R v Candaele, 2022 ABKB 605

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Candaele, 2022 ABKB 605 Date: 20220916 Docket: 200180834K1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Ronald John Candaele Offender _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Sentencing of the Honourable Mr. Justice D. Blair Nixon _______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Mr. Candaele was charged with the second-degree murder of Melissa Blommaert pursuant to section 235(1) of the Criminal Code . That was the only Count on the Indictment. [ 2 ] On July 7, 2021, I found Mr.

Candaele guilty of second-degree murder: see R v Candaele , 2021 ABQB 332 . Since he was found guilty of the second-degree murder of Ms. Blommaert, the Criminal Code directs that I shall sentence Mr. Candaele to life imprisonment.

[3] Given that the sentence is directed under the Criminal Code for second degree murder, the sole issue for me to decide iswhether I should extend the parole ineligibility aspect that is to be imposed on Mr. Candaele. At a minimum, Mr. Candaele must serve atleast 10 years of his life sentence, but I may extend the period of parole ineligibility up to a maximum of 25 years. [4] This sentencing decision was given on Thursday, August 31, 2022, from the bench, and the appropriate orders entered. Thedetailed reasons and conclusions are provided below. II.

Sentencing – The Statutory Framework [5] To impose a fit sentence, I must apply a proportionate sentence. The sentence must consider both the gravity of the offenceand the degree of responsibility of Mr. Candaele: R v Safarzadeh-Markhali, 2016 SCC 14 at para 70; and

section 718.1 of the CriminalCode. [6] When considering the gravity of the offence, the concept is tied to what Mr. Candaele has done wrong. There are twocomponents to this concept: (

i) the harm or likely harm to the victim; and (ii) the harm or likely harm to society and society’s values: R vArcand, 2010 ABCA 363 at para 57. [7] Concerning the gravity of the offence, there is no greater harm to a victim than to take their life. This is the reason seconddegree murder imposes a life sentence. The remaining decision for this Court is the length of parole ineligibility. The determination ofthe parole ineligibility term is governed by

section 745.4 of the Criminal Code, which imposes a requirement to consider the nature ofthe offence and the circumstances surrounding its commission. [8] Concerning the “degree of responsibility of the offender”, the greater the harm intended or the greater the degree ofrecklessness or wilful blindness, the greater the moral culpability: Arcand at para 58. This relates to the character of Mr. Candaele and isclosely analogous to this sentencing principle: see

section 745.4 of the Criminal Code. [9] The sentence of life imprisonment for second degree murder captures the greatest degree of harm that can be intended in anoffence. A conviction of second-degree murder presumes a high degree of responsibility. The only remaining balancing under thisprinciple is to determine how the harm intended translates to years without eligibility for parole. [10] In addition to the fundamental principle contained in

section 718.1, I must consider the sentencing principles enumerated insection 718.2, including both the aggravating and mitigating circumstances of the offence committed by Mr. Candaele, the principles ofparity and totality, and the determination of a reasonable sanction in circumstances consistent with the harm to the victim or thecommunity. Particular attention must be given to the circumstances of Indigenous offenders. [11] As with all second-degree murder sentencing decisions, I have one central task when considering these principles and factors.That is to set a date for when Mr.

Candaele can make an application to the Parole Board. [12] To determine a fit period of parole ineligibility, I will consider the enumerated factors set out in

section 745.4 of the CriminalCode which governs judicial discretion with respect to setting parole ineligibility. Those factors are: (

i) the character of Mr. Candaele;(ii) the nature of the offence; and (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence. [13] A sentencing judge may accept as proved any information disclosed during trial or during the sentencing proceedings and anyfacts agreed on by the prosecutor and the offender: section 724(1) of the Criminal Code. Section 724(3) of the Criminal Code provideshow to deal with disputed facts. It reads as follows: 724(3) Where there is a dispute with respect to any fact that is relevant to the determination of a sentence, (

a) the court shall request that evidence be adduced as to the existence of the fact unless the court is satisfied that sufficient evidencewas adduced at the trial; (

b) the party wishing to rely on a relevant fact, including a fact contained in a presentence report, has the burden of proving it; (

c) either party may cross-examine any witness called by the other party; (

d) subject to paragraph (e), the court must be satisfied on a balance of probabilities of the existence of the disputed fact before relyingon it in determining the sentence; and (

e) the prosecutor must establish, by proof beyond a reasonable doubt, the existence of any aggravating fact or any previous convictionby the offender. [14] Concerning the time frame of parole ineligibility, it is incorrect to start from the proposition that the ten-year minimum willapply absent unusual circumstances. All sentencing principles are relevant to the exercise of the sentencing judge’s discretion: R vShropshire, (SCC), [1995] 4 SCR 227 at paras 23-26, 31, 33. [15] Sentencing is an individualized process. However, sentencing is not just about the offender, Mr. Candaele.

The issue ofdetermining the period of parole ineligibility involves the larger community as well. This point is well summarized in R v Garland, 2017ABQB 198 at para 36, aff’d 2021 ABCA 46 that provides as follows: But the sentence to be imposed today is not just about [the offender], it is about all of the [other] members of the community and ourcollective need to denounce this conduct; express our collective outrage; and re-affirm the values that lie at the heart of the sentencingprinciples, that is to sustain public confidence in the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society.

[ 16 ] The circumstances of Ms. Blommaert’s murder are set out in my reasons for judgment indexed at 2021 ABQB 332 . I will only repeat what is necessary for the purposes of sentencing. III. Positions of Crown and Defence A. The Crown [ 17 ] The Crown’s position regarding Mr. Candaele is that a period of parole ineligibility be set in the range of 16 to 18 years. B. Defence [ 18 ] Defence for Mr. Candaele submits that the appropriate period of parole ineligibility should not be increased beyond the ten- year minimum.

In the alternative, Defence asserts the appropriate range of parole ineligibility should be 10 to 13 years. IV. Jurisprudence – Parole Ineligibility [ 19 ] To properly determine the period of parole ineligibility, an understanding of the relevant case law is important. That knowledge guides me in deciding what facts are relevant to the analysis which underlies the determination of parole ineligibility. A. The Leading Case [ 20 ] The leading case governing parole ineligibility is Shropshire .

In that case, Justice Iacobucci stated for the Court that extending the period of parole ineligibility above 10 years does not require “unusual circumstances”: Shropshire at para 26 . In fact, he commented “the power to extend the period of parole ineligibility need not be sparingly used”: Shropshire at para 31 . [ 21 ] That said, this Court’s duty is to use its discretion to determine whether such an order is fit in the circumstances of the case. Concerning this point, Picard JA wrote that

section 745.4 of the Criminal Code “is designed and intended to support the exercise of judicial discretion”: R v Ryan , 2015 ABCA 286 at para 55 , leave to appeal to SCC refused 36841 (May 26, 2016). [ 22 ] The facts in Shropshire were that the accused had killed the victim in his home during a marihuana transaction. The Supreme Court upheld the trial judge’s determination of a period of parole ineligibility of 12 years. [ 23 ] There were mitigating factors present in Shropshire . Specifically, Mr.

Shropshire turned himself into police two days after committing the offence and entered a guilty plea to second degree murder. Mr. Candaele did neither of these things. [ 24 ] The factors on which the trial judge relied on in Shropshire to increase the parole ineligibility period, were: (

a) the circumstances of the killing were strange in that they provided no real answer to why it took place, and the accused was unwilling or unable to explain his actions; (

b) the murder was committed during the course of committing another offence, namely a drug transaction; and (

c) the accused had a record for both narcotic offences and violence. [ 25 ] While Shropshire is the leading case, it is important to note that the decision precedes the codification of the sentencing principles in sections 718 , 718.1 , and 718.2 of the Criminal Code . That said, the sentencing principles remain proper considerations for determining parole ineligibility: Ryan at para 84 per Wakeling JA. [ 26 ] Denunciation can be part of the analysis under “the nature of the offence,” and future dangerousness can fall within the analysis of the “character of the offender”: Shropshire at para 19 .

Deterrence is also a relevant concern since a longer period of parole ineligibility can be expected to deter some persons from re-offending. B. Principle of Parity [ 27 ] The Crown and Defence relied on many cases. First, I will discuss the principle of parity. Second, I will then turn to the case law relied upon by Crown and Defence. [ 28 ]

Section 718.2 (

b) of the Criminal Code holds that similar sentences should be imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. It is trite law to state that no two cases are exactly alike. However, I must take a principled approach to like cases. [ 29 ] While identical factual circumstances and offenders may not be present, similar themes, circumstances, and factors may exist. This is referred to as the principle of parity. [ 30 ] To assist in framing the principle of parity, the jurisprudence is instructive.

In particular, the Alberta Court of Appeal identifies categories in which parole ineligibility for second degree murder should be considered: see Ryan . Given the nature of this case and Mr. Candaele, the relevant factors as stated in Ryan at para 171 (per Wakeling JA) are as follows: a. the offender was or had been the domestic partner or was a parent or grandparent of the victim and the homicide was directly attributable to this relationship;

b. the offender betrayed the kindness extended by the victim; or c. the victim was a vulnerable member of the community. [ 31 ] The nature of the relationship between a victim and the offender may make the offence more egregious. Of particular relevance is the fact that it has been recognized that “wife homicide is an extreme form of domestic violence and a reprehensible abuse of power and control by a man…” against a wife or former wife: R v Diep , 2005 ABQB 81 at para 5 ; see also

section 718.2 (a)(iii) of the Criminal Code with respect to positions of trust. In my view, this marital relationship occupied a position of trust as between the parties. [ 32 ] The ranges proposed in Ryan are accompanied by an extensive index of authorities of second-degree murder sentencing decisions in Alberta. The sentencing decisions considered in the Ryan case spanned from January of 1990 to December of 2014. Concerning Mr. Candaele, I will focus on cases between approximately June 1999 and October 2020. 1. Crown a.

R v Bobocel , 2014 ABQB 570 [ 33 ] In Bobocel , the offender murdered his wife of 15 years by striking her in the head with a hammer while she was sleeping. After killing her, Mr. Bobocel attempted to dispose of her body through a mulcher. [ 34 ] Mr. Bobocel tendered a late guilty plea once the proceedings had commenced. He was of Métis descent, but the pre-sentence report revealed that Gladue principles had no relevance because of the circumstances of the case. [ 35 ] Mr. Bobocel had a limited and dated criminal record with no prior violent convictions. However, there was evidence before the Court that Mr.

Bobocel had allegedly assaulted the deceased and received a peace bond. He also had a history of mental health issues, including a delusional disorder of mixed type, primarily persecutorial and jealousy. In the context of the case, the Court found the mental health condition of Mr. Bobocel was not mitigating to his moral blameworthiness because he had not sought treatment beforehand. [ 36 ] The Court in Bobocel imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 15 years.

In obiter , the Court indicated that without the guilty plea, the period of parole ineligibility would likely have been in the range of 18 to 20 years. b. R v Diebel , 2007 ABCA 418 [ 37 ] Mr. Diebel used a hammer and brutally ambushed an unarmed, unsuspecting woman with whom he had a short, intimate relationship. They were not living together at the time. [ 38 ] Mr. Diebel later dumped her body where it would not be found. He misled police and others after her disappearance. [ 39 ] The Court of Appeal concluded there was some planning and forethought prior to the murder. The Court also concluded that Mr.

Diebel’s mental status, for which he persistently resisted treatment, was not a mitigating factor because it posed an ongoing danger to others. This justified a significant increase in parole ineligibility. [ 40 ] Mr. Diebel was convicted. While he made a pre-sentence statement of remorse to the trial judge, the Court disbelieved the statement. [ 41 ] The Court of Appeal increased the parole ineligibility in Diebel from 12 years to 20. c. R v Martel , 2011 ABCA 225 [ 42 ] Mr. Martel stabbed his common-law spouse a single time in the upper chest.

He video-recorded her dying moments on his phone. [ 43 ] In the video, Mr. Martel was found to have a calm and cool demeanour when recording her dying moments. He made comments, saying, “right on”, signifying approval enthusiasm, while admiring his work. [ 44 ] Mr. Martel deleted the video and staged a crime scene to make it appear as though someone else had killed his spouse. He then lied to police until he was shown the recovered video. [ 45 ] Mr. Martel was convicted. He had a dated record for spousal assault. [ 46 ] The Court of Appeal noted there was an absence of mitigating factors on sentence.

That Court increased the parole ineligibility concerning Mr. Martel from 12 years to 15 years. [ 47 ] In arriving at this position, the Court concluded that Mr. Martel’s conduct in attempting to hide his culpability not only elevated the proper range of parole ineligibility beyond that which would apply if one looked at the stabbing alone, but was sufficiently significant to elevate parole ineligibility from 12 years to 15 years. d. R v White , 2006 ABQB 909

[ 48 ] Mr. White murdered his pregnant wife in their home. He used a knife. [ 49 ] Mr. White then disposed of her body in a ditch, stripped her naked, and left her exposed to the elements to decompose. [ 50 ] Mr. White then tried to cover up this crime, including the staging of a fake crime scene, lying to the police, leading search parties to find her, and enlisting the media in public appeals. [ 51 ] Mr. White was considered “youthful” at the age of 29.

He lacked a related criminal record for domestic violence and had considerable family support. [ 52 ] The Court found the deprivation of their young child of their mother was an aggravating factor. [ 53 ] The Court imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 17 years on Mr. White. e. R v Diep , 2005 ABQB 81 [ 54 ] Mr. Diep stabbed his former wife while she was in what had been their matrimonial bed. He committed this murder on the evening before she was to leave to start a new life for herself and her parents. [ 55 ] The Court found the violence to be at the lower end of domestic murders. Mr.

Diep had been prescribed anti-depressants at the time of the offence, admitted the offence immediately after the event, expressed his remorse, and entered a guilty plea. [ 56 ] Mr. Diep had no prior criminal record. Also, he had no history of violence in their relationship. Mr. Diep was 57, a Vietnamese boat person and it was unlikely that he would present a danger to society. [ 57 ] The Court imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 10 years on Mr. Diep. f. R v Radonjic , 2004 ABCA 323 [ 58 ] Mr. Radonjic murdered his wife and did so while facing assault charges against her.

He was bound by two separate restraining orders at the time of the murder. [ 59 ] Mr. Radonjic stabbed his wife to death in a city street in broad daylight. He was not under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time, and he showed no remorse. [ 60 ] Mr. Radonjic was diagnosed as being extremely self-absorbed, having a narcissistic personality with paranoid traits. He indicated his wife deserved what she got. [ 61 ] Mr. Radonjic turned himself in immediately after committing the offence and pled guilty.

Of greatest concern to the Court was the conduct in the face of the restraining orders and outstanding charges. [ 62 ] The Court of Appeal upheld the parole ineligibility of 15 years. g. R v Beglau , 2017 ABQB 133 [ 63 ] Mr. Beglau entered a guilty plea to murdering his estranged wife. Prior to the murder, Mr. Beglau had been told by RCMP to communicate with the deceased by email only, and not to enter the house. [ 64 ] Mr. Beglau entered the house and stabbed the deceased with a steak knife 21 times.

He had a prior criminal record, which was very dated and unrelated. [ 65 ] There was no evidence of prior violence by Mr. Beglau. The victim lived alone when the offence took place. [ 66 ] Mr. Beglau attended at the victim’s home with the anticipation of violence. He pled guilty without ever setting a trial date. [ 67 ] The Court imposed a parole ineligibility period of 13 years. h. R v Mbaye , 2020 ABQB 698 [ 68 ] Mr. Mbaye entered a guilty plea to second degree murder before trial.

The offence involved a serious amount of violence to the deceased, including numerous stab wounds with multiple knives. [ 69 ] The deceased was the estranged wife of Mr. Mbaye. She was intending to divorce him. [ 70 ] The Court found the long-term relationship between Mr. Mbaye and the deceased established a position of trust. As such, it was an additional aggravating factor. [ 71 ] Mr. Mbaye was the first to call 911. He identified himself to the call taker and admitted to stabbing his wife. He asked for help. [ 72 ] Mr. Mbaye had no prior criminal record or history of domestic violence.

He grew up in impoverished circumstances in Senegal.

[ 73 ] The Court imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 14 years. i. R v Stephen , 1999 ABCA 190 [ 74 ] Mr. Stephen appealed the 15-year period of parole ineligibility fixed by the trial judge following his conviction for second degree murder. Although the circumstances of the killing were not detailed, the Court of Appeal noted several aggravating factors, including the violation by Mr.

Stephen of a no-contact release provision, the domestic context in which the offence occurred, the preceding history of domestic violence, and his threatening conduct at his sentence hearing. [ 75 ] The Court of Appeal upheld the 15-year period of parole ineligibility. j. Crown – Average Parole Ineligibility [ 76 ] While there are many other factors to consider, I note that the mathematical average of the Crown cases concerning parole ineligibility is 14.89 years. 2.

Defence [ 77 ] The Defence argues that there is no reason that the parole ineligibility in the case at bar should increase beyond the ten-year minimum required by the Criminal Code . The cases advanced by the Defence in support of its position are as follows. a. R v Diep , 2005 ABQB 81 [ 78 ] The defence relies on Diep to support their submission that the period of parole ineligibility should not be raised above the 10- year statutory minimum. I summarized this case above. b. R v Desroches , 2015 BCSC 1287 [ 79 ] In

an act that was completely out of character, the offender accessed his World War II vintage pistol he may have had acquired in the course of his military career and ammunition, loaded it, shot the family dog, and then shot his wife of 40 years through the chest while she was asleep in bed. There had been no police involvement with the family. There was no suggestion from the neighbours that anything was seriously wrong. The offender who was in his early seventies pleaded guilty. [ 80 ] The sentencing judge imposed a period of parole ineligibility of 10 years. c.

R v Penner , 2018 BCSC 411 [ 81 ] The offender brutally murdered his mother. He had a highly dysfunctional relationship with his mother and was 48 years old at the time of the incident. The offender had drug and alcohol issues and had a quick temper. The offender had an extensive criminal record, though mostly related to his drug and alcohol addiction. He had been physically abusive with his mother in the past. He pleaded guilty after the trial started and a number of Crown witnesses had testified.

The Crown and defence made a joint submission with respect of parole ineligibility of 10 years which was endorsed by the sentencing judge. [ 82 ] In Penner , the parole ineligibility period accompanying the sentence of life imprisonment was set at 10 years. d. R v DA , 2011 ONSC 462 [ 83 ] The offender asphyxiated his wife in front of their two young children. The offence was committed during the course of a domestic altercation relating to a custody dispute and separation.

While acknowledging that his actions killed his wife, he did not acknowledge responsibility for the death of his wife. [ 84 ] The offender was convicted of second-degree murder by a jury and the jury’s recommendation was to impose a 10-year period of parole ineligibility. At the time of sentencing, the offender was 41 years old and had no prior criminal record. He was well educated, employed was a good father and was generally considered a person of good character. [ 85 ] The Court imposed a period of parole ineligibility at 12 years. e.

R v Soosay , 2021 ABQB 507 [ 86 ] The event unfolded in a residence on the Samson Reserve. There was a party where everyone was drinking alcohol and smoking marihuana, everyone had brought their machetes into the house. The machetes at one point were all on the dining room table. [ 87 ] The offender attacked his friend who had protected the offender when he was younger. The offender struck him with a machete, the machete broke, and then struck him with a wrench. The deceased died before first responders arrived. The killing was brutal. [ 88 ] The Indigenous offender was convicted at trial.

The sentencing Court considered many factors, including the offender’s Gladue report, and it imposed a parole ineligibility of 13 years. f. Defence – Average Parole Ineligibility

[ 89 ] While there are many other factors to consider, I note that the mathematical average of the Defence cases concerning parole ineligibility is 11 years. C. Sentencing – The Principles [ 90 ] Setting a period of parole ineligibility is part of the sentencing process. It engages the factors generally relevant to sentencing: Shropshire at para 23 . The factors are well known, and the overriding principle is “proportionality”. Importantly, the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility offender: see

section 718.1 ; and R v Garland , 2021 ABCA 46 at para 110 . [ 91 ] As alluded to above, sections 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code set out the purpose, principles and objectives of sentencing, and those factors guide the determination of a fit sentence. [ 92 ] The sentence imposed should be proportionate to the gravity of the offence committed and to the moral blameworthiness of the offender.

In essence, the seriousness of the criminal conduct. [ 93 ] The principle of proportionality is a fundamental and underlying principle of sentencing and requires a court to ensure the penalty fits the crime. [ 94 ] The concept of gravity of the offence is directed at what the offender did wrong. As mentioned above, this includes two components: (

i) the harm or likely harm to the victim; and (ii) the harm or likely harm to society and its values. [ 95 ] Moral culpability means the extent to which the accused actually intended the consequences of his or her actions. The greater the harm intended, the greater the moral culpability. Several factors are relevant, including the following: (

a) The nature of the act itself. (

b) The method by which it was committed. (

c) The manner in which it was committed in terms of degree of planning and deliberation. (

d) The motive for committing the crime. [ 96 ] Additional principles of sentencing include the following: (

a) Deterrence – General and Specific - invoking fear so that the offender and others who may think of offending will be restrained. (

b) Denunciation – communicating society’s condemnation of the conduct, and the harm done to the victims or community caused by the conduct. (

c) Rehabilitation – individualizing the sentencing process based on the needs of the offender. (

d) Retribution – the sentence reflects the moral blameworthiness of the offender. (

e) Reparation – to the victims or to the community for the harm done. (

f) Protection of society – offenders must be separated from society when necessary. D. Victim Impact Statements [ 97 ] Members of the family of Ms. Blommaert prepared victim impact statements. The particular members who provided the victim impact statements were: (

i) the daughters of Ms. Blommaert and the Diaz Family; (ii) Charles Blommaert; (iii) Lorianne Blommaert; (iv) Monique Blommaert; and (

v) Robin Sawers. [ 98 ] The victims describe their anger, profound grief, how their lives will never be the same, and how much they miss Ms. Blommaert. Understandably, the trial itself caused emotional harm to them because they learned what transpired on February 10, 2020. [ 99 ] The Diaz Family expressed the sadness, anger, and anxiety they face over considering how they will tell the daughters of Mr. Candaele about the events that resulted in the death of their mother, Ms. Blommaert. [ 100 ] Charles Blommaert expressed his inability to return to work following and since the death of his daughter, Ms.

Blommaert, and his inability to speak about it for eight months. [ 101 ] Lorianne Blommaert expressed her apprehensions regarding Mr. Candaele’s release and the security of her granddaughters, should he be able to see them. [ 102 ] Monique Blommaert expressed her “extremely elevated” anxiety levels, and the depression she has experienced since the death of her cousin, Ms. Blommaert. Monique Blommaert advised that following the death of Ms. Blommaert, she cancelled her plans to attend school and likely suffered economical impacts as a result. E. Parole Ineligibility – Applying the Framework

[ 103 ] As I touched on above,

section 745.4 of the Criminal Code stipulates the factors to be considered by me in fixing a period of parole ineligibility upon Mr. Candaele for the conviction of second-degree murder. That statutory provision also prescribes the boundaries within which parole ineligibility period may be fixed, which is not less than ten years and not more than twenty-five years. [ 104 ] As mentioned above, the factors that must be considered in fixing parole ineligibility are: (

i) the character of the offender; (ii) the nature of the offence; (iii) the circumstances surrounding the commission of the offence; and (iv) if applicable, the recommendation, if any, of the jury. Since this case was a trial by judge alone, the fourth factor is not relevant. I will now turn to the other three factors in sequence. 1. Character of the Offender [ 105 ] Mr. Candaele was 35 years old when he murdered Ms. Blommaert. He was not a youthful offender. [ 106 ] This murder was not the first documented incident of violence by Mr. Candaele, much less domestic violence.

He was first sentenced for breaching no contact conditions in 2014 with respect to another individual. He received a fine for that offence. [ 107 ] In 2019, Mr. Candaele received his first convictions for domestic violence against Ms. Blommaert. He was sentenced on January 30, 2019 for these offences, after entering guilty pleas on April 19, 2018. [ 108 ] The first of these convictions took place in early 2018. It involved an assault with a weapon. Mr. Candaele broke a glass juice bottle on the living room table, and then held the glass bottle to Ms. Blommaert's throat for five seconds.

This incident occurred in the context of a physical confrontation. During this altercation, Mr. Candaele asked Ms. Blommaert: “Do you want to die?” Mr. Candaele then pushed Ms. Blommaert to the ground and at some point, shoved a washcloth in her mouth. At the time this altercation took place, Ms. Blommaert was pregnant with their first child. [ 109 ] Less than one month later, Mr. Candaele assaulted Ms. Blommaert again. This time he punched her in the face several times. Mr. Candaele then took her car keys and her bank card. [ 110 ] Ms. Blommaert had physical markings consistent with the assaults.

A third-party witness called the RCMP, who attended the residence of Ms. Blommaert. [ 111 ] As I mentioned above, Ms. Blommaert was five months pregnant with Mr. Candaele’s child at this time. While Ms. Blommaert was intoxicated and uncooperative when the Police Officers first arrived, she later told the RCMP about the assault. She also stated to the RCMP that she was scared to go home. [ 112 ] When Mr. Candaele was apprehended, he was found with a knife concealed in his jacket pocket and alcohol on his person. This breached his probation order which stipulated, amongst other conditions, that Mr.

Candaele was not to possess either weapons or alcohol at the time. [ 113 ] Mr. Candaele received a custodial sentence for these offences, as well as for the assaults of two peace officers. He also received a probation order with a term of 18 months. This probation order was in place until July 2020. [ 114 ] Among other conditions in that probation order was that Mr. Candaele was to have no contact with Ms. Blommaert. There were no exceptions. [ 115 ] Less than nine months into this probation order, Mr. Candaele disregarded his no contact conditions. [ 116 ] On the morning of September 21, 2019, Mr.

Candaele attended at the home of Ms. Blommaert. A physical altercation took place. Ms. Blommaert told police she had allowed Mr. Candaele into her home notwithstanding that she was aware he was bound by an order prohibiting him from having any contact or communication with her. At the time, Ms. Blommaert was eight months pregnant, and the eldest child of the relationship was living with her. [ 117 ] Mr. Candaele entered a guilty plea on October 7, 2019. He received a $500 fine. [ 118 ] Mr. Candaele has already been sentenced for the previous offences of domestic violence.

The Crown has made it clear that it is not seeking to have Mr. Candaele re-sentenced on these offences. [ 119 ] Rather, the Crown argues these offences relate to: (

i) the propensity of Mr. Candaele for violence; (ii) his lack of self-control; (iii) his indifference to social control orders; and (iv) the effect of his offences on others. [ 120 ] These are all valid reasons to discuss these prior offences: R v Prevost , 2019 ABCA 398 at para 10 . These previous assaults are relevant to sentencing because they provide evidence to demonstrate that the violence was a common occurrence in the couple’s relationship and would occur each time Mr.

Candaele was intoxicated or frustrated: see R v Angelillo , 2006 SCC 55 at para 30 . [ 121 ] For these reasons, the past criminal convictions of Mr. Candaele show the full picture of the relationship he had with Ms. Blommaert. He was violent. He was unpredictable. He dismissed court orders put in place to separate him and Ms. Blommaert for her safety. [ 122 ] The murder of Ms. Blommaert, on February 10, 2020, was not an isolated incident. It was part of a long and tragic cycle of domestic violence which culminated in Mr. Candaele committing the most heinous offence against Ms. Blommaert. 2.

Nature of the Offence [ 123 ] The nature of the offence in this case is murder. In particular, I found that Mr. Candaele did unlawfully cause the death of Ms.

Blommaert. [ 124 ] The offence of murder, and in particular spousal murder, is one of the most heinous crimes in society. That offence attracts serious denunciation and revulsion by society. The inherent evil in such a crime has been appropriately articulated in Beglau at paragraph 40 as follows: Murder of a spouse, including while separated, is one of the most horrendous forms of murder. It destroys the institution of marriage, destroys relationships, destroys children and brings irreparable harm to the family, to the neighbourhood and to society.

Nothing that this Court can do will address the anger, pain, loss and devastation that murder in a domestic situation causes. It breaches the fundamental principles of respect for life and respect for the rule of law. This Court must denounce murder, particularly with respect to domestic situations, express its revulsion for this crime, and take steps to deter others from taking the life of another human being. All of these matters have been taken into account in the Criminal Code in imposing a life sentence of imprisonment.

They must also be taken into account in determining the period of ineligibility for parole. 3. Circumstances Surrounding the Commission of the Offence [ 125 ] The context underlying the commission of the murder of Ms. Blommaert by Mr. Candaele is one of violence and abuse. It led to the tragic incident. [ 126 ] Based on the evidence and analysis in the trial, I found Ms. Blommaert’s injuries did not occur as a result of simple trip and fall underneath the U-Haul Vehicle. Rather, I found the Crown established, beyond a reasonable doubt, that Mr. Candaele ran over Ms. Blommaert with the fully loaded U-Haul Vehicle.

That action crushed Ms. Blommaert and was a significant contributing cause of her death: Candaele at para 455 . [ 127 ] I reiterate that I also found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Ms. Blommaert did not die by accident: Candaele at para 473 . I also found the Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Candaele caused the death of Ms. Blommaert, and that he did so in an unlawful manner: Candaele at paras 483 and 484 . Further, Mr. Candaele committed this murder notwithstanding the conditions in the abovementioned probation order which stipulated that he was to have no contact with Ms.

Blommaert. There were no exceptions provided for in that no contact order. [ 128 ] The circumstances of the offence before me are discussed in greater detail below in the context of the aggravating and mitigating factors associated with this offence. I reiterate, second degree murder is amongst the most serious offences recognized in the Criminal Code . V. Sentencing – Assessing the Factors A. General Comments [ 129 ]

Section 718.2 of the Criminal Code requires me to consider a number of aggravating and mitigating factors, as well as sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences. Common aggravating and mitigating factors include planning and deliberation; association with a criminal organization; weapons; vulnerability of the victim; post-offence conduct; previous good character of the accused; potential for rehabilitation; age of the offender; remorse; and whether a guilty plea has been entered: R v Honorio , 2016 ABQB 351 at para 8 . B. Lack of Remorse [ 130 ] In this case, Mr.

Candaele has yet to show any real remorse for the murder of Ms. Blommaert. When I asked him, in the context of the sentencing hearing, whether he had anything to say to the Court in respect of his sentencing, Mr. Candaele stated that he would never hurt Ms. Blommaert. He went on to indicate that her death was an accident and that he was innocent. [ 131 ] While the lack of remorse should not be considered an aggravating factor, it does constitute an absence of a mitigating factor.

As a result, a lack of remorse is a factor to be considered in this sentencing hearing when determining parole ineligibility. [ 132 ] In Radonjic , the Alberta Court of Appeal noted that the trial judge considered the lack of remorse of Mr. Radonjic in the context of his character. The Court agreed that the trial judge was obliged to consider the lack of remorse in coming to an appropriate period of parole ineligibility. [ 133 ] The lack of remorse is clearly relevant to an assessment of the character of Mr. Candaele, the gravity of the offence, the degree of culpability of Mr.

Candaele, and to his degree of dangerousness: R v Ambrose , 2000 ABCA 264 at paras 4 , 82-83. These are proper sentencing considerations, and a lack of remorse may increase a sentence. C. Aggravating Factors 1. Domestic Relationship & Criminal Record [ 134 ] Under

section 718.2(a)(ii) of the Criminal Code , the marital relationship of Mr. Candaele and Ms. Blommaert is a statutorily aggravating factor. Wife homicide is an extreme form of domestic violence, and a reprehensible abuse of power and control by a man: Diep at para 5 . This is so, in my view, because the marital relationship involves a position of trust between the parties.

[ 135 ] The case before this Court for sentencing is the tragic culmination of domestic violence. Mr. Candaele had a history of terrorizing Ms. Blommaert. [ 136 ] The context includes threats, violent assaults, disregarding no contact orders, and the offence we are addressing before the Court today. Based on facts before me for the purposes of this sentencing, I find that Mr. Candaele has shown a complete and utter disregard for the dignity of Ms. Blommaert. He posed a serious risk to her safety. [ 137 ] Based on the facts before me, I also infer that Mr.

Candaele poses a risk to members of the community who cross his path. I am particularly concerned about other individuals who cross the path of Mr. Candaele at some future date in a domestic context. [ 138 ] The Crown argues these are the strongest of the aggravating factors in this case. They require a strong message of denunciation and deterrence, both to Mr. Candaele and the community. I agree. 2. Vulnerability of the Victim [ 139 ] While a portion of

section 718.2 (a)(ii) of the Criminal Code exists due to the inherent vulnerability of domestic partners, the circumstances of Ms. Blommaert on the night Mr. Candaele took her life exacerbated her situation of vulnerability. Indeed, the events are analogous to the aggravating circumstances Courts have found for sentencing attacks on homeless individuals: R v Ostamas , 2016 MBQB 136 at para 41 , varied on other grounds 2022 ABCA 68 . [ 140 ] Ms. Blommaert was recently homeless.

She had been evicted from her apartment and was travelling in the U- Haul Vehicle with all of her worldly possession in the back of it: Candaele at para 60 . She was alone at night, in the streets of Calgary. While I acknowledge the views of Defence Counsel to the effect that she had other options, I infer from all of the evidence that Ms. Blommaert was of the view that her only refuge from the elements was the U-Haul Vehicle. This was the same vehicle Mr. Candaele used to murder Ms. Blommaert. Given the circumstances, I find the degree of vulnerability in this case is a further aggravating factor. 3.

Bound by Court Orders [ 141 ] Mr. Candaele was bound by a probation order stemming from his previous domestic abuse of Ms. Blommaert. As mentioned above, that probation order included an express no contact condition in respect of Ms. Blommaert. The Court issued this probation order because it was fully aware of the risk Mr. Candaele posed to Ms. Blommaert. This condition was imposed to reduce the risk to her safety. [ 142 ] As his previous convictions demonstrate (including his most recent conviction from October 2019), the actions of Mr.

Candaele, in the early morning hours of February 10, 2020, illustrate that he had no regard for the no contact conditions. Indeed, Mr. Candaele and Ms. Blommaert were even married during the period that he was to have no contact with her. Their marriage occurred on December 1, 2019. [ 143 ] Given the circumstances, I find the disregard Mr. Candaele had for Court Orders generally, and the prohibition order in particular, is a further aggravating factor. 4. Significant Impact of the Offence [ 144 ] Mr. Candaele and Ms. Blommaert had two children together.

At the time of the murder, the children were in the care of a state- appointed guardian. [ 145 ] Regardless of the state-appointed guardian, the option for these children to have a relationship with their mother at some later time in their life has been eliminated by the murder of Ms. Blommaert. [ 146 ] For completeness, I also note that the collateral consequences of a sentence on Mr. Candaele in respect of his future contact with his children is neither an aggravating nor mitigating factor within the meaning of

section 718.2 (

a) of the Criminal Code . They are relevant, however, under the principles of sentencing individualization and parity and the objective of assisting in rehabilitating offenders: R v Pham , 2013 SCC 15 at para 11 ; and R v Suter , 2018 SCC 34 at paras 45-50 . [ 147 ] In this case, the mitigating role of collateral consequences is low. The offender will not have a relationship with his children for many years, but the victim will never have one because of the offender’s actions and the children will never have that option either. It is relevant, and I can take it into account.

That said, it will not have a significant weight in this case. [ 148 ] Given the circumstances, I find the significance of this harm to the children to be an aggravating factor on sentence to be issued against Mr. Candaele: White at para 26 . I make this determination because, as with most domestic murders, this tragic offence by Mr. Candaele has, and will continue to have, a significant harmful impact on these children. 5. Post-Offence Conduct [ 149 ] Post-offence conduct can operate in a broad spectrum when applied to homicide cases.

It can range from fleeing the scene to destroying and disposing of evidence, including the bodily remains of the deceased: Bobocel ; see also White at paragraphs 8 and 9 , Diebel ; and Martel . [ 150 ] Based on my review of the context in this case, the post-offence conduct of Mr. Candaele falls into the middle of the spectrum. After he left the scene of the crime (after passing through it a second time), Mr. Candaele attempted to propagate a story of his innocence. Obviously, this occurred prior to his arrest by Constable Black, and these actions indicated a lack of remorse.

By virtue of his collective actions, I find Mr. Candaele intended to deflect suspicion away from himself. [ 151 ] Mr. Candaele did not provide a single denial. He informed multiple parties his wife had gone missing. A review of his post-

offence conduct reinforces this determination. Mr. Candaele told his former neighbour, Mr. Parker. He told Ms. Sharma and Ms. Saunders at the storage businesses in Bowness. He told the cab driver, Mr. Sra. [ 152 ] Mr. Candaele expressed to all of them his concern that his wife, Ms. Blommaert, was missing. Each time these statements were unprompted. In doing so, I find Mr. Candaele clearly intended to deflect suspicion away from himself. [ 153 ] When Mr. Candaele called 911, he provided further details and concocted stories of how Ms.

Blommaert may have met her end at the hands of kidnappers: Candaele at para 312 . [ 154 ] The phone calls Mr. Candaele made to Mr. Shevalier also showed attempts to provide a separation from Ms. Blommaert’s murder and the offender’s whereabouts. He told Mr. Shevalier that Ms. Blommaert ran away “around midnight” or “about 1:00-1:30”: Candaele at para 439 . [ 155 ] Mr. Candaele continued his attempts to obfuscate and distract when Constable Black arrested him.

He repeated to Constable Black that his wife was missing, and that he had “proof” that he had done nothing wrong and could account for this time: Candaele at para 441 . He repeated these statements throughout his interaction with Constable Black. [ 156 ] In the interview with Detective Bangloy, Mr. Candaele maintained a similar story. He continued to distance himself from the murder, but later told Detective Bangloy about the final location where he left Ms. Blommaert: Candaele at para 442 . [ 157 ] Mr.

Candaele also minimized any anger or rage he had when discussed his behaviour on the night of the murder: Candaele at para 442 . When confronted with the exact time the murder took place based on the CCTV footage, Mr. Candaele remained steadfast in his lie that he had last seen Ms. Blommaert at “2:00, 2:30”: Candaele at para 442 . [ 158 ] The more aggravating cases of post-offence conduct often involve elaborate attempts to misdirect the police or hide or destroy the body of the deceased: see for example White , Diebel, and Bobocel . [ 159 ] The aggravating factors found in Martel , where Mr.

Martel lied to police until the video he had recorded of the deceased dying moments was revealed, are similar to the case before me: Martel at para 4. Similar to Martel , Mr. Candaele provided alternative ways Ms. Blommaert met her demise. While Mr. Martel called 911 and told authorities someone must have broken-in and committed the murder, Mr. Candaele called 911 to feign concern for his missing wife, while speculating to authorities about her potential demise at the hands of kidnappers. [ 160 ] Based on the facts and analysis, I find the actions of Mr.

Candaele are somewhat more aggravating than those in Martel . When confronted with the inculpatory video, Mr. Martel admitted to the offence. In contrast, Mr. Candaele never acknowledged or admitted to committing the offence, even when told of the U-Haul Vehicle footage captured at the scene. That said, I acknowledge that Mr. Martel made some attempt to stage a break-in, which was not done by Mr. Candaele. [ 161 ] Given the circumstances, I find the post-offence conduct of Mr. Candaele is a further aggravating factor. In particular, the conduct of Mr.

Candaele immediately post-offence reflected a total disregard for the needs of Ms. Blommaert. He left her on the street when her time of need was greatest. A number of witnesses testified that on first glance they believed the body was a bag of trash: Candaele at paras 83 and 106 . Tragically, I find Mr. Candaele left Ms. Blommaert dying in the middle of the street, in middle of the night, in the dead of winter, like a bag of garbage. D. Mitigating Factors [ 162 ] The Crown asserts that the only mitigating factors concerning the sentence to be imposed on Mr. Candaele are the Gladue elements. Mr.

Candaele asserts that the event was spontaneous and occurred in a period of less than two minutes. He also asserted that his mental health issues are best left to the Parole Board. [ 163 ] As discussed below, the Gladue elements do not significantly reduce the moral culpability of Mr. Candaele. That said, they must be considered when determining an appropriate sentence. 1. Mental Health Issues [ 164 ] Mental health issues were raised in the previous sentencings of Mr. Candaele. In particular, they were raised when he entered guilty pleas on April 19, 2018. Counsel for Mr.

Candaele stated to the Court at that time that he did have some mental health issues which necessitated the requirement of a Forensic Assessment Outpatient Service Report (“ 2018 FAOS Report ”). The facts of that guilty plea also show Mr. Candaele was apprehended during one of the offences under the authority of the Mental Health Act , RSA 2000, c M- 13 . [ 165 ] Mental health issues can distinguish one offender from another, but their nature and effects should be proven under

section 724 of the Criminal Code : R v Costello , 2019 ABCA 104 at para 8 . It is not sufficient for a mental health issue just to be alleged. [ 166 ] In addition to the need to prove mental health elements, they must be relevant to the offence or the offender in a rational and proportionate sense under

section 718 of the Criminal Code : Costello at para 8 . In some circumstances, mental health issues can invite primacy to consideration of the objective of protection of the public: Costello at para 8 ; see also R v Virani , 2012 ABCA 155 at para 16 . [ 167 ] While mental health issues can amount to mitigating circumstances in some cases, Courts have been less likely to extend such mitigation to offenders who are aware of their mental illness and are unmoved to address their diagnoses through treatment: Bobocel at para 37 .

The refusal by an offender to treat a long-standing mental health condition did not make him or her any less morally blameworthy due to their mental health condition: Bobocel at para 37 .

[168] The Crown asserts the mental health condition of Mr. Candaele, without further evidence about his state at the time of thehomicide, does not warrant a reduction to his moral blameworthiness. The Court accepted the mental health issues of Mr. Candaele whenhe entered pleas in April 2018, as demonstrated by the Court ordering the 2018 FAOS Report. When Mr. Candaele was ultimatelysentenced, steps were taken to assist him with rehabilitation in the form of a probation order with treatment and counselling conditionsdealing with substance abuse, mental health issues, anger management, and domestic violence.

This attempt to use restorative sentencingprinciples was to no avail. Based on his own evidence at the time, Mr. Candaele continued to self-medicate with illicit substances. [169] Based on the facts and analysis, I find this is the circumstance where protection of the public is paramount: Costello at para 9.While Ms. Blommaert can no longer be victimized at the hands of Mr. Candaele, he is still a risk to the general public. In particular, thenext potential domestic partner of Mr. Candaele is at risk. [170] In

summary, to the extent that his mental health bears any weight on the sentence imposed, it greatly impacts the risk Mr.Candaele poses to members of the public that become involved in his life in any long-term context. 2. Gladue Factors [171] Mr. Candaele identifies as Indigenous. That being the case,

section 718.2(

e) of the Criminal Code requires me to take this intoaccount when sentencing him and follow the guidance provided from the Supreme Court in the decisions of Gladue and Ipeelee: R vGladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 SCR 688, R v Ipeelee, 2012 SCC 13. [172] Justice Renke in Soosay dealt with the case law applying Gladue factors to second degree murder sentencing. The Courtoutlined the application of the case of the Alberta Court of Appeal decision in R v Laboucane, 2016 ABCA 176, leave to appeal to SCCrefused 37177 (December 22, 2016) which distilled the Gladue factors: Soosay at para 137 citing Laboucane at para 63.

Those distilledpoints are as follows. a. An offender is not required to establish a causal link between background factors and the commission of the current offence beforebeing entitled to have those matters considered by the sentencing judge: Ipeelee at para 83. b. There is nothing in the Criminal Code or Gladue that places the burden of persuasion on an Indigenous accused.

As expressed inGladue, and R v Kakekagamick [R v Kakekagamick, (2006), (ON CA), 81 OR (3d) 664 (CA), leave to SCC refused31826 (May 10, 2007)], the sentencing judge must, “give attention to the unique background and systemic factors which may haveplayed a

part in bringing the particular offender before the courts”: Gladue at para 69. This is a much more modest requirement than thecausal link suggested by some trial judges: R v Collins, 2011 ONCA 182. c. Systemic and background factors “do not operate as an excuse or justification for the criminal conduct. Rather, they provide thenecessary context to enable a judge to determine an appropriate sentence”: Ipeelee at para 83. d. Unless the unique circumstances of the particular offender bear on his or her culpability for the offence or indicate whichsentencing objectives can and should be actualized, “they will not influence the ultimate sentence”: Ipeelee at para 83. [173] The operation of

section 718.2(

e) of the Criminal Code is not an automatic reduction of sentence or a remission of a warrantedperiod of incarceration for Indigenous offenders: Laboucane at para

Section 718.2(

e) is simply a recognition that the sentence mustbe individualized and that there are serious social problems with respect to Indigenous individuals that require creative and innovativesolutions: Laboucane at para 54 referring to R v Vermette, 2001 MBCA 64. [174] The sentencing judge in Laboucane canvassed the items characterized as Gladue factors. The Court commented on thewitnessing of domestic violence and substance abuse with his older sister - with no proof Mr. Laboucane was resident in the home whenthis was ongoing. The Court further noted the domestic violence in Mr.

Laboucane’s relationship, drug and alcohol abuse at a youthfulage, and a lack of employment and educational success were not attributable to his Indigenous heritage. Neither of Mr. Laboucane’sparents had any involvement with the residential school system.

There was no history of substance abuse or domestic violence in Mr.Laboucane's family: Laboucane at para 75. [175] The sentencing judge in Laboucane concluded that the Gladue factors in that case and the offences (which were domesticviolence) did not bear on his culpability or indicate which sentencing objectives should be actualized: Laboucane at para 76. [176] The Crown argues that similar to Laboucane, Mr.

Candaele was “not exposed to the reality of constrained circumstances thatmay have diminished his moral culpability or may have called for a sanction that ought to take into account these circumstances ofdeprivation and limited opportunities, rather than a sanction aimed at punishment”: Laboucane at para 77. [177] In this case, Mr. Candaele’s parents are Indigenous. His father passed away from a drug overdose when Mr. Candaele was five-years old. Mr. Candaele started drinking alcohol when he was 13 and later used cocaine and crystal meth, which he no longer uses.Notwithstanding this history, Mr.

Candaele does not believe he requires substance abuse intervention. [178] Mr. Candaele was close to his grandmother. His maternal grandmother attended residential school and talked to him about herhorrifying experience. [179] In

summary, there are few, if any, crimes more serious and violent than the murder of one’s spouse. In my view, the serious andviolent nature of the offence reduces the mitigation of the Gladue factors when determining the appropriate parole ineligibility of thisparticular offender. VI. Other Matters – Ancillary Orders Sought

[ 180 ] The Crown also seeks the following ancillary orders, to which the Defence takes no issue: a. An order prohibiting Mr. Candaele from possessing firearms for life, pursuant to

section 109. This is a mandatory order. b. An order authorizing the taking the number of samples of bodily substances from Mr. Candaele that is reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis, pursuant to

section 487.051(1). This is a mandatory order. VII. Concluding Comments –

Summary of Findings [ 181 ] I summarize the sentencing factors. First the aggravating factors, and second, the mitigating factors. [ 182 ] Concerning the aggravating factors, I make the following findings: a. This was a spousal homicide:

section 718.2 (a)(ii) of the Criminal Code . b. Mr. Candaele occupied a position of trust when he murdered Ms. Blommaert:

section 718.2 (a)(iii) of the Criminal Code . c. Mr. Candaele has left his two daughters without their mother. d. Ms. Blommaert was particularly vulnerable because she was recently evicted and living on the street in the U-Haul Vehicle, which Mr. Candaele used to kill her. e. Mr. Candaele has a recent criminal record, including recent convictions for domestic violence and breaches of a no-contact order with Ms. Blommaert. f. Mr. Candaele was bound by a Probation Order, which stipulated that he was to have no contact with Ms. Blommaert at the time. He violated that Probation Order. g. Mr.

Candaele attempted to cover up his murder of Ms. Blommaert by directing the attention of both civilian and police to third parties. h. Mr. Candaele left Ms. Blommaert to die alone in the middle of the street on a frigid winter night. [ 183 ] Concerning the mitigating factors, I find the only factor that is mitigating on the sentence of Mr. Candaele are the Gladue elements. However, as discussed above, the Gladue elements do not reduce the moral culpability of Mr. Candaele. That said, they must be considered when determining an appropriate sentence. VIII.

Sentencing – Final Decisions [ 184 ] Given the above facts and analysis and taking into account all the principles of sentencing and the submissions of Counsel, I order as follows. (

a) The period of parole ineligibility concerning Mr. Candaele will be set at 16 years. (

b) Concerning

section 109 of the Criminal Code , I hereby order against Mr. Candaele a lifetime prohibition from possessing firearms. This is a mandatory order. (

c) Concerning

section 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code , I hereby issue an order authorizing the taking the number of samples of bodily substances from Mr. Candaele that is reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis. This is a mandatory order. Heard on the19 th – 30 th days of April, 2021, 3 rd – 7 th days of May, 2021, 7 th day of July, 5 th day of October, 2021 and 26 th day of July, 2022. Oral reasons for sentencing given on 31 st day of August, 2022. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 16 th day of September, 2022.

D.B. Nixon J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Hyatt Mograbee and Robert Marquette for the Crown Kim Ross for the Accused