Leia v Styles, 2023 ABKB 213

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Leia v Styles, 2023 ABKB 213 Date: 20230413 Docket: 1901 13067 Registry: Calgary Between: Gregor J Leia Appellant - and - Herb Styles and Verna Seale Respondent _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice C. Dario

_______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] The Appellant, Gregory Leia, appeals a decision of the Court of King’s Bench Assessment Officer (also referred to as a review officer) regarding fees charged to his former clients in relation to an oppression action and the appointment of a director. [ 2 ] Gregory Leia operates together with, or employs another lawyer or lawyers, including Craig Leggatt, under the trade name “Wolff Leia”.

Wolff Leia was engaged as counsel to Herb Styles, Verna Seale and Douglas Bamlett (collectively, the “ABCA Action Applicants”) and Caravan Trailer Lodges of Alberta Limited (“Caravan”) in an oppression action, Action #1801 07584 (the “ABCA Oppression Action”) pursuant to the Business Corporations Act (Alberta) . An action was also commenced to appoint Mr. Styles as a director of Caravan: Action # 1901 13067.

The Respondents entered into Retainer Agreements with Wolff Leia in November 2017 (“2017 Retainer Agreements”), and a revision to the 2017 Retainer Agreements entered into roughly one year later (“2018 Revision Agreement”, collectively with the 2017 Retainer Agreements being the “Retainer Agreements”). The 2018 Revision Agreement established security for payment of legal fees through a charge against the Respondents’ shares in Caravan. Most of the hours billed were for work performed by Gregory Leia. [ 3 ] The matter proceeded through litigation and was resolved by Consent Order: January 9, 2019.

The Consent Order granted much of the relief sought by the ABCA Action Applicants, and also resolved the directorship issue by appointing Mr. Styles as a member of Caravan’s board of directors. By an Order of the same date, Justice Jones directed 100% of legal fees relating to the action for appointing Mr. Styles as a director be paid by Caravan, subject to taxation. [ 4 ] The issue of costs relating to the oppression action was disputed and then decided by Justice Jones in a reported decision at: Styles v Caravan Trailer Lodges of Alberta Limited , 2019 ABQB 558 .

In that decision, two views regarding the appropriate methodology for apportioning costs is discussed at paras 46 through 60. Justice Jones held that, while there are arguments for employing the Costs

Schedule in the Alberta Rules of Court or multiples thereof, if the benchmark objective is to achieve a costs award of roughly 40-50% of the actual (solicitor-client) costs, then applying a percentage to the actual (rather than scheduled) costs is the most expeditious manner at arriving at that end, and was the appropriate method to employ in the facts of that case.

In addressing concerns that this approach could lead to large variations in costs awards and the opposing party having to pay for unreasonable fees of the victorious party (widening the divide between those who can and cannot afford legal representation), Justice Jones’ position was that this could be addressed through taxation by an assessment officer who would be in a better position to assess the reasonability of the costs than many of the justices who have been removed from the practice of billing for many years. [ 5 ] Justice Jones directed 60% of the ABCA Action Applicants reasonable legal costs pertaining ABCA Oppression Action be paid by Caravan, subject to taxation if they could not agree. [ 6 ] The matter went to the Assessment Officer for a review of the accounts, together totalling $201,519.31 prior to interest.

The Assessment Officer reviewed the Appellant’s accounts, the Retainer Agreements. The Assessment Officer then heard the parties’ submissions over a two-day assessment hearing. [ 7 ] The Assessment Officer, by a decision dated August 10, 2020, reduced the total fees relating to the oppression action by an amount of roughly $30,960 (plus GST totalling $32,508).

None of the reductions assessed were applied to the portion of fees owing by Herb Styles in relation to appointing him as a director (being $31,619.70), and as such, that component of the assessment is not appealed by the Appellant. [ 8 ] Of the $32,508 reduction in fees assessed against Herb Styles and Verna Seale relating to the oppression action, the Appellant, Mr. Leia appeals the reduction of $22,500 plus GST, totalling $23,625 from an original total fee amount of almost $170,000.00. This fees reduction relates to research, correspondence and client reports.

He seeks a reversal of this deduction. [ 9 ] This matter has proceeded by way of desk application. Areas of Dispute: [ 10 ] Mr. Leia, appeals the findings of the Assessment Officer on several grounds, including errors of fact and of law. One error of law alleged is that, once the Assessment Officer determined what the appropriate amount of hours for certain of the services were, it was not within the purview of the Assessment Officer to make a determination of what was the reasonable billable rate for those hours.

Specifically, it was an error to impose an articling student rate for 25 hours of correspondence and 30 hours of research related to this matter. Mr. Leia alleges that the Assessment Officer also misinterpreted the Retainer Agreement of November 7, 2017, and made factual errors in relation to reporting letters to clients of May 19, 2019, and June 1, 2019, affecting the reduction applied. He asserts some of the reporting letter fees pertained to the directorship component of the dispute for which 100% of the fees were allowed by the Assessment Officer.

Standard of Review: [ 11 ] Pursuant to Rule 10.41 of the Alberta Rules of Court, the Assessment Officer has the authority to decide whether charges in a lawyer’s accounts are reasonable and properly incurred, taking into account the conduct of the parties; see also Paradigm Quest Inc v Moser , 2015 ABQB 557 , at para 32 [“ Paradigm ”]; and Ma v Coyne [“ Ma ”], 2013 ABQB 426 . [ 12 ] The standard of review for applying an erroneous legal principle is correctness. The standard of review of the determination of whether costs awarded were reasonable and proper in the circumstances is one of reasonableness .

Under the reasonableness standard, an assessment officer is entitled to curial deference, given an assessment officer’s specialized function and expertise; Ma at paras 17 to

19 and 21 and Fraser Milner Casgrain LLP v Kristof Financial Inc., 2012 ABQB 359 [FMC v Kristof], at paras 16-18. [13] As stated in FMC v Kristof, at paras 17-18: Curial deference, however, is not absolute. A court hearing an appeal from a review officer's decision may interfere if the review officer“operated on a wrong principle and thereby fell into error”: McLennan Ross at para 6, citing Cape Breton Landowners v. StoraKopparbergs Bergslags Aktiebolag (1983), (NS CA), 33 CPC 1, 146 DLR (3d) 369, 58 NSR (2d) 193, 123 APR(NSCA); Petty v. Bishop & McKenzie (1977), 2 AR 241 at 243 (QB).

An error in principle may include a situation where the quantumthat the review officer awards is inordinately high or low: McLennan Ross ibid; 509703 at para 11. Similarly, a court hearing an appealfrom a review officer's decision may interfere if the review officer makes an error concerning the scope of the retainer agreement underwhich the parties are operating: Brown v. Snyder & Associates, 2004 ABQB 899at para 20 ["Brown"].

Finally, a court hearing anappeal from a review officer's decision may find that the review officer made a finding of fact that is clearly in error: Carter v.Blake (1982), 41 AR 418 at para 7 (NWTCA) ["Carter"].

With respect to the latter point, a court hearing an appeal from a review officer's decision must exercise caution, and must not step too farinto arena of gathering evidence and weighing that evidence. ... [emphasis in original] [14] As such, if the Assessment Officer operated on a wrong principle and thereby fell into error, assessed an amount that isinordinately high or low, made an error concerning the scope of the retainer agreement, or made a finding of fact that is clearly in error(without the appeal court getting into the exercise of gathering and reweighing the evidence), these could be bases for appellateinterference.

Depending on the issue in question, misinterpretation of a retainer agreement may fall into one of these categories. Analysis: [15] The Appellant challenges the Assessment Officer’s determination on three areas of assessment: reductions on fees charged forresearch, correspondence, and reporting letters. The Appellant argues the Assessment Officer erred in applying a different rate thanagreed to in the retainer agreement, in reducing the fees once the appropriate number of hours was assessed, and in various relatedfactual determinations. Further, he erred in his

interpretation of the 2017 Retainer Agreement. [16] The Appellant also suggests it is an error in law to reduce compensation payable to the lawyer once the accounts of the lawyerare deemed reasonable, however, as the entire assessment is to determine the reasonability of the accounts, this argument is inherentlyflawed. There was no initial determination by the Assessment Officer of the reasonability of the Appellant’s accounts.

Implicit andexplicit in the Assessment Officer’s findings is that the accounts were not reasonable based on the nature of the work performed and the$400 per hour charged for a portion of that work. That finding was made notwithstanding the complexity of the research and urgencywith which the Appellant states the research was conducted.

Reductions for Research: [17] The Assessment Officer assessed that 30 of the 36 hours spent on research should have been applied at a student rate, therebyreducing the Appellant’s fees by $9,000.00. [18] The Appellant argues the once the Assessment Officer determined what the appropriate amount of hours for certain of theservices were, it was not within the purview of the Assessment Officer to make a determination of what was the reasonable billable ratefor those hours. [19] The Assessment Officer has the jurisdiction to determine if a lawyer’s charges and retainer agreement are reasonable.

UnderRule 10.9, the reasonableness of a retainer agreement and the lawyer’s charges, despite any agreement to the contrary, are subject toreview. Fairness and reasonableness in billing is also required under Rule 3.6-1 of the Law Society of Alberta Code of Conduct. [20] The 2017 Retainer Agreement in question provided: Where I am able, I will delegate some of the work on your file to my paralegal, Mumtaz Dhanani, or our Articling Student at an hourlyrate of $100.

The kind of work delegated includes drafting legal documents, preparing and organizing financial documents, somecorrespondence with opposite counsel or their office, correspondence with the Courthouse, taking information from you, and othersimilar tasks. It does not include basic word processing, filing, dictation and other purely secretarial duties. [21] The Appellant disputes the Assessment Officer’s credibility assessment of Mr. Styles in finding that Mr. Styles did not knowMr. Leia did not have an articling student. The Respondents assert that at no point has the Appellant claimed that he informed Mr.

Stylesthat there was no articling student. Further, if the Appellant did not have an articling student to complete certain tasks, including research,at the rate of $100.00 per hour, then he should not have made such a representation in his 2017 Retainer Agreement.

I find that, in theabsence of evidence to the contrary, the Assessment Officer’s finding is not in error. [22] In his decision, the Assessment Officer recognized that “research” was not specifically listed in the 2017 Retainer Agreementas a task that would be delegated to an articling student, however, it was historically an item one would expect a student to be doing for afirm. It would be difficult to hold this as a finding of fact that is clearly in error. I note research would properly fall under the “othersimilar task” category with which the articling student could be tasked.

Further, “research” was not listed in the 2017 RetainerAgreement as type of work that the lawyers would provide, which was particularized as interviews, telephone calls, receipt andpreparation of correspondence and documents, court appearances, negotiations or meetings, or any other necessary services performed onbehalf of the client.

[ 23 ] In a legitimate exercise of this authority, the Assessment Officer came to a reasonable conclusion that, based on the terms of the 2017 Retainer Agreement, Mr. Styles understood that certain tasks could (and would) be delegated at a student rate, even if not expressly enumerated in the Retainer Agreement. Given Mr.

Styles’ experience with legal counsel, he would have reasonably assumed some of the research would be delegated to a student, notwithstanding the discretion afforded to counsel in that provision of the Retainer Agreement. [ 24 ] Even where a retainer agreement sets out an hourly fee, the Assessment Officer is still required, and has authority, to assess the reasonableness of the impugned accounts. It is not the Assessment Officer’s role to simply enforce the hourly rate of a lawyer against the client.

Instead, the Assessment Officer must assess whether the amounts charged to the client are reasonable in light of the work completed and the retainer agreement between the parties.

Further, this is an assessment of the value the Respondents received for this work, regardless of what level of counsel performed the task. [ 25 ] Factors relevant to this billing assessment included considering the time and effort required and spent; difficulty of the matter; the nature, importance and urgency of the matter to the client; the client's circumstances; whether some special skill or service was required and provided; the results obtained; the experience and ability of the lawyer; and the client's prior consent to fees; Rule 10.2; Code of Conduct [3.6-1[1]]; Ashraf v Zinner Law Office , 2013 ABQB 730 , at para 44 . [ 26 ] In the present case, the Assessment Officer acknowledged elements of this litigation that were complex, and that the matter was hotly contested.

There were matters of urgency that arose. The assessment was not conducted in a vacuum, nor was it a rough ballparking of fees without an understanding of the nature of the issues involved. The Assessment Officer had an opportunity to review the Appellant’s accounts and the 2017 Retainer Agreement, and heard the parties’ submissions over a two-day assessment hearing.

The Assessment Officer reasonably concluded that based on the amount of time spent on certain tasks, the value of the work product, the Appellant’s experience level, and the difficulty of the task, it was not reasonable for the Appellant to bill his $400.00 hourly rate for 30 of the 36 hours of research tasks charged. [ 27 ] There was no error in law in the Assessment Officer’s

interpretation of the 2017 Retainer Agreement as representing that certain tasks, including some research, would be delegated at a reduced rate. Further, his determination of the appropriate amount of hours to which a reduced rate would be applied and the proper chargeable rate of $100 per hour was reasonable (especially in light of the provision of the 2017 Retainer Agreement setting this hourly rate for articling student work) and entitled to curial deference. See also Rule 10.41(3)(c).

Further, the Assessment Officer did not substitute his opinion on the necessity of the steps; rather, the Assessment Officer, acting in accordance with Rule 10.9, assessed whether the fee charged for the steps was reasonable: Paradigm at para 32 .

For these and other reasons, the facts of this case differ from those in Steinke v Hajduk Gibbs LLP , 2014 ABQB 34 , [“ Steinke ”], wherein an assessment decision was overturned for not applying the terms of the retainer agreement in the absence of compelling reasons not to, and did not provide reasons for determining certain steps were unnecessary or that the law firm’s fees were exorbitant: para 76.

Contrary to the Appellant’s position, Steinke supports that, in appropriate cases, the Assessment Officer could in fact determine that certain steps should not be chargeable if they did not increase the likelihood that the purposes of the retainers would be achieved or that they were unnecessary. See also Rule 10.41(3)(

b) which expressly allows the Assessment Officer to disallow unnecessary items. Reductions in Fees for Correspondence: [ 28 ] The Assessment Officer assessed that 25 of the 176.8 hours spent on correspondence should have been applied at a student rate, thereby reducing the Appellant’s fees by $7,500.00. [ 29 ] Based on similar principles as discussed above, it was reasonable for the Assessment Officer to find certain correspondence tasks could be charged at a student rate, based on the terms of the 2017 Retainer Agreement and the expectations of the Respondents.

Further the number of hours assessed to be chargeable at the reduced rate is entitled to curial deference. [ 30 ] Contrary to the Appellant’s claims that the Assessment Officer did not make this reduction in a principled manner because the Assessment Officer did not specify why emails or letters would be restricted or the date and time of the offending correspondence, an assessment is not a purely mathematical process, but an overall assessment of the reasonableness of a lawyer’s fees: Repchuk v Silverberg , 2013 ABQB 305 at paras 54 to 55 [ “Repchuck” ].

Extensive reasons are not required: Brown v Snyder & Associates , 2004 ABQB 899 , [“ Brown ”] at para 25 . The Assessment Decision was an assessment of the reasonable cost of the work completed based on the Assessment Officer’s expertise and discretion, and is owed deference. Reductions in Fees for Reporting Letters: [ 31 ] The Assessment Officer also reduced the amount spent on preparing May 12 and June 1, 2019, reporting letters by 15.6 hours (or $6,240), finding that the total number of hours spent on those two letters should not have been 40.6 hours but 25.

He noted that the letters contain many of the same observations and conclusions. [ 32 ] The Appellant submits that this was an erroneous determination as there were additional reporting letters that were prepared as part of the 40.6 hours billed that were not considered in the assessment of this fee. Fees for these 40.6 hours billed all related to a number of reporting letters, all of which were completed and billed in the months of May and June of 2019. Further, the Appellant argues 4.2 of those hours related to the other action (appointing Mr.

Styles as a director), and all of those fees had been allowed by the Assessment Officer. [ 33 ] In reply, the Respondent notes that the method of the Appellant’s block billing practice made it difficult to deconstruct the time spent on the file for various activities. There were three invoices provided over that two-month period, the first two equalling 37.3 hours for reporting letters. The last invoice included only 4.2 hours on reporting letters.

[ 34 ] The Respondent states that the Assessment Officer was aware of the additional reporting letters and was provided with the Responses to Undertakings, which included all such letters. Further, the Appellant was given an opportunity to speak to each item entry in the bill referencing a reporting letter.

Thus, the Respondent argues, even though the Assessment Officer referred to the amount billed for only two reporting letters, he was aware of the other reporting letters and this error in referring to only two letters is not material given all such letters occurred over a short two-month period. [ 35 ] The Respondent also points to a de minimis argument, namely, that in light of the quantum of the bill in review and the extent of the procedure engaged to reviewing the billing, if there was an error, it is not significant enough to overturn the overall assessment of the Assessment Officer. [ 36 ] While the Assessment Officer may have intended the reference to the permitted 25 hours to apply to the preparation of all reporting letters in that two-month period, on the face of his decision, it appears that there was an error of the Assessment Officer in understanding how the 40.6 hours should have been allocated.

It is less clear if the error emanated from the Appellant’s method of block billing or otherwise. An adjustment to the determination to address this error would be to reinstate up to 15.6 hours (or $6,240) in fees, depending on the appropriateness of those 15.6 hours for the other reporting letters rendered within those two months.

While the Appellant could be notionally successful in this aspect of his appeal, the Respondents point to the de minimis value of this component of the fees in light of the total fees in question and the volume of materials and legal fees expended to go through an appeal of the Assessment Officer’s decision. The de minimis nature of this claim will be addressed further below. I consider that an objective of the assessment review – being bringing finality to the dispute - is vastly undermined by having to go through an appeal process where the sole component of success is only a small amount of fees.

Procedural Fairness [ 37 ] Though not expressly raised by the Appellant, I find the process employed was procedurally fair and exhaustive. The parties were given multiple opportunities, both orally and in writing, to submit their respective positions to the Assessment Officer. The record before the Assessment Officer was extensive. The Respondent notes it included five banker’s boxes of materials, transcripts from two days of questioning, numerous responses to undertakings, a two-day Assessment Hearing, and three written briefs.

The Assessment Officer noted in his reasons that this was one of the most paper intensive reviews he has seen in his capacity as a lawyer and a review officer. [ 38 ] While the Assessment Officer’s review did not go line by line through each entry in the invoices pointing out which specific entry was reduced, this is not required. A review is a global review of a lawyer’s overall accounts.

T he Assessment Officer gave reasons that expressed all relevant factors, made findings of fact on disputed points, and provided specific hours and rates resulting in specific reductions, and provided reasons for each reduction; Brown , at para 25 ; Repchuk , at paras 54 to 56 . [ 39 ] While the procedure adopted must be fair, a primary objective of the Assessment Process is finality (i.e. a resolution of the dispute) even more than ensuring it is a comprehensively exhaustive process: Steinke , at para 51 .

Such review assessments should not be held to the highest standards of procedural protections; Repchuk at paras 46, 51, & 53 .

Additional reductions [ 40 ] The Respondents argue that, while they are of the view the decision of the Assessment Officer should not be altered, should this court find a redetermination is appropriate, they seek a further reduction of $15,000 to be made to the accounts charged by the Appellant to account for errors on the part of the Assessment Officer. [ 41 ] Specifically, the Respondents raise the following errors, after which I include my response to each issue in light of the Assessment Officer’s decision.

Issue 1: [ 42 ] The Appellant did not disclose that he was not a litigation lawyer and had the Respondents known that, they would have sought other legal counsel. Response: [ 43 ] Although Mr. Leia may not have been a litigator, the Assessment Officer commented that Mr. Leia had extensive experience in this complex area of practice. The extent to which lack of litigation experience cost the Respondents’ financially is unclear at this point in light of the Respondents’ at least partial success in the underlying issues.

Issue 2: [ 44 ] The Assessment Officer did not take into account the lengthy and expensive step the Appellant undertook without the Respondents’ instruction of filing a complaint with the Securities Commission that did not seem to advance the Respondents’ position at all. Response: [ 45 ] It is concerning if steps such as this were taken without the clients’ knowledge or approval. That said, the Assessment Officer does note that this step was likely part of the strategy to apply pressure to get the Respondents to agree to remove two of the defendants as directors in the underlying litigation.

The defendants did remove those directors, after which, it made the complaint to the Securities Commission unnecessary. He determined this step was not unnecessary as it finally brough the defendants to the negotiation table.

Further he notes that Mr. Styles appears to have known about and agreed to this step; it is unclear however on what factual basis this determination was made. I consider the depth of review of the Assessment Officer with respect to this file, and without specific reference to email communications (or the lack thereof) or some other document to counter this fact finding, I defer to the Assessment Officer who held this file was under instruction similar to “no stone unturned”. [ 46 ] In his October 24, 2019, affidavit, Mr.

Styles comments that there were other affidavits and applications prepared but never filed or used, and various steps taken without his knowledge or direction. This is not addressed in detail by the Assessment Officer other than the comments regarding Mr. Styles high level of engagement in the litigation. If the Assessment Officer’s decision is altered, this may require further review. Issue 3: [ 47 ] Most significantly, the Appellant altered his retainer letter through the 2018 Revision Agreement to allow Mr.

Leia to make decisions on the nature of the settlements or compromises in this case rather than the client having that ability. This revision was made because payment for Mr. Leia’s fees were dependent on the outcome of the settlement since security was taken by the Appellant over the Respondents’ shares in Caravan. The provision at issue reads: In this case, because it is my money at risk, I get to make the decision on the nature of the settlements or compromises which need to be made.

If you disagree with me, it is open for you to pay my legal bills, and hand the files over to another lawyer who can then carry out your instructions. If I want to quit, and you want to carry on with another lawyer, my debts will still remain as the first charge against your shares, but we will not require payment before handing the file over to a different lawyer. [ 48 ] The Respondents note that this is in contravention of

Section 3.2-4 of the Law Society of Alberta Code of Conduct and resulted in the Appellant taking steps without obtaining the Respondents’ approval. That provision of the Code of Conduct states: A lawyer must obtain instructions from the client on all matters not falling within the express or implied authority of the lawyer. Response: [ 49 ] The Assessment Officer specifically refers to this provision in the 2018 Revision Agreement. He made several statements suggesting Mr. Styles was engaged during the litigation steps, and very “hands on”. Further, the 2018 Amendment Agreement gave Mr.

Leia the express authority to make the settlement decisions. Despite this express authority, the Code of Conduct also states: A lawyer has an ethical obligation to put all settlement offers to the client and to obtain specific instructions with regard to making or accepting settlement offers on a client’s behalf (see Rule 3.2-1) [ 50 ] The Assessment Officer does not address whether this provision of the 2018 Revision Agreement is contrary to the Code of Conduct or the Rules otherwise.

While not addressing this issue directly, the fact finding of the Assessment Officer appears to be that the conduct of the parties in any event complied with the intent of the provisions of the Code in that Mr. Styles was very involved in each stage of the process and consulted on issues. It does not appear that the Assessment Officer was alive to this issue.

Without the benefit of the transcripts of the questioning and oral submissions, it is difficult to know the extent to which it was raised before the Assessment Officer. [ 51 ] Nevertheless, this type of wording in the 2018 Revision Agreement is questionable at best. There are many contexts in which lawyers’ fees are subject to the outcome of the case (including every contingency-based retainer agreement), and yet it is not the practice, nor appropriate in such circumstances, for the lawyer to then assume the right to make a final approval regarding the settlement.

Such an authorization goes against at least the spirit of this

section of the Code. Compliance with the Code of Conduct is expected and provisions assigning exclusive authority to settle to the lawyer, such as the one in question, should be avoided. Specifically, Rule 10.6(1) (

b) explicitly states that a provision in a retainer agreement that purports that an action, application or proceeding cannot be settled without a lawyer’s consent is void . [ 52 ] Further, I consider the commentary in the Code of Conduct 3.4-13 at paragraph 11 which states: Where a client proposes to pay for legal services by transferring an interest in a corporation, property, investment or other enterprise, the lawyer must, at a minimum, recommend that the client receive independent legal advice. [ 53 ] There is no information on whether this occurred in the present case.

While the Assessment Officer allowed charges for drafting the 2018 Revision Agreement to be billed to the Respondents (since the request to change the billing structure came at the request of the Respondents), in light of these issues, some or all of that component of the fees could be reviewed if the Assessment Officer’s decision is altered. Disposition: [ 54 ] Regarding the issues raised by the Appellant in this appeal, the determinations of the Assessment Officer were a valid exercise of the Assessment Officer’s authority, entitled to deference.

None of the circumstances meriting judicial appellate interference highlighted in FMC v Kristof are present in this case. The Appellant has not established any errors in legal principle on a standard of correctness. With the limited possible exception of the 15.6 hours of fees (or $6,240 in fees) regarding the reporting letters, the Appellant has not established any error in fact finding by the Assessment Officer on a reasonableness standard.

I agree that the reference to two reporting letters rather than reporting letters over a two-month period, while technically inaccurate, does not impact the overall validity of the Assessment Officer’s decision, given the de minimis value of the error in totality of the fees charged and assessed. This is especially true in light of the consequence of a finding to the contrary. If I were to open up the decision of the Assessment Officer, it would be appropriate for me to further consider each of the additional issues (listed above) that were raised by the Respondents. This

would likely result in additional reductions to the allowable fees, further diminishing any amount recoverable by the Appellant through this appeal (or even requiring a net repayment by the Appellant due to additional reductions in allowable fees). [ 55 ] In this context, I agree with the

summary espoused by the Respondents in this case: With respect to the issues raised by the Appellant in this appeal, in deciding to reduce the Appellant’s fees, the Assessment Officer properly considered the terms of the 2017 Retainer Agreement, made appropriate findings of fact, applied the correct principles of law, and reduced the accounts accordingly, again, with the limited exception of a potential factual error or miscalculation in the reduction to the reporting letter costs.

The Assessment Officer’s decision to reduce the Appellant’s fees should be afforded significant deference, given the Assessment Officer’s experience and expertise. [ 56 ] Accordingly, Certificates of Review are upheld as approved and granted by the Assessment Officer in the relevant assessment decision. Costs for Appeal: [ 57 ] The Respondents are entitled to costs. The Respondents seek costs of the Assessment Appeal on a solicitor and own client (full indemnity) basis. [ 58 ] This was a desk application and neither party specified a request to bring further submissions for costs.

This court is loathe to require the parties a further attendance to resolve the issue of costs.

In the circumstances of this case, given the limited potential success of the Appellant and the noted issues with provisions of the 2018 Retainer Agreement, and in light of the extensive review undertaken at the Assessment Officer stage of this process, I direct that the Respondents are entitled to costs of this costs appeal on the same basis as the underlying litigation, being 60% of solicitor-client costs. [ 59 ] Within 15 days of this decision, the Respondents shall provide their bill of costs and calculate the permitted costs pursuant to this decision. [ 60 ] If neither party brings a further request to make submissions regarding costs within 30 days of this decision, the Appellant shall pay the Respondents the cost amount forthwith.

Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 13 th day of April, 2023. C. Dario J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Greg Leia Self Represented Litigant Catrina Webster and Kaitlin Ward for the Defendants