R. v. Saggu Date:, 2016 BCPC 289

Citation: R. v. Saggu Date: 20160804 2016 BCPC 289 File No: 210435-1 Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal Division REGINA v. BALWINDER KUMAR SAGGU ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. OULTON Counsel for the Crown: K. Wendel Counsel for the Defendant: M. Bloom Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: June 22, 2016 Date of Judgment: August 4, 2016

Introduction: [ 1 ] THE COURT : Balwinder Saggu entered a guilty plea on Information 210435 for failing to remain at the scene of an accident in which he knew Kevin Dhillon had suffered bodily harm and the death of Kevin Dhillon ensued, and Mr. Saggu was reckless as to whether Kevin Dhillon's bodily harm would result in death, and he failed to stop his vehicle and give his name and address and offer assistance with intent to evade criminal or civil liability, contrary to s. 252(1.3) (

b) of the Criminal Code . [ 2 ] There is no minimum sentence for this offence and the maximum sentence for this offence is life in prison. The offence has been in our Criminal Code since July 1st, 1999. [ 3 ] The Crown seeks a sentence of 12 to 18 months' jail, a lifetime Criminal Code driving prohibition, and an order that Mr. Saggu provide a sample of his DNA. Defence submits that this case has rare exceptional circumstances and that I should therefore suspend the passing of sentence and place Mr. Saggu on probation for a period of two to three years.

Defence argues that the primary reason this case is exceptional is due to Mr. Saggu's poor health. Defence submits that a s. 98 Motor Vehicle Act driving prohibition of three to five years would be sufficient in all the circumstances, and that the probation have a condition that Mr. Saggu not be found in the driver's seat of a motor vehicle. Defence made no submissions about the DNA order sought. [ 4 ] Counsel agree that the primary sentencing principles to be addressed in this case are deterrence and denunciation. Crown submits that the range for this offence is 3 to 18 or 3 to 24 months' jail.

Defence submits that the range is 12 months' jail maximum. [ 5 ] The issue for the court is to determine a fit sentence, having regard to this offence, this offender, s. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code , the case law provided, and the submissions of counsel. Circumstances of the Offence: [ 6 ] On June 24, 2014 at 10:45 p.m., Kevin Dhillon, 16-years-old, was travelling westbound on a motorcycle on 96 Avenue approaching the intersection with 123A Avenue in Surrey, British Columbia. 96 Avenue runs east/west and has two lanes eastbound and two lanes westbound.

Kevin Dhillon was travelling in the fast, or number 1 lane, westbound. Mr. Saggu, 62-years-old, was travelling eastbound on 96 Avenue approaching the same intersection in a Honda Accord. Mr. Saggu was also travelling in the fast, or number 1, lane. [ 7 ] The intersection in question, 96 Avenue and 123A Avenue is a "T" intersection. Traffic approaching from the east can turn left or north at that intersection, but it cannot turn south. Both roads are flat at that location. The speed limit is 50 kilometres an hour. [ 8 ] Kevin Dhillon's cousin, Prabhjot Saini, was travelling behind Kevin.

Bradley Lal was also travelling behind Kevin. Mr. Saggu turned left in front of Kevin's motorcycle. Kevin's motorcycle hit the back right rear corner of Mr. Saggu's car. Kevin was ejected from his motorcycle and died a short time later of the injuries he sustained in the crash. There is no evidence that either Mr. Saggu or Kevin were speeding before the accident. [ 9 ] There were conflicting statements as to whether Mr. Saggu put his turn signal on. Mr. Saini and Mr. Lal said they did not see it. Another individual said he did see Mr. Saggu's left turn signal. [ 10 ] Mr. Rasmussen, travelling behind Mr.

Saggu, said he saw Kevin Dhillon and his motorcycle, and he anticipated the collision and warned his wife just before it happened in front of them. [ 11 ] After the collision, Mr. Saggu continued driving north on 123A Avenue. Mr. Saini and Mr. Lal chased him, yelling at him to stop. Mr. Saggu stopped 94 metres past the "T" intersection. Mr. Saini and Mr. Lal described seeing Mr. Saggu get out of the driver's seat. He was described as "stumbling and tumbling" out. Mr. Saini asked him, "Were you drinking?" Mr. Saggu denied that he was. Mr. Saini and Mr. Lal went back to help Mr. Dhillon. They never saw Mr.

Saggu again. [ 12 ] Mr. Staley, a nearby resident, saw Mr. Saggu get out of his car and "stagger" towards the accident scene. According to Mr. Staley, Mr. Saggu sat for a short time near some bushes before he disappeared. [ 13 ] On 123 Street, one block west of the collision, a short time after the collision, Margaret Lee saw a man matching Mr. Saggu's description walking past her house. She had heard the noise of the collision, she thought the man she saw was involved and so she called 9-1-1. She then followed the man west on 97 Avenue. Mr.

Saggu lived then and lives now at [omitted for publication] Avenue, and Crown suggests that Ms. Lee was following Mr. Saggu part of the way as he walked towards his home. [ 14 ] Police arrived at the scene of the accident to find the Honda Accord running with its lights on. From the front seat they found a package from London Drugs with the cell phone number of Mr. Saggu's wife, since deceased. The police pinged the telephone to determine its location. They did so twice, at 11:32 p.m. and 11:55 p.m. On both occasions the phone was less than a hundred metres from Mr.

Saggu's home at [omitted for publication] Avenue. Police attended that residence at 11:44 p.m. The lights were on, but nobody answered the door. [ 15 ] At 11:25 a.m. the next day, Mr. Saggu called police to report that his car, the Honda Accord, had been stolen. A short time after, a friend of his, Mr. Sharma, called to give the VIN number of the alleged stolen Honda Accord. Cst. Sutherland was dispatched to investigate the stolen car. He met up with collision investigators at Mr. Saggu's residence on [omitted for publication] Avenue. Mr.

Saggu did not come to the door. [ 16 ] The police investigation revealed that the licence plate on the Honda Accord was a dealer plate. The car was registered to IP Auto Services and was designated as a salvage vehicle, that is, it was not roadworthy. IP Auto Services advised that they had purchased the Honda as a salvage vehicle and had sold it to Mr. Sharma.

[ 17 ] Mr. Sharma refused to provide a statement to police, but he said he had purchased the Honda from IP Auto Services and then he had taken it to his mechanic, Mr. Saggu, to fix it and make it roadworthy. [ 18 ] A mechanical inspection undertaken later at the behest of the police revealed that the Honda had been rendered roadworthy. It had not yet been checked to confirm that this was the case. Furthermore, it was not insured. [ 19 ] Cst. Sutherland returned in the afternoon of June 25, 2014. He located Mr. Saggu in the driveway. He arrested Mr. Saggu for leaving the scene of an accident. Mr.

Saggu spoke with a lawyer and subsequently confessed to leaving the scene of the accident and falsely reporting that the Honda Accord had been stolen. He suggested that Mr. Dhillon's headlight had not been on, but both Mr. Rasmussen and a forensic analysis of the motorcycle revealed that it had in fact been on prior to the collision. Mr. Saggu also told police he had walked to his friend's house, Mr. Patel, who lived four houses from the collision scene. Mr. Saggu said he had just dropped Mr. Patel off before the collision. Mr. Saggu said Mr. Patel told him to leave the scene. Mr.

Patel denied this and said he did not learn of the collision until three days later. Circumstances of the Offender: [ 20 ] I have the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report to assist me with sentencing Mr. Saggu. Mr. Saggu is 64-years-old. He came to Canada in 1975. He and his wife married in 1978 and they have two sons. Mr. Saggu's wife passed away in February 2016. The sentencing in this matter was delayed so that Mr. Saggu could transport her ashes back to India. The Pre-Sentence Report was prepared in November 2015. [ 21 ] Friends and family of Mr. Saggu have been present in court for the sentencing.

Some wrote letters attesting to his good character as a father, friend and co-worker. [ 22 ] According to the Pre-Sentence Report, Mr. Saggu has worked primarily in the auto body repair industry, although the facts of this plea suggest he also has skills as a mechanic. He worked fulltime for King George Motor and Rentals and Auto Body Repair. He stopped working due to health problems in April 2016. [ 23 ] He has equity in his home. He estimates that he owes the Insurance Corporation of British Columbia approximately $100,000 as a result of the collision on June 24, 2014. [ 24 ] Mr.

Saggu reports no emotional or psychological difficulties. He does have several health problems. He is currently, or was when this sentencing began, an outpatient of Surrey Memorial Hospital due to complications from an infection he sustained in early 2016 from stepping on a nail in his house. He is visited by a nurse in his home daily to monitor his IV treatment. He has an indwelling PIC line for administering IV therapy. A good friend of the family has recently moved in with him to assist with his care. [ 25 ] According to his doctor, Dr.

Claire, he also suffers from diabetes mellitus, the effects of chronic alcoholism, chronic pancreatitis, hypothyroidism, a seizure disorder, a benign pituitary tumour, recurrent hypoglycaemia, recurrent gastritis, and chronic anaemia. [ 26 ] Since 2013 his doctor notes that Mr. Saggu "has had over a dozen admissions to hospital, greater than 20 emergency room visits, usually following paramedic house calls.

Various reasons for admissions were related to many of the problems above, including hypoglycaemia, recurrent nausea and vomiting (uncontrollable with routine means) electrolyte imbalances, including low sodium and low potassium and magnesium, alcohol withdrawal issues and most recently, his foot infection." [ 27 ] Mr. Saggu has a criminal record for driving offences, with four convictions for impaired operation of a motor vehicle between 1992 and 2001. The offences occurred in June 1991, October 1991, June 1992 and February 2000.

He has one conviction for assault from 2002, and the remaining entries on his criminal record are for driving offences, twice operating a motor vehicle while under a Criminal Code driving disqualification, in 1992 and 2002, driving without a driver's licence in 2004, and two convictions for driving while prohibited in 2011. Mr. Saggu's driving record has 61 entries beginning in 1985. Aside from the matters just mentioned that comprise his criminal record, of note he has a prior Motor Vehicle Act entry for failing to remain at the scene of an accident in February 2000.

Also of note, the Superintendent suspended his driving privileges indefinitely in December 2007, and the suspension is still in effect and was in effect in June 2014. [ 28 ] Mr. Saggu addressed the court and apologized, and apologized as well to Kevin Dhillon's friends and family. Victim Impact: [ 29 ] Mr. Dhillon's father was present in court and is present in court, and Crown advised me he chose not to fill out a Victim Impact Statement. Two investigating police officers and other friends and family of Mr.

Dhillon have also been present. [ 30 ] I accept the Crown's submission that Kevin Dhillon's father is devastated by the loss of his 16-year-old son. A tragedy like this has and will continue to have a significant impact on all who knew Kevin Dhillon. I acknowledge the enormity of that loss which this criminal sentence can in no way compensate. Cases: [ 31 ] Crown provided a casebook with three authorities, R. v. Davis , [2010] O.J. No. 4742 (C.J.) ; R. v. Dhaliwal , [2012] M.J. No. 194 (Q.B.) ; and R. v. Gill , [2010] B.C.J. No. 1691 (C.A.) .

Defence provided a casebook with 24 authorities, but focused his submissions both orally and in writing on the following: R. v. Marthinus , 2016 BCSC 1019 ; R. v. Harrison , 2015 BCPC 126 ; R. v. Giles , 2002 BCSC 755 ; R. v. Voong , 2015 BCCA 285 ; R. v. Uppal , 2013 BCPC 110 , R. v. Cameron , 2004 BCPC 500 ; R. v. Gentles , 2015 BCSC 1364 ; and R. v. Helten , 2007 BCPC 383 . In the event that a copy of these Reasons for Sentence is ordered, I will attach an appendix with the cites of the other authorities that were provided in the casebook by defence.

[ 32 ] I agree with Crown that cases before July 1, 1999, when this

section was introduced to the Criminal Code , were not helpful. Before that date, the maximum sentence for the offence of failing to remain at the scene of an accident was five years. Cases where the offence under consideration was a different offence, such as drive without due care and attention, or dangerous driving, were also not useful.

Finally, cases where the offence predated the November 20, 2012 amendment to the Criminal Code which removed the possibility of a conditional sentence order for this offence were also of limited utility. [ 33 ] The cases were useful for their statements of principle, their attempts to identify a range of sentence for this offence, and an identification of what factors have been found aggravating and mitigating in other cases, but sentencing is an individualized process. [ 34 ] I do not propose to review all of the cases provided here, although I have read them all.

The cases I found most useful were the Davis decision from the Ontario Court of Justice, and the Gill decision from the B.C. Court of Appeal. The case of Mr. Davis was the most factually similar to this one. It was a 2010 decision of the Ontario Court of Justice. Mr. Davis, 58, was charged with the same offence. He was turning left at an intersection and collided with Mr. Dorion, who was driving a motorcycle through the intersection. Mr. Davis was also uninsured and a prohibited driver. He had two Criminal Code entries for driving offences, fewer than Mr.

Saggu, and while he did not stop at the scene of the accident, he turned himself in to authorities later that day, which is an important distinguishing feature from this case. He pled guilty and was sentenced to 12 months’ in prison and given a three year driving prohibition. [ 35 ] In R. v. Gill , the B.C. Court of Appeal upheld an 18 month consecutive jail sentence imposed after a guilty plea on Mr. Gill, who was also convicted of dangerous driving in relation to the same incident, preceding his failure to remain at the scene of an accident in which bodily harm ensued.

The maximum sentence for that offence is 10 years, rather than life. [ 36 ] Mr. Gill received a 12 month consecutive sentence for the dangerous driving, for a total sentence of 30 months. Mr. Gill had been inattentive to driving for a period of several seconds, possibly as many as 15, and his car, as a result, had a collision with an oncoming vehicle. The driver of that vehicle suffered serious and permanent injuries. Despite having a cell phone, Mr.

Gill chose to use it, not to call for help for the injured woman, but to arrange instead for he and his passenger to be picked up and taken back to the party they had just left. The next day Mr. Gill's wife called the police to falsely report that the car Mr. Gill had been driving that night was stolen. She was initially charged with making a false report, but Crown did not proceed against her in exchange for Mr. Gill's plea to the failure to remain at the scene of an accident in which bodily harm ensued. It was Mr.

Gill's passenger reporting to police a few months later that precipitated the investigation and the charges against Mr. Gill. Mr. Gill, 51, had no criminal record and a good driving record. Similar to this case, the moral blameworthiness of an offender is heightened considerably when, in addition to the initial immoral, illegal but perhaps impulsive and panicked choice of failing to remain at the scene of an accident, several hours later the offender makes a deliberate choice to attempt to actively mislead investigators.

Sentencing Principles: [ 37 ] The principles of sentencing have evolved in Canadian common law and are now largely codified in the Criminal Code .

Section 718 of the Criminal Code provides that the fundamental purpose of sentencing is to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. As set out in s. 718 , the objectives of sentencing include the denunciation of unlawful conduct, deterrence of the offender and others from committing further offences, separation of the offender from society where necessary, rehabilitation of the offender, reparation for harm done, and promotion of a sense of responsibility in offenders, including acknowledgement of the harm done. [ 38 ]

Section 718.1 articulates the most basic principle of sentencing, namely, that the sentence imposed must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender.

Section 718.2 sets out a number of specific principles. A sentence should be similar to sentences imposed on similar offenders for similar offences in similar circumstances. A sentence should be increased or reduced to take account of any aggravating or mitigating factors. [ 39 ] I agree with counsel that the primary objectives in this case are deterrence, specific and general, and denunciation. Despite Mr. Saggu's comments to the probation officer writing the Pre-Sentence Report that he has not driven since and does not intend to drive again, given Mr.

Saggu's driving record where he has repeatedly driven while prohibited or disqualified, including on this occasion, specific deterrence remains a relevant sentencing objective. Rehabilitation is of less importance in this case, and I agree with Crown that it is difficult to meaningfully address rehabilitation in this case, given Mr. Saggu's age and antecedents. [ 40 ] Defence made no suggestions as to proposed rehabilitative steps for Mr. Saggu connected to the offence on the probation order he requests. Defence argued that the court should consider Mr.

Saggu's physical rehabilitation as an appropriate sentencing principle, but I disagree with that submission. Mr. Saggu's poor health, while unfortunate, is not linked in any way to this criminal offence, and his physical rehabilitation from his current health crisis, the infected foot, is not an appropriate factor for the court to take into account as an objective of sentencing, other than as it informs Mr. Saggu's circumstances as an offender. Analysis: [ 41 ] As I have said, this offence has no minimum punishment and is punishable by up to life in prison.

The gravamen of this offence is the failure in a moral and legal duty as a driver, as a citizen and as a human being to remain and offer whatever assistance, whether to an injured person or to an investigating police officer, when involved in an accident. As stated by Justice Alder of the Ontario Court of Justice in R. v. Davis at paragraph 22: General deterrence and denunciation are of paramount importance for this offence, even when the accused is not charged with a driving offence related to the accident.

This is because leaving the scene of an accident and not offering assistance is an offence that generally carries a high level of moral blameworthiness. It is, as the Ontario Court of Appeal has stated, not only contrary to the Criminal Code , but contrary to any standard of decency and humanity. [ 42 ] The mitigating factor here is the guilty plea. Mr. Saggu's poor health is a circumstance that I take into account when considering the proportionality of the sentence, because it is who he is as an offender, but it is not a mitigating circumstance. Through

letters filed on his behalf and with his apology in court, he expressed remorse, but I place those expressions of remorse in the context of his behaviour on June 24 th and June 25 th , 2014 and I do not accord them much weight. While courts have held that civil consequences may be an appropriate factor to take into account when imposing sentence, here I find that the civil consequences are distinct from the offence for which I am sentencing him, and so I do not accord them much weight either. [ 43 ] The aggravating factors are Mr.

Saggu's driving record, with 61 entries since 1985; a driving record which includes 15 prohibitions or suspensions, and also includes an entry from February 2000 for failing to remain at the scene of an accident; the fact that he was prohibited from driving at the time having been subject to an indefinite prohibition from the Superintendent since December 2007; the fact that the vehicle he drove was uninsured at the time; and his related criminal record for driving offences, although I have not considered the delicts twice, but only noted that some entries on his driving record are in fact also criminal convictions. [ 44 ] Some of the facts surrounding the failure to remain at the scene after the accident are aggravating, namely, that when Mr.

Dhillon's cousin and friend chased him down, thereby leaving no doubt that the consequences of what had just taken place were very serious, Mr. Saggu initially walked back towards the scene, but failed to remain. His duty to remain was independent of their actions, but their actions and his reaction underscore his callous choice. Mr. Saggu's actions prevented a complete investigation at the time and have left important unanswered questions, such as was Mr. Saggu impaired by alcohol at the time? The observations of Mr. Saini and Mr.

Staley suggest he may have been, but we will never know. [ 45 ] It is also aggravating that almost 12 hours later, a passage of time after which Mr. Davis turned himself in to authorities when Mr. Saggu would have had time to reflect and consider, and any panic in the moment was no longer present, Mr. Saggu called police and made a false report, claiming his vehicle had been stolen, thereby actively attempting to obstruct the police investigation into the accident. [ 46 ] The defence relies on the R. v.

Voong , supra, decision as authority for the proposition that a suspended sentence and probation can be a fit sentence, even where the primary sentencing objectives are deterrence and denunciation. R. v. Voong was a decision heard with three other appeals in which judges of the Provincial Court had imposed a suspended sentence for the offence of dial-a-dope drug trafficking, an offence for which our Court of Appeal has stated that absent exceptional circumstances, the starting sentence, even for a first time offender, should be 6 to 9 months’ jail.

In three of the four cases under appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the suspended sentence based on the exceptional circumstances of the offender. [ 47 ] Both the offence and the offender are different here. To the extent that the principles could still be said to apply, the only exceptional circumstance relied on by defence counsel here is Mr. Saggu's poor health. If Mr. Saggu's poor health alone were determinative of the appropriate sentence in this case, in my view, I would be over-emphasizing but one of the factors I must take into account in deciding a fit sentence for Mr. Saggu.

It would distort the sentencing process. [ 48 ] Defence's submission was that, absent Mr. Saggu's poor health, an appropriate sentence for Mr. Saggu would be 9 to 12 months’ jail. With respect to Mr. Saggu's physical frailties, both counsel directed me to the following paragraph in R. v. Marthinus , citing R. v. Myette , [2013] ABCA 371: This Court has previously observed (in the case of a wheel-chair bound inmate in R. v. B.(T.L.) ... that the Crown is obliged to accommodate special needs inmates, but issues of safety and security are for prison authorities to determine, not the courts.

Although imprisonment may have a disproportionate effect on the disabled, this cannot be used to forego the imposition of custodial sentences where it would otherwise be warranted. "If that were the case, then individuals with disabilities could never be incarcerated, no matter their crime. That cannot be" R. v. B.(T.L.) at para 33 ... The Court held that the sentencing judge had erred in not imposing a custodial sentence.

On the other hand, "the fact that a custodial sentence will have a disproportionate impact on a person with disabilities may well be a legitimate factor to take into account in determining the length of that custodial sentence" ... (para 34) [ 49 ] The defence also reminds the court of the principle of restraint, but I note that

section in the Criminal Code is contextual in its wording: ... an offender should not be deprived of liberty, if less restrictive sanctions may be appropriate in the circumstances... And courts have often interpreted it to refer to first time offenders, which Mr. Saggu is not. [ 50 ] After my review of the case law, I agree with the Crown's submission as to the appropriate range of sentence here, 3 to 18 or 3 to 24 months’ jail. R. v. Peragine, 2012 BCPC 355 , at para. 42 , R. v. Harrison , 2015 BCPC 126 , at para. 61 . [ 51 ] Stand up, please, Mr.

Saggu. [ 52 ] In my respectful view, this is a serious offence for which Mr. Saggu has a high level of moral blameworthiness. Given the objectives and principles of sentencing, including proportionality, the aggravating and mitigating factors present, but having regard also to Mr. Saggu's circumstances as an offender, in my view a fit sentence would be 18 months’ imprisonment, but I will reduce that sentence by three months to 15 months’ jail to reflect the fact that Mr.

Saggu's poor health means that any jail sentence I impose will be more difficult for him to serve. [ 53 ] There will be a lifetime driving prohibition under s. 259(2) of the Criminal Code . [ 54 ] Having regard to the circumstances of this offence and Mr.

Saggu's criminal record, as balanced against his privacy interests for the minimally intrusive requirement to provide a sample suitable for DNA analysis, I make an order that he provide a sample of his DNA suitable for analysis under s. 487.051 of the Criminal Code . [ 55 ] I impose the victim fine surcharge but order that it is payable on or before two months after Mr. Saggu's release from custody.

[56] I also direct that a copy of these Reasons for Sentence, the Pre-Sentence Report and all the exhibits filed at the sentencinghearing be provided to the Correctional authorities to assist in classifying Mr. Saggu. [57] MS. WENDEL: Your Honour, with respect to your review of the facts, I just wish to confirm one thing. When Mr. Saggu leftthe scene and walked back to his residence he passed by a woman living nearby. You referred to that person as Sandeep Sharma. It'sactually Margaret Lee.

In the event that you wish to order Reasons I'll just clarify, it was Margaret Lee. [58] THE COURT: Oh, thank you for correcting that. Margaret Lee. [59] MS. WENDEL: L-e-e. [60] THE COURT: Margaret Lee was the individual, not Sandeep Sharma. Yes. [61] MS. WENDEL: Correct. [62] THE COURT: Thank you. Thank you, Ms. Wendel. [63] MS. WENDEL: And Crown directs a stay of proceedings on Count 2 on the Information. [64] THE COURT: Thank you. [65] MR. BLOOM: Thank you, Your Honour. [66] THE COURT: Thank you. (REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED) Appendix: R. v. McLaren, 2014 BCSC 982 R. v. Edgar, 2002 BCPC 662 R. v.

Waddell, 2005 BCPC 302 R. v. Muise, 2010 BCPC 466 R. v. Sanghera, 2009 BCPC 24 R. v. Newman, [1998] B.C.J. No. 1414 (C.A.) R. v. Pawa, (BC CA), [1998] B.C.J. No. 896 (C.A.) R. v. Reed, [1998] B.C.J. No. 959 (C.A.) R. v. Lisi, 2001 BCCA 559 R. v. Alves, 2012 BCPC 403 R. v. Peragine, 2012 BCPC 355 R. v. McAndrew, 2004 BCCA 368 R. v. Dhaliwal, 2008 BCPC 451 R. v. Basra, 2015 BCSC 2051 R. v. Zhang, 2007 BCPC 221 R. v. Roby, 2015 BCSC 1929