R. v. Stride-Drew, 2019 NLSC 147

court crest IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR GENERAL DIVISION Citation : R. v. Stride-Drew , 2019 NLSC 147 Date : August 2, 2019 Docket : 201703G0007 HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN v. Dakota stride-drew Restriction on Publication: By Court order made under subsection 486.5(1) of the Criminal Code , information that may identify the person described in this judgment as I.J. or the complainant or the victim shall not be published, broadcasted, or transmitted in any manner. Before: Justice Kendra J. Goulding Edited Oral Reasons for Judgment Place of Hearing: Grand Falls-Windsor, Newfoundland and Labrador Dates of Hearing: March 19, 2019; May 27, 2019 Date of Oral Judgment: June 25, 2019

Summary: A first offender pleaded guilty to sexual interference involving a 14 year old child. The offender’s Aboriginal status triggered a Gladue analysis. The offender was sentenced to 33 months imprisonment with mandatory orders imposed.

Appearances: Tina M. Walsh Appearing on behalf of the Crown Stephen P. Orr Appearing on behalf of the Accused Authorities Cited: CASES CONSIDERED: R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688; R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6; R. v. A.B., 2015NLCA 19; R. v. Barrett, 2012 NLCA 46; R. v. Muise, 2018 NLSC 8; R. v. F.H.L., 2018 ONCA 83; R. v. Giovannini, 2016 NLTD(G)160; R. v. Hiscock, 2016 NLCA 74; R. v. Gregoire, 2009 NLTD 21. STATUTES CONSIDERED: Criminal Code of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46. REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Goulding, J.: INTRODUCTION [1] The Offender, Dakota Stride-Drew, pleaded guilty to one count of sexual interference contrary to

section 151 of the CriminalCode of Canada, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, which occurred on July 17, 2015 at Conne River, in the Province of Newfoundland andLabrador. She was 22 years of age while the victim, I.J., was 14 years old. Issue [2] The issue today is the determination of a fit and just sentence for this Offender considering the circumstances of this offence. Agreed Statement of Facts [3] On the evening of July 17, 2015, I.J. attended a house-party at around 10:00 p.m. at a residence in Conne River,Newfoundland and Labrador. At the time, he was 14 years old.

At some time between 2:00 a.m. and 3:00 a.m. on July 18, 2015, I.J.was in a bedroom with a friend when 22 year old Stride-Drew entered the room. Shortly after, the friend left to go to the bathroom. Stride-Drew put I.J. down on the bed, pulled down his pants and positioned herself astride him. She then grabbed his penis and put it inher vagina. I.J. was lying on his back with his hands over his face. The friend returned to the room within five minutes and observedStride-Drew on top of I.J. on the bed. I.J. had his hands over his eyes and was telling her to stop.

She was not listening so the friend toldthem they needed to get up because she lost her phone on the bed. [4] After they got up, I.J. fixed his pants and then Stride-Drew undid his zipper and put his penis in her mouth for a few secondswhen another person entered the room and told Stride-Drew to stop. [5] This person confirmed that when she entered the room, Stride-Drew was performing oral sex on I.J. who was crying. I.J. wasstanding and Stride-Drew was on her knees. She stated that she told Stride-Drew to get out and they argued. Finally Stride-Drew leftthe room.

Stride-Drew left the party approximately 30 minutes later and I.J. went home later that morning. [6] Stride-Drew subsequently sent a text message to I.J. which read: So I just heard about what apparently happened last night and if it is true then I’m really sorry. I know there’s no words that can undowhat happened but I was extremely drunk on whiskey and I blacked out. I can’t remember anything. I know I was way too wild lastnight and because of that I’m no longer drinking with young ones. If you charge me or try to it will ruin my life.

Position of the Crown [7] The Crown submits that a term of imprisonment of three years with mandatory ancillary orders is appropriate and is at the lowend of a sentence for sexual intercourse with a child under the age of 16 years. Position of the Defence [8] The Defence requests a term of imprisonment of two years plus a day be imposed on the basis of Gladue considerations thatsupport a sentence outside the range (see R. v. Gladue, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688).

The Offence [9] Sexual Interference.

Section 151 of the Criminal Code of Canada reads: 151 Every person who, for a sexual purpose, touches, directly or indirectly, with a part of the body or with an object, any part of thebody of a person under the age of 16 years (

a) is guilty of an indictable offence and is liable to imprisonment for a term of not more than 14 years and to a minimum punishment ofimprisonment for a term of one year; or Principles of Sentencing [10] In R. v. Nasogaluak, 2010 SCC 6, Label, J.A. summarized the principles of sentencing pursuant to

section 718 of the CriminalCode of Canada at paragraphs 39 and 40: 39 The objectives and principles of sentencing were recently codified in ss. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code to bring greaterconsistency and clarity to sentencing decisions. Judges are now directed in s. 718 to consider the fundamental purpose of sentencing asthat of contributing, along with crime prevention measures, to "respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safesociety".

This purpose is met by the imposition of "just sanctions" that reflect the usual array of sentencing objectives, as set out in thesame provision: denunciation, general and specific deterrence, separation of offenders, rehabilitation, reparation, and a recent addition:the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the offender and acknowledgement of the harm caused to the victim and to the community. 40 The objectives of sentencing are given sharper focus in s. 718.1, which mandates that a sentence be "proportionate to the gravity ofthe offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender".

Thus, whatever weight a judge may wish to accord to the objectives listedabove, the resulting sentence must respect the fundamental principle of proportionality.

Section 718.2 provides a non-exhaustive list ofsecondary sentencing principles, including the consideration of aggravating and mitigating circumstances, the principles of parity andtotality, and the instruction to consider "all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances", withparticular attention paid to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. [11]

Section 718.01 of the Code states that when a court imposes a sentence for an offence that involved the abuse of a person underthe age of eighteen years, it shall give primary consideration to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence of such conduct. Section718.2(ii.1) requires that the abuse of a person under the age of 18 years be deemed an aggravating circumstance. Caselaw Cited by the Crown [12] In R. v.

A.B., 2015 NLCA 19, at paragraph 23, Welsh, J.A., writing for a unanimous court, referenced the conclusion in R. v.Payne, 2012 NLCA 72, that a three year term of imprisonment for sexual assault of a thirteen year old girl involving intercourse is at thelow end of the range. [13] Welsh, J.A. stated in paragraph 24: 24 In R. v. Barrett, 2012 NLCA 46, 324 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 246 (N.L. C.A.), the Court discussed the effect of the statutory inability of aminor to consent to sexual conduct contrary to

section 271 of the Criminal Code. There were three complainants in that case. H.P. wasfourteen years old at the time of the offence. She had been evicted from her parents' house and accepted an invitation from Mr. Barrett tostay at his residence. She engaged in sexual intercourse with Mr. Barrett, having initially refused, but eventually acceding to hispersistent requests.

In determining that a sentence of three years imprisonment would be appropriate, Hoegg J.A., for the Court,explained: [48] While I am not prepared to say that factual consent can never be a consideration in the sentencing of an offender for the sexualassault of a minor, it is not a mitigating factor, as the trial judge stated in this case, nor can it be used to justify lowering a sentence belowthe normal range.

While I prefer and adopt the reasoning in Hann [ (1992), (NL CA), 100 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 339 (Nfld.C.A.)], I note that H.P.'s eventual factual consent would also not be considered a mitigating factor on an Allen [ (1989), (NL CA), 77 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 138 (Nfld. C.A.)] analysis. Accordingly, the trial judge erred in imposing a two-year sentence for thesexual assault of H.P. [14] In Barrett, an additional six months imprisonment over the three years was appropriate …to take account of Mr.

Barrett’s persistence in disregarding B.S.’s expressed desire not to engage in sexual intercourse and alsoexposing her to the risk of pregnancy as well as his premeditation and planning. These sentences, being at the low end of the range, takeaccount of the principles of sentencing listed in

section 718 of the Criminal Code and in particular the objective of assisting in therehabilitation of offenders. [15] Welsh, J.A. set out the relevant factors for consideration by a sentencing judge in paragraph 26: 26 These decisions indicate that a term of imprisonment of three years is at the low end of the range in sentencing an adult offender forsexual assault involving intercourse where the complainant is below the age of consent. The range serves to assist the court indetermining a sentence consistent with the principle that similar sentences should be imposed on "similar offenders for similar offencescommitted in similar circumstances" (section 718.2(

b) of the Criminal Code). Determination of an appropriate sentence will, of course,

depend on the facts of the particular case. A review of the case law provides a helpful

summary of some relevant factors: 1. Position of trust, more serious where the offender is in a position of authority; 2. Age of the victim, being less serious where the victim is close to the age of consent; 3. Significant age difference between the parties; 4. Sexual encounters occurring over a period of time; 5. Manipulation of the victim; 6. Planned or calculated conduct by the offender; 7. Knowledge of and acting on the victim's vulnerability; 8. Continuation of conduct after being warned; 9. Particular impact on the victim; 10.

Lack of remorse or acceptance of responsibility; placing of blame on the victim or others; limited appreciation of the harm caused; minimization of the offence; 11. Previous criminal record; 12. Prospects for rehabilitation and risk of re-offending; 13. Positive pre-sentence report; 14. Guilty plea; and 15. Willingness to access counselling. [ 16 ] In R. v. Muise , 2018 NLSC 8 , an offender who was 18 years old on the date of the offence, was sentenced to 30 months imprisonment for sexual interference involving sexual intercourse with an intoxicated 13 year old complainant. Mr.

Muise pleaded guilty and eventually accepted responsibility for his actions. Mr. Muise is a Mi’kmaq and a recognized member of Qalipu First Nation Band which triggered a Gladue analysis, a factor which is also present in the case before me. [ 17 ] Mr. Muise was born to a young alcoholic mother. His parents were largely absent from his childhood. His father was serving a Federal sentence for a sexual offence on a child. Mr. Muise had been in foster care and eventually a treatment centre wherein he witnessed incidents of physical discipline on aboriginal children.

The systemic and background factors affecting him as an aboriginal were considered by Stack, J. and resulted in a sentence below what has been identified as the low end for sentencing in such circumstances. [ 18 ] In R. v. F.H.L. , 2018 ONCA 83 , an Aboriginal accused in his thirties pleaded guilty to sexual assault and sexual touching of a female child under 14. He was the boyfriend of the complainant’s mother. The complainant gave birth to the biological child of the

accused. Although the trial judge erred in the application of the Gladue principles, eight years imprisonment was upheld. [ 19 ] In R. v. F.H.L. , at paragraphs 44 to 47 , the court stated: 44 F irst, a sentencing judge must take judicial notice of the systemic and background factors affecting Aboriginal peoples in Canadian society.

These factors include "such matters as the history of colonialism, displacement, and residential schools and how that history continues to translate into lower educational attainment, lower incomes, higher unemployment, higher rates of substance abuse and suicide, and of course higher levels of incarceration for Aboriginal peoples": Ipeelee , at para. 60.

This list is not exhaustive. 45 Second, a sentencing judge must consider whether those systemic and background factors "bear on the [offender's] culpability or indicate which types of sanctions may be appropriate in order to effectively achieve the objectives of sentencing": Kreko , at para. 23. This inquiry, by necessity, requires the sentencing judge to consider whether those factors have impacted the offender's own life experiences — in other words, whether the offender has "lift[ed] his life circumstances and Aboriginal status from the general to the specific": Monckton , at para. 117; R. v.

Bauer , 2013 ONCA 691 , 119 O.R. (3d) 16 (Ont. C.A.), at para. 13 . If systemic and background factors have impacted an Aboriginal offender's own life experiences, the sentencing judge must then consider whether they "illuminate the offender's level of moral blameworthiness" or disclose the sentencing objectives that should be prioritized: Radcliffe , at para. 53; Kreko , at para. 23.

The Supreme Court provided the following comments about moral blameworthiness in Ipeelee , at para. 73: Many Aboriginal offenders find themselves in situations of social and economic deprivation with a lack of opportunities and limited options for positive development. While this rarely — if ever — attains a level where one could properly say that their actions were not voluntary and therefore not deserving of criminal sanction, the reality is that their constrained circumstances may diminish their moral culpability".

Failing to take these circumstances into account would violate the fundamental principle of sentencing — that the sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender .

The existence of such circumstances may also indicate that a sanction that takes account of the underlying causes of the criminal conduct may be more appropriate than one only aimed at punishment per se . 46 Sentencing judges must therefore be attentive to whether the circumstances of Aboriginal offenders — viewed in the light of the systemic and background factors described above — "diminish their moral culpability".

In conducting this inquiry, however, courts must display sensitivity to the "devastating intergenerational effects of the collective experiences of Aboriginal peoples", which are often difficult to quantify: Ipeelee , at para. 82. When inquiring into "moral blameworthiness", courts must ensure they do not inadvertently reintroduce the same evidentiary difficulties that Ipeelee sought to remove: Kent Roach, "Blaming the Victim: Canadian Law, Causation and Residential Schools" (2014) 64 University of Toronto L.J. 566, at 588-593; Clayton Ruby, Gerald Chan, Nader R.

Hasan, Annamaria Enenajor, Sentencing: Ninth Edition (Markham: LexisNexis Inc., 2017), at 712; R. v. Quinn , 2015 ABCA 250 , 606 A.R. 233 (Alta. C.A.), at para. 49 ( per Biebly J.A., dissenting). I find persuasive the following observation by the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal in Whitehead on the approach that sentencing judges should follow: The link between systemic or background factors and moral culpability for an offence does not require a detailed chain of causative reasoning. Instead, the analysis is based on inferences drawn from the evidence based on the wisdom and experience of the sentencing judge ...

In applying this approach, sentencing courts must pay careful attention to the complex harms that colonisation and discrimination have inflicted on Aboriginal peoples. 47 Systemic and background factors, however, do not operate as an excuse or justification for an offence: Ipeelee , at para. 83. They are only relevant to assessing the "degree of responsibility of the offender", and to considering whether non-retributive sentencing objectives should be prioritized.

Accordingly, Gladue and Ipeelee do not detract from the "fundamental principle" that a sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender: Ipeelee at para. 73. What Gladue and Ipeelee recognize is that evaluating the degree of responsibility of an Aboriginal offender requires a "different method of analysis": Ipeelee , at para. 59. A different method of analysis does not necessarily mandate a different result: Kakekagamick , at para. 36.

Crafting a just and appropriate sentence may, in some cases, require giving greater weight to sentencing objectives such as deterrence and denunciation: Gladue , at para. 78 ; R. v. Wells , 2000 SCC 10 , [2000] 1 S.C.R. 207 (S.C.C.), at para. 44 . As this court recognized in Kakekagamick , at para. 42: To be clear, s. 718.2 (

e) does not require, nor is there a general rule, that Aboriginal offenders must be sentenced in a way that gives the most weight to the principle of restorative justice. It may be that in certain cases the objectives of restorative justice articulated in s. 718.2 (

e) and Gladue will not weigh as favourably as those of separation, denunciation and deterrence. [ 20 ] In R. v. Giovannini , 2016 NLTD(G) 160, an accused with a lengthy criminal record had forced sexual intercourse with a 14 year old complainant. A global sentence of 4.5 years imprisonment was imposed. The accused did not indicate any remorse nor accept any responsibility. [ 21 ] In R. v. Hiscock , 2016 NLCA 74 , the police found the undressed accused in a tent lying on top of one complainant who was unclothed from the waist down. The complainant advised the accused had sexual intercourse with her.

A second complainant informed the police that the accused had sexually assaulted her by laying naked on her. The accused was sentenced to four years imprisonment

which was upheld on appeal. CASELAW CITED BY DEFENCE COUNSEL [ 22 ] In R. v. Gregoire , 2009 NLTD 21 , Goodridge, J. sentenced an Aboriginal offender for two counts of impaired driving causing death and two counts of impaired driving causing bodily harm. Goodridge, J. found that a conditional sentence of two years less a day followed by two years probation was appropriate as the offender was suitable for supervision and was not a danger to the community.

Mitigating factors included that the offender was an Aboriginal woman with a dysfunctional family background, multi-generational alcoholism and was a victim of physical and sexual abuse as a child. In paragraph 49, Goodridge J. referenced R. v. Gladue , as follows: 49 This latter point, about giving particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders, was discussed in detail in R. v. Gladue . At paragraph 93 of that decision, Cory and Iacobucci JJ. provided a general

summary to guide trial judges in the sentencing of aboriginal offenders. I will not reproduce that

summary but mention a few of the highlights: • I am to consider all available sanctions other than imprisonment that are reasonable in the circumstances, with particular attention to the circumstances of aboriginal offenders. • The purpose of s.718.2 (

e) is to ameliorate the serious problem of overrepresentation of aboriginal people in prisons, and to encourage sentencing judges to have recourse to a restorative approach to sentencing. • There is a judicial duty to give the remedial purpose of s.718.2 (

e) real force. •

Section 718.2(e), among other provisions, has placed a new emphasis upon decreasing the use of incarceration. • The effect of s. 718.2(

e) is to alter the method of analysis which sentencing judges must use in determining a fit sentence for aboriginal offenders. •

Section 718.2(

e) directs sentencing judges to undertake the sentencing of aboriginal offenders individually, but also differently, because the circumstances of aboriginal people are unique. • In sentencing an aboriginal offender, the judge must consider: • The unique systemic or background factors which may have played a

part in bringing the particular aboriginal offender before the courts; and • The types of sentencing procedures and sanctions which may be appropriate in the circumstances for the offender because of his or her particular aboriginal heritage or connection. • Judges may take judicial notice of the broad systemic and background factors affecting aboriginal people, and of the priority given in aboriginal cultures to a restorative approach to sentencing. • If there is no alternative to incarceration the length of the term must be carefully considered. • The absence of alternative sentencing programs specific to an aboriginal community does not eliminate the ability of a sentencing judge to impose a sanction that takes into account principles of restorative justice and the needs of the parties involved. • The jail term for an aboriginal offender may in some circumstances be less than the term imposed on a non-aboriginal offender for the same offence. factors considered in sentencing

[ 23 ] The Extent of the Assault and the Degree of Violence or Force Used . The extent of the sexual interference on the victim is very grave and on the high end of the scale as it involved both sexual intercourse and oral sex. The victim’s unwillingness and distress should have been obvious to Stride-Drew as he had his hands over his face and was telling her to stop. A young person re-entered the room and used the excuse of having lost her cell phone in an effort to end the sexual abuse. The victim fixed his pants and the offender then undid the victim’s zipper and put his penis in her mouth.

Another person then entered the room and told the offender to stop and get out. The victim was observed to be crying. After an argument, Stride-Drew finally left the room. I note there was no violence on the part of Stride-Drew to perpetrate the offence. [ 24 ] Planned or Calculated Conduct . There is no evidence that Stride-Drew planned to have sexual intercourse with the victim. However, she quickly took full advantage of the opportunity to sexually abuse this child when she entered the room and saw him on the bed. [ 25 ] The Degree of Trust .

Stride-Drew was not in a position of trust with respect to the victim. [ 26 ] Impact of the Crime on the Victim . I.J. has not filed a victim impact statement. However, the traumatic and long-lasting effects of sexual abuse on children are well known. The facts indicate that I.J., only 14 years old, was very upset during the incident which was partially witnessed by two persons who came to his assistance. [ 27 ] Past Criminal Record and Youthfulness . Stride-Drew is a youthful first offender which is a mitigating factor. [ 28 ] Plea . Stride-Drew has entered a guilty plea to the charge and has expressed remorse.

However, I.J. was required to testify at a Preliminary Inquiry. [ 29 ] Disparity in Ages . Stride-Drew is about eight years older than I.J. and was married at the time of the offence. [ 30 ] Public Abhorrence of the Crime . To commit a sexual offence on a vulnerable child is a reprehensible act which is greatly abhorred by the public. [ 31 ] Pre-Sentence Report . The pre-sentence report sets out a brief history of the Mi’kmaq who are indigenous peoples who have lived in this Province since at least the 16th century. Stride-Drew is a member of the Miawpukek First Nations Band of Conne River.

Her paternal grandparents were born and raised in Conne River and were also members of the Miawpukek Band. Stride-Drew reported that her paternal grandparents experienced significant poverty throughout their entire lives. Her grandfather was killed in a car accident over 40 years ago and her grandmother worked as a basket-maker and regularly participated in Aboriginal practices and traditions. [ 32 ] Her maternal grandmother is part-Aboriginal of Mi’kmaq descent. Stride-Drew attended school in Conne River which emphasizes the Mi’kmaq language, education and culture. She is able to speak Mi’kmaq.

She attended the yearly PowWow and was a member of the Young Women’s Cultural Group. Stride-Drew was employed for one year in the Arts and Crafts Store in Conne River. She is one of three children and her mother is employed in an outfitting company and her father works as a canoe-maker and hunting guide. [ 33 ] Stride-Drew graduated from grade 12 and completed two years of university courses towards her Bachelor of Arts degree. She has a positive attitude towards employment and has plans for her future.

She is very receptive to counselling and agrees that a Federal term of incarceration would be in her best interests given the available programs. This is her first involvement with the law to my knowledge. [ 34 ] From the information Stride-Drew provided to the Probation Officer, her life was out of control at the time of the offence and for almost two years thereafter. I feel the very negative and extreme circumstances of her childhood had finally caught up with her.

While this is not offered at all as an excuse to sexually abuse a child, it does give an understanding of this young Aboriginal woman, how it has impacted her and the offence as Gladue requires. [ 35 ] To say that Stride-Drew’s upbringing was extremely unstable is an understatement. Her father was an alcoholic who also suffered from significant mental health issues. He was often physically violent towards Stride-Drew, her mother and her siblings. Her parents divorced when she was five years old but out of sympathy for her father, she remained with him.

She endured physical violence and mental abuse for many years and recalled very serious incidents wherein she witnessed firearms being threatened or held to family members and her interventions to stop the violence. She kept silent for many years as she did not want her father to be charged again. [ 36 ] She moved in with her boyfriend at age 16. This was also a dysfunctional relationship. They later married but separated partly as a result of the matter before the Court.

She is now remarried and resides with her husband and his parents. [ 37 ] Stride-Drew reported living in poverty throughout her childhood and moving around frequently. She experienced racism outside her community because of her Aboriginal ancestry. Stride-Drew began consuming alcohol at age 11. She would drink numerous times per week to the point of intoxication. After experiencing alcoholic poisoning, she ceased drinking at age 17, which sobriety lasted 5 years. Thereafter, her consumption of alcohol became very problematic.

At the time of the pre-sentence report, she had been sober for three months and was confident she would not relapse. [ 38 ] Shortly after the offence, Stride-Drew began using cocaine and was involved in the sex trade. She suffered three cocaine overdoses and last used the drug in March 2017. She is receptive to receiving formal addictions counselling at the institution. Stride- Drew’s mother confirmed the physical violence inflicted on her daughter and the racism she suffered both in and out of the community. She believes her daughter has been the victim of extensive sexual abuse and domestic violence.

Stride-Drew has physical and mental health problems requiring daily medication. [ 39 ] The Probation Officer noted that Stride-Drew expressed remorse regarding the offence but rationalized her behaviour to some degree.

[ 40 ] Prospects of Rehabilitation . Stride-Drew has made a significant effort in the past two years to remain away from hard drugs and to focus more on her mental health. She seeks a Federal sentence so she can avail of addictions counselling and other programs. Despite the very dysfunctional unstable childhood and the significant physical and sexual abuse suffered by her, she has done well in her education and her employment and has shown courage in addressing her addictions. I believe her prospects for rehabilitation are positive.

Conclusion [ 41 ] I have considered the mitigating factors of her guilty plea, the lack of a prior record and the expression of remorse. Stride-Drew is a youthful Aboriginal woman. I am satisfied that unique systemic and background factors have played a

part in bringing this particular Aboriginal offender before the Court. If not for her high degree of intoxication on the date of the offence, she may not have committed this offence. However, the facts are very grave. Stride-Drew violated and raped a 14 year old boy. She was 22 years old at the time and she paid no heed to his pleas and his distress. It required the intervention of another adult to stop the incident. Denunciation and deterrence remain the primary considerations. Other than the Gladue factors, this is not a case where a sentence would be on the low end of the scale.

Rather, the sentence would be three and a half years imprisonment consistent with the sentence imposed by Hoegg, J.A. in R. v. Barrett . However, given the compelling information presented in the pre-sentence report which enabled a thorough Gladue analysis, I am reducing that sentence from three and a half years to a sentence of 33 months. In addition, I am imposing the following orders: i. DNA order pursuant to

section 487.051 of the Criminal Code permitting the taking of bodily substances from Stride-Drew for DNA profiling and analysis; ii. In accordance with

Section 490.013(2) (

b) of the Criminal Code , to comply with the Sexual Offender Information Registration Act for 20 years commencing today; iii. Mandatory firearm prohibition order under section 109(1)(

a) for 10 years commencing on the date of her release from prison. _____________________________ Kendra Goulding Justice