2016 QCCQ 3228, 2016 QCCQ 3228

Varma c. Chronopoulos 2016 QCCQ 3228 COURT OF QUEBEC Small Claims Division CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF MONTREAL Civil Division No: 500-32-146861-150 DATE: April 28, 2016 ______________________________________________________________________ BY THE HONOURABLE JEFFREY EDWARDS, J.C.Q. ______________________________________________________________________ ANIL VARMA Plaintiff v.

CHRISTOPHER CHRONOPOULOS Defendant ______________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ______________________________________________________________________ [ 1 ] Anil Varma sues Christopher Chronopoulos, his former father in law, for $15,000 for damages resulting from the disposal and non-return of restaurant equipment co-owned by them. Mr. Chronopoulos denies any liability stating that Mr. Varma’s claim is prescribed and that in any event, no amount is owed. Mr. Chronopoulos also claims against Mr. Varma by Cross-Demand for $3,258 on the basis that Mr.

Varma’s judicial demand constitutes an abuse of procedure. Questions in Issue 1) Is Anil Varma’s claim prescribed? 2) If not, is Christopher Chronopoulos liable for Anil Varma’s alleged loss? 3) Is Christopher Chronopoulos’ Cross-Demand for abuse of proceedings well founded? Context [ 2 ] Mr. Varma alleges that in 2002, he and Mr. Chronopoulos purchased together certain restaurant equipment for the amount of $14,000, plus taxes [1] . This equipment was then used by Mr. Varma to operate a restaurant in a building owned by a company whose principal shareholder was his mother in law at the time. Mr.

Chronopoulos managed the building on her behalf. [ 3 ] From 2002 to 2015, Mr. Varma was married to Mr. Chronopoulos’s daughter, Irene. In 2003, the restaurant failed and closed. [ 4 ] In approximately 2004, a new restaurant tenant, operating under the banner “La Belle Province” leased the former restaurant’s premises.

[ 5 ] Le Belle Province rejected the existing equipment as it did not conform to their business model and requirements. La Belle Province then discarded the equipment. Plaintiff became aware of the situation in 2004 and complained then to his father in law that he did not feel fairly treated in the circumstances and that he wanted some sort of compensation as a result of the disposal of the equipment in which he had a 50% ownership interest. [ 6 ] Mr. Varma repeated verbally that claim against Christopher Chronopoulos over the next several years but Mr. Chronopoulos denied any liability.

The divorce proceedings between Mr. Varma and Mr. Chronopoulos’s daughter were finalized on […] 2015 [2] . [ 7 ] On March 30, 2015, Mr. Varma resurrected his claim for compensation for the disposal of the equipment and sent a claim letter to Mr. Chronopoulos [3] . Analysis and Decision 1) Is Anil Varma’s claim prescribed? [ 8 ] The deadline to file into Court a proceeding with respect to a claim is three (3) years from the day the claim or cause of action arises [4] .

Article 2925 of the Civil Code of Quebec (“C.C.Q.”) reads as follows: 2925. An action to enforce a personal right or movable real right is prescribed by three years , if the prescriptive period is not otherwise determined. [Emphasis added.] [ 9 ] Based upon the evidence of Mr. Varma, he was aware of his claim at the latest in 2004 and made multiple requests to Mr. Chronopoulos for compensation. If we take the latest possible date of that year for the calculation of prescription, namely December 31, 2004, Mr. Varma’s claim was prescribed after December 31, 2007. [ 10 ] As Mr.

Varma filed his legal proceeding on April 22, 2015, his claim is clearly prescribed and was instituted after over seven (7) years from the legal deadline. 2) If not, is Christopher Chronopoulos liable for Anil Varma’s alleged loss? [ 11 ] Based on the above conclusion to question 1), it is not necessary to answer question 2). 3) Is Christopher Chronopoulos’ Cross-Demand for abuse of proceedings well founded? [ 12 ] Mr. Chronopoulos claims $3,258 as damages ($2,500 for stress and inconvenience plus $758 for legal fees) resulting from the abusive proceedings of Mr. Varma). [ 13 ] Mr. Chronopoulos alleges that Mr.

Varma has embarked on a campaign of harassment and intimidation against him and his

spouse for manifestly unfounded claims and that such conduct is only motivated by his disappointment regarding the settlement of his divorce proceedings with Mr. Chronopoulos’ daughter. Mr. Chronopoulos alleges that since claims against Mr. Varma’s ex-wife Irene are excluded under the divorce agreement, Mr Varma is, in spite and for reasons of vengeance, taking proceedings against Mr. Chronopoulos and his wife. [ 14 ] It is further alleged that Mr.

Varma is using the judicial system, in particular the Small Claims Division of the Court of Quebec in an excessive and unreasonable manner for the sole purpose of getting back at Mr. Chronopoulos and his family for supporting their daughter Irene during the divorce proceedings [5] . [ 15 ] Mr. Chronopoulos asks that Mr. Varma’s conduct be sanctioned by a monetary condemnation for abuse. [ 16 ] These accusations are serious and if future conduct of Mr.

Varma confirms their accuracy, such a sanction, including designation of Anil Varma as a vexatious and quarrelsome litigant should be considered and may be appropriate in accordance with Articles 51, 55, 341 and 342 of the new Code of Civil Procedure (“C.C.P.”). [ 17 ] These Articles read as follows: 51. Les tribunaux peuvent à tout moment, sur demande et même d’office, déclarer qu’une demande en justice ou un autre acte de procédure est abusif.

L’abus peut résulter, sans égard à l’intention, d’une demande en justice ou d’un autre acte de procédure manifestement mal fondé, frivole ou dilatoire, ou d’un comportement vexatoire ou quérulent. il peut aussi résulter de l’utilisation de la procédure de manière excessive ou déraisonnable ou de manière à nuire à autrui ou encore du détournement des fins de la justice, entre autres si cela a pour effet de limiter la liberté d’expression d’autrui dans le contexte de débats publics. 51.

The courts may, at any time, on an application and even on their own initiative, declare that a judicial demand or a pleading is abusive. Regardless of intent, the abuse of procedure may consist in a judicial demand or pleading that is clearly unfounded, frivolous or intended to delay or in conduct that is vexatious or quarrelsome. It may also consist in a use of procedure that is excessive or unreasonable or that causes prejudice to another person, or attempts to defeat the ends of justice, particularly if it operates to restrict another person’s freedom of expression in public debate. 55.

Lorsque l’abus résulte de la quérulence d’une partie, le tribunal peut, outre les autres mesures, interdire à la

partie d’introduire une demande en justice ou de présenter un acte de procédure dans une instance déjà introduite sans l’autorisation préalable du juge en chef et selon les conditions que celui-ci détermine. 55. If an abuse of procedure results from a party’s quarrelsomeness, the court may, in addition to other measures, prohibit the party from instituting pleading in an ongoing proceeding except with a judicial demand or presenting the authorization of and subject to the conditions determined by the chief justice or the chief judge.

341. Le tribunal peut ordonner à la

partie qui a eu gain de cause de payer les frais de justice engagés par une autre

partie s’il estime qu’elle n’a pas respecté adéquatement le principe de proportionnalité ou a abusé de la procédure, ou encore, s’il l’estime nécessaire pour éviter un préjudice grave à une

partie ou pour permettre une répartition équitable des frais, notamment ceux de l’expertise, de la prise des témoignages ou de leur transcription. Il le peut également si cette

partie a manqué à ses engagements dans le déroulement de l’instance, notamment en ne respectant pas les délais qui s’imposaient à elle, si elle a indûment tardé à présenter un incident ou un désistement, si elle a inutilement fait comparaître un témoin ou si elle a refusé sans motif valable d’accepter des offres réelles, d’admettre l’origine ou l’intégrité d’un élément de preuve ou de participer à une séance d’information sur la parentalité et la médiation en matière familiale. Il le peut aussi si cette

partie a tardé à soulever un motif qui a entraîné la correction ou le rejet du rapport d’expertise ou qui a rendu nécessaire une nouvelle expertise. 341. The court may order the successful party to pay the legal costs incurred by another party if it is of the opinion that the successful party did not properly observe the principle of proportionality or committed an abuse of procedure, or that such an order is necessary to prevent serious prejudice to a party or to permit a fair apportionment of the costs, including those incurred for expert fees, the taking of oral evidence or its transcription.

The court may also make such an order if the successful party breached its undertakings with regard to the conduct of the proceeding, such as by failing to meet time limits, if it unduly delayed in presenting an incidental application or filing a notice of discontinuance, if it needlessly required a witness to attend at court or if it refused, without valid cause, to accept tenders, to admit the origin or integrity of evidence or, in a family matter, to participate in a parenting and mediation information session.

As well, the court may make such an order if the successful party delayed in raising grounds that resulted in the expert report being corrected or rejected or a new expert’s opinion being necessary. 342. Le Tribunal peut, après avoir entendu les parties, sanctionner les manquements importants constatés dans le déroulement de l’instance en ordonnant à l’une d’elles, à

titre de frais de justice, de verser à une autre partie, selon ce qu’il estime juste et raisonnable, une compensation pour le paiement des honoraires professionnels de son avocat ou, si cette

partie n’est pas représentée par avocat, une compensation pour le temps consacré à l’affaire et le travail effectué. 342. The Court, after hearing the parties, may punish substantial breaches noted in the conduct of the proceeding by ordering a party to pay to another party, as legal costs, an amount that it considers fair and reasonable to cover the professional fees of the other party’s lawyer or, if the other party is not represented by a lawyer, to compensate the other party for the time spent on the case and the work involved. [ 18 ] At this junction, the Court gives Mr.

Varma the benefit of the doubt and considers that his actions in the present matter, although ill-conceived and manifestly unfounded in law, are not motivated by the intent decried by Mr. Chronopoulos. Accordingly, although Mr. Chronopoulos’ Cross-Demand will be dismissed, in accordance with

Article 341 C.C.P., on the basis that such a disposition is necessary for a fair apportionment of the costs, the Court will order Anil Varma to pay Christopher Chronopoulos’ Court Stamp fees on his Cross-Demand. FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: DISMISSES Anil Varma’s Judicial Demand; WITH JUDICIAL COSTS of $190 (Court Stamp fee on Defence) payable to Christopher Chronopoulos by Anil Varma. DISMISSES Christopher Chronopoulos’ Cross-Demand; WITH JUDICIAL COSTS of $75.25 (Court Stamp fee on the Cross-Demand) payable to Christopher Chronopoulos by Anil Varma.

__________________________________ Jeffrey Edwards, J.C.Q. Date of hearing: April 1, 2016