K.H. v. V.M.P., 2018 BCPC 128

Citation: K.H. v. V.M.P. 2018 BCPC 128 Date: 20180517 File No: 21033 Registry: Victoria IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA IN THE MATTER OF THE FAMILY LAW ACT , S.B.C. 2011 c. 25 BETWEEN: K.H. APPLICANT AND: V.M.P. RESPONDENT REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE L. MROZINSKI Counsel for the Applicant: L. Atkinson Counsel for the Respondent: V. Hemminger Place of Hearing: Victoria , B.C. Date of Hearing: November 14, 2017, January 9, April 13, 2018 Date of Judgment: May 17, 2018

A Corrigendum was released by the court on May 30, 2018. The corrections have been made to the text and the Corrigendum isappended to his document. I. Introduction [1] V.M.P. brings this application for an order increasing the respondent K.H.’s child support payments retroactive to 2001. Inaddition, V.M.P. seeks an order that K.H. contribute his proportional share to their child’s extraordinary expenses, including danceclasses.

Finally, V.M.P. asks the court to impose a fine on K.H. for what she maintains was his failure to disclose financial informationas required by court order. [2] V.M.P. and K.H. are the biological parents of G.P., born [omitted for publication]. Until he was served with a copy of thisapplication on August 24, 2016, K.H. last had contact with G.P. and V.M.P. in September, 2002.

Still, over the years, K.H. mademonthly child support payments pursuant to a consent order dated November 5, 2001, in the amount of $303.00 per month premised onan annual income of approximately $35,000. [3] Between the date of the consent order and August 24, 2016, when this application was served on him, K.H.’s income has risenmore or less steadily.

It now well exceeds his 2001 income. [4] V.M.P. originally sought increased child support retroactive to 2001 but clarified at the conclusion of this hearing that herapplication was for an order to 2006, the year in which K.H.’s income was twice what it was when he consented to the November, 2001order. This, V.M.P. submits, is when K.H. knew or ought to have known that his support payments were woefully inadequate. II. The Issues [5] The first issue in this case is whether the factors set out in D.B.S. v.

S.R.G., 2006 SCC 37 , [2006] 2 S.C.R. 231 favouran upward adjustment of K.H.’s child support obligations retroactive to 2006, or only as far back as the date of effective notice on August24, 2016.

Fundamentally, the success of V.M.P.’s application will come down to the question whether the failure by K.H. to report toher an increase in his income over the years amounts to blameworthy conduct in all the circumstances. [6] On a go forward basis, K.H. has agreed to pay child support in the amount of $1,191.00 per month based on his current annualFederal Child Support Guidelines (Guidelines) income of $129,500, commencing this July 1, 2018.

The parties agree that K.H. willcontribute his proportionate share to G.P.’s special and extraordinary expenses, all of which are agreed upon, but for G.P.’s variousdance classes. Here the question is whether the cost of these classes constitutes an extraordinary expense given K.H.’s child supportpayments. [7] Finally, V.M.P. was awarded a fine in the amount of $500.00 when K.H. failed to disclose financial information to her on thedate ordered by this court. K.H. asks this court to set that order aside on the ground that V.M.P. obtained it by having misled the court.

V.M.P. seeks not only the award granted but an additional fine in a greater amount to compensate for K.H. having failed to meet a seconddeadline for disclosure. III.

The Parties’ Background [8] As the court writes at paragraph 99 of D.B.S., in order to determine whether to order increased child support retroactively, thecourts must “strive for a holistic view of the matter and decide each case on the basis of its particular factual matrix.” Context isparamount. [9] D.B.S. requires judges faced with an application for retroactive support to consider the applicant’s reasons for the delay inbringing the application, the conduct of the parent from whom the support payment is sought, the needs of the child, and the effect of aretroactive award overall.

These factors, and the very nature of a retroactive order, call for a consideration of the history or backgroundof the parties. [10] For example, while it is unusual for parents of a child to have had no contact with one another for most of the child’s life, in thisinstance the fact V.M.P. and K.H. had dated only briefly before V.M.P. became pregnant with G.P. helps to explain matters. The precisedetails of the relationship were not provided at trial. What I can glean from the evidence is that the parties dated for a short time andended their relationship in either November, 2000 or March, 2001.

K.H. testified that when V.M.P. became pregnant she broke up withhim. That would accord with V.M.P.’s evidence that the two broke off their relationship in November, 2000. Both agree that V.M.P. didnot advise K.H. of G.P.’s birth, though K.H. knew V.M.P. was pregnant. [11] The evidence is consistent that the two had no contact with one another at least after March, 2001 until after G.P. was born on[omitted for publishing]. [12] In October, 2001, K.H. was served with an application for child support payments.

The order was sought and obtained by theMinister acting pursuant to the BC Benefits (Income Assistance) Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 27, for the benefit of V.M.P., who was, at thetime, collecting social assistance. [13] K.H. testified that he quickly retained counsel, though he personally consented to the support order of November 5, 2001.Counsel for K.H., Ms. Porter, did represent him in court on July 24, 2002, when the parties entered into a consent order in which K.H.was granted interim access to G.P. for two hours each day on July 27, August 8 and August 25, 2002.

K.H.’s access was to besupervised by a professional child access supervisor nominated by V.M.P. It was to take place at the Lake Cowichan CommunityServices Facility which K.H. was required to rent. [14] The order of July 24, 2002 provided that the parties would return to court for a review on September 4, 2002. On that day, Ms.

Porter appeared again on behalf of K.H. An interim order was granted by the court giving K.H. access to G.P. for two hours each Saturday, provided such access was supervised by V.M.P.’s sister at a place to be agreed upon by the parties. The matter was set down for further review on November 20, 2002. No record of that proceeding was produced in this trial. V.M.P. did appear in court on December 18, 2002 wherein the September 4, 2002, order was cancelled. The matter was adjourned to February 26, 2003 for a family case conference. V.M.P. testified that K.H. did not attend the conference.

She added that it was not clear he had received notice of the conference as the Registry notice letter was returned unopened. [ 15 ] The parties agree that the last time K.H. visited with G.P. was on September 21, 2002. (

i) K.H.’s Access Visits [ 16 ] K.H.’s few visits with G.P. did not go well from the perspective of either party. V.M.P. testified she had three reasons to be concerned about letting G.P. visit with her father. The first was health related. At about 9 months of age, G.P. fell and hit her head and suffered a seizure. V.M.P. testified that every time G.P. hit her head after that she would pass out. She therefore had great concern leaving G.P. with anyone at that time. Secondly, V.M.P. testified she understood that K.H. did not have a good driving record.

She recollected that he drove erratically, if not while under the influence of alcohol, when they were together even when she was pregnant. V.M.P. was therefore uncomfortable with the idea of G.P. being driven by K.H. Thirdly, V.M.P. testified that she would not put her daughter in the hands of anyone who was a stranger and K.H. was a stranger. [ 17 ] K.H. submits that V.M.P. simply made the visits impossible. He likened the supervised visitation as akin to an accusation that he had done something wrong.

The last straw, as he described it, was when his attempt to bring his own sister to one of his visits was denied by V.M.P. because it was not in the court order. K.H. denied having any driving record, let alone any drinking and driving challenges. [ 18 ] The record indicates that Ms. Porter attended two court appearances as counsel for K.H. before he gave up on the proceedings entirely. K.H. testified that he had spent close to $20,000 on legal fees and could no longer afford the fight.

He decided then not to have a relationship with his biological daughter not because he did not want one but because he had no stomach for the legal confrontation. [ 19 ] V.M.P. submits that the evidence given by K.H. regarding his reasons for walking away from G.P. should not be believed. She submits that for a number of reasons K.H. should not be found to have been a credible witness. [ 20 ] Firstly, V.M.P. submits that although she has asked for records of K.H.’s legal expenses, none have been forthcoming.

She submits that the few court appearances attended by counsel on behalf of K.H. in 2002 could not possibly have resulted in a legal bill anywhere near $20,000.00. V.M.P. also points to what she alleges are attempts by K.H. to understate his annual expenses and the value of his home equity. For example, K.H. claims to spend nearly $20,000.00 annually on mortgage payments. I find I agree with counsel for V.M.P. that in the event K.H. is either declaring only his share of the mortgage payment, or he is paying on behalf of both himself and his spouse.

If the latter, it would follow that he has preferred his and his spouse’s interests over his child support obligations. [ 21 ] Even accepting this submission, I do not disbelieve all of K.H.’s evidence. To the contrary, I found his evidence regarding his early attempts to visit with G.P. compelling. I have no difficulty accepting that it would not have been comfortable for K.H. to visit with his daughter while under supervision. The conditions of his few visitations were onerous, including being required to rent a community hall.

As V.M.P. testified, it was her intention and her desire to maintain complete control over K.H.’s contact with G.P. even to the exclusion of his family members. Whatever K.H.’s legal costs, and they would not have been negligible, there was a cost and his visits were hard won, onerous and ultimately unproductive. [ 22 ] In outlining her three reasons for concern about K.H. visiting with his daughter, V.M.P. mentioned K.H.’s driving record.

Even if I could be satisfied on the evidence there was a basis for that concern, particularly in light of K.H.’s denial that he had a driving record, this concern cannot have had any bearing on K.H.’s early visits in the rented hall in Lake Cowichan. Clearly what V.M.P. intended to communicate in her testimony was a concern that K.H. would ever have access to his daughter certainly in her early years other than in a confined and supervised setting.

Moreover, other than the fact V.M.P. felt intimidated by K.H.’s sister, there does not appear to have been any objective reason to deny G.P.’s paternal aunt an opportunity to visit G.P. in the presence of K.H. and the supervisor. The evidence discloses only that the supervisor, V.M.P.’s sister, was uncomfortable but again there appears to be no objective reason to exclude G.P.’s paternal aunt. The reason, given by V.M.P. in her testimony, was that she wanted to control the circumstances.

In this context, I have little difficulty accepting K.H.’s testimony that from his perspective V.M.P. intended to make his visits with G.P. as difficult as possible, the invitation to engage in collaborative counselling notwithstanding. [ 23 ] In finding this, I do not discount V.M.P.’s own views. At the material time, V.M.P. was doing what she felt was in G.P.’s best interests. K.H. was indeed a stranger, though I find through no fault of his. The parties knew one another only briefly before G.P. was conceived and there was no intention to join together as a family.

Rather, it is clear on the evidence that V.M.P. did not intend to include K.H. in G.P.’s life - at least in the early years. The first application for support came not from V.M.P. but from the Minister on her behalf. Once K.H. pressed for access, V.M.P. proved reluctant. She was clear in her testimony, and again in submissions, that in G.P.’s early years, particularly after K.H. walked away from the legal proceedings, she did not want contact with him lest he try again for an access order. [ 24 ] V.M.P. did testify that she made several attempts to contact K.H. over the years and it was he who proved elusive.

V.M.P. testified she first attempted to contact K.H. to get health information when G.P. was four and preparing to undergo surgery. I have no evidence as to what attempts were made in that regard.

Secondly, V.M.P. thought of contacting K.H. for assistance to obtain a passport for G.P; thirdly when G.P. was 5 and V.M.P. was out of work with a detached retina; fourthly when V.M.P. declared bankruptcy the next year; fifthly when G.P. was ten and V.M.P. was out of work and depressed; and finally when G.P., aged 14, urged her mother to seek additional support. [ 25 ] As corroboration of her efforts to contact K.H. while G.P. was still young, V.M.P. provided letters from two individuals who had come into contact with K.H. through a slo-pitch league.

One of these individuals would have known K.H. in the mid-90’s, and the other at some undetermined time. Both wrote that V.M.P. asked them if they knew how to contact K.H. and neither did. One such

request is said to have been made in 2005 and another in 2010. V.M.P. also provided a letter from previous counsel who wrote only that V.M.P. had been unable to contact her daughter’s father and so was unable to get him to sign her passport application. [ 26 ] K.H. testified that from 2000 to 2008 he had retained the same telephone number he had when he and V.M.P. dated. He remained at the same job he had when he and V.M.P. dated up to the year 2007.

His parents, whom V.M.P. had met, were in the phone book as was his brother and his sister, whom V.M.P. well knew. [ 27 ] V.M.P. testified she felt uncomfortable contacting K.H.’s family members and decided they would not assist her in any event.

She also testified that she felt unable financially and emotionally to bring an application for additional support until G.P. ultimately forced the issue at which time she had some money from an ICBC settlement. [ 28 ] Still, when V.M.P. brought her application for increased and retroactive child support on April 14, 2016, she indicated that she had not approached K.H. for support earlier because she was afraid he would respond with an application for time with G.P.

Given the desultory attempts made by V.M.P. to contact K.H., and the absence of any real evidence that even those early attempts were in aid of an application for increased child support, I am convinced on balance that the reason V.M.P. did not seek child support before April 2016 is as disclosed in her application: that is that she did not want to face an application by K.H. for access to G.P.

When V.M.P. finally brought her application in April, 2016, G.P. was 14 years of age and well able to determine for herself whether and when she would see her biological father. [ 29 ] On the whole of the evidence I find that both parties withdrew from one another voluntarily each for different reasons, albeit both having to do with G.P. I find on balance that V.M.P. was content to let matters lay lest she have to fight an application by K.H. for access to his biological daughter.

I find K.H. sought to avoid confrontation with V.M.P. and simply gave up on a relationship with his biological daughter, at least during her formative years. K.H. was not hiding from V.M.P. If necessary, he was easily found. (ii) The Parties’ Finances [ 30 ] V.M.P. started out as a single parent on income assistance. She had, she said, assistance from family members from time to time but life was, she testified, stressful. By 2004, V.M.P. was upgrading her education and obtained student loans. By 2005, she and G.P. had moved from their home in Lake Cowichan to Victoria where V.M.P. was studying at college.

By 2006, V.M.P. was working several jobs at the [omitted for publication] and at the [omitted for publication]. Over the next two years V.M.P. suffered a detached retina and subsequently declared bankruptcy. She returned to work in 2008, though not without difficulty. Eventually V.M.P. qualified and found work as a [omitted for publication]. Today, V.M.P. makes a comfortable living. Working full time has enabled her to pay off her student loans and catch up financially.

Still, as anyone who has raised a child knows, child rearing is an expensive proposition and tends to get more rather than less expensive as the child ages. [ 31 ] In their early years, G.P. and V.M.P. lived in basement suites. Typically they shared a room. V.M.P. testified that G.P. was acutely aware of the difference between her lifestyle and those of her friends.

It was, as V.M.P. testified, the fact G.P.’s friends in dance were able to do so much more than her that caused G.P. to ask her mother “why don’t you ask (my dad) to pay (for dance) because all of my friends’ dad’s pay…”. [ 32 ] In or around 2011, G.P. and V.M.P. were able to move out of their basement suite into more comfortable accommodations. Recently, V.M.P. has, with the help of her mother, purchased her first home. Still, V.M.P. earns much less than K.H. [ 33 ] K.H. is currently employed as the [omitted for publication] of the [omitted for publication], where he has been employed for the past eleven years.

In 2006, K.H. married. He and his wife have no children. Before obtaining work at the [omitted for publication], K.H. worked at [omitted for publication], the business he was employed by when he and V.M.P. dated. Since 2001, the year of G.P.’s birth, K.H.’s income has risen for the most part. On occasion, such as in 2003, it fell below the previous year but still above the year before that. Again in 2005, K.H.’s income fell below that of 2004 only to go back up in 2006 and to fall again in 2007.

By 2008, K.H. was making exactly twice what his income was imputed to be for the purpose of the October, 2001 child support order. Since that time, K.H.’s income has risen to nearly $130,000.00 at present. [ 34 ] In 2008, if K.H. were to have paid in accordance with the Guidelines , his child support payments would have been double that which he paid to V.M.P.

In subsequent years, for the most part, K.H.’s Guidelines payment would have increased even further. [ 35 ] In addition to his income, K.H. has acquired assets since 2001 including a residential property that he shares with his spouse, albeit one which is heavily mortgaged. As disclosed by K.H.’s most recent financial statement, he and his wife have approximately $54,000.00 in home equity. K.H. does have some RRSP’s and a work pension. Whatever the value of the pension, K.H. does disclose total assets valued at $128,032.85, some of which is held jointly with his spouse.

His annual expenses at least for the last several years are less than his annual income. [ 36 ] For some years K.H. operated a small landscaping business that appears to have yielded little in the way of personal income. He was cross examined at length regarding this business but in the end V.M.P. seeks a child support order based only on K.H.’s personal income. Still it is part of V.M.P.’s submissions that a potentially fruitful source of K.H.’s income has gone unexamined. [ 37 ] Of the two parties, it is abundantly clear that K.H. is by far the better off financially.

V.M.P. had unquestionably been disadvantaged financially by taking on the role of single parent of G.P. even despite K.H.’s monthly support payments since 2001. (iii) G.P.’s Special and Extraordinary Expenses [ 38 ] As V.M.P. testified, G.P. has over the years been involved in a number of extracurricular activities which V.M.P. has financed though not without difficulty. Most especially, beginning as a young child, G.P. has been involved in dance as an extracurricular activity. [ 39 ] Although G.P. appears to have many strengths, V.M.P. testified that the child also struggles with anxiety. As. V.M.P. described

matters, G.P.’s passion for dance, which she developed at a young age, is where she gets her confidence and self-esteem. Dance is saidto come naturally to G.P. and is an activity G.P. engages in as much as possible. At present, G.P. is enrolled in ballet, hip hop, streetfusion, and stage production, among other activities. [40] Relative to V.M.P.’s income and child support payments, at least in accordance with the 2001 order, G.P.’s dance classes areexpensive.

Moreover, several of G.P.’s medical caregivers have given the opinion that G.P.’s continued involvement in dance is animportant part of the treatment plan for G.P.’s anxiety. There is no medical evidence suggesting dance is the treatment for anxiety; onlythat it has proven useful in the case of G.P. in managing the child’s anxiety and the caregivers highly recommend G.P.’s continuedparticipation in this activity for her own good. [41] V.M.P. seeks a contribution towards G.P.’s dance classes, although she is willing to bear the cost of the various costumes G.P.will need to provide from time to time.

Still, the fees are not insignificant. K.H. does not concede that G.P.’s dance costs constitutespecial or extraordinary expenses in any event. He has to a certain extent resisted paying these costs even on an interim basis. [42] Early in these proceedings, on December 8, 2016, this court ordered K.H. to pay $250.00 per month towards G.P.’s dancelessons. K.H. paid $500.00 pursuant to that order but stopped payment after learning that G.P. was not involved in dance due to a kneeinjury.

The December, 2016 order was amended by order dated February 23, 2017 deleting the requirement that K.H. pay for G.P.’sdance lessons until G.P. returned to dance. [43] The interim order regarding the payment of dance fees is but one of the several skirmishes between the parties leading up to thishearing. I will address the more significant dispute concerning document disclosure later in these reasons when I address V.M.P.’sapplication for a fine pursuant to

section 213 of the Family Law Act (FLA). IV. The Legal Factors Governing Retroactive Child Support Orders [44] I have already alluded to the reasons of the court in D.B.S. and the factors a court must take into consideration when deciding anapplication for retroactive support.

Briefly, in considering such an application, I am required to consider the reasons for the delay inbringing the application; the conduct of the payor parent; the child’s circumstances; and the effect of a retroactive order. [45] As the court in D.B.S. emphasizes, child support is the right of the child; it is the child that is entitled to support commensuratewith his or her parent’s income. Against that right there is a concomitant obligation to pay child support, again commensurate with one’sincome.

But the overarching purpose of any such award is to benefit the child; that is the purpose of the child support regime in thisprovince and throughout the country. Any retroactive award has to keep faith with this principle. [46] At the same time, when dealing with an application for a retroactive increase in child support, the courts have to strike a fairbalance between the child’s right to support against a payor parent’s right to certainty.

The court in D.B.S. put it this way at paragraphs 5and 6 as follows: [5] …A modern approach [to retroactive support] compels consideration of all relevant factors in order to determine whether aretroactive award is appropriate in the circumstances. Thus, while the propriety of a retroactive award should not be presumed, it will notonly be found in rare cases either. Unreasonable delay by the recipient parent in seeking an increase in support will militate against aretroactive award, while blameworthy conduct by the payor parent will have the opposite effect.

Where ordered, an award shouldgenerally be retroactive to the date when the recipient parent gave the payor parent effective notice of his/her intention to seek anincrease in support payments; this date represents a fair balance between certainty and flexibility. [6] …Courts must be open to ordering retroactive support where fairness to children dictates it, but should also be mindful of thecertainty that fairness to payor parents often demands… [47] With those comments, I now turn to the D.B.S. factors and first to the reasons for delay in this case. (

i) The Reason for Delay [48] In regard to delay, the court in D.B.S. writes the following at paragraph 101: Delay in seeking child support is not presumptively justifiable. At the same time, courts must be sensitive to the practical concernsassociated with a child support application. They should not hesitate to find a reasonable excuse where the recipient parent harbouredjustifiable fears that the payor parent would react vindictively to the application to the detriment of the family.

Equally, absent any suchan anticipated reaction on the part of the payor parent, a reasonable excuse may exist where the recipient parent lacked the financial oremotional means to bring an application, or was given inadequate legal advice: see Chrintz v. Chrintz (1998), (ONSC), 41 R.F.L. (4th) 219 (Ont. Ct. (Gen. Div.)), at p. 245.

On the other hand, a recipient parent will generally lack a reasonable excusewhere (s)he knew higher child support payments were warranted, but decided arbitrarily not to apply. [49] V.M.P. submits that for the most part she lacked the financial and emotional resources to seek increased child support fromK.H. any time before April, 2016. More fundamental was her concern that if she raised the issue of child support, as the Minister did in2001, K.H. would seek access to G.P.

This, I am convinced, was V.M.P.’s primary and overriding motivation for not seeking a review ofK.H.’s child support obligations before bringing this application when, as a practical matter, any contact between G.P. and K.H. wouldoccur only if and when G.P. wanted. [50] In her written submissions, V.M.P. refers to K.H.’s decision to seek access time with G.P. in 2001 as bullying and intimidating. I accept that this was V.M.P.’s perception of events but there is no objective evidence on which I could find K.H. was engaged inbullying or intimidating behaviour.

He was, I find, seeking or attempting to have a relationship with his biological child, even though hehad no relationship with V.M.P. [51] V.M.P. also submits that K.H.’s response to this application including his application for DNA testing and failing to meet

disclosure deadlines puts proof to her earlier assumption that she did not have the resources for a difficult and costly legal fight. In my view it cannot be open to this court to bootstrap K.H.’s response to this application, when represented by counsel, onto V.M.P.’s earlier reasons for not notifying K.H. before 2016 that she wanted to revisit his child support payments. Moreover, V.M.P.’s concern was with an application for contact.

K.H.’s opposition to this application for retroactive child support is an entirely different matter. [ 52 ] V.M.P. was at an economic disadvantage relative to K.H., and I accept that she and G.P. did struggle financially. But V.M.P. had family support, she connected with legal counsel for help obtaining a passport for G.P. to travel outside Canada, and she is educated. I cannot help but reflect on the people coming before this court, many with far fewer resources, yet still able to file an application for child support.

The evidence falls far short of demonstrating that V.M.P. was unable for financial or other reasons to bring this application before April, 2016. As I noted earlier in these reasons, I am convinced by V.M.P.’s own evidence that she did not bring this application before 2016 out of fear that she would have to fight K.H. for access to G.P. The fact K.H. might have sought access does not justify the reason for delay. [ 53 ] V.M.P. does take some responsibility for delay.

As an example, in her written submissions she agrees that she had control over information concerning G.P.’s special and extraordinary expenses from 2001 and yet made no effort to seek a contribution from K.H. V.M.P. submits that on this ground she will bear the burden of these costs. She nevertheless seeks a contribution to G.P.’s orthodontic care before 2016 nonetheless because it cost her the majority of an inheritance. [ 54 ] I take from these submissions only that the matter of G.P.’s special and extraordinary expenses retroactive to 2006 is not before me, with the exception of her orthodontic expenses.

I make no finding respecting the correctness of that concession. (ii) Blameworthy Conduct [ 55 ] As the court in D.B.S . writes regarding blameworthy conduct, commencing at paragraph 105, while a payor parent’s interest in certainty is most compelling when the recipient parent unreasonably delays an application for child support, that same payor parent’s interest in certainty loses its force once the payor parent has engaged in blameworthy conduct. [ 56 ] In this application, the central question, apart from V.M.P’s reason for delay, is whether K.H. has engaged in blameworthy conduct by, as his counsel puts it, simply not advising V.M.P. of his increase in income.

In this regard, K.H. points to paragraph 108 of D.B.S . which states that a payor parent who does not increase support payments automatically does not engage in blameworthy conduct. K.H. submits further that cases in which blameworthy conduct has been found have included not only a failure to increase child support concomitant with an increase in income, but also instances of outright deceit, fraud, or attempts at intimidation. [ 57 ] In this instance, it is submitted that K.H. has not engaged in blameworthy conduct because he and V.M.P. had simply lost touch.

He would have had no way of knowing the two were struggling financially; he was never informed by V.M.P. until her application in April, 2016 that she wanted an increase in child support. [ 58 ] Like V.M.P., K.H. made no effort to contact V.M.P. or G.P. even though they too were easily found. As I have found, both parties in my view were avoiding the other. [ 59 ] Still, blameworthy conduct is not, I find, confined to those instances where the payor parent has done something more than just fail to advise of an increase in income.

At paragraph 108 of D.B.S . , the court writes as follows: …Whether a payor parent is engaging in blameworthy conduct is a subjective question. But I would not deny that objective indicators remain helpful in determining whether a payor parent is blameworthy. For instance, the existence of a reasonably held belief that (s)he is meeting his/her support obligations may be a good indicator of whether or not the payor parent is engaging in blameworthy conduct.

In this context, a court could compare how much the payor parent should have been paying and how much (s)he actually did pay; generally, the closer the two amounts, the more reasonable the payor parent's belief that his/her obligations were being met. Equally, where applicable, a court should consider the previous court order or agreement that the payor parent was following. Because the order (and, usually, the agreement) is presumed valid, a payor parent should be presumed to be acting reasonably by conforming to the order.

However, this presumption may be rebutted where a change in circumstances is shown to be sufficiently pronounced that the payor parent was no longer reasonable in relying on the order and not disclosing a revised ability to pay. [my emphasis] [ 60 ] The highlighted portion of this passage from paragraph 108 of D.B.S . forms the substance of V.M.P.’s case. By 2008, if not 2006 as submitted, K.H. was making twice what he made in 2001 when the support order was made. [ 61 ] In Vandenborn v.

Vandenborn , unreported, December 14, 2009, Victoria Registry No. 5939/27660, Justice Metzger held that a 50 percent increase in the payor parent’s income was sufficient to rebut his claim that he had a reasonably held belief he was meeting his child support obligations. In this case, by 2006 and certainly by 2008, K.H.’s income well exceeded this mark. In 2008, for example, K.H.’s line 150 income totalled $72,995.00. He paid child support at the rate of $303.00 per month for an annual payment of $3,636.00.

Had K.H. paid in accordance with the Guideline amount for that year, he would have paid $8,160.00 - a difference of $4,524.00. By 2008, in my view, K.H. was well settled into a much larger, more comfortable income than he enjoyed in 2001 and had been for some time. [ 62 ] In Burchill v.

Roberts , 2013 BCCA 39 , Justice Prowse, writing for the court, wrote at paragraph 30 that merely carelessly or negligently failing to address ongoing child support obligations constituted blameworthy conduct on the part of the payor parent though that parent was less blameworthy than if he had knowingly withheld disclosure, or actively deceived or intimidated the recipient parent. [ 63 ] This case in particular demonstrates that blameworthy conduct may be found in the absence of deceit or fraud or intimidation.

It can be, in the circumstances of Burchill at least, based on a mere failure to withhold disclosure of improved financial circumstances. [ 64 ] The court’s comments at paragraph 108 of D.B.S ., and in Vandenborn and Burchill , support V.M.P.’s argument that K.H.’s failure to report an increase in his income by 2008, if not by 2006, can constitute blameworthy conduct. K.H. submits both Vandenborn

and Burchill are distinguishable but that in any event in the context of this case even this failure is not blameworthy such that a retroactive order should be imposed increasing his child support back to 2006. [ 65 ] K.H. relies on Plank v. Plank , 2008 BCSC 519 , the facts of which are as counsel submits, strikingly similar to those before this court. In Plank , a notice of an application for arrears was made in 2008 seeking an increase in child support payments back to 1997.

The payor parent had, since 1997, been paying in accordance with a court order on a monthly basis but had not reported an increase in income over those years. Justice Morrison referred to the comments in D.B.S. that a payor parent who does not increase child support in accordance with income may be liable for retroactive payments but noted also that the Guidelines do not require payor parents to disclose their income.

The courts require it once the recipient parent makes a request. [ 66 ] In this case, for example, the November 5, 2001, does not require disclosure of financial information. [ 67 ] Justice Morrison noted at paragraph 55 of Plank that various factors might excuse a payor parent from increasing child maintenance in accordance with his or her income.

This includes a delay by the recipient parent in asking; that the payor parent may not be aware of needs on the part of the child; and the mere fact no problems were drawn to the attention of the payor parent may have led that person to feel his or her obligations were met. [ 68 ] In Plank , at para 58 , the court noted also that there was room in that case for suspicion that the recipient parent was not encouraging contact between her daughter and the payor. On the other hand, the payor was equally not making attempts to contact his child.

Ultimately Justice Morrison held that given the lack of information on the part of the payor parent, and despite his failure to disclose financial information and increase his child support, his obligation to increase his payments became clear once he received a demand for an increase from the recipient parent. The child support order in Plank was made retroactive to the date of effective notice and not earlier. [ 69 ] Other cases cited by K.H. include Foster v. Foster , 2009 BCSC 1633 , in which a child support order was made retroactive for three years and not the six years sought.

In Foster , the payor parent had child support pursuant to a separation agreement for five years based on shared parenting, though the children resided primarily with the recipient parent. Justice Smith held the conduct was not blameworthy as the payor was, during the period, asking the recipient parent to comply with the agreement. In addition, Justice Smith found the recipient parent had not adequately explained her delay in bringing the application for an increase based on the actual parenting arrangement.

He concluded that the blameworthiness of the payor parent, to the extent there was blame, was balanced by the undue delay on the part of the recipient parent. [ 70 ] In SLL(

L) v. GRL , 2014 BCPC 117 , Judge Pothecary of this court found at paragraph 72 that the payor parent had not increased his child support payments at a point where he could not reasonably have believed he was meeting those obligations.

Still, Judge Pothecary declined the application for a retroactive increase in child support past the date of effective notice on the grounds stating at paragraph 72 that the payor parent’s failure to voluntarily disclose his increased income was “more a response to the failure of his relationships with his children as a result of the interventions of the Mother and other family members than an effort to avoid paying increased child support.” [ 71 ] In Athwal v.

Athwal , 2007 BCSC 221 , the payor parent was found to have engaged in blameworthy conduct by failing to provide financial disclosure upon request, yet the court excluded from its retroactive order a lengthy period in which it found there was an unreasonable delay in requesting financial disclosure.

Athwal also found that applicant had not shown the child would benefit from a retroactive award as a reasonable standard of living was provided for the child by virtue of the payor parent’s child support payments and the recipient’s own income. [ 72 ] K.H. distinguishes Burchill on the grounds that there was in that case no finding of unreasonable delay on the part of the recipient parent. In addition, the parents, who had lived together in a common-law relationship when their son was born, had contact with one another over the years. Mr.

Burchill’s failure to disclose his income is likened to more intentional almost deceitful behaviour. [ 73 ] Finally, K.H. submits that in Vandenborn as in Burchill the parties had been in contact throughout the years. From time to time, the recipient parent in Vandenborn would ask her ex-husband for more money but not necessarily information concerning his income.

As noted, in that case the court found blameworthy conduct not because information was not provided after it was sought, but because the payor parent had to have known he was underpaying his child support once his income increased by 50 percent. [ 74 ] What this brief review of the cases demonstrates in my view is how the highly contextual D.B.S . analysis can produce such a variety of results. If there is an overarching theme it is that the courts have striven to arrive at a fair result in myriad circumstances.

In some instances, the failure to report an increase in income has been found to be blameworthy conduct; in others it has not. Even where a payor parent is found to have failed to report an increase in income, and thus engaged in blameworthy conduct as it is described in D.B.S . , a retroactive award has not gone past the date of effective notice. In other cases, it has gone back three years and in still others, up to eleven years. [ 75 ] I find I agree with counsel for K.H. that it is important to bear in mind the context of each of these cases and judge this case on its own facts.

In determining whether K.H.’s failure to disclose his income over the years to V.M.P. constitutes blameworthy conduct, I bear in mind that the two were and remain virtual strangers, even though they are the biological parents of G.P. There was no contact between the parties from the fall of 2002 to the spring of 2016 when V.M.P. brought this application. I have found this state of affairs was brought about mutually; that neither sought the other out.

I do not accept that V.M.P. could not locate K.H. had she made any kind of real effort. [ 76 ] I have found that V.M.P. has not shown a reasonable excuse for failing to bring this application sooner, yet I acknowledge that she would not have known what K.H.’s income was over the years as he had not disclosed it to her. Still, an increase in his income over a near fifteen year period could not have been unexpected. Considering the whole of the evidence, I am not satisfied that K.H.’s failure to disclose his income to V.M.P. until the application was brought constitutes blameworthy conduct.

That does not end the matter since, as the court in D.B.S . notes, the absence of blameworthy conduct does not necessarily militate against a retroactive award.

[77] All the factors in D.B.S. must be considered to determine whether such an award ought to be granted. That includes the needs ofthe child and the effect of such an award on the payor parent. (iii) The Needs of the Child [78] This factor in D.B.S. requires the court to consider whether, given the child’s present circumstances, a retroactive award isjustified.

By way of example, the court writes at paragraph 111 that a child enjoying a relatively healthy standard of living may benefitless from an award than one in need. [79] In this case, I am not prepared to find G.P. to be in need, but nor does the evidence suggest G.P. enjoys or has enjoyed arelatively high standard of living. Still, at present, with child support payments in accordance with K.H.’s guideline income, and hiscontribution to her special and extraordinary expenses, G.P. will not miss out any opportunities, including post-secondary education if shechooses to attend.

Moreover, the evidence does not establish that G.P. missed out on any activities of her choice; to the contrary, V.M.P.testified that G.P. engaged in a number of activities, including a variety of dance classes.

Money was tight to be sure and V.M.P. hasfallen behind financially but G.P. it appears has had her needs met. [80] I am not convinced that at this juncture a large award such as the one sought by V.M.P. is necessary to meet the needs of G.P. (iv) The Effect of a Retroactive Award Overall [81] This factor outlined at paragraphs 115 and 116 of D.B.S. requires the court to consider the impact of a retroactive award on thepayor parent. In this case, as I noted earlier, the award sought going back to 2006, if granted, would be substantial.

V.M.P. seeks aretroactive award in the amount of $92,967.00 in child support, $5,385.00 in special expenses for orthodontic care, and $3,636.00 inextraordinary expenses for dance and medical insurance premiums. V.M.P. suggests this could be paid to her partially in a lump sumpayment in the amount of $60,000.00, with additional payments in the amount of $1,116.00 per month until the arrears are paid.

Thiswould be in addition to ongoing child support payments in the Guidelines amount of $1,119.00 per month, a proportional contribution toG.P.’s special and extraordinary expenses, and $376.00 per month toward G.P.’s dances expenses and medical and dental insurancepremiums. [82] I have set out K.H.’s income and assets earlier. While he makes more than V.M.P., and has some savings, a pension, homeequity and RRSP’s, he also carries a heavy mortgage, and consumer debt.

I have no doubt such an order would constitute a significanthardship for K.H. in light of his assets and liabilities, his age and his ongoing support obligations. V.

Summary of the Claim for a Retroactive Increase in Support [83] Acknowledging always that child support is the right of the child, a claim for retroactive support requires the court to balancethat right against a payor parent’s right to certainty. That latter right has less force when the payor parent has engaged in blameworthyconduct.

However, a finding of blameworthy conduct itself requires the court to engage in a contextual analysis; conduct which may beblameworthy in one instance, may not in an entirely different context. [84] In this case, I have found that even though K.H. did not disclose his increase in income to V.M.P. over the years, and, evenaccepting that by 2006, he would have known he was not paying in accordance with the Guidelines, the failure to disclose over the longterm was not so blameworthy as to justify an increase in child support back to 2006.

Still, as the court writes in D.B.S., a retroactive childsupport order may be made even in the absence of blameworthy conduct. When child support is not being paid in accordance with theGuidelines, once the payor parent has effective notice of a need for increased support or for disclosure of financial information by therecipient parent, the Guidelines payments should be made unless there are other reasons such as hardship, for example. [85] V.M.P. filed her application for financial disclosure, an increase in child support payment, and retroactive support payments inApril 2016.

There was a considerable lag between the application and the matter coming before the courts. K.H. was not served untilAugust 24, 2016. By order dated December 8, 2016, K.H. was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $748.00 per month basedon an imputed income of $80,000.00 though he should have paid $804.00 per month based on an annual income totalling $86,300.00.

K.H. has yet to pay child support in the Guidelines amount but does agree to do so on an ongoing basis. [86] In these circumstances, it is, I find, appropriate to make an order for increased child support retroactive to September 1, 2016,such that K.H.’s child support payments from that month forward conform to the Guidelines. [87] I will outline the terms of this and other aspects of the order in this trial later in these reasons after I address the remainder of theissues before me. VI.

G.P.’s Extraordinary Expenses - Dance Class [88] V.M.P. seeks an order that K.H. pay $376.00 per month towards G.P.’s special and extraordinary expenses, those being dancesexpenses and medical and dental insurance premiums. K.H. does not oppose the latter but does oppose the application for any paymenttowards G.P.’s dance classes. [89]

Section 7 of the Guidelines enable a court to order a payor parent to cover his or her proportional share of special andextraordinary expenses. Subsection (1.1) of the Guidelines sets out the meaning of such expenses. They are also discussed by the BC Court of Appeal in the oft-cited case McLaughlin v. McLaughlin (1998), (BC CA), 167 D.L.R. (4th) 39, at paragraphs81 and 82. There, Justice Prowse writing for the court concluded in part that: [81] …in deciding whether an expense, or the totality of expenses claimed on behalf of children under s. 7(1)(

f) are extraordinary, thecourt should take into consideration the combined income of the parties, as well as the nature and amount of the individual expense, thenature and number of the activities, any special needs or talents of the children, and the overall cost of the activities. This list is notintended to be exhaustive, as considerations may arise in other cases which may also be relevant…

[82] … once an expense or expenses are found to be extraordinary it is necessary for the court to proceed to determine whether the expenses are necessary in relation to the children's best interests and reasonable, having regard to the means of the spouses and those of the child, and to the family's spending pattern prior to separation… [ 90 ] K.H. disputes that G.P.’s dance class costs are either reasonable in the circumstances, or necessary. In determining whether the parties have the means to afford the classes, I find they are, even given K.H.’s current child support obligations, an extraordinary expense.

They are, however, not an unreasonable expense again given the income of both parties. [ 91 ] This is obviously not a case in which the court will look at the spending pattern of the parties before separation. To the extent some cases discuss whether or not the parties have consulted on the expense, it is clear that neither G.P. nor V.M.P. are ever likely to consult with K.H. on this expense, nor would it seem that K.H. wants to be consulted in this regard. [ 92 ] Dance, as the evidence demonstrates, is not just any extracurricular activity for G.P.

There is no evidence that G.P. is particularly skilled in the practice, or that she will go on to dance professionally. Rather, the evidence is that dance is a fount for G.P.’s self-esteem; it helps to regulate her anxiety. It is an activity that is clearly in G.P.’s best interests.

It qualifies, in my view, as an extraordinary expense; that is to say one that is in the child’s best interest and cannot be expected to be paid out of child support payments. [ 93 ] Accepting as I do that V.M.P. and K.H. are unlikely to consult regarding G.P.’s extraordinary expenses, and accepting that dance classes qualify, it is still unfair to simply require K.H. to pay a proportional share of those classes on an unlimited basis. It is, I have found, important that G.P. take dance but it is not a medical necessity.

In the circumstances of this case, I order that K.H. pay his proportional share of G.P.’s dance classes up to a maximum of $250.00 per month, upon receipt of invoices regarding the same. [ 94 ] In his draft order, K.H. seeks to offset from his child support obligations a total of $500.00 which he has contributed to G.P.’s dance classes pursuant to the order of Judge Higinbotham dated December 8, 2016. K.H. submits he is entitled to these monies as G.P. did not attend dance classes in either January or February, 2017, even though he paid V.M.P. pursuant to court order.

This matter was raised, however briefly, before Judge Rogers in a hearing on an interim application on February 23, 2017. At that hearing, as I read the transcripts, whatever K.H. paid pursuant to the December 2016 order would offset his proportional share of G.P.’s physio, chiropractor and massage treatments incurred while she convalesced in order to return to dance. It is not apparent to me that this did not occur.

If it did not - and the parties are best able to determine this - the $500.00 that was paid for G.P.’s dance should be applied as a credit, if it has not already, against K.H.’s obligations for G.P.’s other special expenses. [ 95 ] I now turn to V.M.P.’s application for payment of the $500.00 fine ordered by Judge Higinbotham as well as an additional fine pursuant to s. 213 of the FLA for what V.M.P. submits is a failure by K.H. to comply with various disclosure orders making this litigation more difficult for her than it ought to have been. VII. V.M.P’s Application for Fines Pursuant to

Section 213 of the FLA [ 96 ] By order dated March 16, 2017, Judge Higinbotham imposed a fine on K.H. in the amount of $500 for failure to provide V.M.P. with copies of all of his financial information, including his income tax returns and assessments to 2001.

K.H. asks this court to set that order aside on the grounds, inter alia , it was based on misleading information provided by V.M.P. [ 97 ] The order, dated December 8, 2016, provided not only for the payment of child support by K.H. but also for the disclosure of his income tax returns from 2001 within 60 days of receipt of DNA testing confirming his paternity of G.P.

The order provided as well that if K.H. was unable to provide disclosure in the time ordered, he was to provide written proof setting out the reasons for that inability to comply. [ 98 ] On February 23, 2017, V.M.P. appeared in court represented by duty counsel who advised that V.M.P. had information that K.H.’s paternity had been confirmed by DNA on January 3, 2017. V.M.P. took the position that K.H.’s document disclosure was therefore due no later than March 4, 2017. Ms.

Miller, then counsel for K.H., took the position the disclosure was due March 12, 2017, 60 days after receipt of the DNA confirmation at her office on January 12. [ 99 ] V.M.P. was anxious to receive K.H.’s financial disclosure in order to prepare for a mediation set for March 27, 2017. Ms. Miller advised that K.H. had his tax returns from 2006 to the present and was working on his financial statement but that he would not likely have his tax information from 2001 to 2005 ready even by March 12, 2017. Ms.

Miller indicated K.H. would be providing a written explanation for that delay. [ 100 ] At the February 23 hearing, the court ordered K.H. to produce copies of his income tax assessments and returns from 2006 to the present on or before March 1, 2017. He was required to provide his completed financial statement by March 1, 2017 and his 2001 to 2005 tax returns by March 4, 2001, or else provide written proof of the inability to provide those. [ 101 ] It is not in dispute that K.H.’s financial statement and some of his 2006 to the present income tax information was not provided to V.M.P. until March 3, 2017.

V.M.P. attended at court on March 16, 2017 and was again represented by duty counsel who advised the court that V.M.P. was having difficulty getting disclosure from K.H., that she had spoken to counsel for K.H. the day before and expected counsel to be present at court. Ms. Hemminger maintains this was not true as counsel had advised V.M.P. that she could not be present and needed a one week adjournment. That appears to have been the instructions given to Ms. Morrison, who acted as agent that day for Ms.

Miller. [ 102 ] V.M.P. further advised the court through duty counsel that she had not received detailed tax information for the years 2001 to 2015, although she had some, but had not been provided a letter from Revenue Canada explaining why K.H. could not provide his returns from 2001 to 2005 as required by the orders of both December 8, 2016 and February 27, 2017. [ 103 ] In the event, Judge Higinbotham imposed a fine in the amount of $500.00. He advised V.M.P. it was open to her to apply for a further fine of a much higher level if the missing information had not been provided by March 30, 2017.

[ 104 ] On March 30, 2017, V.M.P. appeared in court again represented by duty counsel. Ms. Hemminger appeared on behalf of K.H. Ms. Hemminger sought to set aside the fine imposed by Judge Higinbotham on March 16, 2017. V.M.P. sought immediate payment of the fine and an additional fine in the amount of $3,500.00 for K.H.’s failure to disclose all of his required financial information. In essence, in some of his disclosure K.H. referred to business income. V.M.P. determined that she needed documentation around the deductions made by K.H. to his business income. [ 105 ] On March 30, Ms.

Hemminger advised the court that her client had provided all of his personal income tax returns from 2001 to 2016. Ms. Hemminger advised the court as well that pursuant to the court order, K.H. had provided V.M.P. with a written call log setting out all of the attempts he had made with Revenue Canada to obtain his historical income tax returns.

It was not the case that K.H. had simply ignored court orders. [ 106 ] In this hearing, K.H. submits it is open to the court to set aside the fine ordered by Judge Higinbotham based on the order of Judge Wishart, dated March 30, 2017, suspending that order for determination at this hearing. V.M.P. submits the order cannot be set aside by this court. She seeks an additional fine somewhere in the range of $2,500.00 to $3,500.00. [ 107 ]

Section 213 of the FLA enables this court to impose a fine not in excess of $5,000.00 for a failure to comply with a requirement to disclose information pursuant to the Provincial Court (Family) Rules . The significance of

section 213 is discussed in J.D.G. v. J.J.V., 2013 BCSC 1274 . At para 21, Justice Punnett writes:

Section 213 recognizes that non-disclosure is a barrier to the speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In many cases considerable resources, both private and public, are expended on pre-trial disclosure. This before any consideration of the real issues can be carried out. It is a barrier that should not be countenanced. Private and public resources are better spent on resolving the real issues between the parties rather than being depleted on such matters. [ 108 ] At paragraph 28 of J.D.G. v. J.J.V . , Justice Punnett notes also that the severity of any order under

section 213 is fact dependent. It should, he wrote, “depend on the circumstances of the case, the degree of non-disclosure, the reasons for late disclosure and when it was made. Likewise the need for the information in order to resolve the matters may be a factor. In addition, while in most cases disclosure may not be either complex or onerous there will be such cases where disclosure is. That should be recognized as well.” [ 109 ] The disclosure request and requirement, because of the consent order made early on in the case, was onerous if not complex.

It is unusual in these courts for an order requiring fourteen years of financial disclosure. I am not satisfied on the evidence that K.H. deliberately withheld information, or took steps to slow the process. K.H. retained counsel. The undisputed evidence is that he worked with his accountant to obtain the information necessary for disclosure, and he documented his efforts with Revenue Canada. [ 110 ] On the other hand, V.M.P. had a valid reason for wanting at least some reasonable disclosure in order to prepare for the March 27 mediation.

By March 30, V.M.P. told the court she had enough information, she felt, to proceed with the mediation. What was missing by March 30 was some undetermined information concerning K.H.’s business expenses and deductions. I do not take from that that K.H. was indifferent to the various court orders made regarding disclosure. [ 111 ] I would not order a fine based on the absence of business records by March 30, 2017. By then, I am satisfied V.M.P. had virtually all of the material she needed to proceed to mediation and/or trial.

As for Judge Higinbotham’s order, while I regard it as unfortunate that there was confusion regarding counsel’s availability, in the circumstances I see no reason to set that order aside. The order suspending payment on Judge Higinbotham’s order is lifted; the money is payble to V.M.P. within 7 days of the date of this order. I decline to issue any further fines regarding the conduct of this litigation by K.H. VIII.

Summary and Order [ 112 ] I am not satisfied on the evidence that V.M.P. had a reasonable excuse for failing to seek greater child support payments from K.H. until the spring of 2016. I find further, looking at the matter holistically, that K.H.’s failure to inform V.M.P. of an increase in his income does not constitute blameworthy conduct so as to justify an increase in child support payments before the date of effective notice.

After that date, being the date of service on K.H. of the application on August 24, 2016, K.H. must be held to child support payments in accordance with the child support table for British Columbia based on his Guideline income. [ 113 ] I have found also that G.P.’s dance classes do qualify as an extraordinary expense, at least for the present. Still, the evidence does not support G.P. attending unlimited dance classes; only that participating in dance alleviates her anxiety.

I think it is fair in the circumstances to limit K.H.’s contribution to this extraordinary expense to no more than $250.00 per month, upon receipt of invoices for the same, unless the parties otherwise agree. [ 114 ] Finally, I have lifted the suspension on the fine ordered by Judge Higinbotham. That fine, in the amount of $500.00 is payable by K.H. to V.M.P. within 7 days of the date of this order. [ 115 ] Given these reasons, I make the following order regarding the child support: 1. That all orders in this matter regarding child support be set aside in their entirety and the following order be put in place:

a) commencing on September 1, 2016 to November 1, 2016, pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines , child support for the child G.P. is payable in the amount of $804.00 per month, based upon the Guideline income of K.H. in the amount of $86,300.00;

b) commencing on December 1, 2016 to November 1, 2017, pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines , child support for the child G.P. is payable in the amount of $804.00 per month, based upon the Guideline income of K.H. in the amount of $86,300.00;

c) commencing on December 1, 2017 to June 1, 2018, pursuant to the Federal Child Support Guidelines , child support for the child G.P. is payable in the amount of $825.00 per month, based upon the Guideline income of K.H. in the amount of $86,300.00;

d) commencing on July 1, 2018, child support for the child G.P. is payable in the amount of $1,190.90 per month based on the Guideline income of K.H. in the amount of $1,190.90;

e) that arrears up to May 1, 2018 be set at $2,579.93; being arrears for the period September 1 to November 1, 2016 in the amount of $1,501.93; arrears for the period December 1, 2016 to October 1, 2017 in the amount of $616.00; and arrears for the period November 1, 2017 to May 1, 2018 in the amount of 462.00;

f) that arrears be payable by K.H. to V.M.P. within 30 days of the date of this order;

g) that child support be payable by K.H. to V.M.P. for the child G.P. for so long as the child G.P. remains eligible for the child support under the Family Law Act ;

h) that upon G.P. reaching the age of majority, no child support will be payable by K.H. unless K.H. has at least 30 days’ notice of G.P.’s attendance at a full-time post-secondary studies; and payments will cease even while G.P. is in attendance at such a program unless K.H. has been provided with transcripts of G.P.’s grades within 30 days after the completion of each semester;

i) that V.M.P. will advise K.H. within 30 days of G.P. moving out of her home with V.M.P., such communication to occur through K.H.’s counsel of record;

j) that commencing September 1, 2016, K.H. will contribute his proportionate share of G.P.’s special and extraordinary expenses;

k) that the following are special and extraordinary expenses for G.P.: (

i) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to G.P.; (ii) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100.00 annually, including dental, orthodontic treatment, psychological or other counselling treatment as deemed necessary, prescription drugs prescribed by a medical physician, hearing aids, glasses, and any other medical support device; (iii) extraordinary expenses for secondary school education; (iv) expenses for post-secondary education; and (

v) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities provided the parties agree or as otherwise ordered by the court;

l) that pursuant to

section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , K.H. shall pay to V.M.P. the sum of $250.00 per month for the following extraordinary expense of G.P. commencing on May 1, 2018 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter provided K.H. is provided within 30 days of payment K.H. is provided with receipts of G.P.’s attendance at the same: (

i) dances expenses, including travel for dance, competition fees, registration fees, and class fees.

m) the parties will share special and extraordinary expenses with the exception of G.P.’s dance classes in proportion to their Guideline Income;

n) for so long as G.P. is eligible to receive child support, the parties will exchange copies of their respective income tax returns for the previous year, including all attachments, not later than June 1 of each year, and copies of any Notices of Assessment or Re- assessments provided to them by Revenue Canada, within 7 days of receipt;

o) the parties will adjust child support annually on the 1 st day of July, commencing this July 2019 and continuing on the 1 st day of July of each year thereafter using the Line 150 income set out in their respective Notices of Assessment or Re-assessments for the previous year in accordance with the child support tables for British Columbia;

p) the document attached as

Schedule A to this order forms part of this order and the parties will complete it by July 1, commencing July 1, 2019, and by the 1 st day of July each year thereafter so long as G.P. remains eligible for child support; and

q) that the order of Judge Higinbotham dated March 16, 2017 will be enforced and K.H. will pay to V.M.P. the fine of $500.00 within 7 days of the date of this order. _____________________________ L. Mrozinski, PCJ CORRIGENDUM - Released May 30, 2018 In the Reasons for Judgment dated May 17, 2018 , the following changes have been made: [1] On page 37, starting at paragraph 115(1)(

h) the sub-paragraphs should be re-numbered. The sub-paragraphs should now read as follows:

i) that V.M.P. will advise K.H. within 30 days of G.P. moving out of her home with V.M.P., such communication to occur through K.H.’s counsel of record;

j) that commencing September 1, 2016, K.H. will contribute his proportionate share of G.P.’s special and extraordinary expenses;

k) that the following are special and extraordinary expenses for G.P: (

i) that portion of the medical and dental insurance premiums attributable to G.P.; (ii) health-related expenses that exceed insurance reimbursement by at least $100.00 annually, including dental, orthodontic treatment, psychological or other counselling treatment as deemed necessary, prescription drugs prescribed by a medical physician, hearing aids, glasses, and any other medical support device; (iii) extraordinary expenses for secondary school education; (iv) expenses for post-secondary education; and (

v) extraordinary expenses for extracurricular activities provided the parties agree or as otherwise ordered by the court;

l) that pursuant to

section 7 of the Federal Child Support Guidelines , K.H. shall pay to V.M.P. the sum of $250.00 per month for the following extraordinary expense of G.P. commencing on May 1, 2018 and continuing on the first day of each month thereafter provided K.H. is provided within 30 days of payment K.H. is provided with receipts of G.P.’s attendance at the same: (

i) dances expenses, including travel for dance, competition fees, registration fees, and class fees.

m) the parties will share special and extraordinary expenses with the exception of G.P.’s dance classes in proportion to their Guideline Income;

n) for so long as G.P. is eligible to receive child support, the parties will exchange copies of their respective income tax returns for the previous year, including all attachments, not later than June 1 of each year, and copies of any Notices of Assessment or Re- assessments provided to them by Revenue Canada, within 7 days of receipt;

o) the parties will adjust child support annually on the 1 st day of July, commencing this July 2019 and continuing on the 1 st day of July of each year thereafter using the Line 150 income set out in their respective Notices of Assessment or Re-assessments for the previous year in accordance with the child support tables for British Columbia;

p) the document attached as

Schedule A to this order forms part of this order and the parties will complete it by July 1, commencing July 1, 2019, and by the 1 st day of July each year thereafter so long as G.P. remains eligible for child support; and

q) that the order of Judge Higinbotham dated March 16, 2017 will be enforced and K.H. will pay to V.M.P. the fine of $500.00 within 7 days of the date of this order.