Waddy v Hartford et al, 2023 ABKB 105

Court of King’s Bench of Alberta Citation: Waddy v Hartford et al, 2023 ABKB 105 Date: 20230223 Docket: 2210 00556 Registry: Red Deer Between: Julia Waddy Appellant - and - Ryan J Hartford Davidson and Williams LLP 289904 Alberta LTD TransUnion Canada Respondents _______________________________________________________ Ruling on Costs of the Honourable Justice Eleanor J Funk _______________________________________________________ [ 1 ] This matter came before me as an appeal of a decision of Applications Judge Mattis, in which Ms. Waddy’s claim against Mr. Hartford, and his law firm, was summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 7.3. In these reasons, I will collectively refer to the

Respondents as the Hartford Respondents. [2] On January 25, 2023, I released my reasons in which I dismissed Ms. Waddy’s appeal of that decision, Waddy v Hartford,2023 ABKB 47 , 2023 ABKB 0047. In those reasons, I also considered, and dismissed, Ms. Waddy’s additional arguments thatthe Hartford Respondents’ application for

summary dismissal should be dismissed for alleged breaches of the Rules of Court. [3] The issue of costs is now before me. [4] The Hartford Respondents seek costs pursuant to

Schedule C of the Rules of Court. Because, in her Statement of Claim, Ms.Waddy claimed $800,000 against the Hartford Respondents, they seek Column 4 costs in the amount of $2,501. [5] Instead of making submissions on costs, Ms. Waddy asks that I recuse myself from this matter for what she alleges are realand perceived biases in my reasons. Her complaints are mostly focused on my analysis in relation to Mr. Hartford’s application being onthe “wrong form” and my treatment of Rule 7.3(1)(c). For Ms.

Waddy, my reasons reflect what she perceives as an inherent bias in theCourts, in general, and in my reasons, specifically, against self represented litigants. Law and Analysis [6] The test for establishing a reasonable apprehension of bias was recently re-stated by Justice Hayes-Richards, in R. v.

Churchin the Vine and Fortin, 2022 ABKB 704, at paragraph 37: The test for a reasonable apprehension of bias was affirmed in Yukon Francophone School Board, Education Area #23 v Yukon(Attorney General), 2015 SCC 25 at para 20: a reasonable apprehension of bias will exist if an informed person, viewing the matterrealistically and practically — and having thought the matter through — would conclude that it is more likely than not that the decision-maker, whether consciously or unconsciously, did not decide fairly.

There exists a strong presumption of judicial impartiality that is noteasily displaced: Cokocaru v British Columbia Women's Hospital and Health Centre, 2013 SCC 30 at para 22; see also Yukon at para25. As such, there must exist a real likelihood or probability of bias: Arsenault-Cameron v Prince Edward Island, [1999] 2 SCR 851 atpara 2; see also R v S(RD), (SCC), [1997] 3 SCR 484 at para 136; Yukon at para 25. The inquiry is contextual andfact-specific with a high burden of proof on the party alleging the bias: Wewaykum Indian Band v Canada, 2003 SCC 45 at para 77; seealso S(RD), at para 114.

The impugned conduct, taken in context and in light of the whole proceedings, must truly demonstrate a soundbasis for perceiving that a particular determination has been made on the basis of prejudice or generalizations: S(RD) at para 141; Yukonat para 26. The entire record must be considered to determine the cumulative effect of the alleged improprieties: Miglin v Miglin, 2003SCC 24 at para 26; R v Stephan, 2021 ABCA 82 at para 111. [See also, Destine v. Cloutier, 2022 ABCA 331, at para 38 and, R v.

Chui, 2021 ABCA 137 at note 3] [7] An unfavourable result or conclusion by a judge is not, in itself, a basis to conclude there has been bias or prejudice. What’smore, repeated unfavourable results are not evidence of bias: Christofi v. Newcombe, 2022 ABQB 375 at paras 6 and 7, citing R vS(RD), at para 105; AHS v Wang, 2018 ABCA 104 at para 9. [8] Ms. Waddy’s allegations of bias reflect her disagreement over my

interpretation of the evidence, findings of fact, andapplication of the relevant legal principles. In particular, she takes issue with my conclusions in relation to the Hartford Respondents’application being on the “wrong form” (Waddy, paras 57-64) and my treatment of Rule 7.3(1)(c) (Waddy, paras 76-81). [9] For Ms. Waddy, my reasons reflect a preferential treatment given to Mr. Hartford because he is a lawyer. She alleges myconclusions would not be the same for a self-represented litigant, such as herself. [10] In my reasons, I carefully addressed each of Ms.

Waddy’s arguments in relation to alleged breaches of the Rules of Court. Ineach instance, I grounded my analysis on the evidence before me; the relevant Rules of Court; and the application of the appropriate legalprinciples. I was in no way influenced or persuaded in my analysis by the fact that Mr. Hartford is a lawyer and Ms. Waddy is self-represented. I am abundantly satisfied that my reasons reflect neither an actual nor an apprehension of bias against Ms.

Waddy,specifically, nor against self-represented litigants, in general. [11] I am confident that a reasonable, informed person would come to this same conclusion. That person would see that my reasonsare grounded not in denying Mr. Hartford (or anyone) access to justice for minor errors or irregularities on the form of an application, butinstead in promoting access to justice with a focus on ensuring that Ms. Waddy (like any litigant) is not prejudiced by such irregularities. [12] While Ms.

Waddy clearly disagrees with my analysis, and my conclusions, I find she has not identified any real likelihood orprobability of bias. For these reasons, her application that I recuse myself is dismissed. Costs [13] As the successful party in the appeal, the Hartford Respondents are presumptively entitled to costs, paid by the Appellant, Ms.Waddy. [14] In McAllister v Calgary (City), 2021 ABCA 25, the Court of Appeal confirmed the default rule that the successful party isentitled to costs against the unsuccessful party, and that the Court has considerable discretion in deciding to award costs.

The Court’sdiscretion must be exercised judicially. Reference to

Schedule C is only one of many options available to judges in deciding “reasonableand proper costs”: McAllister, at paras 29-30. [15] Here, the Hartford Respondents seek costs of $2,501, based on

Schedule C, Column 4. Ms. Waddy chose to make nosubmissions in relation to costs. [16] When I consider the Hartford Respondents’ request, I am mindful that the Applications Judge already awarded $1000 in costs

against Ms. Waddy following the Respondents’ success in having Ms. Waddy’s claims dismissed. [ 17 ] In this appeal, Ms. Waddy continued to pursue an argument that she somehow has a cause of action against the Hartford Respondents in relation to her difficulties in having a civil judgment removed from her credit report. [ 18 ] Ms. Waddy raised additional arguments that the Hartford Respondents’ initial application should be struck for alleged breaches of the Rules of Court . These allegations were equally unfounded. In her pursuit of arguing these alleged breaches of the Rules , Ms.

Waddy appears to have lost sight of the fact that her Statement of Claim against the Hartford Respondents has “no merit” and fails to reveal any genuine issues requiring a trial. In other words, even if she were successful in having the Hartford Respondents’ application struck for any of the alleged breaches, Ms. Waddy would be wholly unsuccessful at trial if she pursued any of her claims against the Hartford Respondents. [ 19 ] In light of these factors, I find the request for costs in the amount of $2,501 both reasonable and proper.

Conclusion [ 20 ] For the reasons given, I award costs in favour of the Hartford Respondents in the amount of $2,501. [ 21 ] Ms. Waddy is a self-represented litigant. The Supreme Court of Canada in Pintea and Johns , 2017 SCC 23 , set instructions to judges concerning their interactions with self represented litigants. Mindful of that instruction from the Supreme Court, should Ms. Waddy choose to pursue her disagreement with my Decisions, her remedy is an appeal to the Alberta Court of Appeal. If she chooses to do so, I suggest Ms.

Waddy retain legal counsel to assist her in that pursuit. [ 22 ] Counsel for the Hartford Respondents shall prepare the Order giving effect to this Decision, and the previous Decision in which I dismissed Ms. Waddy’s appeal. Heard on the 06 th day of January, 2023. Dated at the City of Red Deer, Alberta this 23 rd day of February, 2023. Eleanor J. Funk J.C.K.B.A. Appearances: Julia Waddy Self-Represented for the Appellant Jennifer Blanchard Alberta Lawyers Indemnity Association for the Respondents