Director v. B.R. and K.K. Date:, 2015 BCPC 419

Citation: Director v. B.R. and K.K. Date: 20151119 2015 BCPC 0419 File No: 19003 Registry: Terrace IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE CHILD FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE ACT , R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 46 AND THE CHILDREN: A.K ., born [omitted for publication] Q.K. , born [omitted for publication] BETWEEN: DIRECTOR OF CHILD, FAMILY AND COMMUNITY SERVICE APPLICANT AND: B.R. PARENT AND: K.K. PARENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE C. A. STRUYK

Counsel for the Director: K. L. Whonnock Appearing on their own behalf: K.K. Counsel for B.R. : W.C. MacGregor Place of Hearing: Terrace , B.C.

Date of Judgment: November 19, 2015 [ 1 ] THE COURT: Around January 8, 2015 the Director under the Child, Family and Community Service Act, which I will refer to going forward primarily as the Act , became aware that B.R. was leaving her son, A.K., then eight years old, home alone unsupervised after school between three o'clock and five o'clock during the week. [ 2 ] On February 16, 2015, the Director filed for a supervision order from the Court pursuant to s. 21.1 of the Act . [ 3 ] A presentation hearing was conducted before a Provincial Court Judge on March 27, 2015 and a decision was rendered April 15, 2015, granting a supervision order.

That order was appealed by B.R. to the British Columbia Supreme Court and the appeal was dismissed by Justice Punnett in B.R. v. K.K., 2015 BCSC 1658 on September 15, 2015. [ 4 ] The protection hearing was heard and argued on August 26, 28, and September 22, 2015. K.K., the father of the subject children, only attended on the date argument was presented on September 22, 2015. Positions of the Parties [ 5 ] The Director argues that the children are in need of protection as the eight-year-old was regularly being left home alone unattended and there is a high likelihood of risk of physical harm.

The Director refers to numerous risks including accidents or other misfortunes that might occur while the child is home alone. [ 6 ] Under the Act , there is no age specified for when children may be left alone unsupervised.

There are, however, policies of the Director with respect to foster children and foster parents that direct no children to be left home unsupervised under the age of 12. [ 7 ] In the circumstances of leaving a child home alone unsupervised under the age of ten, the Director argues no such child is sufficiently developed to adequately reduce or prevent all the potential risks of harm when left home alone unsupervised. [ 8 ] Counsel for B.R. argues that the Director offers no evidence that the eight-year-old boy, A.K., was in need of protection other than the fact he is an eight-year-old. [ 9 ] The father, K.K., as I indicated, only attended on the last day of hearing.

He shares care of the children with B.R. equally on a week-on, week-off basis. He supports the Director's position for a supervision order. [ 10 ] I am going to refer to the evidence. Evidence [ 11 ] Constable D. Black testified. He is a five-year member of the RCMP, the local community policing force.

He testified that in circumstances where the RCMP become aware of a child eight years of age home alone, they will attend at a residence and remain present until either they receive appropriate direction from the Ministry of Children and Families or a responsible person at least 16 years of age attends to care for the child. [ 12 ] Kelsey Minhinick [phonetic] testified she teaches home and community safety in a home alone course targeted at children nine to eleven years old.

The course does not specify an age where children can be left home alone. [ 13 ] Kerry Vigue [phonetic] is a child protection social worker currently assigned to the file and family before the Court. She testified that the Ministry initially became involved because the information they received was the eight-year-old child was home alone after school with a four-year-old sibling.

Eventually, it was determined the four-year-old was not being left home alone, only the eight- year-old. [ 14 ] The original social worker on the file spoke directly to the mother, B.R., who confirmed the older child was being left home alone. B.R. was informed by the social worker that the Director considered it inappropriate to leave an eight-year-old home alone unsupervised. The social worker requested to interview the eight-year-old child but was refused.

An attempt to make a safety plan with the cooperation of B.R. was made, but B.R. refused to agree to and apply the Director's safety plan. [ 15 ] The Director did not apprehend the children but took the next step and applied to court for a supervision order, an interim form of which was granted by a Provincial Court Judge on April 15, 2015 with three supervision terms including that B.R. will ensure that A.K. and Q.K. will be under the care and supervision of a responsible adult at all times and not be left alone to care for themselves. [ 16 ] Ms.

Vigue testified there are no other protection concerns with respect to the children. She testified the specific concern for the Director was likelihood of harm based on lack of supervision of the child. This harm was described as including falls, fires, or home invasions, and I should say that comment about home invasions may not have come directly from Ms. Vigue, that may have come from one of the other witnesses for the Director.

[ 17 ] Ms. Vigue attempted to deal directly with B.R. without success and describes her as essentially uncooperative with the Ministry. She also testified that their information was that the father, K.K., supported the supervision order and did not want his child left home alone. [ 18 ] Under cross-examination, Ms. Vigue testified that all children under the age of 19 are “Children” for the purposes of the Act and their circumstances could be assessed by social workers to determine if lack of supervision is appropriate for them.

She also agreed that the risk of harm issues raised by the Director could be just as difficult for an older child or adult to deal with. She also testified in cross- examination that A.K. had been interviewed by another social worker. [ 19 ] Jason Evans was Team Leader with the Ministry of Children and Family Development, Terrace Office, and in that position had oversight of this matter at the time it came to the Director's attention. He testified the primary concern of the Director was leaving an eight-year-old child at home unsupervised and lack of cooperation from the mother.

The Director would have preferred a collaborative approach to resolving the issues with B.R., but that was not an option. The father was described as cooperative. [ 20 ] Mr. Evans emphasized that through social research there is cross-Canada acceptance of standards that includes a consensus that children under ten should not be left home alone unsupervised.

There are circumstances where children even as old as 16 or 18 are not left unsupervised and there are no circumstances where the Director is satisfied a child under ten is responsibly left home alone unsupervised. [ 21 ] Many articles were tendered that document the social science around neglect, lack of supervision, and harm or potential harm to children. The defence did not object to these being entered though I find them generally of little value in addressing the narrow issue before the Court. If anything, they appear to support the evidence of Mr.

Evans that the Ministry position requiring supervision of children under the age of ten is reasonable. [ 22 ] Mr. Evans agreed there is no one-size-fits-all policy approach to the appropriate age for children to be left alone, but having said that, was of the view children under ten should not be left alone and that assessments conducted by social workers might reach different conclusions with children over the age of ten. His own view was that parents tend to over-estimate the abilities of their children. [ 23 ] On cross-examination, Mr.

Evans' evidence clarified that in his view no children under the age of ten should be left home alone unsupervised due to the risk of harm given the child's development. The child's development may be advanced in some areas, but a child under ten is not sufficiently mature to adequately respond to the various risks of harm that may present themselves. [ 24 ] It becomes clear on Mr. Evans' evidence that the Ministry position is no children under ten are properly left home unsupervised. In fact, in Mr.

Evans' view the standard is so rigid that the individual circumstances of a child under the age of ten are irrelevant. [ 25 ] Mr. Evans also testified that local social conditions are also taken into account in the Director's concern with respect to leaving A.K. home alone. Specifically, he referred to local crime rates, but offered no hard evidence of that raising risk or the statistics about it. B.R. [ 26 ] B.R. testified. She is the mother of two children, is a pharmacist and business person in Terrace, British Columbia.

Her child, A.K., is in Grade 4 and the other child is in daycare. [ 27 ] She testified that she had discussed with both her children personal safety and safety at home. In explaining the background, B.R. testified in 2014 there was a teachers’ strike and the care of children became a talking point among many parents and children. In the fall of 2014, B.R. had numerous discussions with A.K. about how to conduct himself at home if alone. This included using the alarm system, how to handle appliances such as the stove and microwave and the risks involved with having friends over without supervision.

She reviewed what steps to take if there was a fire and how to use 9-1-1. A few trial runs were made leaving A.K. in charge of the home and over time by November and December 2014 he was left on his own two to three times a week. [ 28 ] In February 2015, B.R. was contacted by personnel of the Ministry of Children and Families inquiring if she was leaving her eight-year-old son home alone. She was advised in that telephone discussion that such a practice was not considered appropriate by the Ministry. [ 29 ] A meeting was arranged between two social workers and B.R. at her residence.

She was presented with a safety plan for signature which included a requirement that A.K. not be left home alone. B.R. refused to sign the safety plan. [ 30 ] The social worker also requested an interview with A.K. B.R. refused that interview and explained in her testimony that the interview would be neither recorded nor conducted in the presence of third parties so she refused. [ 31 ] On September 22, 2015, two additional affidavits were admitted onto the trial, one of Jason Evans, and the other of B.R., the mother. These affidavits refer to an incident that occurred on September 14, 2015. Mr.

Evans was not directly involved with that incident but includes it in his affidavit as material he was informed about. [ 32 ] According to the affidavit material, the local Ministry office was informed that on September 14, 2015, A.K. went home instead of to daycare. The daycare provider attended to the residence of B.R., saw A.K.'s backpack and jacket in the home, knocked on the door and A.K. did not respond. RCMP were contacted and attended and B.R. was informed. B.R. located A.K. nearby at a friend's home playing video games.

A.K. apparently decided on his own to attend a friend's home without informing anyone else or at least without informing his mother. [ 33 ] B.R.'s affidavit was prepared in response to Mr. Evans' affidavit. A.K. was staying with his father, K.K., for the week of September 7 to 14, 2015 and was not familiar with the arrangements B.R. had made for his after school care. B.R. made arrangements

with A.K.'s school to inform him where he should be picked up by the daycare provider after school. According to B.R.'s affidavit, whenquestioned by police and B.R. after finding him at a neighbour's, he related that he had not been told by school staff or K.K. whatarrangements were made for him after school. Arguments and Discussion of the Law [34] This is a protection hearing. The Director has alleged by way of the Form F filed February 16, 2015 that the children needprotection due to the existence of the following circumstances as described under s. 13 of the Act.

The child has been or is likely to bephysically harmed because of neglect by the child's parents. [35] By way of a Court Plan of Care document filed April 24, 2015, the Director confirmed its intentions to seek an order that a childbe returned to or remain in the custody of the parent apparently entitled to custody and be under the Director's supervision for a specifiedperiod. The Court Plan of Care confirmed the parents of the children share parenting responsibilities. [36] Mr.

MacGregor argues the Director offers very little evidence about the child A.K. to help assess risk as there is minimalevidence with respect to A.K.'s maturity, capacity and comfort level with being left alone after school. Further, it is argued that Fahlmanby His Guardian Ad Litem, Fiona Gow v. Community Living British Columbia, 2007 BCCA 15 (also cite 034239 CA), a decision of theBritish Columbia Court of Appeal upholding the British Columbia Supreme Court decision that when Community Living applied apolicy denying benefits based on a certain maximum IQ, which Mr.

Fahlman exceeded by nine points, it unlawfully fettered itsdiscretion. By extension of principle or precedent, it is argued the Director unlawfully fetters its discretion by maintaining a policyposition that no child under ten should be left home alone when the statute itself sets no such age standard. [37] The Director argues that need of protection has been established on the basis of age, that is, eight at the time of February 2015,nine now, being left home unattended and the high likelihood of risk of physical harm.

K.K., the father of the children, supports theDirector's position that the children should not be left home alone unsupervised. [38] The relevant sections of the Act which are applicable here in my view are: Guiding Principles 2 This Act must be interpreted and administered so that the safety and well-being of children are the paramount considerations andin accordance with the following principles: (

a) children are entitled to be protected from abuse, neglect and harm or threat of harm; (

b) a family is the preferred environment for the care and upbringing of children and the responsibility for the protection of childrenrests primarily with the parents; (

c) if, with available support services, a family can provide a safe and nurturing environment for a child, support services should beprovided … [39] When I refer to these statutes, I am not suggesting I am reading the entire

section and subsections into the record. These are notexhaustive lists. [40] The next heading under the Act that I am referring to is: When protection is needed 13

(1) A child needs protection in the following circumstances: [and these are in my view some of the relevant subsections under s. 13(1)] (

a) if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed by the child's parent; … (

d) if the child has been, or is likely to be, physically harmed because of neglect by the child's parent; … (

h) if the child's parent is unable or unwilling to care for the child and has not made adequate provision for the child's care… [41] In the decision of B.S. v. British Columbia (Director of Child, Family and Community Services), (BC CA),[1998] B.C.J. No. 1085 (B.C.C.A.), the Court pronounced on the interplay of ss. 2 and 13 of the Act. Ultimately, the Court found thevarious descriptions of what constituted the need for protection under that

section was not closed due in part to the purposiveinterpretation of the Act required by s. 2. [42] The Director has the burden of proof on a balance of probabilities to demonstrate the child A.K. is in need of protection. [43] What is the evidence offered to conclude that? I am going to refer to some of the evidence again: (

a) At age eight, the child A.K. was regularly being left home alone after school until around 5:00 p.m. The child is now nine. (

b) The mother B.R. refused to allow an unrecorded and unmonitored interview by a social worker with the child A.K. (

c) The mother B.R. refused to sign a safety plan which is essentially a form of collaborative planning requiring that she providesupervision for A.K. for the period after school until she arrived at home. (

d) At some point a social worker did interview A.K. and determined that A.K. was not sufficiently mature to be home alone. The social

worker and the specifics of when and how that interview occurred were not put before me in the evidence although there was a reference to who that social worker was but that is essentially the extent of what I have heard. (

e) On the evidence, A.K. has not suffered any physical or other harm while on his own after school. The Court heard evidence from a witness for the Director that children left on their own at A.K.'s age may suffer negative impacts and come to harm. (

f) The Director has no protection concerns with respect to B.R. beyond leaving A.K. home alone. (

g) B.R. has not actively cooperated with the social workers assigned to the file and directs all queries to her lawyer. (

h) On September 14, 2015 arrangements were made by B.R. for A.K. to attend after school daycare and such was not communicated to A.K. who after going home went to a friend's house without notifying any other adults such as B.R. or the daycare provider. [ 44 ] In addition, the evidence of the Director also is consistent with the following. [ 45 ] B.R. appears in all respects to be a competent and appropriate parent.

In my view, the real issue here is the risk of harm. [ 46 ] A decision of Judge Collings of the Provincial Court in Re: T.J. (In the matter of the Family and Child Service Act) , S.B.C. 1980, c. 11 and amendments , 1987 Carswell BC 4071 deals with a seven-year-old boy raised by a single father who travelled across Vancouver on his own by way of bus and Skytrain and kept himself occupied after school or at his father's office until his work was finished. The father testified the child was unusually mature and responsible.

The judge made the following comments at paragraphs 11 and 12 [as read in]: [11] After considerable thought I must say I don't agree. First of all, I believe that Mr. T. under rates the risk. He just doesn't move in circles where he comes into contact with assaults against and abuse of children and so he downgrades the chance of such things happening to J. It’s possible that I myself and Mr. Lowson the social worker who both move in circles where we deal with such things every day may over rate the risk, but even making allowance for that I think it is considerable.

And of course the kind of risk I am thinking about the first proof I was right might make it too late to fix. [12] Secondly, I don't agree with treating J. as an adult or quasi-adult for these purposes. I can envisage a whole series of circumstances in which he either could not do anything or would not know what to do. It isn't fair to expect a 7-year-old to look after himself. What would happen if he found himself alone on a Skytrain with a drunk or a pedophile? How could he look after himself? That is what young children have parents for to provide them with adult protection.

I agree that no parent can do it all the time but they have to organize to do it more closely than Mr. T. has. [ 47 ] Judge Collings went on to make a supervision order with guidelines designed to prevent unaccompanied trips on public transportation. I recognize this decision involved very different facts and an even younger child.

However, the case illustrates a court attempting to assess risk to children of tender years, the challenge in doing so and that any risk crystallized in harm would be viewed in retrospect as too much risk. [ 48 ] The decision of B.S., supra , speaks further to this issue in the comments of the British Columbia Appeal Court, Judge Lambert. I am starting at paragraph 26: [26] … But the test remains the same.

The weight of the evidence must show that it is more probable than not that the assertion being made is correct. [27] When the assertion being made is about a past event then the actual occurrence of that event must be shown by the weight of the evidence to have been more probable than not. That is the case with past abuse, neglect, or harm to a child. [28] But where the assertion being made is that there is a risk that an event will occur in the future, then it is the risk of the future event and not the future event itself that must be shown by the weight of the evidence to be more probable than not.

That is the case with consideration of a threat of future harm. [29] The result is that in considering past abuse the degree of certainty that it has occurred will be more than is required in considering whether abuse will occur in the future.

A ten percent risk of future abuse may meet the risk being shown to exist on the balance of probabilities, whereas a ten percent assignment of the probability that the abuse had occurred in the past would not meet the balance of probability test. [30] In assessing the risk of future harm, (which is called the threat of future harm in s. 2), there is room for a variable assessment depending on the nature of the threatened harm which is in contemplation.

A threat of harm through neglect of the child's hygiene might well have to be much more probable in order to meet the balance of probability test than a threat of serious permanent injury through physical or sexual abuse.

Generally speaking, a risk sufficient to meet the test might well be described as a risk that constitutes "a real possibility". [ 49 ] The circumstances that faced Judge Collings, in Re: T.J. , are not factually close to the facts before the Court here except that in both instances the Court is dealing with relatively young children. [ 50 ] Is the risk of potential harm the Director seeks to eliminate or reduce such that it constitutes a real possibility of harm? [ 51 ] I am not convinced that every child under ten should be supervised by an adult or supervisor in all circumstances.

If this were the case, should children under ten not be allowed to walk or bike home from school? Should children under ten be disallowed from exploring their own neighbourhoods on their own, climb trees on their own or go to a schoolyard down the street to get on a swing except under supervision? It seems to me the risks articulated by the Director in these scenarios are as identifiable as those raised in home alone circumstances.

[52] Obviously, context is important. Based on the evidence I heard from the Director's witnesses, all children under ten aresusceptible to social worker scrutiny if engaged in some of these activities on their own. The thrust of the evidence of the Director is thatin no circumstances should a ten-year-old child be left home alone for extended periods based on the social science research.

I expect aninstitution such as the Ministry for Children and Families to take such policy positions given the nature of the social science researchthey have sourced and practical manageability and consistency. [53] There is some appeal to the argument made by counsel for the mother that is articulated in Fahlman. The Director hasunlawfully fettered its discretion by taking a position that all children under the age of ten must be supervised when home alone. JusticePunnett in B.R. v.

K.K., supra, an appeal of the presentation ruling made in this matter, discusses the application of Fahlman to the Act. [54] I appreciate those comments may be characterized as obiter dictum but I find them persuasive on the following pointsreproduced below starting at paragraph 39: [39] Fahlman is further distinguishable on the basis that it involved entitlement to benefits.

The Court of Appeal found that theCLAA constituted benefits-conferring legislation "that is protective of vulnerable persons in the community," and considered that anyambiguity in its language should be resolved in favour of the claimant (para. 35). It is clear that the CFCSA is not a benefit-conferringstatute in that sense, and in any event, the vulnerable persons protected by s. 29.1 are children.

At the presentation hearing stage, theCFCSA must be interpreted in the context of ss. 2-4, which place emphasis on the safety and protection of children, particularly from"harm or threat of harm." [40] I do not think that anything can be made of the fact that no minimum age for leaving a child unsupervised has been prescribedunder s. 13 of the CFCSA. Nothing in that provision suggests that it attempts an exhaustive listing of circumstances in which childrenrequire protection. The following discussion from the Court of Appeal in B.S. v.

Director of Child, Family and Community Services(1998), (BC CA), 160 D.L.R. (4th) 264 at 276 (B.C.C.A.), supports this view: [23] ... the legislative purpose of the Act ... is to provide for the protection of every child who needs protection. No childshould continue in a state of abuse, neglect, harm or threat of harm while administrators, lawyers and judges argue about whichprecise lettered compartment of s-s 13(1) the case comes within or indeed, whether it comes with any lettered compartment at all. There is a reason for the paramountcy of the principles set out in s. 2.

It is to ensure that the legislative purpose of the Act isnot defeated by legal niceties such as those which have troubled the courts in the G. case, [1989] B.C.J. No. 1577 and in this case. [24] So my conclusion on the

interpretation question is that s. 2 of the Act sets out a paramount principle of positive lawwhich confirms the entitlement of a child, as a matter of legislative enactment, to be protected from abuse, neglect, harm orthreat of harm. [55] Based on the comments of Justice Punnett, I find the application of Fahlman to this Act and these facts of little value. Given thestatements of the B.C. Supreme Court and B.C. Court of Appeal, I find myself largely guided by s. 2(

a) to (

c) of the Act which I havealready referred to earlier. [56] Now, there are concerns specific to this scenario. B.R. obviously resents Ministry interference in her child-rearing choices. Shedid not agree to an interview of A.K. and did not agree to a safety plan which would have likely prevented this matter from ever being incourt.

The Act and its authorized interference of social workers in families' lives may be an affront to some parents, but it does legitimizeand authorize state interference in family life when conduct breaches those standards established under the Act. [57] There is no obligation on B.R. to cooperate with the Director. However, such a response to a legitimate inquiry of the Directorhas its own risks.

The Director is obligated to assess scenarios that may qualify as protection concerns with respect to children and did sohere. [58] The Director was initially denied access to the child, A.K., which prevented the very subjective assessment B.R.'s counselargues the Court should take or that the Director should take. Witnesses for the Director testified to the dangers of children being homealone including risk of fire, injuries, falls, home invasions, et cetera.

Though I digress, it seems many children engage in fairly benignactivities after school when at home such as video games, television watching or maybe even homework. [59] As Mr. MacGregor has pointed out, the risks of children at home described by the witnesses could easily result in pooroutcomes even when faced by older children or adults. [60] This is true, but younger children would, with their limited life experience even if cognitively highly developed, be far moresusceptible to negative outcomes if faced with a crisis in or at a home on their own.

Experience often tied to age, allows for betterdecision making in difficult or crisis scenarios. It is why we take notice when young children make particularly heroic decisions in timesof crisis and we forgive them quickly when circumstances overwhelm them. [61] There has also been a great deal of social science research referred to with respect to the vulnerability of young children left ontheir own. Mr. Evans for the Director testified to the Director's policy position and what he viewed as a consensus on not leavingchildren under age ten home alone.

It is not this Court's task to necessarily endorse the policy of the Director but based on the materialreferred to, the policy position of the Director, it does not seem unreasonable. Having said that, it is not difficult to contemplatecircumstances where a child under ten is left alone at home or in other circumstances on a calculated reasonable risk. There is no suchthing as eliminating all risk in raising children even when such children are supervised. [62] The Court must be guided by the evidence and material available to it in this hearing.

Referring to that, I note the following. [63] On September 14, 2015, A.K. caused unwittingly a small crisis involving the police, daycare providers, and his mother, B.R.,by not calling her to tell her where he was after school. I only point that out as a demonstration of how the best laid plans are easilydisrupted when applied to a child.

[ 64 ] B.R. testified she has worked with and trained A.K. to respond to various crisis scenarios and that he appears quite capable of handling such situations. [ 65 ] The father of A.K. disagrees. K.K., who is separated from B.R., supports the Director's position though he did not provide evidence. I am told that he did not attend at the initial hearing or when evidence was heard due to an emergency at work. I understand K.K. has the child A.K. in his care half of the time.

Though there is no evidence from K.K. before the Court, I cannot ignore his position in supporting the Director. [ 66 ] From the Court's perspective, another deficiency in the evidentiary record is the lack of direct evidence from the social worker who apparently interviewed A.K. and concluded he was not mature enough to be left alone. It is concerning that this evidence has not been put directly before the Court though there may well be a perfectly acceptable explanation.

When offered as hearsay, it was not objected to. [ 67 ] I am satisfied the Director has established in this matter that there is sufficient risk of real possibility of physical harm or threat of future harm to A.K. and I apply and in particular consider the following factors: (

a) A.K. just turned nine in August and is only in Grade 4. (

b) The social worker was not initially allowed to assess the child by interview. (

c) At some point when the child was interviewed, the conclusion reached by a social worker was that he was too immature to be left home alone. That is not objected to as hearsay evidence and in my view is sufficiently reliable and is allowed by s. 68(2) of the Act . (

d) The father of the children fully supports the Director's position. He is in a position that is influential with the Court as he is in at least an equal position to B.R. to know his child. (

e) The recent incident involving A.K. not going to his arranged caregiver -- and I do accept there was a communications mix-up -- but going somewhere else without advising B.R. underlines the unpredictability of children's behaviour despite the best laid plans. [ 68 ] I should note that I accept B.R. has worked with A.K. to anticipate risky scenarios but on the evidence and positions I have heard it does not satisfy me it is sufficient given his tender years and the points I have referred to, to sufficiently reduce the risk posed of leaving A.K. unsupervised at home after school on a regular basis. [ 69 ] I will include Q.K. in this order as both children are named, and given Q.K.'s age, it obviously would be inappropriate to leave him home alone.

I confirm there is no evidence he has been left home alone or under the supervision of A.K. [ 70 ] I am ordering a six-month supervision order on the following terms. [ 71 ] On the basis that I find the children in need of protection that the children A.K. and Q.K. remain in the custody of the parent apparently entitled to custody under the Director's supervision on the following terms and conditions: 1. B.R. will ensure that A.K. and Q.K. will be under the care and supervision of a responsible adult at all appropriate times and not be left alone to care for themselves after school. 2.

B.R. will allow the Director direct and private access to A.K. and Q.K. whether scheduled in advance or not and at any time the Director deems necessary to ensure the safety and well-being of the children. 3. Failure to comply with the aforementioned terms of the supervision order must result in the removal of the children. [ 72 ] THE COURT: All right. Thank you, I have heard enough.

Here is what I am going to order -- will be under the care -- this is term 1 Madam Clerk with respect to the order -- will be under the care and supervision of a responsible adult or other caregiver approved of by the Director. [ 73 ] MR. MACGREGOR: Okay, thank you. [ 74 ] THE COURT: We will stand down and take the morning break. (REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)