De’Medici v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2023 ABKB 210

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: De’Medici v Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company, 2023 ABKB 210 Date: 20230412 Docket: 2208 00318 Registry: Medicine Hat Between: Jurisprudence De’Medici Plaintiff - and - Wawanesa Mutual Insurance Company and Western Financial Group and Desjardins and Hi-Alta Capital Inc and Tracey Arcand and Danielle Belanger Defendants _______________________________________________________ Memorandum of Decision of Associate Chief Justice K.G. Nielsen _______________________________________________________ I.

Introduction [ 1 ] Counsel for the Defendants, Western Financial Group, Hi-Alta Capital Inc, Tracey Arcand, and Danielle Belanger, asks the Court to dismiss this proceeding under Civil Practice Note 7 [“CPN7”], because the Plaintiff has a pattern of vexatious behaviour displayed in the course of his litigation history. [ 2 ] Recently, the Court has seen a significant increase in the number of written requests for CPN7 procedures, especially from counsel. These written requests also include an increasing amount of detail, often with written argument and unsworn evidence.

Counsel are also sending in numerous supporting documents and are expecting the Court to sort out what they relate to. In this case, specifically, counsel for the Defendants has provided the Court with a 10-page written request that includes a detailed history of previous Actions commenced by the Plaintiff and substantial legal argument, including a review of the caselaw on vexatious litigants.

The letter also refers to 8 related pleadings as attachments, although those pleadings were never provided. [ 3 ] In light of the increasing number of written requests for the Court to invoke CPN7 and the increased content included in those requests, this is an appropriate time for the Court to revisit the procedures to be followed when making a written request to the

Court with respect to CPN7.

Given the increasing complexity of the legal submissions being sent to the Court and, moreover, the number of legal submissions that do not effectively address the requirements for CPN7, it is also an appropriate time to revisit the law behind CPN7 to clarify when the procedures under the Practice Note are appropriate and when another procedure available under the Alberta Rules of Court , Alta Reg 124/2010 may be a better approach to deal with a faulty pleading or other procedural defect in the litigation. [ 4 ] In this case, counsel for the Defendants has effectively asked the Court for a Vexatious Litigant Order pursuant to a CPN7 review of the Statement of Claim.

For the reasons that follow, I find this is not an appropriate case to refer to the CPN7 process. To be clear, this result does not prevent the Defendants from applying under the Alberta Rules of Court for remedies for alleged issues or deficiencies in the claim. It also does not prevent the Defendants from making an Application for a Vexatious Litigant Order under the Judicature Act , RSA 2000, c J-2 if that is the relief they are seeking. II.

CPN7 [ 5 ] CPN7 is entitled the “Vexatious Application/Proceeding Show Cause Procedure (General Powers to Stay or Dismiss a Frivolous, Vexatious, or Abusive Application or Proceeding)”. It was introduced by the Court in 2018 to deal with a potentially abusive Court filing in a cost-effective and timely manner: Unrau v National Dental Examining Board , 2018 ABQB 874 at para 18 [ Unrau ]. In terms of content, CPN7 sets out

summary procedures for the Court to use r 3.68 of the Alberta Rules of Court in relation to a claim, defence, action, application, or proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. [ 6 ] Under CPN7, the Court may make an Order to stay or dismiss an Apparent Vexatious Application or Proceeding [“AVAP”] on its own initiative, on the written request of any party to a proceeding, or after notification from a Clerk of the Court, Complex Litigant Management Counsel, or Case Management Counsel.

If a Clerk, Complex Litigant Management Counsel, or Case Management Counsel becomes aware of an AVAP, then under CPN7 they must notify the Court. [ 7 ] In substance, CPN7 sets out a

summary procedure for dealing with an AVAP under r 3.68. 1. The Court shall direct the Clerk to serve an AVAP Notice to the party filing the AVAP that tells the party the Court is considering making an Order to stay or dismiss the AVAP. 2. The party receiving the AVAP Notice may, within 14 days after receiving it, file a Written Submission of a maximum of 10 pages with the Court responding to the AVAP Notice and serve that Written Submission on every other party to the proceeding. 3.

Any other party to the proceeding may, within 7 days of being served with the Written Submission, file a Written Reply of a maximum of 10 pages with the Court and serve that Written Reply on every other party to the proceeding. [ 8 ] After this process has been carried out, the Court applies r 3.68 to the AVAP. If the Court makes an Order to stay or dismiss an AVAP, the Clerk must serve a copy of the Order on every party to the proceedings. CPN7 also allows the Court to make an Order prohibiting a person from making any further applications in any proceeding, except with leave of the Court.

However, in Johnson v Lymer , 2020 ABCA 167 , the Court of Appeal limited this Court’s ability to treat a person as a vexatious litigant outside of the process under

Part 2.1 of the Judicature Act : see para 85. As a result, Orders to limit a person’s access to the Courts can no longer be initiated under CPN7, absent an Application under the Judicature Act . [ 9 ] Generally speaking, the procedure set out under CPN7 differs from a standard Court Application in three significant ways. First, the procedures under CPN7 are initiated by the Court itself, although it may do so on written request from a party to the litigation, from the Clerk, or from the Court’s legal counsel.

Second, the procedure takes the form of a “show cause” hearing, which requires the litigant subject to CPN7 to justify their pleading, effectively reversing the normal onus of proof for a Court Application. Finally, the procedure under CPN7 is entirely based on written submissions without an oral hearing. On the whole, this means the procedure is significantly limited in comparison with a normal Court Application, as it is meant to provide a way of dealing quickly and efficiently with litigation that is clearly futile or abusive: Unrau at para 19 . III. Substantive Law [ 10 ] As outlined, CPN7 “sets

summary procedures in the Court of Queen’s Bench of Alberta to be followed under Alberta Rules of Court, Alta Reg 124/2010 , r 3.68 for a claim, defence, action, application, or proceeding that appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process.” In other words, it is a truncated process for the Court to apply r 3.68.

Accordingly, the substantive legal tests come from r 3.68, although with a few limitations to recognize the abridged nature of the procedures under CPN7. [ 11 ] In the following sections, I will provide an overview of the law behind r 3.68, dealing specifically with the application of r 3.68; the substantive tests under r 3.68; and the impact of the

summary procedures under CPN7. A. Application of Rule 3.68 [ 12 ] Rule 3.68 sets out the conditions that allow the Court to make an Order under the Rule and the types of Order the Court may grant under the Rule. Specifically, to make an Order under r 3.68, the Court must find one or more of the conditions listed in r 3.68(2) exists. 3.68(2) The conditions for the order are one or more of the following: (

a) the Court has no jurisdiction;

(

b) a commencement document or pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence to a claim; (

c) a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper; (

d) a commencement document or pleading constitutes an abuse of process; (

e) an irregularity in a commencement document or pleading is so prejudicial to the claim that it is sufficient to defeat the claim. [ 13 ] If one or more of the conditions under r 3.68(2) is met, the Court may make one of the Orders listed in r 3.68(1). 3.68(1) If the circumstances warrant and a condition under subrule (2) applies, the Court may order one or more of the following: (

a) that all or any part of a claim or defence be struck out; (

b) that a commencement document or pleading be amended or set aside; (

c) that judgment or an order be entered; (

d) that an action, an application or a proceeding be stayed. [ 14 ] The distinction between the conditions for applying r 3.68 and the Orders that may be granted under r 3.68 carries through to CPN7. In particular, CPN7 applies to a proceeding that “appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process”. This invokes two of the conditions listed in r 3.68(2); i.e., that “a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, irrelevant or improper” and “a commencement document or pleading constitutes an abuse of process”: rules 3.68(2)(c), (d).

As a result, to make an Order under CPN7, the Court must find that a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process, per rules 3.68(2)(

c) or (d). [ 15 ] Once these initial conditions have been met, the Court may then make an Order under r 3.68(1). In this respect, CPN7 is also limited by its text to “an order to stay or dismiss an AVAP”. This invokes r 3.68(1)(d), which allows the Court to stay an action, application, or proceeding, as well as r 3.68(1)(a), which allows the Court to strike out all or any part of a claim or defence, and r 3.68(1) (b), which allows the Court to set aside a commencement document or proceeding. Typically, the Court has made an Order under r 3.68(1)(

d) after it initiates CPN7 to stay the Action pending completion of the procedure under CPN7. Once the CPN7 procedure has been completed, the Court may strike any part of a claim or defence or set aside the pleading or commencement document being considered, if it is confirmed to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process.

To be clear, when a pleading is set aside, it is made null and vacated: Barron’s Canadian Law Dictionary , 6th ed, sub verbo “set aside”; Black’s Law Dictionary , 11h ed, sub verbo “set aside”. [ 16 ] It bears saying that, in some previous cases, this Court has relied on r 3.68(2)(b), which applies when “a commencement document or pleading discloses no reasonable claim or defence to a claim”. Strictly speaking, this condition is not captured by CPN7 and should not be relied on to initiate the CPN7 procedures.

However, to the extent that a pleading does not disclose a reasonable claim or defence, that may be an indication that the pleading is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process, and previous cases that rely on r 3.68(2)(

b) should be read in this manner. [ 17 ] Taken altogether, this means the Court may use the procedure set out in CPN7 to make an Order where a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, vexatious or otherwise an abuse of process, per rules 3.68(2)(c), and (d). In doing so, the Court may stay an action, an application, or a proceeding per r 3.68(1)(d). The Court may also order that a claim or defence may be struck per r 3.68(1)(

a) or that the commencement document or pleading be set aside per r 3.68(1)(b). B. Substantive Tests for Rule 3.68 [ 18 ] Although CPN7 sets out a

summary procedure for dealing with commencement documents or pleadings, in substance it involves the application of r 3.68. This means that the substantive tests for deciding whether a commencement document or pleading is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process apply, with only minor modifications to account for the

summary procedure set out in the Practice Note. Those modifications will be discussed in the following section. [ 19 ] The three conditions captured under CPN7 each have their own substantive legal requirements, although they are interconnected and often overlap.

To start, a frivolous pleading is a pleading that is “so palpably bad that no real argument is needed to show how bad it is”: William A Stevenson & Jean E Côté, Alberta Civil Procedure Handbook (Edmonton: Juriliber, 2021) at 3-137; see also Sturgeon Lake Indian Band v Canada (AG) , 2016 ABQB 384 at para 275 ; Arabi v Alberta , 2014 ABQB 295 at para 37 ; Onischuk v Alberta , 2013 ABQB 89 at para 31 ; McMeekin v Alberta (AG) , 2012 ABQB 144 at para 29 ; Wong v Leung , 2011 ABQB 687 at para 27 .

In other words, it is a pleading that is obviously going to fail and does not require much consideration to arrive at that conclusion. [ 20 ] Next, a pleading is an abuse of process if it is “unfair to the point that [it is] contrary to the interests of justice” and “oppressive or vexatious and [violates] the principles of justice”: Behn v Moulton Contracting Ltd , 2013 SCC 26 at para 39 [ Behn ]; see also PricewaterhouseCoopers Inc v Perpetual Energy Inc , 2022 ABCA 111 at paras 77-78 .

According to the Supreme Court, the doctrine of abuse of process is fundamentally flexible, and it has no specific requirements. This is because it exists to prevent the misuse of Court procedure in a way that would be manifestly unfair or bring the administration of justice into disrepute: Behn at para 40 ; see also McLelland v McLelland , 2021 ABCA 102 at para 17 , citing Reece v Edmonton (City of) , 2011 ABCA 238 at para 15 .

So, there are recognized categories of abuse of process, but the list of what exactly constitutes an abuse of process is not closed to allow the Court to adapt to new circumstances that threaten the administration of justice. [ 21 ] Finally, there is no precise definition of what constitutes a vexatious pleading. However, in Al-Ghamdi v Alberta , 2017 ABQB 684 , aff’d 2020 ABCA 81 at paras 18-19 , this Court explained that the concept of vexatious litigation is related to an abuse of process

and frivolous litigation: at para 123. Importantly, even though r 3.68(2)(

c) no longer mentions vexatious litigation, the Court has continued to use rules 3.68(2)(

c) and (

d) to strike out vexatious litigation, because it is effectively the same thing as impropriety and an abuse of process: ibid .

In other words, vexatious litigation is one form of abuse of process, and it may also be frivolous depending on the exact form it takes. [ 22 ] From a practical perspective, in Chutskoff v Bonora , 2014 ABQB 389 at paras 91-92 , Michalyshyn J provided examples of what constitutes vexatious litigation, including: • Collateral attacks, either trying to relitigate an issue or to trying to circumvent a Court Order; • Hopeless proceedings, which cannot succeed, for example because they are nonsensical, or which request relief that is grossly disproportionate or cannot be obtained; • Escalating proceedings that accumulate grounds, issues, and parties, sometimes folding them over into subsequent proceedings; • Busybody lawsuits to enforce the alleged rights of third parties; • Sensational claims of intimidation, harassment, or bias or far-flung conspiracies; • Scandalous or inflammatory language; and • Organized Pseudo-legal Commercial Argument strategies. [ 23 ] Taken altogether, this means that CPN7 can be engaged where a pleading is so bad that no argument is necessary to show how bad it is or where a pleading is oppressive or vexatious and violates the principles of justice or is unfair to the point of being contrary to the interests of justice.

There are no closed categories for what is vexatious or constitutes an abuse of process. In this respect, the law behind CPN7 follows the same tests that apply to r 3.68(1)(

c) and r 3.68(1)(

d) outside of the CPN7 context. C. Impact of

Summary Procedures [ 24 ] In addition to the substantive law under r 3.68, CPN7 engages its own policy considerations that relate to the

summary procedures set out in the Practice Note. CPN7 was modelled after r 2.1 of Ontario’s Rules of Civil Procedure , RRO 1990, Reg 194 , and the Alberta caselaw on the

summary procedure under CPN7 has developed in line with the guidance set out by the Courts in Ontario: Unrau at paras 19-22 ; Ubah v Canadian Natural Resources , 2019 ABQB 347 at para 33 [ Ubah ]. [ 25 ] Specifically, in Scaduto v Law Society of Upper Canada , 2015 ONCA 733 [ Scaduto ], the Ontario Court of Appeal explained that the point of r 2.1 is to weed out litigation that is clearly frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process: at para 8.

As a result, the Rule should only be used for “the clearest of cases where the abusive nature of the proceeding is apparent on the face of the pleading and there is a basis in the pleadings to support the resort to the attenuated process”: ibid at para 8. [ 26 ] Similarly, in Gao v Ontario (Workplace Safety and Insurance Board) , 2014 ONSC 6497 [ Gao ], the Ontario Superior Court explained the distinction between r 2.1 and other procedural Rules that deal with the same subject matter and held that r 2.1 is aimed at clearer cases of abuse, which is what justifies the

summary procedure under the Rule. For example, it can be used where the target might misuse the normal litigation process or where the pleading is so obviously frivolous that a proper Application would be an utter waste of time, money, and resources: ibid at para 12. In these cases, it is fair for the Court to employ a

summary procedure to evaluate a pleading. Notably, the decision in Gao was endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Scaduto : at para 9 . [ 27 ] The Alberta jurisprudence has drawn from these Ontario decisions for the general principles behind the CPN7 process. Most importantly, in Unrau , this Court adopted the principles articulated in Gao and Scaduto , according to which CPN7 should not be used for close calls: Unrau at para 22 . As well, this Court has endorsed the view from Ontario that the frivolous, vexatious, or abusive nature of the proceeding should be apparent on the face of the pleading: ibid .

This latter requirement can also be seen in the wording of CPN7, which requires the impugned pleading to appear on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. [ 28 ] Moving forward, I would also endorse the Ontario caselaw that says CPN7 should not be used unless there is a reason to prefer it to the other procedures available under the Alberta Rules of Court , such as in cases where a litigant might use those other procedures to perpetuate an abuse of the Court’s process or where the pleading is so clearly hopeless that an Application under the Alberta Rules of Court would be an utter waste of time, money, and resources.

In other words, there should be a reason for the Court to invoke CPN7 that justifies the use of the abridged procedures set out in the Practice Note rather than the standard procedures to apply r 3.68 under the Alberta Rules of Court . In conjunction with the requirement that the defect in the pleading should be evident on its face, this ensures the Court is using a fair and proportionate process to evaluate the pleadings that are being reviewed. IV.

Initiating CPN7 [ 29 ] Under CPN7, “[a]ny party to a proceeding may ... file with the Court a written request for an Order to stay or dismiss that proceeding as an [Apparent Vexatious Application or Proceeding]”. The Practice Note does not specify what must be included in such a written request. It also does not specify what may not be included in such a request. [ 30 ] Increasingly, the Court is receiving requests to consider proceedings under CPN7 from counsel. These requests come in the form of letters, which outline counsel’s position on the impugned claim or proceeding.

They usually include a copy of the allegedly defective pleading or commencement document, and they often provide background circumstances for the litigation. Where counsel alleges that the claim is a collateral attack, the letter may also include a history of previous litigation and attach other commencement documents or pleadings to substantiate the collateral attack.

[ 31 ] This Court has provided limited guidance on the contents of a letter requesting a review under CPN7. Specifically, in Ubah , Rooke ACJ held that if the pleading in question is vexatious or an abuse of process, it should be evident on its face, which means the written request will not need to provide much explanation of the issue: at paras 47-48.

At the same time, Rooke ACJ held that a person is entitled to provide a narrative of how proceedings have developed to the present and to attach Court materials to establish that an issue is being relitigated, is a collateral attack, or is a duplicate proceeding; that the proceeding is in breach of existing access restrictions; or that the proceeding is blocked by a binding legal argument: Ubah at para 45 . [ 32 ] Subsequently, in Goertz v John , 2019 ABQB 350 , Rooke ACJ clarified that a written request should not contain arguments or indirectly depose to facts: at paras 14-15.

The Court has not revisited the issue since that decision. [ 33 ] In Ontario, the Courts faced the problem of increasingly detailed request letters early on. In response, in Raji v Borden Ladner and Gervais LLP (BLG) , 2015 ONSC 801 [ Raji ], the Ontario Superior Court told parties to limit their written requests to a line or two of explanation: at para 12. The reason given by the Court was that the focus of the analysis should be the face of the pleadings, so there is no need for a lengthy explanation.

On the other hand, if such an explanation should be necessary, then there are other procedures available under the Rules of Civil Procedure that allow for more developed written submissions: Raji at para 12 . [ 34 ] Notably, in limiting the length of written requests, the Court in Raji emphasized the fairness considerations behind allowing a party to make a written request to the Court. In a nutshell, the process is fairer if the requesting party does not have a chance to provide initial submissions in their written requests.

This is an especially important consideration given the abridged nature of the process and the need to be fair to parties whose pleadings are being subjected to the procedures under it. [ 35 ] In Raji , the Ontario Superior Court also held that a party requesting a motion under r 2.1 is entitled to submit previous reported decisions to show the issues in a pleading are res judicata : Raji at para 11 .

In a subsequent decision, Covenoho v Ceridian Canada , 2015 ONSC 2468 [ Covenoho ], the Court clarified that the problem with the pleading must still be obvious on its face to qualify for dismissal under Ontario’s r 2.1: at para 7. So, if the motions judge is required to work through a number of reported decisions to decide if the plaintiff is relitigating, the pleadings are not frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process on their face, and r 2.1 is not the appropriate procedure: Covenoho at para 7 .

Notably, the decisions in both of these cases were endorsed by the Ontario Court of Appeal in Scaduto : at para 9 . [ 36 ] Much like Ontario’s r 2.1, CPN7 sets out a procedure that is meant to deal with a commencement document or pleading that appears on its face to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. In my view, a written request for the Court to follow the procedures under CPN7 should reflect the fact that the review of the pleading or commencement document is conducted on the face of the pleading.

In other words, there should be no need for a lengthy explanation of why the pleading is defective. If such an explanation is necessary, then CPN7 is probably not the correct procedure for dealing with any alleged problems with the pleading.

In this respect, I agree with Rooke ACJ’s holding in Ubah , as well as the caselaw from Ontario. [ 37 ] However, with respect to a party’s ability to provide a narrative of previous Court proceedings, I am inclined to agree with Rooke ACJ’s subsequent holding in Goertz v John , which made clear that a party is not entitled to use their written request to advance written submissions or depose to evidence. More clearly, this means that parties should resist the urge to explain their request to the Court beyond the line or two allowed by the Courts in Ontario.

If something more is necessary, then the parties may instead want to resort to the other procedures available under the Alberta Rules of Court . [ 38 ] Additionally, parties should limit what they include along with their written requests to the Court. They should include a copy of the impugned pleading or commencement document. They may also include a prior written Court decision that shows the pleading is a collateral attack or res judicata . However, they should not attach an extensive series of cases or written decisions to explain their position.

To do so would be to move past the requirement under CPN7 that a pleading or commencement document must be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process on its face. The review under CPN7 is meant to be quick, because the defect in the pleading should be clear to be captured by the Practice Note.

If a party needs to submit multiple cases to explain the defect in the pleading, then it may no longer be apparent on its face. [ 39 ] In addition to a prior written decision, the parties also may choose to include other filed materials with their written request, such as another pleading or a Court Order that helps show the pleading in question is res judicata or a collateral attack. However, in doing so, the parties should keep in mind that, for CPN7 to apply, the defect in the impugned pleading must be obvious on its face.

In other words, the same considerations apply as with previous written decisions. [ 40 ] In

summary, a written request for the Court to invoke CPN7 should abide by the following guidelines. 1. A letter requesting CPN7 should be no more than a line or two. The whole point of CPN7 is that the defect in the pleading is evident on its face, so there should be no need for an extensive explanation of the request. If further explanation is required, the parties may want to consider other procedures available under the Alberta Rules of Court . 2. A letter requesting CPN7 should include a copy of the impugned pleading or commencement document. 3.

If a party is alleging that a pleading is defective, because it is a collateral attack or res judicata , then the party may also include a copy of any previous written decision that shows the collateral attack or issue that has already been decided. The party may also choose to include another filed document, such as a pleading or a Court Order. That said, if a party attaches more than a couple of decisions or other filed documents, the defect may not be evident on its face, and CPN7 may not be the appropriate procedure. V.

Application to the CPN7 Request Before the Court [ 41 ] Counsel for the Defendants asks this Court to dismiss this proceeding under CPN7, because the Plaintiff has a pattern of vexatious behaviour displayed in the course of his litigation history. Counsel has provided a 10-page letter to the Court with details about

other proceedings that have been initiated by the Plaintiff. Counsel for the Defendants alleges that the pleadings in some of these Actions are duplicitous, set out fanciful claims, and are an abuse of process. The written request also includes a

summary of the law relating to vexatious litigants. Additionally, it indicates that 8 pleadings would be attached to the letter, although, as stated previously, none of those pleadings were included with the written request. [ 42 ] In light of the preceding discussion, I will not take into account the detailed litigation history provided by Counsel for the Defendants in the written request. I also decline to consider the legal submissions on the basis that a pleading or commencement document must be problematic on its face to be captured by CPN7.

In this case, since none of the pleadings that were referred to in the written request were actually provided, I decline to consider them. On this basis, and since the written request did not provide the impugned Statement of Claim in this matter, I cannot conclude that the Statement of Claim is, on its face, frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process. [ 43 ] As a final comment, I note that Counsel for the Defendants asked the Court to invoke CPN7, because the Plaintiff has filed previous litigation and, on that basis, the current litigation is vexatious.

As a matter of principle, I am not certain I would be able to conclude that the Statement of Claim in this case is vexatious even if the Plaintiff had previously filed vexatious pleadings, in the absence of a collateral attack or another form of abuse of process. The fact that a litigant may have previously filed vexatious pleadings does not automatically mean that the present pleading is vexatious.

Instead, the present pleading must be assessed of its own right to determine whether it is vexatious. [ 44 ] In this respect, it is important to draw the distinction between a potentially vexatious pleading, which can be dealt with under CPN7, and a potentially vexatious litigant, who may be subject to an Application under the Judicature Act . There may be overlap between the two circumstances, such as when a vexatious litigant files a vexatious pleading. However, following Jonsson v Lymer , CPN7 is no longer a venue for dealing with an allegedly vexatious litigant.

Instead, CPN7 is meant to deal with a commencement document or pleading that is frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process on its face: see Ubah at paras 30-32 . As discussed, the parties may submit a limited number of reported decisions or filed documents along with a written request in order to show that a pleading is problematic on its face. However, if there is a need for further evidence, then the parties may consider other procedures available under the Alberta Rules of Court . [ 45 ] In conclusion, I decline to refer this proceeding to the CPN7 process.

In doing so, I reiterate that this result does not prevent the Defendants from applying under the Alberta Rules of Court for remedies for alleged issues or deficiencies in the claim. It also does not prevent the Defendants from making an Application for a Vexatious Litigant Order under the Judicature Act . Dated at the City of Edmonton, Alberta this12th day of April, 2023. K.G. Nielsen A.C.J.K.B.A. Appearances: Domenic S. Venturo, K.C. – by Submissions Scott Venturo Rudakoff LLP For the Defendants Jurisprudence De’Medici – no appearance