R v Collins, 2023 ABKB 134

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: R v Collins, 2023 ABKB 134 Date: 20230308 Docket: 210951018Q1, 211117809Q1 Registry: Edmonton Between: His Majesty the King - and - Jesse Collins Accused Restriction on Publication Identification Ban – See the Criminal Code ,

section 486.4 . By Court Order, information that may identify the victim must not be published, broadcast, or transmitted in any way. NOTE: This judgment is intended to comply with the identification ban. _______________________________________________________ Sentencing Judgment of the Honourable Justice N.E. Devlin _______________________________________________________ Overview [ 1 ] Over a year ago, Jesse Collins pled guilty to four sexual offences against two children. When he was between 29 and 30 years of age, Mr.

Collins twice initiated electronic communications with female children, aged 14 and 15 respectively, rapidly leading to the commencement of sexual activity with them. Mr. Collins had been arrested and was on release for his interactions with the first victim when he lured and commenced a prolonged period of sexual interaction with the second. [ 2 ] Mr. Collins has now been in pretrial custody for two years.

A planned Charter motion challenging the conditions of his pretrial detention has been abandoned, with the Crown and defence agreeing to both reduce their respective sentencing positions by one year, on application of the principles detailed in R v Nasogaluak , 2010 SCC at para 53. The Facts [ 3 ] An agreed statement of facts was entered and provides the details of Mr. Collins’ offences. Victim 1 – (LG) [ 4 ] In June 2020, Mr. Collins began messaging LG on Snapchat, after having met her through a feature allowing users to connect with others in geographic proximity. Mr.

Collins rapidly learned that LG was 15 years old at the time. He invited LG to his house and they met at a nearby school, before proceeding to his residence, where they watched a movie and talked.

[ 5 ] Later the same day, after LG had returned home, Mr. Collins messaged her on Snapchat and asked if she would come over to his house the next day and have sex with him. She replied that she would. [ 6 ] Consistent with this communication, Mr. Collins and LG met the next day and went to his residence. Once inside his bedroom, LG disclosed that she had never had sex before and was scared. She began to cry. Mr. Collins attempted to console her and LG told him she just wanted “to get it over with”. They undressed and had vaginal intercourse.

He walked her halfway home and they agreed to meet again the next day. [ 7 ] For two consecutive days, LG returned to Mr. Collins’ residence. On each occasion they had penile-vaginal sex. Mr. Collins did not wear a condom. He told LG that she was the youngest person he had ever had sex with and that her age excited him. He cautioned LG not to tell anyone about their interactions. [ 8 ] On the fourth day, Mr. Collins asked LG for oral sex, which she refused. She felt pressured and did not like this. He also asked her to remove her shirt while they were having sex, which she did not want to do. [ 9 ] Mr.

Collins subsequently started asking LG to send nude photos of herself on Snapchat. She sent a single photo of herself in a bra. He continued to pressure her for oral sex and sent her a photograph of his penis. These requests, and the sexual image sent to her, made LG uncomfortable. She blocked the accused on Snapchat and stopped communicating with him. [ 10 ] The offences came to light in July, when LG went to the doctor because she was worried that she might be pregnant. She then revealed her sexual relationship with Mr. Collins and her mother contacted the police. Mr.

Collins was arrested and charged with sexual interference and child luring. Victim 2 (DL) [ 11 ] In January 2021, Mr. Collins started to chat with DL on Facebook messenger. His pretence for contacting her was to ask whether she was had a connection to certain people he knew. She indicated that she was, and they continued to message one another. At the time, Mr. Collins was 30 years old and DL was 14. [ 12 ] Mr. Collins asked DL to come to his house and give him a massage. He also told her that he wanted to engage in sexual activity and sent her photos of himself wearing only a towel.

DL reciprocated by sending photos of herself in underwear with a T-shirt on. [ 13 ] At the end of January, Mr. Collins invited DL to hang out at his apartment. After this, they saw each other at his residence on a daily basis. Mr. Collins gave DL a key and she came and went from his apartment as she pleased. She normally would go to his residence after school, staying until the early evening and then returning after her parents thought she was asleep to spend the night before returning to her home in the early hours of the morning. [ 14 ] This pattern continued until March 17 th when police went to Mr.

Collins’ apartment following a complaint from DL’s mother. Despite Mr. Collins’ initial denials, police found both DL and a 16-year-old girl inside the apartment. In a subsequent interview at the Zebra Centre, DL told police that she thought of Mr. Collins as her boyfriend and that she loved him. [ 15 ] DL also told investigators that Mr. Collins was aware of her age as they discussed it frequently and it was “a joke between them.” She described that Mr. Collins had initially told her that they could not engage in sexual contact because he could get in trouble due to her age.

However, despite initially telling her that they would have to wait until she was 16 to have sex, she and Mr. Collins began to have penile-vaginal intercourse after about a month and continued to do so until the police intervened. [ 16 ] DL had not had sexual contact with anyone prior to Mr. Collins. Their interactions included vaginal intercourse and mutual oral sexsocial. DL disclosed that Mr. Collins did not like condoms and did not use one the first time they had intercourse. She said that she also did not want to use condoms and removed one from Mr. Collins the second time they had intercourse.

Condoms were found at Mr. Collins home that had both his and DL’s DNA on them. [ 17 ] DL told police that Mr. Collins purchased and gave her Plan B to avoid her becoming pregnant. She also said that he gave her marijuana, which they smoked together, and that he used crystal meth while she was in his apartment. She described him as becoming paranoid and jealous while smoking meth. [ 18 ] Mr. Collins was arrested on March 17, 2021 and has remained in pretrial custody ever since. As of his sentencing date, Mr. Collins will have been in custody 721 days. The guilty pleas [ 19 ] Mr.

Collins was scheduled to have a trial in respect of the offences against LG in March 2022. After extensive negotiations, the matter was brought forward before me on February 16 th and Mr. Collins pled guilty to four counts: unlawful sexual touching (s.151) and child luring (s.172.1(1)(b)) in relation to LG, and unlawful sexual touching (s.151) and failure to comply with recognizance (s.145(4)) in relation to DL. At the time, no trial or preliminary hearing had been scheduled in relation to DL. Delay to bring a Charter motion [ 20 ] Mr.

Collins’ matter was initially put over to permit him to bring a Charter application seeking redress for his treatment in remand. Due to personal matters impacting his former counsel and delays in the production of institutional records, the matter was not

set to be argued until this week. Crown and defence reached an agreement that eliminated the need for a lengthy evidentiary hearing.Pursuant to that agreement, the Crown reduced the period of imprisonment being sought by one year. [21] I expressed regret to Mr. Collins for the matter having been so delayed for reasons that were not his fault. Notably, heresponded that having been in prison had, in his words “saved my life.” The offender’s circumstances [22] Defence counsel provided details about Mr. Collins’ life circumstances that were not factually disputed by the Crown. Mr.Collins is now 32 years old.

He is the youngest of three children. His oldest sibling was given up for adoption and Mr. Collins has nevermet her. He was raised by a single mother until the age of nine, at which point a physically and verbally abusive stepfather came into hislife. Mr. Collins’ biological father visited him perhaps twice a year but spent most of his life in and out of jail. He committed suicide in2006 when Mr. Collins was 14 or 15 years old. [23] Mr. Collins struggled in school and has been diagnosed with ADHD. He was teased for being a “dumb kid” and begandrinking at the age of 15.

He was expelled from school for selling marijuana and completed his high school diploma through an outreachprogram. He has struggled with addictions, as confirmed by his use of crystal meth while with DL. [24] At the age of 20, Mr. Collins began working in concrete and continued in that field for almost 10 years. In Court, he describedhimself as hard-working and having known no other job than this. Both he and Mr. Wegener alluded to the difficulty he experiencedwhen he lost his work in the early days of the Covid pandemic. [25] In early 2020, Mr.

Collins learned that his mother had leukemia and he moved back in with her. She suffered a brain aneurysmand was left hospitalized, incapable even of feeding herself. It was during this time that Mr. Collins committed the offences against LG. [26] The family made the decision to remove Mr. Collins’ mother from life support and she passed away in September 2020, at theage of 57. The Court was advised that he continued a downward spiral after this, struggling with depression and consuming a significantquantity of illicit drugs.

This condition continued through his contact with DL and culminated in his arrest. [27] Mr. Collins has an aunt who has maintained close contact with him and wishes to provide support in the community when heis released. [28] While in remand, Mr. Collins engaged in a significant amount of programming, including personal life-skills and Biblecourses. He presented the Court with a large number of completion certificates and a very positive letter from the Remand Centre’schaplain. [29] Mr. Collins addressed the Court, apologizing for his conduct, taking responsibility for its wrongfulness and expressingremorse.

He placed considerable emphasis on his desire to work hard and to make amends, including making his mother proud. Heexpressed no resentment for having spent two years in what I accept to be extremely unfavourable circumstances in remand. The parties’ positions [30] The Crown seeks a global sentence of eight years imprisonment. The defence suggests that six years is the appropriatepunishment. Both of these proposed dispositions include a one-year reduction for Mr. Collins’ experiences while in remand and wouldbe subject to reduction for time served on a 1.5:1 basis in accordance with R v Summers. 2014 SCC 26.

A series of ancillary orders arealso agreed to be appropriate and will be detailed at the end of these reasons. [31] Both Crown and defence provided detailed briefs supporting their respective positions and suggested allocations of the netsentence to the four counts. Foundational principles of sentencing in sexual offences againstchildren [32] Having sex with children, and luring them for that purpose, are both invariably serious crimes.

In R v Friesen, 2020 SCC 9,the Supreme Court of Canada comprehensively restated the correct approach to sentencing such cases, instructing Courts to imposesanctions that “fully reflect and give effect to the profound wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual offences against children”. [33] At the heart of the Friesen decision lies a definitive judicial recognition that the harms of sexual offences against children areuniquely serious, long-lasting, and pervasive: Friesen at para 74; R v D(D), (ON CA) at para 72.

Experiencingsexual violence in childhood can and often does have “life altering consequences”: R v Woodward, 2011 ONCA 610 at para 76.

Suchviolence “can interfere with children’s self-fulfillment and healthy and autonomous development to adulthood precisely because childrenare still developing and learning the skills and qualities to overcome adversity”; Friesen at para 58. [34] Sexual violence against children is also known to damage relationships within families even where the perpetrator lies outsidethe circle of trust, and this harm can spread to the child’s other social relationships at school and in the community more broadly:Friesen at paras 60-61.

Even more tragically, it is well-established that “children who are victims of sexual violence may be more likelyto engage in sexual violence against children themselves when they reach adulthood. Sexual violence against children can thus fuel acycle of sexual violence”: Friesen at para 64.

[ 35 ] The dated and retrograde conception of sexual contact with children being a form of poorly chosen sexual activity has been definitively replaced with an understanding that touching children sexually is a form of violence, aggravated by the dimension of interference in the victim’s sexual integrity during vulnerable and developmentally critical phases of life: Friesen , at para 77 . Such crimes are seriously harmful per se , even in the absence of additional physical violence or cruelty: Friesen at para 82 .

Even where evidence of case-specific harm to the victim is absent, courts can and should presume considerable potential harm in the future as a foreseeable consequence: Friesen at paras 84-86 . [ 36 ] For these reasons, the objectives of denunciation, general and specific deterrence, and the need to separate offenders from society must take precedence in such cases, save for exceptional circumstances: DD at para 72; R v Woodward , 2011 ONCA 610 at para 76 .

This principle conforms with Parliament’s enactment of s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code , which elevates these sentencing objectives to a primary position in crimes involving the abuse of people under the age of 18. [ 37 ] Finally, Friesen expressly invited upward departures from prior precedents in the sentencing of sexual offensives against children where this is necessary to give effect to the governing principles articulated in that case. [ 38 ] By way of specific guidance, the Supreme Court offered five non-exhaustive factors which sentencing courts should consider in assessing a proportionate penalty.

These include: (

i) the likelihood of re-offence; (ii) abuses of trust or positions of authority; (iii) the duration and frequency of the assaults involved; (iv) the age of the victim; and (

v) the degree of physical interference with the child: Friesen at para 121-147 . [ 39 ] Notwithstanding the recent jurisprudential focus on the nature and severity of sexual violence against children, sentencing for these offences must continue to follow the prime directive of proportionality and engage a specific factual consideration of every individual offender and their unique circumstances: Criminal Code ss. 718.1 , 718.2 (a); Friesen at para 30 ; R v Safarzadeh-Markhali , 2016 SCC 14 at para 70 ; R v Parranto , 2021 SCC 46 at paras 10-12 .

Sentencing ranges for the offences involved [ 40 ] The sentencing divide between the parties stems in large measure from their different conceptions as to how starting points should operate in respect of the two principal offences of which Mr. Collins has been convicted.

Section 151 - unlawful touching of a child for a sexual purpose [ 41 ] The core offence for which Mr. Collins is being sentenced is the unlawful sexual touching of two children, contrary to s.151 of the Criminal Code . The parties disagree as to whether a starting point applies.

The Crown relies on R v Hajar , 2016 ABCA 222 , and cases following it, for the proposition that our Court of Appeal has dictated a three-year starting point for a single act of major sexual interference by an adult not in a position of trust. [ 42 ] The defence submits that Hajar , its predecessors and progeny, along with starting points generally, no longer have the same binding effect, having been superseded by the Supreme Court’s guidance in Parranto . [ 43 ] To begin with, the Supreme Court in Friesen , at para 106 , declined to create national starting points or sentencing ranges for sexual offences against children.

What then of the previous clear authority in this province that offences of this nature attract a 3-year starting point?

In Paranto , at para 36, the plurality of the Supreme Court laid out the following key principles: 1. starting points and ranges are not and cannot be binding in theory or in practice ( Friesen , at para. 36 ); 2. ranges and starting points are “guidelines, not hard and fast rules”, and a “departure from or failure to refer to a range of sentence or starting point” cannot be treated as an error in principle ( Friesen , at para. 37 ); 3. sentencing judges have discretion to “individualize sentencing both in method and outcome”, and “[d]ifferent methods may even be required to account properly for relevant systemic and background factors” ( Friesen , at para. 38 , citing Ipeelee , at para. 59); and, 4. appellate courts cannot “intervene simply because the sentence is different from the sentence that would have been reached had the range of sentence or starting point been applied” ( Friesen , at para. 37 ).

The focus should be on whether the sentence was fit and whether the judge properly applied the principles of sentencing, not whether the judge chose the right starting point or category ( Friesen , at para. 162 ). [ 44 ] As is now recognized in this province, starting points are not binding authority as to the requisite sentence, but rather provide “useful tools because they convey to sentencing judges an appreciation of the gravity of the offence....[a]nd offer judges a place to begin their thinking”: Parranto at para 44 ; R v Stewart , 2021 ABCA 79 at paras 41-42 ; R v Quintero-Gelvez , 2023 ABCA 64 at paras 16-20 . [ 45 ] It is on this basis that cases such as R v EJB , 2018 ABCA 239 , R v DSC , 2018 ABCA 335 , and R v EF , 2021 ABQB 272 , continue to provide strong jurisprudential support that sentences for the unlawful sexual touching of a child that includes oral or penile intercourse should most often be in the range of three years, where significant mitigating or aggravating features are absent.

Nothing in recent jurisprudence suggests a need or principled basis for a downward departure from this quantitative guidance. Indeed, any such decrease would be explicitly contrary to the Supreme Court’s suggestion in Friesen , at para 107 , that, if anything, increased sentences may be required to proportionately address the harm caused by sexual offences against children. [ 46 ] Therefore, in line with the guidance provided by the case law reviewed above, the Court should begin its analysis of Mr.

Collins s.151 offences in the range of three years in relation to the offence itself, prior to applying factually specific considerations, in particular those regarding the offender himself: Quintero-Gelvez at para 19 .

s. 172.1 – Child luring through telecommunications [47] In Hajar, at para 155, the Court of Appeal said the following about child luring: Luring of a child is a serious offence because the Internet provides those intent on abusing children with access to them that wouldalmost certainly be blocked in their own homes: R v Legare, 2009 SCC 56 at para 26, [2009] 3 SCR 551. Hajar’s use of the Internetrequired planning and deliberation.

The ease with which this offence can be committed and its prevalence and long reach are all factorswhich speak to the need for this Court to strongly discourage and denounce this modern criminality: see R v Paradee, 2013 ABCA 41 atpara 12, 542 AR 222 [Paradee].

This offence too falls within the scope of s 718.01 of the Code which requires that, in sentencing,primary consideration be given to the objectives of denunciation and deterrence. [48] The Court of Appeal went on in Hajar, at paras 166-167, to suggest that a range of 2 to 4 years might be justified for manycases of child luring, endorsing the words of Moldaver JA (as he then was) in Woodward at para 58, where he held that: [e]ven if Jarvis did purport to set a range of 12 to 24 months for the offence of luring, that range needs to be revised given the 2007amendment in which Parliament doubled the maximum punishment from five years to ten years.

Moreover, if it is shown through theintroduction of properly tendered evidence that the offence of luring has become a pervasive social problem, I believe that much stiffersentences, in the range of three to five years, might well be warranted to deter, denounce and separate from society adult predators whowould commit this insidious crime. [49] The defence relies on the concurrence of Karakatsanis J in R v Morrison, 2019 SCC 15 at para 177 for the principle that theappropriate range is indeed the 12 to 24 months suggested in R v Jarvis, (ON CA).

Respectfully, I find that thesesingle-judge reasons do not represent the prevailing view in Canada and have been supplanted by the Supreme Court’s subsequentunanimous decision in Friesen. [50] One cannot overstate the severity of child luring. We believe our children to be safe in our care and in our homes. The internetand other means of electronic communications have, however, permitted predators to silently breach the doors and walls of ourchildren’s’ rooms and steal them away for the very worst purposes.

The facts of this case illustrate how alarmingly easy it can be to lurea child to events of physical and psychological trauma, if not worse: Woodward at para 59. [51] A review of the post-Friesen jurisprudence demonstrates that courts are beginning to heed Justice Moldaver’s call for anincreased range of sentence for this crime.

In R v Moolla, 2021 ONSC 3702 at para 21, Code J. carefully reviewed the evolution of thelaw and social reality in this realm and concluded that he was “satisfied that three to five years is now the appropriate range.” In R vSinclair, 2022 MBCA 65, the Manitoba Court of Appeal followed this reasoning and highlighted the explosive prevalence of online childexploitation and the need for higher deterrent sentences to combat it.

In R v Wall, 2023 ABPC 3, an “exceptional” case attracted asentence of two years less a day, to be served conditionally. [52] On the other hand, the defence quite properly provided an extensive survey of cases in which courts have imposed or upheldmuch lower aggregate sentences for luring as well as luring followed by sexual assaults: see for instance R v Ford, 2019 ABCA 87; R vAlfred, 2021 BCCA 71; R v Bertrand-Marchand, 2021 QCCA 1285. [53] Offences under s. 172.1 cover a great range of behaviour and circumstances. Therefore, the concept of a universal range orstarting point is not helpful.

However, for cases where a mature adult makes a serious attempt to persuade a child to participate in in-person sexual activity through telecommunication-based luring, I am satisfied that a sentence will rarely fall below two years and mayextend upwards to the 4-year mark suggested in Hajar, even for a single victim. [54] The rationale for such serious punishments is simple: electronic child luring is hard to detect, penetrates normal parentalprotections, is known to succeed all too easily, has become a widespread problem, exposes children to life-long and life-threateningharms, and is a crime of high moral culpability. [55] With these principles in mind, I turn to the specific factors at play in this case.

Aggravating factors [56] In respect of LG, the most serious aggravating factor is the extent of the physical interference, namely that Mr. Collins had fullpenetrative intercourse with this child on numerous occasions. This is made worse by the fact that he did not use a condom, therebyputting her at risk of STIs and pregnancy: EJB at para 47. The gap in age between him and LG is also somewhat aggravating: Hajar at119. Furthermore, the exchange of intimate images between them, which independently would constitute criminal offences, is alsoaggravating. [57] The same factors aggravate the offence against DL.

In her case, however, far and away the most aggravating factor is that Mr.Collins was already on judicial interim release for the same crime at the time he re-offended with her. The failure to comply withrecognizance is near the maximal severity for that offence. The persistence with which Mr. Collins sought out “relationships” with naïveyoung teenagers also raises concern as to his risk to reoffend. [58] As well, the number and variety of sexual acts he performed on DL were greater. Indeed, with DL, the purported mutuality ofthe “relationship”, and the fact that she described being “in love” with Mr.

Collins and regarding him as her boyfriend, are illustrative ofboth the harm and vulnerability described by the Supreme Court in Friesen. [59] This was a physically and psychologically unhealthy series of interactions that evidently distorted the nascent and formativepsyche of this young woman to a degree that can be presumed to have long-lasting impacts on her ability to form other healthyrelationships. Again, the persistently unsafe sexual acts Mr. Collins performed on DL significantly increased the potential for serious

physical and psychological harm and is aggravating. [ 60 ] In both cases the victims endured their first sexual experiences in these unhealthy circumstances of exploitation. That is aggravating insofar as it likely elevates the long-term risk of psychological harm. That said, it would never be mitigating for a young person to have been otherwise sexually active prior to being victimized in this manner. [ 61 ] The Crown argues that Mr.

Collins’ criminal record is aggravating, insofar as it contains a previous obstruction of justice and he weakly attempted to persuade the attending officers who discovered DL in his apartment that he had no young female company. However, Mr. Collins has no similar offences in his past and has never served time in jail, much less in the penitentiary. To the contrary, he made it through his 20s with a very minimal record and what is described to me as a strong work history, despite an adverse upbringing.

The record for obstruction is a neutral factor. [ 62 ] The Crown also argued that there was a trust element present in Mr. Collins’ relationship with DL, because he gave her a key to his house, and she was allowed unrestricted access. With respect, this submission inverts the concept of the trust relationship. The fact that Mr. Collins conducted himself as if he was in a normal dating relationship with this young person does not generate a trust relationship as that concept operates in the realm of sentencing. Mitigating factors [ 63 ] The dominant mitigating factor in this case is Mr. Collins’ guilty plea.

The Crown suggested that the timing attenuated its value. I do not agree. Both victims were spared the ordeal of testifying, which is no small matter, and in the case of DL the plea came well in advance of any trial date. These are fulsome pleas in which Mr.

Collins took complete responsibility for the entirety of his conduct and the other participants in the criminal justice system gained the full panoply of advantages. [ 64 ] It is principled to conceive of high-value guilty pleas as warranting in the range of a one-third reduction from the the sentence an offender would have received after trial: R v Rossi , 2016 ABCA 43 at para 104 . The plea demonstrates remorse and I further accept, to at least some degree, the sincerity of what Mr. Collins expressed to me in court. This has mitigating value and speaks to potential for rehabilitation.

Overall, these factors justify a significant reduction of sentence from an after-trial level of punishment. [ 65 ] One of the few factors on which the parties strongly disagree is the potential mitigating value of Mr. Collins’ difficult upbringing and personal circumstances at the time of the offences. The Crown rightly points out that a clear nexus is required between factors such as supposed depression or deprived upbringing and the crime an accused commits before significant mitigation will be accorded for these factors: R v Ledesma , 2022 ABCA 285 at para 36 .

On the other hand, an offender’s personal circumstances always inform the extent of their moral culpability to some extent: R v Mahon , 2016 ABCA 230 at para 12 ; R v Davies , 2017 ONCA 467 at para 5 . [ 66 ] While the details are scant, the facts before me indicate that Mr. Collins was himself the victim of maltreatment as a child. This provides at least some link to his incapacity to grasp the full wrongness of what he was doing in the moment. He also clearly has more limited intellectual, educational and social resources than many and this serves to situate him on the spectrum of moral culpability.

Finally, although it is clear that Mr. Collins has a proclivity for sexual attraction to minors, as his statements to both victims regarding the illicit thrill of their age indicates, he offended during a time of exceptional personal stress and emotional hardship.

At a minimum, this makes the surrender to his dangerous arousals less of an ordinary-course event and, when taken together with the absence of any related record and his expressions of remorse, suggests that his risk of re-offence may be more manageable. [ 67 ] While these considerations are not strongly mitigating, they do inform the assessment of moral culpability and the manner in which the Court needs to fulfil the purposes of sentencing enumerated in s. 718 of the Criminal Code . [ 68 ] Finally, Mr.

Collins has made significant efforts to seek relevant programming under adverse conditions of pretrial detention. This has led him to secure spiritual support from members of the community, enhancing the prospect for rehabilitation and the mitigation of future risks. Application of the principles to the facts [ 69 ] To reach a fit sentence, I will begin by identifying the correct sentence for each count. I will then adjust the total aggregate sentence as required to respect the principle of totality. Thereafter, I will reduce that number by the agreed-upon one year to reflect the circumstances of Mr.

Collins’ pretrial detention and deduct from this the credit for the time he has already served. 1. Luring of LG [ 70 ] Mr. Collins sought out, briefly conversed with, and promptly sexually propositioned a child. The fact that the child readily responded is an illustration of why this offence is so dangerous, and teenage girls are so vulnerable. Using social media platforms that are popular with adolescents to randomly locate and converse with a nearby child, with sexual activity in mind, must be denounced and deterred in the strongest terms.

I find that this offence would have attracted a sentence of three years after trial and a sentence of two years would be appropriate, granting significant mitigation for his guilty plea and other mitigating factors. 2. Unlawful sexual touching of LG [ 71 ] Mr. Collins repeatedly had unprotected sexual intercourse with LG over several days. He talked her into having sexual intercourse for the first time when she was clearly in distress about doing so. He pressured her into an escalating course of conduct that

she was uncomfortable with. He exposed her to the risk of pregnancy and STIs. After trial, this offence would have attracted a sentencein the range of four years. Again, in light of the guilty plea and other circumstances, a sentence of 32 months appropriate. [72] The sentence for luring must run consecutively to the sexual contact offence it facilitated. Luring is a separate serious offenceand to treat it concurrently would effectively discount it as a necessary appurtenance to the sexual assault of the child that followed.

Toput it bluntly, an offender does not get the luring for free because it was successful.[1] Concerns about an excessive sentence are moreproperly dealt with under the rubric of the totality analysis. 3. Unlawful sexual touching of DL [73] Mr. Collins had a weeks-long sexual interaction with DL, featuring regular acts of oral and vaginal intercourse. DL’s confusedemotional attachment to Mr. Collins is an aggravating factor demonstrating her vulnerability and the intensity of the psychological harmthat this sort of conduct can occasion. As with LG, Mr.

Collins did not use condoms and exposed DL to risks of pregnancy and STIs.Worst of all, he committed this offence while on judicial interim release for doing the same thing with another child six months earlier. [74] Taking account of these aggravating factors, I find that the appropriate sentence for the offence against DL would have beenfive years after trial. Considering Mr. Collins’ circumstances and his acceptance of responsibility and expression of remorse, hisappropriate sentence on this count is 40 months. 4. Failure to comply with recognizance (contact with the minor) [75] Mr.

Collins pled guilty to breaching his bail by contacting another person under 16. This count is effectively a stand-in forMr. Collins’ luring of DL. The Crown’s acceptance of a plea to this, rather than a further offence under

section 172.1(1) reflects anegotiated compromise that explains why this offence will attract a lower pre-totality sentence than would an equivalent luring count. [76] The breach of the no contact provision is separate and distinct from his delict of having sex with another minor while on bailfor the same offence. It is a flagrant breach of the most serious type. At trial, he would properly have received a sentence in the vicinityof 18 months for this offence. As it is, I find that a sentence of 12 months is appropriate on this count.

This would ordinarily runconsecutively to the other counts. [77] The counts involving DL are necessarily consecutive to the accounts involving LG. Therefore, the initial aggregate sentence inthis case is 108 months or 9 years. Totality [78] Despite the significant sentences required to punish sexual offences against children proportionally, the principles of totalityoperate with undiminished force in this context. Namely, a series of consecutive sentences, while individually fit to the counts theymatch, may nonetheless aggregate to “a crushing sentence” that is disproportionate.

As the Court of Appeal stated in R v Great WhiteHoldings Ltd., 2005 ABCA 188 at para 27: Where consecutive prison sentences for different offences (counts) are imposed, a special principle of sentencing arises. Even ifthe sentence for each offence is proper when viewed in isolation, the court must also look at the total sentence. Sometimes the total is toohigh, given the total factual circumstances, the moral blameworthiness of the offender, and his personal history and features. If the totalis too high, then the total must be reduced: R. v. Fait (1982) 1982 ABCA 148 , 37 A.R. 273, 277-8 (C.A.); R. v.

C.A.M. (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500, 531; R. v. Drouin (1994) (SK CA), 125 Sask. R. 49 (C.A.). (Or someprison sentences which should be consecutive if it were not for this principle may be made concurrent: R. v. Keshane, 2005 SKCA 18).Of course, that changed total requires adjustment of some individual sentences, because each conviction must have a specific sentenceattached to it in some manner. R. v. Fait, supra. [79] The aggregate sentence in this case would be excessive and disproportionate.

While the crimes are very serious and requirestrong deterrent and denunciative sanctions, and indeed a significant period of separation from society in which Mr. Collins has a chanceto identify and address why he committed these crimes and how he will avoid doing so in the future, I find that his difficult personalcircumstances and genuine expression of remorse, both through his statement in Court and his work while incarcerated, makerehabilitation a hopeful outcome in this case. [80] For these reasons, I would reduce the global sentence in this case to seven and a half (7.5) years.

Pursuant to the agreement ofCounsel, that is reduced to six and a half (6.5) years in light of the conditions of pretrial custody. To achieve this just and proportionaloutcome, Mr. Collins is sentenced as follows: Indictment 210951018Q1 (offences against LG) Count 1 (s. 151) – 3 years Count 3 (s. 172.1(1)(b) – 2 years, concurrent Indictment 211117809Q1 (offences against DL) Count 1 (s. 151) – 3.5 years, consecutive Count 5 (s. 145(4)(a) – 1 year, concurrent

Final Sentence in light of pre-trial custody [ 81 ] As mentioned, Mr. Collins has served a total of 721 days in pretrial custody as of the imposition of the sentence. Much of that period was through the Covid pandemic. He is entitled to credit of 1,082 days for time already served, on a 1.5:1 basis. The 6.5 year net sentence is 2,372 days. With time-served deducted, Mr. Collins has 1,290 days remaining, or just slightly over 3.5 years. Ancillary orders [ 82 ] A number of appropriate ancillary orders are sought and not opposed. DNA sample [ 83 ] Mr.

Collins will give a DNA sample in relation to count one of both indictments, as well as the offence under s.172.1(1)(b), which are primary DNA offences pursuant to

section 487.04(a). Firearms ban [ 84 ] Mr. Collins will be barred from owning firearms or explosives for 10 years pursuant to section 109(1). SOIRA [ 85 ] Mr. Collins will be subject to registration under SOIRA for a period of 20 years. Prohibition Order [ 86 ] Mr. Collins will be subject to prohibitions following his release from custody pursuant to

section 161 of the Criminal Code . In light of his personal circumstances and mitigating factors I am satisfied that this order need only be imposed for a period of 15 years. In consideration of the circumstances of the offences, I do not find that an exclusion from public parks is necessary or proportionate. Therefore, for a period of 15 years following his release from custody, Mr.

Collins is subject to the following prohibitions: • pursuant to s. 161(1)(a), he is prohibited from attending a public swimming area where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present, or a daycare centre, school ground, or playground unless in the company of another adult who is not under such an order, registered with SOIRA, or under any Court-ordered conditions regulating contact with minors. • Pursuant to s. 161(1)(b), he is prohibited from seeking, obtaining or continuing any employment, whether or not the employment is remunerated, or becoming or being a volunteer in a capacity, that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards persons under the age of 16 years. • Pursuant to s. 161(1)(c), he is prohibited from having any contact — including communicating by any means — with a person who is under the age of 16 years, except for routine retail transactions, unless in the company of another adult family member of that minor, or pursuant to a Court Order. • Pursuant to s. 161(1)(d), he is prohibited from using the internet or any other digital network to: 1) Contact anyone who he believes to be, or who appears or is represented as being, under the age of 18; and /or 2) Engage in any online chat groups; and/or 3) Use any encryption software or security program designed to prevent access to the contents of his internet capable devices, or encrypt any digital storage devices in his possession, or install or permit to be installed on his internet capable device any software or service designed to defeat forensic analysis of the internet capable device, including TOR browsing applications and Virtual Personal Networks. 4) Use or permit to be installed on any device in his possession any program or service designed to allow anonymous use of the internet.

No contact order [ 87 ] Mr. Collins is banned from communicating directly or indirectly with the victims or DL’s sister, pursuant to

section 743.2(1). [ 88 ] I would like to commend counsel for their helpful submissions and highly professional and cooperative approach to this difficult case. Heard on the 6 th day of March, 2023. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 8 th day of March, 2023. N.E. Devlin J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Carolyn Ayre for the Crown James Wegener for the Accused