Docken v Anderson, 2023 ABKB 515

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Docken v Anderson, 2023 ABKB 515 Date: 20230912 Docket: 2201 08392 Registry: Calgary Between: Clint Docken and Guardian Law Group LLP Plaintiffs - and - Sandra Anderson and Susan Anderson Defendants - and - Estella Meza and Basil Panidisz Interfering Third Parties _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of the Honourable Justice C.M. Jones

_______________________________________________________ I. Introduction [ 1 ] Sandra Ann Anderson [Ms. Anderson] is a problematic litigant with an extended record of inappropriate and abusive litigation conduct that now extends back years. Ms. Anderson is a highly active, abusive Organized Pseudolaw Commercial Argument [OPCA] ( Meads v Meads , 2012 ABQB 571 ) litigant. Ms. Anderson’s record of repeated and persistent abuse of this Court and litigants led Associate Chief Justice Rooke to on April 26, 2022 impose court access restrictions on Ms.

Anderson following a Judicature Act , RSA 2000, c J-2 ss 23-23.1 Application by the Attorney General of Canada: Canada (Attorney General) v Anderson , 2022 ABQB 310 [ Canada v Anderson ]. Further stringent communications and filing restrictions were subsequently imposed on Ms. Anderson in Royal Bank of Canada v Anderson , 2022 ABQB 525 at para 62 [ RBC v Anderson #2 ]. [ 2 ] Ms. Anderson litigates to inflict harm on those who defy her illegal activities. Ms. Anderson has repeatedly and consistently employed disruptive and harassing OPCA strategies in her litigation and has been repeatedly penalized for that.

This Court has concluded that Ms. Anderson will never voluntarily pay any penalty, costs award, or judgment against her. Contempt sanctions are ineffective because Ms. Anderson does not respond to court instructions and is already the target of multiple arrest warrants that result from Ms. Anderson’s refusal to appear in Alberta Court of Justice criminal proceedings where she is the accused. [ 3 ] Because of this situation, this Court ordered Royal Trust pay into court a total of $650,000 in funds from the estate of Ms. Anderson’s father ( Estate of James Carl Anderson , Alberta Court of King’s Bench Docket No.

ES01 119128): Royal Bank of Canada v Anderson , 2022 ABKB 733 [ RBC v Anderson #5 ]; Docken v Anderson , 2023 ABKB 313 [ Docken #2 ]. Those funds were called “security for costs”, but really that pool of money is more accurately described as “security against pseudolaw and abusive conduct by Ms. Anderson in the Alberta Court of King’s Bench that injures others and causes injustice.”: Royal Bank of Canada v Anderson , 2023 ABKB 180 . After multiple fines and other payments, at present $4 14,730.68 in funds remain: Docken v Anderson , 2023 ABKB 474 at para 18 [ Docken #3 ] . [ 4 ] Currently, Ms.

Anderson is a co-Defendant in a civil lawsuit conducted by Clint Docken and Guardian Law Group LLP [Plaintiffs]. The other Defendant is Ms. Anderson’s sister Susan Anderson. The Anderson sisters have been noted in default. On September 1, 2023 Acting Associate Chief Justice Jeffrey declared that the Anderson sisters had engaged in defamation and ordered the Anderson sisters pay $600,000 in general damage, $55,000 in aggravated damages, and $6 million in punitive damages, and $30,000 in costs to the Plaintiffs. [ 5 ] Rather than cooperate and engage in the Docken v Andersion lawsuit, Ms.

Anderson has over and over employed pseudolaw schemes, that are detailed in Docken v Anderson , 2023 ABKB 291 at paras 6-22 [ Docken #1 ], and Docken #2 at paras 22-36 . A new aspect of Ms. Anderson’s abusive litigation strategies is her using two proxies to conduct elements of her litigation activities: a Calgary resident named Basil Panidisz , and Estella Meza, a person who provided a mailing address in Rochelle, Illinois.

These individuals claim to be “Trustees” of something called “SANDRA ANN ANDERSON”, a “Living Trust”, what Canadian law classifies as a fictitious pseudolaw “Strawman Theory” strategy: Docken #2 at paras 6-7 . [ 6 ] In Docken #1 at paras 40-42 , I included Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza within the existing penalty scheme for misconduct by Ms. Anderson, and imposed communications and filing prohibitions, and interim court access restrictions on Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza.

I then requested that the Plaintiffs indicate by June 16, 2023 whether they would initiate a Judicature Act s 23.1(4) application to expand the existing Canada v Anderson court access restrictions to include Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza: Docken #1 at para 43 . No application followed: Docken #3 at para 6 . Pursuant to Jonsson v Lymer , 2020 ABCA 167 , this Court initiated a Judicature Act s 23.1(4) process on its own motion with notice to the Minister. The deadline for Ms.

Anderson, and Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza, to make submissions and/or submit affidavit evidence in response to the Court’s application was August 31, 2023. [ 7 ] Nothing was received by that date from Ms. Anderson and Estella Meza. Basil Panidisz did not make submissions, but instead on August 26, 2023 sent this Court a letter, that I will discuss below. [ 8 ] This Memorandum of Decision addresses two issues: 1. whether Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza should be subject to court access restrictions as proxy actors in Ms.

Anderson’s OPCA litigation, pursuant to Judicature Act s 23.1(4), and 2. penalties in response to Ms. Anderson’s most recent breach of court orders by document requests made by Ms. Anderson under the façade of two fictitious lawyers. II. Judicature Act s 23.1(4) Application on the Court’s Own Motion [ 9 ]

Section 23.1(4) of the Judicature Act states: The Court may at any time on application or on its own motion , with notice to the Minister, make an order under [ Judicature Act s 23.1(1)] applicable to any other individual or entity specified by the Court who in the opinion of the Court is associated with the person against whom an order under subsection (1) is made . [Emphasis added.] [ 10 ] To date there has been almost no judicial commentary on s 23.1(4). There are comparatively few instances where Judicature

Act s 23.1(4) has been applied by this Court, and the Alberta Court of Appeal has not commented at all, to the best of my knowledge, on the operation of this section. [ 11 ] In 1158997 Alberta Inc v Maple Trust Company , 2013 ABQB 483 , LoVecchio J expanded court access restrictions to a range of businesses and their directors that were conducting a mortgage fraud “dollar dealer” scam.

These additional personalities were shells and proxies that carried out the scheme as organized by a central planner after court orders had been put in place to mitigate and manage steps by the primary actor. [ 12 ] Rooke ACJ in Re Onischuk , 2017 ABQB 553 provided some more context on when Judicature Act s 23.1(4) may be applied. In this instance court access restrictions were imposed on a husband. The wife then conducted litigation with the same subject, operating as the husband’s litigation proxy.

That meant the wife was “associated” with the person already subject to Judicature Act ss 23-23.1 court access restrictions (para 20), and the wife also was directly engaged in abusive litigation (para 21). [ 13 ] I concluded in Docken #1 at para 43 that the decision of Jonsson v Lymer , 2020 ABCA 167 , where Slatter JA “read down” the “on its own motion” authority of this Court to impose Judicature Act ss 23-23.1 court access gatekeeping to a residual form, also applied to Judicature Act , s 23.1(4).

The result is that “own motion” steps by the Alberta Court of King’s Bench are only permitted after the Court has first requested involved non-abusive litigation parties take steps, and then nothing followed. [ 14 ] That is what has since happened here. The Plaintiffs were asked to initiate a Judicature Act s 23.1(4) application: Docken #1 at para 43 . The Plaintiffs first by letter stated they would make that application, but then did not do so by the deadline set by the Court: Docken #3 at para 10 .

The Court, therefore, on its own motion has initiated the Judicature Act s 23.1(4) process, and set a deadline of August 31, 2023 for Ms. Anderson, and Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza to make written submissions which complied with the communications requirements and structure set in Docken #1 and RBC v Anderson #2 . [ 15 ] The August 31, 2023 deadline has passed with no materials received.

I, therefore, now proceed to evaluate what steps, if any, should be taken pursuant to Judicature Act s 23.1(4). [ 16 ] I believe this is a useful opportunity to develop a more complete test for application of Judicature Act s 23.1(4). The plain text of s 23.1(4) is that this provision allows the Court to expand the operation of a pre-existing Judicature Act s 23.1(1) court access restriction order to apply to other additional individuals. I, therefore, conclude that the Court does not need to inquire into the basis on which the original abusive litigant, here Ms.

Anderson, was made subject to court access restrictions pursuant to Judicature Act ss 23- 23.1. Ms. Anderson could have challenged that step by appealing Canada v Anderson . She did not do so. [ 17 ] That means the scope and nature of the pre-existing Judicature Act s 23.1(1) court access restriction order litigant gatekeeping steps are considered valid and justified, and are not a part of the Judicature Act s 23.1(4) analysis. A court applying Judicature Act s 23.1(4) operates on the assumptions that: 1. the target(

s) of the Judicature Act s 23.1(1) court access restriction order are properly, in law, subject to court access gatekeeping, and 2. the litigation misconduct that led to those target(

s) being subject to that court access gatekeeping is, in law, an abuse of court. [ 18 ] Application of Judicature Act s 23.1(4) has two parts, the first explicit, the second implicit: 1. are the candidates for the Judicature Act s 23.1(4) application court access restrictions “associated” with the target(

s) of the pre- existing Judicature Act s 23.1(1) order; and 2. is that “association” one that relates to and/or furthers the abusive conduct of the target(

s) of the pre-existing Judicature Act s 23.1(1) order? [ 19 ] My conclusion is that a Judicature Act s 23.1(4) application does not require the court inquire or investigate whether the candidates to be added to a pre-existing Judicature Act s 23.1(1) order are, themselves, persons who should be subject to the high, “last ditch recourse”, standard for a Judicature Act s 23.1(1) order, as set by the Alberta Court of Appeal in Jonsson v Lymer . Instead, the issues in a Judicature Act s 23.1(4) process are much narrower: 1) association, and 2) that association facilitates the abusive and improper conduct by the person(

s) subject to pre-existing court access restrictions. [ 20 ] My conclusion is that for Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza these two criteria are satisfied. I will not go into great detail on the evidence to support this conclusion in the interest of judicial economy since the problematic activities of Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza are already documented in detail in Docken #1 at paras 6-22, 34-32 , and Docken #2 at paras 22-36 . [ 21 ] Association is obvious. These individuals self-identify as the “Trustees” for Ms. Anderson.

I have previously characterized Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza as “litigation proxies” for Ms. Anderson. They are interacting with the Court on behalf of Ms. Anderson, and taking steps in her name. Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza are clearly “associated” with Ms. Anderson. [ 22 ] The second issue is the nature of that “association”. Given the apparent purpose of Judicature Act s 23.1(4), again, the existing record establishes that Basil Panidisz and Estella Meza are “associating” with Ms. Anderson to both: (1) further Ms.

Anderson’s abusive OPCA litigation by purporting to exercise non-existent not-law processes and rights, and (2) do so in a manner that is intended to defeat and evade the litigation and litigant management steps already imposed on Ms. Anderson. [ 23 ] The one additional factor is only relevant in relation to Basil Panidisz. In his August 26, 2023 correspondence, Basil Panidisz makes “... a simple offer of apology ...” for his activities at the Alberta Court of King’s Bench.

He says: “I have taken your wise advice and reviewed my situation very seriously.” He points to the earlier Docken #1-#3 judgments, which he describes as “... very clear and concise ...”, and thanks myself and the Court for preparing these responses. I accept Basil Panidisz’s apology, and that he is abandoning pseudolaw strategies and court activity.

[ 24 ] This Court has a long-standing practice to recognize and support persons who abandon abusive and problematic litigation. That includes pseudolaw litigants.

For example, in DKD (Re) , 2019 ABQB 26 , Mandziuk J concluded court access restrictions were not necessary where the pseudolaw litigant apologized and denounced his earlier use of pseudolaw strategies of Sovereign Citizen pseudolaw promoter Carl (Karl) Lentz. [ 25 ] I take the same approach with Basil Panidisz and conclude that - despite his prior very problematic conduct - court access gatekeeping is no longer necessary for Basil Panidisz, and so I vacate the interim court access restrictions imposed on Basil Panidisz in Docken #1 , and the communications protocol imposed on Basil Panidisz in Docken #1 at para 41 . [ 26 ] I caution Basil Panidisz that he should be careful in his future interactions with the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, and in particular the Court’s front-line staff.

Further litigation misconduct, and/or abuse of the Court and its personnel, will likely lead to an immediate and strict response. [ 27 ] I, therefore, conclude that Estella Meza should be subject to indefinite court access restrictions pursuant to Judicature Act s 23.1(4) that match those imposed on Ms. Anderson in Canada v Anderson , and Order: 1. Paragraph 2 of the Penalty and Court Access Restriction Order dated May 12, 2023 in Alberta Court of King’s Bench docket 2201 08392 is vacated in relation to Basil Panidisz. 2.

Paragraphs 3-8 of the Penalty and Court Access Restriction Order dated May 12, 2023 in Alberta Court of King’s Bench docket 2201 08392 are vacated, immediately. 3. Estella Meza is prohibited from commencing, or attempting to commence, or continuing, any appeal, action, application, or proceeding in the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, on her own behalf or on behalf of any other person or estate, without an order of the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice of the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, or her or his designate. 4.

To commence or continue an appeal, application, or other proceeding in the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, Estella Meza must first submit an application to the Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or her or his designate. If such an application is made: (

i) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or his or her designate, may, at any time, direct that notice of an application to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or proceeding be given to any other person. (ii) Any application shall be made in writing. (iii) Any application to commence or continue any appeal, action, application, or proceeding must be accompanied by an affidavit:

a) attaching a copy of the Order arising from this decision that restricts Estella Meza’s access to the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta;

b) attaching a copy of the appeal, pleading, application, or process that Estella Meza proposes to issue or file or continue;

c) deposing fully and completely to the facts and circumstances surrounding the proposed claim or proceeding, so as to demonstrate that the proceeding is not an abuse of process, and that there are reasonable grounds for it;

d) indicating whether Estella Meza has ever sued some or all of the defendants or respondents previously in any jurisdiction or Court, and, if so, providing full particulars;

e) undertaking that, if leave is granted, the authorized appeal, pleading, application or process, the Order granting leave to proceed, and the affidavit in support of the Order will promptly be served on the defendants or respondents; and

f) undertaking to diligently prosecute the proceeding. (iv) The Chief Justice or Associate Chief Justice, or his or her designate, may:

a) require the applicant for leave, or the Court on its own motion, to give notice of the proposed claim or proceeding and the opportunity to make submissions on the proposed claim or proceeding, if they so choose, to: (1) the involved potential parties; (2) other relevant persons identified by the Court; and (3) the Attorneys General of Alberta and Canada;

b) respond to and dispose of the leave application in writing; or

c) hear and dispose of the leave application in open Court where the decision shall be recorded. 5. For clarity, this order does not prevent Estella Meza from taking any steps required to make full answer and defence to any criminal proceeding brought against Estella Meza, or to appeal any verdict in a criminal matter. 6. Leave to commence or continue proceedings may be given on conditions, including the posting of security for costs, and proof of payment of all prior cost awards. 7. An application that is dismissed may not be made again, directly or indirectly. 8. An application to vary or set aside this Order must be made on notice to any person as directed by the Court.

9. Estella Meza must describe herself in any application for leave, or document to which this Order applies, as “Estella Meza”, and not by using initials, an alternative name structure, or a pseudonym. 10. The Clerks of the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta shall refuse to accept or file any documents or other materials from Estella Meza unless: (

i) Estella Meza is a named defendant or respondent in the action in question, or (ii) if the documents and other materials are intended to commence or continue an appeal, action, application, or proceeding, Estella Meza has been granted leave to take that step by the Court. [ 28 ] These new indefinite court access restrictions on Estella Meza are in addition to the previous communications structure imposed on Estella Meza in Docken #1 at para 41 , that continues to operate. III. Additional Misconduct by Ms. Anderson [ 29 ] Docken #3 reports how in late July 2023, Ms.

Anderson repeatedly telephoned the Calgary Clerk of the Court in breach of the communications structure put in place by Associate Chief Justice Rooke in RBC v Anderson #2 at para 62 . In these telephone calls Ms. Anderson demanded to know the status of certain litigation. Ms. Anderson was told by the Clerk that she should not be communicating with the Court in this manner, as that was in breach of the Court’s order, but, nevertheless, Ms. Anderson persisted. [ 30 ] The Court imposed a $40,000 Rule 10.49(1) penalty against Ms.

Anderson that was then paid from the “security against misconduct” funds held by the Court: Docken #3 at paras 17-18 . [ 31 ] During the July period where Ms. Anderson was telephoning the Court, Ms. Anderson reported that she would be having her (unnamed) lawyer engage the Court. What next occurred was on July 27, 2023, the Court received an electronic document request from Ms. Anderson, that instructed court documents be sent to “Erika Health”, and delivered to a post-office box in Calgary, though the customer’s address was instead in Wellington, Florida.

This request was rejected by the Clerk of the Court, because Ms. Anderson had again not followed the RBC v Anderson #2 at para 62 communications protocol. [ 32 ] Next, “Erika Health” on August 14, 2023 wrote the Clerk of the Court by email using a gmail address, “lawassistla@gmail.com”, that was also on the July 27, 2023 document request form: Subject: Re: Search Request Thank you for your prompt response. Can you please provide me the reason/law for not providing information as to whether case # 2201-08392 is still active or withdrawn?

I am not as familiar with Canadian Law but in the USA all cases (Unless sealed by the court) are open to the public to view. In addition, the memorandum of decision / order does not list anything about preventing public access to any documents regarding the case. Thank you again Erika [ 33 ] “Erika Health” thus appeared to be Ms. Anderson’s Florida-based lawyer. The Clerk of the Court responded by email to “Erika Health” and confirmed that this Court’s records are public, clarified the restrictions on Ms.

Anderson’s interactions with the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, and asked “If you are a lawyer who is representing Ms. Anderson, please provide your Law Society information to verify your status since no one named “Erika Health” is an active member of the Law Society of Alberta.” [ 34 ] There was no reply from Erika Health. No one named Erika Health is registered as a member of the Florida Bar. However, the same day a further second document request was received in relation to one of Ms. Anderson’s legal actions. These two document requests sought the same materials.

This time the search was submitted by “Lynn Ross”, of “Ross Law”, who on the document request form provided two Lethbridge Alberta addresses. Again, the email address used was not that of a law firm, but “llhtrustee@gmail.com”. [ 35 ] RBC v Anderson #2 permits a lawyer qualified to appear in Alberta courts and who is representing Ms. Anderson to directly contact and correspond with the Court of King’s Bench of Alberta on Ms. Anderson’s behalf, bypassing the screening procedure imposed in RBC v Anderson #2 . That alternative procedure was imposed to facilitate legitimate interactions by Ms.

Anderson with the Court, with the assurance that those communications would be compliant with Canadian and Alberta law, and respect the Court’s processes. The Clerk of the Court therefore wrote “Lynn Ross” by email and requested Lynn Ross’s Law Society of Alberta membership number to confirm that the second request is valid and did not breach RBC v Anderson #2 . “Lynn Ross” was also asked to confirm the telephone number provided in the document request form. [ 36 ] No reply was received by Lynn Ross.

The Law Society of Alberta does not include a person named “Lynn Ross” as an active lawyer, or with any other status. Similarly, there is no Lethbridge area or, for that matter, Alberta law firm named “Ross Law”. [ 37 ] Next, on August 29, 2023, “Erika Health” re-appeared, emailing the Clerk of the Court to announce “I am a lawyer but not with your Law Society of Alberta”, and stating that Ms. Anderson should not be penalized for the court document request, because it was “Erika Health” who made the request (despite the document request form having Ms.

Anderson’s name on it): “Ms Anderson DID NOT request that I contact the court for this information. I did that on my own. It was my error.”

[ 38 ] The Clerk of the Court then requested that “Erika Health” provide her US Bar Association Directory registration information for the Court’s records. “Erika Health” did not reply. [ 39 ] From this series of events, it is patently clear that Ms.

Anderson followed up her unsuccessful telephone calls that demanded information from the Clerk of the Court by inventing first, Erika Health, a Florida-based lawyer, then “Lynn Ross” of “Ross Law”. “Lynn Ross” was unable to provide basic information to validate her status as an Alberta lawyer, which is, of course, entirely unsurprising, since “Lynn Ross” does not exist. [ 40 ] This warrants a further Rule 10.49(1) penalty, following the existing scheme set in Royal Bank of Canada v Anderson , 2022 ABQB 577 . Associate Chief Justice Rooke at para 25 ruled that Ms.

Anderson “... should also anticipate that additional penalties will increase, stepwise, until Ms. Anderson discontinues her misconduct.” The most recent “baseline” penalty imposed for Ms. Anderson’s bad conduct was $35,000: Docken #3 at para 16 . The current baseline penalty is now $40,000. [ 41 ] This Court has previously imposed penalties above the baseline in response to aggravating aspects of Ms. Anderson’s abusive litigation conduct, e.g., Docken #1 at paras 27, 30 ; Docken #2 at paras 39-40 ; Docken #3 at para 17 . Here, I identify several aggravating factors in Ms. Anderson’s activities, Ms.

Anderson: 1. is continuing prior abusive conduct that she was aware was prohibited, and specifically warned against; 2. adopted a new information gathering strategy specifically intended to evade the Court’s attempts to manage her abusive and bullying interactions with Court staff; and 3. fabricated a false Alberta lawyer identity and attempted to pass herself off as a lawyer. I note this last action is an offense pursuant to Legal Profession Act , RSA 2000, c L-8 s 109. [ 42 ] I conclude that this pattern of behaviour and aggravating factors warrants an elevated Rule 10.49(1) penalty of $50,000.

The $50,000 Rule 10.49(1) penalty on Ms. Anderson will be paid by the Clerk of the Court from the RBC v Anderson #5 and Docken #2 security for misconduct pool of $4 14,730.68 , reducing the remaining funds to $36 4,730.68 . [ 43 ] In Docken #3 at para 19 , I strongly recommended that if Ms. Anderson does retain a lawyer, Ms. Anderson show that lawyer Ms. Anderson’s litigation record and the resulting judgments, and then listen to the advice offered by that lawyer. I repeat that suggestion. I also note to Ms. Anderson that when Associate Chief Justice Rooke imposed a communications structure on Ms.

Anderson in RBC v Anderson #2 he provided the option that Ms. Anderson could retain a lawyer to facilitate her interactions with the Court. That choice was deliberate, so that Ms. Anderson has an avenue to interact with the Alberta Court of King’s Bench in a simple, direct, but lawful and non-abusive manner. [ 44 ] If Ms. Anderson truly does want information from the Alberta Court of King’s Bench, she has an easy way to do that. Retain a lawyer certified to act in Alberta to act as her communications conduit with the Court.

I cannot imagine that would cost anything approaching the Rule 10.49(1) penalty imposed in this Memorandum of Decision. Have that lawyer write to me confirming the lawyer has been retained by Ms. Anderson, and that one aspect of the lawyer’s designated tasks is to interact with the Clerk of the Court on Ms. Anderson’s behalf. If that were to happen, I would instruct the Clerk of the Court cooperate with any request or action that is legitimately permitted by the Alberta Rules of Court . Put another way, there is a very simple solution to meet Ms.

Anderson’s document and record requests, if those are legitimate. [ 45 ] Of course, if Ms. Anderson does not take advantage of that alternative provided by the Court, then that has its own implications. As Moldaver J observed in R v Tatton , 2015 SCC 33 , Canadian law incorporates “... the common sense inference that a person intends the natural consequences of his or her actions, one can typically infer intent from the performance of the act. ...”. IV. Conclusion [ 46 ] Estella Meza is subject to the indefinite global court access restrictions imposed on Ms. Anderson in Canada v Anderson at para 23 .

This person has operated as a litigation proxy to conduct and expand Ms. Anderson’s abusive OPCA litigation activities, and so should be subject to the same litigation and litigant management steps as Ms.

Anderson, pursuant to Judicature Act s 23.1(4). [ 47 ] The Court orders the Clerk of the Court satisfy the Rule 10.49(1) penalty imposed in this Memorandum of Decision by paying $50,000 of the funds held by the Court pursuant to RBC v Anderson #5 at paras 19-21 and Docken #2 at para 44 . [ 48 ] The Court will prepare and file the Order imposing court access restrictions on Estella Meza and implementing the $50,000 Rule 10.49(1) penalty. The approval of Ms. Anderson and Estella Meza of that Order is dispensed with, pursuant to Rule 9.4(2)(c). Ms.

Anderson, Estella Meza, and Basil Panidisz shall be served this Decision and the corresponding Order to the email addresses: andersonasandra@gmail.com and saalivingtrust@gmail.com. A copy of this Memorandum of Decision and its corresponding Order will also be directed to Counsel for the Plaintiffs. Dated at the City of Calgary, Alberta this 12 th day of September, 2023.

C.M. Jones J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Basil Panidisz Self-represented Litigant