College of the North Atlantic Applicant And: Information v. Privacy Commissioner of Newfoundland and Labrador, 2021 NLSC 120

court crest IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NEWFOUNDLAND AND LABRADOR GENERAL DIVISION Citation : College of the North Atlantic (Re) , 2021 NLSC 120 Date : September 24, 2021 Docket : 202001G0627 In The Matter of an access to information request made pursuant to subsection 11(1) of the Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 2015 , S.N.L. 2015, c. A-1.2 (the “ Act ”); AND IN THE MATTER OF an Application by College of the North Atlantic (“CNA”) for a declaration pursuant to subsection 50(2) (

a) and 50(2) (

b) of the Act that CNA is not required to comply with recommendations of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Newfoundland and Labrador (the “Commissioner”) Between: College of the North Atlantic Applicant And: Information and Privacy Commissioner of Newfoundland and Labrador Intervenor Before: Justice Vikas Khaladkar On Judicial Review From: A Decision of the Information and Privacy Commissioner of Newfoundland and Labrador, Report A-2020- 001 dated the 14th day of January, 2020. Place of Hearing: St. John’s, Newfoundland and Labrador Date of Hearing: April 21, 2021

Summary: The identity of the Complainant does not need to be disclosed where it is already known to the Requestor.

Communications to which solicitor-client privilege attach need not be disclosed to the Requestor. Section 33(3) of the Act does not override the provisions of

section 40 of the same Act . In the context of a workplace investigation the employer is bound to provide all relevant material to the person being investigated subject to the reasonable protection of privacy rights, under

section 40, of complainants and third parties. Appearances: J. Alexander Templeton Appearing on behalf of the Applicant Andrew A. Fitzgerald Appearing on behalf of the Intervenor Authorities Cited: CASES CONSIDERED: Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v. Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority , 2015 NLTD(G) 183; Oleynik v. Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador , 2021 NLSC 51 ; Kirby v. Chaulk , 2021 NLSC 86 ; Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner) , 2011 NLCA 69 ; Archean Resources Ltd. v.

Newfoundland (Minister of Finance) , 2002 NFCA 43 ; Corner Brook (City) v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner), 2020 NLSC 37 STATUTES CONSIDERED: Access to Information and Protection of Privacy Act, 2015 , S.N.L. 2015, c. A-1.2 ; Public Interest Disclosure and Whistleblower Protection Act , S.N.L. 2014 c. P-37.2 REASONS FOR JUDGMENT Khaladkar, J. : INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] There is no dispute as to the facts in this matter. In brief compass, they are as follows: THE COMPLAINT AGAINST THE REQUESTOR (

a) The Complainant, an employee of CNA, filed the complaint about the Requestor, the supervisor of the Complainant, in the early spring of 2019. (

b) Subsequent to receiving the complaint, CNA conducted an occupational health and safety (“OHS”) assessment at one of its campuses. The assessment was documented in the form of the OHS Report referenced in the Access to Information Request (“Access Request”). The OHS Report documented certain observations made at the campus and a list of recommended remedial actions. (

c) CNA engaged KPMG (the “Consultant”) to conduct a forensic investigation of certain activities alleged to have been performed by the Requestor. The Consultant was asked to investigate the requisitioning and purchasing concerns set out in the complaint, as well as the

culture at the campus pertaining to other areas of concern raised in the complaint. The Consultant was not given the mandate to investigate OHS allegations. The Consultant provided a report and corrective actions were taken by CNA to resolve the problems that were found to exist. (

d) At various times during CNA’s conduct of the OHS assessment and CNA’s engagement of the Consultant, CNA’s in-house general counsel provided legal advice to CNA’s executive officers. THE ACCESS REQUEST AND RELATED PROCESS (

e) In the fall of 2019 the Requestor made the Access Request to CNA. (

f) At CNA’s request the Requestor modified the scope of the required search requested by him. (

g) At the beginning of October, 2019 CNA provided the Requestor with 370 pages of responsive records. CNA set out exceptions to the public right of access set out in sections 29, 30, 37 and 40 of the Act and, on the basis thereof, redacted portions of the provided records. (

h) About a week later the Requestor filed a complaint with the Commissioner appealing the decision of CNA and he indicated that he wished to be placed in possession of full disclosure of the complaint made against him to CNA’s senior management. (

i) CNA continued to withhold information and, in a letter to the Commissioner, explained its position in the late fall of 2019 as follows: i.“[Regarding the claimed redactions in accordance with subsections 40(1) and 37(1)(

a) of the Act: ] Prior to the start of the KPMG investigation into the [subject] campus there were several email conversations about the ongoing issues there. These emails contain significant amounts of personal information including work history, family status, and educational history but it also contains personal opinions and anecdotes which may or may not be accurate. CNA therefore submits that the release of this information would be an unreasonable invasion of privacy to the employees involved.

While there is reputational harm for the individuals involved to consider CNA believes there is also potential for reprisal and censure within the community. This creates a reasonable probability of harm to these individuals in the form of threats to their safety and mental health and well-being.

Furthermore, CNA has redacted other information in an attempt to prevent the mosaic effect. [The subject community] is one of the smaller college communities so there is a high probability that someone familiar with the campus could know who is being referenced even if the name is not mentioned. ii.[Regarding further claimed redactions in accordance with subsection 40(1) of the Act :] The college recognizes that some of the personal information included does not pose a threat to individual safety if it is disclosed. However, it still amounts to an unreasonable invasion of privacy.

For example, signatures have been redacted as have personal cell phone numbers and email addresses. iii.[Regarding the claimed redactions in accordance with subsection (29)(1)(

a) of the Act :] These notes capture the advice and recommendation that [the Chief Operating Officer] was considering in relation to the results of the KPMG report into the activities at CNA’s [subject] campus. In her role as Chief Operating Officer [the Chief Operating Officer] is responsible for Human Resources and Campus Operations for the college. iv.[Regarding the claimed redactions in accordance with subsection (30)(1)(

a) of the Act :] These redactions are made to protect the litigation privilege of the direction and advice provided by CNA’s general counsel.” [ 2 ] Informal resolution of the Requestor’s complaint was unsuccessful. The Commissioner moved to a formal investigation of the complaint in accordance with section 44(4) of the Act . [ 3 ] In early 2020 CNA provided additional reasoning concerning the Application of the exceptions to access. The additional reasons can be briefly captured as follows: (

a) The name of the Complainant is not relevant to the workplace investigation. The Requestor was made fully aware of the nature of the allegations received but the identity of the Complainant and the identities of witnesses who provided evidence to the Consultant were not disclosed to the Requestor. Anonymized information was provided to the Requestor. (

b) No credibility assessments were undertaken by the Consultant in relation to either the Complainant or the witnesses.

(

c) CNA reiterated that disclosure of identities could threaten the safety or mental and physical health of the persons involved. CNA took the position that releasing the names of individuals would serve no meaningful purpose and would be an unreasonable invasion of their privacy. (

d) CNA believes that the witnesses interviewed would not have been as forthcoming with their information if they had been asked to consent to the release of their names. CNA cited section 7(2) of the Public Interest Disclosure and Whistleblower Protection Act , S.N.L. 2014, c. P-37.2 which states as follows: 7.

(2) The identity of an employee making a disclosure shall be kept confidential to the extent permitted by law and consistent with the need to conduct a proper investigation. THE COMMISSIONER’S RECOMMENDATIONS [ 4 ] The Commissioner issued a report and, pursuant to

section 47 of the Act , recommended that the redactions in dispute should be disclosed to the Requestor. [ 5 ] The Commissioner referenced section 33(3) of the Act and noted that it contains a mandatory disclosure provision requiring the head of a public body to disclose to a Requestor who is a party to a workplace investigation all relevant information created or gathered for the purpose of a workplace investigation.

Information which might otherwise be exempt from disclosure under other provisions of the Act may, therefore, be subject to mandatory disclosure if created or gathered during a workplace investigation and relevant to the investigation. [ 6 ] The investigations by CNA were undertaken as a direct result of allegations made about the Requestor’s conduct in the workplace. As a direct result of those investigations, progressive discipline steps were taken by CNA. [ 7 ] The Commissioner recommended that the identities of witnesses, with one exception, were not relevant to the investigation.

The exception concerned a particular allegation made against the Requestor by that employee.

To that extent, the identity of the employee was relevant according to the Commissioner. [ 8 ] The Commissioner also recommended that the name of the Complainant be disclosed since this information was already known to the Requestor through correspondence sent directly from the Complainant to the Requestor prior to the Requestor’s request for disclosure. [ 9 ] With respect to solicitor-client privilege the Commissioner recommended that, with one small exception, the information be disclosed because it was not gathered or created for the purposes of a workplace investigation and, therefore, not captured by

section 33 of the Act . [ 10 ] The parties have provided to the Court for its review the redacted and unredacted portions of the records in dispute. ISSUES [ 11 ] CNA has succinctly stated the issues that need to be resolved in this Application. They are as follows: (

a) Does section 40(1) of the Act require CNA to refuse access to the Complainant’s identity? (

b) Is CNA authorized under section 30(1) of the Act to refuse access to the legal advice?; and (

c) Does section 33(3) of the Act regarding workplace investigations require CNA to disclose Complainant’s identity to the Requestor notwithstanding its exception from access in accordance with section 40(1)? ANALYSIS Does section 40(1) of the Act require CNA to refuse access to the Complainant’s identity? [ 12 ] Section 40(1) does not exist in isolation. One must have regard to the entire

section in order to discern the intention of the Legislature, since the subsections following subsection (1) provide a roadmap that the head of a public body must utilize in determining whether or not to refuse access to a complainant’s identity. Section 40(5) is particularly relevant to the facts of this case. It states as follows:

(5) In determining under subsections (1) and (4) whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy, the head of a public body shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether (

a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the province or a public body to public scrutiny; (

b) the disclosure is likely to promote public health and safety or the protection of the environment; (

c) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of the applicant's rights;

(

d) the disclosure will assist in researching or validating the claims, disputes or grievances of aboriginal people; (

e) the third party will be exposed unfairly to financial or other harm; (

f) the personal information has been supplied in confidence ; (

g) the personal information is likely to be inaccurate or unreliable; (

h) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of a person referred to in the record requested by the applicant; (

i) the personal information was originally provided to the applicant ; and (

j) the information is about a deceased person and, if so, whether the length of time the person has been deceased indicates the disclosure is not an unreasonable invasion of the deceased person’s personal privacy. [Emphasis added] [ 13 ] In the case before the Court the Complainant first complained directly to the Requestor. Subsection 40(5)(

i) therefore applies. Where personal information has already been provided directly by the Complainant to the Requestor, the “cat is out of the bag” as it were. The head of the public body need not be concerned any further about unreasonable invasion on the third party’s personal privacy because the third party’s own actions foreclosed any opportunity for the head of the public body to protect that identity. [ 14 ] There is no need for CNA to disclose the identity of the Complainant because it is already known by the Requestor.

However, CNA would not be breaching the Complainant’s right to privacy if it disclosed the identity since it is already known. [ 15 ] Different considerations apply with respect to the statements obtained from witnesses who were not complainants. It can fairly be stated that the information received from witnesses was received in confidence. The essence of what the witnesses said was provided to the Requestor in anonymized format.

This satisfies the Requestor’s desire to know what allegations have been made against him, but the non-disclosure of the identities of the witnesses serves several broad, underlying, policy considerations: (

a) The disclosure of relevant information is facilitated when it is given under the understanding that the views expressed by the witnesses will remain anonymous. To do otherwise would jeopardize the ability of the head of the public body to gather the information in the first place. (

b) The policy consideration accords with section 7(2) of the Public Interest Disclosure and Whistleblower Protection Act , which makes the identity of the person making a work-related disclosure mandatorily confidential. The

section states: 7.

(2) The identity of an employee making a disclosure shall be kept confidential to the extent permitted by law and consistent with the need to conduct a proper investigation. [ 16 ] The Commissioner recommended that the identity of witnesses need not be disclosed. I endorse that recommendation under the circumstances of this case. It is not necessary for the Requestor to know who said what. It is, however, necessary for the Requestor to know what was said. Is CNA authorized under section 30(1) of the Act to refuse access to the legal advice? [ 17 ] Section 30(1) of the Act states as follows: 30.

(1) The head of a public body may refuse to disclose to an applicant information (

a) that is subject to solicitor and client privilege or litigation privilege of a public body; or (

b) that would disclose legal opinions provided to a public body by a law officer of the Crown.

(2) The head of a public body shall refuse to disclose to an applicant information that is subject to solicitor and client privilege or litigation privilege of a person other than a public body.

[ 18 ] The only claim for solicitor-client privilege that is at issue in this Application appears in the redactions that are in dispute in this matter. The redacted and unredacted copies of the matters that may pertain to solicitor-client privilege were provided to the Court as part of the record. I have reviewed same and find that the information sought to be redacted can be considered as part of a “continuum of communication” in which advice is being sought and is, or will be, tendered. As was held by Justice Orsborn of this Court in Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v.

Eastern Regional Integrated Health Authority , 2015 NLTD(G) 183 at paragraph 24, within such a continuum, the privilege may extend to the communication of legal information. [ 19 ] The subject matter of the communication between CNA’s general counsel and members of its senior management team was the workplace complaint that is the subject matter of this investigation.

The general counsel’s advice was in the process of being sought, and the general counsel was in the course of beginning to respond to the request. [ 20 ] Section 30(1) of the Act authorizes CNA to refuse the Requestor access to the solicitor-client privileged information as a matter that falls within CNA’s discretion to refuse. It is not an unreasonable position for CNA to take under the circumstances of this case. [ 21 ] I agree with Justice Noel’s decision with respect to the interplay between section 33(3) and the solicitor-client privilege exception found at

section 30 of the Act . He held, at paragraph 98 of his decision in Oleynik v. Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador , 2021 NLSC 51 , as follows: 98 To accept the position of Oleynik and the Commissioner, the wording of section 33(3) would require specific language in the nature of ‘notwithstanding

section 30 of the Act ’ to abrogate solicitor-client and litigation privilege. No such explicit language is employed, so I conclude the Legislature did not intend to abrogate this fundamental privilege embedded in our law. … Does section 33(3) of the Act regarding workplace investigations require CNA to disclose Complainant’s identity to the Requestor notwithstanding its exception from access in accordance with section 40(1)? [ 22 ] The hearing of this matter took place on April 21, 2021. At the conclusion of the hearing I reserved my decision.

However, on June 10, 2021 Justice Knickle (as she then was) released her decision in Kirby v. Chaulk , 2021 NLSC 86 . The parties requested me to consider additional submissions because they deemed that Justice Knickle’s decision was relevant to the facts of this case. I gave the parties leave to file additional briefs in writing and they have done so. [ 23 ] The issue revolves around the interplay between the mandatory direction given in section 33(3) of the Act to disclose all relevant information and the mandatory exemptions contained in

section 40. It may be useful, at this juncture, to reproduce

section 33 and

section 40 in their entirety. They are as follows: Information from a workplace investigation 33 .

(1) For the purpose of this

section (a) "harassment" means comments or conduct which are abusive, offensive, demeaning or vexatious that are known, or ought reasonably to be known, to be unwelcome and which may be intended or unintended; (b) "party" means a complainant, respondent or a witness who provided a statement to an investigator conducting a workplace investigation; and (c) "workplace investigation" means an investigation related to (

i) the conduct of an employee in the workplace, (ii) harassment, or (iii) events related to the interaction of an employee in the public body's workplace with another employee or a member of the public which may give rise to progressive discipline or corrective action by the public body employer.

(2) The head of a public body shall refuse to disclose to an applicant all relevant information created or gathered for the purpose of a workplace investigation.

(3) The head of a public body shall disclose to an applicant who is a party to a workplace investigation the information referred to in subsection (2).

(4) Notwithstanding subsection (3), where a party referred to in that subsection is a witness in a workplace investigation, the head of a public body shall disclose only the information referred to in subsection (2) which relates to the witness' statements provided in the course of the investigation. … Disclosure harmful to personal privacy 40 .

(1) The head of a public body shall refuse to disclose personal information to an applicant where the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy.

(2) A disclosure of personal information is not an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy where (

a) the applicant is the individual to whom the information relates; (

b) the third party to whom the information relates has, in writing, consented to or requested the disclosure; (

c) there are compelling circumstances affecting a person’s health or safety and notice of disclosure is given in the form appropriate in the circumstances to the third party to whom the information relates; (

d) an Act or regulation of the province or of Canada authorizes the disclosure; (

e) the disclosure is for a research or statistical purpose and is in accordance with

section 70 ; (

f) the information is about a third party's position, functions or remuneration as an officer, employee or member of a public body or as a member of a minister's staff; (

g) the disclosure reveals financial and other details of a contract to supply goods or services to a public body; (

h) the disclosure reveals the opinions or views of a third party given in the course of performing services for a public body, except where they are given in respect of another individual; (

i) public access to the information is provided under the Financial Administration Act ; (

j) the information is about expenses incurred by a third party while travelling at the expense of a public body; (

k) the disclosure reveals details of a licence, permit or a similar discretionary benefit granted to a third party by a public body, not including personal information supplied in support of the application for the benefit;

(

l) the disclosure reveals details of a discretionary benefit of a financial nature granted to a third party by a public body, not including (

i) personal information that is supplied in support of the application for the benefit, or (ii) personal information that relates to eligibility for income and employment support under the Income and Employment Support Act or to the determination of income or employment support levels; or (

m) the disclosure is not contrary to the public interest as described in subsection (3) and reveals only the following personal information about a third party: (

i) attendance at or participation in a public event or activity related to a public body, including a graduation ceremony, sporting event, cultural program or club, or field trip, or (ii) receipt of an honour or award granted by or through a public body.

(3) The disclosure of personal information under paragraph (2)(

m) is an unreasonable invasion of personal privacy where the third party whom the information is about has requested that the information not be disclosed.

(4) A disclosure of personal information is presumed to be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy where (

a) the personal information relates to a medical, psychiatric or psychological history, diagnosis, condition, treatment or evaluation; (

b) the personal information is an identifiable part of a law enforcement record, except to the extent that the disclosure is necessary to dispose of the law enforcement matter or to continue an investigation; (

c) the personal information relates to employment or educational history; (

d) the personal information was collected on a tax return or gathered for the purpose of collecting a tax; (

e) the personal information consists of an individual's bank account information or credit card information; (

f) the personal information consists of personal recommendations or evaluations, character references or personnel evaluations; (

g) the personal information consists of the third party's name where (

i) it appears with other personal information about the third party, or (ii) the disclosure of the name itself would reveal personal information about the third party; or

(

h) the personal information indicates the third party's racial or ethnic origin or religious or political beliefs or associations.

(5) In determining under subsections (1) and (4) whether a disclosure of personal information constitutes an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy, the head of a public body shall consider all the relevant circumstances, including whether (

a) the disclosure is desirable for the purpose of subjecting the activities of the province or a public body to public scrutiny; (

b) the disclosure is likely to promote public health and safety or the protection of the environment; (

c) the personal information is relevant to a fair determination of the applicant's rights; (

d) the disclosure will assist in researching or validating the claims, disputes or grievances of aboriginal people; (

e) the third party will be exposed unfairly to financial or other harm; (

f) the personal information has been supplied in confidence; (

g) the personal information is likely to be inaccurate or unreliable; (

h) the disclosure may unfairly damage the reputation of a person referred to in the record requested by the applicant; (

i) the personal information was originally provided to the applicant; and (

j) the information is about a deceased person and, if so, whether the length of time the person has been deceased indicates the disclosure is not an unreasonable invasion of the deceased person’s personal privacy. [ 24 ] The Newfoundland and Labrador Court of Appeal has endorsed Driedger’s modern approach to statutory

interpretation in considering access to information legislation. In Newfoundland and Labrador (Attorney General) v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner) , 2011 NLCA 69 , the Court of Appeal confirmed its decision in Archean Resources Ltd. v. Newfoundland (Minister of Finance) , 2002 NFCA 43 at paragraph 18 . In these cases the Court of Appeal has given specific instruction that the scheme, object and intention of Parliament must be determined from a broad range of sources of meaning apart from the actual words used.

These sources of meaning must be analyzed in an integrated fashion to determine the scope of a particular piece of legislation and how it should be fairly applied in a given case. [ 25 ] Justice Handrigan in Corner Brook (City) v. Newfoundland and Labrador (Information and Privacy Commissioner) , 2020 NLSC 37 , stated at paragraph 78 of his decision that section 33(3) provides an “exception to the prohibition in section 33(2)”. [ 26 ] The prohibition in section 33(2) is, of course, aimed at applicants who have no vested interest in the workplace investigation – a member of the public, for example.

The Legislature has clearly indicated that, where the applicant who is not a party requests information created or gathered for the purposes of a workplace investigation, the applicant is not to receive that information. [ 27 ] Section 33(3), on the other hand, creates an exception to the rule in section 33(2) – insofar as parties to the workplace investigation must receive all relevant information. [ 28 ] CNA argues that the words of section 33(3) should be properly read as an exception to the prohibition set out in section 33(2), but ought not to go so far as becoming an exception to the Application of all the other exceptions set out in the Act that may be applicable to parts of responsive records. [ 29 ] The Commissioner argues that one must determine the status of the Requestor with respect to the workplace investigation.

Section 33(3) provides for mandatory disclosure to parties – depending upon their level of involvement. The Commissioner says that if

section 33 is inapplicable, then decisions with respect to the disclosure of personal information must be made in accordance with

section 40.

[ 30 ] Kirby v. Chaulk dealt with the interplay between section 33(2) and

section 41 – which deals with the Disclosure of House of Assembly service and statutory office records. However, Justice Knickle stated as follows: 42 Considering the sections as they occur within the Act , there is nothing to suggest that section 33(2) is necessarily paramount to

section 41 or to any of the other exceptions stated in Division II . For example, where the complainant or respondent in a workplace investigation seek access under section 33(2), it is not difficult to envisage that there may be a need to limit the access to information in order to protect sensitive personal information of the opposing party. For example, under

section 40 of ATIPPA it may be that information related to the opposing party, as a third party may be withheld from access, if it would be an “unreasonable invasion of their privacy” . In Oleynik v. Memorial University of Newfoundland and Labrador , 2021 NLSC 52 , Noel, J. found that the mandatory disclosure under

section 33 did not override the prohibition under

section 40 of ATIPPA . [Emphasis added] [ 31 ] Justice Noel was dealing with solicitor-client privilege and he was careful to refrain from making a ruling with regard to the interplay between sections 33 and 40 in the absence of appropriate context and an appropriate fact situation. [ 32 ] Section 33(3) of the Act mandates that the head of a public body must disclose to the subject of a workplace investigation all relevant information created or gathered for the purpose of a workplace investigation. [ 33 ] Section 40(1) of the Act directs the head of a public body to refuse to disclose personal information to an applicant where the disclosure would be an unreasonable invasion of a third party's personal privacy. [ 34 ] A reading of

section 30 and Division II of the Act leads me to the conclusion that the subject of a workplace investigation is entitled to receive all relevant information provided that any infringement of a third party’s personal privacy is reasonable. [ 35 ] Section 33(3), therefore, does not override the provisions of

section 40. In this case the Requestor is a party to a workplace investigation. Prima facie , therefore, he is entitled to all relevant information gathered by the employer. This right, however, is qualified by the provisions of

section 40 – to the extent that the disclosure cannot result in an unreasonable invasion of the third party’s personal privacy. [ 36 ] In the context of this case, then, the disclosure of the Complainant’s identity is not an unreasonable infringement of his personal privacy because the Complainant disclosed his own identity in, initially, making his complaint directly to the Requestor. [ 37 ] Furthermore, the divulging of the identities of third party witnesses who gave their statements in confidence would be an unreasonable infringement on their personal privacy.

CNA would not have been able to obtain the statements in question without an understanding that the third parties’ identities were being protected. The Requestor is able to make full answer and defence by having, at his disposal, the anonymous statements of the third parties. As I stated earlier, it is not important who said what, it is important what was said. [ 38 ] Similarly, providing personal information such as cellphone numbers or e-mail addresses of third parties including the Complainant would be both irrelevant information under

section 33 and an unreasonable infringement of privacy. [ 39 ] Each party shall bear its own costs of the Application. _____________________________ Vikas Khaladkar Justice