains the same whether the agreement was incorporated in the order or not and there is apresumption that the agreement was properly considered at the time the original order was granted (Willick; Leskun; L.M.P v. L.S., 2011SCC 64, [2011] 3 S.C.R. 775).

[18] The above cases involved long term traditional marriages, and they pre-dated the Guidelines. Although theGuidelines had not been published at the time the corollary relief order was granted in this case, it is generally accepted they apply to areview or to a variation proceeding that takes place thereafter (R.L. v. N.L., 2012 NBQB 123, 388 N.B.R. (2d) 220, at para. 19;Cavanaugh v. Cavanaugh, 2008 NBQB 387, 341 N.B.R. (2d) 166, at para. 57; Gray v. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, [2014] O.J.

No. 4519(QL), at paras. 42-45). [19] In The Spousal Support Advisory Guidelines: A New and Improved User’s Guide to the Final Version by CarolRogerson and Rollie Thompson (Ottawa: Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada, 2010) (the “Improved User’s Guide”), theauthors acknowledge the Guidelines can be used in variation hearings (Chapter 13), but they specifically note the requirement to considerthe exceptions, where appropriate, as will be discussed further in these reasons. Prior to 2008, it was thought the Guidelines applied onlyto initial support applications.

However, following the decision in Fisher v. Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11, [2008] O.J. No. 38 (QL), at para.96, the authors clarified the Guidelines have a conditional role to play in variation motions. In Beninger v. Beninger, 2007 BCCA 619,[2007] B.C.J. No. 2657 (QL), the Court added a cautionary note: This question is answered, to some extent, by the authors of the SSAG who indicate in their proposal that the SSAG should beapproached with considerable caution on variation applications.

They state the SSAG were not designed to address some of the morecomplex issues which can arise on variation proceedings, including the impact of remarriage, second families and retirement. In somecases, entitlement may also have become an issue since the initial order was made. In certain circumstances, however, the SSAG can beused on a variation application albeit with care. [para. 52] [20] Professors Thompson and Rogerson noted the types of variation or review cases that should be approachedwith caution: i. Old orders made prior to the Guidelines; ii.

A post-separation increase in income of the payor spouse; iii. A post-separation decrease in income of the recipient spouse; iv. Remarriage or partnering of the recipient spouse; v. Second families; vi. Applications to terminate on the grounds of no entitlement. [21] The Guidelines formula in this case prescribed that spousal support would terminate based on the years ofmarriage alone. By the time of the hearing, Mr. Black had paid support two and one half years longer than what is prescribed in theformula, and two years longer than the length of his marriage. On this basis, Mr.

Black submitted his support payments should beterminated. He acknowledged the Court’s authority to order non-compensatory spousal support based only on the disability of the otherspouse, referencing the Supreme Court decision in Bracklow v Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 420, [1999] S.C.J.No. 14 (QL), however, he submitted the obligation should not be indefinite. Mr. Black submitted economic need does not, by itself,obligate a payor spouse indefinitely, particularly when the marriage was of short duration.

He submitted he agreed to pay a higheramount of spousal support on the grounds he remained optimistic his former wife would be working in four years; hence, there was anexpectation his support obligations would eventually come to an end. In his view, the review clause contemplated a change in theduration only, and not the quantum of support. [22] In support of his submission that spousal support should terminate, Mr. Black referred us to Aujla v. Singh,2012 ONSC 5217, [2012] O.J. No. 4395 (QL).

In that case, Grey J. observed that “maintenance of a totally disabled spouse requires adelicate balancing of interests” (para. 51), and that the family, society at large, and indeed, the disabled person themselves, may be calledupon to contribute. [23] In Aujla, the wife immigrated to Canada in 2006, two years into the marriage. In 2007, she was diagnosed withmultiple sclerosis. This childless relationship deteriorated, and eventually the wife was forced to move into a nursing home. She soughtspousal support in the amount of $1,000 monthly, to be paid indefinitely.

The Guidelines prescribed a range between $154 to $208monthly, payable for two to four years. The Court concluded this was not a case for compensatory support, considered the disabilityexception set out in the Guidelines, and awarded $300 monthly payable indefinitely based on the wife’s extreme economic need.Similarly, Mrs. Black is unable to contribute to her own support as a result of her disability. There was evidence she receives supportfrom her mother and her brother, and society is already contributing to her support through the payment of disability benefits.

Mr.Black’s contributions enable her to meet the basic necessities of life. There is evidence of ongoing economic need, and Mr. Black hasadmitted entitlement.

[ 24 ] Following the bankruptcy in 2011, Mr. Black found employment as a construction worker in Nunavut. His salary is approximately $117,000 per annum. Mr. Black submitted the motion judge erred when he found his employment as a construction worker in Nunavut constituted a “material” change in circumstances. He asserted this is a short term position, and that a temporary increase in his financial circumstances should not be used as the basis for an indefinite increase in his spousal support obligation.

This submission may have had some traction; however, by the date of the hearing, he had been employed by the same company on and off since 2011, with no evidence his position would become redundant. As the Court stated in Brown v. Brown , 2010 NBCA 5 , 353 N.B.R. (2d) 323 : [I]n each instance, the order is contingent on the court finding a "change in circumstances" of one of the parties, or a child, between the time of the original order and the application for variation.

Invariably, the law requires the change to be "material". […] As a general proposition, the court will be asking whether the change was significant and long lasting; whether it was real and not one of choice. [para. 2] [ 25 ] Therefore, if the evidence suggests the material change is temporary, with no degree of continuity, and may be a short-lived unique event, a court would be reluctant to permanently vary a prior court order ( Powell v. Levesque , 2014 BCCA 33 , [2014] B.C.J. No. 129 (QL) , at para. 24 ).

Clearly, although he may not enjoy the dislocation, he has been employed in Nunavut in excess of four years, with no evidence it might terminate in the future. The issue of material change will be discussed further in the context of s. 17 of the Act . B. The disability exception and short term marriages [ 26 ] The Supreme Court in Bracklow stated “in some circumstances the law may require that a healthy party continue to support a disabled party, absent contractual or compensatory entitlement. Justice and considerations of fairness may demand no less” (para. 48).

In that case, the parties cohabited for four years prior to their marriage in 1989. They separated in 1992 and divorced in 1995. Mrs. Bracklow was unable to work from 1991 onward as a result of a medical condition, and she received disability benefits. Mr. Bracklow was ordered to pay $400 monthly spousal support with no time limit. The trial judge found Mrs. Bracklow had contributed financially to the household expenses and she had a compensatory claim on that basis. The Supreme Court remitted the case to the trial judge for the purpose of assessing quantum and duration of support on the basis of entitlement.

The Supreme Court did not rule out the possibility that Mr. Bracklow had sufficiently compensated Mrs. Bracklow for any economic disadvantage she suffered as a result of the marriage and its breakdown, and concluded there is no presumptive right to support based on disability. The analysis focused on the compensatory and non-compensatory models of spousal support. [ 27 ] In

Chapter 12 of the Guidelines , the authors observe that disability cases are challenging, particularly where, as here, the marriage has been of short duration and is childless. The Guidelines formula requires a termination date in most cases, unless the case falls within one of the exceptions. In the Improved User’s Guide , the authors state the following: “Even now, more than five years after … the Draft Proposal and almost two years after the release of the Final Version, it is still surprising how often lawyers and judges fail to consider the exceptions.

It remains one of the great mysteries of the Advisory Guidelines so far”. The authors formulate three approaches to these types of cases, with no one approach taking precedence. One approach would permit an increase in the quantum of spousal support with an extended duration, another would apply the formula ranges for both amount and duration, with no recognition of a “disability exception”, and finally, the third approach would allow for a reduced amount of support with an extended duration.

The authors acknowledge that “[u]ntil appellate courts provide further guidance, these divergent approaches towards illness and disability will continue”. T his inconsistency has created problems for motion judges as well as trial judges. Some courts have referred to the Guidelines ’ disability exception, and others have not. It is fair to say the jurisprudence is particularly inconsistent in cases involving short to medium term marriages where there is a disabled recipient spouse. Lepp v. Lepp , 2008 BCSC 448 , [2008] B.C.J. No. 640 (QL) ; Beninger v. Beninger , 2009 BCCA 458 , [2009] B.C.J.

No. 2197 (QL) ; Pratt v. Pratt , 2008 NBQB 94 , 334 N.B.R. (2d) 22 ; Jens v. Jens , 2008 BCCA 392 , [2008] B.C.J. No. 1886 (QL) ; Elaschuk v. Elaschuk, [1999] O.J. No. 2462 (C.A.) (QL) ; Richardson v. Normand , 2000 MBQB 110 , [2000] M.J. No. 355 (QL) ; Kerwood v. Kerwood, [1999] B.C.J. No. 830 (B.C.S.C.) (QL) ; Wilson v. Marchand , 2007 ONCJ 408 , [2007] O.J. No. 3738 (QL) ; Haggerty , supra ; R.M.S. v. F.P.C.S ., 2011 BCCA 53 , [2011] B.C.J. No. 174 (QL) ; Stergios v. Kim , 2011 ONCA 836 , [2011] O.J. No. 5900 (QL) ; Hurley v. Hurley , 2012 NSCA 32 , [2012] N.S.J. No. 161 (QL) ; Powell , supra ; Stannett v.

Green , [2014] O.J. No. 47 (Ont. Sup. Ct.) (QL) . Due to the short duration of the marriage as well as Mrs. Black’s disability, this case is considered exceptional. [ 28 ] The motion judge in this case referred to the Guidelines , but he did not provide reasons as to how he applied them. The reasons do not inform on what basis the support award falls within the formulaic range, nor do they inform whether the disability exception was considered, or which approach was applied. This was a perfect opportunity for the Court to apply the Guidelines exceptions, or to reject them.

As this Court has stated, if a hearing judge decides to deviate from the Guidelines he/she needs to provide a rational basis for doing so ( Smith v. Smith , 2011 NBCA 66 , 375 N.B.R. (2d) 208 ). In Smith , Quigg J.A., writing for the Court, reasoned that the Guidelines are advisory, not binding, and therefore courts have a residual discretion not to follow them. However, she stated that courts “should” follow them, and when there is a deviation from the formula, the judge must state his or her reasons for the deviation (para. 26).

There is no indication in the reasons how, if he did at all, the motion judge applied the Guidelines in this case. The variation

order requires Mr. Black to pay support in an amount that exceeds the formulaic range, with no mathematical calculation, for anindefinite duration. This represents an unexplained deviation that fails to comply with this Court’s direction in Smith. C. Compensatory and non-compensatory support [29] The compensatory model of support was explained in Moge v. Moge, (SCC), [1992] 3 S.C.R.813, [1992] S.C.J.

No. 107 (QL), where the Supreme Court stated: […] Today, though more and more women are working outside the home, such employment continues to play a secondary role andsacrifices continue to be made for the sake of domestic considerations. These sacrifices often impair the ability of the partner who makesthem (usually the wife) to maximize her earning potential because she may have to forgo educational and career advancementopportunities.

These same sacrifices may also enhance the earning potential of the other spouse (usually the husband) who, because hiswife is tending to such matters, is free to pursue economic goals”. [para. 70] This principle was reiterated by the Supreme Court in Bracklow (paras. 24 and 41) when it held the basis for this relief is in recognitionof the sacrifices made by the recipient spouse in assuming household and child care responsibilities, often resulting in a lower earningpotential and fewer prospects for economic independence.

Such was not the case here. [30] The compensatory model of support recognizes the respective roles the spouses performed during the marriageand is tied to the economic advantage or disadvantage which arose as a result of the marriage or its breakdown. These are connected tothe contractual, compensatory and non-compensatory models of support first discussed by the Supreme Court in Moge. In Scott v.

Scott,2011 NBCA 7, 368 N.B.R. (2d) 281, Richard J.A., writing for the Court, stated the following: “In other words, the spouse iscompensated for having sacrificed his or her own career and financial security by assuming a particular role in the family. A commonexample is a spouse remaining at home to care for the children of the marriage, while the other spouse pursues a career” (para. 25).

Thismodel of support was identified by the Supreme Court in Bracklow, Moge, and Hickey. [31] In the case before us, although the motion judge acknowledged the compensatory element had “dwindled”, heproceeded to arbitrarily increase the spousal support quantum. He reasoned Mrs. Black’s contributions to her husband’s business allowedhim to make that compensatory link and he then conflated that reasoning with the increase in Mrs. Black’s cost of living, relying onHickey.

In Hickey, the Supreme Court acknowledged an increase in the cost of living of the recipient spouse can constitute materialchange in a variation proceeding. L’Heureux-Dubé J. agreed an “upward adjustment for an increase in the cost of living also accords withthe objectives of variation orders set out in s.17(7)” (para. 26).

In that case, there was a significant compensatory element as a result ofthe length of the marriage, the roles the parties performed during the marriage, and the economic disadvantage the recipient wifesuffered as a result of her decision to leave the workforce to stay home to care for the children. The Supreme Court agreed inflationaryincreases in the wife’s cost of living were legitimately considered as part of the compensatory element of support. The present case canbe distinguished on each of these points.

Although the hearing judge acknowledged the weak case for compensatory support, heproceeded to arbitrarily link the increases in Mrs. Black’s monthly expenses to that element of support. This was an error in principle. [32] At this juncture, I pause to note the Guidelines do not rule out a “compensatory exception” in childlessmarriages of short duration. In certain cases, the formula does not necessarily have to be used (Guidelines,

Chapter 12.5). In Ann C.Wilton & Noel Semple, Spousal Support in Canada, 3rd ed (Toronto: Carswell, 2015), the authors state, however: “The majority of casesrecently of compensatory support in short marriages without children have been found to be in situations where the recipient spouse hasmade a dramatic relocation for the sake of the relationship, often giving up a good job to do so” (p. 611). The authors referred to Tasmanv. Henderson, 2013 ONSC 4377, [2013] O.J. No. 3102 (QL); R.M.S v. F.P.C.S., 2011 BCCA 53, [2011] B.C.J. No. 174 (QL), Beardsallv. Dubois, [2009] O.J. No. 416 (C.A.) (QL); Volik v.

Lisovska, 2011 BCSC 22, [2011] B.C.J. No. 28 (QL); Ahn v. Ahn, 2007 BCSC1148, 2007 B.C.J. No. 1702 (QL), Fuller v. Matthews, 2007 BCSC 444, [2007] B.C.J. No. 656 (QL), in support of this proposition. Suchis not the case before us. Mrs.

Black did not relocate for the sake of the relationship, nor did she give up a “good job” to assist in herhusband’s business. [33] In Bracklow, the Supreme Court also opened the door to a support-based model on a non-compensatory basis.This model of support is grounded in the “social obligation model” of marriage, which states that on the dissolution of a maritalrelationship, when there is economic need, the primary burden should lay with the former partner and not with the state. This is oftenreferred to as the “needs and means” approach to spousal support. In

Chapter 12.7 of the Guidelines, the authors contemplate there couldbe a basic needs exception under the ‘without child’ formula, intended to deal with shorter marriages where the recipient has little or noincome, such as in this case. Before us, Mrs. Black asked us to consider the social obligation of marriage as the basis upon which weshould uphold the motion judge’s decision. She submitted that once we were satisfied she continued to have economic need, and that Mr.Black had the ability to pay, the Court should uphold the increase in spousal support on that basis.

On this issue, the authors of theGuidelines note the following: “Some would even broaden this exception beyond illness and disability, into something more like a

“basic social obligation” exception, where the recipient has basic needs beyond any formula support for one of any number of reasons.We believe that the sheer breadth of a basic social obligation exception would undermine the integrity and consistency of any formula orguidelines”. I agree. [34] The non-compensatory model of support required the motion judge to conduct an analysis based on the needsand means of the parties (Bracklow, para. 41), which would have included a review of the division of assets and debts on separation.There was no analysis of the non-compensatory basis of support in this decision.

Instead, the motion judge chose to rely on thecompensatory model only, stating that Mrs. Black’s claim was based largely on the work she did in her husband’s business. In myopinion, this claim was overstated by the motion judge. Mrs. Black’s contribution to the business was minor. She did not leave a job toassist in her husband’s business, nor did she retire or leave her employment to relocate elsewhere with him. D. Post-separation increases in Mr. Black’s income [35] Mr.

Black also submitted the motion judge erred when he considered the increases in his post-separationincome, as they had no connection to the marriage. When the domestic contract was executed, Mr. Black’s income was $53,000 perannum compared to his current average income of $117,000. The authors of the Guidelines carefully observed there is a questionwhether post-separation increases in the income of the payor spouse should be considered in cases of short to medium term marriages.Canadian jurisprudence remains divided, and ultimately the question is resolved on a case by case basis. [36] In Campbell v.

Vaughan, 2015 NBQB 110, [2015] N.B.J. No. 145 (QL), d’Entremont J. discussed this“evolving” Canadian jurisprudence with specific reference to Thompson v. Thompson, 2013 ONSC 5500, [2013] O.J. No. 4001 (QL),where, at para. 103, the Court made reference to the Guidelines, the general factors and objectives underlying them, and concluded that aspouse is not automatically entitled to share in post-separation increases in the income of a payor spouse. Such a right typically does notexist in non-compensatory claims for support.

She observed compensatory claims for support may “provide a foundation” forentitlement to share in post-separation increases in income in certain cases where there is a demonstrated link between the contributionsmade by the recipient spouse to the economic success of the payor spouse.

In varying the award in that case, the judge acknowledgedthis had been a long term traditional marriage, that entitlement was based on both compensatory and non-compensatory factors, that Mr.Vaughan’s economic success was linked to his wife’s contributions to the family unit over the years, and, therefore, she felt comfortableincreasing the support order on those bases.

The above facts do not exist in the case before us. [37] To share in post-separation increases in income, the recipient spouse must prove a connection with his/hercontribution to the marriage, which, over time, benefited the career of the payor spouse, and added to the economic well-being of thefamily unit (Fisher). In Philip Epstein’s Annotation to Fisher, 2008 ONCA 11 , 2008 CarswellOnt 43 (WL Can), the authorstates the following: There is no automatic entitlement to increased spousal support when a spouse’s post-separation income increases.

See Dextraze v.Dextraze, 2004 BCSC 215 , 2004 CarswellBC 287 (B.C.S.C.) at 40 and Hariram v. Hariram, (ON SCDC), 2001 CarswellOnt 732, 14 R.F.L. (5th) 88 (Ont.Div.Ct.).Generally, there must be some economic advantage/disadvantage conferred andsuffered in order to share in any increase in income […]. […] Much case law suggests that a direct contribution to future income earning potential by way of contributing to credentials or skills is anecessary precondition of sharing post-separation success.

If the payor obtains skills or credentials during the marriage, the recipient ismore likely to be entitled to share in the future increases of income. If the payor’s post-separation success flows from a job which is adifferent job than that which he had during the marriage, the court is more likely to reject a claim for the sharing of post-separationsuccess.[…] [38] There is no presumption the standard of living of the recipient spouse should increase post-separation by virtueonly of the payor’s increased income. This principle was accepted in Jabora-Scott v.

Scott, 2011 NBCA 7, 368 N.B.R. (2d) 281; Reid v.Gillingham, 2015 NBCA 27, [2015] N.B.J. No. 99 (QL); and Brooks v. Brooks, 2014 NBCA 29, 419 N.B.R. (2d) 326. In this case, thereis no demonstrable link between Mr. Black’s current income and employment, the corresponding skills he acquired during the marriage,and any contribution Mrs. Black may have made towards the acquisition of those skills. In fact, Mr. Black’s construction business failedfollowing the breakdown of the marriage. There was an assumption by the motion judge that Mrs.

Black would have an automatic rightto share in the post-separation increase in Mr. Black’s income based primarily on the fact that her expenses increased. This is an error inprinciple. He acknowledged the damage to Mrs. Black’s overall financial situation as a result of her “albeit relatively brief but

devastating sojourn into the ravages of gambling”, however, attributed her economic need to factors distinct from that “situation”, without quantifying what they were, or linking them to the marriage or its breakdown, as required by s. 17 of the Act . This leads me to the analysis required in variation proceedings. VII. Has Mr. Black met the test for variation? [ 39 ]

Section 17 of the Act sets out the test for variation orders:

(4.1) Before the court makes a variation order in respect of a spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either former spouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order or the last variation order made in respect of that order, and, in making the variation order, the court shall take that change into consideration.

(4.1) Avant de rendre une ordonnance modificative de l’ordonnance alimentaire au profit d’un époux, le tribunal s’assure qu’il est survenu un changement dans les ressources, les besoins ou, d’une façon générale, la situation de l’un ou l’autre des ex-époux depuis que cette ordonnance ou la dernière ordonnance modificative de celle-ci a été rendue et tient compte du changement en rendant l’ordonnance modificative. [ 40 ] The Supreme Court in Willick defined “material change” as follows: This means a change, such that, if known at the time would likely have resulted in different terms.

The corollary to this is that if the matter which is relied on as constituting a change was known at the relevant time, it cannot be relied on as the basis for variation. […] [para. 21] [ 41 ] The same principles were applied by the Supreme Court in G.(L.) v. B.(G.) . Section 17(4.1) of the Act requires a court to “satisfy itself” that a change in the condition, means, needs, or “other circumstances” of either former spouse, has occurred since the making of the last order prior to varying it.

Section 17(7) requires a consideration of the four objectives a variation order should “achieve”, including; i. a recognition of the economic advantages or disadvantages arising from the marriage or its breakdown; ii. apportion the financial consequences arising from the child care responsibilities; iii. relieve any economic hardship of the former spouses arising from the marriage breakdown; iv. as far as “practicable”, promote economic self-sufficiency. [ 42 ] In L.M.P. v.

L.S. , the Supreme Court discussed the difference in the type of analysis depending on whether the order is one of first instance pursuant to s. 15 of the Act , or a variation of an existing order pursuant to s. 17 of the Act. In that case, the wife became ill with multiple sclerosis a short time after the marriage. The marriage was 15 years in duration, with children. A separation agreement was entered into prior to the Divorce Order. In 2007, the wife filed a motion seeking retroactive and prospective increases in support. The husband replied with an application to reduce and terminate his spousal support.

The Supreme Court identified the differences between an application in the first instance for spousal support pursuant to s. 15 of the Act , and a motion to vary pursuant to s. 17 , placing the emphasis on s. 17 . The decision reiterates that the onus is placed on the moving party to satisfy the requirements of material change, and also requires consideration of whether knowledge of the circumstances at the time the original order was granted would have altered the terms.

The Supreme Court found there had been no material change in the circumstances since the original order, as both parties were aware of the wife’s medical condition at the time the order was issued. Nothing had changed with respect to her employability. The husband had not established a material change in circumstances which would justify a variation. [ 43 ] In Miglin v.

Miglin , 2003 SCC 24 , [2003] 1 S.C.R. 303 , the Supreme Court affirmed that the test is the same whether a party seeks to vary a court order or a domestic contract when it stated: […] it would be inconsistent if a different test applied to change an agreement in the form of an initial order under s. 15.2 [of the Divorce Act ] and to variation of an agreement incorporated into an order under s. 17 . In our view, the Act does not create such

inconsistency. [para. 91] [44] The Supreme Court identified a two-stage analysis starting with an examination of the circumstancessurrounding the preparation and execution of the agreement. If satisfied there was nothing in those circumstances that would justifyvariation, the second stage requires the reviewing judge to examine the request for variation through the lens of the objectives set out ins. 15 of the Act. In order to succeed on a variation motion, the moving party must lead evidence of change which was not within thecontemplation of the parties at the time the agreement was signed. See G.(L.) v. B.(G.). [45] On this point, the Supreme Court in Hickey states: Section 17(7)(

a) requires the court to take into account economic advantages and disadvantages arising from the marriage or itsbreakdown. This, in particular, recognizes the importance, when deciding on spousal support or variation orders, of compensating formerspouses for advantages gained and disadvantages suffered as a result of the marriage itself and the decisions the parties made and rolesthey played within it: see Moge, supra. Section 17(7)(

c) outlines the equally important objective of relieving economic hardship arisingfrom the breakdown of the marriage: see Moge, supra, at p. 865, and Bracklow, supra, at paras. 36 and 41. Considering this objectiveincludes examining the change to the economic situation of the parties caused by the separation, taking into account current needs andmeans and all other relevant circumstances of the parties: see Moge, supra, at pp. 865-66.

The second and fourth objectives -- those ofapportioning child rearing costs over and above the extent reflected in the child support order, and promoting economic self-sufficiencyto the extent practicable -- must also be taken into account in determining the appropriate support or variation order. As was held inMoge, supra, at pp. 866-67: The exercise of judicial discretion in ordering support requires an examination of all four objectives set out in the Act in order to achieveequitable sharing of the economic consequences of marriage or marriage breakdown.

This implies a broad approach with a view torecognizing and incorporating any significant features of the marriage or its termination which adversely affect the economic prospects ofthe disadvantaged spouse. [para. 22] [46] Applying the above reasoning in L.M.P. v. L.S., the Supreme Court found there had been no material change incircumstances since the making of the order. At the time the original order was executed, the wife had multiple sclerosis and was notexpected to seek employment outside of the home.

The husband’s motion to seek a variation of the original support order failed, as he didnot meet the threshold required by s. 17(4.1) of the Act. The Supreme Court provided different reasons but came to the same result. Ireproduce the reasons of McLachlin C.J. and Cromwell J. as they flesh out the core of the court’s task: This, I think, is not a controversial matter.

Section 17(4.1) of the Act directs that "[b]efore the court makes a variation order in respect ofa spousal support order, the court shall satisfy itself that a change in the condition, means, needs or other circumstances of either formerspouse has occurred since the making of the spousal support order". The Court in Willick v. Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3S.C.R. 670, which concerned child support, held that what is required is a "material change" of these circumstances. This means "achange, such that, if known at the time, would likely have resulted in different terms.

The corollary to this is that if the matter which isrelied on as constituting a change was known at the relevant time it cannot be relied on as the basis for variation (p. 688). This thresholdalso applies to applications to vary spousal support: G. (L.) v. B. (G.), (SCC), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 370, at para. 73, perSopinka J., and paras.48-51, per L'Heureux-Dubé J. It is thus clear from Willick that a matter known at the time of the original order cannot provide the basis of a material change incircumstances. But what about matters that were simply foreseeable at that time?

According to L'Heureux-Dubé J. in G. (L.)., thequestion is whether the parties must be taken to have actually contemplated the matter in question; as she put it at para. 51, simpleforeseeability does not bar a variation finding under s. 17 because "the fact that a change was objectively foreseeable does not necessarilymean that it was contemplated by the parties": citing Willick, at p. 734 (emphasis added). Thus, changes which the parties actuallycontemplated or that must have been in the parties' contemplation cannot constitute material changes.

There is, in my opinion, no inconsistency between Miglin and Willick. Miglin did not suggest that the "material change" threshold forvariation as set out in Willick does not apply. Willick did not discuss the weight that the parties' agreement should be given on avariation application other than, as we shall see in the next section, by setting out the effect on the variation application of the fact thatthe parties' agreement had been incorporated into a court order. [paras. 66-68] [47] In other words, at the variation stage, a previously executed agreement must be given significant weight. The

Supreme Court in L.M.P. v. L.S. has provided hearing judges a framework for the analysis. This framework requires the court to ensure that the analysis conforms to the principle established in Willick , that is, that the original order is assumed to have been correct. If the matter relied upon as constituting the change was known at the relevant time, it cannot form the basis for variation. The Supreme Court added the analysis at step two of Miglin should inform the inquiry.

Therefore, as Cromwell J. stated, “[t]he test, however, is not simple foreseeability in its broadest sense as virtually any change is foreseeable” (para. 92). The test is whether the situation now relied upon as constituting material change was reasonably within the contemplation at the parties. Moving to the second step of the analysis set out in Miglin , Cromwell J. reiterated that “ all of the objectives of the Act must be taken into consideration” (para. 92).

Those objectives include not only the statutory requirements, “but also the broader objectives of finality, certainty and autonomy” (para. 92). [ 48 ] In this case, Mrs. Black’s medical condition was known to Mr. Black at the time the parties executed their domestic contract and, therefore, cannot be relied upon by Mr. Black as support for a variation of the order. There was no submission before us that the domestic contract was improperly drafted and, therefore, it is presumed to be correct. Mr. Black did not request a time- limited support order at the time the divorce was heard.

There were no parameters set for the contemplated review. Mr. Black failed to adduce evidence that would meet the material change threshold established in s. 17 of the Act , therefore, on the same basis as L.M.P. v. L.S. , his request to terminate or vary his spousal support payment fails. VIII. Disposition [ 49 ] The motion judge erred in principle in arbitrarily increasing the support payments to $1,514 monthly, without analyzing how this amount met the formulaic range set out in the Guidelines , if at all. There was no consideration of the disability exception and whether it would apply in this case.

On the material change in circumstances analysis pursuant to s. 17 of the Act , the reasons did not inform on what basis the material change was not within the contemplation of the parties at the time the domestic contract was incorporated in the order for corollary relief, or whether the change was linked to the marriage or its breakdown. The motion judge over-stated the compensatory element of the wife’s claim to spousal support. Mrs. Black was not automatically entitled to an increase in her support by virtue of Mr. Black’s post-separation increases in income or on the basis her financial need had changed.

The motion judge downplayed the impact Mrs. Black’s mismanagement of funds had on her economic need. For the above reasons, I would allow the appeal in part, by restoring the original order for support in the amount of $750 monthly with no time limit and I would require Mr. Black to pay the health insurance premiums on behalf of Mrs. Black as he had agreed to do. [ 50 ] Before us, Mr. Black advised he was not able to deduct the payments he is making to Blue Cross on behalf of Mrs. Black, due to the wording of the order which failed to track the language of the legislation.

The domestic contract and subsequent corollary relief order contemplated these payments would be tax deductible to Mr. Black. As a result, this has operated as a penalty to Mr. Black and a windfall to Mrs. Black. It was clear the motion judge believed he was crafting an order that would comply with the Income Tax Act and he intended that these payments would form part of the spousal support award; however, the legislation requires specific wording for this purpose (ss. 56.1(2) and 60.1(2)). As a result, Canada Revenue Agency will not permit Mr. Black to deduct the Blue Cross payments.

This part of the order is remitted to the motion judge so that a properly worded order can be filed for this purpose. IX. Costs [ 51 ] With respect to the costs that were awarded at the hearing, I vary the motion judge’s award and award no costs on the same basis as in MacLellan v. MacLellan , 2001 NBCA 82 , [2001] N.B.R. (2d) (Supp.) No. 58, where the Court found that since there was a mixed result at trial, there should not be an award of costs. With respect to costs of the appeal, Mr.

Black has been substantially successful, however, there were no costs requested, so none will be ordered. ___________________________ BARBARA L. BAIRD, J.A. WE CONCUR: ___________________________ M.E.L LARLEE, J.A.

___________________________ KATHLEEN A. QUIGG, J.A. Version française de la décision de la Cour rendue par LA JUGE BAIRD I. Introduction [1] L’appelant, Michael Kenneth Black, interjette appel d’une ordonnance de modification d’une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale en faveur de son ex-épouse, Bonnie Jean Black, ordonnance qui a été rendue par un juge de la Cour du Banc de la Reine conformément à l’ art. 17 de la

Loi sur le divorce , S.R.C. ( 1985), ch. 3 (2 e suppl.) (la « Loi ») . M. Black demande que cette décision soit infirmée en

partie et il invoque cinq moyens d’appel . II. Contexte et nature de l’instance [2] M. et M me Black ont été mariés pendant huit ans et quatre mois avant leur séparation en 2003 . Ils n’ont pas cohabité avant le mariage et aucun enfant n’est issu du mariage . Il s’agit d’un mariage non traditionnel de courte durée . Frappée de maladie en 2000, M me Black s’est retirée de la population active . Les parties ont signé un contrat familial, le 25 août 2004, qui réglait leurs affaires financières, et M.

Black a consenti à verser une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale de durée non limitée se montant à 750 $ par mois, en plus de payer des primes d’assurance-maladie à la Croix-Bleue en faveur de M me Black .

Le 7 septembre 2004, un jugement de divorce a été rendu et celui-ci reprenait certaines mesures accessoires prévues dans le contrat familial, plus précisément celles énoncées aux paragraphes 6 et 7 . [3] Le contrat familial prescrivait la révision obligatoire de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale quatre ans après la date de la signature du contrat et prévoyait aussi que les parties s’échangeraient une preuve de leur revenu chaque année . D’autres dispositions obligeaient M me Black à informer son ancien mari [TRADUCTION] « sans délai » de tout changement dans son revenu, et M.

Black avait le droit de demander sur une base annuelle des rapports médicaux des professionnels de la santé qui soignaient M me Black [TRADUCTION] « afin d’obtenir une confirmation de l’état de santé actuel de l’épouse et de sa capacité d’obtenir et de conserver un emploi » . Il y a lieu de noter que ni l’une ni l’autre des parties n’a demandé la révision au bout de quatre ans, ni n’a échangé avec l’autre les renseignements financiers prévus . [4] Au moment de la séparation, M. Black était propriétaire et exploitant d’une entreprise de construction non personnalisée .

L’entreprise payait les primes d’assurance-maladie de M me Black . Le contrat familial prévoyait que [TRADUCTION] « [l]e mari, par l’entremise de son entreprise, continuer[ait] de payer mensuellement les frais de ce régime au profit de l’épouse tant qu’il aur[ait] l’obligation de payer une prestation alimentaire matrimoniale au profit de l’épouse » (par. 7b)) . Les primes d’assurance-maladie étaient estimées à l’époque à 333 $ par mois; elles sont passées depuis à 514 $ par mois . Le contrat prévoyait aussi que si M.

Black cessait d’exploiter l’entreprise, ce qui effectivement s’est produit, il [TRADUCTION] « payer[ait] personnellement les frais de ce régime » . L’entreprise de M. Black a échoué en octobre 2011 et à ce moment-là il a déposé une requête de mise en faillite . Selon les dossiers, ses dettes s’élevaient à 663 544,29 $ et ses comptes bancaires ont été gelés . Sur l’avis de son ancien avocat, il a cessé de faire les paiements prescrits à la Croix-Bleue et il a retardé les paiements au

titre de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale, ce qui a eu pour effet de compromettre le régime d’assurance-maladie de M me Black . [5] Le 20 décembre 2011, M me Black a déposé un avis de motion sollicitant des mesures réparatoires ex parte , ou, subsidiairement, un abrègement du délai en vue de l’audition de la motion exigeant que M.

Black [TRADUCTION] « [se conforme] aux [par.] 6 et 7 du contrat [familial] annexé à [l’]ordonnance de la Cour, afin que la requérante continue de recevoir une pension alimentaire à son profit ainsi qu’une protection d’assurance-maladie et d’assurance dentaire jusqu’à ce que l’affaire ait été entièrement instruite » . De plus, l’avis de motion sollicitait des mesures réparatoires pour outrage, une ordonnance de modification de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale conformément à l’art. 17 de la Loi, une ordonnance exigeant que M.

Black paye [TRADUCTION] « le coût intégral des frais médicaux que la requérante (intimé

e) doit supporter, et ce, maintenant, à l’avenir, et pendant le reste de sa vie à elle », une ordonnance de paiement de provision pour frais ainsi que les frais entre avocat et client . En

réponse, M. Black a sollicité la révision de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale et la cessation de celle-ci au plus tard le 1er juillet2013, pour le motif que sa situation financière avait changé. Subsidiairement, il sollicitait une modification de la prestation alimentairematrimoniale [TRADUCTION] « en raison du changement de situation important », et il voulait que son obligation alimentaire prennefin à une date donnée. III. Conclusions du juge saisi de la motion [6] Dans une décision de 84 pages, le juge saisi de la motion a accepté le témoignage de Mme Black concernant son état de santé.

Il a conclu qu’elle souffrait d’un [TRADUCTION] « trouble dépressif majeur » et de fibromyalgie en2000, ce qui avait entraîné son retrait de la population active et qu’elle était admissible aux prestations d’invalidité pour un montantapproximatif de 9 000 $ par année. Elle souffre maintenant d’ostéo-arthrite, a des problèmes de mobilité qui font obstacle à sa viequotidienne et elle a reçu dernièrement un diagnostic de trouble de conversion, ce trouble lui causant de temps à autre des pertes deconnaissance. Les conclusions ci-dessus étaient étayées par les rapports médicaux, lesquels faisaient

partie de la preuve. Le juge saisi de la motion a conclu que, d’après les états financiers, les frais de subsistance de Mme Black avaient augmenté après la séparation et qu’elle avait eu un problème d’adonnance au jeu pendant une courte période qui avait débuté après la séparation en 2006. Qui plus est, Mme Black avait prêté la somme de 10 000 $ à un ami et cette somme n’avait jamais été remboursée. Au bout du compte, elle a fait faillitepersonnelle en 2007. [7] Le juge saisi de la motion a examiné les antécédents de travail de M.

Black et observé qu’il avait exploité une entreprise de construction non personnalisée pendant le mariage et que Mme Black avait fourni, sans rémunération, desservices administratifs et des services de tenue de livres à l’entreprise avant la séparation du couple. L’entreprise avait cessé d’exploiterson activité en 2011 et, au moment de l’audience, M. Black continuait de rembourser ses dettes à un syndic de faillite. Le juge saisi de lamotion a examiné les revenus et les dépenses des parties entre 2002 et la date de l’audience. Il n’a pas été discuté du montant desdépenses, le cas échéant, que M.

Black partage avec sa conjointe actuelle; toutefois, le juge a mentionné brièvement, dans ses motifs, l’arrêt Chamberlain c. Chamberlain, 2002 NBCA 12, 247 R.N.-B. (2e) 258, et la décision Hersey c. Hersey (1993), (NB CA), 135 R.N.-B. (2e) 67, [1993] A.N.-B. no 278 (C.A) (QL), deux décisions qui abordent la question de la pertinence du partagedes dépenses lorsqu’il s’agit d’instances en modification de prestations alimentaires matrimoniales, mais il n’a pas procédé à une analysede ces décisions. IV.

Analyse faite et décision rendue par le juge saisi de la motion [8] Le juge saisi de la motion a refusé de procéder à la révision de la prestation alimentairematrimoniale pour le motif que [TRADUCTION] « le cadre et l’objectif » de la révision n’avaient pas été précisés par les parties à laclause 6d) du contrat familial (voir Leskun c. Leskun, 2006 CSC 25, [2006] 1 R.C.S. 920).

Il s’est penché alors sur la clause 6e)(iv) ducontrat familial, qui prévoyait une révision automatique de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale s’il se produisait [TRADUCTION]« un autre changement de situation important », notamment un changement dans l’état de santé de l’époux créancier ou un changement[TRADUCTION] « important » dans la situation financière de l’époux débiteur. Le juge saisi de la motion a ensuite conclu à l’existence,en l’espèce, du changement important envisagé dans l’arrêt Willick c. Willick, (SCC), [1994] 3 R.C.S. 670, [1994] A.C.S. no 94 (QL), et dans l’arrêt Hickey c.

Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 518, [1999] A.C.S. no 9 (QL). Il a conclu que Mme Black avait des besoins financiers continus et que M. Black avait la capacité de payer. Il a mentionné l’âge des parties et a conclu que Mme Black avait subi des inconvénients économiques en conséquence du mariage et de la rupture de celui-ci, et qu’elle nepouvait plus compter sur la capacité de gains de M. Black.

Il s’est reporté aux Lignes directrices facultatives en matière de pensionsalimentaires pour époux (les « Lignes directrices »), et il a prolongé la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale, compte tenu des [TRADUCTION] « circonstances particulières de l’espèce », pour le motif que Mme Black [TRADUCTION] « devrait être dédommagéede sa participation au mariage pour ce qui concerne l’entreprise de l’intimé et la contribution de l’épouse à la gestion du ménage ».

Il a reconnu que la [TRADUCTION] « démarche compensatoire a peut-être perdu un peu de sa valeur », mais que Mme Black avait ététotalement à la charge de son mari pendant les deux dernières années de leur cohabitation et qu’elle continuait d’avoir des besoinsfinanciers. Il s’est ensuite penché sur la question des primes d’assurance-maladie et a conclu que ces dernières faisaient

partie de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale, en se fondant sur l’art. 60 de la Loi de l’impôt sur le revenu, S.R.C. (1985), ch. 1 (5e suppl.). [9] Au sujet de l’outrage, le juge saisi de la motion a conclu que M. Black n’avait pas l’intentionde [TRADUCTION] « déconsidérer l’administration de la justice » et il a refusé de rendre une ordonnance. Il a accepté que la décisionde M. Black de mettre fin à la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale et de retarder le paiement des primes d’assurance-maladie avait étéprise sur l’avis de son conseiller juridique précédent et qu’elle n’avait pas été prise de mauvaise foi.

Enfin, il a refusé d’ordonner lepaiement des frais entre avocat et client pour le motif que l’acte posé par M. Black, [TRADUCTION] « compte tenu de sa conduite dansson ensemble, ne satisfait pas au critère régissant l’attribution des frais entre avocat et client ». Il a refusé d’ordonner le paiement deprovision pour frais, toutefois, il a ordonné à M. Black de payer des dépens se montant à 6 000 $ en raison de sa conduite.

Il a concluqu’il avait compétence pour modifier le montant de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale conformément à l’art. 17 de la Loi et il a portéce montant à 1 000 $ par mois pour une période indéterminée et a ajouté le coût des primes d’assurance-maladie, pour une prestation

alimentaire matrimoniale totale de 1 514 $ par mois. V. Moyens d’appel [10] Sur cette toile de fond, M.

Black interjette appel en invoquant les moyens énoncés ci-après et ensoutenant que le juge saisi de la motion a commis des erreurs de droit et de fait : 1. lorsqu’il a conclu qu’il y avait eu un changement de situation important concernant le revenu de l’appelant malgré la naturetemporaire et non durable de ce changement; 2. en concluant qu’une ordonnance de modification de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale était requise pour alléger les difficultésfinancières subies par l’intimée en raison du mariage, même si ces difficultés sont le résultat des dépenses négligentes de l’intimée; 3. en augmentant la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale payable à l’intimée [faisant passer cette prestation à 1 000 $] par mois, àlaquelle il a ajouté le coût de l’assurance-maladie, et en accordant cette prestation alimentaire matrimoniale accrue pendant une périodeindéterminée; 4. en omettant de mettre fin à la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale payable à l’intimée; 5. en prenant en considération la conduite de l’appelant lorsqu’il a accordé à l’intimée des dépens [pour un montant de 6 000 $].

VI. Norme de contrôle en appel [11] Dans l’arrêt LeBlanc c. LeBlanc, 2013 NBCA 22, 401 R.N.-B. (2e) 334, notre Cour, sous laplume de la juge d’appel Larlee, a énoncé les principes directeurs de la révision en appel. En règle générale, la décision d’un juge doitbénéficier d’une grande retenue, à moins que cette décision ou ordonnance ne soit le fruit d’une erreur de droit, d’une erreur de principe, ou d’une erreur dans l’interprétation de la preuve (MacDonald c.

MacDonald, 2011 NBCA 25, 372 R.N.-B. (2e) 179, autorisation de pourvoi refusée, [2011] C.S.C.R. no 237 (QL), au par. 7). [12] Comme il est indiqué dans l’arrêt Bourque c. Bourque, 2004 NBCA 60, 274 R.N.-B. (2e) 72,aucune déférence n’est accordée à la décision d’un juge lorsque les « motifs […] révèlent une erreur de principe, une erreur significativedans l’interprétation de la preuve, ou, encore, que la décision est manifestement erronée » (par. 10). En outre, dans l’arrêt J.A.D. c.

L.D.D., 2010 NBCA 69, 364 R.N.-B. (2e) 200, la Cour a indiqué qu’elle est tenue à aucune déférence concernant la décision d’un juge deprocès « en ce qui concerne une question de droit », y compris la détermination du critère qui s’applique (par. 9). S’agissant desordonnances de prestation alimentaire matrimoniale, la juge d’appel Larlee, qui rendait jugement au nom de la Cour, a dit ce qui suit, dans l’arrêt B.P. c. A.T., 2014 NBCA 51, 423 R.N.-B. (2e) 99 : La norme de contrôle applicable aux affaires de pension alimentaire au profit du conjoint est décrite dans l’arrêt Milton c.

Milton, 2008 NBCA 87, 338 R.N.-B. (2e) 300. Nous ne modifierons une ordonnance alimentaire qu’en cas d’erreur de principe ou d’erreursignificative dans l’interprétation de la preuve, ou encore si la décision est manifestement erronée : voir Hickey c. Hickey, (SCC), [1999] 2 R.C.S. 518, [1999] A.C.S. no 9 (QL), au par. 11, et J.P. c. R.R., au par. 27.

Bref, à l’égard des deux questions, enl’absence d’une erreur, nous ne pouvons pas refaire le procès de l’affaire. [par. 12] [13] Pour les motifs énoncés ci-après, je conclus que le juge saisi de la motion a commis des erreursde principe susceptibles d’entraîner l’infirmation de sa décision et que l’ordonnance rendue est manifestement erronée; en conséquence,j’accueillerais l’appel en partie.

A. Révision ou modification [14] Dans la présente décision, je me pencherai sur les diverses normes applicables en matière derévision et de modification, sur les modèles de prestation alimentaire qui s’appliquent relativement aux motions en modification et,enfin, j’examinerai les exceptions prévues dans les Lignes directrices lorsqu’il s’agit d’un mariage de courte durée et que le conjointbénéficiaire est frappé d’incapacité. [15] En application de l’art. 17 de la Loi, le fardeau de preuve dans les instances de révision estdifférent de celui qui s’applique dans les instances de modification.

Dans l’arrêt Leskun, la Cour suprême a mis en garde les juges contrele fait d’ordonner la révision des ordonnances alimentaires définitives au profit d’un époux, à moins qu’il n’existe une question qu’il estessentiel de déterminer et uniquement lorsque les conditions de la révision ont été bien circonscrites dans l’ordonnance initialeprescrivant des mesures accessoires. Cette directive tient au fait qu’il est interdit d’instruire à nouveau une question qui a déjà ététranchée. [16] S’agissant d’une instance de révision, « nul n’a à établir un changement de situation » (Leskun,par. 39).

Le conjoint bénéficiaire devrait présenter des éléments de preuve au sujet des efforts qu’il a déployés pour atteindrel’indépendance économique et le juge saisi de la motion peut alors modifier l’ordonnance ou y mettre fin. Lorsqu’il s’agit d’une instancede modification, toutefois, il incombe à l’auteur de la motion de remplir les exigences préliminaires du changement de situationimportant prévu à l’art. 17 de la Loi. Ce sont des distinctions importantes qui régissent la manière dont un juge doit aborder les motionsen modification d’une ordonnance alimentaire.

Ces distinctions sont importantes aussi pour les parties, étant donné que,vraisemblablement, par suite d’une révision, les prestations alimentaires seraient normalement maintenues s’il n’y a pas eu dechangement résultant en l’indépendance du conjoint bénéficiaire. Le juge saisi d’une demande de modification jouit d’une plus grandeliberté d’action quant à l’étendue de la preuve qu’il admettra pour mener l’analyse prévue à l’art. 17 de la Loi.

Ainsi, il est absolumentimportant que le juge établisse le fondement de sa compétence pour rendre la décision, à savoir si l’affaire s’inscrit dans le modèlecompensatoire ou non compensatoire de prestation alimentaire matrimoniale. En l’espèce, les deux parties ont demandé une modificationde l’ordonnance de mesures accessoires; par conséquent, les deux ont le fardeau d’établir qu’il y a eu un changement de situationimportant.

La cour doit être convaincue que « [c]ela signifie un changement qui, s’il avait été connu à l’époque, se seraitvraisemblablement traduit par des dispositions différentes » (Willick, le juge Sopinka, au par. 21). [17] Dans l’arrêt G. (L.) c. B. (G.), (SCC), [1995] 3 R.C.S. 370, [1995] A.C.S. no 72(QL), la Cour suprême a précisé le sens qu’elle attribuait au terme changement « prévisible », en affirmant que le fait qu’un changementsoit objectivement prévisible ne signifiait pas nécessairement qu’il avait été envisagé subjectivement par les parties au moment del’ordonnance initiale.

La Cour est allée plus loin dans l’arrêt Hickey lorsqu’elle a dit que le caractère suffisant du changement doit êtreexaminé en fonction de la situation financière globale des parties. La Cour a ajouté que la question de savoir si un changement desituation important a été démontré dépend des circonstances réelles des parties au moment où l’ordonnance a été rendue, et il doit s’agird’un changement continu.

L’exigence préliminaire demeure la même, que l’entente ait été incorporée dans l’ordonnance ou non et il y aprésomption du fait que l’entente a été convenablement prise en considération au moment où l’ordonnance initiale a été rendue (Willick;Leskun; L.M.P. c. L.S., 2011 CSC 64, [2011] 3 R.C.S. 775). [18] Dans les affaires mentionnées ci-dessus, il s’agissait de mariages traditionnels de longue duréeet ces décisions ont été rendues avant l’adoption des Lignes directrices.

Même si les Lignes directrices n’avaient pas été publiées lorsquel’ordonnance de mesures accessoires a été rendue en l’espèce, il est généralement accepté que celles-ci s’appliquent lorsqu’il y a une instance de révision ou de modification par la suite (R.L. c. N.L., 2012 NBQB 123 , 2012 NBBR 123, 388 R.N.-B. (2e) 220, au par. 19; Cavanaugh c. Cavanaugh, 2008 NBBR 387, 341 R.N.-B. (2e) 166, au par. 57; Gray c. Gray, 2014 ONCA 659, [2004] O.J.

No.4519 (QL), aux par. 42 à 45). [19] Dans l’ouvrage intitulé Lignes directrices facultatives en matière de pensions alimentaires pourépoux : Guide d’utilisation amélioré pour la version définitive, par Carol Rogerson et Rollie Thompson (Ottawa : Ministère de la Justicedu Canada, 2010) (le « Guide d’utilisation amélioré »), les auteurs reconnaissent que les Lignes directrices peuvent s’appliquer dans desinstances de modification (chapitre 13), mais ils soulignent spécifiquement la nécessité de prendre en compte les exceptions, le caséchéant, ainsi qu’il sera indiqué plus loin dans les présents motifs.

Avant 2008, on croyait que les Lignes directrices s’appliquaientuniquement aux demandes de prestation alimentaire initiales. Toutefois, par suite de la décision rendue dans Fisher c. Ficher, 2008ONCA 11, [2009] O.J. No. 38 (QL), au par. 96, les auteurs ont précisé que les Lignes directrices jouaient un rôle dans les motions enmodification, à certaines conditions. Dans l’arrêt Beninger c. Beninger, 2007 BCCA 619, [2007] B.C.J.

No. 2657 (QL), la Cour a fait lamise en garde suivante : [TRADUCTION]On trouve réponse à cette question, dans une certaine mesure, dans les Lignes directrices, où les auteurs indiquent, dans leur proposition,que celles-ci devraient être abordées avec beaucoup de réserve lorsqu’il s’agit de demandes de modification. Ils indiquent que les Lignes

directrices ne visent pas à fournir une réponse à certaines des questions les plus complexes qui peuvent survenir dans les instances demodification, notamment l’incidence d’un nouveau mariage, d’une deuxième nouvelle famille et de la retraite. Dans certains cas, le droitaux prestations a peut-être également été mis en doute depuis le prononcé de l’ordonnance initiale.

Dans certains cas, toutefois, lesLignes directrices peuvent être appliquées aux demandes de modification, quoique cela doive être fait avec réserve. [par. 52] [20] Les professeurs Thompson et Rogerson ont indiqué les genres de demandes de modification oude révision qui doivent être abordées avec réserve : i. les anciennes ordonnances rendues avant l’adoption des Lignes directrices; ii. une augmentation après la séparation du revenu du conjoint débiteur; iii. une diminution après la séparation du revenu du conjoint bénéficiaire; iv. le remariage du conjoint bénéficiaire ou la formation d’une nouvelle union; v. la formation d’une nouvelle famille; vi. une demande d’extinction de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale pour le motif que le conjoint bénéficiaire n’y a plus droit. [21] Selon la formule des Lignes directrices applicable dans la présente affaire, les prestationsalimentaires devaient prendre fin rien qu’en fonction des années de mariage.

Au moment de l’audience, M. Black avait versé uneprestation alimentaire matrimoniale pendant deux ans et demi de plus qu’il n’aurait été tenu de le faire en fonction de la formule et il apayé pendant une période supérieure de deux ans à la durée du mariage. Compte tenu de cela, M. Black a fait valoir qu’il devrait être misfin à la prestation alimentaire. Il a reconnu que la Cour a le pouvoir d’ordonner une prestation alimentaire non compensatoire en fonctionuniquement de l’incapacité dont souffre l’autre conjoint, faisant référence à cet égard à la décision rendue par la Cour suprême dans l’affaire Bracklow c.

Bracklow, (SCC), [1999] 1 R.C.S. 420, [1999] A.C.S. no 14 (QL), toutefois, il a soutenu quel’obligation ne devrait pas se prolonger sur une période indéterminée. M. Black prétend que les besoins financiers ne sauraient, à euxseuls, contraindre un conjoint débiteur sur une période indéterminée, particulièrement lorsqu’il s’agissait d’un mariage de courte durée.

Ila fait valoir qu’il avait accepté de payer une prestation alimentaire d’un montant supérieur pour le motif qu’il demeurait optimiste queson ex-épouse travaillerait après quatre ans; par conséquent, il nourrissait l’attente que son obligation alimentaire prendrait finéventuellement. À son avis, la clause de révision envisageait un changement quant à la durée seulement, et non pas quant au montant dela prestation alimentaire. [22] À l’appui de sa prétention selon laquelle il devrait être mis fin à la prestation alimentairematrimoniale, M. Black a invoqué la décision Aujla c. Singh, 2012 ONSC 5217, [2012] O.J.

No. 4395 (QL). Dans cette affaire, le jugeGrey a fait remarquer ce qui suit : [TRADUCTION] « s’agissant de la prestation alimentaire en faveur d’un conjoint souffrantd’incapacité totale, il faut soupeser soigneusement les intérêts » (par. 51), la famille, la société en général et, effectivement, la personnefrappée d’incapacité elle-même, pouvant être appelées à contribuer. [23] Dans l’affaire Aujla, l’épouse avait immigré au Canada en 2006, deux ans après son mariage. En2007, un diagnostic de sclérose en plaques a été posé à son égard.

Le mariage, dont aucun enfant n’était issu, s’est détérioré etéventuellement l’épouse a dû emménager dans un foyer de soins. Elle a demandé une prestation alimentaire de 1 000 $ par mois pour unepériode indéterminée. Les Lignes directrices prescrivaient un montant variant entre 154 $ et 208 $ par mois pour un mariage de deux àquatre ans. La Cour a conclu qu’il ne s’agissait pas d’une affaire nécessitant une ordonnance alimentaire compensatoire, elle a tenucompte de l’exception établie dans les Lignes directrices au

titre de l’invalidité et elle a accordé une prestation alimentaire de 300 $ par mois pour une période indéterminée en fonction des besoins financiers extrêmes de l’épouse. À l’instar de l’épouse susmentionnée, Mme Black n’est pas en mesure de contribuer à ses propres frais de subsistance en raison de son incapacité. La preuve indique qu’elle reçoit unsoutien financier de sa mère et de son frère, et l’État contribue déjà à son soutien financier par l’entremise des prestations d’invalidité.Les contributions de M. Black lui permettent de subvenir à ses besoins fondamentaux.

La preuve indique qu’elle a des besoins financierscontinus et M. Black a admis qu’elle avait droit à une prestation alimentaire. [24] À la suite de la déclaration de faillite en 2011, M. Black a obtenu un emploi comme travailleurde la construction au Nunavut. Il gagne environ 117 000 $ par année. M. Black a soutenu que le juge saisi de la motion avait commis uneerreur lorsqu’il avait conclu que son emploi comme travailleur de la construction au Nunavut constituait un changement de situation« important ».

Il a soutenu que ce poste était de courte durée et qu’une amélioration temporaire de sa situation financière ne devrait pasêtre utilisée comme fondement d’une augmentation indéterminée de son obligation au

titre de la prestation alimentaire matrimoniale. Cetargument a pu attirer un peu d’attention; toutefois, à la date de l’audience, il avait travaillé pour le compte de la même société de façonintermittente depuis 2011 et rien n’indiquait que son poste deviendrait superflu. C

[…]