[2019] 1 F.C.R. 652 T-1590-17 2018 FC 947 Helmut Oberlander ( Applicant ) v. The Attorney General of Canada ( Respondent ) and League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada ( Intervener ) Indexed as: Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General) Federal Court, Phelan J.—Toronto, May 2; Ottawa, September 27, 2018.

Citizenship and Immigration — Status in Canada — Citizens — Judicial review of Governor in Council (GIC) decision revoking applicant’s citizenship because of nature of applicant’s involvement in activities of Nazi Schutzstaffell (SS) killing squad — Einsatzkommando 10a during World War II — Applicant previously found to have significantly misrepresented wartime activities when applying to enter Canada — GIC concluding that applicant voluntarily making knowing, significant contribution to crimes, criminal purpose of SS killing squad — Federal Court of Appeal remitting matter back to GIC for redetermination on issue of complicity under framework of Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ezokola v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration); if found complicit, to reassess applicant’s defence of duress — Canada’s policy to pursue revocation of citizenship for World War II matters in only those cases for which evidence of complicity in war crimes or crimes against humanity existing (the Policy) at issue here — Whether applicant complicit with Ek 10a’s crimes pursuant to Policy in manner consistent with law in Ezokola; specifically, whether decision to revoke applicant’s citizenship abuse of process; whether breach of procedural fairness occurring; whether correct standard of proof applied; whether decision to revoke applicant’s citizenship reasonable — Decision to revoke applicant’s citizenship not abuse of process — Applicant ably defended in written submissions by counsel — GIC decision also procedurally fair — Decision to revoke applicant’s citizenship for fourth time not meeting high threshold necessary for abuse of process finding — No breach of procedural fairness occurring here — Procedural fairness not requiring oral hearing — Minister’s Report examining all evidence that went to complicity, duress — Correct standard of proof articulated, applied in present matter — Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola explicity replacing test for complicity in Ramirez v.

Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration) with significant contribution test — Report distinguishing between standard of proof required by Ezokola, lesser standard of proof required by Policy — Minister finding applicant complicit on both standards — Reasons contained in Order in Council, Report disclosing that GIC reasonably found serious grounds for considering that applicant voluntarily, knowingly, significantly contributing to crime or criminal purpose of Ek 10a, that defence of duress not made out — Report justifiable, transparent, intelligible — Report’s conclusion that applicant complicit pursuant to test in Ezokola, Policy falling within range of possible, acceptable outcomes defensible in respect of facts, law — GIC’s decision to revoke applicant’s citizenship reasonable — Application allowed.

This was an application for judicial review of a decision of the Governor in Council (GIC) revoking the applicant’s citizenship because of the nature of his involvement in the activities of a Nazi Schutzstaffell (SS) killing squad - Einsatzkommando 10a (Ek 10a). Four attempts had been made to strip the applicant of his citizenship. He had previously been found to have significantly misrepresented his wartime activities when he and his wife applied to enter Canada. He failed to disclose his service as an interpreter with this SS killing squad.

The GIC concluded that the applicant voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crimes and criminal purpose of this SS killing squad. In the previous Federal Court of Appeal decision, that Court remitted the matter back to the GIC for redetermination on the issue of complicity under the framework of the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision in Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) and, if found complicit, to reassess his defence of duress.

It was uncontested that the applicant obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances by failing to disclose involvement in the SS at the time of his immigration screening. This type of material misrepresentation, as found by the Federal Court, allowed the GIC to revoke the applicant’s citizenship pursuant to

section 10 of the Citizenship Act . At issue was Canada’s policy to pursue the revocation of citizenship for World War II matters in only those cases for which there is evidence of complicity in war crimes or crimes against humanity (the Policy). In the decision at issue in this case, the GIC found that the applicant was sufficiently complicit and that the defence of duress was not engaged. Provisions involving the revocation of citizenship were amended in 2015. However, the decision that was the subject of judicial review here had to proceed under the old regime given transitional provisions.

Once the GIC is satisfied that citizenship has been obtained through false representation, fraud, or by knowingly concealing material circumstances in a manner consistent with sections 10 and 18 of the Act, the Policy must be met. The main issue was whether the applicant was complicit with Ek 10a’s crimes pursuant to the Policy in a manner consistent with the law in Ezokola .

More specifically, it had to be determined whether the decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship was an abuse of process; whether there was a breach of procedural fairness; whether the correct standard of proof was applied; and whether the decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship was reasonable. Held , the application should be dismissed. The decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship was not an abuse of process.

The applicant, 94, has been ably defended in written submissions by his counsel, and the GIC’s decision did not require him to orally defend himself in a manner that made the delay prejudicial to him. The applicant’s ability to present his case had therefore not been significantly prejudicially impacted between the first

revocation decision and the fourth revocation decision. The GIC decision was also procedurally fair. The Minister’s Report was not a credibility determination but was a weighing of the evidence exercise in which more weight was attached to evidence against the applicant. It was a weighing which the GIC and the Minister were entitled to conduct. The GIC’s decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship for a fourth time did not meet the high threshold necessary for a finding that an abuse of process had occurred.

While the applicant may have disliked the result, it was open to the GIC to reconsider the case in accordance with the directions of the Federal Court of Appeal and decide to revoke the applicant’s citizenship for a fourth time. There was no breach of procedural fairness here. In the unique circumstances of this case, procedural fairness did not require an oral hearing. There was a full oral hearing before the Federal Court that resulted in all the findings of facts necessary to ground a citizenship revocation on the law as it stood at the time.

The Minister’s Report examined all the evidence that went to complicity and duress. The applicant had a reasonable opportunity to participate in a meaningful manner in the decision-making process and did so. Also, there was no breach of procedural fairness in failing to disclose the composition of the GIC. The GIC is the decision maker required by the Act and there was no requirement when this matter was sent back in this case for redetermination in accordance with the law that the GIC be constituted in a specific manner. The correct standard of proof was articulated and applied in this case.

The applicant’s reliance on the standard of proof as set out in Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration ) was misplaced. The Supreme Court of Canada in Ezokola explicitly replaced the test for complicity in Ramirez with the significant contribution test. Ezokola is the proper authority for the standard of proof and it rephrases the standard. The Report distinguished between the standard of proof required by Ezokola and the lesser standard of proof required by the Policy, and importantly, the Minister found the applicant complicit on both standards.

As well, the Report considered the applicant’s complicity in detail. It showed that the Minister considered all the factors and aspects from the test in Ezokola and found that there were “serious reasons for considering” that the applicant met the significant contribution test. Regarding the reasonability of revoking the applicant’s citizenship, the GIC was instructed to reconsider complicity and duress.

The reasons contained in the Order in Council and the Report disclosed that the GIC reasonably found serious grounds for considering that the applicant voluntarily, knowingly, and significantly contributed to the crime or criminal purpose of Ek 10a and the defence of duress was not made out. The Report was incredibly straightforward and considered every finding in comprehensive detail. The Minister in the Report, and the GIC in adopting it as the reasons, considered the application of the Policy and the law and weighed it against the applicant’s personal interests and the public interest.

The Report was justifiable, transparent, and intelligible. The Report’s conclusion that the applicant was complicit pursuant to the test in Ezokola and the Policy fell within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which were defensible in respect of the facts and law. It was reasonable to find that the applicant significantly contributed to the Ek 10a’s crimes or criminal purposes. The consideration of the defence of duress here was also reasonable. With respect to credibility, it was reasonable for the GIC to take cognizance of the Federal Court’s concerns regarding the applicant’s testimony.

In conclusion, the Report found that the requirements for complicity in Ezokola , and the lesser standard required by the Policy, were met in this case. The Report also properly considered the finding in the Federal Court decision that the applicant had obtained citizenship through false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, and it weighed the applicant’s personal interests and the public’s interests in making the decision. The GIC’s decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship was therefore reasonable. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED Canada Evidence Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-5.

Canadian Bill of Rights , R.S.C., 1985, Appendix III. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , being

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 ,

Schedule B, Canada Act 1982 , 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44]. Citizenship Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29, ss. 10, 18 . Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity , December 20, 1945, art. II. Immigration Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7 . Order in Council P.C. 2001-1227. Order in Council P.C. 2007-801. Order in Council P.C. 2012-1137. Order in Council P.C. 2015-0626. Order in Council P.C. 2017-793. Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , S.C. 2014, c. 22, ss. 32 , 33 .

TREATIES AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS CITED Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, [1978] Can. T.S. No. 32, 989 U.N.T.S. 175. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court , 17 July 1998, [2002] Can. T.S. No. 13, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3. CASES CITED

APPLIED: Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 678; League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canadav. Canada, 2010 FCA 307, [2012] 2 F.C.R. 312, as to standard of review; Ferguson v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2008 FC1067, 170 A.C.W.S. (3d) 397; Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3; Dunsmuir v.New Brunswick, 2008 SCC 9, [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190. DISTINGUISHED: League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada v. Canada, 2010 FCA 307, [2012] 2 F.C.R. 312; Beltran v.

Canada (Citizenship andImmigration), 2011 FC 516, 204 A.C.W.S. (3d) 602; Khadr v. Canada (Attorney General), 2006 FC 727, [2007] 2 F.C.R. 218. CONSIDERED: Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FCA 52, [2016] 4 F.C.R. 55, leave to appeal to S.C.C. refused July 7, 2016 [2016] 1S.C.R. vi; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Oberlander (2000), (FC), 185 F.T.R. 41, 95A.C.W.S. (3d) 614 (F.C.T.D.); Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 FCA 213, [2005] 1 F.C.R. 3; Oberlander v. Canada(Attorney General), 2009 FCA 330, [2010] 4 F.C.R. 395; Oberlander v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 46, [2016] 1 F.C.R. 56;Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, (1997), 151 D.L.R. (4th)119; United States v. Osidach, 513 F. Supp. 51 (ED Pa. 1981); Miranda Alvarado v. Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006); Zhang JianXie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2006); Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (FCA),[1992] 2 F.C. 306, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 173 (C.A.); Montoya v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 FC 827, 269 A.C.W.S. (3d) 227; ProphetRiver First Nation v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2015 FC 1030, 97 C.E.L.R. (3d) 23, affd 2017 FCA 15, 408 D.L.R. (4th) 165; Vavilovv. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FCA 132, [2018] 3 F.C.R. 75, 281 ACWS (3d) 472; Yamani v. Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration), 2003 FCA 482, 314 N.R. 347; Al Omani v. Canada, 2017 FC 786; Poshteh v. Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration), 2005 FCA 85, [2005] 3 F.C.R. 487; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Maan, 2005 FC1682, 145 A.C.W.S. (3d) 46. REFERRED TO: Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 1200, [2009] 3 F.C.R. 358; Oberlander v.

Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FC944, 238 F.T.R. 35; Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 771, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12, affd 2003 FCA 134, 26 Imm. L.R.(3d) 165; R. v. Ryan, 2013 SCC 3, [2013] 1 S.C.R. 14; Ellis-Don Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 2001 SCC 4, [2001] 1 S.C.R.221; Mission Institution v. Khela, 2014 SCC 24, [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502; Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307; R. v. Power, (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, (1994), 117 Nfld. & P.E.I.R. 269; Gladman v.Canada (Attorney General), 2017 FCA 109; Phipps v.

Canada Post Corp., 2016 FCA 117, 265 A.C.W.S. (3d) 993; Sketchley v. Canada(Attorney General), 2005 FCA 404, [2006] 3 F.C.R. 392; Committee for Justice and Liberty et al. v. National Energy Board et al., (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 369, 68 D.L.R. (3d) 716; Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, (FC), [1996] 2 F.C. 729 (T.D.); Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v. Tobiass, (FCA), [1997] 1F.C. 828 (C.A.); Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General) (2004), (ON SC), 69 O.R. (3d) 187 (Sup. Ct.);Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2004 CarswellOnt 1515 (WL Can.) (Sup. Ct.).

AUTHORS CITED Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Canada’s War Crimes Program, Annual Report 2000-2001. Citizenship and Immigration Canada. Enforcement Manual (ENF),

Chapter ENF 18: “War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity”. Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Vol. IV, Nuremberg, October1946-April 1949. APPLICATION for judicial review of a decision of the Governor in Council revoking the applicant’s citizenship because of the nature ofhis involvement in the activities of a Nazi Schutzstaffell (SS) killing squad - Einsatzkommando 10a during World War II. Applicationdismissed. APPEARANCES Ronald Poulton, Barbara Jackman and Talia Joundi for applicant. Angela Marinos, Meva Motwani and Daniel Engel for respondent.

David Matas for intervener. SOLICITORS OF RECORD Poulton Law Office and Jackman, Nazami & Associates, Toronto, for applicant. Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent. David Matas, Winnipeg, for intervener. The following are the reasons for judgment rendered in English by Phelan J.:

TABLE OF CONTENTS SECTIONS: PARAGRAPH I. Introduction 1 II. Factual Background 9 A. The Applicant 10 B. The Law of Citizenship Revocation 20 C. Procedural History –

Summary 33

(1) The First Decision: Order in Council PC 2001-1227 33

(2) The Second Decision: Order in Council PC 2007-801 40

(3) The Third Decision: Order in Council PC 2012-1137 42

(4) The Fourth (and Present) Decision: Order in Council PC 2017-793 44

(5) The Minister’s Report 45 (

a) The Size and Nature of the Organization 53 (

b) The Part of the Organization with which the Applicant was most directly concerned 54 (

c) The Applicant’s Duties and Activities within the Organization 55 (

d) The Applicant’s Position or Rank in the Organization 62 (

e) The Length of Time the Applicant was in the Organization, particularly after acquiring Knowledge of the Group’s Crime or Criminal Purpose 63 (

f) Knowledge 64 (

g) Significant Contribution 65 (

h) Voluntariness/Duress 67 (

i) Imminent Physical Peril 70 (

j) No Safe Avenue for Escape 71 (

k) Proportionality 73 (

l) Personal Interests 76 (

m) The Applicant’s Submissions 78

(6) Impugned Decision 79 III. Issues 80 IV. Standard of Review 81 V. Analysis 99 A. Issue 1: Is the decision to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship an abuse of process? 99

(1) Re: Delay 100

(2) Re: Improper Behaviour and Bad Faith 106

(3) Re: Credibility 112

(4) Re: Abuse of Process 114 B. Issue 2: Was there a breach of procedural fairness? 118

(1) Re: Oral Hearing 124

(2) Re: Right to Reply 133

(3) Re: Prosecutor’s Brief 138

(4) Re: Star Chamber 143 C. Issue 3: Was the correct standard of proof applied? 148 D. Issue 4: Was the decision to revoke the Applicant’s citizenship reasonable? 161

(1) The Report 162

(2) Re: Complicity 163

(3) Re: Age 168

(4) Re: Significant Contribution 170

(5) Re: Duress 179

(6) Re: Credibility 186 VI. Conclusion 188 I. Introduction [ 1 ] The Governor in Council (GIC) revoked Mr. Oberlander’s citizenship because of the nature of his involvement in the activities of a Nazi Schutzstaffell (SS) killing squad - Einsatzkommando 10a (Ek 10a). He had previously been found to have significantly misrepresented his wartime activities when he and his wife applied to enter Canada. He failed to disclose his service as an interpreter with this SS killing squad. [ 2 ] This is the judicial review of that GIC decision―and the fourth attempt by Canada to strip Oberlander of his citizenship.

The GIC concluded that Oberlander voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crimes and criminal purpose of this SS killing squad. [ 3 ] In the previous Federal Court of Appeal decision― Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2016 FCA 52 , [2016] 4 F.C.R. 55

(FCA-3), that Court remitted the matter back to the GIC for redetermination on the issue of complicity under the framework of Ezokolav. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2013 SCC 40, [2013] 2 S.C.R. 678 (Ezokola) and if found complicit, to reassess his defence ofduress. The Court of Appeal directed (at paragraph 22): … The appellant was entitled to a determination of the extent to which he made a significant and knowing contribution to the crime orcriminal purpose of the Ek 10a. In so doing, the earlier decisions on complicity by virtue of membership are superseded.

This is a new analytical framework. [4] It is uncontested that Oberlander obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or by knowingly concealing materialcircumstances by failing to disclose involvement in the SS at the time of his immigration screening.

There is no doubt that to have doneso would have resulted in the rejection of his citizenship application. [5] This type of material misrepresentation, as found by Justice MacKay in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.Oberlander (2000), (FC), 185 F.T.R. 41, 95 A.C.W.S. (3d) 614 (F.C.T.D.) (MacKay Decision), allowed the GIC torevoke Oberlander’s citizenship pursuant to

section 10 of the Citizenship Act, R.S.C., 1985, c.

C-29. [6] At issue and a limitation on the GIC’s power of revocation, throughout the Oberlander saga, is Canada’s policy to pursue therevocation of citizenship for World War II matters in only those cases for which there is evidence of complicity in war crimes or crimesagainst humanity (the Policy). [7] In the decision at issue in this case, the GIC found that the applicant was sufficiently complicit (as those words are nowinterpreted pursuant to the Supreme Court of Canada decision in Ezokola), and that the defence of duress was not engaged. [8] The relevant legislation is set forth in Appendix A to these reasons.

II. Factual Background [9] The basic facts of this matter have been canvassed in the four previous GIC decisions. For ease of reference, Appendix B to thesereasons is a factual and procedural history. Many of the critical facts are found in the MacKay Decision. A. The Applicant [10] Oberlander was born on February 15, 1924, to a family of German ethnicity in Halbstadt, Ukraine. He was not a German citizenuntil later in World War II. He is now 94 years old. [11] He was a member of a mobile killing squad known as Ek 10a serving as an interpreter and an auxiliary starting in 1941 or 1942and ending in 1943 or 1944.

Ek 10a was one of the squads of the Einsatzgruppen which was operated by the SS and responsible for theexecution of more than two million people (primarily Jewish) who were considered “unacceptable” to Nazi Germany. The applicant’sduties included interpreting for the security police force of the SS―the Sicherheitsdienst (SD)―which was found to be a criminalorganization in 1946 by the International Military Tribunal and by

Article II of Control Council Law No. 10. [12] No evidence was led that indicated the applicant directly participated in the atrocities committed by Ek 10a but he was aware thatthese atrocities were being committed. [13] In 1943 or 1944, Oberlander became an infantryman in the German army. In part because of his service in the SS, he, his mother,and sister were granted German citizenship in April 1944. [14] In 1952, Oberlander and his wife applied to immigrate to Canada.

Security screening of such applicants included an interview in1953 by a security officer who asked questions about the applicant’s background, his origins in the Ukraine, how he came to Germany,his previous addresses and, importantly, his military and other service during the wartime. [15] Critically, had Oberlander answered the security officer’s questions truthfully by including his service as an interpreter with Ek10a, his application would have been rejected on security grounds. [16] Absent truthful responses, Oberlander’s application to immigrate was approved and he was admitted to Canada in 1954 as apermanent resident.

He obtained Canadian citizenship on April 19, 1960, having made false representation and knowingly concealingmaterial circumstances. [17] In 1970, the applicant was interviewed by a German consular official in Toronto in relation to a German trial against one of thewartime commanders of Ek 10a. This resulted in a signed statement from the applicant regarding his wartime experience. In 1995,RCMP officers commenced an investigation regarding the applicant’s involvement in war crimes.

Two days later, the process ofrevoking the applicant’s citizenship began. [18] The applicant has two daughters, both born in Canada, one of whom is challenged and requires family support. His wife passedaway in 2013. [19] The applicant had worked in building development in the Kitchener-Waterloo area and is reputed to have made a significantcontribution to the local community. Oberlander’s life since arriving in Canada has been beyond reproach. He is in his 90s withsignificant health issues. B.

The Law of Citizenship Revocation [20] The revocation of citizenship in this case requires consideration of statute, policy, and jurisprudence. A

summary of thoseconsiderations follows.

[ 21 ] Subsection 10(1) of the Citizenship Act , as it read on May 27, 2015 (the relevant date, as explained below), states that a person ceases to be a citizen where the GIC is satisfied, on report from the Minister, that citizenship was obtained by false representation, fraud, or by knowingly concealing material circumstances. [ 22 ] Subsection 10(2) provides the presumption that citizenship is deemed to have been obtained by false representation, fraud, or knowingly concealing material circumstances if the person was lawfully admitted to Canada for permanent residence on the basis of such actions and subsequently obtained citizenship. [ 23 ]

Section 18, a procedural provision, provides the person concerned with the opportunity to have the matter referred to the Federal Court as a “reference” prior to the Minister’s report. Subsection 18(3) makes that reference decision final and not subject to further appeal. [ 24 ] The Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , S.C. 2014, c. 22 , amended the Citizenship Act in a manner that resulted in sections 10 and 18 being combined into the new

section 10 . Amongst other changes, the decision maker changed from the GIC to the Minister. These amendments came into force by Order in Council P.C. 2015-0626 on May 28, 2015. [ 25 ] As is clear from the procedural history, three of the attempts to revoke the applicant’s citizenship clearly occurred under the old regime, prior to the above amendments. [ 26 ] Due to the transitional provisions in sections 32 and 33 of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , the most recent decision and the subject of this judicial review also proceeds under the old regime.

Sections 32 and 33 provide that ongoing matters―where the Minister was already entitled to make or had made a report, or where an order had been set aside and referred back for redetermination by the Federal Court―are to be determined by the GIC in accordance with

section 10 as it read immediately before the day the amended

section 10 came into force: May 27, 2015. This is the case at hand. [ 27 ] Once the GIC is satisfied that citizenship has been obtained through false representation, fraud, or by knowingly concealing material circumstances in a manner consistent with sections 10 and 18, the Policy, regarding the revocation of citizenship of war criminals in World War II, must be met. The relevant portion of the Policy, from the public report entitled Canada’s War Crimes Program: Annual Report 2000-2001 , is as follows: The policy of the Government of Canada is clear.

Canada will not become a safe haven for those individuals who have committed war crimes, crimes against humanity or any other reprehensible act during times of conflict. … World War II cases … The government pursues only those cases for which there is evidence of direct involvement in or complicity of war crimes or crimes against humanity. A person is considered complicit if, while aware of the commission of war crimes or crimes against humanity, the person contributes, directly or indirectly, to their occurrence.

Membership in an organization responsible for committing the atrocities can be sufficient for complicity if the organization in question is one with a single, brutal purpose, e.g. a death squad. [Emphasis in original.] [ 28 ] Although policy guidelines are not binding, the Federal Court of Appeal in Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2004 FCA 213 , [2005] 1 F.C.R. 3 (FCA-1), found at paragraph 30 that since the GIC opted in this case to adopt guidelines and to apply them to the case, it had to put its mind to determining whether the applicant came within the scope of the Policy.

This required a determination of the applicant’s complicity. [ 29 ] Prior to 2013, the jurisprudence provided that membership in a limited brutal purpose organization created a factual presumption of complicity that could be rebutted by evidence that there was no knowledge of or involvement in the acts: Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2009 FCA 330 , [2010] 4 F.C.R. 395 (FCA-2), at paragraph 18. The Policy was consistent with this jurisprudence. [ 30 ] In the

section 18 reference decision in this case, the MacKay Decision, Justice MacKay was tasked with making findings of fact relevant to

section 10. Justice MacKay found that the applicant had obtained his Canadian citizenship by false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances, and that he had been a member of Ek 10a. [ 31 ] In 2013, the Supreme Court of Canada subsequently changed the test for complicity in Ezokola . The Court in Ezokola set the new test for complicity at paragraph 29, requiring that there be “serious reasons for considering that he or she voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the group alleged to have committed the crime.” The following factors guide this analysis (paragraph 91): (

i) the size and nature of the organization; (ii) the part of the organization with which the refugee claimant was most directly concerned; (iii) the refugee claimant’s duties and activities within the organization; (iv) the refugee claimant’s position or rank in the organization; (

v) the length of time the refugee claimant was in the organization, particularly after acquiring knowledge of the group’s crime or criminal purpose; and (vi) the method by which the refugee claimant was recruited and the refugee claimant’s opportunity to leave the organization.

[32] Membership in a single, brutal purpose organization is no longer sufficient for a determination of complicity. As the MacKayDecision found that the applicant had obtained citizenship through false representation or by knowingly concealing materialcircumstances, the statutory requirements in the Citizenship Act for revocation have been conclusively satisfied. The only live issueremains whether the applicant was complicit with Ek 10a’s crimes pursuant to the Policy in a manner consistent with the law in Ezokola. C. Procedural History –

Summary

(1) The First Decision: Order in Council P.C. 2001-1227 [33] On January 27, 1995, pursuant to subsections 10(1) and 18(1) of the Citizenship Act, the Minister gave notice to the applicant ofhis intention to make a report to the GIC recommending that the applicant’s citizenship be revoked on the grounds that he had beenadmitted to Canada for permanent residence and had obtained citizenship by false representations, fraud, or knowingly concealingmaterial circumstances. [34] At the applicant’s request, and as provided by

section 18 of the Citizenship Act, the case was referred to the Federal Court. Thecase then met with many procedural disputes. It was joined with two other similar matters in an attempt to resolve these preliminaryissues. [35] Due to issues of the apparent compromise of judicial independence, these joined cases were stayed until the stays were lifted bythe Federal Court of Appeal, a decision upheld by the Supreme Court of Canada in Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) v.Tobiass, (SCC), [1997] 3 S.C.R. 391, (1997), 151 D.L.R. (4th) 119 (Tobiass). [36] The Federal Court reference went forward.

In the MacKay Decision, Justice MacKay decided that the applicant had obtained hisCanadian citizenship by false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances within the meaning of subsection 18(1)of the Citizenship Act. The MacKay Decision, pursuant to subsection 18(3), is final and not subject to appeal. [37] Following the MacKay Decision, the Minister considered submissions from the applicant, then sent a report to the GICrecommending that the applicant’s Canadian citizenship be revoked.

On July 12, 2001, the GIC decided that the applicant had obtainedcitizenship by false representation, fraud, or knowingly concealing material circumstances and revoked his citizenship pursuant to section10 of the Citizenship Act. Order in Council P.C. 2001-1227 was issued revoking the applicant’s citizenship. [38] The applicant sought judicial review of this decision. In Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2003 FC 944, 238 F.T.R. 35(FC-1), Justice Martineau dismissed the application.

The Federal Court of Appeal in FCA-1 set aside Justice Martineau’s decision andremitted the matter back to the GIC with direction to explicitly consider the applicant’s personal interests and whether the case fellwithin the Policy. [39] Meanwhile, the applicant had sought an order in the Federal Court to stay deportation proceedings that had been commencedunder the Immigration Act, R.S.C., 1985, c. I-2, pending resolution of the judicial review application. This motion was denied:Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2002 FCT 771, 116 A.C.W.S. (3d) 12, affd 2003 FCA 134, 26 Imm. L.R. (3d) 165.

(2) The Second Decision: Order in Council P.C. 2007-801 [40] The GIC reviewed the Minister’s new report, which included submissions from the applicant as well as the Department ofJustice, but made the same recommendation to revoke the applicant’s citizenship. On May 17, 2007, the GIC decided for a second timeto revoke the applicant’s Canadian citizenship. Order in Council P.C. 2007-801 was issued to this effect. [41] The applicant again sought judicial review of this decision, and in Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2008 FC 1200,[2009] 3 F.C.R. 358 (FC-2), I dismissed his application.

The Federal Court of Appeal in FCA-2 allowed the appeal on a new ground ofduress not previously raised and remitted the matter back to the GIC for determination of the defence of duress.

(3) The Third Decision: Order in Council P.C. 2012-1137 [42] The applicant provided further submissions on the issue of duress, and the Minister prepared a supplementary report which stillrecommended that the applicant’s citizenship be revoked. On September 27, 2012, the GIC decided to revoke the applicant’s citizenshipfor the third time and issued Order in Council P.C. 2012-1137. [43] The applicant again sought judicial review of this decision. Justice Russell in Oberlander v. Canada (Attorney General), 2015FC 46, [2016] 1 F.C.R. 56 (FC-3) dismissed this application.

The Federal Court of Appeal in FCA-3 remitted the matter back to the GICfor redetermination on the issue of complicity under the new framework set out in Ezokola, and, if it was found that he was complicit, toreassess his defence of duress. The Attorney General of Canada’s application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada wasdismissed on July 7, 2016 [[2016] 1 S.C.R. vi].

(4) The Fourth (and Present) Decision: Order in Council P.C. 2017-793 [44] The GIC undertook to re-evaluate the matter in light of the new test for complicity and the defence of duress. The Ministercompleted a draft version of the report to the GIC, and provided it to the applicant, who provided 95 pages of submissions in response.The Minister revised the draft report in consideration of these submissions, but recommended again that the GIC revoke the applicant’scitizenship. The final report (the Report) is 94 pages long, and forms the majority of the reasons for the decision at issue.

(5) The Minister’s Report [45] Since the finding of misrepresentation in the MacKay Decision was binding, the GIC now had to conclude whether the applicantwas complicit in war crimes or crimes against humanity in a manner consistent with Ezokola.

[ 46 ] Since some of the elements required by Ezokola were not put before Justice MacKay in 1998, the assessment of complicity was supplemented by all of the applicant’s prior sworn statements, affidavits, memoranda of facts and law, and his Court testimony. [ 47 ] The applicant argued as if the MacKay Decision was the only critical evidence against the applicant. Counsel particularly noted Justice MacKay’s comment that there was no evidence of the applicant committing the war crimes of Ek 10a. [ 48 ] However, the materials in support of the Report consisted of more than the MacKay Decision.

They included an expert report by Manfred Messerschmitt outlining the role of the Einsatzgruppen, including the role of support personnel such as drivers, radio operators and interpreters.

He outlined in detail such matters as organizational structure, the “cleansing actions” directed at Bolsheviks and Jews; the route of Ek 10a’s operations in the summer and fall of 1941; and the function of interpreters. [ 49 ] The record also consisted of materials from the Nuremberg War Crimes trials regarding the conduct of the Einsatzgruppen. [ 50 ] Justice MacKay found many inconsistencies and improbabilities in the applicant’s evidence and a pattern of minimizing his wartime role, which gave rise to serious doubts regarding reliability.

The transcripts of government witnesses were also examined since Justice MacKay noted they were credible witnesses who had assisted the Court. [ 51 ] Pursuant to Ezokola , the Report stated that “an individual will be found inadmissible for complicity in international crimes if there are serious reasons for considering that he voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the group alleged to have committed the crime” (emphasis by the Minister).

The factors from Ezokola were then each considered. [ 52 ] The following paragraphs summarize the key elements of the Report’s assessment of each of the factors from Ezokola . The Report substantially constitutes the reasons for the decision. (

a) The Size and Nature of the Organization [ 53 ] The applicant was a member of a limited, brutal purpose organization. The relatively small size of Ek 10a gave grounds for believing that the applicant likely knew of and contributed to the crimes or facilitated the criminal purpose of Ek 10a. This was consistent with the policy in the Citizenship and Immigration Manual, Enforcement ENF 18: War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity (Ottawa: Public Works and Government Services Canada) (Manual). (

b) The Part of the Organization with which the applicant was most directly concerned [ 54 ] The applicant was a member of Ek 10a as an unpaid auxiliary interpreter who lived, ate, and travelled with Ek 10a, and had a uniform but no rank. (

c) The Applicant’s Duties and Activities within the Organization [ 55 ] The applicant described various mundane tasks he fulfilled in addition to interpreting, but he was also issued a weapon. His description of his duties as an interpreter was inconsistent, but Justice MacKay noted that he admitted to serving as an interpreter in occasional interrogation sessions where German officers questioned those detained who were suspected of anti-German sentiments or activities. [ 56 ] A witness in the MacKay reference, Mr.

Sidorenko, observed the applicant’s involvement in two interrogations, one of a woman suspected of being Jewish who was then released, and his own for allegedly helping a prisoner escape. He implied that if the outcome were different he would have been shot, leading to the inference that the applicant participated in interrogation sessions that could result in death of the person detained. [ 57 ] The applicant took particular exception to the story of the woman suspected of being a Jew on the basis that no wrong was committed when she was determined not to be Jewish.

The applicant’s position ignores the consequence if she had been found to be Jewish (execution) and the role played by interpreters in making that type of determination with those types of consequences. [ 58 ] Justice MacKay found that the applicant’s role later expanded to include questioning detained persons and those without valid explanation for their presence or activities.

Justice MacKay also found that the applicant had served as an interpreter for many months. [ 59 ] The applicant’s denials of involvement in Ek 10a’s crimes were insufficient to negate the common purpose and shared objectives that could be inferred from the applicant’s duties and activities, which corresponded with Justice MacKay’s finding that “Oberlander served the purpose of his unit, the Ek 10a.” There was a sufficient link between the applicant’s day-to-day participation as an interpreter and the crimes and criminal purpose of Ek 10a. [ 60 ] The Report considered the record and reliable public information to determine the usual participation of interpreters in the crimes of Ek 10a.

As noted earlier, Justice MacKay found there was no evidence that the applicant participated in any atrocities, but noted that he admitted to serving as an interpreter during occasional interrogations of detained individuals, and found his evidence not credible and evasive. Expert evidence on interpreters suggested that they were generally present at executions, conveyed orders to victims, or participated during interrogations. [ 61 ] Justice MacKay made no finding on the inconsistencies in the evidence regarding the timing of the applicant’s service.

The applicant’s testimony, with which Justice MacKay had reliability and credibility concerns, the witnesses Mr. Huebert and Mr. Sidorenko, who Justice MacKay found more persuasive, and historical accounts of Ek 10a’s activities were considered in the Report to construct the most plausible timeline to consider the applicant’s duties in the context of Ek 10a’s activities as a killing squad: • the applicant started to serve as an interpreter with the Ek 10a in early October 1941 at the age of 17, and the same day he was asked to report to headquarters, he departed for either Mariupol or Melitopol.

During that time, there were 2 000 victims of Ek 10a in Melitopol;

• the applicant arrived in Taganrog in mid to late October 1941 and stayed until at least July 1942, where there were roughly 1 500victims in that period; • the applicant arrived in Rostov in early July 1942 and stayed for four weeks, where there were around 2 000 victims; • the applicant arrived in Krasnodar in early August 1942 and left by the end of the month, where there were around 7 000 victimsduring that time; and • the applicant arrived in Novorossiysk in late August 1942 and stayed until the end of February 1943, where prisoners were executedafter interrogations and also Jewish people were executed with or without interrogation. (

d) The Applicant’s Position or Rank in the Organization [62] The applicant was an auxiliary interpreter with Ek 10a, and not part of the upper hierarchy of his unit, but an interpreter forinterrogations is more likely to have knowledge of his organization’s crimes or criminal purpose than many foot soldiers. As aninterpreter, he would have had some control over the decisions made by his superiors to send a prisoner to his death through the power totranslate whatever information he wanted. (

e) The Length of Time the Applicant was in the Organization, particularly after acquiring Knowledge of the Group’s Crimeor Criminal Purpose [63] The applicant served as an auxiliary interpreter with the Ek 10a from roughly October 1941 to late 1943. Only October 1941 toFebruary 1943 was considered for the complicity analysis in the Report, during which Ek 10a killed at least 91 678 people. (

f) Knowledge [64] Based on Justice MacKay’s findings, the size and limited, brutal purpose of Ek 10a, the applicant’s role as an interpreter, and hisknowledge of the group’s crimes or criminal purpose, the applicant was found to have made his contribution knowingly. (

g) Significant Contribution [65] International jurisprudence suggested that admitted involvement as an interpreter in occasional interrogations could amount toserving as a step towards the realization of the group’s crime or criminal purpose: • United States v. Osidach, 513 F.

Supp. 51 (ED Pa. 1981), at pages 96–99―an interpreter during interrogations from 1942 to 1944was found to have facilitated the persecution of civilians as the necessary link between the Germans and the Jewish people while awareof the overarching criminal purpose. • The Report of Trials of War Criminals before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals under Control Council Law No. 10, Nuremberg,October 1946―April 1949, Volume IV (Radetzky)―it was noted in regards to an interpreter in a unit similar to Ek 10a that providinginterpretive services during interrogations, while aware that it might result in execution based on what was said, was conduct of aculpable nature as it served a step towards the realization of the group’s purpose. • Miranda Alvarado v.

Gonzales, 449 F.3d 915 (9th Cir. 2006)―interpreting during interrogations was found to have contributed tothe crimes to a sufficient degree to establish complicity. • Zhang Jian Xie v. INS, 434 F.3d 136 (2d Cir. 2006), at pages 142–143―an individual was found to have made a significantcontribution for only occasional involvement after transporting women to hospitals for forced abortion three to five times. [66] The applicant’s work as an interpreter facilitated the screening process for executions and served an important step towards therealization of Ek 10a’s criminal purpose.

Given Ek 10a’s unique nature, there was no other purpose to

interpretation during interrogationother than to fulfill the group’s deadly mandate. The applicant’s occasional involvement as an interpreter in interrogation of thosesuspected of anti-German sentiments and activities contributed significantly to Ek 10a’s crimes or criminal purpose. (

h) Voluntariness/Duress [67] Justice MacKay observed that the applicant believed that he had no alternative and that he would have been subject to theharshest penalties if he had not done as ordered by Ek 10a. However, this was not a finding of fact. The only evidence of conscriptionwas the applicant’s testimony that he needed to register with the German occupying forces as an Ethnic German, which was unrelated toconscription as an interpreter.

Since conscription was not a barrier to complicity, the issue of conscription was considered moot in theReport. [68] As noted, if the applicant knew nothing and did only mundane activities, it was unclear why he claimed to have been underduress. [69] The test for duress drew on the tests from immigration law in Ramirez v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), (FCA), [1992] 2 F.C. 306, 89 D.L.R. (4th) 173 (C.A.) (Ramirez), criminal common law in R. v. Ryan, 2013 SCC 3,[2013] 1 S.C.R. 14, international law in

Article 31(

d) of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, [2002] Can.T.S. No. 13, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force 1 July 2002) (Rome Statute), and the policy set out in the Manual. (

i) Imminent Physical Peril [70] There was insufficient evidence to establish a threat of death or bodily harm, explicit or implicit, imminent, past, or future, or thatsuch apprehension was reasonable. The applicant’s statements about fear of death were not substantiated by other evidence on the record.

(

j) No Safe Avenue for Escape [ 71 ] The applicant had a safe opportunity for escape during his posting in Rostov when he was a solitary guard armed with a rifle protecting a barge for three to four weeks. There was no imminent, real, or inevitable threat during that time. There may have also been an opportunity for escape while he was home on leave.

The Military Tribunal in Radetzky also noted that there was the opportunity in the Einsatzgruppen to ask for a transfer or to be excused from participating without immediate peril. [ 72 ] A reasonable person in the same situation as the applicant with the same personal characteristics and experience would have concluded that a safe avenue for escape existed. Whether he was 17 or 18 years old when he started, he had shown his maturity by supporting his family, and stayed with the Ek 10a until he was 20, which allowed for him to consider desertion or transfer. His continued service was therefore not involuntary. (

k) Proportionality [ 73 ] The harm inflicted by the applicant must not be greater than the harm threatened against the applicant. There were at least 10 000 victims of the Ek 10a’s large scale executions in the locations where the applicant was working as an interpreter, but the applicant failed to establish an imminent physical threat for leaving Ek 10a. The harm faced by the victims far outweighed the fear of harm alleged. [ 74 ] The applicant benefited from receiving a War Service Cross and German citizenship, which were both voluntary, as was his service after any alleged conscription.

Duress was therefore not established. [ 75 ] The Report concluded that the applicant served the members of Ek 10a voluntarily, significantly, and knowingly in accordance with the Ezokola factors and the Policy. (

l) Personal Interests [ 76 ] Revocation of citizenship would render the applicant stateless, but

Article 8, subparagraph 2(

b) of the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, 30 August 1961, [1978] Can. T.S. No. 32, 989 U.N.T.S. 175 (entered into force 13 December 1975) allows for the deprivation of nationality where it has been gained through misrepresentation or fraud. [ 77 ] The applicant’s personal circumstances in Canada were compelling, but did not outweigh the importance of preserving the integrity of Canadian citizenship from deceit and recognition of Canada’s obligation to ensure that there is no safe haven for those involved in mass atrocities.

It was noted that the applicant has not acknowledged the seriousness of his misrepresentation in gaining citizenship, nor has he expressed any remorse for having served with the Ek 10a despite its atrocities. (

m) The Applicant’s Submissions [ 78 ] The Minister responded to the applicant’s submissions in detail. A number of changes were made to the Report as a result of those submissions.

(6) Impugned Decision [ 79 ] Order in Council P.C. 2017-793, dated June 20, 2017, states that the GIC, on the Report from the Minister, is satisfied that the applicant obtained Canadian citizenship by false representation or fraud or by knowingly concealing material circumstances pursuant to subsection 10(2) of the Citizenship Act as it read on May 27, 2015. The Order in Council then states as follows: Therefore, His Excellency the Governor General in Council, on the recommendation of the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration, pursuant to

section 10 of the Citizenship Act , as it read on May 27, 2015, fixes the date of this Order as the date on which the [Applicant] ceases to be a Canadian citizen. III. Issues [ 80 ] The issues which the Court concludes must be addressed are: 1. Is the decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship an abuse of process? 2. Was there a breach of procedural fairness? 3. Was the correct standard of proof applied? 4. Was the decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship reasonable? (The applicant abandoned the issue of whether the leave requirements of the Citizenship Act violated the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , being

Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982 ,

Schedule B, Canada Act 1982 , 1982, c. 11 (U.K.) [R.S.C., 1985, Appendix II, No. 44] or the Canadian Bill of Rights , R.S.C., 1985, Appendix III.) IV. Standard of Review [ 81 ] The parties and I agree that the standard of review for the GIC’s decision to revoke citizenship is the standard of reasonableness: League for Human Rights of B’Nai Brith Canada v. Canada , 2010 FCA 307 , [2012] 2 F.C.R. 312 ([hereinafter referred to as] Odynsky ), at paragraph 85; Montoya v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2016 FC 827 , 269 A.C.W.S. (3d) 227 ( Montoya ), at paragraph 21 .

The issue between the parties is the appropriate level of deference to be awarded the GIC in these circumstances. [ 82 ] The respondent highlights that a decision by the GIC implicates “the decision making of Cabinet, a body of diverse policy perspectives representing all constituencies within government”, that “exercises its discretion to decide on a different platform, based on

polycentric considerations and a balancing of individual and public interests”: Odynsky , at paragraph 78; Prophet River First Nation v. Canada (Attorney General) , 2015 FC 1030 , 97 C.E.L.R. (3d) 23 ( Prophet River FC ), at paragraph 46 , affd 2017 FCA 15 , 408 D.L.R. (4th) 165 ( Prophet River FCA ).

Considerable deference is owed to a decision of the GIC, since it is a result of “a highly discretionary, policy-based and fact driven process”: Prophet River FCA , at paragraph 30; Prophet River FC , at paragraph 46. [ 83 ] The intervener similarly emphasizes that the individual rights at stake must be balanced with “elements of general policy” in determining whether to revoke citizenship, and the GIC is free to make a determination on general policy as long as it does not conflict with the Citizenship Act or its purposes: Odynsky , at paragraphs 86 and 81, citing FC-1, at paragraph 18.

The highly deferential standard that was used to uphold the decision of the GIC not to revoke citizenship in Odynsky should not be altered now that the decision is to revoke citizenship. [ 84 ] The applicant submits that the GIC is not engaging in a polycentric decision-making process, but is instead called upon to apply the facts to the legal definition of complicity in Ezokola . Additionally, this decision has been sent back three times for reconsideration due to the GIC’s mistakes.

The lowest level of deference is appropriate. [ 85 ] The intervener argues, to the contrary, that the presumption of regularity of administrative procedures, absent evidence to the contrary, indicates that after four tries the GIC should be presumed to get the law right: Ellis-Don Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board) , 2001 SCC 4 , [2001] 1 S.C.R. 221, at paragraph 33 . That decision does not necessarily support the Intervener’s argument. [ 86 ] The applicant further notes that in Vavilov v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FCA 132 , [2018] 3 F.C.R. 75 , 281 ACWS (3d) 472 ( Vavilov ), at paragraphs 36–37 , the Federal Court of Appeal noted that when significant interests were at stake, or on issues of statutory

interpretation in the immigration context, the reasonableness standard has been applied “in a more exacting way”. [ 87 ] I find that considerable deference is owed to the GIC’s decision due to the polycentric nature of the specific issue being addressed. Reasonableness assessed in an exacting way is an appropriate standard when examining facts and the application of law to those facts. [ 88 ] Although the applicant’s individual interests are high, which in Vavilov indicated that the reasonableness standard should be approached in a more exacting way, statutory

interpretation is not at issue in this case. The MacKay Decision conclusively found that the applicant obtained citizenship through false representation or by knowingly concealing material circumstances pursuant to

section 10 of the Citizenship Act . [ 89 ] Once the Citizenship Act requirements for revocation have been met, the GIC must weigh the Policy, the applicant’s personal interests, and the public interest to determine whether citizenship should be revoked. As stated by the respondent, this is a polycentric balancing. [ 90 ] What is at issue is whether the applicant’s citizenship should be revoked in light of the Policy, which requires that only those cases be pursued where the individual was complicit in war crimes or crimes against humanity.

This assessment requires an application of the legal framework of complicity in Ezokola . In addition, if it is determined that the applicant was complicit, and the Policy was satisfied, the applicant’s personal interests and the public interest must also be considered.

As noted in Montoya at paragraph 21 , the GIC’s decision involves broad discretion and a delicate balancing of policy and personal and public interests. [ 91 ] Reasonableness in the context of a revocation of citizenship by the GIC was also comprehensively described by Justice Stratas in Odynsky [at paragraphs 85–91], which provides considerable guidance in this case: Under the standard of reasonableness, our task is not to find facts, reweigh them, or substitute our decision for the Governor in Council.

Rather, our task is to ask ourselves whether the decision of the Governor in Council fell within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law. (See Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 , [2008] 1 S.C.R. 190, at paragraph 47 .) In assessing what range of defensible outcomes was available to the Governor in Council, we must be mindful of the Governor in Council’s task and what it involved.

In this case, the Governor in Council’s task was to consider the record presented to it in the form of the Minister’s report and to consider whether citizenship revocation was warranted in the circumstances. Subsection 10(1) does not provide any specific criteria or formula for the Governor in Council to follow in carrying out this task. It leaves the Governor in Council free to act on the basis of policy, but those policies cannot conflict with the Act or its purposes: Thamotharem v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2007 FCA 198 , [2008] 1 F.C.R. 385 .

In this case, the Government of Canada has developed a war crimes policy. None of the parties in this Court suggests that it was inappropriate or should not have been applied to these cases. Accordingly, in these cases, if the Governor in Council measured the facts contained in the Minister’s report against the war crimes policy of the Government of Canada and reached a rationally defensible result in its decisions under subsection 10(1) of the Act, they should be regarded as reasonable.

Put another way, in the circumstances of these cases, a rationally defensible application of a previously announced, unchallenged policy should be taken as a badge of reasonableness under Dunsmuir . … Another way of measuring the Governor in Council’s decisions against the deferential standard of review of reasonableness is to review the submissions of the parties that were contained in the reports the Minister sent to the Governor in Council.

These submissions reveal sharp divisions on the weight to be given to certain facts, how the policy should be applied to those facts, and how the Governor in Council should exercise its discretion. These are cases where, in the words of the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir , above, at paragraph 47 , the questions for decision “do not lend themselves to one specific, particular result” but instead “give rise to a number of possible, reasonable conclusions.” Under the deferential standard of review of reasonableness, it is not our job to reweigh the evidence that the Governor in Council

weighed, grapple with interpretative issues concerning the war crimes policy, and then replace the Governor in Council’s discretionary, fact-based conclusions with our own conclusions. [ 92 ] This “reasonableness standard”, as described by Justice Stratas, admits that there could be more than one reasonable result.

This is not a case where there could only be one reasonable answer. [ 93 ] The Court’s task is not to conclude which of the different reasonable views is the most reasonable but whether the GIC’s view can withstand the scrutiny of being within a range of possible, acceptable outcomes which are defensible in respect of the facts and the law. [ 94 ] In many respects the applicant is asking the Court to reweigh evidence, to accept one person as more credible than another and to even question findings of Justice MacKay.

This is not the Court’s role in this type of review. [ 95 ] In considering the reasonableness of the GIC decision, the Court must examine it in context against the backdrop of the record that was before Cabinet. Some findings may appear stronger than others but the decision must be considered as a whole, not piecemeal. [ 96 ] I would also note that the matters of procedural fairness are reviewed on the standard of correctness: Mission Institution v.

Khela , 2014 SCC 24 , [2014] 1 S.C.R. 502, at paragraph 79 ; Montoya , at paragraph 20 . [ 97 ] Closely allied to the standard of review is the standard of proof which governs the GIC decision.

At page 8 of the decision, the GIC quoted the correct test from Ezokola : … an individual will be found inadmissible for complicity in international crimes if there are serious reasons for considering that he voluntarily made a knowing and significant contribution to the crime or criminal purpose of the group alleged to have committed the crime. [Emphasis in original.] [ 98 ] For the reasons which follow, the Court concludes that the GIC decision is reasonable and ought not to be disturbed. V. Analysis A.

Issue 1: Is the decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship an abuse of process? [ 99 ] In arguing that the GIC decision was an abuse of process, the applicant raised the issues of delay in continuing to attempt to strip Oberlander of his citizenship; improper behaviour of the government in changing from criminal proceedings to citizenship revocation; bad faith in misstating facts and law; and the making of credibility findings without providing Oberlander a fair hearing (an issue also argued under breach of procedural fairness).

(1) Re: Delay [ 100 ] Since these proceedings began with the notice of revocation in 1995, the length of these proceedings has been largely due to the applicant’s successful procedural steps: • when judicial independence appeared to have been compromised in 1996, the applicant successfully took the case to the Supreme Court of Canada in Tobiass , but the remedy was not the stay that the Applicant sought, and the reference to Justice MacKay went forward; • as a result of the findings in the MacKay Decision in 2000, the first revocation was issued in 2001, which the applicant successfully had set aside in FCA-1 in 2004 which was remitted back to the GIC; • the second revocation was issued in 2007, which the applicant successfully had set aside in FCA-2 in 2009 on new grounds not argued before the GIC or the Federal Court and remitted back to the GIC; • the third revocation was issued in 2012, which the applicant successfully had set aside in FCA-3 in 2016 and remitted back to the GIC, and this fourth revocation was issued in 2017. [ 101 ] The applicant relies on Beltran v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2011 FC 516 , 204 A.C.W.S. (3d) 602 ( Beltran ). It was important that there was no justification for the government keeping information on the applicant “up its sleeve” for 22 years, and it was explicitly noted that the applicant had misrepresented nothing (paragraphs 53 and 42). Justice Harrington found at paragraph 51 that had the government proceeded when it first learned of Mr. Beltran’s involvement in the questionable organization, he would have been in a much better position to lead evidence. [ 102 ] The present case is clearly distinguishable from Beltran .

The notice of revocation was issued two days after the RCMP commenced an investigation against the applicant. Since that point, the longest delays that are attributable to the GIC are the 3-year periods following FCA-1 and FCA-2 when the GIC was reconsidering the revocation. Under the circumstances this is not an unreasonable delay. [ 103 ] In Yamani v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration) , 2003 FCA 482 , 314 N.R. 347, at paragraph 32 , the Federal Court of Appeal noted that successive proceedings initiated by Mr.

Yamani’s applications for judicial review had led to a number of lengthy proceedings that were disturbing, but found that it did not amount to abuse of process as none of the previous applications had completely resolved the allegations against him: …. While the appellant is entitled to invoke the rights available to him, the success he achieved in his previous applications for judicial review did not completely resolve the allegations against him. Rather, in each case, the matter was remitted for reconsideration.

The mere fact that multiple proceedings may be required to fully resolve a matter does not necessarily constitute an abuse of process.

[104] In Al Omani v. Canada, 2017 FC 786, at paragraph 69, Justice Roy similarly noted at paragraph 69 that “[i]t is difficult to seehow seizing the Court on judicial review by the Plaintiffs can be an abuse of process of the Court by the Defendant.” [105] The applicant is 94, but he has been ably defended in written submissions by his counsel, and the GIC’s decision did not requirehim to orally defend himself in a manner that made the delay prejudicial to him.

The record as relied on by the Minister in preparing theReport and the GIC in making the decision was largely formed by the MacKay Decision, evidence in that proceeding, the applicant’ssubmissions in response to the Report, and other documentary and affidavit evidence. The applicant’s ability to present his case hastherefore not been significantly prejudicially impacted between the first revocation decision and the fourth revocation decision.

(2) Re: Improper Behaviour and Bad Faith [106] Any improper behaviour on the part of the government that was addressed in the Tobiass decision is, in my view, irrelevant to theGIC’s decision or this judicial review. This occurred prior to any of the four revocation decisions, and is not relevant to an abuse ofprocess in the decision at issue in this case. [107] The choice on the part of the respondent not to pursue a finding that the applicant personally participated in executions at the timeof the MacKay Decision proceeding was not a misrepresentation before the Supreme Court of Canada.

The respondent did not need toprove direct participation in war crimes or crimes against humanity, as it was sufficient to determine complicity according to the Policyand the law at the time by merely proving membership in a single, brutal purpose organization like Ek 10a. Justice MacKay found thatthe applicant was a member of Ek 10a. [108] To follow the applicant’s suggestion of misrepresentation before the Supreme Court of Canada, one would have to conclude thatCrown counsel including Ian Binnie (later Mr. Justice Binnie of that court) participated in a misrepresentation.

There is no evidence tosupport such a suggestion and it ought not to have been made. [109] There is insufficient evidence that the decision not to pursue direct participation by the applicant in the MacKay Decisionproceeding was misconduct, and again there is no connection between the decision not to pursue a finding of direct participation in 1998before Justice MacKay and the present 2017 decision to revoke citizenship that would suggest an abuse of process. [110] Finally, the draft report was provided to the applicant to allow him to know the case to meet and for him to provide submissions.He did provide those submissions.

The final version of the Report was revised in response to those submissions prior to being given tothe GIC for a decision, and a

section of the Report outlines in detail the Minister’s response to the applicant’s submissions, what changeswere made, and why. [111] The Minister was transparent in what was altered about the Report, and explained when it disagreed with the applicant’ssubmissions. It is clear from the Report in general and that

section of the Report in particular that there was no bad faith on the part ofthe Minister.

(3) Re: Credibility [112] As will be discussed below in Issue 2, the GIC decision was procedurally fair. The Minister’s Report does not contain any newcredibility determinations. Instead, the Minister relied on credibility determinations made by Justice MacKay and weighed the evidenceon the record to determine what was more likely and more plausible to have occurred. [113] The Report was not a credibility determination but was a weighing of the evidence exercise in which more weight was attached toevidence against Oberlander. It was a weighing which the GIC and the Minister were entitled to conduct.

(4) Re: Abuse of Process [114] An abuse of process is only found in “extremely rare” and “the clearest of cases” when the Court is satisfied that the fairness ofthe administrative process has been so compromised that the damage to the public interest outweighs the harm to the public interest if theproceedings were halted: Blencoe v. British Columbia (Human Rights Commission), 2000 SCC 44, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 307, at paragraph120 citing L’Heureux-Dubé, J in R. v.

Power, (SCC), [1994] 1 S.C.R. 601, at page 616. [115] The GIC’s decision to revoke the applicant’s citizenship for a fourth time does not meet the high threshold necessary for a findingthat an abuse of process has occurred. [116] I also do not find, as argued by the Intervener, that the applicant’s behaviour rises to the level of abuse of process.

He hassuccessfully taken advantage of legal steps available to him, and was granted the remedy he sought in FCA-3 for the GIC to reconsiderthe revocation decision. [117] It was open to the GIC to reconsider the case in accordance with the directions of the Federal Court of Appeal and decide torevoke the applicant’s citizenship. The applicant may dislike the result, but it was not an abuse of process for the GIC to decide torevoke his citizenship for a fourth time. B.

Issue 2: Was there a breach of procedural fairness? [118] The applicant submits that since citizenship revocation engages highly important interests, an accordingly high degree ofprocedural rights and protections are appropriate. [119] The applicant contends that because credibility findings were made, he was entitled to an oral hearing before the GIC.

He alsoargues that the Report was an “advocacy piece” and an effort in the final version to sanitize errors while misstating fact and law. [120] The applicant also asserts that the GIC had to issue reasons independent of the Report (an argument rejected in FCA-1) and

involves the suggestion of Star Chamber type proceedings. [ 121 ] For the reasons set out below, I do not find that there has been a breach of procedural fairness. [ 122 ] In regards to the Intervener’s argument for minimal procedural rights, I agree with the applicant that the rights and privileges of an individual are directly affected in the present case in a way that they were not in Odynsky, where the appellant was not directly affected by the GIC decision.

I would find, therefore, that the content of the duty of fairness should not be comparable with Odynsky . [ 123 ] I note, however, that the Federal Court of Appeal also noted at paragraph 95 that no objective standards and criteria were imposed in the context of a decision under

section 10 of the Citizenship Act . Instead the GIC was empowered to exercise a broad discretion guided by the Policy. This indicates that the content of procedural fairness is lower than that argued for by the applicant.

(1) Re: Oral Hearing [ 124 ] I find that procedural fairness did not require an oral hearing. [ 125 ] The circumstances of this case are unique. There was a full oral hearing before Justice MacKay that resulted in all the findings of facts necessary to ground a citizenship revocation on the law as it stood at the time. Any credibility findings in this case were the ones made by Justice MacKay. [ 126 ] Since then, the law of complicity changed, and more than membership in Ek 10a was required to demonstrate complicity.

Justice MacKay chose not to make a finding of fact regarding the applicant’s description of his duties or the timeline of his service with Ek 10a. The defence of duress was not squarely raised before Justice MacKay, so no findings were made on that point, either. [ 127 ] The applicant submits that he is unable to be questioned due to his age and failing memory.

It is perhaps unsurprising that the Minister chose to proceed without an oral hearing―and without any fresh determinations of credibility―to favour a weighing of the evidence on the record to determine plausibility. [ 128 ] The applicant’s plea for an oral hearing in which he cannot participate rings hollow. [ 129 ] The Report examined all the evidence that went to complicity and duress. The evidence was from several sources and often contradictory. The applicant’s own testimony had often been inconsistent.

Also considered were the credibility findings made by Justice MacKay regarding the Applicant, which the jurisprudence suggests is permissible. In FC-3, overturned on appeal on the separate issue of discretion in issue estoppel without comment on this point, Justice Russell noted as follows at paragraphs 195–196: … I think the case law suggests that the Minister was free to rely on Justice MacKay’s findings regarding Mr. Oberlander’s lack of credibility on important issues (see e.g.

Oberlander (2000), above, at paras 151-152) to conclude that his statements carried little weight and were insufficient on their own to establish the points for which they were submitted. … … Justice MacKay found a lack of credibility in relation to his finding that Mr. Oberlander was a member of Ek 10a and that he had misrepresented his membership. The GIC’s decisions on complicity and duress are, to some extent, continuations of Justice MacKay’s decision. Whether Mr.

Oberlander’s affidavit is entitled to the presumption of truthfulness does not need to be decided but the case law suggests that the previous credibility findings support the Minister’s findings that Mr. Oberlander’s assertions are insufficient to satisfy the legal standard. [ 130 ] As noted in Ferguson v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2008 FC 1067 , 170 A.C.W.S. (3d) 397 ( Ferguson ), at paragraph 26 “[i]t is open to the trier of fact, in considering the evidence, to move immediately to an assessment of weight or probative value without considering whether it is credible.” At paragraph 27, Justice Zinn provided the following example: Evidence tendered by a witness with a personal interest in the matter may also be examined for its weight before considering its credibility because typically this sort of evidence requires corroboration if it is to have probative value.

If there is no corroboration, then it may be unnecessary to assess its credibility as its weight will not meet the legal burden of proving the fact on the balance of probabilities. When the trier of fact assesses the evidence in this manner he or she is not making a determination based on the credibility of the person providing the evidence; rather, the trier of fact is simply saying the evidence that has been tendered does not have sufficient probative value, either on its own or coupled with the other tendered evidence, to establish on the balance of probability, the fact for which it has been tendered.

That, in my view, is the assessment the officer made in this case. [ 131 ] In this case, the Minister examined the record, including the statements of the applicant. Taking into consideration the credibility findings made by Justice MacKay regarding the applicant’s testimony (see paragraph 186 of these reasons), the Minister assessed what was more likely to have occurred. A significant consideration was whether corroboration with witness accounts or documentary evidence was possible. I do not take the Minister’s use of the word “plausible” to mean credible.

I take it to mean “more likely to have occurred” or an assessment on the balance of probabilities. [ 132 ] Justice Zinn also stated as follows at paragraph 34 of Ferguson : It is also my view that there is nothing in the officer’s decision under review which would indicate that any part of it was based on the Applicant’s credibility. The officer neither believes nor disbelieves that the Applicant is lesbian―he is unconvinced. He states that there is insufficient objective evidence to establish that she is lesbian.

In short, he found that there was some evidence―the statement of counsel―but that it was insufficient to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that Ms. Ferguson was lesbian. In my view, that determination does not bring into question the Applicant’s credibility. This is the case in the Report as well. The Minister refrains from any independent findings of the applicant’s credibility, but considers

Justice MacKay’s credibility findings along with the other evidence available.

(2) Re: Right to Reply [133] The applicant had a reasonable opportunity to participate in a meaningful manner in the decision-making process and did so. [134] There is no legal basis for the applicant’s assertion of a right to reply to the Minister’s Report prior to its submission to the GIC. [135] The applicant argued that there were “21 additional pages of comment” that neither the applicant nor his counsel had seen, but theapplicant did not point to anything in those 21 pages that was new or an extrinsic fact or argument. From a reading of those pages of theReport, one does not see any new facts or arguments.

An exception to this may be the Minister’s response to the new materials providedby the applicant. For the most part, this distinguishes articles submitted by the applicant and addresses the affidavit of the applicant’sdaughter, Irene Rooney.

None of this response is extrinsic, but instead is mostly repetitive of statements made elsewhere in the Report. [136] It is worth noting that, as much as the applicant objects to the fact the Report is revised due to his submissions, the Federal Courtof Appeal commented negatively in FCA-1 that the Minister’s final report was not revised to take the applicant’s submissions intoconsideration, and merely referenced their existence and had them attached. This contributed at paragraph 58 of FCA-1 to the firstrevocation decision being found unreasonable.

In regards to the fourth revocation decision that is currently at issue, the Minister wasclearly obligated to revise the Report to respond to the applicant’s submissions. It is difficult to see why the applicant objects to that forwhich he asked. [137] Examining the whole of the context of these proceedings and its history, I cannot find anything unfair in not submitting a draft ofthe amended Report to the applicant before it went to the GIC. The applicant had fully exercised his rights to comment on the Reportand at some point the process must end.

In the final analysis, the Report as the reason for decision must stand on its own merits.

(3) Re: Prosecutor’s Brief [138] The rejection of the applicant’s argument about the Report being an advocacy piece or “prosecutor’s brief” in FCA-1 applies withequal force to the current argument. This argument was rejected again, albeit more briefly, in FC-3, at paragraph 120. In this case, a draftversion of the Report was provided to the applicant for comment, and it was revised to incorporate and respond to those submissionsbefore it was provided to the GIC.

The Report is not so substantially changed in the current context so as to make the statement of thelaw in FCA-1 inapplicable. [139] The Report comprehensively considers and weighs the evidence on the record and the applicant’s submissions in making therecommendation to the GIC to revoke the applicant’s citizenship. It cannot be properly characterized as an instrument of advocacy. [140] In Suresh v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), 2002 SCC 1, [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3, at paragraph 126, the SupremeCourt of Canada stated that reasons must “articulate and rationally sustain a finding”, articulate the basis for the decision, and come fromthe person making the decision. In the case at hand, Order in Council P.C. 2017-793 from the GIC stated in brief the basis for thedecision, stated that the Re

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