R. v. Snelgrove, 2021 NLSC 149

court crest IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR GENERAL DIVISION Citation : R. v. Snelgrove , 2021 NLSC 149 Date : November 12, 2021 Docket : 201601G2389 Her Majesty The Queen v. Carl Douglas Snelgrove Restriction on Publication: By court order made under subsection 486.4(1) of the Criminal Code , information that may identify the person described in this judgment as the complainant or a witness shall not be published in any documents, broadcasted, or transmitted in any way. Before: Justice Vikas Khaladkar Reasons for Judgment Given Orally Place of Hearing: St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador Date of Hearing: September 29, 2021 Date of Oral Judgment: November 12, 2021

Summary:

The Offender, an on duty police officer, was convicted of sexually assaulting the Complainant contrary to section 271(1) of the CriminalCode by a Court composed of a judge and jury. The Offender was sentenced to a term of incarceration of four years, together with anumber of ancillary Orders. Appearances: Lloyd M. Strickland Appearing on behalf of the Crown Randolph J. Piercey, Q.C. & Jonathan E. Noonan Appearing on behalf of the Offender Authorities Cited: CASES CONSIDERED: R v. A. (K.J.) (1988), (NL CA), 69 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 99, 211 A.P.R. 99 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v.MacLean, 2021 NLCA 24; R. v.

Cook, 2010 ONSC 5016; R. v. Willis, 2018 NSSC 238; R. v. Keats, 2018 NSCA 16; R. v. Kennedy, 2021NLCA 42; R. v. Freake, 2012 NLCA 10; R. v. Squires, 2012 NLCA 20; R. v. M.R., 2018 ONSC 583; R. v. M.D., 2018 ONSC 2792; R. v.V. (H.G.), 2000 ABPC 160; R. v. H. (H.) (2002), (ON CA), 158 O.A.C. 272, 53 W.C.B. (2d) 493; R. v. M.(D.), 2001 NWTSC 6; R. v. G. (R.F.), 2006 NBCA 104; R. v. Doering, 2020 ONSC 5618; R. v. Kelly, 2019 NLCA 23 STATUTES CONSIDERED: Sexual Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10; Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c.

C-46 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT (SENTENCING) Khaladkar, J.: INTRODUCTION [1] Sentencing is often described as a trial judge’s most difficult task. And, it is. [2] My task today is to determine a fit sentence for the Offender, who was convicted by a jury of sexually assaulting theComplainant, a young woman who, having had a bit too much to drink, sought Cst. Snelgrove’s assistance in getting home. At the timeCst. Snelgrove was a member of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary. He was on duty, dressed in his uniform and sitting in his policecar in front of the Supreme Court building in St.

John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador. He was in the process of writing up his notes afterdepositing an arrested person at the lockup located in the basement of the Supreme Court. It was there, in the parking lot of the SupremeCourt, that the Complainant approached Cst. Snelgrove for help. She testified that she didn’t want to take a cab home for fear of beingsexually assaulted. She decided to repose her trust in a police officer. [3] Upon arriving at her home the Complainant discovered that she was locked out. Cst. Snelgrove assisted her in getting awindow to her basement apartment open.

She entered her apartment and opened the door. Cst. Snelgrove entered and, thereafter, theactivity that the jury found to be a sexual assault, occurred. [4] During trial, it was agreed by Counsel for the Offender (the “Defence”) that Cst. Snelgrove applied force to the Complainant,and that he did so intentionally. It was also admitted that the force that was applied was of a sexual nature. Cst. Snelgrove testified thatthe sexual acts consisted of fellatio, vaginal sex and anal sex. The Complainant testified that, on account of intoxication, she could notremember what transpired between her and Cst.

Snelgrove. [5] The jury were asked to determine whether the Complainant consented to these sexual acts and, if she could not or did not, todetermine whether Cst. Snelgrove honestly believed, mistakenly, that the Complainant consented. [6] The jury were also asked to determine whether the Complainant’s consent to the sexual activity was induced by means of theabuse of a position of trust, power or authority. [7] There is no question that Cst. Snelgrove was, at all material times, a person who occupied a position of authority.

[8] By making a finding of guilt the jury would have had to determine that: a. The Complainant did not consent to the sexual force that was applied to her; or b. The Complainant was too inebriated to consent to the sexual force that was applied to her; and c. Cst. Snelgrove knew that the Complainant did not consent; or d. Cst. Snelgrove was reckless or willfully blind to whether or not the Complainant consented; or e. Cst.

Snelgrove induced the Complainant to consent by abusing his position of authority. [9] For the purposes of my sentencing decision I find that the Complainant did not consent to the application of sexual force byCst. Snelgrove and, at all material times, he was in a position of authority owing to his occupation, his dress and the fact that he was onduty, at the time of the interaction between them. [10] I have taken into account the Complainant’s victim impact statement. Most victims in her circumstances never come forward atall. Many who do are unable to continue.

We try our best to give support, but it is not an easy thing to accomplish during the course of anadversarial process that demands impartiality and reserve. I applaud the officers of Victim’s Services – who provide much neededassistance as cases wend their way through the Courts. In this case for a period of seven years. [11] The Complainant has been traumatized not only by the sexual assault, but also by the time that it has taken to get this far. She ison medication for anxiety and depression. She feels unsafe in her own home.

She has had suicidal ideation and attempted to take her ownlife by overdosing on drugs. She is unable to maintain relationships because of what had happened to her. She moved away from St.John’s because she no longer felt safe in the City. [12] I have taken into account, as well, the sincere and impassioned plea that was made by Diana Parsons on behalf of her husband.Mr. Snelgrove is a lucky man to have Ms. Parsons advocating on his behalf. With her continuing support he will have a decent chancefor rehabilitation. There are many spouses who would not stand by an offender in circumstances such as these.

SENTENCING POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES Crown’s Sentencing Submission [13] The Crown submitted that a sentence of five years’ incarceration was appropriate under the circumstances. In addition, theCrown sought a DNA Order, registration under the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act, S.C. 2004, c. 10, a firearmsprohibition and a no contact Order under

section 743.21 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 while the Offender is incarcerated. [14] The Crown asked me to consider the following R. v. A. (K.J.) (1988), (NL CA), 69 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 99, 211A.P.R. 99 (Nfld. C.A.) factors: a. The extent of the sexual assault – I have already noted the sexual assault involved fellatio, unprotected vaginal intercourse andanal intercourse. The Crown submitted that these actions constituted a significant violation of the sexual integrity of the Complainant. b.

The degree of force used – Although sexual assaults are inherently violent, the Complainant testified that the sexual assault causedher physical pain for a period of time. The Crown asserted that this highlights the violent nature of the acts. c. The impact of the crime on the Complainant – We have the victim impact statement of the Complainant. The Crown submitsthat the Complainant, a young woman in the prime years of her life, has been permanently marred by the events of December, 2014.

Sheis now in a prison of her own and may have to cope with the psychological ill effects of the sexual assault for a very long time. d. The degree of trust involved – This, in the Crown’s submission, is the definitive factor in this case. There is, submits the Crown, atwo-fold breach of trust: the actions complained of breached the trust that the Complainant had in the Offender. She felt safe getting aride home with a police officer. She would not have allowed him into her home but for the fact that he was a police officer. But theCrown says that there is also a breach of trust for the broader community.

When a police officer exploits and assaults a vulnerable youngwoman, it stains the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary and blemishes the entire administration of justice. e. Public abhorrence – The Crown submitted that the public interest requires not only deterrence but, as well, denunciation for thetype of behaviour exhibited in this case. f. The Offender’s attitude – The Crown accepts that it was Mr. Snelgrove’s right to proceed to trial. However, there has been noexhibition of remorse that could be viewed as a mitigating factor in this case. g.

Need for specific and general deterrence – There is no need for specific deterrence in the Crown’s submission. Mr. Snelgrove isnot likely to reoffend. However, members of the public and, in particular, persons who occupy positions of authority and trust, must bewarned that breaches of that authority and trust will be dealt with appropriately by the Courts.

h. Prospect for rehabilitation – The Crown considers that Mr. Snelgrove is a good candidate for rehabilitation. He has no addictions, no criminal record and will not be returning to his former job as a police officer. While Mr. Snelgrove may be able to become a contributing member of society in the future, in the Crown’s submission his prospects for rehabilitation cannot override the need for deterrence. With respect to this factor, the Crown referred a recent case decided by the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal in R. v. MacLean , 2021 NLCA 24 .

In that case the Court of Appeal unanimously increased an intermittent 90 day sentence to three years’ incarceration. The case involved the sexual assault of a 12-year-old victim by a 21-year-old offender. The Court held that the trial judge erred by not giving primary consideration to denunciation and deterrence. i. The antecedents and age of the Offender – The Crown acknowledged that many people have come forward to vouch for Mr. Snelgrove’s character. The Crown referred to R. v.

Cook , 2010 ONSC 5016 , a decision of the Ontario Superior Court of Justice, in which Hill, J. wrote at paragraph 36: Not surprising is the reality that individuals who find themselves before a criminal court convicted of breach of trust crime are able to adduce abundant good character evidence – “[i]t is, of course, this very type of character profile which allows an individual to attain a position of trust” … j. Sentences imposed by other Courts in Newfoundland and Labrador and Canada – The Crown indicated that it was unable to locate a case directly on point.

The Crown referred to some analogous cases and, in particular the following: • R. v. Willis , 2018 NSSC 238 – A case in which a Canadian Border Security Agency officer used his position to force the complainant to have sexual intercourse with him on a number of occasions. He was sentenced to six years for sexual assault and breach of trust. • R. v. Keats , 2018 NSCA 16 – Mr. Keats, a paramedic, was in a position of trust and acting in his capacity as a paramedic when he sexually assaulted three victims at different times and places.

The assault against one of the victims consisted of the offender putting a stethoscope on the victim’s chest and pubic area, underneath her garments, and moving it about for a sexual purpose. Similarly, with a second victim, he fondled her breasts and vagina while she was being transported in an ambulance. And, in relation to the third victim, the offender sexually assaulted a patient by touching her breasts, digitally penetrating her and attempting oral and anal sex. The Court of Appeal held that a total sentence of six years and six months was appropriate for these criminal adventures. • R. v.

Kennedy , 2021 NLCA 42 – A unanimous Court of Appeal held that a three-year and six-month sentence imposed on an appellant who was convicted of sexual assault – including oral sex and vaginal intercourse, was appropriate. The Court of Appeal referred to its decision in R. v. Freake , 2012 NLCA 10 , in which the Court upheld a four-year sentence for sexual assault involving sexual intercourse and stated that the range of sentence for sexual assault involving sexual intercourse would be three to five years. • R. v.

Cook – An Ontario Superior Court of Justice decision in which a constable employed by the Peel Regional Police Service was sentenced to a total of five years and eight months for theft of 15 packages of what the constable thought was cocaine worth almost $500,000 and possession of stolen MP3 players and marijuana. • R. v. Freake – A case in which the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal reiterated that a sentence for a sexual assault involving intercourse in circumstances where the complainant and offender had been in a domestic relationship would be three to five years.

On appeal the sentencing judge’s four-year sentence for sexual assault was upheld. Mr. Freake was 20-years-old at the time of the offences and had a moderate criminal record. • R. v. Squires , 2012 NLCA 20 – The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal upheld sentences of four years for sexual assaults involving intercourse. Mr. Squires had, like Mr. Freake, been involved with the victim in a domestic relationship. [ 15 ] The Crown submitted that aggravating factors in the instant case include the extent of the assault, its impact on the Complainant and the profound breach of trust that was involved.

Accordingly, the Crown requested a sentence at the top of the judicially declared range. Defence’s Sentencing Submission [ 16 ] The Defence urged me to consider a sentence in the range of 18 months to two years. [ 17 ] The Defence acknowledged that there was a significant impact on the Complainant, and that there was a degree of trust involved. The Defence indicated that the Offender admitted the sexual acts that had taken place. The Defence indicated that there were no biological or psychiatric issues in this case, and felt that specific deterrence was not required.

The Defence noted that the Offender had good prospects for rehabilitation. [ 18 ] The Defence submitted that none of the sentencing authorities noted by the Crown ought to be given much weight. [ 19 ] The Defence reminded me that the Complainant never stated that she actively resisted. The Defence said that the Offender did not plan to involve himself in any sexual activity. At the Complainant’s residence, the Offender had left her house and went back to his police car. Only after he went back to the police car did the situation between him and the Complainant develop. [ 20 ] The Defence indicated that Mr.

Snelgrove had a 16-year career with the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary. The conviction will have huge consequences to his career. At the time of sentencing submissions Mr. Snelgrove had obtained employment at a job site in Labrador. [ 21 ] The Defence indicated that the letters of support filed in Mr. Snelgrove’s favour demonstrate his good character and the fact that he has people to return to. His wife continues to stand by him. [ 22 ] The Defence indicated that in the R. v. Cook case cited by the Crown, the accused had what he thought were 15 kilograms of

cocaine. He would have received five years in jail for the possession whether or not he was a police officer. [23] In paragraph 43 of the R. v. Cook decision the Defence noted that the Court took notice of the fact that a police officer willalmost inevitably serve much or all of his sentence in protective custody. The Court, in that case, held that the ensuing limitations onsocial contact and institutional amenities warrant consideration in mitigation of punishment. [24] The Defence distinguished the cases that had been cited by the Crown. The facts in R. v.

Freake were different from the case atbar the Defence argued. [25] In R. v. Keats a paramedic who raped an elderly woman received a sentence of 30 months for sexual assault. He was alreadyserving a sentence of four years in respect of another sexual assault that pre-dated the one that he was being sentenced upon. If I read theNova Scotia Court of Appeal’s decision correctly, Mr. Keats received a total of six and one-half years’ incarceration in respect of sexualassaults against two different women. [26] R. v.

Squires is an interesting decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal insofar as the majority held that a fitoverall sentence for two sexual assaults, an assault causing bodily harm and a common assault, was three years and three months. JusticeWelsh indicated that the lower end of the range for sexual assault involving sexual intercourse ought to become 18 months. However,Justice Rowe did not agree to such a reduction and Justice Hoegg, who was in the minority, felt that a sentence of four years for sexualassault was not demonstrably unfit.

The case can be taken for the proposition that 18 months is not the new lower end of the range forsexual assaults. In addition, the R. v. Squires case is one in which the victim and offender had an ongoing relationship. In this case nosuch relationship existed. [27] The Defence noted that the fact situation in R. v. Willis was much worse than the instant case. In R. v.

Willis, the CanadianBorder Security Agency employee received a six-year sentence on account of coerced sexual assaults against the victim that went on fora considerable period of time. [28] The Defence noted that the Complainant had testified that she might have gone along with kissing Cst. Snelgrove. [29] The Defence then referred me to a number of cases as follows: • R. v. M.R., 2018 ONSC 583 – The Ontario Superior Court of Justice sentenced the offender to 14 months in prison. He was anemployer who digitally penetrated a sleeping, drunk employee.

Justice Boswell noted, at paragraph 32 of his decision, “that the usualrange of sentence for an offender who has committed an invasive sexual assault on a sleeping or unconscious victim is eighteen monthsto three years in custody”. He held that the sexual assault in the M.R. case was minimally invasive – consisting, as it did, of digital analpenetration. • R. v. M.D., 2018 ONSC 2792 – The Ontario Superior Court of Justice sentenced an employer who performed cunnilingus upon,and briefly digitally penetrated, a sleeping employee.

A nine-month sentence of incarceration was imposed, along with a probationOrder. • R. v. V. (H.G.), 2000 ABPC 160 – The Alberta Provincial Court imposed a two-year conditional sentence on an offender, a soccercoach, who had fondled one of the victims and performed fellatio on another while they slept. The victims were both soccer players. Theoffender had pleaded guilty to the charges and had no criminal record. • The M.D. and V. (H.G.) cases are distinguishable on a number of grounds. Firstly, the sexual acts complained of in this case aresubstantially more invasive.

Secondly, the Offender here was a police officer who was on duty and in uniform when the acts occurred.There is a different standard of expected behaviour insofar as police officers are concerned. The cases are not analogous in my opinion. • R. v. H. (H.) (2002), (ON CA), 158 O.A.C. 272, 53 W.C.B. (2d) 493 – An employer took an employee to hishome, had her drink until she passed out, carried her upstairs to a bedroom, undressed her and had vaginal sexual intercourse with her.She woke up and told him to stop, but he continued until he was finished.

At trial the offender was sentenced to a two year less a dayconditional sentence Order. On appeal to the Ontario Court of Appeal the Court imposed a custodial sentence of 18 months in addition tothe time (almost two years) that had already been served under the conditional sentence Order. Justice Charron wrote, at paragraph 5,that in the Court’s view “a penitentiary term would have been appropriate”. H. (H.) is distinguishable on the basis that Mr. Snelgrovewas a police officer on duty at the time of the offence. It is also distinguishable in that the nature of the acts committed by Mr.

Snelgrovewere more intrusive. • R. v. M. (D.), 2001 NWTSC 6 – The Northwest Territories Supreme Court sentenced the offender, an uncle to the victim, to a termof two years’ incarceration on account of a joint submission, following a guilty plea. The case has limited precedential value because itwas a joint submission. • R. v. G. (R.F.), 2006 NBCA 104 – The New Brunswick Supreme Court sentenced a female teacher who had had sexual intercoursewith a 13-year- old student to a conditional sentence Order for two years less a day.

On appeal, the New Brunswick Court of Appealconverted the sentence to one of imprisonment for the same term. [30] The Defence submitted that Mr. Snelgrove has performed significant service to his country. He has served in a United Nationspeacekeeping force in Kosovo. He has been a member of the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary for 16 years and served on their tacticalsquad, a position of some responsibility. The Defence reminded me that Mr. Snelgrove testified that he felt regret immediately after theincident, and that he had not gone to the Complainant’s apartment with the intention of committing any illegal act.

He has a number ofletters of support that were filed with the Court, and I have had an opportunity to review all of them. analysis [31] None of the cases filed by the Crown or the Defence are directly on point. There are no reported cases of police officers

committing sexual assaults while on duty and in uniform. Nevertheless, there is a body of law that deals with situations in which policeofficers have run afoul of the law, and those cases are instructive. [32] In R. v. Doering, 2020 ONSC 5618 Justice Pomerance notes at paragraph 25: It has been recognized that crimes committed by police officers represent a breach of the public trust.

It is for this reason that police are“held to a higher standard than would be expected of ordinary citizens”, and “the principles of denunciation and general deterrencebecome magnified” in the sentencing of police … [33] Police officers take an oath to serve and protect members of the public. They swear that, in doing so, they will uphold the lawand that they will abide by the values of the community that they serve. In performing their functions as police officers the communityreposes in them a great deal of trust and power.

When a police officer commits a criminal offence the community’s trust suffers. [34] In R. v. Kelly, 2019 NLCA 23, Justice Hoegg wrote: 83 It is well established in sentencing case law that law enforcement officers who break the law breach the public trust placed inthem, especially when the offence committed is related to the officer’s duties. Such breaches are regarded as serious, and call foremphasis on denunciation and deterrence in sentencing … 84 In R. v. M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500 (S.C.C.). Lamer C.J.C. explained the sentencing objective ofdenunciation (section 718(

a) of the Code) at paragraph 81: …The objective of denunciation mandates that a sentence should also communicate society’s condemnation of that particular offender’sconduct. In short, a sentence with a denunciatory element represents a symbolic, collective statement that the offender’s conduct shouldbe punished for encroaching on our society’s basic code of values as enshrined within our substantive criminal law. As Lord JusticeLawton stated in R. v. Sargeant (1974), 60 Cr. App.

R. 74, at p. 77: “society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of particulartypes of crime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is by the sentences they pass”. The relevance of both retribution anddenunciation as goals of sentencing underscores that our criminal justice system is not simply a vast system of negative penaltiesdesigned to prevent objectively harmful conduct by increasing the cost the offender must bear in committing an enumerated offense. Ourcriminal law is also a system of values.

A sentence which expresses denunciation is simply the means by which these values arecommunicated. In short, in addition to attaching negative consequences to undesirable behaviour, judicial sentences should also beimposed in a manner which positively instills the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians as expressed by the CriminalCode. [35] Let me put all of this into layman’s terms. [36] Mr. Snelgrove’s actions on the night of December 21st, 2014 were reprehensible.

They offend our values as Canadian citizens.They bring the Royal Newfoundland Constabulary and the administration of justice into considerable disrepute. Members of the public,including the Complainant in this case, deserve to be secure in the knowledge and belief that no harm will befall them at the hands of apolice officer. That knowledge and belief has been severely strained, if not shattered, by what happened in this case. [37]

Section 718 of the Criminal Code instructs that: the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for thelaw and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by unlawful conduct; • Denunciation is one of the prime factors that I am bound to consider. (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; • I acknowledge that specific deterrence of Mr. Snelgrove is not a factor that I need consider. It is highly unlikely that he willreoffend. However, general deterrence is a prime factor that I must consider. The sentence that I impose today must send a message toother persons in a position of power and authority and, in particular, police officers that this type of conduct is never appropriate and willbe appropriately dealt with by the Courts when it occurs. (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary;

• The sentence that I am going to impose will separate Mr. Snelgrove from society. However, its main purpose is less to separate him from society and more to serve as a deterrent to others who might consider engaging in similar forms of conduct. (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders: • Mr. Snelgrove will lose his job as a police officer. He has found alternative employment. He is employable. I do not expect that Mr. Snelgrove will be involved in any further criminal activity. The sentence is not needed to rehabilitate him. (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and • I acknowledge there is no sentence I can deliver that will put the victim back in the condition she was in before these events transpired. I am hopeful, however, that she will feel vindicated despite a long, and arduous, journey through the criminal justice system. The community should be satisfied that Mr. Snelgrove has been dealt with in a manner that will deter police officers from similar behaviour in the future. (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgement of the harm done to victims or to the community. • I am reasonably certain that Mr. Snelgrove has a grasp of the damage that he caused by a serious lapse in his judgment. [ 38 ] Under

section 718.2 of the Criminal Code I am bound to consider some additional principles relating to aggravating and mitigating factors. I will deal with the applicable principles only: (iii) evidence that the offender, in committing the offence, abused a position of trust or authority in relation to the victim. • I have discussed the Offender’s position as a police officer elsewhere in my decision.

Suffice it to say that the fact he was an on duty police officer is an aggravating factor that I have considered for the purposes of sentencing. (iii.1) evidence that the offence had a significant impact on the victim, considering their age and other personal circumstances, including their health and financial situation. • The Complainant has been significantly impacted. I consider this an aggravating factor in sentencing. • I have considered mitigating the fact that Mr. Snelgrove will most likely be spending all of his time in the penitentiary in segregation. CONCLUSION [ 39 ] Mr. Snelgrove, please rise.

Before proceeding with the passing of sentence, Mr. Snelgrove, do you have anything that you wish to say? [ 40 ] On the single count of sexual assault I sentence you to a penitentiary term of four years’ imprisonment. I give you credit, at the rate of one and one-half to one for the time that you have spent in custody. That time will be deducted from the sentence I am imposing on you today. [ 41 ] In addition to the term of incarceration, I make the following ancillary Orders: a. Under

section 743.21(1) of the Criminal Code I prohibit you from contacting the Complainant, directly or indirectly for any purpose during the custodial period of your sentence; b. Pursuant to

section 487.051(1) of the Criminal Code it is ordered that you provide such samples as are required for the purpose of forensic DNA analysis; c. Pursuant to

section 490.012(1) of the Criminal Code it is ordered that you comply with the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act and, under

section 490.013(2) (

b) of the Criminal Code the duration of the Order shall be 20 years; d. Pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code it is ordered that you are prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, restricted

weapon, ammunition and explosive substance for a period of 10 years and any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition for life. _____________________________ Vikas Khaladkar Justice