R. v. Movsessian Date:, 2016 BCPC 455

Citation: R. v. Movsessian Date: 20161216 2016 BCPC 455 File No: 209087-1 Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal REGINA v. VICKEN MOVSESSIAN ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF HONOURABLE JUDGE D.R. GARDNER Counsel for the Crown: J. Neal and C. Morgan Counsel for the Defendant: W.B. Smart, Q.C. Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: November 7-9, 29, 2016; December 1 and 2, 2016 Date of Judgment: December 16, 2016 [ 1 ] Vicken Movsessian is charged under s. 86(1) of the Criminal Code with careless use of a firearm.

[ 2 ] On November 7, 2013, the police were going to effect a high-risk vehicle stop. They were attempting to arrest Corey Foster, who was considered to be armed and dangerous. He was known to be an associate of the Independent Soldiers Gang, a notorious and violent gang associated to the drug trade.

He has a lengthy criminal record, and at the time, had more than 30 outstanding warrants, including for aggravated assault in Kamloops, two counts of using a firearm in the commission of an offence in Surrey, pointing a firearm, robbery, aggravated assault in Surrey, forcible confinement and robbery. [ 3 ] On that date, police had information from an informant than he was attempting to obtain a firearm to conduct a home invasion.

They also believed he was using GHB, commonly known as a date-rape drug, on a daily basis. [ 4 ] It was dark, and the scene of the takedown was illuminated with artificial light and surrounding businesses in the strip mall. It was raining moderately. [ 5 ] Cst. Movsessian was driving a Chevrolet Tahoe. Cpl. Bowman was in the front passenger's seat. A decision was made to initiate the arrest by employing a high-risk vehicle takedown, meaning all of the officers would draw their firearms as they approached the target vehicle. They all believed that the person in the backseat of the Toyota Camry was Mr. Foster.

That resulted from incorrect intelligence and surveillance activity they had received. [ 6 ] There were two other unidentified young men occupying the front seat of the Camry. The target was observed behaving in an agitated manner in the Donair Restaurant prior to this incident. [ 7 ] The plan was to drive up and box in the Camry. Cpl. Bowman was to be a contact officer, meaning he was the only member to issue commands to the people in the Camry.

The Tahoe was delayed somewhat as it moved through the parking lot, allowing the Camry to back up and move forward slightly, forcing the police to box it in at roughly a 45-degree angle. [ 8 ] The Tahoe's headlights and emergency equipment were activated. Two other officers arrived in a Ford Crown Victoria within a second of the Tahoe stopping. As the Tahoe came to a stop, Cpl. Bowman had his door half open and left the vehicle immediately, drawing his service pistol. He yelled, "Police, stop, you're under arrest." [ 9 ] The two young adults in the front seat raised their hands. At that moment, Cst.

Movsessian fired his weapon. He then said, "Fuck." Cpl. Bowman quickly went over to see if Cst. Movsessian had been hit. He said that Cst. Movsessian was standing in the A- frame behind the door, with his gun pointing downwards. Cpl. Bowman could hear yelling coming from the Camry, but then heard Cst. Movsessian saying, "Are you hit, are you hit?" He said Cst. Movsessian then went around the driver's door of the Tahoe and advanced quickly towards the rear passenger's seat of the Camry. He opened the door and pulled the person who had been shot out of the vehicle.

He cradled the person he had shot and apologized to him. [ 10 ] Cpl. Bowman quickly realized that the victim was not Mr. Foster, but rather, it was Michael Minchin, who he recognized from previous dealings. An ambulance arrived and he was taken to the hospital. [ 11 ] Mr. Minchin, now 31 years of age, has testified that he is currently on disability. He said that the driver of the Camry, Matthew Newman, had picked him up earlier that day at the Gateway Sky Train Station. They went to Donair's, and after dinner, he was going to be driven home.

Before Donair's, they stopped at a friend's place, where he was told by his friend's dad that his son was not there. After they got back into the Camry, they backed up, and had just pulled forward when the SUV was siren-stopped and the officers emerged from the vehicle. He claims that he was simply reaching for his seatbelt when he was shot. Initially, he thought he had been shot with a beanbag. He denied that the officer said anything to him before shooting him. He was then dragged out of the vehicle onto the concrete, while he was screaming, "What did I do? I didn't do anything wrong.

Why did you shoot me with a beanbag?" He was told to stop yelling and was advised that he had not been hit with a beanbag. He then saw blood pouring out of his chest and onto his stomach. [ 12 ] He described the officer who shot him as shaking, like he was startled, and apologetic. He denied leaning back from the seat, away from the police car's headlights, and when asked if he ever tried to get anything out of his pockets from inside his pants, he replied, "Not that I recall." [ 13 ] He also admitted using crystal-meth and GHB, if not on a daily basis, then every second day.

He had been in recovery and about three months prior to the incident, he relapsed after being clean for 18 months. He was unable to recall if he used drugs on the day he was shot. He does recall, however, drinking three vodka coolers that day. He admitted to having crystal-meth and cocaine on him, which was mainly for personal use. On cross-examination, he acknowledged selling drugs to support his habit.

He also said that he could not say where those drugs were in the backseat of the Camry, and admitted they were on his body someplace, and conceded that if those drugs were found on him by the police, that might cause him some real difficulty, given that he had been sentenced sometime before for six months in prison for a similar offence. [ 14 ] He also admitted that four days beforehand, he had been stopped and searched by the police. In that search, the police discovered drugs hidden in his private parts, and that it is not unusual for people selling drugs to hide them.

He was pressed on that point and was asked again if the drugs had been hidden in his crotch area four days before. To this rather pointed question, he replied, "I'm not sure." However, he did say that he had drugs on him that day for the purpose of selling. [ 15 ] When asked about the earlier observations by a police officer that he had stopped at a house close to the Donair, he first said that he never picked up anything there. When pressed on that point that he had been observed reaching up into the rafters of the carport and taking something, he said it was for a pack of cigarettes.

When asked if it was in fact drugs, he tried to explain that is a good way to store cigarettes so nobody steals them. When confronted by the fact that the police discovered three phones, a scoresheet and a quantity drugs, and then asked if he was planning on trafficking that day, he said he was not doing so on that day.

When asked why he would be driving around with drugs, a scoresheet and three phones if he was not selling drugs, he said he did not want to leave them at home. [ 16 ] He was then asked if he recalled the police vehicles coming up very quickly, stopping right in front of his vehicle, the police then getting out with guns pointed at them, and saying words to the effect of "put up your hands." His answer was simply, "No." Next question from defence counsel was, "I'm going to suggest that happened." He simply answered, "Okay." Then he was asked that when

he saw the guns, what did he do with his hands. He replied, "I don't recall, it happened so quickly." Then he added that he was reaching for his seatbelt, looked up and saw them pointing guns at him, adding it happened instantaneously. When asked that he knew he didn't want to be arrested with the drugs on him, he said he wasn't thinking that at all, and had no recollection of getting rid of them. [ 17 ] When Mr. Minchin was first interviewed by the RCMP in relation to this incident, he denied that the drugs that were found near him in the Camry belonged to him.

Then, some weeks later, prior to the commencement of this trial, he admitted that the drugs were his, but were for personal use only. Finally, he admitted to Crown counsel on the morning before he was set to testify that he was in possession of the drugs with the intention of selling them. At one point he insisted that he could not remember anything that happened 36 hours after he was shot. [ 18 ] He was, however, interviewed the day after the shooting by the Independent Investigation Office at the hospital. He claimed to have no memory of that interview.

Defence counsel quoted from part of that interview where an investigator, Gail Holochuck (phonetic), introduced herself as, "Are you familiar with our agency?" Answer, "Not really, I watch TV. It's kind of like Internal Affairs." She then explained, "We're an independent agency that was set up to investigate incidents that involve the police when someone is killed or injured. We are a civilian-led organization. We're independent. We come in and we gather the facts." To that, Mr. Minchin asked, "Who signs the cheques?" Ms.

Holochuck asked, "Who signs the cheques for us?" To which he says, "Yeah." She says, "The Ministry of Justice is who we work for." Mr. Minchin said, "Cool, cool." When asked if he had a recollection of that conversation, he replied, on the witness stand, "None at all." When pressed on that point, he said, "I said a lot of ridiculous things in here," referring to his statement, "that to me clearly shows how affected by the painkillers I was." [ 19 ] He also said he had no memory of calling a television station and then giving an interview to a reporter that was later shown on the news.

Once again he was referred to a transcript of that interview, where he said, "I'm calling CTV News, Global, the Now, the News, the frickin' Province, the Sun, National Post, Edmonton Sun, ITV News. I'm not stopping." His explanation was, "There's a lot of ridiculous things I have said in the statement." That interview was shown later on CTV News and he did admit telling them that there were no drugs in his car. He also did not deny telling the paramedic that took him to the hospital that he had consumed alcohol and had taken GHB that afternoon. [ 20 ] The Crown has called Sgt.

Gravelle, a full-time trainer in the use of force, which includes control tactics and high-risk takedowns. Even he had to concede that he cannot replicate a real-life situation during training exercises, and I quote, "Real life is not always perfect." In a situation such as this, if an officer believes someone has a gun, an assessment must be based on the subject's behaviour. He also said that if an officer sees a gun, the priority is to shoot your gun. [ 21 ] Cst. Movsessian has testified on his own behalf. He became a police officer in May 2006. He received the firearm he used that night at that time.

He has received extensive training in the use of firearms, as well as how officers are to conduct themselves during high-risk situations. He has never dislodged his firearm accidentally. [ 22 ] On November 7, 2013, he was aware of the target, Mr. Foster's criminal past and the more than 30 outstanding warrants, as well as being informed that he was looking for a firearm to be used during a home invasion. He was also told that Mr. Foster was using a large amount of GHB and, if so, that would cause him to act in an unpredictable manner.

He believed him to be a high-risk offender, primarily because of the number of warrants for offences relating to firearms, which indicated he had a propensity for violence. He had also been advised that the people in the car had taken something from the rafters of a carport, which Surveillance described as something consistent with a firearm. [ 23 ] The officers had made the decision to arrest Mr. Foster when he returned to the vehicle from the restaurant. He had discussed with Cpl. Bowman how they were going to proceed.

After seeing the Camry backing out of the parking spot, they decided to position their vehicle at a 45-degree angle behind it and activate the service lights. After doing so, Cst. Movsessian got out of his vehicle and yelled, "Police, show me your hands." He then saw the target in the backseat lean forward, then turn sideways towards the window. Initially he saw that person's hands in the air and his face pressed against the window. His face was illuminated by the nearby lighting. He had his hands in the air, then suddenly he could not see his hands anymore, as he was leaning back.

He seemed to be reaching for something, and the officer thought he was reaching for a firearm. He fired, and saw him fall backwards across the backseat of the car. He could then see his hands in the air, and he was yelling, "Don't shoot, don't shoot." He could then see him illuminated completely by the light of the police vehicle. He then went forward towards the Camry and opened the door. Mr. Minchin continued to yell, "Don't shoot, don't shoot." He then pulled him out of the vehicle, searched him, and placed him in handcuffs. [ 24 ] He checked for weapons.

He searched the back of the car and admits to only finding a bag of marihuana. He admits to being confused at that point, as he did not find a firearm. Cpl. Bowman then arrived and he soon realized that it was the wrong person. He apologized, because he realized at that point he had just shot someone over a bag of marihuana. [ 25 ] On cross-examination, he said that he shot Mr. Minchin because he believed his life was in peril. He admitted that his adrenaline was pumping, as initial contact is the most important time. He believed the victim was reaching for a firearm, and that is why he shot.

The accused said he did not fire out of anger, the word he would choose was "fear." [ 26 ] It was suggested to him that he yelled the word "fuck" because he shot someone accidentally. I pause to say in my experience, that word is commonly used as a noun, a verb, an adverb and an adjective, and I do not attach any particular meaning to it within this scenario. [ 27 ] I have read and re-read the very helpful submissions of counsel, so it is not necessary that I review them at length. I have also reviewed the caselaw that I have been provided. [ 28 ] The Crown has argued that Cst.

Movsessian's evidence is inconsistent with the evidence of other witnesses. It is also significant that his memory of the incident is not reliable. I have heard that suggestion in numerous trials where someone is not charged with an offence for several months, or sometimes years, after the fact. I have not lost sight of the fact that Cst. Movsessian was not charged until roughly a year and a half after the incident. It strikes me as fundamentally unfair that after a significant lapse of time, the accused is criticized for not having an accurate memory.

I make this observation not only with regards to this officer, but to any individual who has

to wait years for their opportunity to answer to a charge. [29] The Crown has acknowledged that there is inconsistency in all of the witnesses' evidence as to how much time elapsed betweenthe accused leaving his vehicle and the shot being fired. This is another issue that frequently arises during the course of a trial. Thisreminds me of the time the late H.A.D. Oliver, Queen's Counsel, and later a Supreme Court Justice of our Province, testified in apersonal injury case while he was still a barrister. The trial arose from a motor-vehicle collision.

On cross-examination, the lawyerasked him, "So you're saying that you saw these vehicles two or three seconds before the collision?" Mr. Oliver replied, "I did not saytwo or three seconds, I said a moment." The lawyer persisted. "And what do you mean by a moment?" At that point, Mr. Oliver turnedto the trial judge and said, "A moment, My Lord, a brief period of time incapable of being measured accurately." Now, that may not bethe dictionary meaning of the word, but I find his words to be helpful in my analysis. [30] The Crown has referred the Court to the case of R. v.

Gosset, (SCC), [1993] 3 S.C.R. 76, which is the leadingauthority on careless use or discharge of a firearm. In Gosset, the Court held that careless use of a firearm is a crime of negligencerequiring consideration based on the objective standard. The court said: What need be proven in order to convict under this provision is conduct that constitutes a marked departure from the standard of care of areasonably prudent person in the circumstances.

If a reasonable doubt exists, either that the conduct in question did not constitute amarked departure from that standard of care, or that reasonable precautions were taken to discharge the duty of care in the circumstances,a verdict of acquittal must follow. [31] The Crown also argued the offence of careless use of a firearm is part of an overall regulatory scheme which imposes a dutyupon all persons in possession of firearms to handle, store and use their weapons carefully. The criminal law imposes a single minimumstandard, which must be met by all people who engage in a regulated activity.

In this case, that activity is the use of firearms. Thatstandard must be met by all who engage in the activity, provided they enjoy the requisite capacity to appreciate the danger. While it isan objective standard that must be applied, penal negligence incorporates the particular frailties of the accused, if any, because he or shecould not have acted other than they did in the circumstances. [32] The Crown further contends that reasonableness cannot be assessed in the abstract, but must relate to the circumstances of theaccused at the time of the offence.

As stated by Lamer, C.J. in Gosset: It is important to distinguish, however, between the relevance of personal factors to the question of whether the accused's conductconstituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonable person, and the relevance of personal factors to the question of whetherthe accused was capable of meeting that standard of care. The Supreme Court said: I note initially that some factors particular to the offence will not be personal to the accused.

The standard of care must obviously bedetermined with reference to the external physical circumstances of the offence; for example, prevailing road conditions where a drivingoffence is at issue. Rather, a personal factor relating to defining the standard of care is the accused's membership in a groupcharacterized by training or specially superior knowledge which indicates that a higher standard of care than that which would beexpected of the untrained or non-specialist reasonable person is appropriate.

Just as in the law of civil negligence, the defendant withspecial knowledge or experience is held to a higher standard commensurate with their knowledge or experience, so in penal negligence, apolice officer trained and experienced in the use of firearms should be held to a higher standard of care in the handling of firearms thanthe non-police officer. [33] The Court, in Gosset, went on to note that: An accused's training and experience as a police officer will be relevant to the standard of care owed under s. 86.

The threshold questionis then whether the accused's actions constituted a marked departure from the conduct expected of a reasonable member of theexperienced or specialist group. [34] Once the court finds that a marked departure from the standard of care has occurred, then the focus of the analysis must shift toask whether the accused was capable of recognizing that he had not met the standard of care required in the circumstances. [35] In Gosset, the court created a checklist to assist in determining fault under s. 86.

First of all, was the conduct of the accused amarked departure from the standard of care of a reasonable person in the circumstances of the offence? If the answer to this question isno, then the accused must be acquitted, since his or her conduct was not objectively negligent. If the answer is yes, however, then thejury must be instructed to consider the second question, which is: was the conduct of the accused a marked departure from the requiredstandard of care because (

a) he or she did not turn his or her mind to the duty of care, and thus to the risk likely to result from theconduct; or (

b) he or she lacked the capacity to turn his or her mind to the duty of care due to human frailties? If the answer is (a), theaccused must be convicted, since the criminal law cannot allow the absence of actual awareness to be an excuse to criminal liability fornegligence.

If the answer is (b), the third stage of the inquiry is needed, under which the jury should be instructed to consider the thirdquestion, which is, in the context of the particular offence, would the reasonable person with the capacities of the accused have madehim or herself aware of the standard of care? [36] The defence has urged the court to accept the evidence of Cst. Movsessian that he intentionally discharged his firearm becausehe believed his life was in imminent danger from his observations of the conduct of the person believed to be Corey Foster.

All of theofficers at the scene agreed that they shared that belief and that this was a high-risk takedown. It was unpredictable, fluid anddangerous. [37] The accused's description of Mr. Minchin's actions of lowering his hands, arching his back and reaching into his waist or pocketarea is consistent with him having reached for the bag of drugs or the bag of marihuana to throw it off him. It is also argued that theaccuracy of the discharge is more consistent with being intentional than accidental.

[ 38 ] Furthermore, the fact that he did not seek cover after the discharge, and instead moved towards the target, holstered his firearm and pulled the person from the vehicle, does not assist in determining whether the discharge was intentional or accidental. Either way, he approached the target, believing that person was Mr. Foster, who he believed to be armed. [ 39 ] Both Sgt. Rodriguez and Sgt.

Gravelle testified that the objective of the training they provided to officers was to simulate real- life situations so that the officers would be properly equipped to handle the emotional and physical stress of real life, and to make good decisions in fulfilling their duties. Those emotions can be intense. Sgt. Rodriguez testified that when an officer makes the conscious decision to shoot another person, they experience extreme emotions stemming from the stress of the incident unfolding, and the stress of the decision to pull the trigger.

Both sergeants testified to teaching their officers principles and concepts to apply to real-life circumstances. The approach to training recognizes that situations will not always unfold as planned. When asked if there were rules and exceptions in police officer training, Sgt. Rodriguez made it clear there were no rules, just concepts. Sgt. Gravelle testified that principles and concept models allowed for officers to be flexible in responding to an unfolding situation. [ 40 ] Sgt. Rodriguez testified he recalled training the accused on a number of occasions, and that there was nothing in his training of Cst.

Movsessian that caused him concern that the constable was not following the four basic rules of handling the firearm. He also had no concern about his ability to control his emotions and physical actions during simulated high-stress situations. [ 41 ] It was also submitted that Cst. Movsessian had been trained that if someone was reaching for a gun, he was not going to be able to respond quickly, even if he waited to confirm they were reaching for a gun. The defence pointed to the evidence of the Crown's expert, Insp. Butler, on this point. In his evidence, Insp.

Butler testified, and I quote: We've got to look at the entire context of the situation. We've got a suspected violent individual with an extreme history of violence, drug use, which can result in very unpredictable behaviour.

We suspect that he's either got a firearm or is seeking to obtain possession of a firearm, and what we know from the research is that if the officer waits, so if I -- if I have all that as my background context, and I'm dealing with the threat, and I see a movement consistent with somebody -- and there's undirected movement, I've told them to keep their hands up, and their hands are up, and now they make a move which I perceive to be contextually a cue and assaultive behaviour; in other words, reaching behaviour, drawing for a firearm.

Now, if the officer waits until they see that firearm begin to come and do, what we know is that the offender will be able to fire two, three, perhaps four shots before the officer is actually able, even if they've got their own gun out in a ready position able to respond to that threat. So this is an extremely dangerous for police officers, because we end up with what's call mistake-of-fact shootings.

In other words, an officer believes a subject is engaging in threatening behaviour, and because of all the context, they believe a lethal threat is going to present itself, they either can wait until they confirm that the gun is coming out, and knowing if they do, that they're going to have multiple shots fired at them before they can respond, or they respond quickly with their firearm, with lethal force, prior to the offender having the opportunity to present that weapon and shoot.

He goes on to say that, in his research of [indiscernible] weapons he had conducted on reaction times of officers, he was presented with an excerpt of his expert report on this issue, which stated, in part: In examining the research on subject action time and officer reaction time, what is clear is that the subject action will almost always be a police officer's reaction. When officers use force during the execution of their duties, it is typically as a reaction to the threatening stimulus, behaviours or actions of the subject the officer is dealing with.

Therefore, subjects will practically always have the opportunity to initiate some type of threatening action first. The officer will observe the threatening action and then decide on a course of response action and then begin a must-go motor response or reaction to that threat. The research on human decision-making informs us that it takes an average of 180 to 200 milliseconds for a person to be able to begin to observe/perceive a simple stimulus change in their environment.

In a complex visual scene, such as an officer assessing a rapidly-unfolding situation, visual reaction time processing to a stimulus change is likely to be closer to 300 milliseconds. For example, in extensive research conducted by the Force Science Institute in examining officer reaction to threats during a traffic-stop situation, it was discovered that the average reaction time from the initial presentation of the threat stimulus to the beginning of the officer's motor movement response was 0.37 seconds.

Once the observation/perception time is completed, the party then has to active the appropriate motor muscle response. With officers who have their firearms drawn and held in a ready position, the research demonstrates in a clinical laboratory environment, the average response time to a simple visual stimulus is 0.83 seconds for the officer to raise their weapon and fire one round.

If the officer has his weapon pointed directly at a subject with their finger on the frame of the weapon, not inside the trigger guard, it will take approximately .2 seconds to complete the movement of the finger to depress the trigger. He went on to say: Officer perception and response times and suspect assault times discussed above need to be brought together and understood. The

summary of the above two points means that officers are almost always behind the action/reaction time curve. If an officer waits until he or she is able to discern with complete certainty that an offender does in fact have a gun, the officer will be shot at 100 percent of the time before they respond. [ 42 ] The defence acknowledges that Mr. Minchin certainly is a victim of the offence that transpired on November 7, 2013, but argues that his evidence is unreliable. First of all, he was likely using drugs on that date, which would have affected his perception, memory and conduct.

He also has a motive to lie about how he conducted himself when the takedown was initiated, as he did not want to be caught with drugs on his person. Cpl. Bowman observed a package of drugs falling from Mr. Minchin when he was on the ambulance stretcher. It had fallen from his right hip onto the pavement. However, Mr. Minchin denied in cross-examination having any memory of getting rid of the drugs. [ 43 ] Notably, his story about the drugs has evolved over time.

On the evening of November 8, 2013, he called CTV News, and during that interview, said he was not aware of any drugs or weapons in the car, but that he was carrying two vodka coolers. A month later, he told the RCMP investigators the drugs were not his. Eventually he admitted to Crown counsel, several weeks before the trial, that they were his, but for his own personal use. Finally, on the morning of November 8, 2016, he admitted to the Crown, for the first time, that the drugs were for selling.

[ 44 ] The defence has correctly stated that the Crown bears the burden of proof that Cst. Movsessian's use of his firearm constituted a marked departure from the standard of a reasonably prudent person, and that there was an objective foresight of risk or harm. [ 45 ] The Crown's theory is that the accused forgot his training to keep his index finger off the trigger guard and accidentally shot Mr. Minchin. They say he did so unintentionally. [ 46 ] It is the defence position that Cst. Movsessian acted intentionally in discharging his firearm, and his conduct did not amount to careless use of a firearm.

The defence also contends that there is no direct evidence to suggest he used his firearm in a dangerous manner. Instead, the Crown asks the court to infer from certain circumstantial evidence that he must have shot his gun accidentally. [ 47 ] The Crown has emphasized that he made several mistakes that were contrary to his extensive training. This is a valid point, but I emphasize that these are not disciplinary proceedings. These are, of course, criminal proceedings, where I must decide this case without sympathy or bias towards the accused or the victim of the shooting.

It is most unfortunate that the police were acting upon flawed intelligence. [ 48 ] I also note that this trial has occurred over the course of four days. The submissions of counsel alone lasted more than two hours, and I have not lost sight of the fact that the accused did not have that amount of time to decide whether or not to shoot. [ 49 ] In considering all of the evidence and the submissions of counsel, I have concluded that Cst. Movsessian, who was obviously sober at the time, has given a far more accurate and credible account as to what happened that evening, as opposed to the version offered by Mr.

Minchin. [ 50 ] I have also considered the case law I have been referred to, as well as having considered the test that I must apply in R. v. W.D. with respect to assessing guilt based on the credibility of witnesses. I have concluded that Cst. Movsessian had reasonable grounds to believe, at the moment he fired his weapon, his life was in danger due to the unpredictable actions of Mr. Minchin. As such, Cst.

Movsessian's actions were not a marked departure from the standard of care of a reasonably prudent police officer in these circumstances. [ 51 ] Accordingly, I find him not guilty of this charge. (REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)