R. v. Ward, 2023 NLSC 15

court crest IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR GENERAL DIVISION Citation : R. v. Ward , 2023 NLSC 15 Date : February 7, 2023 Docket : 201808G0196 HIS MAJESTY THE KING v. VINCENT WARD Before: The Honourable Mr. Justice Alphonsus E. Faour Place of Hearing: Happy Valley-Goose Bay, Newfoundland & Labrador Heard : January 26, 2023 Sentenced: February 3, 2023 Appearances: Trina D. Simms and Appearing on behalf of the Crown Ashley J.M. Targett Mark J. Gruchy and Appearing on behalf of the Offender Jonathan D. Regan

Summary:

The Offender was charged with second-degree murder. He was found guilty of manslaughter following a trial before a jury. The Courtimposed a sentence of 5.5 years. This satisfies the mandatory minimum of 4 years for manslaughter with a firearm under s. 236 of theCode. He was given credit for his pre-trial detention on remand at the rate of 1.5:1, which reduced his sentence by 4 years, 4 months,and 12 days. Authorities Cited: CASES CONSIDERED: R. v. C. (F.J.) (1999), (NL SC), 174 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 201, 42 W.C.B. (2d) 188, 533A.P.R. 201 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)), aff’d 2002 NFCA 1; R. v. Abel, 2012 NLTD(G) 27; R. v.

Badhesa, 2019 BCCA 70; R. v. Bragg, 2022BCSC 1249; R. v. Canning (1996), (NL SC), 148 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1, 464 A.P.R. 1 (Nfld. S.C.(T.D.)); R. v. Deo,2022 BCSC 1835; R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6; R. v. Fowler (1984), 48 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 175, 142 A.P.R. 175 (Nfld. C.A.); R. v. Green,2001 BCCA 672; R. v. Husbands, 2019 ONSC 6824; R. v. Morris, 2006 NLTD 178; R. v. Nguyen, 2017 BCSC 1401; R. v.Panipakoocho, 2022 NUCJ 43; R.;Pearson, 2002 NBQB 218; R. v. Snelgrove (1977), 13 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 190, 29 A.P.R. 190 (Nfld.C.A.); R. v. Wall, 2010 BCSC 972; R. v. Yaali, 2018 ONSC 3045; R. v. Laberge 1995 ABCA 196; R. v.

Ansari, 2008 BCSC 1709; R. v.Aubin, 2008 BCSC 400; R. v. Bill (1997), (BC SC), 13 C.R. (5th) 103, 37 W.C.B. (2d) 305 (B.C.S.C.); R. v.Dingwell, 2012 PESC 13; R. v. Fabas, 2017 BCSC 1693; R. v. Firth, 1983 11 W.C.B. 265, 52 A.R. 311 (N.W.T.S.C.); R. v. Morrisey,2000 SCC 39; R. v. Onalik, 2022 NLSC 137; R. v. Pynn, 2015 NLTD(G) 37; R. v. Quinlan, 2009 BCSC 1327; R. v. Sahal, 2016 ONSC6864; R. v. Saswirsky, 1981 CarswellOnt 3596, 6 W.C.B. 344 (Cty. Ct.); R. v. Wisdom (1996), (BC CA), 75 B.C.A.C.231 STATUTES CONSIDERED: Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT FAOUR J.: I. INTRODUCTION Mr.

Ward was found guilty of manslaughter following a trial before a jury for a charge of Second Degree Murder. The offence ispunishable under

section 236 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-46. I have to determine an appropriate sentence arising from thisconviction. II. THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND [1] Mr. Ward was charged with Second Degree Murder in the death of Vincent Belanger-Dompierre. Mr. Belanger-Dompierrewas involved in bringing drugs into Labrador West and attempting to establish a trade in illicit drugs in the area. Mr. Ward was anassociate of Mr.

Belanger-Dompierre, and that connection led to the tragic events of April 25–26, 2018, at 1006 Pine Avenue inLabrador City. [2] The incidents with which we are concerned occurred late on Wednesday evening, April 25, 2018, and include a series ofevents that led to the shooting that killed Mr. Belanger-Dompierre. The two men had been acquainted for several months prior to theshooting. Mr. Ward, and one of the witnesses, Mr. Audet, described their interactions as friendly, with no negative interactions until thelast moment before the shooting. [3] That day, according to Mr.

Ward in his statement, supported by another associate, Jacob Beason, Mr. Ward was becomingmore and more anxious and stressed about what he perceived as threats by third persons who were going to cause harm to both himselfand Mr. Belanger-Dompierre. This arose because of missing drugs with a significant street value. Mr. Beason said Mr. Ward describedhis own fear, and fear for the safety of his children.

[ 4 ] As the day progressed, Mr. Ward was in and out of the Pine Avenue house several times. Mr. Beason drove him, in the evening, to Mr. Ward’s own home where several firearms were retrieved, along with ammunition. Both Mr. Ward in his statement, and Mr. Beason in his testimony, said that the guns were so that Mr. Ward and Mr. Belanger-Dompierre could protect themselves against those he thought were coming to harm them. [ 5 ] Mr. Beason drove Mr. Ward back to Pine Avenue, but did not enter the house. Mr. Ward took two of the guns and ammunition into the house. He gave one to Mr.

Belanger-Dompierre and kept the second for himself. He and Mr. Belanger-Dompierre were sitting opposite each other in the living room. While it is not clear exactly what happened, the jury heard from Mr. Martin Audet that the shot was fired without any warning or prior argument between them. [ 6 ] Mr. Ward’s account was somewhat different. He said in his recorded statement that Mr. Belanger-Dompierre began taunting him, and pointed the gun in his hands at Mr. Ward in jerky motions. Mr. Ward said he was startled by these actions and reacted with the shot.

Variously, he said it was a panic reaction, or that the gun discharged by accident, or that he aimed to the right of Mr. Belanger- Dompierre’s head. The bullet struck the deceased in the mouth and passed through the back of his neck, killing him. [ 7 ] Mr. Ward’s description of those events indicated that all of this happened within a very brief timeframe. He gave Mr. Belanger-Dompierre the gun, there were brief comments and jerky motions that Mr.

Ward perceived as threatening, and he reacted by firing the shot. [ 8 ] Later that night, or early the next morning, police arrived on the scene and began their investigation. Other than the forensic investigation, the most substantial evidence before the jury was the hours-long video recording of the statement given by Mr. Ward to Superintendent Warren, and the testimony of both Mr. Audet and Mr. Beason as to the events that day leading to the time of the shooting. [ 9 ] It may be useful to set out here a distillation of Mr.

Ward’s comments to Superintendent Warren as they bear on the issues of intent that the jury had to consider. In my observation of the statement, I noted the following: 1. He spoke of his relationship with Steve, as he referred to Mr. Belanger-Dompierre, over several months before the shooting. 2. He said the relationship started out very friendly until the evening of April 25, 2018; 3. He made multiple statements that people were coming for both him and Mr. Belanger-Dompierre; 4. He reported that Mr. Belanger-Dompierre said the same thing, that people were coming for them over missing drugs; 5.

He said he feared for his life and the safety of his children, and that if “the people” didn’t get him, they would go after his family; 6. He described being taken by Mr. Beason to his house where he picked up two guns and ammunition. The guns were the .22 rifle and the .270 rifle, along with a number of live shells that were in the pocket of hip waders; 7. He said he retreived the guns to protect all of them from those he thought were coming to harm them. He said he thought they would be coming within hours or days; 8. Mr. Beason drove him back to the Pine Avenue house in his pickup truck; 9.

He brought the two guns and the hip waders containing the ammunition into the house; 10. He says he first brought the .22 rifle to Mr. Belanger-Dompierre, and placed the hip waders with the ammunition on the floor, then returned to the entrance to get the other rifle, the .270; 11. He said he knew the .22 rifle was not loaded when he gave it to Mr. Belanger-Dompierre; 12. Mr. Ward described his view of the events that led to the shooting: (

a) When he returned to the living room, after retrieving the .270 rifle, he said that Mr. Belanger-Dompierre was taunting him; (

b) He said he felt that Mr. Belanger-Dompierre had turned on him; (

c) He said that Mr. Belanger-Dompierre said that he, Mr. Ward, was going to die; (

d) Mr. Belanger-Dompierre raised the .22 and pointed the barrel toward him in jerky motions; (

e) Mr. Belanger-Dompierre said the gun was “locked and loaded”; (

f) Mr. Ward said that that action startled him; (

g) He says he reacted with the shot; (

h) He said he didn’t intend shooting Mr. Belanger-Dompierre, but said he aimed to the right of Mr. Belanger-Dompierre’s head alongside his ear; (

i) He said “my heart sank when I realized there was no clip in his gun; 13. Superintendent Warren in this testimony before the Court said it was clear to him that Mr. Ward was under the influence of a

drug. [10] This describes the events gleaned from the evidence at trial. In a finding of manslaughter, we are unsure as to the rationaleused by the jury in reaching its verdict. However, for sentencing following a guilty finding by a jury, I must take the essential elementsof the offence as proven.

Section 724 of the Criminal Code, R.S.C., 1985, c. C-46, (the “Code”) states: Where the court is composed of a judge and jury, the court (

a) shall accept as proven all facts express or implied, that are essential to the jury's verdict of guilty; and (

b) may find any other relevant fact that was disclosed by evidence at the trial to be proven ... [11] In R. v. C. (F.J.) (1999), (NL SC), 174 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 201, 42 W.C.B. (2d) 188, 533 A.P.R. 201 (Nfld.S.C.(T.D.)), aff’d 2002 NFCA 1, Justice Mercer of this Court outlined the basis for the factual background to sentencing following aguilty verdict by a jury.

After noting the Code provision and the evidence presented at trial, he said at paragraph 4: “The unavoidableconclusion is that the jury must have accepted that the essential elements of the offences were proven by the evidence of H.P.” [12] The same considerations apply in this case. As a consequence, I must accept the evidence presented by the Crown consideredby the jury supporting its finding of guilty of manslaughter as proving the essential facts upon which the convictions are based. [13] The offence of manslaughter includes three elements. First, that the Offender caused the death of Mr. Belanger-Dompierre.

There was no doubt that Mr. Ward fired the fatal shot that killed the deceased. He said so, himself, in his statement. [14] Second, that shooting, being at minimum an assault, was an unlawful act on the Offender’s part. The consequences of thatunlawful act foreseeably involved a risk of harm to the victim exceeding that which was trivial. [15] As part of the second element, the jury had to consider whether there was evidence to support a finding of self-defence.

If thishad been accepted by the jury, the actions of the Offender in firing the fatal shot would not have been unlawful, and therefore the offenceof manslaughter would not have been made out. However, it is clear from the verdict that the jury found the shooting to be unlawful,thereby rejecting self-defence as a justification. It is clear that the jury accepted evidence to support the second element, that the actionsof the Offender in firing the shot were unlawful. [16] Third, the jury had to consider whether Mr. Ward had the state of mind required for murder. In other words, did he mean tokill Mr.

Belanger-Dompierre or, if not, did he intend to cause him serious bodily harm, which he knew was likely to kill him. These twoaspects are key elements, one of which must be present for murder, which are absent in a finding of manslaughter. In the result, I have toconsider that Mr. Ward did not intend to kill Mr. Belanger-Dompierre, nor did he intend to cause him serious bodily harm.

The juryaccepted that he did not have the state of mind required for murder: otherwise it would have found him guilty of Second Degree Murder,the charge in the indictment. [17] In reaching this conclusion, the jury had before it evidence that the Offender’s state of mind was overwhelmed by his fear ofrepercussions to him or his family concerning drug debts owed by him to Mr. Belanger-Dompierre. There was further evidence that theshooting was not meant to kill, but was a reaction to what was perceived as a threat to the Offender himself, and arose in the heat of themoment.

There was evidence from the police witness who did a trajectory analysis that could have supported a finding that the one shotfired was done so in a panic mode and not in a deliberate manner. The jury heard evidence that the victim had excessive amounts ofmethamphetamine in his system that could cause the kind of behaviour related by the Offender in his video statement to police.

Therewas also evidence before the jury that both the Offender’s judgment and ability to form the requisite intent for murder was impaired byhis consumption of drugs that day. [18] It is clear that the jury did not accept that there was evidence of intent, which would have supported a verdict of murder. However, in a conviction for manslaughter, the level of culpability may range from near-accident to near-murder. Assessing the level ofculpability, or blameworthiness will be critical in the determination of an appropriate sentence.

It is for the court at this stage todetermine the level of culpability arising from this set of facts. To this end, I will examine the evidence presented on the sentencing, thearguments of the Crown and the Defence, before determining an appropriate sentence. III. EVIDENCE ON THE SENTENCING [19] At the hearing, I was presented with a Pre-Sentence Report, the statements of several family members of Mr. Belanger-Dompierre, Mr. Ward’s own comments to the Court, and evidence on the length of time he had been in custody before the trial.

Pre-Sentence Report [20] A Pre-Sentence Report was provided and entered into evidence at the sentencing hearing. It was quite favourable to theOffender. Mr. Ward was born in 1988 and grew up in a small community located on the southern coast of Labrador. His family hadlived there for several generations, and stayed there even after many of their neighbours resettled to larger communities along the coastin the 1960s. He has positive memories of his childhood, and did not report being exposed to physical or substance abuse. He reported

positive relationships with several family members but has no contact with one brother and one sister. [ 21 ] He relocated to Happy Valley-Goose Bay at age six for his stepfather’s employment. His mother and stepfather were supportive of him, and he had positive memories of his life with them. He appears to have had the closest relationship with his maternal grandparents, who raised him through a significant part of his childhood. They brought him to church each Sunday, and he continued this practice until about 2016.

He says he no longer attends church, but still maintains a personal spiritual life. [ 22 ] The Report outlined his social history arising from his upbringing in an Inuit community on the southern Labrador coast.

While his family did not speak Inuktitut his experiences in his small community and on the land were positive influences on him. [ 23 ] He completed secondary school on the Labrador Coast, before heading to Labrador City in 2006 where he continued his education, taking an electrical program, and later a welding program in Happy Valley-Goose Bay in 2016. [ 24 ] He reported a relationship from about age 24 in 2012 with a woman that started out positive, but later deteriorated. They were involved with drug and alcohol use, which fueled frequent fighting and separations.

They had two children, who now are ages 10 and 11, but they permanently separated by 2015. At that time he became a single parent to two young children. That led to a return to his childhood community where his grandparents developed a strong relationship with the children. [ 25 ] His children have been in his care from the time of the separation from their mother, but in recent years they have co-parented as his ex-girlfriend became more involved with the children.

In particular, while he was in custody following the current charges the children lived with her, and he maintained his relationship with them through telephone calls. [ 26 ] He has recently re-established a relationship with a woman he met in 2015 when he lived in Happy Valley-Goose Bay for the welding course. Since 2021 they have developed their relationship and it seems to have had a positive influence on him.

It appears that the newfound stability in his life has kept him sober, both during his period of custody following the charges and since his release in 2021. [ 27 ] He does not have any prior criminal record, and his behaviour while in custody appears to have been without significant incidents for almost three years. [ 28 ] He has always worked, first as a young man working on the scallop fishing boats, and after age 18 in various areas of construction, carpentry, and plumbing.

His education in electrical and welding has given him the opportunity to be regularly employed both before and after his remand in custody. He fully expects to have no problem being employed once these proceedings are behind him. [ 29 ] The writer of the Pre-Sentence Report assesses that he is a very low risk to offend. This is based on certain standardized assessment tools. [ 30 ] His prospects appear good, as long as he can avoid alcohol and drug use, which were problematic in the past and directly led to the current offence.

His recent experience in this area has been positive, and he has been sober since this incident in 2018. He has availed of rehabilitative programs while in prison, and is eligible for further counselling services offered by the NunatuKavut Community Council. He can be referred to these services, among others, as needed by Adult Probation. The report indicates he is receptive to compliance with any such services as are appropriate and recommended for him.

This indicates to me that he would be receptive to an opportunity for continued participation in these services, and therefore would benefit from a post-incarceration probation order. [ 31 ] In

summary, his current circumstances indicate positive prospects for his future. His skills will ensure his employment. His current relationship seems stable, and he has a good relationship with his children. He also reports a close circle of friends who will be positive influences on him. He continues to have good relationships with family members, including his mother, his father, his stepfather and his grandmother. [ 32 ] With respect to the current offence, he acknowledged the seriousness of taking a life, and even though he feels he reacted in the moment, he has accepted responsibility.

He reported feeling remorse for what happened and recognizes the impact on the family of the deceased. [ 33 ] The author of the report indicated that Mr. Ward was cooperative as information was gathered, and he was open about his personal circumstances. It was also reported that he was willing to comply with any community-based supervision, in particular, conditions of probation. [ 34 ] The author summarized as follows: Mr. Ward is a first time offender who is a very low risk to reoffend. He has accepted responsibility for his actions and he appears remorseful.

He has demonstrated positive lifestyle changes such as seeking help for trauma and addiction, obtaining and maintaining sobriety, maintaining consistent employment and developing positive prosocial relationships. Mr. Ward appears motivated to commit to any intervention strategies recommended in the event of community supervision. [ 35 ] The Pre-Sentence Report’s conclusions are consistent with his history before the events that led to this offence and his behaviour since his release from remand custody in 2021. This means that he is likely a positive candidate for rehabilitative measures.

Victim Impact Statements [ 36 ] The Court received and heard three statements from members of the family of the deceased. All gave compelling accounts of the impact of the loss of a son, a stepson, and a brother.

[ 37 ] His stepmother, Mme. Nadia Des Ormeaux, spoke of the emotional wounds suffered from the loss, and in particular watching the impact on her partner, Mr. Belanger-Dompierre’s father. In this regard she said in her statement: I saw a man – a father, my beloved partner – broken by grief who literally screamed with the loss of a son whom he will never see again. I saw him sink into a state that I could never have imagined. He was bedridden for days, moaning, sick, staring into space desperate to fall asleep so he could forget and put an end to his indescribable suffering.

This experience was distressing, deeply shocking and unfortunately will remain with me always. [ 38 ] Later in her statement, she described her own reaction to the loss: To say that the news of his death was a shock is a euphemism. As you all know, the death of a child (who, moreover, had just turned 28) is a catastrophe of unspeakable sadness. Knowing that he was shot in the head by someone that he knew, while he was sitting in his living room, adds to our disbelief and anger. How could such a thing have happened? How can we recover from this?

Imagine that you lost one of your children and imagine that this immense loss was not the result of illness or accident, but of homicide! [ 39 ] She seemed to understand the extent of the tragedy that unfolded that night. She went on to say: When I think of how that fateful night of April 25, 2018, ended, I fear that he was the victim of a misunderstanding or worse. We are deprived of Vincent’s presence and what the future with him had in store. [ 40 ] His father, M. Alain Dompierre, spoke of the sense of loss, and noted many people shared their grief: I mourned for him these past years.

I went through so many emotions, and reminisced about the good memories I have of him. . . . The funeral home was overflowing with people who came to pay their respects. Among them his past football teammates and even some of his grade school and high school teachers were in attendance to say their final goodbye. His death affected so many people. [ 41 ] His brother, and self-described best friend, M. Jeremie Dompierre, spoke of the loss of his little brother: . . . When I heard about this tragic event, my whole life changed! . . . . I will forever miss his laughter and our intimate connection.

I will forever miss him. Today I have faith in life, I believe there is better days ahead and I know my little brother walks just by my side. [ 42 ] These comments from close family members remind us of the tragedy that a death visits on a wide range of people. It affects the whole community, and these statements serve to articulate the incredible loss when something like this happens. It is clear that these family members have been deeply affected by the loss of their son and brother.

I appreciate also that the family members were communicating with the Court in a language not their own, and from a great distance. That added to their distress, and I can only hope that time will heal their pain. The Offender’s Comments [ 43 ] After the submissions of counsel, Mr. Ward addressed the Court. He expressed regret for what had happened and acknowledged the impact on the deceased’s family. His comments demonstrated insight into the impact of the lifestyle in which he had engaged for that period of his life, and his remorse for the outcome of his actions.

I believe it reflected his sincere determination never to live like that again. [ 44 ] I found his apology sincere and heartfelt. While it was the only time he spoke to the Court, in my view it was consistent with his demeanour during the many days of the trial before the jury. His words also reflected the assessment of the author of the Pre- Sentence Report, to which I have made reference above. Pre-Trial Custody [ 45 ] Mr. Ward was arrested on April 26, 2018, and ultimately was released on bail on March 24, 2021. That means he spent some 34 months, and 28 days in custody pending his trial.

This may be calculated variously as 2 years, 10 months, and 28 days, or 1062 days in custody. [ 46 ] However, the practice of courts in this country is to give additional credit for time spent on remand, as set out in s. 719 of the Code . The

section permits me, where circumstances warrant, to calculate the credit at the rate of one and a half days for each day spent in custody. Taking into account the additional credit for remand time, his effective time in prison was, at 1.5 times remand, 4 years, 4 months, and 12 days. Both counsel agree, and I agree, that this credit may be applied to the ultimate sentence imposed. [ 47 ] The point of this calculation is to determine, based on the actual time served, the effective length of his sentence.

I will consider these numbers later when I establish an appropriate sentence for manslaughter within the range suggested by counsel as a disposition for Mr. Ward. IV. PRINCIPLES OF SENTENCING [ 48 ] The principles that I must apply in sentencing the Offender are set out in the Code . The law directs me to balance the objective

of denunciation of this kind of behaviour, with the rehabilitative potential of the offender.

Section 718 provides the basic framework for sentencing: 718. Purpose The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and to the community. 718.1 Fundamental principle A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. 718.2 Other sentencing principles A court that imposes a sentence shall also take into consideration the following principles: (

a) a sentence should be increased or reduced to account for any relevant aggravating or mitigating circumstances relating to the offence or the offender … ... (

b) a sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences committed in similar circumstances; [ 49 ] These provisions direct me to consider the nature of the offence and the aggravating and mitigating factors before imposing sentence. The most significant principles noted in the Code that bear on this case relate to denouncing unlawful conduct and the threat to the community, and general and specific deterrence.

I am also directed by the Code to ensure that the sentence is proportionate, both to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. [ 50 ] In this case, the analysis must also include an assessment of the degree of culpability of the Offender. V. THE APPROPRIATE SENTENCE [ 51 ] Counsel have pointed out, and I agree, that the authorities present a very wide range of dispositions with respect to manslaughter. Because a firearm was used in this offence,

section 236 of the Criminal Code sets out the range available to a court in sentencing this Offender. It reads: 236 Manslaughter Every person who commits manslaughter is guilty of an indictable offence and liable (

a) where a firearm is used in the commission of the offence, to imprisonment for life and to a minimum punishment of imprisonment for a term of four years; ... [ 52 ] I accept that, in this case, the minimum sentence must apply. Counsel for the Defence did not raise an objection to the application of this provision. At the other extreme, life imprisonment is not going to be considered. It was not suggested as an appropriate sentence and the authorities do not support it. [ 53 ] However, with four years as a minimum, there is still a wide range of applicable sentences.

I also must consider whether it is appropriate to impose a sentence that will permit a probation order following release. [ 54 ] Counsel have provided me with a survey of authorities imposing sentences involving manslaughter. The Crown has submitted a number of authorities to support its recommendation. 1. In R. v. Abel , 2012 NLTD(G) 27, the sentencing court examined a series of authorities and concluded that the range of sentence for manslaughter was between four and eight years. A firearm was not used in this case, but the evidence pointed to death by smothering. A sentence of seven years was imposed.

2. R. v. Badhesa, 2019 BCCA 70. The offender pleaded guilty to manslaughter following a brutal beating and killing of hismother while heavily intoxicated and suffering from severe psychotic depression. The court examined the spectrum of culpability from“near accident” to “near murder.” Both the sentencing judge and the Court of Appeal accepted his mental state as a factor in assessingculpability. The sentence of 10 years was reduced on appeal to seven years. 3. R. v. Bragg, 2022 BCSC 1249. The court imposed a sentence of seven years on a 77-year-old offender.

There was evidenceof threats made by the deceased toward the offender prior to his firing the gun eight times. In addition, there was evidence ofpreparation in some of the comments made by the offender prior to the incident. The number of shots fired, the advance thought andpreparation, led to a conclusion this was not a situation of acting in sudden panic. The only significant mitigating factor was his age. 4. In R. v. Canning (1996), (NL SC), 148 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 1, 464 A.P.R. 1 (Nfld.

S.C.(T.D.)), a sentence offour years was imposed for manslaughter where a firearm was not properly stored in a residence and was in a useable state, loaded withammunition, and accidently discharged causing the death. There was no level of violence involved. 5. R. v. Deo, 2022 BCSC 1835. The offender pled guilty to a charge of manslaughter following an accidental discharge of afirearm that killed his girlfriend.

The mitigating circumstances included his youth, he was 19 at the time of the offence, had no priorcriminal convictions, had complied with strict bail conditions for over 3 years, the near-accident nature of the shooting, was of a low riskto reoffend, and the guilty plea. The aggravating circumstances included his attempts to cover up the killing and dispose of the body, hisinvolvement in a criminal lifestyle, and the carrying of an illegal, unregistered gun. He was sentenced to five years for manslaughter. 6. R. v. Ferguson, 2008 SCC 6.

An RCMP officer was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after a detainee was killed bygunshot following an altercation with the officer. The sentencing judge found that the mandatory minimum of 4 years imprisonmentconstituted “cruel and unusual” punishment. The Supreme Court found it did not, and imposed the minimum. 7. R. v. Fowler (1984), 48 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 175, 142 A.P.R. 175 (Nfld.

C.A.) was a case where the accused was charged withfirst-degree murder following the shooting death of her husband, and after three trials, the Court of Appeal entered a conviction formanslaughter and imposed a fifteen-year sentence. 8. R. v. Green, 2001 BCCA 672. The offender killed a friend in a cocaine-induced psychosis. He pled guilty and expressedremorse. The trial judge imposed a sentence of 7 years.

The Court of Appeal noted the balancing of the aggravating factors – anextremely brutal killing by multiple stabbings and use of a dangerous substance; and the mitigating factors – no criminal record, nohistory of violence and a guilty plea – and agreed that the sentencing judge made no error. The court took the view that generaldeterrence was an important factor in the sentence, but aimed at irresponsible conduct that could lead to violence, not the act itself. 9. R. v. Husbands, 2019 ONSC 6824.

Offender was convicted of manslaughter after opening fire in a crowded mall food courtafter spotting perpetrators of a past attack on him. He was sentenced to life imprisonment. 10. R. v. Morris, 2006 NLTD 178. Offender pled guilty to manslaughter following an incident where the victim brandished a gunat him, put it down, and the offender picked it up and immediately the victim was shot. Within the context of provocation, the courtimposed a sentence of 8 years. 11. R. v. Nguyen, 2017 BCSC 1401. The offender was charged with second-degree murder, but following a jury trial he wasfound guilty of manslaughter.

The facts indicated a particularly violent incident, but a shooting that took place in the context of panic. The mitigating factors included his difficult history arising from emigration from Vietnam, no prior record, genuine remorse, and anoffer to plead guilty to manslaughter (not accepted by the Crown). The aggravating factors included the possession of an unlicensed andunregistered firearm, the repeated firing of shots resulting in the death of the victim, and the commission of the crime in the presence ofhis own young sons.

The court imposed a sentence of 9 years, less credit for time served, resulting in a net sentence of 3 years, 7months. 12. R. v. Panipakoocho, 2022 NUCJ 43. The accused was charged with first-degree murder in the death of the victim bygunshot. The shot appeared to have been aimed at the legs of the victim to ensure it would not be lethal. Unfortunately it struck criticalarteries and the victim bled to death. The trial judge found no intent to cause the death, but intent to shoot the victim, and found himguilty instead of manslaughter and imposed a sentence of 9 years and 3 months. 13. R. v.

Pearson, 2002 NBQB 218. The offender was charged with second degree murder in the shooting death of his fiancé. Ajury found him guilty of manslaughter. The facts indicated he shot her after she said she was leaving him and then came back. The courtimposed a sentence of 9 years. 14. R. v. Snelgrove (1977), 13 Nfld. & P.E.I. R. 190, 29 A.P.R. 190 (Nfld. C.A.). The Court of Appeal imposed a sentence of 10years for manslaughter where the accused, while drunk, fired a shotgun at the house where his estranged wife and children lived, killingthe owner.

When the owner of the house came outside, the accused shot and killed him. 15. R. v. Wall, 2010 BCSC 972. The accused, a 16-year-old male at time of offence, charged with no previous record of offences,pleaded guilty to and was convicted of manslaughter in the course of a trial on a charge of first-degree murder. The accused had beenthreatened by the deceased and his associates on multiple occasions, including death threats from the deceased. He had armed himselffor protection, then received another oral death threat from deceased.

Acting in the heat of passion caused by the deceased's provocativethreats and insults," the accused fired some eight or nine shots into the deceased's van, causing his death. A sentence of 14 years wasimposed, reduced by credit for time in pre-trial custody. 16. R. v. Yaali, 2018 ONSC 3045. Accused pled guilty to manslaughter. He and the deceased had a prior romantic relationship.

She started another relationship, and following an altercation between the accused and the new boyfriend, the accused went to thevictim’s home and fired several shots intending the target to be the new boyfriend, but instead killing her. His degree of moralculpability was high, and the court imposed a sentence of 13 years, less time served with a 1.5 factor.

[55] The Crown’s authorities support a range of between 4 years and life imprisonment. However, in my view, the dispositions inAbel, Bragg, Green, Morris, Nguyen, and Wall are most relevant to the Crown’s submission in this case. Most of those authoritiesprovide for sentences in the 7–8 year range for circumstances that generally display a high level of deliberateness and violence. [56] The Crown took the view that there were aspects of this crime that raised the level of culpability on the part of Mr. Ward. Counsel pointed to the fact that he brought a gun to the house on Pine Avenue.

He loaded it, and was responsible for firing the fatalshot. The police were not called for over 3 hours. [57] The Crown was not persuaded that the level of drugs consumed, and hence the impact on his judgment, should lower Mr.Ward’s blameworthiness. It pointed to the comments by the British Columbia Court of Appeal in the Badhesa case, at paragraph 39: Intoxication by alcohol or drugs often figures prominently in manslaughter cases.

While relevant to moral culpability, self-inducedintoxication that leads to violence is typically the product of intentional risk-taking, which conduct is itself dangerous, irresponsible andblameworthy. In such circumstances, the offender is held fully accountable for his or her condition and principles of deterrence anddenunciation are paramount in the determination of a fit sentence.

This is because the offending conduct encroaches on our society'sbasic code of values and warrants condemnation and punishment. [58] In the view of the Crown, the choice of a lifestyle that included drugs and weapons showed that the Offender was involved increating the risk that resulted in the death. As a result, the Crown submitted that this offence, on the spectrum identified in R. v. Laberge1995 ABCA 196, was closer to murder than accident.

Therefore, in this submission, the level of culpability was very high and should bereflected in the sentence. [59] The Crown suggested that the disposition should include a custodial sentence of between 8 and 10 years. The Crownacknowledged that Mr. Ward was entitled to a deduction from any sentence I impose by virtue of his pre-trial custody. It also agreedthat he should be given credit based on one and a half days for each day in custody. [60] The Defence has taken a different view of the appropriate sentence in this case. It has provided a number of authorities as well: 1. R. v. Ansari, 2008 BCSC 1709. Mr.

Ansari was convicted by a jury of manslaughter following multiple stab woundsinflicted on the victim. It appears the incident arose following a disagreement over a commercial arrangement. The relationship betweenoffender and victim was characterized by a “toxic mixture of elements of bravado, intransigent frustration and resentment.” The offenderhad good antecedents, was a bright student at law school, and had significant family and community support. The court found it was aculpable homicide with a weapon committed in circumstances of significant duress. A sentence of 5 years was imposed. 2. R. v.

Aubin, 2008 BCSC 400. The victim was involved in selling marihuana and asked the offender to get him a gun. Whenhe delivered it, the victim was shot, and the jury convicted the offender of manslaughter. Aggravating factors included use andpossession of a firearm while under court-ordered ban, and commission of an offence while on probation. He had anger problems andthe sentence should be sufficiently long to permit him to complete a rehabilitative program. A sentence of 7 years, less 2 years credit forpre-trial custody was imposed. 3. R. v. Bill (1997), (BC SC), 13 C.R. (5th) 103, 37 W.C.B. (2d) 305 (B.C.S.C.).

The offender wasconvicted by a jury of manslaughter following a shooting causing a death. He had brought a gun to a gathering where his youngerbrother was associating with gang members, and intended to use it to scare off the members of the gang. He unintentionally caused thedeath of the victim. No sentence was indicated, but the court found that the mandatory minimum in s. 236 was unconstitutional. 4. R. v. Dingwell, 2012 PESC 13. The offender was found guilty of manslaughter following a trial before a judge. He shot hisbrother with a handgun after his brother threatened the offender’s son.

He intended to shoot and harm the victim, so there was a highdegree of moral culpability. A sentence of 5 and a half years was imposed, less 17-months credit for time served. 5. R. v. Fabas, 2017 BCSC 1693. The offender pled guilty to manslaughter with a firearm. He fired a rifle toward a window ina hotel where the deceased was standing. The offender did not realize the deceased was shot between the eyes at the time. He wassentenced to 6 years imprisonment. 6. R. v. Ferguson. An RCMP officer was convicted by a jury of manslaughter after a detainee was killed by gunshot followingan altercation with the officer.

The sentencing judge found that the mandatory minimum of 4-years imprisonment constituted “cruel andunusual” punishment. The Supreme Court found it did not, and imposed the minimum. 7. R. v. Firth, 1983 11 W.C.B. 265, 52 A.R. 311 (N.W.T.S.C.). The offender pled guilty to manslaughter following recklessshooting of the victim while the offender was impaired. He accepted responsibility for the death and showed remorse. He had a longcriminal record, mostly liquor related. The court imposed a sentence of 3 years. (this appears to have been considered prior to theenactment of the mandatory minimum in s. 236.) 8. R. v.

Laberge. The court discussed the spectrum of the degree of moral culpability involved in a conviction formanslaughter. The offender pled guilty to manslaughter after, in frustration, he grabbed his child, 9-months-old daughter, and struck herhead on the floor. The resulting injuries killed her within 30 minutes. The sentence at first instance was 3 years. The Court of Appealexamined the subjective level of culpability and the need to denounce this behavior. It imposed a sentence of 4 ½ years. 9. R. v. Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39.

The offender pled guilty to criminal negligence causing death in the killing of the victim afterthe offender jumped while holding a loaded rifle. It discharged, killing his friend. The sentencing judge found the mandatory minimumviolated s. 12 of the Charter and imposed a 2-year sentence. The Supreme Court of Canada ruled that the mandatory minimum did notviolate the Charter, and imposed a 4-year sentence. 10. R. v. Onalik, 2022 NLSC 137. The offender pled guilty to manslaughter where he fought with his uncle and death occurred asa result of a beating.

The court viewed the level of violence brought the level of blameworthiness near the middle of the Laberge

spectrum from near-accident to near-murder. He was sentenced to five years with credit given for time served. 11. R. v. Pynn, 2015 NLTD(G) 37. The offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury. On sentence, 8 ½ years was imposed,less 4 ½ years credit for time served. The incident involved a struggle over a gun, which discharged killing a third party. The offenderhad a significant criminal record, several for violent crimes, but mostly for failure to abide by court orders. 12. R. v. Quinlan, 2009 BCSC 1327.

The offender pled guilty to manslaughter following an alcohol-fueled incident where, insearching for more alcohol, he fired a gun eight times wounding two individuals, and causing fatal injury to one. Aggravatingcircumstances included bringing the gun demonstrating some planning, and also firing multiple times at multiple persons. Mitigatingcircumstances included his surrender soon after the shooting, cooperation with police, and a full confession followed by a guilty plea. Hehad no prior criminal record.

The court found the circumstances not as egregious as cases that attracted penalties in the 8 to 10 yearsrange. The appropriate sentence was 6 years, less time in custody on a 2x basis, resulting in a net sentence of 3 years and 11 months. 13. R. v. Sahal, 2016 ONSC 6864. The offender was convicted of manslaughter by a jury following a shooting at a party at thedeceased’s apartment. The court found mitigating factors, including the offender’s youth, lack of criminal record, strong family support,his efforts at employment, and a new personal relationship.

The court found that the shooting was intentional, and done for the purposeof intimidation in the course of a dispute about illicit activity. A sentence of 6 years was imposed, less credit for pre-trial custody on a1.5 basis, reducing it by 3 years. 14. R. v. Saswirsky, 1981 CarswellOnt 3596, 6 W.C.B. 344 (Cty. Ct.). The offender pled guilty to a charge of criminal negligencecausing death. The victim was a woman with whom the offender was having an affair. He was a police constable, separated from hiswife.

It appeared the death occurred when he was playing with his service revolver, thinking there was no bullet in the chamber, andshot playfully at his girlfriend, killing her. He was sentenced to one year in prison. 15. R. v. Wisdom (1996), (BC CA), 75 B.C.A.C. 231, the accused shot and killed a male romantic rival. He hadprior convictions, including one for possession of a weapon. He served eleven months in pre-trial custody. This was an alcohol-relatedoffence committed while the accused was under a firearm's prohibition order.

The British Columbia Court of Appeal affirmed a sentenceof six years’ imprisonment. [61] The authorities submitted by the Defence in relation to manslaughter show a range of between 3 years and 6 years, after creditfor pre-trial custody. However, in my view, the dispositions in Ansari, Dingwell, Firth, Onalik, Quinlan, and Sahal are most relevant tothe submission of the Defence. They provide for a disposition in the 3–6 year range. [62] The Defence submitted that the level of blameworthiness should be considered to be at the lower end of the spectrum.

Itsuggested a custodial sentence of between 4 and 6 years, less credit for pre-trial custody. It pointed to his antecedents – he has no priorcriminal record and a very positive social history as pointed out in the Pre-Sentence Report.

Counsel also distinguished the Crown’sauthorities, saying that the facts of those cases were not comparable with this case, and therefore the Crown has exaggerated the level ofculpability. [63] Counsel also urged the Court to consider that the Offender is an indigenous person, and has been subject to disruptions infamily life, as well as the societal dysfunctions arising from the history of marginalization in communities in Labrador. It was submittedthis was the only way to explain the dramatic change in his life from being an upstanding citizen to descending into the world of drugsand weapons. VI.

Analysis [64] From these authorities, I can safely assume that, depending on the level of culpability and the degree of violence, the range ofsentence is, at the lower end, the minimum of four years, to about eight years at the higher end. In this case, the level of violence wassignificant, although of very short duration. There was no planning or preparation in relation to the shooting of the victim. There wasplanning based on Mr. Ward’s perception of the threat to both himself and Mr. Belanger-Dompierre.

The fact that he brought the guns tothe house at Pine Avenue did not indicate preparation for the shooting that did occur. Mr. Ward’s video statement was to the effect thatin the previous days he had come to believe, from Mr. Belanger-Dompierre, that there were individuals involved in the drug trade whowere looking for both himself and Mr. Belanger-Dompierre. [65] In addition to this perception on his part, both Mr. Ward and Mr. Belanger-Dompierre were seriously under the influence of avariety of drugs. The toxicology report indicated that Mr.

Belanger-Dompierre, in particular, had a level of methamphetamine in hisblood consistent with a toxic dose. This would have affected his perceptions and responses to stimuli around him, including hisperception of the presence of Mr. Ward. Mr. Ward’s level of drugs, including methamphetamine, was much lower, but would haveaffected his perceptions and responses as well. [66] It would appear that the jury accepted Mr. Ward’s statement that he responded to Mr. Belanger-Dompierre’s actions in almosta panic mode. In his statement, he said he was in “survival mode” and when he perceived that Mr.

Belanger-Dompierre was pointing thegun at him, he reacted without thinking by shooting the gun in his hands. [67] In this case, there are both aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Aggravating factors include the use of a firearm, forwhich the mandatory minimum applies, and the voluntary acceptance of a toxic lifestyle involving drugs and weapons. Mitigatingfactors include his very positive antecedents, as set out in the Pre-Sentence Report, his behaviour while in remand and following hisrelease pending trial, and the relationships he has re-established or formed since the offence.

[ 68 ] On balance, the facts of this case place Mr. Ward’s culpability at the moderate to lower level of the spectrum discussed in the Laberge case in the Alberta Court of Appeal.

In that case, the court discussed the challenge of assessing the level of blameworthiness and culpability: 14 Despite the fact that the Crown need not prove that an offender knew or intended that his conduct would put his victim at risk of injury in order to ground a conviction for manslaughter, whether this additional level of subjective intent has been established is important in assessing the offender's blameworthiness for sentencing purposes.

That is because our criminal justice system is based on the premise that, all other things being equal, the more an offender's "intention" or "awareness" approaches the point that he knew or was wilfully blind to the fact that his unlawful act was not only likely to put the victim at risk of death, but indeed to cause death, the more culpable he is.

Similarly, even absent proof of subjective mens rea , the more that the offender's conduct, on an objective basis, approaches the point where it can be said that he ought to have known, had he proceeded reasonably, that his unlawful act would be likely to cause life-threatening injuries as opposed to simply putting the victim at risk of bodily injury, the more culpable he is.

In other words, the offender's moral blameworthiness and in turn the gravity of the offence are functions of the degree of fault. [ 69 ] Whether one considers the unlawful act of shooting from an objective or subjective perspective, the facts before the Court suggest there was no opportunity for reflection on the part of the Offender. Objectively, aiming a loaded firearm and shooting, whatever the rationale, is a dangerous act. Subjectively, Mr. Ward appears to have reacted in the moment, without consideration of any consequences.

His reactions were likely affected by the drugs in his system, and the actions of Mr. Belanger-Dompierre to which he responded were similarly driven by the massive amount of methamphetamine in his system. [ 70 ] As noted, the Defence asked me to consider his indigenous status as a mitigating factor and to take into account the history to which communities in Labrador have been subject by virtue of the disruption in their traditional lifestyles. I hesitate to attribute the Offender’s actions to historical factors without evidence of their impact on him as an individual.

In fact, the Pre-Sentence Report speaks of his very positive antecedents and family support, notwithstanding some issues in his family over the years. He has benefited from the strong connection with his grandparents in the past, and currently by re-establishing a good relationship with his children with the support of his current partner. [ 71 ] I prefer to analyze this case along the Laberge spectrum as suggested by counsel.

In my view, when one considers the level of violence and deliberateness demonstrated in many of the authorities cited, as well as comparing the aggravating and mitigating factors, the facts of this case would place the Offender’s actions at the low level of blameworthiness, and therefore closer to the near-accident side of the spectrum, rather than the near-murder side. [ 72 ] Considering all these issues, I am more inclined to the

interpretation of the facts put forth by the Defence rather than the Crown. The authorities cited by the Crown supporting a longer sentence generally have facts that do not compare with the facts of this case. For example in Bragg , the fact that the offender shot at the victim eight times begs a conclusion that this was a level of culpability much more serious than Mr. Ward’s case. Yet the disposition, at 7 years, was below the range suggested by the Crown. In Morris , the offender’s action was deliberate and appeared to be carried out without significant impairment by alcohol.

Yet even there, the disposition was at the low end of the Crown’s suggested range. In this case there was no evidence that Mr. Ward’s actions were carried out with a comparable degree of intent. [ 73 ] In Nguyen , the offender was involved in a particularly violent event, firing repeatedly in the context of panic. In a case which, in my view, displayed much more violence and deliberateness than the current case, the court imposed a sentence of 9 years. Again, within the Crown’s suggested range, but for actions which are not comparable to Mr. Ward’s.

In Panipakoocho the court imposed a sentence of just over 9 years, but in that case, there was evidence of an intent to shoot, but not to cause death. The court found it was an inherently dangerous act. Shooting is always a dangerous act, but in Mr. Ward’s case, there was no evidence of intent. That means that the result in Panipakoocho is not a good basis for comparison with this case. [ 74 ] Finally, the Wall case was particularly brutal, and the Crown has cited this on the basis that it represented the high end of a sentence for manslaughter.

In this case, the Offender was deemed to have had options to the threats against him, and responded with a level of deliberateness not present in the current case. [ 75 ] I prefer the approach of Justice Ryan of this Court in the Onalik case. That case involved a higher level of violence as the victim was subject to a serious and extended beating resulting in death.

The issue of intoxication was addressed, and the conclusion was that to “treat alcohol use as an aggravating factor used to increase a sentence would impair the restorative justice objectives.” She also took into account the social and familial circumstances of an offender with roots on the Coast of Labrador in imposing a sentence of 5 years before credit for time served. [ 76 ] The circumstances surrounding the events that evening at Pine Avenue would place Mr. Ward’s level of culpability at the lower end of the spectrum.

In this case, I accept that the range for manslaughter, as noted above, is between the statutorily prescribed minimum sentence of 4 years, and the Crown’s submission of ten years. At the lower end, this would reduce the range to between 4 and 6 years. [ 77 ] There is also a further question arising from the possibility of the imposition of a period of probation following release from custody. In my view, probation will be helpful to Mr. Ward, because it will facilitate his access to the services offered in the community, in particular by the NunatuKavut Community Council.

To ensure access to the supervision occasioned by probation, his net sentence, following credit for time serviced, would have to be less than 2 years. The Crown agreed that should the final disposition permit, a probation order would be appropriate. [ 78 ] In my view, a sentence reflecting the low level of blameworthiness, the need for denunciation, and a reflection of Mr. Ward’s very positive antecedents would be in the range of between 5 and 7 years.

Given his circumstances, I would impose a sentence of five and one half years, less credit for time served at the rate of 1.5:1. [ 79 ] In addition, since with credit for time served the resulting sentence will be less than 2years, the Offender shall be subject to a probation order for 3 years following his release from custody, with the general conditions set out in the Code , and in addition:

1. To report to a Probation Officer within two working days of release from custody, and thereafter when required, and in the manner directed by the Probation Officer; and 2. Attend and actively participate in such awareness, educational, assessment programs or counselling sessions directed by the Probation Officer, and in particular, any relating to alcohol, drug, or substance abuse, or addiction or trauma. ANCILLARY ORDERS [ 80 ] The Crown has made four additional requests arising from the conviction in the instant case. [ 81 ] The Crown seeks an order under section 109(1) (

a) of the Code prohibiting the Offender from possessing any weapon as set out in the provision. This order shall be for life, pursuant to section 109(3). This is a mandatory provision, and I will so order. [ 82 ] The Crown seeks an order under paragraph 487.051(1) of the Code permitting a sample of bodily substance to be taken for the purpose of DNA analysis. This is a mandatory provision in this offence, and I will so order. [ 83 ] The Crown seeks an order for forfeiture and destruction of the exhibits in this proceeding under s. 490.1 of the Code , and subject to the notice provisions of s. 490.4 .

Having been satisfied that the conditions in s. 490.1 have been met, and the notice requirement in s. 490.4 has been met through participation in the trial, I will so order. [ 84 ] The Crown has also requested that a victim surcharge be imposed. In accordance with section 737(1) and (2). Accordingly, I will impose an amount of $200.00. DISPOSITION [ 85 ] For conviction of manslaughter in the death of Vincent Belanger-Dompierre, Vincent Ward is sentenced to the following: 1. A custodial sentence of five and one-half years.

Against this, he will be entitled to credit for time served in the amount of four years, four months, and twelve days, or 1,593 days; 2. Following release from custody, a probation order shall be imposed for three years pursuant to

section 731, to include the statutory conditions prescribed in

section 732.1 of the Code , and in addition: (

a) To report to a Probation Officer within two working days of release from custody, and thereafter when required and in the manner directed by the Probation Officer; and, (

b) Attend and actively participate in such awareness, educational, assessment programs or counselling sessions directed by the Probation Officer and, in particular, any relating to alcohol, drug, or substance abuse, or addiction or trauma. 3. In addition, the following Orders shall be issued: (

a) Under section 109(1)(

a) of the Code a lifetime weapons prohibition; (

b) Under paragraph 487.051(1) of the Code respecting the taking of a sample of bodily substance for the purpose of DNA analysis; (

c) Under

section 490.1 respecting the forfeiture and destruction of the exhibits in this proceeding. (

d) Under section 737(1) and (2) the imposition of a victim surcharge in the amount of $200.00. __________________________ ALPHONSUS E. FAOUR Justice