R v Cameron, 2023 ABCJ 100

In the Alberta Court of Justice Citation: R v Cameron, 2023 ABCJ 100 Date: 20230428 Docket: 200856573P1; 200938744P1 Registry: Calgary Between: His Majesty the King Crown - and - Ethan Connell Cameron Accused Reasons for Sentence of the Honourable Justice A.A. Fradsham Introduction [ 1 ] Mr. Cameron has pleaded guilty to charges that he: 200938744P1; Count 3: On or about the 9th day of February, 2020, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did, in committing an assault upon Tara Nish, Leo Andaur, Llenay Rosa, use or threaten to use a weapon, to wit: imitation firearm or an imitation thereof, contrary to

section 267 (

a) of the Criminal Code of Canada . 200938744P1; Count 5: On or about the 9th day of February, 2020, at or near Calgary, Alberta, being at large on a release order, did fail, without lawful excuse, to comply with a condition of that release order, to wit: you are prohibited from owning, having in your possession or carrying a weapon, contrary to section 145(5) (

a) of the Criminal Code of Canada . 200856573P1; Count 4: On or about the 30th day of August, 2020, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did unlawfully possess an unloaded prohibited or restricted firearm, to wit: handgun, together with readily accessible ammunition that is capable of being discharged in the firearm, at calgary, not being the holder of an authorization or licence under which they could possess the firearm in that place, contrary to section 95(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada . 200856573P1; Count 6: On or about the 30th day of August, 2020, at or near Calgary, Alberta, was without lawful excuse in possession of a firearm to wit: handgun knowing that the serial number on it had been removed, contrary to section 108(1) (

b) of the Criminal Code of Canada . 200856573P1; Count 7: On or about the 30th day of August, 2020, at or near Calgary, Alberta, did have in his possession a firearm (or crossbow or a prohibited weapon, or a restricted weapon, or prohibited device, or ammunition or prohibited ammunition or an explosive substance) while he was prohibited from doing so by reason of an order made pursuant to

section 51 Youth Criminal Justice Act , contrary to

section 117.01(1) of the Criminal Code of Canada .

200856573P1; Count 11: On or about the 30th day of August, 2020, at or near Calgary, Alberta, being at large on a release order, did fail, without lawful excuse, to comply with a condition of that release order, to wit: 9. Do not communicate, directly or indirectly, with: - Reece Jackson except: -when in court; or -through legal counsel, contrary to section 145(5) (

a) of the Criminal Code of Canada . 200856573P1; Count 12: On or about the 30th day of August, 2020, at or near Calgary, Alberta, being at large on a release order, did fail, without lawful excuse, to comply with a condition of that release order, to wit: 12. you are prohibited from owning, having in your possession or carrying weapon, including knives, except those you use for preparing or eating food. work tools, while you are at work, are a permited exception to this ban, contrary to section 145(5) (

a) of the Criminal Code of Canada . [ 2 ] A reference in these Reasons to a

section number, unless specifically stated otherwise, is a reference to that

section number in the Criminal Code . All charges were prosecuted by way of indictment. Issues [ 3 ] The issue is whether a sentence equivalent to Mr. Cameron’s pre-sentence custody credit is sufficient, or if additional time in custody is required. Facts The Offences Information 200938744P1 [ 4 ] On July 13, 2019, Mr. Cameron entered into a recognizance which contained a condition that he would not be in possession of any weapons (including firearms). That recognizance was in effect on February 9, 2020. [ 5 ] On February 9, 2020, Mr. Cameron and his girlfriend had an argument while at their residence.

Three other persons intervened, and Mr. Cameron pointed at the four individuals what was thought at the time to be a firearm, but was later determined to be an imitation firearm. Mr. Cameron threatened to kill the individuals if the police became involved. The police were called, but Mr. Cameron left the residence before the police arrived. Mr. Cameron was arrested on February 10, 2020. Information 200856573P1 [ 6 ] On December 14, 2018, Mr. Cameron was made the subject of two, concurrent, 5 year firearms prohibition order in Youth Court. [ 7 ] On March 27, 2020, Mr.

Cameron entered into a Release Order which contained conditions: (1) requiring him, when outside his approved residence, to carry with him a copy of his release documents and produce them on demand to a peace or surveillance officer; (2) prohibiting him from communicating, directly or indirectly, with Reece Jackson; (3) prohibiting him from possessing weapons; and (4) prohibiting him from possessing firearms. That Release Order was in effect on August 30, 2020. [ 8 ] On August 30, 2020, while in a C-Train car, and latterly within a C-Train station, and while in the presence of Reece Jackson, Mr.

Cameron was found to be in possession of a shoulder bag in which was located a loaded semi-automatic pistol (.22 calibre). Mr. Cameron knew the firearm was in the shoulder bag, and he knew that it was loaded, and that the serial number of the firearm had been removed. It is not alleged that Mr. Cameron removed the serial number. Mr. Cameron was arrested without incident at the C-Train station.

These events occurred between 17:29 hours and 17:48 hours. [ 9 ] The presence of the firearm was discovered because while on the C-Train he threatened a passenger with the firearm (though he did not remove it from the bag in which it was located), and that incident was reported to Calgary Transit Security. [ 10 ] The firearm was a restricted firearm. Mr. Cameron did not possess a possession and acquisition licence, nor a licence permitting him to possess the restricted firearm. The Offender [ 11 ] I had the benefit of a thoughtful

summary of Mr. Cameron’s life as set out in the defence written submissions. I reproduce it here: 7. Mr. Cameron is 22 years old. His upbringing can be described as unstable, traumatic, and tragic. He was born in Nova Scotia. Mr. Cameron describes being raised mostly by his mother, while his father was in-between serving jail sentences. He was exposed to drug use, domestic violence, and crime at an early age. His mother struggled with addition throughout his life. He was physically and mentally abused as a child by his biological father, his mother and his mother’s boyfriends. From Mr.

Cameron’s recollection, “All I saw growing up was violence and hate.” Mr. Cameron recalls from his early youth that his mother would threaten to harm herself, as well as him. He recalls during his childhood, his maternal grandfather had been involved in a murder-suicide, shooting his wife and then himself. 8. Around age 8, Mr. Cameron was removed from his mother’s care and placed into social services. He was returned back to his mother’s care around ago 10, and then sent to live with his maternal uncle around age 13. It was around this time when Mr. Cameron stated using drugs, and also around this time Mr.

Cameron was sexually abused by an older friend of the family. 9. By age 16, Mr. Cameron had left his home, mostly dropped out of school, and returned to Calgary. Mr. Cameron’s biological father returned to his life at this time. While far from being a positive role model on his teenage son, Mr. Cameron and his father engaged in criminal activity together including robbery with a firearm, for which Mr. Cameron was sentenced as a youth. Following this, Mr. Cameron began to receive threats on his life, which he believed was in relation to his father’s criminal activity. Mr. Cameron was

shot at, and stabbed twice. He began to carry a firearm for protection. 10. For a period of time, Mr. Cameron began employment in dry-wall, and then gained employment at the Fed-Ex Warehouse. He began a stable relationship with his domestic partner Bree, who became pregnant. Unfortunately, this period of stability was interrupted on January 26, 2021, when Mr. Cameron’s mother died. The manner of death was determined to be a suicide. 11. Mr. Cameron has both mental health and addiction issues.

He recalls early diagnoses around 12-13 years of age, and being medicated for Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder, Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder, Bipolar Disorder, and Obsessive Compulsive Disorder. Throughout his life, and beginning in early adulthood, Mr. Cameron recalls using substances including cocaine, oxycontin, MDMA, methamphetamine, and fentanyl. 12. Mr. Cameron has a partial grade 11 education, with 86 credits. Upon his release, he plans to resume cohabitation with his girlfriend Bree and their 19-month-old child. His partner and child live with their grandparents [in] Calgary AB.

The grandparents of his child are agreeable to allowing Mr. Cameron to reside with them. Mr. Cameron’s focus on his life going forward is to be a present and supportive parent for his infant daughter. 13. While at the Calgary Remand Centre, Mr. Cameron completed the 30 hour, “Working with Anger Program,” offered through the Mount Royal University Adult Offender Education Program. Mr. Cameron realizes he needs continued support and counselling in areas of addiction, grief and trauma, and anger management.

He is agreeable to engaging in these programs through probation. [ 12 ] I accept the accuracy of those statements. I also note that Mr. Cameron had just turned 20 years of age when the C-Train offences occurred. [ 13 ] Mr. Cameron’s criminal record (Exhibit 2) is as follows: Ethan CAMERON CRIMINAL RECORD 2014-01-07 267(a) – assault with a weapon 12 M probation Ft.

McMurray (Youth) 2014-06-13 430(4) – mischief 3 M supervision deferred & Red Deer, AB 145(5) – fail to attend 12 M probation (Youth) YCJ 137 – breach youth order 430(4) – mischief 264.1(1)(a) – utter threats 266 – assault 267(a) – assault with a weapon 2014-06-13 267(a) – assault with a weapon Calgary, AB 145(3) – breach recognizance (Youth) 145(3) – breach recognizance 267(a) – assault with a weapon 2018-12-14 334(b) – theft under 10 M & 5 M under Calgary, AB 266 – Assault supervision in the community (Youth) 226 – Assault & 9 M probation + firearm 344 – Robbery prohibition 393(3) – fraudulently obtain transportation 145(3) – fail to comply with recognizance 145(3) – fail to comply with recognizance 344(1)(a) – Armed Robbery using a restricted or prohibited firearm 2022-07-27 117.01(1) – breach firearms prohibition 1 D (90 D PTC) + 18 M

264.1(1) – utter threats 88(1) – possess weapon dangerous 2022-05-12 145(2)(a) – fail to attend court 1 D (15 D PTC cons) 145(5)(a) – fail to attend court 1 D (15 D PTC) 145(5)(a) – fail to attend court 1 D (15 D PTC conc) [ 14 ] As of today’s date, Mr. Cameron has spent 515 days actual days in pre-sentence custody. I give him enhanced credit of 773 days. Law and Analysis Crown position [ 15 ] The Crown submitted that general and specific deterrence are the appropriate sentencing objectives, and that a global sentence of 4.5 years incarceration (against which pre-sentence custody is to be applied) is appropriate.

The Crown submitted that the sentence should be allocated as follows: On Information 200938744P1: 1. Count 3 (assault with a weapon): 6 months 2. Count 5 (breach of a release order): 30 days concurrent On Information 200856573P1 1. Count 4 (possession of a loaded prohibited firearm): 3.5 years consecutive 2. Count 6 (possess a firearm knowing that its serial number has been removed): 3.5 years concurrent 3. Count 7 (possess a firearm while prohibited from doing so): 6 months consecutive 4. Count 11 (breach of a release order): 30 days concurrent 5.

Count 12 (breach of a release order): 30 days concurrent [ 16 ] The Crown submitted that the following ancillary orders should be granted: 1. A

section 109 firearms prohibition for life (in relation to count 3 on Information 200938744P1; and in relation to count 4 on Information 200856573P1); 2. A

section 487.051(1) primary designated offence DNA order (in relation to count 3 on Information 200938744P1); 3. A

section 491 forfeiture order in relation to the seized firearm and ammunition. [ 17 ] The Crown submitted that the facts relating to the firearm are such as to attract an exemplary sentence. Mitigating factors as noted by the Crown [ 18 ] The Crown submitted that the mitigating factors are the guilty plea (though made 27 months after his first appearance in court, and in the face of a strong Crown case in relation to Information 200856573P1), and the youthfulness of the offender.

Aggravating factors as noted by the Crown [ 19 ] The Crown submitted that the aggravating factors are the related criminal record of the offender, the fact that the offender was subject to a firearms prohibition when he committed the firearms offence, and he was bound by a probation order and a release order when he committed the firearms offence and the assault with a weapon offence. [ 20 ] The Crown further submitted that, in relation to Count 3 on Information 200938744P1, it is aggravating that: there were multiple victims; the offence involved an intimate partner [statutorily aggravating under

section 718.2(a)(ii)]; the offence occurred in the residence shared between the offender and his intimate partner; the weapon used, though an imitation handgun, would have appeared real to the victims, and that would have engendered greater fear in the victims. [ 21 ] In relation to the firearms offences on Information 200856573P1, the Crown, relying on R. v.

Morrisseau 2010 ABPC 404 at paragraph 104 , submitted that it was aggravating that the offences occurred on public transit, and the presence of the firearm was made known to a passenger as a means of conveying a threat. [ 22 ] The Crown also submitted that it was aggravating that the serial number had been removed from the firearm, and that the offender was under firearm prohibition orders. Defence Position [ 23 ] The defence submitted that the appropriate global sentence is a period of incarceration equivalent to the offender’s pre-

sentence custody credit followed by 24 months of probation. [24] The defence acknowledged the aggravating factors alleged by the Crown, but submitted that the mitigating factors are: 1. The firearm was never taken from the shoulder bag; 2. The guilty plea; 3. The youthfulness of the offender; 4. The remorse of the offender; 5. The adversity suffered by the offender when he was a child; 6. The time the offender spent in remand during the Covid pandemic including the fact that he was “triple bunked” for 100 days. [25] The defence did not dispute the ancillary orders sought by the Crown.

Court’s Analysis Objectives [26] The sentencing objectives with respect to each of the offences are deterrence and denunciation. In relation to count 3 onInformation 200938744P1, I am mindful of sections 718.04 and 718.201. Aggravating factors [27] I accept the aggravating factors as outlined by the Crown and acknowledged by the defence. Mitigating factors [28] I find that the mitigating factors are as follows: 1. The guilty pleas of the offender. 2. The youthfulness of the offender. 3.

The adversity faced by the offender when he was a child. [29] I consider the remorse of the offender to be part of mitigating effect of the guilty pleas. [30] The fact that the offender did not remove the firearm from the shoulder bag is the absence of an aggravating factor. [31] Mr. Cameron seeks additional pre-sentence custody credit because he was “triple-bunked” while he was in the RemandCentre. [32] Harsh pre-sentence custody conditions can constitute a mitigating factor in sentence. In R. v.

Biever 2023 ABCA 138, thecourt said: [29] While it is not necessarily an error to express the recognition of particularly harsh pre-sentence custody conditions as enhancedcredit, it is preferable to consider such conditions as a mitigating factor to be considered in determining the appropriate sentence at theoutset: see R v Taylor, 2023 ABKB 175at para 40. As with any mitigating factor contested, a bare allegation is insufficient. There mustbe evidence as to the particular conditions existing and how they affected the individual being sentenced.

The goal remains to craft a fitand proportionate sentence. [33] In the case at bar, no evidence was offered of either the conditions or the effect the conditions had on Mr. Cameron. [34] I do not consider the conditions Mr. Cameron experienced in remand to be mitigating. Proportionality [35] “A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender”: section718.1. All sentences must satisfy this principle: R. v. Parranto 2021 SCC 46 at paragraph 10; R. v.

Swampy 2017 ABCA 134 atparagraphs 25-26. [36] The relationship between “gravity of the offence” and the offender’s “degree of responsibility” was discussed in R. v. Ipeelee2012 SCC 13: [37] The fundamental principle of sentencing (i.e., proportionality) is intimately tied to the fundamental purpose of sentencing — themaintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society through the imposition of just sanctions. Whatever weight a judge may wish to accord tothe various objectives and other principles listed in the Code, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle ofproportionality.

Proportionality is the sine qua non of a just sanction. First, the principle ensures that a sentence reflects the gravity of theoffence. This is closely tied to the objective of denunciation. It promotes justice for victims and ensures public confidence in the justicesystem. As Wilson J. expressed in her concurring judgment in Re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, (SCC), [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486, atp. 533:

It is basic to any theory of punishment that the sentence imposed bear some relationship to the offence; it must be a “fit” sentence proportionate to the seriousness of the offence. Only if this is so can the public be satisfied that the offender “deserved” the punishment he received and feel a confidence in the fairness and rationality of the system. Second, the principle of proportionality ensures that a sentence does not exceed what is appropriate, given the moral blameworthiness of the offender. In this sense, the principle serves a limiting or restraining function and ensures justice for the offender.

In the Canadian criminal justice system, a just sanction is one that reflects both perspectives on proportionality and does not elevate one at the expense of the other. [ 37 ] In R. v.

Ipeelee , supra , at paragraph 73 , the Court said this: In speaking of what are often called the Gladue factors which are to be considered in relation to Aboriginal offenders, the Court said: Gladue is entirely consistent with the requirement that sentencing judges engage in an individualized assessment of all of the relevant factors and circumstances, including the status and life experiences, of the person standing before them. [ 38 ] Though Mr. Cameron is not an Indigenous Person, I refer to R. v.

Ipeelee , supra , because it clearly states the Court’s reaffirmation that judges, in respect of all offenders, must “engage in an individualized assessment of all of the relevant factors and circumstances, including the …life experiences, of the person standing before them.” Consequently, I must consider the life experiences of Mr. Cameron when assessing his degree of responsibility in committing the offences for which I am sentencing him. [ 39 ] While I must assess Mr. Cameron’s “degree of responsibility” (which is one part of “proportionality” under

section 718.1), I must also be mindful of how “public safety” factors into the particulars of the case at bar. [ 40 ] In R. v. Ledesma 2022 ABCA 285 , our Court of Appeal cautioned sentencing judges about giving inadequate weight to the issue of public safety simply because of the presence, in the cases before them, of Gladue factors (which affect the “degree of responsibility”). The Court’s comments, though made in the context of sentencing an Aboriginal offender, are applicable to the case at bar because the sentencing of Mr.

Cameron involves both issues of public safety and the presence of factors in the life of Mr. Cameron which may affect his degree of responsibility. In R. v. Ledesma , supra , the Court said: [59] Viewing this case realistically, the tortured history of the appellant cannot change the fact that the public needs protection from him.

Tragically, that is sometimes the case with the result that the effect of those factors cannot overcome protection of the public: see eg R v Mattson , 2014 ABC A 178 at para 44 , 309 CCC (3d) 496; R v Dayton Dillon , 2014 SKCA 83 , 442 Sask R 185; R v Peekeekoot , 2014 SKCA 97 at para 46 , 446 Sask R 22, leave denied (2015) [2014] SCCA No 502 (QL) (SCC Np 36186); R v H(JW) , 2015 ONCA 617 , [2015] OJ No 4735 (QL); R v Jennings , 2016 BCCA 127 , 384 BCAC 152; R v Weese , 2016 ONCA 449 , 350 OAC 170. [60] More recently, and in the aftermath of leading cases such as Laboucane , supra , it is still the role of the Court to take a holistic view of the facts and to impose a fit and proportional sentence which is consistent with the protection of the public even if there are Gladue considerations (and even if there is error in addressing them): see R v Campeau , 2016 ABCA 378 at paras 16-18 , [2016] A.J.

No. 1240 (QL); R v Radcliffe , 2017 ONCA 176 at paras 52-59 . 347 CCC (3d) 3, leave denied [2017] SCCA No 274 (QL) (SCC No 37671) (also cited in L(FH) , 2018 ONCA 83 ); R v Bonnetrouge , 2017 NWTCA 1 at paras 21-26 , [2017] NWTJ No 2 (QL); R v Wolfleg , 2018 ABCA 222 at para 164 , 363 CCC (3d) 168, leave denied [2019] SCCA No 59 (QL) (SCC No 38541); R v Awasis , 2020 BCCA 23 at paras 120-135 , 385 CCC (3d) 369, leave denied [2020] SCCA No 225 (QL) (SCC No 39262); R v Vicaire , 2020 NBCA 77 at para 44 , 397 CCC (3d) 3; R v Toulejour , 2022 SKCA 20 at paras 65-77 , [2022] SJ No 40 (QL).. [61] Similarly, the magnitude of the offence and its impact on not only victims but society is also not automatically reduced by a tragic indigenous background: compare R v Michelle , 2015 MBCA 6 , 315 Man.R. (2d) 78; R v J(CJ) , 2022 ABCA 190 , at para 33 , 43 Alta LR (7th) 1.

We hasten to emphasize that we are not proposing that all these cases are entirely comparable to the case at bar. Rather, the common point in this lengthy line of authority is that the objective of protection of the public or the magnitude of the offence may be such that they overcome any potential effect of Gladue considerations: see also Newborn . [ 41 ] Likewise, in relation to Mr.

Cameron, when I reach my final conclusion as to a fit sentence, I must take into account his personal circumstances as part of my assessment of his “degree of responsibility”, but, at the same time, I must not lose sight of the public safety issues arising from his offending conduct. Case authority Firearms offences [ 42 ] The leading sentencing case for offences committed contrary to section 95(1) is R. v. Nur 2015 SCC 15 . At paragraph 82, Chief Justice McLachlin said: [82] Section 95(1) casts its net over a wide range of potential conduct.

Most cases within the range may well merit a sentence of three years or more, but conduct at the far end of the range may not. At one end of the range, as Doherty J.A. observed, “stands the outlaw who carries a loaded prohibited or restricted firearm in public places as a tool of his or her criminal trade. . . . [T]his person is engaged in truly criminal conduct and poses a real and immediate danger to the public”: para. 51. At this end of the range — indeed for the vast majority of offences — a three-year sentence may be appropriate.

A little further along the spectrum stands the person whose conduct is less serious and poses less danger; for these offenders three years’ imprisonment may be disproportionate, but not grossly so. At the far end of the range, stands the licensed and responsible gun owner who stores his unloaded firearm safely with ammunition nearby, but makes a mistake as to where it can be stored. For this offender, a three-year sentence is grossly disproportionate to the sentence the conduct would otherwise merit under the sentencing provisions of the Criminal Code . [ 43 ] In R. v.

Fares 2017 ABQB 509 , Justice Tilleman, after conducting a review of the relevant jurisprudence, said (at paragraph 19):

[19] The foregoing review of authorities suggests that the appropriate range for a first-time offender under s.95(1), in the absence ofsignificant aggravating or mitigating circumstances, is two to three years.... [44] In R. v. Fares, supra, the loaded firearms were in a residence, but no one had immediate physical possession of them. [45] In R. v.

Bird 2022 ABPC 9, Judge (as she then was) Tibbitt, after reviewing cases involving situations in which “the offenderheld or had immediate access to a loaded restricted or prohibited firearm in a vehicle or other public place”, said: [17] These cases suggest a range of 3 to 5 years incarceration for a violation of s. 95(1) of the Criminal Code in circumstances similar tothe case before the Court. This range is also consistent with the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R v Nur (supra).

Although thelength of sentence was not specifically argued before the Supreme Court, McLachlin, C.J., for the majority, upheld a sentence of 40months incarceration for a 19-year-old first-time offender who had a loaded semi-automatic handgun with an oversize clip near acommunity centre. [18] Sentencing is, of course, an individualized process, and lesser sentences have been imposed in exceptional circumstances.Exceptional circumstances may be found where moral culpability was low in the particular circumstances of the case, the offender didnot pose a risk to the community, and specific deterrence was not required. [46] As noted by Chief Justice McLachlin in Nur, one may violate section 95(1) in a wide variety of factual contexts.Consequently, the sentences imposed for section 95(1) offences do cover a wide spectrum which is generally found in the two to fiveyear range of incarceration.

Where a sentence should fall within that range, or whether it should fall outside that range, will bedetermined by the particular facts and factors at play in the particular case. [47] As to the offence contrary to

section 117.01(1), I respectfully rely upon the following guidance from our Court of Appeal in R.v. Hilbach 2020 ABCA 332 at paragraphs 77-78: [77]

Section 117.01, Criminal Code concerns violation of a firearms prohibition. Typically, sentences run concurrently to one another ifthey arise from the same circumstances. However, breach of a prohibition order is an exception to this rule as it is essentially a contemptof court order.

As a result, the sentencing judge should have made the term of imprisonment on the breach offence consecutive to thesentence imposed on the robbery offence, providing that the totality principle is not violated by the imposition of consecutive sentences:R v Martin, 2018 NLCA 12, para 25. [78] As a result, the sentence imposed by the sentencing judge for the violation of the firearms prohibition of two years less a day shouldhave been ordered to be served consecutively, not concurrently, subject to the totality principle…. [48] As to the actual length of sentence to be imposed for the breach of the firearms prohibition order, the same factors relating tothe offender’s degree of responsibility for the section 95(1) offence apply to the

section 117.01(1) offence. Indeed, they also apply to theoffences under sections 108(1)(b). [49] In addition to the general jurisprudence cataloguing the serious public safety concerns which accompany criminal offencesinvolving firearms, it is appropriate for me to consider the particular circumstances of the community in which the offences occurred, InR. v. M. (C.A.) (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, the Supreme Court of Canada said (at paragraph 91): [91] ...A sentencing judge also possesses the unique qualifications of experience and judgment from having served on the front lines ofour criminal justice system.

Perhaps most importantly, the sentencing judge will normally preside near or within the community whichhas suffered the consequences of the offender's crime. As such, the sentencing judge will have a strong sense of the particular blend ofsentencing goals that will be "just and appropriate" for the protection of that community.

The determination of a just and appropriatesentence is a delicate art which attempts to balance carefully the societal goals of sentencing against the moral blameworthiness of theoffender and the circumstances of the offence, while at all times taking into account the needs and current conditions of and in thecommunity.... [50] I am mindful that, as I write these Reasons for Sentence, the public in Calgary is aware of a shooting on a Calgary Transit bus,and a shooting in busy residential/commercial area just north of the downtown, both of which occurred this week and in the same 24-hour period.

As a “front-line” judge in this community, I am aware of the heightened concerns in this community about crimesinvolving firearms. [51] Having said that, I am also mindful that it would be wrong in law (and logic) to make the sentencing of Mr. Cameron aconvenient vehicle for the expression of the entirety of the public’s understandable fears arising from, and anger relating to, all firearmviolence occurring within the community. Through the sentences imposed upon Mr.

Cameron, he must answer for his offending conductin this community; however, he must not be made a lightening rod to attract all the public’s understandable outrage in relation to allfirearm offences in the community. [52] To possess a loaded handgun on a C-Train is an egregious criminal act in Canadian society. To knowingly possess a firearmfrom which the identifying serial number has been removed strikes a serious blow to part of the legislative enactments designed toprotect the public from the illegal use of firearms.

To possess firearms when a court has specifically prohibited one from doing so thwartspart of the judicial system’s efforts to protect the safety of public.

Section 718.1 requires the court to consider “the gravity of theoffence”; the firearms offences committed by Mr. Cameron are very serious. [53]

Section 718.1 also requires the court to consider “the degree of responsibility of the offender”. This is sometimes referred toas the moral blameworthiness of the offender, and, earlier in these Reasons, I have set out the law in relation to that aspect ofproportionality. [54] What must be remembered in the case at bar is that Mr. Cameron’s earlier criminal conduct relating to firearms occurredwhen he was 17 years old.[1] The person who led him into that activity, and participated in that activity with him, was his father. When

one considers Mr. Cameron’s turbulent childhood, and that his own father introduced him to, and participated with him in, the use of firearms as a means of committing criminal offences, one is compelled to repeat the comments of Justice Gerckol (as quoted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Ipeelee , supra ): “few mortals could withstand such a childhood and youth without becoming seriously troubled.” [ 55 ] I find that Mr. Cameron’s degree of responsibility for the offences which are before me for sentencing is significantly diminished. The sentences which I impose upon him must reflect that diminished responsibility. Sentences [ 56 ] In order comply with both

section 718.1 and

section 718.2(c) (totality), I have made concurrent some sentences which would normally be made consecutive. [ 57 ] I find that the following sentences achieve the applicable sentencing objectives and comply with the proportionality requirement of

section 718.1: Information 200856573P1 Count 4 [ section 95(1) ] - 730 days incarceration followed by two years probation. Count 6 [ section 108(1) (b)] - 365 days incarceration, concurrent. Count 7 [

section 117.01(1) ] - 23 days incarceration, consecutive. Count 11 [ section 145(5) (a)] - 30 days incarceration, concurrent. Count 12 [ section 145(5) (a)] - 30 days incarceration, concurrent. Information 200938744P1 Count 3 [

section 267 (a)] - 20 days incarceration consecutive to the 753 days incarceration imposed on Information 200856573P1, followed by two years probation concurrent to the two- year probation order on Count 3 of Information 200856573P1. Count 5 [ section 145(5) (a)] - 20 days concurrent. [ 58 ] The global sentence for both Informations is 773 days of incarceration. [ 59 ] I apply the 773 days of enhanced pre-sentence custody credit to the global sentence with the result that Mr. Cameron has no further days of incarceration to serve, but will be bound by two concurrent two-year probation orders. I will hear submissions from counsel on the terms of those orders. Ancillary Orders 1. Pursuant to

section 109, and in relation to count 4 on Information 200856573P1 and count 3 on Information 200938744P1, I make an order prohibiting Mr. Cameron from possessing any firearm, cross-bow, prohibited weapon, restricted weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, prohibited ammunition and explosive substance during his life. 2. Pursuant to

section 487.051(1) (primary designated offence), and in relation to count 3 on Information 200938744P1, I make an order in Form 5.03 authorising the taking of the number of samples of bodily substances from Mr. Cameron that is reasonably required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis. 3. Pursuant to

section 491, and in relation to Information 200856573P1, I make an order forfeiting to His Majesty the King the seized firearm and ammunition. 4. I find that it would be a financial hardship on the offender to impose victim surcharges on any of these matters, and I decline to do so. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 28 th day of April, 2023.

A.A. Fradsham A Justice of the Alberta Court of Justice Appearances: Ryan Jenkins for the Crown Matthew Walton for the Accused