R. v. Cody, 2018 NLSC 46

court crest IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR GENERAL DIVISION Citation : R. v. Cody , 2018 NLSC 46 Date : March 5, 2018 Docket : 201701G1823 Her Majesty The Queen v. Jarrett Cody Before: Justice Rosalie McGrath Edited Transcript of Oral Reasons for Judgment Place of Hearing: St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador Date of Hearing: February 28, 2018 Date of Oral Judgment: February 28, 2018

Summary: The offender was sentenced to two years plus one day in jail for possession of hydromorphone and oxycodone for the purpose of trafficking.

Appearances: Elaine M. Reid Appearing on behalf of the Crown Jarrett Cody Appearing on his own behalf Authorities Cited: CASES CONSIDERED: R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43; R. v. Druken, 2006 NLCA 67; R. v. Oxford, 2010 NLCA 45; R. v. Oates(1992), (NL CA), 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 289, 16 W.C.B. (2d) 485 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Kane, 2012 NLCA 53; R. v. Brake(2017), 139 W.C.B. (2d) 605, 2017 CarswellNfld 345 (Prov. Ct.); R. v. Stewart, 2012 NLTD(G) 187; R. v. Klassen, 2011 NLTD(G) 100 STATUTES CONSIDERED: Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19; Criminal Code. R.S.C. 1985, c.

C-46 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT SENTENCING McGrath, J.: INTRODUCTION [1] Mr. Cody has been charged and pleaded guilty to the following two counts contained in an Indictment filed on February 28,2017: Count #1: On or about the 20th day of August, A.D., 2015, at or near St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, did unlawfully have in hispossession, for the purpose of trafficking, hydromorphone, a substance included in

Schedule 1 of the Controlled Drugs and SubstancesAct, S.C. 1996, c. 19, and did thereby commit an indictable offence contrary to Section 5(2)-5(3)(

a) of the said Act. Count #2: On or about the 20th day of August, A.D., 2015, at or near St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, did unlawfully have in hispossession, for the purpose of trafficking, oxycodone, a substance included in

Schedule 1 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act,S.C. 1996, c. 19, and did thereby commit an indictable offence contrary to Section 5(2)-5(3)(

a) of the said Act. [2] The matter is before me today for sentencing. FACTS [3] The Crown and Mr. Cody signed an Agreed Statement of Facts that was filed with the Court, and is attached as

Schedule ‘A’to this decision. [4] To briefly summarize, Mr. Cody has admitted to having possession of 58 oxycodone pills and 574 hydromorphone pills, bothof which are prohibited substances under

Schedule 1 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act, S.C. 1996, c. 19 (“CDSA”). These

pills were contained in a large white pill bottle that also contained 46 vitamins. The pill bottle was located in Mr. Cody’s front, rightjeans pocket when he disembarked a flight from Toronto to St. John’s. The RCMP/RNC Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit(CFSEU-NL) in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador, were present at St. John’s International Airport when Mr. Cody disembarkedhis flight as they had obtained information from an ongoing police investigation in the province of Ontario that Mr. Cody would becarrying a significant quantity of prescription medications. [5] Mr.

Cody was arrested shortly after he disembarked the flight. The pill bottle and drugs were seized. Subsequent laboratorytesting confirmed the contents of the pills in the bottle. During the course of being searched at the airport, Mr. Cody stated that he hadrun into some hard times and needed quick money.

He further advised police that someone else had bought him the plane ticket. [6] The Agreed Statement of Facts also confirmed the contents of an expert opinion prepared by RCMP Constable DavidEmberley of the CFSEU-NL, opining that the street value of the prohibited drugs was $4,640.00 for the oxycodone pills and $20,090.00for the hydromorphone pills, for a total street value for the seized drugs of $24,730.00. [7] Constable Emberley provided his opinion that, given the quantity, method of storage and value of the drugs seized and thecomments of Mr. Cody upon arrest, Mr.

Cody possessed oxycodone and hydromorphone for the purposes of trafficking. ConstableEmberley based his opinion upon the fact that the pills were mixed together in a vitamin bottle, where accidental ingestion could be fatal,and the fact that most persons with prescriptions for these pills keep them in the bottle in which they were prescribed or in pillorganizers. Constable Emberley also provided his opinion that those who use opioids typically are not in possession of more than acouple of pills at a time as opposed to the quantity possessed by Mr.

Cody. [8] Based upon the agreed facts, I find that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Cody knowingly hadpossession of hydromorphone and oxycodone. Having reviewed Constable Emberley’s curriculum vitae and the contents of his report, Iam prepared to qualify Constable Emberley as an expert in the possession, trafficking, sale, value and pricing of oxycodone andhydromorphone. I accept his uncontroverted expert opinion that the 58 oxycodone pills had a street value of $4,640.00 and the 574hydromorphone pills had a street value of $20,090.00 for a total street value of $24,730.00.

I also accept his opinion that, given thequantity, method of storage and value of drugs seized, and the comments of Mr. Cody upon arrest, Mr. Cody possessed oxycodone andhydromorphone for the purposes of trafficking. As a result, the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the possession by Mr.Cody of hydromorphone and oxycodone was for the purpose of trafficking. Convictions on both those counts are therefore entered. ISSUES [9] The sole issue for determination is the sentence to be imposed for these offences.

The Crown suggests that a total prisonsentence of two years for these offences is a fit and appropriate sentence and had put this recommendation to Mr. Cody who indicated hispreference that the custodial sentence be two years plus a day to allow him to serve his sentence at a federal institution. Mr. Codyconfirmed to me that this is his submission for sentencing. The Crown says it is agreeable to a sentence of two years plus a day as itdoes not feel a period of probation is required in Mr. Cody’s circumstances, with Mr.

Cody having the benefit of rehabilitative services ina federal institution. [10] The Crown also seeks ancillary orders including a firearms prohibition order, a DNA order, a victim surcharge and a forfeitureorder in respect of all offence-related property. Mr. Cody confirmed he is in agreement with these ancillary orders as well. [11] The Crown notes that this is not truly a joint submission on sentencing as Mr. Cody is representing himself. A self-representedaccused does not necessarily have the legal knowledge required to assess what is a fit and appropriate sentence.

In such a case, the courtshould take care to ensure justice is done. However, as the submissions on sentencing of the Crown and Mr. Cody are the same, I willconsider the principles applicable to a joint sentencing submission. As well, I note that, even in a situation where there is a jointsubmission from counsel for the Crown and counsel for the accused, I must still have in mind whether the proposed sentence is close tothe range of a fit and appropriate sentence.

I will therefore undertake that exercise. principles of sentencing [12] In respect of a joint sentencing submission, the Supreme Court of Canada, in R. v. Anthony-Cook, 2016 SCC 43, held that,except in rare exceptional circumstances, joint submissions should be accepted by the sentencing judge. The Supreme Court of Canadarelied heavily on the decisions of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal in R. v. Druken, 2006 NLCA 67 and R. v. Oxford,2010 NLCA 45. [13] Those decisions adopted the public interest test in determining whether a trial Judge should depart from a joint submission.

Atparagraph 32 of Anthony-Cook, the Supreme Court of Canada stated that the public interest test requires a trial judge to accept a jointsubmission unless the proposed sentence would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or is otherwise contrary to the publicinterest. [14] In determining whether a joint submission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contrary to the publicinterest, the Supreme Court of Canada referred with approval to Druken, at paragraph 33 of the Anthony-Cook decision: 33 In Druken , at para. 29, the court held that a joint submission will bring the administration of justice into disrepute or be contraryto the public interest if, despite the public interest considerations that support imposing it, it is so "markedly out of line with theexpectations of reasonable persons aware of the circumstances of the case that they would view it as a break down in the properfunctioning of the criminal justice system".

And, as stated by the same court in R. v. O. (B.J.), 2010 NLCA 19 (N.L. C.A.) , atpara. 56, when assessing a joint submission, trial judges should "avoid rendering a decision that causes an informed and reasonablepublic to lose confidence in the institution of the courts". [15] At paragraph 34 of Anthony-Cook, Justice Moldaver notes that rejecting a joint submission denotes that the submission is: 34 …so unhinged from the circumstances of the offence and the offender that its acceptance would lead reasonable and informed

persons, aware of all the relevant circumstances, including the importance of promoting certainty in resolution discussions, to believe that the proper functioning of the justice system had broken down. [ 16 ] Justice Moldaver notes that this is an undeniably high threshold and for good reason. [ 17 ] The Supreme Court of Canada, at paragraphs 51 and 52 of Anthony-Cook , directed that sentencing judges should first approach a joint submission on an "as-is" basis, but secondly, should apply the public interest test when they are considering “jumping” or “undercutting” a joint submission. [ 18 ] As noted above, even when faced with a joint submission that requires further scrutiny, I must apply the public interest test, including a consideration of whether the sentence is close to the range of what is a fit and appropriate sentence.

This includes consideration of the statutory sentencing principles set out in the Criminal Code , R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. The

preamble to

section 718 states that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is the protection of society and the contribution of sentencing, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. A number of objectives are stated in an attempt to achieve this purpose. These include:

a) denunciation of unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or the community at large;

b) general and specific deterrence;

c) the separation of offenders from society, where necessary;

d) rehabilitation of offenders;

e) reparation for harm done to victims or to the community; and

f) the promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims or to the community. [ 19 ] Another fundamental principle of sentencing is set forth in

section 718.1. This principle provides that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

Section 718.2 requires that I take into consideration a number of other factors which may increase or reduce the sentence having regard to aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to both the offence and the offender. Further, this

section also articulates the parity principle that a like sentence ought to be imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances. [ 20 ] Finally, in sentencing an offender under the CDSA , I must be satisfied that the proposed sentence is consistent with the objectives and principles of sentencing as set out in

section 10 of that Act as follows: 10

(1) Without restricting the generality of the Criminal Code , the fundamental purpose of any sentence for an offence under this

Part is to contribute to the respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society while encouraging rehabilitation, and treatment in appropriate circumstances, of offenders and acknowledging the harm done to victims and to the community. Marginal note:Factors to take into consideration

(2) If a person is convicted of a designated substance offence for which the court is not required to impose a minimum punishment, the court imposing sentence on the person shall consider any relevant aggravating factors including that the person (

a) in relation to the commission of the offence, (

i) carried, used or threatened to use a weapon, (ii) used or threatened to use violence, (iii) trafficked in a substance included in

Schedule I, II, III, IV or V, or possessed such a substance for the purpose of trafficking, in or near a school, on or near school grounds or in or near any other public place usually frequented by persons under the age of 18 years, or (iv) trafficked in a substance included in

Schedule I, II, III, IV or V, or possessed such a substance for the purpose of trafficking, to a person under the age of 18 years; (

b) was previously convicted of a designated substance offence; or

(

c) used the services of a person under the age of eighteen years to commit, or involved such a person in the commission of, the offence.

(3) If, under subsection (1), the court is satisfied of the existence of one or more of the aggravating factors enumerated in paragraphs (2)(

a) to (c), but decides not to sentence the person to imprisonment, the court shall give reasons for that decision. Marginal note:Drug treatment court program

(4) A court sentencing a person who is convicted of an offence under this Part may delay sentencing to enable the offender (

a) to participate in a drug treatment court program approved by the Attorney General; or (

b) to attend a treatment program under subsection 720(2) of the Criminal Code.

(5) If the offender successfully completes a program under subsection (4), the court is not required to impose the minimum punishmentfor the offence for which the person was convicted. analysis [21] The starting point is to recognize that the possession of

Schedule 1 drugs for the purpose of trafficking carries a maximumpunishment of life in prison. There is no minimum penalty for this offence. [22] The Crown correctly notes that in most drug trafficking crimes, general deterrence and protection of the public are thedominant considerations. This is recognized in the 1992 decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal in R. v. Oates(1992), (NL CA), 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 289, 16 W.C.B. (2d) 485 (Nfld. C.A.), per Goodridge, C.J.N and the morerecent 2012 decision of the Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal in R. v. Kane, 2012 NLCA 53, per Welsh, J.A.

The focus ongeneral deterrence and protection of the public means that the punishment should be of sufficient severity to discourage any othermembers of the community from engaging in this type of criminal activity. [23] As well, it cannot be contested that the possession of

Schedule 1 drugs for the purpose of trafficking is a serious crimerequiring a significant term of imprisonment. The sale and use of illicit drugs causes far-reaching harm to individuals and the generalpublic. As Constable Emberley notes in his report, opiate abuse is a serious problem in this Province, leading to large increases in armedrobberies, drug store break-ins and other crimes, as addicts try to feed their addictions. [24] The Crown referred me to the Provincial Court decision of Judge Porter in R. v. Brake (2017), 139 W.C.B. (2d) 605, 2017CarswellNfld 345 (Prov. Ct.) in which Judge Porter describes

Schedule 1 drugs as “hard” drugs. In particular, he states the following atparagraph 3: 3 The penalties for trafficking drugs and controlled substances vary according to the substances and drugs, which are particularized inthe Schedules.

Schedule 1 includes "hard" drugs, including opium, codeine, morphine, hydromorphone, oxycodone, oxymorphone andcocaine. Given that they all belong to the same Schedule, sentences for the various offences will be comparable. [25] The Crown was unable to find any cases directly on point dealing with hydromorphone or oxycodone in similar circumstances,but on the basis that they are “hard” drugs under

Schedule 1, she submits that sentencing decisions in respect of other

Schedule 1 drugs,such as cocaine, establish the acceptable range of sentencing. As noted above, the sentence for Mr. Cody should be similar to sentencesimposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances. [26] In sentencing an offender for trafficking in illicit drugs, the case of Oates from the Newfoundland Court of Appeal, providesguidance as to the acceptable range of sentences for trafficking in serious drugs.

In Oates, Goodridge, C.J.N. declined to interfere with asentence of two years less a day for conspiracy to traffic in cocaine but noted that a sentence in the range of 3 ½ to 4 years would havebeen more in keeping with the offence in light of the factor of general deterrence. However, it is noted that in Oates, there was evidencethat the accused had conspired with others to import five shipments of cocaine into the Province in what could be referred to as asophisticated operation. The offender’s role was described as going beyond that of a courier.

The drugs seized also were in a largequantity with a 1992 street value of $61,000.00. The type and quantity of drug involved, the sophistication of the organization and theperiod of time involved, as well as the role or level of the accused in the organization, are all factors to be considered on sentencing. [27] However, in the case before me, the drugs seized had a significantly lower street value than in Oates. Further, the facts do notreveal a level of sophistication to this crime, with Mr. Cody’s involvement appearing to be that of a courier as opposed to a high levelplayer.

The circumstances of these offences and this offender are much closer to the cases put before me by the Crown in whichsentences in the two-year range were imposed. [28] In the decision of Justice Goodridge of this Court, in R. v. Stewart, 2012 NLTD(G) 187, Justice Goodridge sentenced anoffender to two years in prison for possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

In that case, the offender had 116.8 gm ofcocaine, an amount which is typical of a mid-level drug dealer as opposed to a wholesaler. [29] In that decision, Justice Goodridge reviewed other sentencing decisions from this Province and Nova Scotia in which prison

sentences of between fifteen months to five years were imposed in respect of the offence of trafficking or conspiracy to traffic in hard drugs. Justice Goodridge noted that the circumstances before him in Stewart were at the lesser range in terms of seriousness of the offence, justifying a two-year sentence. [ 30 ] In another decision of Justice Goodridge of this Court, R. v. Klassen , 2011 NLTD(G) 100, an offender who acted as a courier was sentenced to two years in jail, followed by two years’ probation, for trafficking in cocaine and ecstasy.

The street value of the drugs in the offender’s possession in that case was anywhere between $45,686.00 and $164,735.00, a much larger quantity than in the case of Mr. Cody. As a result, it could be said that in Klassen , there was a higher degree of seriousness for sentencing purposes within the broad range of drug trafficking offences. [ 31 ] Finally, in Brake , referred to above, Judge Porter thoroughly canvassed comparable sentencing decisions and imposed a prison term of two years’ incarceration, followed by three years’ probation.

In that case, the offender was convicted after trial of possession of a kilogram of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. In that case, Mr. Brake was in a similar position to Mr. Cody in that he was transporting the drugs for another person. [ 32 ] Overall, having considered the acceptable range of sentences for these offences as set out above, I am satisfied that the proposed sentence of two years plus one day falls within that acceptable range. While the two offences of possession for the purpose of trafficking in

Schedule 1 drugs are serious offences requiring a significant jail term in order to achieve specific and general deterrence, I am satisfied that the circumstances of this case justify a jail term towards the lower end of the acceptable range. [ 33 ] In making this finding, firstly, I note that none of the aggravating factors set out in section 10(2) of the CDSA are present in respect of this offence. [ 34 ] Secondly, I note that the offender comes before this Court as a first time offender who has pleaded guilty to both counts, saving the Crown the expense of a trial.

He has acknowledged responsibility for his actions and indicated a willingness to serve his time in a federal institution where he will obtain programming to improve his prospects for rehabilitation. This will provide protection to the public. The Crown, in this case, does not think that probation following a jail term is necessary. [ 35 ] I have also considered Mr. Cody’s statement that he wishes to serve time in a federal penitentiary to avoid association with prisoners he may know at the Penitentiary.

He has indicated a desire to do his time, undergo programming and return as soon as possible to his three month old daughter. As well, Mr. Cody has no prior criminal record. [ 36 ] In terms of aggravating factors, I note that the possession of

Schedule 1 drugs is a serious charge. As well, the amount of drugs in Mr. Cody’s possession was not insignificant, with the drugs having a $24,000.00 street value. However, it is not such a large quantity as to put it at the higher end of the range. In addition, Mr. Cody does not appear as a high level player in a sophisticated criminal organization. [ 37 ] I therefore find that a sentence of two years plus one day in jail for each count of possession for the purpose of trafficking, to be served concurrently, meets the public interest test and falls within the range of a fit and appropriate sentence.

It achieves the goals of specific and general deterrence and separates Mr. Cody from society for the duration of his time in prison. A total sentence of two years plus a day in federal prison should discourage Mr. Cody and others from engaging in the illegal trafficking in drugs while still meeting the objective of rehabilitation. DISPOSITION [ 38 ] Mr. Cody, please stand now while I impose your sentence. Imprisonment [ 39 ] You are sentenced to two years plus one day in jail for each count of possession for the purpose of trafficking, to be served concurrently. DNA ORDER [ 40 ] Pursuant to

section 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code , an order is granted permitting the taking of bodily substances from you for DNA profiling and analysis (Form 5.04). I am satisfied that the public interest is served by making such an order. Firearms Prohibition [ 41 ] Pursuant to

section 109 of the Criminal Code , I impose a firearms prohibition. This is a lifetime prohibition in the case of any prohibitive firearm, restrictive firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device and prohibited ammunition; and it is a 10-year prohibition for other firearms, crossbows, restricted weapons, ammunition and explosive substances. Forfeiture Order [ 42 ] A forfeiture order under section 16(1) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act is granted. The offence-related property includes: 1. the pill bottle seized; 2. the 58 oxy 8 mg pills (oxycodone);

3. the 574 dilaudid 8 mg pills (hydromorphone); and 4. 46 vitamin pills (not scheduled). Victim Surcharge [ 43 ] Finally, I order you to pay a mandatory victim surcharge of $200.00 ($100.00 for each offence) pursuant to section 737(2) (

b) of the Criminal Code . This surcharge shall be paid within 30 days and in default shall be subject to the additional penalty as set out in the regulations. conclusion [ 44 ] In conclusion, I accept the parties’ submissions on sentence, and impose a sentence of imprisonment on Mr. Cody of two years plus one day, along with ancillary orders, which include a DNA order, a

section 109 order, a forfeiture order and a victim surcharge order. _____________________________ Rosalie McGrath Justice

SCHEDULE ‘A’ AGREED STATEMENT OF FACTS 1. On August 20, 2015, police officers with the Combined Forces Special Enforcement Unit in St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador (CFSEU-NL), attended a meeting to discuss reliable information received by Cst. Cody Field. The information was obtained as a result of an ongoing police investigation in the province of Ontario. In the course of the Ontario investigation, private communications were intercepted pursuant to a

Part VI Authorization (Wiretap) that Jarrett Cody (1986-08-23) would be arriving in St. John’s on August 20, 2015 via an Air Canada Flight, and that he would be carrying a significant quantity of prescription medications. Subsequent information was received that Mr. Cody would be arriving at 7:25 p.m. on flight 686 from Toronto. 2. Five officers of the CFSEU-NL attended the St. John’s International Airport to await Jarrett Cody’s arrival. At 7:28 p.m., Cst. Randy White observed Jarrett Cody approach the arrival gate from the flight. Mr.

Cody was wearing jeans and a dark coloured shirt, a light coloured belt, and a dark ball cap. Mr. Cody had a large white pill bottle with a purple cap in his front right pocket. 3. Cst. White and Cst. Brendon McGuire approached Mr. Cody, identified themselves as police officers, and advised Mr. Cody he was under arrest. The officers conducted this in a manner not to draw attention to themselves or Mr. Cody and they asked Mr. Cody to move away from the gate area. Once away from the gate, Mr. Cody was handcuffed and walked to the Canada Border Services secure screening area. 4. At 7:30 p.m. Mr.

Cody was again advised he was under arrest for possession for the purpose of trafficking in controlled drugs; he was read his rights and caution from the police issued card; Mr. Cody indicated he understood his rights and he did not want to contact counsel. 5. Mr. Cody was subsequently searched, incident to arrest, in the secure screening area and a large white pill bottle with a purple cap was seized from his front right jeans pocket. It was subsequently determined that the pill bottle contained the following: a. 58 Oxy 80mg pills (Oxycodone,

Schedule 1 CDSA )

b. 574 Dilaudid 8mg pills (Hydromorphone,

Schedule 1 CDSA ) c. 46 Vitamins (not scheduled) Photos, taken by Cst. Richard Wheaton, attached at Tab 1, show Mr. Cody, the pill bottle in this pocket, and the pills laid out next to the bottle for counting. 6. At 7:31 p.m. during the search, Mr. Cody stated, “this wasn’t supposed to happen; I just needed a quick buck, ran into some hard times.” Mr. Cody went on to say that someone else had bought him the plane ticket and that he was supposed to have flown in earlier, but that never happened. Mr.

Cody stated he did not believe the drugs would have been found if he had come in on the earlier flight as he had them better concealed earlier, but that did not work for the later flight. 7. At 7:45 p.m., Mr. Cody was released on a Promise to Appear and Police Undertaking. 8. The seized items were transported to the CFSEU-NL office were [sic] they were processed by the police for submission to the Health Canada Laboratory for analysis. A sample from the Oxy 80 pills was given exhibit number D0377625. A sample from the Dilaudid 8 pills was given exhibit number D0377627. 9.

Health Canada certificates of Analysis were returned from the Laboratory (Tab 2). These confirm that the pills that appeared to be Oxy 80, exhibit D0377625, were Oxycodone, a

Schedule 1 controlled substance under the Controlled Durgs and Substances Act (see Certificate No. 15 38741

M) and that the pills that appeared to be Dilaudid 8, exhibit D0377627, were Hydromorphone, also a

Schedule 1 controlled substance under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (See Certificate No. 15 38743 M). 10. An Expert Opinion was prepared in relation to this file by Cst. David Emberley. (Expert Opinion and Curriculum Vitae are at Tab 3). Cst. Emberley’s report explains the background of the drugs in question and highlights that, “the abuse of prescription pill opiates in Newfoundland and Labrador is rampant. This has led to a huge demand for prescription pill opiates on the street.” 11. Cst.

Emberley’s Expert Opinion outlines that at the time of these offences, the street values for these drugs were: a. 1 @ Oxy 80 (oxycodone) = $80; 58 oxycodone 80 x $80 = $4,640. b. 1 @ Dilaudid 8 (hydromorphone) = $35; 574 hydromorphone x $35 = $20,090.00 Therefore the approximate total street value for the drugs seized from Mr. Cody was $24,730. 12. Cst.

Emberley provided an expert opinion that individuals who legitimately possess oxycodone and dilaudid (hydromorphone) pills tend to keep them in the bottles they were prescribed in or in pill organizers, not mixed together in a vitamin bottle, where accidental ingestion could be fatal. Cst. Emberley also provided an opinion that those who abuse opiates typically are not in possession of more than a couple of pills at a time. 13. Given the quantity, method of storage, and value of drugs seized, and the comments of Mr.

Cody upon arrest, Jarrett Cody possessed Oxycodone and Hydromorphone for the purposes of trafficking. This Agreed Statement of Facts has been reviewed by Jarrett Cody and it is accepted as being correct.