R. v. Danyliuk Date:, 2012 BCPC 481

Citation: R. v. Danyliuk Date: 20121025 2012 BCPC 0481 File No: 189054-3-C Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. KYLE BRANDON DANYLIUK ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE M.B. HICKS Counsel for the Crown: B. Kielmann Counsel for the Defendant: I. Ferbey Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: September 27, 2012 Date of Judgment: October 25, 2012 [ 1 ] THE COURT : Kyle Brandon Danyliuk is before the court today to be sentenced following his pleas of guilty to four serious

criminal offences arising from the tragic events of May 18, 2011 in White Rock, British Columbia.

Those offences are the following: First, that he operated a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner and thereby caused the death of Marilyn Laursen, contrary to s. 249(4) of the Criminal Code ; second, that he operated a motor vehicle in a dangerous manner and thereby caused bodily harm to Solmaz Pourmohammadbhagerna, contrary to s. 249(3) of the Criminal Code ; third, that having the care or control of a motor vehicle that was involved in an accident with Marilyn Laursen, and knowing that death or bodily harm resulted to her, with intent to escape civil or criminal liability he failed to stop, give his name and address and offer assistance, contrary to s. 252(1.3) (

a) of the Criminal Code , and; fourth, that in the same circumstances, having been involved in an accident with Solmaz Pourmohammadbhagerna, he failed to stop, give his name and address and offer assistance, contrary to s. 252(1.2) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] Dangerous driving causing death carries a maximum sentence of 14 years imprisonment. The same offence where bodily harm occurs carries a maximum sentence of ten years.

Failure to stop at the scene of the accident in circumstances of the death of Marilyn Laursen carries a maximum sentence of life imprisonment, and in the circumstances of bodily harm caused to Ms. Pourmohammadbhagerna, the maximum sentence is ten years. [ 3 ] The Crown seeks sentences of 30 months incarceration on the charge of dangerous driving causing death, and 12 months on the charge of dangerous driving causing bodily harm, to be served concurrently.

On the charges of failing to remain at the scene of the events, the Crown seeks an 18-month sentence where death occurred and nine months on the count involving bodily harm, to be served concurrent with each other, but consecutive to the dangerous driving counts. This would result in a global 48-month or four year sentence of incarceration. [ 4 ] Mr. Ferbey, on behalf of Mr. Danyliuk, says that Mr. Danyliuk's youth, positive rehabilitative prospects, and his circumstances argue for a global sentence in the range of 18 months to two years less a day, followed by two to three years of probation.

He agrees that the sentence should be structured as the Crown proposes, with the failure to remain at the scene of the events offences consecutive to the dangerous driving offence, reflecting the views of the Court of Appeal in this province that the offence of fleeing the scene follows the completion of the offences of dangerous driving in which death and bodily harm occurred and is a separate and distinct event. ( R. v.

Gill 2010 Carswell BC 2267 at paragraphs 15 and 16 ). [ 5 ] The Crown seeks ancillary orders for DNA sampling and a driving prohibition under s. 259(2) of the Criminal Code for five years, and those orders I understand are not opposed. [ 6 ] The circumstances of May 18, 2011 are set out in an Agreed Statement of Facts. I will summarize those circumstances as follows. [ 7 ] At 9:30 p.m. on that date, Cst. Bickle of the RCMP was parked in his marked police car on Marine Drive in White Rock. He heard loud music coming from a vehicle behind him.

He identified the source to be a red Nissan Maxima, British Columbia plate number: 292-PBV, owned by Carleigh Merritt and driven by Mr. Danyliuk, who was alone at the time. Cst. Bickle followed the vehicle east on Marine Drive and then north on Elm Street. The vehicle then turned around and drove back south on Elm Street. Cst. Bickle turned and followed the vehicle. It turned to go west onto Marine Drive without braking at the intersection. Cst. Bickle activated emergency lights intending to pull Mr. Danyliuk over. [ 8 ] Mr.

Danyliuk was aware the police were behind him with emergency lights on and that he was being pursued, but he failed to pull over. He turned north on Oxford Street and then east on Buena Vista Avenue. [ 9 ] Cst. Bickle continued pursuit. The speed limit is 50 kilometres per hour in that area. Cst. Bickle's vehicle reached 88 kilometres per hour driving along Buena Vista Avenue. At the intersection with Johnston Road, a vehicle immediately ahead of Mr. Danyliuk stopped for a stop sign. Mr.

Danyliuk applied his brakes, drove into the oncoming lane and around the stopped vehicle and turned left to go north on Johnston Road. He did not stop for the stop sign. Cst. Bickle had by this point activated all emergency equipment. [ 10 ] Mr. Danyliuk's vehicle momentarily crossed the centre line into the oncoming lane to pass a vehicle on Johnston Road. Mr. Danyliuk drove north on Johnston Road towards Thrift Avenue, followed by Cst. Bickle with emergency equipment activated. Mr.

Danyliuk's speed at that time exceeded 80 kilometres per hour in that 50 kilometre zone. [ 11 ] The intersection at Thrift Avenue is controlled by traffic lights. At the intersection there are three lanes of travel for vehicles approaching on Johnston Road. The left lane is for traffic intending to turn westbound and at the time it was occupied by two vehicles. The middle lane is for traffic proceeding north through the intersection and was occupied by two vehicles, including the white Honda driven by Ms. Pourmohammadbhagerna.

The right lane is for traffic turning eastbound on Thrift Avenue and that lane was unoccupied. [ 12 ] Ms. Pourmohammadbhagerna saw the police lights approaching from behind. She drove from the middle lane into the right lane to yield to the police car. As she did so, Mr. Danyliuk drove into the right lane and collided with her vehicle on the front passenger- side quarter panel and bumper. The passenger side tires on Mr. Danyliuk's vehicle went onto the sidewalk. The light was red for northbound traffic on Johnston Road. Despite the collision with Ms. Pourmohammadbhagerna, Mr.

Danyliuk continued through the red light northbound without braking. [ 13 ] At that moment Marilyn Laursen and Shaunna Radford, her close friend, were crossing Johnston Road in a marked crosswalk. Mr. Danyliuk drove into the crosswalk and struck Ms. Laursen. He did not stop, although he knew that he had struck her. Cst. Bickle did stop to assist the victims. [ 14 ] Mr. Danyliuk continued north. He turned east on North Bluff Road and then north on 160th Street, and then northwest on King George Boulevard, left onto 20th Avenue and left on Broome Road. Mr.

Danyliuk then drove onto Lilac Drive where he abandoned the vehicle. [ 15 ] Carleigh Merritt's home at that time was a short distance away on Broome Road. Mr. Danyliuk and Ms. Merritt were then in a relationship, which continues to the present time.

[ 16 ] The abandoned vehicle was located by police at 10:00 p.m. that evening in a damaged state. At 10:10 p.m., Ms. Merritt called 9-1-1 to report her vehicle was stolen from a friend's residence. [ 17 ] Mr. Danyliuk did not turn himself in to police. An intensive investigation followed, which led to his arrest on these charges on July 16th of 2011, about two months later. [ 18 ] On his arrest, Mr. Danyliuk gave a warned statement in which he admitted the circumstances set out in the agreed facts. Mr.

Danyliuk has never held a driver's licence and he was not a licensed driver on May 18th, 2011. [ 19 ] Solmaz Pourmohammadbhagerna suffered significant soft tissue injuries to her neck and back as a result of the impact with Mr. Danyliuk's vehicle. She worked as a kickboxing instructor and held a black belt in that discipline. She has been unable to return to work. She has been diagnosed with Post Traumatic Stress Disorder. Although she has chosen not to file a victim impact statement, one can only conclude from this information that her injuries and the trauma she has suffered as a result of Mr.

Danyliuk's conduct has had a profound effect on her life. [ 20 ] Marilyn Laursen was killed when she was struck by the vehicle driven by Kyle Danyliuk. I am going to speak for a moment to those who are here today, family and friends of Marilyn Laursen. [ 21 ] I have read the seven victim impact statements filed with the court and I listened as Ms. Laursen's sisters, Cheryl Parrott and Lynn McCutcheon, and her close friend, Shaunna Radford, read their statements during the sentencing hearing on the last date. [ 22 ] Marilyn Laursen was a person engaged in and enjoying the very best years of her life.

She was pursuing a successful career. She enjoyed a wide circle of friends and activities, and she was at the centre of a large family which relied upon and provided great support to each other. In an instant that family, her mother, her daughter, and her wide circle of friends, suffered the worst kind of loss in the most terrible way. Their agony continues to this day. [ 23 ] The place Ms. Laursen enjoyed in each of their lives is eloquently described in each of the statements that have been filed.

I wish to read two brief passages from two of those statements because I believe they help us to understand better the magnitude of these events and the impact of this loss. [ 24 ] Angela Bowman is Ms. Laursen's daughter. She has provided a lengthy victim impact statement. I am going to read from portions of two paragraphs. She said this: My mom was a legend. She was fun. She had friends and admirers everywhere she went. As my uncle once said, she's the only person he knew who could walk into a room of strangers and be best friends with everyone by the time she left.

Her goal in life was to enjoy it and ensure everyone around her did the same. In recent years she had become a career woman in an industry she loved, and built for herself a professional reputation that won admiration and respect from clients, colleagues and business partners. She continued: I've lost a mother. My children will not know their grandmother. My husband, Arthur, has lost someone who he always called the best mother-in-law in the world. And she went on to say: My mom held the hands of so many people who needed a friend, a helping hand or just a shoulder to cry on. [ 25 ] Patricia Kanwischer is Ms.

Laursen's mother. She said this: I still wait for her phone calls, her happy laughter and her visits. I agonize regarding her daughter. She only had one child who has lived in Australia for five years now. There is a space in my life that will never heal. I have lost so much. My other children have lost and not even time will heal that. She also said: I have lost the happy outlook on life and nothing will replace that. And then she had these words which I thought were particularly appropriate in this sentencing hearing.

She said this: I would hope that the accused person responsible for our loss be really aware of the mental suffering that he has caused, for the anguish that I still and probably always will feel, and that he can be helped to realize how his unthinking way of life has damaged our family so much. Life will never again be a happy, safe place for my family. [ 26 ] These words remind us how fleeting life can be and the challenges family and friends face in grieving, coming to terms with the loss of such a vibrant presence, and then finding the strength to pick up, take support from each other and to move forward.

No sentence

which I could or will impose on Mr. Danyliuk today can adequately compensate for injuries suffered or replace the loss or fill the void his conduct on May 18th, 2011 has left; indeed, that is not a realistic expectation of sentencing in criminal cases like this one. [ 27 ] In determining a fit sentence to be imposed upon Mr. Danyliuk I must consider the purpose and principles of sentencing which are set out in s. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code .

The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions which address the following objectives: To denounce unlawful conduct; to deter Mr.

Danyliuk and others from committing such offences; to separate him, if necessary; to assist his rehabilitation; to provide reparation for harm done to victims and the community, and; to promote a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgement of harm done to victims and to the community. [ 28 ] The sentence I impose must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. I must take account of aggravating and mitigating circumstances. The sentence should be similar to sentences imposed in similar cases.

The effect of consecutive sentences should not be unduly long or harsh. Courts must take care when imposing custodial sentences to do so only to the extent required to address sentencing principles. [ 29 ] Imposing a fit sentence in a serious criminal case like this one is among the most challenging responsibilities judges undertake. You will see I hope that it is not an arbitrary process which relies on the application of some simple mathematical formula.

Our sentencing regime calls for a careful balancing of a complex of factors in the context of the specific circumstances of the offence and the particular circumstances of the offender before the court. It requires that I exercise restraint so as to impose a sentence which in its totality is proportionate to the grave circumstances and Mr.

Danyliuk's moral blameworthiness, while at the same time encouraging and supporting rehabilitation and restorative objectives. [ 30 ] Kyle Danyliuk's background and circumstances are important in this process and I am going to review those now. [ 31 ] I have considered the pre-sentence report and the submissions of Mr. Ferbey on behalf of Mr. Danyliuk. I have reviewed letters of support filed by his grandmother, his aunt, Ms. Merritt's parents, and his employer. [ 32 ] Mr. Danyliuk is 20 years of age. He was 18 at the time of these offences. His youthful years were difficult.

He has had no relationship with his father following the separation of his parents when he was aged two. His mother's role has been very limited due to her substance abuse issues. This maternal absence continues and is confirmed most recently by Mr. Danyliuk's mother's failure to follow up with the probation officer preparing the pre-sentence report. When she was present she did not address education and developmental issues involving her son from which he could have benefitted. [ 33 ] Mr. Danyliuk was raised by his maternal grandmother and she remains a strong support in his life.

It is evident from the material before me that she made her best effort for Mr. Danyliuk during his youth and in the absence of his mother and father. [ 34 ] Mr. Danyliuk struggled in school. He dropped out in Grade 10 at the age of 16. He began consuming alcohol and marihuana. [Text removed for publication.] The offences before this court are I believe his first adult offences. [Text removed for publication.] [ 35 ] [Text removed for publication], Mr. Danyliuk has maintained relatively steady employment after dropping out of school.

He completed a substance abuse management program [text removed for publication]. [ 36 ] Mr. Danyliuk met Ms. Merritt two years ago. Their relationship continues and is a strong and supportive relationship based on the material before me. They are the parents of a son aged about a year-and-a-half. They live in Ms. Merritt's father's home. [ 37 ] All the material filed and the submissions made support the conclusion that Mr. Danyliuk has been changed by the events of May 18th, 2011. He is a devoted father and partner to Ms. Merritt, in a committed relationship.

He is fully and steadily employed and is a valued employee. Since his arrest he has accepted responsibility and it has been his intention to plead guilty to these charges from that point. He has fully complied with his bail obligations. No new charges have arisen. He abstains from alcohol and marihuana and is prepared to take substance abuse counselling and treatments as required. He has distanced himself from past negative associates. He is remorseful. [ 38 ] Each person who has filed letters on his behalf has described Mr. Danyliuk's anguish over the loss he is responsible for. Mr.

Danyliuk spoke of this during a brief statement in court at the close of submissions on the previous day. [ 39 ] I have reviewed the case authorities provided by both counsel. I will file with these reasons those case lists. I do not propose to review all of the cases here. They generally cover a range of sentences from high provincial time, that being 18 months to two years less a day, and extending up to penitentiary sentences ranging up to four years or more. In most cases where the offender left the scene a consecutive sentence was imposed (e.g. R. v. Prasad, 2006 Carswell BC 2606 (BCCA) ).

In some cases provided a conditional sentence order was available as a sentencing option, which is not the case here (e.g. R. v. Peters, 2009 Carswell BC 781 (BCPC) , R. v. Jourdin 2005 BCJ 2994 (BCPC) ). Some cases provided involve charges of criminal negligence (e.g. R. v. Chan, 2004 BCSC 1581 ) and some cases there is a past related criminal history (e.g. R. v. Rock, 2009 BCPC 389 ). [ 40 ] My review of these cases confirms the point I made a moment ago that no simple mathematical formula or other quick reference provides a fit sentence.

It is the complexity of circumstances of offence and offender balanced with sentencing objectives that provide the appropriate outcome in each individual case. What is clear from those authorities is the great weight courts must place on denunciation and deterrence in cases where outrageous driving has produced catastrophic loss, as occurred here. [ 41 ] The following passage is taken from the decision of the Supreme Court of Canada in a case called R. v. M. in 1996 from the judgment of the Chief Justice of Canada at the time, and I want to quote briefly from that decision: 79.

The mental state of the offender gives rise to the moral blameworthiness which justifies the state in imposing the stigma and punishment associated with a criminal sentence… I submit that it is this same element of moral blameworthiness which animates the determination of the appropriate quantum of punishment for a convicted offender as a just sanction…

81. ...The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society's condemnation of that particularoffender's conduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender'sconduct should be punished for encroaching on our society's basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. ...Our criminal law is also a system of values. A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values arecommunicated.

In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also beimposed in a manner which positively instills the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the CriminalCode. And he continued with these words: 82. …The relative weight and importance of these multiple factors will frequently vary depending on the nature of the crime and thecircumstances of the offender.

In the final analysis the overarching duty of a sentencing judge is to draw upon all of the legitimateprinciples of sentencing to determine a just and appropriate sentence which reflects the gravity of the offence and the moralblameworthiness of the offender. (R. v. M.(C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 500) [42] R. v. Woodley is a 1993 decision in the British Columbia Court of Appeal.

In that case the Court of Appeal reduced sentencesimposed for criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm and for driving with an excessive bloodalcohol reading from a global three year term to two years less a day and two years probation. Although the offences were not preciselythe ones before me, I take note of paragraphs 24 through 27 of that decision, which state the following: 24. Long penitentiary sentences are reserved for cases in which isolation is the goal. R. v. Lunn is an example of such a case. 25.

Sentences of four years and more are given where there are aggravating circumstances such as prior convictions or particularlyblameworthy conduct. 26. Shorter penitentiary sentences are given in cases that do not exhibit either the need for isolation or great moral blameworthiness. 27. Sentences of less than two years have been imposed on young people, in cases where moral blameworthiness is of short duration orotherwise minimal, where there are mitigating circumstances, or where neither the offence nor the offender can be thought to warrantother than a minimal sentence. (R. v.

Woodley, (BC CA), [1993] BCJ 906 (BCCA)) [43] Mr. Justice McEwan in the Supreme Court in this province referred to those guidelines recently in a case called R. v. Matheson2011 BCJ 434 (BCSC). The offender in the case had been found guilty following a trial on charges of dangerous driving causing deathand bodily harm and impaired driving causing death and bodily harm. Sentences of two years concurrent were imposed on the countsinvolving death and 18 months concurrent on those involving bodily harm.

The court concluded such a sentence met the deterrent anddenunciatory objectives where significant mitigating circumstances were present. [44] R. v. Chan 2004 BCSC 1581 is a decision also in the Supreme Court of British Columbia in 2004. In that case Mr. JusticeGroberman imposed sentences of 18 months less one day for criminal negligence causing death and six months consecutive for fleeingthe scene where a death had occurred. The offender was 19 years of age and drove at high speed through Richmond late at night.

Hedrove through a red light and collided with a police car, killing the officer who was driving that vehicle. He fled the scene and turnedhimself in the following day. The offender had no prior record and his rehabilitation was well established. The court had the option, notavailable here, to impose a conditional sentence order, but determined such a step was not consistent with general deterrence anddenunciation. At paragraph 54 the court said the following: As I have indicated, the accused in this case is now a hard-working, productive member of society and is highly remorseful. He isyoung.

Care must be taken in passing a sentence not to jeopardize his future by imposing too severe a sanction or too long a custodialsentence. Society's denunciation of the crime and general deterrence can be accomplished without imposing a term of several years inprison. [45] R. v. Scott, [2008] BCCA 307, is a decision in the Court of Appeal. There the Court of Appeal confirmed an effective 42-month sentence on pleas of guilty to dangerous driving causing death and bodily harm in respect to a 44-year-old offender. Alcohol wasa factor and the offender had five previous drinking driving offences.

Other Motor Vehicle Act offences and a conviction for failing toremain at the scene were also in his record. He was unlicenced and uninsured at the time. [46] Evidence of significant alcohol consumption was also present in R. v. Kummer 2011 ONCA 39, in the Ontario Court of Appealin which the court upheld an eight-year sentence in respect of dangerous driving causing three deaths, bodily harm and impaired drivingcausing death. Alcohol was also a significant factor as was a past record for impaired driving in R. v. J.A.W., [2006] BCCA 228 in theCourt of Appeal here. The court increased the sentence to four years.

A past drinking driving history was aggravating in R. v. Prasad,[2006] BCCA 470 and in R. v. Rock 2009 BCPC 389, both decisions which resulted in four to five year sentences in the courts in thisprovince. [47] Mr. Danyliuk's level of moral blameworthiness in respect to the offences before me is high. His driving leading up to the pointthat he collided with Ms. Pourmohammadbhagerna's vehicle and then struck Ms. Laursen, as he drove away from that collision andthrough a red light in my view is at the upper end of the range of conduct contemplated in the offence of dangerous driving.

Itapproaches criminal negligence. He had consumed alcohol, although there is no evidence before us as to the extent of that. He was

unlicenced. While he knew he was pursued by police, rather than pull over and face relatively modest consequences, he travelled at high speed over an extended distance along a number of municipal roadways in traffic at night, through a stop sign and around traffic obstructing his escape as he approached Thrift Avenue. At any point along that route a tragedy involving someone innocently going about his or her business was waiting to occur. That catastrophe occurred at the red light at Thrift Avenue. A life was lost, serious injuries were suffered, and the lives of many people will not be the same. [ 48 ] Mr.

Danyliuk then fled. He did not come forward and admit his role until arrested and confronted by police two months later. By failing to come forward Mr. Danyliuk extended the agony and the uncertainty of the families of the victims and he foreclosed any assessment of his sobriety on the night in question. [ 49 ] This is a case in which the grave circumstances and the high degree of moral culpability require I impose a sentence which expresses the community's condemnation of Mr.

Danyliuk's conduct and delivers a deterrent message in strong terms to others who might act this way in the future. [ 50 ] In reaching a proper sentence, I must also take account of Mr. Danyliuk's personal circumstances and consider his rehabilitation and restorative objectives and, particularly so, considering his age. [ 51 ] In addition to his conduct and actions on this night and over the two months that followed, I must consider his background and how he has responded to the events since they occurred. I must be mindful of the principles of proportionality and restraint.

I must bear in mind that the principles of sentencing require that I interfere with his liberty only to the extent required to achieve the objectives of sentencing in this particular case. [ 52 ] Mr. Danyliuk was 18 years of age at the time of these offences. He had limited positive role models on which to rely through his adolescence. He acted irresponsibly in the extreme at the sight of the police car and his conduct thereafter led to great loss. He failed to take responsibility at the earliest opportunity.

However, since these charges were laid he has undertaken positive change and his life is now on a positive track. He is in a committed relationship and the father of a young child. He has abstained from alcohol and marihuana. He is employed and committed to supporting his family. He has the support of those around him and his employer. [ 53 ] Based on what he has said and the letters of support, I conclude Mr. Danyliuk is gathering insight into the offences he committed and the impact that his conduct has had on others.

I accept that he is remorseful and genuinely anguished over the circumstances and consequences of his conduct and he will carry that with him for the years to come. [ 54 ] I conclude from these considerations that his specific deterrence as a sentencing objective has been substantially addressed.

Because he is young his ongoing rehabilitation is an important consideration. [ 55 ] With all of this in mind, I must determine whether a proper balancing of sentencing considerations in this particular case favours a sentence in the federal penitentiary system, that is, a sentence from two years to four years incarceration as proposed by the Crown and which weighs more heavily in the balance the important objectives of denunciation and general deterrence, or whether a sentence in the high provincial range, that is, a period less than two years with probation to follow, gives proper recognition to those objectives, but also allows the positive factors at work in Mr.

Danyliuk's life and supportive of his rehabilitation, to be given the opportunity to mature and develop. [ 56 ] Mr. Danyliuk is not one of those persons who require lengthy isolation. The circumstances and his moral blameworthiness are significant. Courts have recognized, however, that where rehabilitation and specific deterrence are well in hand a sentence at the high end of the provincial range can deliver the significant statement of general deterrence and denunciation required.

That is the case here. [ 57 ] I have determined that a fit global sentence to be imposed is two years less one day, followed by probation. [ 58 ] Mr. Danyliuk, if you could stand, please? I impose the following sentences. [ 59 ] On Count 1, dangerous driving causing the death of Marilyn Laursen, I impose a sentence of 18 months incarceration. [ 60 ] On Count 2, dangerous driving causing the bodily harm of Ms. Pourmohammadbhagerna, I impose a 12-month concurrent sentence. [ 61 ] On Count 3, leaving the scene of the accident knowing that death or bodily harm of Ms.

Laursen occurred, I impose six months less one day consecutive. [ 62 ] On Count 4, leaving the scene knowing bodily harm was caused to Ms.

Pourmohammadbhagerna, I impose six months concurrent. [ 63 ] You will be bound by a probation order for a period of three years thereafter. [ 64 ] The conditions will be that you keep the peace and be of good behaviour. [ 65 ] You must report forthwith to a probation officer and thereafter as directed by the probation officer. [ 66 ] You will reside where directed by the probation officer and you are not to change that address without the prior written approval of the probation officer. [ 67 ] You will attend, participate in and complete to the satisfaction of the probation officer any assessment, treatment or counselling that may be directed by the probation officer. [ 68 ] You will seek and maintain employment and/or attend an educational or vocational program if so directed by the probation officer.

[69] You will abstain absolutely from the possession or consumption of alcohol or non-prescription drugs or substances under theControlled Drugs and Substances Act unless you have a medical prescription for that substance in your name issued by a qualifiedmedical practitioner. [70] Subject to comment from counsel, those will be the conditions on the probation order. [71] I have determined that it is appropriate that you provide a sample of your DNA to the National DNA Databank; this applies as asecondary designated offence in respect to all of the offences on which the court is dealing today, and you will provide that sampleduring the period of your incarceration. [72] There will be a driving prohibition under s. 259(2) of the Criminal Code for a period of five years as sought by the Crown. [73] Surcharges are waived. [74] That concludes the sentence.

You are in the custody of the sheriffs, sir. [75] MR. KIELMANN: Your Honour, the only remaining thing is the Crown directs the Clerk of the Court to enter a stay ofproceedings on the remaining count. (REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED) APPENDIX Defence Authorities 1. R. v. Hansen (1989), 13 M.V.R. (3d) 33, [1989] B.C.J. No. 312 (B.C.C.A.) 2. R. v. Grezenda; R. v. Lunn; R. v. McNeil; R. v. Sweeney, [1992] B.C.J. No. 1 (C.A.) 3. R. v. Woodley (1993), (BC CA), 44 M.V.R. (2d) 51, 24 B.C.A.C. 153, [1993] B.C.J. No. 906 4. R. v. Sidhu (1998), (BC CA), 129 C.C.C. (3d) 26, 111 B.C.A.C. 253, [1998] B.C.J. No. 2039 5. R. v.

McAndrew (2004), 2004 BCCA 368 , 1 M.V.R. (5th) 165, 200 B.C.A.C. 270, [2004] B.C.J. No. 1345 6. R. v. Jourdin (2005) 24 M.V.R. (5th) 209, 2004 BCPC 671, [2005] B.C.J. No. 2994 7. R. v. Sullivan 2005 BCPC 206, [2005] B.C.J. No. 1216 8. R. v. Adamson 2007, 48 M.V.R. (5th) 130, 2007 BCSC 745, [2007] B.C.J. No. 1143 9. R. v. Friesen 2011 BCPC 418, [2011] B.C.J. No. 2594 10. R. v. Bains (27 February 2012), Surrey 180569-2C (B.C. Prov. Ct.) 11. R. v. Giles 2012 BCSC 775 Crown Authorities 1. R. v. Regier, 2011 ONCA 557 2. R. v. Regier, 2010 ONSC 1963 3. R. v. Boukchev, 2005 CarswellOnt 3954 4. R. v.

J.A.W., 2006 BCCA 228 5. R. v. Phillips, 2005 CarswellOnt 187 6. R. v. Prasad, 2005 CarswellBC 1996 7. R. v. Prasad, 2006 CarswellBC 2606 8. R. v. Chan, 2004 BCSC 1581 9. R. v. Rock, 2009 CarswellBC 3632

10. R. v. Goulet, 2009 CarswellOnt 6860 11. R. v. Gill, 2010 CarswellBC 2267 12. R. v. Peters, 2009 CarswellBC 781 13. R. v. Yuzicapi, 2011 CarswellSask 761 14. R. v. Scott, 2008 BCCA 307 , 2008 CarswellBC 1656 15. R. v. Kummer, 2011 CarswellOnt 282 16. R. v. Rawn, 2012 ONCA 487