R. v. C.T.P., 2022 BCPC 185

Citation: R. v. C.T.P. 2022 BCPC 185 Date: 20220914 File No: 21991-3-C Registry: Western Communities IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REX v. C.T.P. BAN ON PUBLICATION – s. 486.4 and 278.95 of the Criminal Code CORRIGENDUM TO THE REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE T. GOUGE Counsel for the Crown: J. Pawlow Counsel for the Accused: R. Horne Place of Hearing: Colwood , B.C. Dates of Hearing: September 14, 2022 Date of Judgment: September 14, 2022 A Corrigendum was released by the Court on September 15, 2022. The correction has been made to the text and the

A Corrigendum was released by the Court on September 15, 2022. The correction has been made to the text and theCorrigendum is appended to this document. The Issue [1] On November 21, 2021, I convicted Ms. P. of two counts of sexual assault, contrary to

section 271 of the Criminal Code, andone count of internet luring, contrary to

section 172.1(1)(

b) of the Criminal Code. It is now my task to impose a sentence for each ofthose offences. The Offences [2] The particulars of the offences are set out in the reasons which I rendered on November 21, 2021: [2021] BCJ No. 2601; 2021BCPC 284. To summarize them briefly:

a) One evening in April 2020, Ms. P. and a female friend encountered a group of boys who lived in the same neighbourhood as Ms. P.and her friend. The boys offered to trade marijuana, which they had, for alcohol. The women agreed to the exchange and went topurchase the alcohol. When they returned to Ms. P.’s home, the boys joined them there for a party, during which alcohol and marijuanawere consumed. During the evening, Ms. P. had vaginal sex in her bedroom with one of the boys, C.M.

b) A few days later, Ms. P. sent a text message to C.M. inviting him to her house for a “hot make-out sesh”. C.M. accepted theinvitation and went to Ms. P.’s house, where they engaged in vaginal sex.

c) At the time of these events, C.M. was 15 years of age and Ms. P. was 25. The Offender [3] Ms. P. was sexually abused as a child, but (quoting from the forensic psychiatric presentence report) does “… not feel there wasany connection between her sexual offence charges and her own abuse experience”. She has received treatment for anxiety anddepression since age 14. She is now 27 years of age. She has a 6 year old son, H. H’s father, Mr. S., spoke at the sentencing hearing. Hereports a strong parental relationship with H., who has his own bedroom in Mr.

S’s home and frequently spends the night in his father’scare. [4] Ms. P. has no criminal history. Her formal education ended after grade 10, but she has recently enrolled in a course for thetraining of paralegals. Her risk of reoffending is assessed as low. She has been employed by an immigration consultant since 2019. Heremployer speaks well of her. She has an intimate partner, whom she met in 2020, and they have a stable relationship. Her mother offersher support. [5] Ms. P.’s family doctor advises that: [Ms. P.’s] mother is in recovery and doing well. [Ms.

P.] has a good relationship with her mother and enlists her assistance with her son’scare. [Ms. P.] remains the primary care giver. Unfortunately H. has Attention Deficit Disorder. His mental health and development willsuffer if his mother were to be incarcerated. Recently [Ms. P.] has connected with an addictions medicine specialist for help with alcohol abuse. She is attending the counsellingappointments and following the directions of the addictions physician. Her prognosis for recovery is good. * * * This past year has been difficult for [Ms. P.].

The court proceedings and the impending sentencing are causing a great strain on hermental stability. Any time spent incarcerated I fear will result in a severe decline in her mental health. I expect that her anxiety anddepression will worsen and that the positive steps towards conquering alcohol abuse will be lost. Her son will suffer with the absence ofhis mother. [Ms. P.’s] mother will be forced to quit work to care for her grandson. [6] The following passage from Ms. P.’s presentence report gives rise to some concern: While [Ms.

P.] acknowledges that she should have made a more fulsome attempt to confirm the age of the victim, she also remarks onthe fact that there are no laws to “hold a minor to account for lying about their age”. In the writer’s opinion, this appears an attempt tominimize her own responsibility. There is a curious parallel between this remark of Ms. P. and a sentence which appears in the letter of reference provided by Ms. P.’semployer. In that sentence the employer refers to C.M. as having “lured [Ms. P.] into crime”. Ms.

P. and her employer do not appear tounderstand, or perhaps do not agree, that the responsibility for preventing sexual activity between adults and youths always lies upon theadult: R. v. George 2017 SCC 38 , [2017] 1 SCR 1021; 2017 SCC 38 at paragraph 2. The Victim [7] C.M. is now 17. His victim impact statement is a powerful articulation of the effects of sexual abuse on children. The followingextracts from the victim impact statement are particularly worthy of note: After this happened, I stopped caring about life, and I don’t really try anymore.

I don’t care what foot goes forward – before I caredabout school and my grades, lacrosse but this changed my outlook on that. I started over thinking everything and became an overthinkerand I just sit by myself and think about stupid stuff that I can’t control and I feel stuck in those thoughts. * * *

This has affected my relationship with my family a lot. I feel like I don’t care about anything. I don’t enjoy things I used to enjoy – likebeing with my family or friends. I just want to be alone and not deal with things. I get angry faster which means sometimes I fight withmy family even if I don’t want to. I just want to isolate. I really struggle with my self-esteem now. I don’t like myself, all I do is find negatives in everything that I do. I can’t find the positives inanything that I do or anything about myself. Because of the impacts on my emotional health, it has affected my physical health.

I don’t eat much anymore. I have lost so much weight– 20 pounds. I don’t find anything appealing anymore, not even my favourite foods. * * * There’s a lot more that I can add but the most important thing for you to hear is that after this, I hit a wall. I’m lost and confused. I wantto care about things in my life, I want to care about anything but I don’t. I don’t have motivation to do anything at all. The Statute [8] In this case, the Crown proceeded summarily. Where the prosecution is conducted summarily: a. [T]he victim was under age 16 at the time of the offence,

section 271 provides for a minimum sentence of 6 months’ imprisonmentand a maximum sentence of 2 years less a day; b. [S]ection 172.1 provides for a minimum sentence of 6 months imprisonment and a maximum sentence of 2 years less a day,regardless of the age of the victim. [9] There is an issue as to the constitutionality of the mandatory minimum sentences. However, the constitutional issue will arise ifand only if a fit sentence for these offences, absent the mandatory minimum, would be less than six months’ imprisonment. Counselagree that I should first determine a fit sentence.

If I conclude that a fit sentence would exceed six months, there will be no need toadjudicate the constitutional issue. [10] I am guided by the following statements of principle: … the election of the Crown as to how to proceed does not make a meaningful difference to sentence provided the sentence is within thelimits established by Parliament for the mode of procedure chosen … Butler v.

The Queen, [2019] NJ No. 123; 2019 NLCA 21 at paragraph 60 A fit sentence for a hybrid offence is neither a function nor a fraction of the sentence that might have been imposed had the Crownelected to proceed otherwise than it did. More particularly, the sentence for a hybrid offence prosecuted summarily should not be "scaleddown" from the maximum on

summary conviction simply because the defendant would likely have received less than the maximum hadhe or she been prosecuted by indictment. Likewise, upon indictment, the sentence should not be "scaled up" from the sentence that theaccused might well have received if prosecuted by

summary conviction. R. v. Solowan, 2008 SCC 62 , [2008] 3 SCR 309; 2008 SCC 62 at paragraph 15 Sentencing in Cases of Sexual Assaults upon Children [11] The principles governing sentencing in cases of sexual assault upon a child were stated by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9; 444 DLR (4th) 1; 391 CCC (3d) 309. It is important to quote at some length from that judgment, because itmandates a new and more rigorous approach to sentencing than that which prevailed in the past.

All sentencing starts with the principle that sentences must be proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibilityof the offender. The principle of proportionality has long been central to Canadian sentencing (see, e.g., R. v. Wilmott, (ON CA), [1966] 2 O.R. 654 (C.A.)) and is now codified as the "fundamental principle" of sentencing in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code. (at paragraph 30) Courts must impose sentences that are commensurate with the gravity of sexual offences against children. It is not sufficient for courts tosimply state that sexual offences against children are serious.

The sentence imposed must reflect the normative character of the offender'sactions and the consequential harm to children and their families, caregivers, and communities (see M. (C.A.), at para. 80; R. v.Morrisey, 2000 SCC 39, [2000] 2 S.C.R. 90, at para. 35). We thus offer some guidance on how courts should give effect to the gravity ofsexual offences against children. Specifically, courts must recognize and give effect to (1) the inherent wrongfulness of these offences;(2) the potential harm to children that flows from these offences; and, (3) the actual harm that children suffer as a result of theseoffences.

We emphasize that sexual offences against children are inherently wrongful and always put children at risk of serious harm,even as the degree of wrongfulness, the extent to which potential harm materializes, and actual harm vary from case to case. (at paragraph 76) We would emphasize that courts should reject the belief that there is no serious harm to children in the absence of additional physicalviolence (Benedet, at p. 299). As we have explained, any manner of physical sexual contact between an adult and a child is inherentlyviolent and has the potential to cause harm.

Even in child luring cases where all interactions occur online, the offender's conduct canconstitute a form of psychological sexual violence that has the potential to cause serious harm (see Rafiq, at paras. 44-45; Rayo, at paras.172-74; L.M., at para. 26).

(at paragraph 82) When possible, courts must consider the actual harm that a specific victim has experienced as a result of the offence. This consequentialharm is a key determinant of the gravity of the offence (see M. (C.A.), at para. 80). (at paragraph 85) Parliament's choice to prioritize denunciation and deterrence for sexual offences against children is a reasoned response to thewrongfulness of these offences and the serious harm they cause. The sentencing objective of denunciation embodies the communicativeand educative role of law (R. v. Proulx, 2000 SCC 5, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 61, at para. 102).

It reflects the fact that Canadian criminal law is a"system of values". A sentence that expresses denunciation thus condemns the offender "for encroaching on our society's basic code ofvalues"; it "instills the basic set of communal values shared by all Canadians" (M. (C.A.), at para. 81). The protection of children is oneof the most basic values of Canadian society (L. (J.-J.), at p. 250; Rayo, at para. 104).

As L'Heureux-Dubé J. reasoned in L.F.W., "sexualassault of a child is a crime that is abhorrent to Canadian society and society's condemnation of those who commit such offences must becommunicated in the clearest of terms" (para. 31, quoting L.F.W. (C.A.), at para. 117, per Cameron J.A.). (at paragraph 105) Courts can and sometimes need to depart from prior precedents and sentencing ranges in order to impose a proportionate sentence.Sentencing ranges are not "straitjackets" but are instead "historical portraits" (Lacasse, at para. 57).

Accordingly, as this Courtrecognized in Lacasse, sentences can and should depart from prior sentencing ranges when Parliament raises the maximum sentence foran offence and when society's understanding of the severity of the harm arising from that offence increases (paras. 62-64 and 74). This guidance from Lacasse applies to sexual offences against children. As noted previously, Parliament's decision in 2015 to increasemaximum sentences for sexual offences against children should shift the range of proportionate sentences as a response to therecognition of the gravity of these offences.

Sentences should increase as a result of this legislative initiative (Rayo, at para. 175). Incertain cases, a sentencing judge [TRANSLATION] "must feel free to impose sentences above" a past threshold (R. v. Régnier, 2018QCCA 306, at para. 78 ). As the Quebec Court of Appeal has reasoned, courts must give "the legislative intent its full effect"and should not feel bound to adhere to a range that no longer reflects Parliament's view of the gravity of the offence (para. 40). Such arange may in fact be "obsolete and must be revised upwards" (para. 30).

A second reason why upward departure from precedents may be required is that courts' understanding of the gravity and harmfulness ofsexual offences against children has deepened, as we have sought to explain above. As Pepall J.A. observed in Stuckless (2019), there hasbeen a considerable evolution in Canadian society's understanding of the gravity and harmfulness of these offences (para. 90). Sentencesshould thus increase "as courts more fully appreciate the damage that sexual exploitation by adults causes to vulnerable, young victims"(Scofield, at para. 62).

Courts should accordingly be cautious about relying on precedents that may be "dated" and fail to reflect"society's current awareness of the impact of sexual abuse on children" (R. v. Vautour, 2016 BCCA 497, at para. 52 ). Evenmore recent precedents may be treated with caution if they simply follow more dated precedents that inadequately recognize the gravityof sexual violence against children (L.V., at paras. 100-102).

Courts are thus justified in departing from precedents in imposing a fitsentence; such precedents should not be seen as imposing a cap on sentences (see Stuckless (2019), at paras. 61-62, per Huscroft J.A.). (at paragraphs 108 to 110) D. (D.), Woodward, S. (J.), and this Court's own decisions in M. (C.A.) and L.M. make clear that imposing proportionate sentences thatrespond to the gravity of sexual offences against children and the degree of responsibility of offenders will frequently require substantialsentences. Parliament's statutory amendments have strengthened that message.

It is not the role of this Court to establish a range or tooutline in which circumstances such substantial sentences should be imposed. Nor would it be appropriate for any court to set out bindingor inflexible quantitative guidance -- as Moldaver J.A. wrote in D. (D.), "judges must retain the flexibility needed to do justice inindividual cases" and to individualize the sentence to the offender who is before them (at para. 33). Nonetheless, it is incumbent on us toprovide an overall message that is clear (D. (D.), at paras. 34 and 45).

That message is that mid-single digit penitentiary terms for sexualoffences against children are normal and that upper-single digit and double-digit penitentiary terms should be neither unusual norreserved for rare or exceptional circumstances. We would add that substantial sentences can be imposed where there was only a singleinstance of sexual violence and/or a single victim, as in this case, Woodward, and L.M.

In addition, as this Court recognized in L.M.,maximum sentences should not be reserved for the "abstract case of the worst crime committed in the worst circumstances" (para. 22).Instead, a maximum sentence should be imposed whenever the circumstances warrant it (para. 20). (at paragraph 114 – underlining added) While it is the proper function of the Supreme Court to deliver messages to trial judges, they rarely do so in such blunt and forcefulterms. I take note accordingly.

Some courts have, while acknowledging that a victim's participation is not a mitigating factor, nevertheless treated it as relevant todetermining a fit sentence (see Scofield, at para. 39; Caron Barrette, at para. 56). This is an error of law: this factor is not a legallyrelevant consideration at sentencing. The participation of a victim may coincide with the absence of certain aggravating factors, such asadditional violence or unconsciousness. To be clear, the absence of an aggravating factor is not a mitigating factor.

We would add the following to assist judges as they give practical effect to Parliament's decision that sentences for sexual offencesagainst children must increase. First, some courts have seemed to equate a child's non-resistance with "de facto consent" (see R. v.Revet, 2010 SKCA 71, 256 C.C.C. (3d) 159, at para. 12). In addition to analogizing a child's participation to consent, this language hintsat the belief that submission or a failure to resist constitutes consent, which is a pernicious myth even for adults.

Judges' analyses need tobe clear that there is no defence of "implied consent" in Canadian law and that a failure to resist or silence or passivity does not constituteconsent (see Barton, at para. 98). Second, a victim's participation should not distract the court from the harm that the victim suffers as a result of sexual violence. We

would thus strongly warn against characterizing sexual offences against children that involve a participating victim as free of physical orpsychological violence, as some courts appear to have done (see Caron Barrette, at para. 46). Instead, as the majority held in Hajar,"Violence is inherent in [such offences] since [they] involv[e] an adult's serious violation of a child's sexual integrity, human dignity andprivacy even in cases of ostensible consent" (para. 115 (emphasis in original)).

The fact that additional forms of violence such asweapons, intimidation, and additional physical assault may not be present does not provide a basis to ignore the inherent violence ofsexual offences against children (see Marshall, at p. 220). Third, in some cases, a victim's participation is the result of a campaign of grooming by the offender or of a breach of an existingrelationship of trust. In no case should the victim's participation be considered a mitigating factor. Where a breach of trust or groomingled to the participation, that should properly be seen as an aggravating factor (R. v.

P.M. (2002), (ON CA), 155O.A.C. 242, at para. 19; R. v. F. (G.C.) (2004), (ON CA), 71 O.R. (3d) 771 (C.A.), at paras. 7 and 21; Woodward, atpara. 43). Adolescence can be a confusing and challenging time for young people as they grow and mature, navigate friendships and peergroups, and discover their sexuality. As Feldman J.A. wrote in P.M., to exploit young teenagers during this period by leading them tobelieve that they are in a love relationship with an adult "reveals a level of amorality that is of great concern" (para. 19).

Finally, a victim's participation should never distract the court from the fact that adults always have a responsibility to refrain fromengaging in sexual violence towards children. Adults, not children, are responsible for preventing sexual activity between children andadults (George, at para. 2; R. v. Audet, (SCC), [1996] 2 S.C.R. 171, at para. 23). We would adopt the words of FairburnJ. (as she then was) in R. v. J.D., 2015 ONSC 5857: Nor is it a mitigating factor that a child appears to acquiesce or even seek out the sexual attention of an adult.

Where children appear tobe seeking out such attention, it is often an outward manifestation of the child's confusion arising from personal difficulties. It is the legalresponsibility of adults who are faced with children who already exhibit signs of struggle, to protect them. Adults who see thesesituations as opportunities to satisfy their own sexual urges, are no better or worse than those who take steps to actively seek out theirvictims. [para. 25 ] (at paragraphs 150 to 154 - underlining added) [12] Mr. Horne referred me to two recent decisions in which Friesen was considered.

a) In R. v. C.J.J., 2020 BCPC 201; [2020] BCJ No. 1693, the Honourable Judge Doulis of this court imposed a suspendedsentence and a period of probation in the case of a sexual relationship of several weeks’ duration between a 20 year old man and a 14year old girl.

b) In R. v. Campbell, 2021 BCSC 323; [2021] BCJ No. 355, the Honourable Justice Brundrett of the British Columbia SupremeCourt imposed a 12 month conditional sentence and a term of 18 months’ probation for a sexual assault by a man in his mid-40’s upon agirl who was 9 to11 years of age at the time of the offence. [13] The decision in C.J.J. has been controversial: R. v.

G.T.A., 2021 BCCA 425; [2021] BCJ No. 2428 at paragraphs 67 to 74; R. v.Charlie, 2021 YKTC 48; [2021] YJ No. 249 at paragraph 37. [14] At paragraph 54 of C.J.J., Judge Doulis said: In this case, the evidence does not establish anything unique to C.J.J.'s particular circumstances of incarceration, or personalvulnerability, that would justify reducing an otherwise fit sentence. C.J.J. is not in-custody. What is unique, however is the impact of theCOVID-19 pandemic on the community and the provincial correctional centres' ability to safely manage inmates.

I understand thatprovincial correctional facilities are straining to maintain proper cohorting and COVID mitigating induction processes, which includeisolation protocols. While COVID-19 is still with us, it is much better-managed than it was in 2020, and poses a significantly lesser threat now than it didthen. I do not find C.J.J. to be a persuasive authority in the circumstances now pertaining. A similar conclusion was reached in R. v.Bertacco, 2021 BCSC 597; [2021] BCJ No. 797 at paragraph 73. [15] In Campbell, the offence occurred during the period 1996 to 1999, and the matter came on for trial in 2020.

At paragraphs 47 to49, Justice Brundrett referred to the “… difficulty applying Friesen in cases of offences committed many years ago …”, and the need togive regard to the development in recent years of our understanding of the serious effects of child abuse. In this case, the offences werecommitted only 2 years ago, and 6 months after the date on which the Friesen decision was published. For that reason, I do not findCampbell to be of assistance in this case.

Sentences in Cases of Internet Luring [16] Before the decision in Friesen, the sentencing range for internet luring was of the order of 12 to 24 months’ jail: R. v. Rayo, 2018QCCA 824 , [2018] QJ No. 4202; 2018 QCCA 824 at paragraphs 125 to 129. As noted in Friesen at paragraphs 108 to 110,some upward revision of that range may now be called for. Consecutive or Concurrent Sentences? [17] In this case, there were two distinct incidents, separated by a period of a few days. During the first incident, Ms. P. had vaginalintercourse with the complainant at Ms. P.’s home.

The second incident was initiated by text message from Ms. P. to the complainant,inviting him to her home for a “hot make-out sesh”. The complainant accepted the invitation and they had vaginal intercourse at Ms. P.’shome. I had inclined to the view that, because the charge of internet luring and the second charge of sexual assault arose from a singleincident, the sentences on the latter two counts should be concurrent, each with the other, and consecutive to the sentence on the firstcount: R. v. Daye, 2010 NBCA 53 , [2010] NBJ No. 244; 2010 NBCA 53.

However, in Rayo at paragraphs 125 to 143, theCourt concluded that the prohibition against internet luring is directed to a different “social interest” than the prohibition against sex with

children, and that the sentence for internet luring must therefore be consecutive to the sentence for sexual assault. The Totality Principle [18] In R. v. C.A.M., (SCC), [1996] 1 SCR 500, Chief Justice Lamer said at paragraph 42: The totality principle, in short, requires a sentencing judge who orders an offender to serve consecutive sentences for multiple offences toensure that the cumulative sentence rendered does not exceed the overall culpability of the offender. As D. A.

Thomas describes theprinciple in Principles of Sentencing (2nd ed. 1979), at p. 56: The effect of the totality principle is to require a sentencer who has passed a series of sentences, each properly calculated in relation tothe offence for which it is imposed and each properly made consecutive in accordance with the principles governing consecutivesentences, to review the aggregate sentence and consider whether the aggregate sentence is "just and appropriate".

Clayton Ruby articulates the principle in the following terms in his treatise, Sentencing, supra, at pp. 44-45: The purpose is to ensure that a series of sentences, each properly imposed in relation to the offence to which it relates, is in aggregate"just and appropriate". A cumulative sentence may offend the totality principle if the aggregate sentence is substantially above thenormal level of a sentence for the most serious of the individual offences involved, or if its effect is to impose on the offender "a crushingsentence" not in keeping with his record and prospects.

Applying the Principles in This Case [19] The Supreme Court was quite clear in Friesen. Parliament has chosen to prioritize denunciation and deterrence in cases of sexualassaults upon children, and the Supreme Court of Canada agrees with that approach. In this case, as in Friesen, it is important that themessage be clear. The message is: If you are an adult, and you have sex with a child, you should expect to go to jail for a long time. [20] At paragraph 85 of Friesen, the Court held that the harm suffered by the victim is the “… key determinant of the gravity of theoffence”. The effect upon C.M. of Ms.

P.’s offending behaviour has been very grave indeed. In his written submissions, Mr. Hornesuggested that it is relevant to consider the fact that, in this case, the offender is a woman and the victim a young boy. I disagree for threereasons:

a) At paragraph 85 of Friesen, the Court held that the harm inflicted on the victim is the “key determinant” of the gravity of theoffence. At paragraph 30, the Court pointed out that the gravity of the offence is the most important factor to be considered in sentencing.As noted, the impact on C.M. of Ms. P.’s assault was very severe.

b) It is necessary to reject the stereotype that teenage boys are less vulnerable to the sequelae of sexual assault than are teenagegirls. C.M.’s victim impact statement effectively refutes any such proposition.

c) To impose a lesser sentence on a female offender than that which would be imposed on a male offender for a similar crimewould infringe the rights of male offenders under

section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. [21] I am concerned about the impact which a jail sentence would have upon Ms. P.’s son, H. However, I do not think that I shouldreduce an otherwise-appropriate sentence for that reason. Many offenders have children. If I were to impose a lesser sentence on Ms. P.because of the impact of the sentence on her mother and son, I would dilute the deterrent effect of the sentence and fail to give effect tothe expressed intention of Parliament and the Supreme Court.

I observe also that H. will not be left without family support and guidance.He has a close and continuing relationship with his father and grandmother, each of whom I expect will care for him. [22] I am concerned by Ms. P.’s response to her conviction. Her expression of remorse at the sentencing hearing was unconvincing.Throughout the proceedings, she blamed C.M. for misleading her about his age. [23] A fit sentence for each of the two sexual assaults of which Ms. P. was convicted would be a “mid-single digit penitentiarysentence”: Friesen at paragraph 114.

In this case, if the Crown had proceeded by indictment, I would have imposed a sentence of theorder of 3 to 5 years’ imprisonment on each count. Because the Crown proceeded summarily, the maximum sentence which I can imposeis 2 years less a day on each count.

Applying the principles stated in Butler and Solowan, I should not reduce the sentence below 2 yearsless a day simply because the Crown elected to proceed summarily. [24] I think that a fit sentence for the count of internet luring would be 18 months’ imprisonment. [25] Applying the principles stated in Rayo, the sentences should be consecutive, not concurrent. [26] The total sentence which I impose will be for a term of 5.5 years’ imprisonment. That is roughly equivalent to that which washeld in Friesen to be appropriate for either of the sexual assaults, standing alone.

For that reason, the “totality principle” is not offendedby a sentence of 5 to 6 years imprisonment. [27] I impose a jail sentence of 2 years less a day on each of counts 1 and 3 (the two sexual assaults) and a jail sentence of 18 monthson count 6 (internet luring). Each of the sentences will be consecutive to each of the others. [28] Ms. P. must comply with the provisions of the Sex Offender Information Registration Act SC 2004, c 10 for life. She mustprovide a DNA sample to the officers at the correctional centre, under the authority of

section 487.051 of the Criminal Code. The victimfine surcharges will be waived.

_____________________________ The Honourable Judge T. Gouge Provincial Court of British Columbia CORRIGENDUM - Released September 15, 2022 In the Reasons for Judgment dated September 14, 2022, the following change has been made: [1] On the Style of Cause page, Regina should read Rex. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge T. Gouge Provincial Court of British Columbia