Achor v Ihekweme, 2023 ABKB 606

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Achor v Ihekweme, 2023 ABKB 606 Date: 20231030 Docket: 2203 10917 Registry: Edmonton Between: Michael Achor and Jennifer Achor Plaintiffs - and - Amaka Rosemary Ihekweme Defendant _______________________________________________________ Reasons for Decision of the Honourable Justice Robert A.

Graesser _______________________________________________________ Introduction [ 1 ] This is an action by Jennifer Achor and Michael Achor (the “Achors”) against Amaka Rosemary Ihekweme for defamation, harassment, breach of confidence, public disclosure of private information, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The Achors seek general damages, punitive damages, costs and interest, and liquidated damages for unjust enrichment and conversion. Claims for injunctive relief were withdrawn as a result of a mutual no contact order entered into by the parties.

[ 2 ] Ms. Ihekweme was noted in default in this action, and on June 21, 2023 I granted default judgment against Ms. Ihekweme for $9,077.84. [ 3 ] I directed Mr. Samia, counsel for the Achors, to file materials for an assessment of damages and to serve that application on counsel of record for Ms. Ihekweme. Those materials were filed on September 1, 2023. My order gave Ms. Ihekweme until September 29, 2023 to file and serve any response brief and materials. Nothing has been filed by Ms. Ihekweme as at the date of this Decision. [ 4 ] This is my assessment of the Achors’ damages. Background [ 5 ] Ms.

Ihekweme is described by the Achors as a “popular social media influencer” who has some 16,000 followers on Instagram. Ms. Achor’s affidavit of March 31, 2022, filed in response to the without notice restraining order Ms. Ihekweme obtained against Ms. Achor provides the necessary background for the dispute that arose between Ms. Ihekweme and the Achors. [ 6 ] The parties are part of the Nigerian community in Edmonton. A friendship developed between Ms. Achor and Ms. Ihekweme in 2020. During the first half of 2021, Ms. Achor let Ms. Ihekweme borrow a number of items of clothing.

Most of these clothes were never returned and led to the default judgment against Ms. Ihekweme for $8,868.45. [ 7 ] Ms. Ihekweme told Ms. Achor that she thought that Dr. Achor was “interested in her sexually”. That led to the break-up of their friendship. It also led to Ms. Ihekweme beginning to post things about Ms. Achor in her social media. After Ms. Achor demanded the return of the loaned clothing, Ms. Ihekweme’s social media posts escalated, and she began to disparage Dr. Achor. She also began posting about personal things Ms. Achor had told her. [ 8 ] Ms.

Ihekweme also alleged in some of her postings that Ms. Achor had posted nude pictures of Ms. Ihekweme on her social media. Ms. Achor denies that. [ 9 ] In her affidavit, Ms. Achor alleges that Ms. Ihekweme created fake social media accounts in Ms. Achor’s name, to fabricate evidence. [ 10 ] On March 3, 2022, Ms. Ihekweme commenced an action against Ms. Achor and obtained a without prejudice restraining order against her (the “Mah Order”). Ms. Achor commenced her own claim against Ms. Ihekweme for a restraining order, and she defended Ms.

Ihekweme’s action against her and she counterclaimed for a restraining order against Ms. Ihekweme. [ 11 ] The two actions were consolidated by an order dated April 4, 2022 and were set over to May 18, 2022 for a review of the order granted against Ms. Achor. By that time, Ms. Ihekweme was represented by counsel. [ 12 ] Dr. Achor’s affidavit of March 31, 2022 denies the allegations Ms. Ihekweme made against him, stating that he took “extreme offence” to them and that the allegations would affect his family negatively. [ 13 ] Ms.

Achor swore a further affidavit on April 19, 2022 in which she outlined various activities of Ms. Ihekweme following the Mah Order, which included posting the Mah Order on her Instagram account and contacting a number of Ms. Achor’s friends and “making false allegations about me or otherwise harassing them for being friends with me”. She said that Ms. Ihekweme’s actions were causing her “severe stress and anxiety” and she was being treated by her doctor for those conditions. A letter from her doctor was attached to that affidavit. [ 14 ] A friend of Ms.

Achor’s, Iryna Yavich, swore an affidavit on May 17, 2022, which attached messages Ms. Ihekweme sent to her about the Achors. The messages included statements to the effect that Ms. Ihekweme wanted Ms. Achor to go to jail, to be deported, and to have a criminal record. [ 15 ] On May 18, 2022, Ms. Achor was granted a restraining order against Ms. Ihekweme, and an oral hearing was set for August 26, 2022 to review the competing restraining orders. [ 16 ] On July 18, Dr. Achor and Ms. Achor commenced this action against Ms. Ihekweme. [ 17 ] Ms. Ihekweme was noted in default in this action.

No steps have ever been taken to open up the noting in default. Counsel of record has never ceased to act for her. [ 18 ] Ms. Ihekweme was cross-examined on her Affidavit in Support of her Restraining Order on July 22, 2022 and August 8, 2022. Numerous undertakings were given by her. [ 19 ] At the hearing set for August 26, 2023, the Parties agreed to adjourn the oral hearing to December 9, 2022. At that hearing, I was presented with a Consent Order signed by counsel for both parties. That order created a mutual no contact and restraining order, which also directed Ms.

Ihekweme to remove all social media posts related to the Achors. It also recognized that this defamation action could proceed against Ms. Ihekweme. [ 20 ] Various steps were taken following the December 9, 2022 Order to compel compliance with the undertakings given by Ms. Ihekweme. Those culminated in a Contempt Order granted by Rothwell J on May 8, 2023, which ordered that Ms. Ihekweme be arrested and brought before the Court to show cause or be sanctioned. That has not yet happened. [ 21 ] An application for default judgment was filed on June 21, 2023 which led to the hearing before me on July 18, 2023.

[22] In support of their claims for general damages, the Achors rely on Ms. Achor’s affidavits of March 31, 2022 and April 19,2022, Dr. Achor’s affidavit of March 31, 2022, and Ms. Vavich’s affidavit of May 17, 2022.

They reference provisions of theDefamation Act, RSA 2000, c D-7, and a number of cases: Pinsent v Sandstrom, 2014 ABQB 269; Lund v Quinn Maintenance Inc, 2020 ABQB 722; Bent v Platnick, 2020 SCC 23; Alberta Health Services v Johnston, 2023 ABKB 209; Hill v Church of Scientology of Toronto, (SCC); Carnegie v Descalchuk, 2022 ABKB 720; Rutman v Rabinowitz, 2018 ONCA 80; Elkow v Sana, 2018 ABQB 1001; LDS v SCA, 2021 ABQB 818; Calin v Calin, 2019 ONSC 3564; AB v WJ, 2023 ABKB 208; ES v Shillington, 2021 ABQB 739; Mahe v Boulianne, 2010 ABCA 74; McAllister v Calgary (City), 2021 ABCA 25; and West Edmonton Mall Property Inc v Proctor, 2020 ABQB 477. [23] The Achors also claim solicitor and own client costs of $32,692.50, plus disbursements of $380.75, and GST of $1,646.00 fora total of $34,718.75.

Costs of $13,800.00 have already been awarded against Ms. Ihekweme as a result of various contempt applications. Analysis General Damages for Defamation [24] In Pinsent v Sandstrom, the Court stated that when a defendant is noted in default, the defendant is deemed to have admittedthe facts and allegations in the Statement of Claim. [25] Paras 7 and 8 of the Statement of Claim state: 7. Michael is, and was at all material times, a practising psychologist and a member of the Alberta College of Physicians andSurgeons.

Additionally, at all material times, and prior to the events outlined below, Michael enjoyed a personal and professionalreputation as a well-respected individual and member of the Community. 8. At all material times, and prior to the events outlined below, Jennifer enjoyed a personal reputation as a well-respected individualand member of the Community. [26] Bent v Platnick discusses the elements of the tort of defamation, namely that the plaintiff must prove: (

a) the words complained of were published, meaning that they were communicated to at least one person other than theplaintiff; (

b) the words complained of referred to the plaintiff; and (

c) the impugned words were defamatory in the sense that they would tender to lower the person’s reputation in the eyes of areasonable person. (at para 92) [27] The Statement of Claim alleges that Ms. Ihekweme posted or published a number of defamatory statements about thePlaintiffs: (

a) the Achors are guilty of criminal, fraudulent, dishonest, or other unlawful or disreputable conduct; (

b) the Achors were lying and being dishonest in the Amaka Restraining Action; (

c) Michael is secretly a frustrated homosexual and the Achors’ marriage is a sham; (

d) Michael does not love, or dislikes, his wife, Jennifer, and would have preferred his former partner to be his wife;

(

e) Jennifer broke-up Michael and his former partner and is the type of person who intervenes in other people’s relationship; (

f) Jennifer is a witch, which is a serious allegation in the Community as witchcraft is a criminal offence in Nigeria; (

g) Jennifer is of limited intellectual capacity; (

h) Jennifer is unhygienic or otherwise dirty and reliant on Amaka to look presentable; (

i) Jennifer is a “bitch” and an “evil” person; (

j) Jennifer creates, and perpetuates, lies for personal benefit and her actions are akin to that of the allegations surrounding the very public Amber Heard and Johnny Depp defamation trial in the United States; (

k) Michael assists Jennifer in plagiarism and dishonest conduct in her educational pursuits; (

l) that Jennifer speaks ill of third-parties and friends; (

m) Jennifer obtained, and then disseminated, nude photographs of Amaka, and engaged in criminal conduct to that effect; (

n) Michael was guilty of medical malpractice and improper conduct as a practicing physician, and improperly prescribes medication to his wife; (

o) Michael engages in conduct that would warrant investigation, scrutiny, or punishment by the Canada Revenue Agency; (

p) the Achors are resentful of their children, are generally poor parents to them, and are neglectful of them and their needs and does not, or is not capable of, teaching their children “anything”; (

q) Jennifer “hates” her children and is “useless” to them; (

r) Jennifer treats her friends poorly or otherwise holds them in general disrepute; (

s) the Achors, or in the alternative just Jennifer, engages in conduct with respect to their / her children that would warrant investigation, scrutiny, and intervention by Child Family Services, with associated implications on their behaviour to that effect; (

t) the Achors are dishonest, untrustworthy, arrogant, disloyal, and are otherwise of general poor moral character; (

u) Amaka had valid grounds for obtaining the Amaka Restraining Order against Jennifer, and Jennifer is guilty of conduct warranting such injunctive relief; and (

v) such further and other portrayals as shall be proven at the trial of this action. [ 28 ] There is no doubt that these allegations were “published”. Some of them were spoken to or communicated to Ms. Achor’s friends directly by Ms. Ihekweme. Others were posted on Instagram. [ 29 ] It is obvious from the above list that most of these allegations are defamatory. Certainly anything that alleges illegal conduct or immorality would be defamatory. Other allegations that might lower a person’s reputation in their own social, cultural, or religious community may be defamatory.

Personal slurs as to intellect, cleanliness, or how they treat others are unlikely to be found to be anything more than rudeness or insults. [ 30 ] In a defamation action, damages are presumed. As stated in Alberta Health Services v Johnston : [110] General damages in defamation cases are presumed without proof of actual injury: Defamation Act , s 2(2); Hill at para 164 . Cory J, writing for the majority in Hill , at para 182 adopted the factors for assessing general damages set out in Philip Lewis, Gatley on Libel and Slander, (8 th ed) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1981) at 592-593 as follows: (

a) The plaintiff’s position and standing; (

b) The nature and seriousness of the defamatory statements; (

c) The mode and extent of publication; (

d) The absence or refusal of any retraction or apology; and (

e) The whole conduct and motive of the defendant from publication through judgment. [ 31 ] Thus, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to call a witness or witnesses who will testify that as a result of the defamatory communication, they thought less of the plaintiff. [ 32 ] Undoubtedly, that type of evidence may be helpful, as would be any evidence of any actual or known harm to the plaintiff. [ 33 ] Absent that type of evidence, however, I am not limited to awarding only nominal damages. [ 34 ] The insidious nature of comments posted on social media is that the plaintiff will never know the impact on their reputation as a result of defamatory comments.

Certainly the more people exposed to lies the greater the likely harm.

[ 35 ] These points were made by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Rutman v Rabinowitz at para 65 : [65] The inability to point to specific reputational harm is not an admission that such harm did not occur. To the contrary, the courts have accepted that, “[t]he consequences which flow from the publication of an injurious false statement are invidious” and that, “[a] defamatory statement can seep into the crevasses of the subconscious and lurk there ever ready to spring forth and spread its cancerous evil.

The unfortunate impression left by a libel may last a lifetime”: Hill , at paras. 168-169 . [ 36 ] That Court noted that “the injurious effects of defamatory statements regarding a professional are particularly acute” (at para 66). [ 37 ] At para 68, they stated: [68] This leads to an additional, key consideration. This is an Internet defamation case.

As this court held in Barrick , at para. 28, the pernicious effect of defamation on the Internet, or “cyber libel.”, distinguishes it, for the purposes of damages, from defamation in another medium… [ 38 ] Belzil J stated at para 100 in LDS v SCA : [100] The online disclosure is particularly insidious in that, the full impact of the online disclosure may never be known and may surface years in the future. [ 39 ] Civil matters like this are determined on a balance of probabilities and not beyond a reasonable doubt, and the Court is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the proven facts. [ 40 ] Ms.

Ihekweme’s posts to Ms. Achor’s friends and online show considerable animus against Ms. Achor, amply supporting a finding of malice. [ 41 ] Mr. Samia points out that the Plaintiffs are well respected individuals in the Nigerian community in Edmonton. Dr. Achor is a psychologist and member of the Alberta College of Physicians and Surgeons. [ 42 ] Ms. Achor’s physician provided a letter which is attached to her April 19, 2022 affidavit.

The letter says that she is under extreme stress as a result of online bullying. [ 43 ] In Chak v Levant , the Plaintiff, a medical doctor, was awarded $40,000 in general damages for defamation. There, Leonard J noted that the defamation occurred during an 11 second portion of an hour long broadcast. It was seen by approximately 16,000 viewers. There had already been some publicity surrounding the controversy described in the 11 seconds. Dr.

Chak was awarded $40,000 in general damages for defamation, and $20,000 for aggravated damages. [ 44 ] In LDS v SCA , Justice Belzil awarded $80,000 in general damages globally, noting at para 93 that “ the Statement of Claim alleges breaches of three intentional torts, Breach of Confidence, Intentional Infliction of Mental Distress, as well as Public Disclosure of Private Facts”. [ 45 ] He relied on the damage award in ES v Shillington , where Inglis J awarded $80,000 in general damages for public disclosure of private facts, breach of confidence, and intentional infliction of mental distress .

Those torts were committed when the Defendant published private images of the Plaintiff on the internet. The parties had been in a romantic relationship and had two children together. A total of $275,000 was awarded as damages for assault, sexual assault and battery, separate from the damages for the other torts. [ 46 ] I note that LDS v SDA and ES v Shillington did not involve defamation. [ 47 ] Here, I am satisfied that Ms.

Achor should be awarded $50,000 in general damages, having regard to the malicious nature of the attacks on her, and particularly considering that the attacks came from a fellow Nigerian community member and that some were made online to a following of some 16,000 viewers. She required medical support for the anxiety and stress she suffered as a result of all this. There was no evidence of any ongoing health difficulties. [ 48 ] Dr.

Achor should be awarded $75,000 for the same reasons above, plus the fact that he is a professional person for whom reputation is important for him to be able to earn a living, Harassment [ 49 ] I had previously recognized this tort in Ford v Jivraj , 2023 ABKB 92 , describing it as an extension of the tort of intentional infliction of mental suffering. [ 50 ] While Justice Feasby disagreed with my characterization of the tort in Alberta Health Services v Johnston (at para 82 ), he agreed that the tort now exists in Alberta. [ 51 ] Justice Feasby outlined the elements of the tort of harassment in Alberta Health Services v Johnston .

I fully agree with his description. He stated at para 107: [107] Based on the foregoing, I define the tort of harassment as follows. A defendant has committed the tort of harassment where he has: (1) engaged in repeated communications, threats, insults, stalking, or other harassing behaviour in person or through or other means;

(2) that he knew or ought to have known was unwelcome; (3) which impugn the dignity of the plaintiff, would cause a reasonable person to fear for her safety or the safety of her loved ones, or could foreseeably cause emotional distress; and (4) caused harm. [ 52 ] Here, the online posts by Ms. Ihekweme and her communications with Ms. Achor’s friends could certainly be characterized as harassment consistent with the elements above, they also constituted the “publication” element of the tort of defamation. The evidence here does not describe conduct or activities beyond the impugned communications.

To the extent that Ms. Ihekweme’s defamatory activities also constituted harassment, any damages for harassment are subsumed in the general damage award for defamation. [ 53 ] I decline to make a separate award for any harassment. Intentional Infliction of Mental Suffering [ 54 ] It is clear from the evidence, namely the content of some of Ms. Ihekweme’s communications, that she intended to cause as much harm to Ms. Achor as she could. My impression is that her attacks on Dr. Achor were not really directed at him, but rather were to cause as much pain to Ms.

Achor as she could. [ 55 ] That said, my conclusion is that any general damages for this tort are subsumed within the damages for defamation. Ms. Ihekweme’s chosen vehicle for causing harm and mental suffering to Ms. Achor was to spread lies about her and her husband. [ 56 ] I award no damages under this head. Breach of Confidence and Public Disclosure of Private Facts [ 57 ] LDS v SCA sets out the elements for the tort of breach of confidence at para 15: [23] It is well established that the tort of Breach of Confidence requires the Plaintiff to prove: (

a) The information conveyed was confidential. (

b) The information was communicated in confidence. (

c) The information was misused by the party to whom it was communicated. [ 58 ] This tort predates the newly-recognized tort of public disclosure of private facts, unless there is a significant distinction to be made between “confidential” and “private”. [ 59 ] This new tort was recognized in Alberta in ES v Shillington , and in Ontario in Jane Doe 72511 v NM , 2018 ONSC 6607 . [ 60 ] In ES , Inglis J held at para 68 : [68] Therefore, in Alberta, to establish liability for the tort of Public Disclosure of Private Facts, the Plaintiff must prove that: (

a) the defendant publicized an aspect of the plaintiff’s private life; (

b) the plaintiff did not consent to the publication; (

c) the matter publicized or its publication would be highly offensive to a reasonable person in the position of the plaintiff; and, (

d) the publication was not of legitimate concern to the public. [ 61 ] I confess to being challenged in distinguishing between the two torts. I assume that breach of confidence requires that the information conveyed was in some way legally confidential by virtue of the relationship between the parties.

The public disclosure of private facts may be a lesser burden on the characterization of the information as well as broadening the scope of the relationship between the parties giving rise to “private” information. [ 62 ] In ES , the plaintiff received a general damage award of $80,000 for public disclosure of private facts, breach of confidence and intentional infliction of mental distress.

There, the defendant, who was the plaintiff’s former partner and the father of her two children, posted private sexual images of her on the internet. [ 63 ] In Jane Doe the plaintiff was awarded $50,000 in general damages, $25,000 in aggravated damages, and $25,000 for punitive damages. There, her former boyfriend posted a sexually explicit video of her on a pornographic website without her knowledge. It had been viewed over 60,000 times. [ 64 ] I do not need to wrestle with the distinction between the two torts here.

As stated by Belzil J in LDS v SCA at para 27 , the Plaintiff only needs to prove at least one cause of action in order to succeed. [ 65 ] In this case, the evidence on breach of confidence or public disclosure of private facts is contained in Ms. Achor’s affidavit of

March 31, 2022 where she stated that Ms. Ihekweme had posted information that she had previously had an abortion and that she had started dating Dr. Achor while he was still in another relationship. [ 66 ] Regardless of the characterization of the tort, it seems to me that any damages awarded for one would entirely subsume the other. [ 67 ] I am concerned that the new tort of public disclosure of private facts may open a floodgate of lawsuits by people against former friends and confidants.

It is one thing for private sexual images shared during the course of an intimate relationship to be broadcast on the internet; it is quite another thing for confidences exchanged between friends to be shared with third parties without consent. While gossiping is recognized as a sin ( Romans 1:29; 2 Corinthians 12:20), I am reluctant to find it to be a civil wrong. [ 68 ] It seems to me that to be liable for this tort, the defendant needs to have been in some sort of a relationship where confidentiality is presumed by reason of the nature of the relationship or it has been expressly agreed to.

An exception may be made for disclosure of certain things like private sexual images which are not only inherently personal but the disclosure of which to others would undoubtedly cause significant harm or embarrassment. Those elements are absent here, and while disclosure of personal information learned in the course of a friendship is offensive, I do not see it as being actionable on the facts of this case. [ 69 ] I do not award any damages under these heads.

Aggravated damages [ 70 ] Justice Leonard set out the considerations for an award of aggravated damages at para 165 of her decision in Chak v Levant : [165] In addition to the five factors discussed in the context of general damages, above, a court may also consider the “conduct of the defendant before action, after action, and in court at the trial of the action”: Hill at para 182 . While this factor overlaps to some extent in the consideration of general damages, the Defendants’ conduct is particularly relevant to the issue of aggravated damages.

That being said, care must be used to ensure that this factor does not result in double counting by including it both under the heading of general damages as well as aggravated damages. [ 71 ] Here, there is no evidence that Ms. Ihekweme did anything after this action was commenced that might be seen to aggravate the damages caused by the defamation in the first place. Ms. Achor’s second affidavit outlines things done by Ms. Ihekweme after Ms. Achor obtained a restraining order against her in April 2022. There have also been difficulties getting Ms. Ihekweme to comply with undertakings given on her questioning.

Those allegations are the subject of contempt proceedings in this Court, which have not yet been dealt with. Ms. Ihekweme has already been ordered to pay $13,800 in costs. [ 72 ] Malice was argued as a circumstance warranting aggravated damages in a defamation case, citing Hill v Scientology . [ 73 ] In Elkow v Sana , the Court of Appeal overturned an award of aggravated damages on the basis that there had been no finding that the plaintiff’s damages were increased by the identified aggravating conduct (at para 35).

They stated: [35] The main issue, however, with the award of aggravated damages is that there was no finding that the respondent’s injury was increased by the identified conduct, over and above the injury that was recognized in the award of general damages. The mere fact that there was a failure to apologize, more than one defamatory statement, etc., does not justify an award of aggravated damages.

The mere identification of “aggravating factors” does not support an award of aggravated damages, unless these aggravating factors were over and above the core findings with respect to the defamation, and resulted in damage not recognized in the general damage award. [ 74 ] Renke J considered aggravated damages in AB v WJ , and stated at para 41: [41] If there is a distinct aggravated damages assessment, it is important that damages factors or considerations are not “double- counted,” once for general damages and again for aggravated damages. “[I]f the plaintiff is fully compensated by the award of general damages, aggravated damages are not warranted:” Elkow v Sana at para 32 . “[O]verlapping factors do not justify a duplication of damages:” ibid. [ 75 ] I have already considered malice in the context of my general damages award as it is obvious from the defamatory words themselves that they were intended to cause harm to the Plaintiffs.

Ms. Ihekweme’s conduct did not in itself increase the harm caused to the Plaintiffs by her words. [ 76 ] I am not satisfied that there is a basis here on which to award aggravated damages against Ms. Ihekweme. None are awarded. Punitive damages [ 77 ] Punitive damages are granted only in exceptional cases where a defendant’s conduct is found to be so egregious as to warrant punishment of the defendant. Whiten v Pilot was cited as support for the award of punitive damages.

I note there that a consideration for the award of punitive damages was to deter the defendant from future wrongful conduct. [ 78 ] Here, the events giving rise to this dispute, and Ms. Ihekweme’s wrongful conduct, spanned several months. They started with the breakdown of the friendship, the dispute over the return of the loaned clothing, and escalated to Ms. Ihekweme’s defamatory communications in March 2022. The Instagram postings stopped with the restraining order in April 2022, and the communications with Ms. Achor’s friends ended with the contempt proceedings in May 2022. But for the refusal of Ms.

Ihekweme to comply with undertakings, there is nothing in the course of the litigation to suggest that she needs to be punished for her conduct. In any event, that is

being dealt with in the ongoing contempt proceedings. [ 79 ] There is no principled basis here to award any punitive damages. None are awarded. Interest [ 80 ] The Achors are entitled to interest on the general damage awards at the rates specified in the Judgment Interest Act , RSA 2000 c J-1 . Costs [ 81 ] The Achors seek enhanced costs under the principles in McAllister v City of Calgary . I recently commented on McAllister in Grimes v University of Lethbridge , 2023 ABKB 432 . It is interesting that the solicitor and own client costs sought here are $32,692.50. The Achors have not provided a draft bill of costs prepared under

Schedule C, which is understandable as they were not aware of the quantum of damages when they made their submissions. [ 82 ] It is interesting that the $13,800 in costs awarded to the Achors as a result of various applications are in the range of 40% of the Achors’ actual costs. I do not see that there has been litigation misconduct by Ms. Ihekweme or any other reason to award solicitor and client costs, let alone solicitor and own client costs.

As a result, I consider that the Achors will be well compensated if in addition to the costs they have already been awarded they recover one set of costs on Column 3, increased by 25%, to account for inflation as described in para 88 of Grimes . Heard by way of written submissions. Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this 30 th day of October, 2023. Robert A. Graesser J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: George Samia, Forum Law for the Plaintiffs Sam Alzaman, Alzaman Law for the Defendant Did not appear or respond Amaka Ihekewem Defendant Did not appear or participate