R. v. Perry, 2022 BCPC 251

Citation: R. v. Perry 2022 BCPC 251 Date: 20221019 File No: 22128-1 Registry: Western Communities IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REX v. ANDREW JOHN EARL PERRY ORAL REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE L. MROZINSKI Counsel for the Crown: J. Pawlow Counsel for the Accused: R. Mulligan, K.C. Place of Hearing: Colwood , B.C. Date of Hearing: October 14, 2022 Date of Judgment: October 19, 2022

[1] THE COURT: Mr. Perry, you are before the court today for sentencing for the offence of possession of child pornographycontrary to s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code. As I outlined in my reasons for decision given this last October 14, 2022, I was satisfied atthe end of the trial in the matter beyond a reasonable doubt that you had possession of a significant amount of child pornographicmaterials on both your computer and your iPhone.

Specifically, as was agreed at trial, after police seized your computer and iPhone, andfollowing a forensic examination, 1,507 images of child pornography were found over both devices. These consisted largely of what aredescribed as collages or multiple images or contact sheets, essentially still shots of videos. Still, as I noted in my reasons for decision aftertrial, your collection included other images and videos.

The content of these materials ranged from the odd shot of a covered breast, forexample, through to the extreme and horrific imagery of young and some very young children, including at least in one instance a baby,being penetrated by and/or having an adult male penis forced into their mouth. [2] In this sentencing, Mr. Perry, as you know, the issue is one of the length of sentence. There is no dispute between counsel thatthe sentencing objectives that must be given priority here are the objectives of specific deterrence as well as general deterrence anddenunciation.

That is clear from any one of a number of decisions relied on both by the Crown and your counsel, starting with R. v.Friesen, 2020 SCC 9, and including R. v. Do, [2021] B.C.J. NO. 1502 at paragraph 104, R. v. C.R.A. 2020 BCPC 171 , 2020B.C.J. No 1448, and R. v. Neasloss, 2020 B.C.J. No. 1321, where at paragraph 28 my sister Judge Doulis cites numerous other cases forthe same proposition. [3] Secondly, counsel agree that except in the most extraordinary of cases, such as R. v. Swaby, 2018 B.C.J. No. 3603, and latterlyR. v.

Humphreys, 2020 BCPC 1136, defendants found guilty of the offence of possession of child pornography can expect to serve acustodial sentence. That is certainly the case here, Mr. Perry. There are no exceptional circumstances in this case to justify anythingother than a custodial sentence. [4] I have outlined the overall circumstances of the offence in this case already. I will, as I must, return to the matter of theseriousness of this offence shortly in these reasons. First, though, Mr.

Perry, I will turn to consider your personal circumstances, andsome of the collateral consequences of this charge and this finding of guilt as outlined by your counsel. [5] Mr. Perry, you are now 40 years of age, and someone who appears before this Court on this sentencing with no criminal record.But for your possession of child pornography, for which I have found you guilty, you have, it appears, lived what is often described inthe case law as a pro-social life. That is to say, Mr.

Perry, you have been employed, you are in a relationship, you have friends and familyand no other interactions with the criminal justice system. I am unaware of any drug or alcohol abuse disorders or anything of the sort. [6] Rather, Mr. Perry, for some 20 years you have served in the Canadian military, the Air Force branch of the military, though asyou testified you often served on ships where you worked as a cook. Your job, Mr. Perry, your service with the military, took you tomany other parts of Canada; indeed, around the world.

You were required as a condition of service to spend large amounts of time awayfrom your home, your partner, friends and family. Both you and they can be said to have made some not insignificant sacrifices in serviceto this country. [7] I am advised, as well, Mr. Perry, that your mother lives in the United States where you have spent a considerable time. As yourcounsel submits, this conviction -- and it will be a conviction -- will impact on your ability to travel. It will affect future workopportunity.

It will, by way of the mandatory SOIRA order, bind you to reporting your address to police for the next 20 years.Unquestionably, there are significant collateral consequences to a conviction for the offence of possession of child pornography. [8] That, Mr. Perry, is in my view commensurate with the nature of the offence. In this kind of offense there are no victim impactstatements, the sort of information the court would consider at this part of the sentencing process. What there is, Mr.

Perry, is asignificant body of case law that has now considered the nature of this offence and the harm it causes to children and to our social order,generally. [9] In R. v. Inksetter, 2018 ONCA 474 , 141 O.R. (3d) 161, the court writes at para 22 that: Child pornography is a pervasive social problem that affects the global community and its children. [it notes that] In . . . R. v. Sharpe,2011 1 S.C.R. 45, the Supreme Court described how possession of child pornography harms children. [it notes further that] As FraserC.J.A. wrote in R. v. Andrukonis, 2012 ABCA 148 , 2012 A.J.

No. 481, at para. 29, "possession of child pornography is itselfchild sexual abuse". The children depicted in pornographic images are re-victimized each time the images are viewed. In amassing,viewing and making available his vast and terrible collection to others, [in that case the court writes] the respondent participated in theabuse of thousands of children. [10] As my brother Judge Blake writes in paragraph 13 of R. v. C.R.A., in Friesen the court gave extensive consideration to childsexual abuse from the criminal sentencing perspective.

As Judge Blake, in my view, astutely recognizes “the judicial views expressedwith such force in Friesen are not novel”, but they are critical “because of the detailed approach the court took to exploring the insidiousways in which sexual abuse of children undermines the dignity and autonomy of the individual victim while at the same time tearing atthe fabric of communities.” [11] But again to emphasize the reasoning of Chief Justice Fraser in R. v. Andrukonis, possession of child pornography is itself childsexual abuse. Possession of child pornography is not innocuous, victimless voyeurism.

What purpose does the downloading, saving andcategorizing of such collections of material serve other than to satisfy some abhorrent urge or curiosity, neither of which have any socialvalue, at the expense of the physical security and safety and the very lives of children and often their families. In the normal course, aperson would want to protect these children: to try to save them, not luxuriate on their obvious distress and misery and pain whilecasually playing online video games and chatting. The consequences for these children and the impact that these assaults on them areabsolutely horrific.

The consequences give rise to a lifelong affliction, for those who survive, that few of us could bear. [12] The moral responsibility of the offender, particularly in your case, Mr. Perry, is distinct from Mr. Swaby, for example, is high.Here, the following comments in part by the court in Friesen at paragraphs 88 to 90 bear consideration:

[88] . . . In assessing the degree of responsibility of the offender, courts must take into account the harm the offender intended or was reckless or wilfully blind to . . .

For sexual offences against children, we agree with Iacobucci J. that, save for possibly . . . rare cases, offenders will usually have at least some awareness of the profound physical, psychological, and emotional harm that their actions may cause the child . . . [89] All forms of sexual violence, including sexual violence against adults, are morally blameworthy precisely because they involve the wrongful exploitation of the victim by the offender — the offender is treating the victim as an object and disregarding the victim’s human dignity . . . [90] The fact that the victim is a child increases the offender’s degree of responsibility.

Put simply, the intentional sexual exploitation and objectification of children is highly morally blameworthy because children are so vulnerable . . . As L’Heureux-Dubé J. recognized in R. v. L.F.W. , . . . “As to moral blameworthiness, the use of a vulnerable child for the sexual gratification of an adult cannot be viewed as anything but a crime demonstrating the worst of intentions”. . . Offenders recognize [the] children’s particular vulnerability and intentionally exploit it to achieve their selfish desires . . .

We would emphasize that the moral blameworthiness of the offender increases when [the] offenders intentionally target[s] children who are particularly vulnerable, including children who belong to groups that face discrimination or marginalization in society. [ 13 ] Given what the Crown submits is the seriousness of this offence, Mr.

Perry, coupled with your moral blameworthiness and lack of any real mitigating factors in the sentencing, Crown submits that a fit proportionate sentence in this case is a custodial sentence of 30 months. [ 14 ] On your behalf, it is submitted that while a custodial sentence is not unfit in this case, and nothing less is sought, 30 months is far too high. In other words, such a sentence would offend against the principle of parity in sentencing. [ 15 ] Mr.

Perry, in this and every other sentencing, this court is governed by the purposes and principles of sentencing and those are set out in s. 718 and 718.2 of the Criminal Code . Those provisions provide as follows. First, s. 718 of the Criminal Code provides that: 718 The fundamental purpose of sentencing is to protect society and to contribute, along with crime prevention initiatives, to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society by imposing just sanctions that have one or more of the following objectives. [ 16 ] Those include: (

a) to denounce unlawful conduct and the harm done to victims or to the community that is caused by [the] unlawful conduct; (

b) to deter the offender and other persons from committing [similar] offences; (

c) to separate offenders from society, where necessary; (

d) to assist in rehabilitating offenders; (

e) to provide reparations for harm done to victims or to the community; and [finally] (

f) to promote a sense of responsibility in offenders, and acknowledgment of the harm done to [the] victims or . . . the community. [ 17 ] Not every objective applies in every case. Some offences may attract but a few objectives; others nearly all.

The question is what sentencing objectives or objectives are necessary to import into a sentence in a given case in order to meet the fundamental purpose of sentencing in order to protect society and to contribute to respect for the law and the maintenance of a just, peaceful and safe society. [ 18 ] In the case of offences involving sexual violence against children the sentencing objectives of denunciation and specific and general deterrence must be given primacy and certainly considerable weight.

Section 718.1 of the Criminal Code states as much, in any event. Clearly, in cases such as this, rehabilitation in the form of sex offender treatment is also an important sentencing objective, as it does offer protection to other potential vulnerable victims. Still, rehabilitation must generally be a secondary consideration in sentencing for this offence. [ 19 ] Other relevant sentencing principles include the principle of proportionality, to which I have referred to earlier, as well as the principles of restraint and parity.

With respect to parity, the general rule is that an offender should receive a sentence that is similar to one imposed on a similar offender for a similar offence. I say it is a general rule because the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Friesen has made it clear that previous sentences for offences of sexual violence against children have been too low across the board. At paragraph 5 of the decision in Friesen the court sets out its concerns and really summarizes the thrust of its subsequent reasoning.

The court writes at paragraph 5, in part: . . . we send a strong message that sexual offences against children are violent crimes that wrongfully exploit children’s vulnerability and cause profound harm to children, [to] families, and [to] communities. Sentences for these crimes must increase.

Courts must impose sentences that are proportional to the gravity of [the] sexual offences against children and the degree of [the] responsibility of the offender, as informed by Parliament’s sentencing initiatives and by society’s deepened understanding of the wrongfulness and harmfulness of sexual violence against children.

Sentences must accurately reflect the wrongfulness of sexual violence against children and the far-reaching and ongoing harm that it causes to children, [and to] families, and [to] society at large. [ 20 ] In that regard the Crown submitted several "pre- Friesen decisions" in which the sentences ranged from a CSO in the case of Mr. Swaby to three years in the case of Mr. Inksetter. In between there is a wide range of sentences. A number of those are usefully described in Neasloss .

Of interest in Neasloss is that Judge Doulis, faced with a joint submission for a CSO for the offences of distributing and possessing child pornography, reviewed a compendium of sentencing decisions starting with sentencing appeal decisions at Courts of Appeal through to sentencing in the BC Supreme Court and then the Provincial Court, only to conclude that the application

of the principle of parity militates against a CSO for this offence but nonetheless, felt bound by the joint submission. The helpful reviewof the sentencing decision in Neasloss evidences, if nothing else, that sentencing is an individualistic exercise. Clearly a range ofsentences has been imposed for the offence of possession of child pornography. [21] In terms of the range of sentence for this offence pre-Friesen, in R. v. Alexander, 2019 BCCA 462, our Court of Appeal acceptedit is anywhere from four months to two years, relying in particular on the reasons in R. v. R.L.W., 2013 BCCA 50. In R. v.

Watson, 2018BCCA 329, the Court of Appeal writes that a sentence of 12 months for the offence of the possession of an extensive collection of childpornography in the case of a 72-year-old offender with no prior record, having been convicted after trial, is not only fit but on the lighterside. [22] As I say, the sentencing decisions all vary to some extent. Most of the cases before this Court include guilty pleas by personswith no criminal record living largely pro-social lives (but for their interest in child pornography), and many indicating remorse. Eventhen, the sentences are not insubstantial. In R. v.

Alexander, a person with no record having pled guilty to possession of a large collectionof child pornography, was sentenced to eight months in 2019. Friesen, not to mention Watson, would suggest this was low and possiblyno longer fit. [23] The parity principle, in my view, is slightly upended by the court's decision in Friesen. It has essentially mandated sentencingjudges to consider prior sentencing decisions as generally too low. Obviously, all would not have been. In a sentencing that post-datesFriesen, R. v. Brown, 2020 B.C.J.

No. 2247, Justice Schultes writes at paragraph 78 that Friesen yet preserves the principle of parity asan aspect of the core sentencing requirement of proportionality. Nonetheless, Justice Schultes also accepts that decisions that pre-date the2015 amendments to the maximum sentence for child-related offending, including possession of child pornography, must be treated withcaution in light of Friesen. In any event, in Brown Justice Schultes imposed a sentence of two years custody to be served concurrentlywith a sentence of four on other child-related offences.

Crown relies on this case as an instance of a sentence of two years for thisoffence. This was a case in which an offender entered a guilty plea, appeared to have been suffering depression at the time of theoffences, expressed profound regret for his actions and indicated a willingness, indeed a desire, for treatment. [24] A number of the cases summarized in Neasloss, and also referred to by the Crown in this case, evidence examples of sentencingfor this offence of less than 12 months duration. These include R. v.

C.H., 2020 BCSC 323, a case in which the offender age 54 with nocriminal record pled guilty and received a sentence of six months followed by 24 months probation, among other orders. The caseindicates the sentencing judge was satisfied of the presence of a number of mitigating factors, some of which reduced, at least to someextent, the offender's moral culpability. [25] The same can be said for the sentence in R. v. Humphreys, 2020 BCPC 136, a decision of my brother Judge McKimm. There, a60-year-old offender with no record pled guilty to one count of the possession of 181 images of child pornography.

In this instance thecourt found exceptional circumstances sufficient to justify a conditional sentence order. [26] Other six-month sentences include the sentencing decisions in R. v. W.M.P., unreported, March 25, 2019, Terrace Registry No.32030-1, a case in which the offender was found to have possession of six videos of child pornography. Mitigating factors appear to havedriven the sentence including the offender's age and lack of criminal record.

The court also seems to have been moved by the collateralconsequences suffered by the offender, having lost his family, home and business. [27] As I say, there are several such sentences, all of which generally include guilty pleas, expressions of remorse, lack of a criminalrecord, a pro-social lifestyle and something serving to reduce moral culpability. [28] In other instances, such a R. v. Inksetter, R. v. R.L.W., R. v. Watson, among others, the sentences have been much higher, in therange of 10 to 12 months, and up to 15 months in R. v.

Mollon, 2019 BCSC 423, despite some mitigating factors including a difficultchildhood and mild cerebral palsy. These mitigating and aggravating factors have served in many of these cases to anchor a sentencewithin the range of four months to two years. [29] In Neasloss my sister Judge Doulis has neatly set out the relevant mitigating and aggravating factors outlined by Justice Molloyin R. v. Kwok, , at paragraph 34.

Aggravating factors are said to include any criminal record for similar or relatedoffences, circumstances where there is also production or distribution of the material, the size of the collection and the nature of thecollection, including the age of the children involved and the relative depravity and violence depicted, the extent to which the offender isseen as a danger to children and finally, whether the offender has purchased child pornography and contributed to the sexualvictimization of children for profit.

Moreover, s. 718.2 provides evidence that an offender abused a person under age 18 is a statutorilyaggravating factor. [30] Even despite the language in Friesen that possession of child pornography constitutes child abuse, it is not clear that this sectionapplies. Still, I find I agree with the Crown that the age of some of the children in the pornographic images you possessed, Mr. Perry, isan aggravating factor on sentence. [31] As for the other aggravating factors listed, it is the case, Mr. Perry, that you have no criminal record, related or otherwise. That,in fact, may be construed as a mitigating factor.

The size of your collection, Mr. Perry, is not insubstantial, its content as I have describedincludes images that are at the outer edge of depravity and violence upon children. How else to categorize images of babies beingpenetrated by adult male penises or adult male penises being forced into the mouths and vaginas of young girls, some clearly under age10. [32] In terms of the extent to which you are or may be seen as a danger to children, Mr. Perry, there are no reports before me to assistone way or another. I can say, Mr.

Perry, that the evidence showed you pursued young girls on the internet. [Omitted for publication],for example, was 14. She was someone you described as a friend, someone whose photo you kept on your computer and your cellphone,a photo you testified you liked to look at from time to time, and a photo, I am convinced beyond any doubt, you opened up and looked atnearly coincidental to your viewing of the video E016.mp4, a video Constable Aho describes as showing various young girls ages 12 topossibly 16 years of age in a variety of sexual activities including oral sex.

[ 33 ] Mr. Perry, there is no dispute in the evidence that you had a predilection for connecting with young female children on the internet through various means, including Instagram and Facebook. You were successful on at least three occasions. You are clever, Mr. Perry, of that there is no doubt, and resourceful. These facts suggest to me that you likely do pose a risk to children. That has implications, both as to the length of sentence and any ancillary orders that I have been asked to make. [ 34 ] Finally, I should note there is no evidence here, Mr. Perry, that you ever purchased child pornography.

Mitigating factors identified by Justice Molloy include the age of the offender, any expression of remorse or insight, factors I would add that bode well for rehabilitation, and of course, signal a lesser need for a sentence that sends a clear message of specific deterrence, a willingness to accept treatment and finally, "the extent to which the offender has already suffered for their crime in their family, career or community". [ 35 ] In Neasloss , for example, it was noted that Mr. Neasloss had been subjected to strict bail conditions and his access to the internet restricted.

He had, the court writes, already been shunned by family and friends long before. [ 36 ] In this case, Mr. Perry, I have already acknowledged the collateral consequences that must inevitably arise from a finding of guilt to this offence. Among other consequences, the finding carries with it a stigma that is not easily erased, limitations on your liberty for some time into the future, including loss of ability to travel, limitations on employment options. [ 37 ] In your case, Mr. Perry, you seem fortunate in that you and Mr. [omitted for publication] have maintained your relationship.

You are no longer a member of the Canadian Armed Forces, but I have no evidence as to whether that was a consequence of this charge, or whether you simply took retirement. There are, to be sure, collateral consequences to this conviction, nonetheless. [ 38 ] I do not disagree with the Crown that in this sentencing the aggravating factors significantly outweigh the mitigating factors. There are no factors that I can discern that limit your moral blameworthiness for this offence, Mr. Perry.

You are to be sentenced, even as a first-time offender, for a serious offence for which you are highly morally culpable. [ 39 ] Bearing in mind these factors as well as the parity principle, Mr. Perry, I accept firstly that a sentence of 30 months for a first- time offender after being found guilty at trial is at the high end of the range. In the case before me, R. v. Inksetter appears the most glaring example of a comparable sentence, though there are others mentioned in the cases. [ 40 ] Here, it bears noting that Mr. Inksetter's collection was much more extensive than at issue here.

It was described in the reasons as "one of the largest and worst collections of child pornography that the Ottawa police had ever uncovered". On appeal, the court writes that: The trial judge concluded that the volume of images and the number of children abused put the possession offence "among the most serious for circumstances of the offence of possession of child pornography". [ 41 ] The material was characterized by the trial judge as well-organized, and at the extreme end of the spectrum. Mr.

Inksetter was 51 years of age with no criminal record, he is said to have pled guilty at the first available opportunity and was found to have shown real remorse and insight for his offending behaviour. In the end, the sentencing judge found that: . . . a sentence of three years' . . . on the count of "possession" of child pornography and three and one-half years' . . . on the count of "make available" child pornography, to be served concurrently, is fit in these circumstances, which include the early guilty plea and other mitigating factors . . . [ 42 ] There is no doubt that Mr.

Inksetter received such a significant sentence for possession of child pornography because of the sheer volume of his collection, as well as its nature. In my view in this case Mr. Perry's collection, while not insubstantial, bears no comparison to that at issue in Inksetter. If anything, the collection is closer to that in R. v. Alexander and not as extensive, at that. [ 43 ] Still, it is without question the case that none of the mitigating factors present in both Inksetter and Alexander are present in this case. There are none.

The absence of mitigating factors in this case does signal a need for a sentence that assures a measure of specific deterrence in addition to the mandatory focus on general deterrence and denunciation. That, in my view, is necessary to ensure as best that can be done the safety of children upon Mr. Perry's release from custody. [ 44 ] At the same time, I am guided and governed by the sentencing principles, particularly of proportionality which includes within it a component of sentencing parity. I accept, as our Court of Appeal writes in R. v. Watson , that 12 months for this offence is on the light side.

There being no mitigating factors in this case, and their absence given cause for concern such that I find it necessary to emphasize specific deterrence as well as general deterrence and denunciation, I find in the circumstances a fit sentence in this case, taking into account all of the factors, is 18 months. [ 45 ] Mr. Perry, I will have you stand, sir. [ 46 ] Mr. Perry, for the offence of possession of child pornography contrary to s. 163.1(4) of the Criminal Code , I hereby sentence you to serve 18 months in custody.

Following your release, you will be placed on probation for a period of two years. [ 47 ] I will return to the conditions of that order shortly. First, I will indicate for the record the various ancillary orders that must be made, or that I find appropriate to make in this sentencing. You can sit down, Mr. Perry, if you like, sir. [ 48 ] Firstly, this is a primary designated DNA offence pursuant to s. 490.1 of the Criminal Code . Because the maximum term of imprisonment for this offence is 14 years in accordance with s. 490.13(2)(

b) of the Code , I am ordering you firstly to comply with the Sex Offender Information Registry Act for a period of 20 years. [ 49 ] As I say, these are all primary designated offences for the purposes of the provision of DNA. In accordance with 487.05(1) of the Code, I make an order in Form 5.03 authorizing the taking of bodily substances from you for the purposes of registration in the DNA national databank. The samples will be taken from you while you are in custody and you must submit to the taking of those samples.

[ 50 ] Pursuant to s. 109 of the Criminal Code , I make an order prohibiting you from possessing any firearm other than a prohibited firearm or restricted firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, ammunition, prohibited ammunition or explosive substance for a period of 10 years from the date of your release from custody.

You are also prohibited from possessing any of the following items: any prohibited firearm, restricted firearm, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, or prohibited ammunition for life. [ 51 ] Finally, pursuant to s. 161 of the Criminal Code , you are prohibited for 10 years from the date of your release from custody from the following: attending a public park, a public swimming area or community centre where persons under the age of 16 years are present or can reasonably be expected to be present or a daycare, school ground, playground, or community except with the written permission of your probation officer.

If you have the permission, you must carry it with you whenever you are in the prohibited area.

You are also prohibited from accepting or performing any employment or volunteer position which involves you coming into contact with or working with or supervising any child under the age of 16 years. [ 52 ] You may access the internet, but not any content that violates the law or access, directly or indirectly, any social media site, social networks, internet discussion forum or chatroom, or maintain a personal profile on any such service where persons under age 16 are present or may reasonably be expected to be present. [ 53 ] With respect to the probation order, I am going to set out the conditions of the probation order, as well.

We had not discussed the probation order, Ms. Pawlow, because you were looking for a federal sentence. I am going to set out the conditions that I intend to impose in the probation order, and I will invite comments from either counsel with respect to those provisions. [ 54 ] As I say, the probation order will be for a period of two years. Mr. Perry, I am going to walk you through the conditions of that probation order, and I am going to confirm with you once I have done that that you understand those conditions. I am also going to ask you on the record whether or not you agree to comply with those.

Depending on your comments, there will be a few other comments and that part will be done. Do you understand all that, sir?

All right. [ 55 ] The mandatory conditions are that you must keep the peace and be of good behaviour, attend at court when required to do so by the court, and you also have to advise the court or a probation officer in advance of any change of name or address, and promptly of any change of employment or occupation. [ 56 ] You must report in person to a probation officer at 836 Courtney Street here in Victoria, British Columbia within two business days after your release from custody, unless you have obtained before your release from custody written permission from the probation officer to report elsewhere or within a different timeframe, and after that you must report as directed by your probation officer. [ 57 ] When you report to the probation officer you will advise that person of your residential address and your telephone number and you will not change either of those without first notifying your probation officer. [ 58 ] The other conditions that I am contemplating, other than counselling, are the following.

First of all, I am contemplating an order prohibiting Mr. Perry from going to public parks. All right. You must not go to any public park, public swimming area, daycare centre, school, playground, or community centre where persons under the age of 16 may be -- are known by you to be present or can reasonably be expected to be present. The exception is if you have the prior written permission of your probation officer. That permission is to be given only for reasonable purposes.

If you have that permission, you will have to carry it with you at all times when you are in the prohibited area. [ 59 ] With respect to employment, I order that you must not seek, obtain, or continue with any volunteer position or employment that involves being in a position of trust or authority towards a person under the age of 16 unless you have got the advance written permission of your probation officer. If you are given that permission you will have to carry it with you, in paper or electronic format, at all times when you are engaged in the activity requiring permission.

I will add that if a peace officer finds you engaged in the activity and requests to see the permission, you must show that to the police officer. [ 60 ] Mr. Perry, you must not enter into or continue any dating relationship, common-law relationship or marriage with any person who has children under the age of 16 or who has care or access to children under that age.

The exception is that you have identified to your probation officer the person with whom you are in or propose to enter a relationship and your probation officer has informed that person of this order, and of your criminal record. [ 61 ] With respect to counselling, Mr. Perry, you must attend and participate in and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or program that may be directed by your probation officer.

That programming should include sex offender treatment programming. [ 62 ] Finally, you must not possess any weapons on your person as those are defined in s. 2 of the Criminal Code during the period of probation. [ 63 ] So, Mr. Perry, do you understand those conditions of your probation order? [ 64 ] THE ACCUSED: I do, Your Honour. [ 65 ] THE COURT: Mr. Perry, do you agree to comply with those conditions of your probation order? [ 66 ] THE ACCUSED: I do. [ 67 ] THE COURT: Okay, sir. Two things.

First, I have to advise you that if you were to breach a condition of the probation order, you must know that a warrant for your arrest could be issued, and you could find yourself detained in custody until the matter is dealt with. Do you understand that? [ 68 ] THE ACCUSED: I do.

[ 69 ] THE COURT: Secondly, during the period of probation, if you are struggling with any of these conditions, rather than breaching them, you have an option, and that is to come back into court, speak to a judge about the condition with your concerns in mind. I do not know what the result is going to be, but that is an option rather than breaching. Do you understand that, as well? [ 70 ] THE ACCUSED: I do. [ 71 ] THE COURT: I am going to dispense with your signature on the order, Mr.

Perry, I will indicate that the order does not have to be read out to you again, given your comments on the record. [ 72 ] There is a $200 victim impact surcharge. I am sending Mr. Perry to custody for 18 months; I am going to waive that victim impact surcharge. I think in the circumstances it is unnecessary. [ 73 ] The only other thing I wanted to cover off was if there was going to be any sort of application for forfeiture of the items seized? [ 74 ] CNSL. J. PAWLOW: Yes. I actually do have an order for forfeiture prepared with respect to the remaining two exhibits, Exhibit 4 and Exhibit 25.

Unfortunately, I dropped it on the way in here so it's a little wrinkled, which I would not normally pass up, but I have prepared that for your consideration. I've signed the back of it, I have not had my colleague sign whether or not he's -- [ 75 ] THE COURT: Right. Is there any issue with that? Any issue? No. All right. (JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)