R. v. M.B. Date:, 2013 BCPC 257

Citation: R. v. M.B. Date: 20130515 2013 BCPC 0257 File No: 22600-1-V Registry: Vancouver IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. M.B. REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE M.F. GIARDINI Counsel for the Crown: R. Flannigan Counsel for the Defendant: M. Sanders Place of Hearing: Vancouver , B.C. Dates of Hearing: January 28 & March 26, 2013 Date of Judgment: May 15, 2013

INTRODUCTION [ 1 ] B.M.J.B. (M.B.) is charged with taking

part in a riot on June 15, 2011, contrary to s. 65 of the Criminal Code . He pled guilty and appeared before me to be sentenced. Counsel for M.B. sought a conditional discharge. The Crown sought a term of probation with conditions. CIRCUMSTANCES OF OFFENCE [ 2 ] Pursuant to s. 655 of the Criminal Code , the following facts were admitted for the purpose of M.B.’s sentencing hearing: The riot generally [ 3 ] On June 15, 2011, the Vancouver Canucks hockey team played game seven of the Stanley Cup finals against the Boston Bruins (“the game”) in Vancouver, British Columbia.

A riot occurred in the downtown core of Vancouver between approximately 7:30 p.m. June 15, 2011 and 12:30 a.m. June 16, 2011 (“the riot”). M.B. participated in the riot. [ 4 ] On June 15, 2011, there were approximately 155,000 people in the downtown core of Vancouver during the game at various venues including Roger’s Arena, public viewing locations, private residences, restaurants and bars.

The main public viewing site was situated around the Vancouver Public Library bounded by West Georgia Street to the north, Robson Street to the south, Hamilton Street to the east and Homer Street to the west (“the live site”). [ 5 ] Approximately 55,000 people watched the game at the live site. An image made up of 216 photographs taken over a period of 15 minutes at approximately 5:45 p.m. was entered as an exhibit. Television coverage of the game commenced at 5 p.m.

The Boston Bruins won the game at approximately 7:45 p.m. with a final score of 4-0. [ 6 ] Two vehicles were parked in front of the Canada Post Building in the live site during the game. Those vehicles were a silver Nissan Versa (“the Versa”), and a green GMC Sierra (“the GMC”). The riot started at this location and spread throughout the downtown core of Vancouver. At approximately 7:42 p.m. a number of individuals flipped the Versa onto its hood. That vehicle was damaged and ultimately set on fire and destroyed shortly before 8:00 p.m. Minutes before the Versa was set afire, rioters began to attack the GMC.

After the Versa was set on fire, police officers forced the crowd away from the Versa and ultimately away from the GMC. Firefighters attended and put out the Versa fire. [ 7 ] After the fire was put out, the crowd returned to the GMC. The rioters damaged the GMC and tried to set it on fire by throwing burning articles onto the truck. When a member of the crowd tried to stop the destruction he was assaulted.

At approximately 8:30 p.m., the rioters overturned the GMC and set it on fire. [ 8 ] As the rioting crowds occupied West Georgia Street and the surrounding areas, multiple commercial premise windows were broken and the contents of the premises looted. Vehicles were vandalized, broken into and set on fire. Crowds of people faced off against the police and projectiles were thrown at the police. Numerous police officers and civilians were assaulted. An atmosphere of lawlessness, violence and destruction quickly consumed the downtown core of Vancouver, including the 600 block of Richards Street.

Rioting in the 600 block of Richards Street [ 9 ] A commercial building located at the corner of West Georgia Street and Richards Street with the street address 475 West Georgia Street housed the following businesses:

a) Black & Lee Formal Wear, located at 688 Richards Street (“Black & Lee”)

b) The Blenz Cafe located at 495 West Georgia Street (“Blenz”); and

c) Da Gino Restaurant located at 100-475 West Georgia Street (“Da Gino”). [ 10 ] The Parkwell Plaza Parkade (“the Parkade”) is located across the street from Black & Lee. The Parkade contains a multi-level parking structure to the south and outdoor street-level parking to the north. All these businesses are located one block west of the live site. An aerial photograph was entered as an exhibit. On the night of June 15, 2011, Black & Lee was closed and there were no employe es inside the store at the time of the riot. Blenz was open with several employees working, including the franchise owner, Min Dun.

Da Gino was also open for business and had several patrons in the restaurant. A security guard was also working at 475 West Georgia Street. [ 11 ] Between 8:00 p.m. and 8:30 p.m., approximately 300 to 400 people had formed crowds around the corner of West Georgia Street and Richards Street. During this time, windows at Da Gino and the common entrance for 475 West Georgia began to be smashed. Shortly after 8:30 p.m., windows at Blenz and Black & Lee began to be smashed. At Blenz, Ms. Dun, her employees, and a customer confined themselves to the back storage room of the cafe to avoid injury during the riot.

From 8:30 p.m. on, numerous telephone calls

were made to 911 complaining of the damage to these businesses. People smashed the windows of these businesses, and stole items from Blenz and Black & Lee. [ 12 ] At the time the riot started, there were 7 vehicles parked in the outdoor street-level parking area of the Parkade. An overhead photograph of the outdoor parking area showing the approximate locations of the vehicles was entered as an exhibit. At approximately 8:30 p.m., the Vancouver Police Department began to receive reports that vehicles in the Parkade were being destroyed.

Ultimately, many vehicles in each part of the Parkade were damaged, overturned and/or destroyed by fire. M.B.’s participation in the riot [ 13 ] On June 15, 2011, M.B. watched the game with friends on a large screen outdoor television at the live site in downtown Vancouver. M.B. was wearing a grey hooded sweatshirt with “CROOKS & CASTLES” written on the back, blue jeans, skate shoes and had short black hair which resembled a short mohawk.

A copy of a photograph showing M.B. on the night of the riot was entered as an exhibit. [ 14 ] After the game, M.B. and his friends walked to the area of Georgia and Richards Street. M.B. was present during the destruction of the Blenz coffee shop. The atmosphere at that location and M.B.’s presence was depicted in a DVD entered as an exhibit. M.B. then travelled northbound to the outdoor portion of the Parkade. In the Parkade, M.B. assisted others as they tried to overturn and destroy a blue Nissan Sentra, (“the Sentra”).

His participation in the destruction of the Sentra was depicted in the DVD as well as in photographs entered as exhibits. The Sentra was subsequently overturned and destroyed, and was determined to be a total loss by the insurance company. A photograph of the destroyed Sentra was entered as an exhibit. A victim impact statement of the owner of the Sentra was also entered as an exhibit. [ 15 ] After participating in the destruction of the Sentra, M.B. and others started to destroy a Hummer.

M.B. struck the Hummer with a piece of broken barricade, breaking one of the back side windows; he threw a mannequin through the back window; he assisted others in rocking the Hummer; and M.B. broke the driver’s side window with an object. His actions and the atmosphere at the scene are depicted in the DVD. The Hummer was completely destroyed. The victim impact statement of the owner of the Hummer was entered as an exhibit. [ 16 ] Sometime after his actions at the Parkade, M.B. left the area of downtown Vancouver. M.B. told police he left downtown via public transit, arriving home at approximately 10:30 p.m.

M.B.’s attendance at the police station [ 17 ] On August 30, 2011, an image of M.B. that was taken during the riot was posted on the Vancouver Police Department website. The website was designed to allow viewers to identify and provide information about photographs which were posted on the website. As a result of tips received through the website, a police officer contacted M.B., who agreed to meet with the officer on September 21, 2011. [ 18 ] M.B. attended at the Delta Police detachment on September 21, 2011, with his older sister, and gave a statement to the police. In that statement M.B. stated:

a) He went downtown to Vancouver with a couple of friends via SkyTrain. They watched the game on the big screen TV at the live site near the Bank of Montreal (“BMO”). M.B. said he was sharing a 26 ounce bottle of vodka with a friend and he was “pretty drunk.”

b) He recalled a car being set on fire when there were about 5 minutes left in the third period of the game. He observed a fight in front of the BMO and people smashing windows at the BMO and Budget Rental store on West Georgia Street. The police were running away. He walked by Blenz and another store that were destroyed. He saw a fire in the Parkade and went over to it.

c) M.B. was shown video clips of his actions at the Parkade and identified himself in the video. He said that the flipping over of the car took place prior to the mischief to the Hummer. He stated it was probably ten minutes before as he was there for maybe half an hour; further, a Hummer at the Parkade was already “torched”.

d) After his actions at the Parkade he took the SkyTrain home, arriving at about 10:30 p.m. that night. M.B. never told anyone about what happened, including his parents. He regretted his actions, and was concerned this one thing could ruin his whole life. Context and impact of the riot [ 19 ] Below is a

summary of the overall context and impact of the riot on Vancouver, its citizens, and businesses.

a) On the night of June 15, 2011, Emergency Personnel were deployed to the downtown core of Vancouver as follows: (i) 928 police officers of which 606 were members of the Vancouver Police Department and 322 were members from other lower mainland municipalities and the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (ii) 63 members of the Vancouver Fire and Rescue Services and;

(iii) 44 members of the British Columbia Ambulance Service.

b) There were more calls to 911 in the 4-hour period after the game than there had historically been in any 24-hour period. For example, at one point during the riot there were 92 calls to 911 for Ambulance Services placed on hold.

c) At approximately 8:17 p.m. Ambulance Services Command determined that the area east of Burrard Street was not safe and relocated all, except six of their members, to St. Paul’s Hospital. Six specially trained Ambulance Services members of the Integrated Tactical Support Unit (“ITSU”) remained with the police in the area of the riot. ITSU members responded to calls within the area of the riot and coordinated casualty removal to safe areas for treatment. The six ITSU members were the only medical resource available in the area of the riot. ITSU dealt with over 100 patients during the riot.

d) Between 6 p.m. on June 15 and 6 a.m. on June 16, St. Paul’s Hospital dealt with 150 emergency room visits. In comparison, Vancouver General Hospital dealt with 15 emergency room visits for the same time frame. St. Paul’s Hospital also set up a patient decontamination area outside of the emergency room to deal with patients suffering from exposure to tear gas or pepper spray. An additional 100 people were treated at the decontamination area.

e) The Integrated Riot Investigation Team of the Vancouver Police Department has identified 297 riot events. A riot event is an incident relating to either a certain location, such as London Drugs, a piece of property, such as a motor vehicle, or a person, such as a victim of an assault. For example, the break and enter to London Drugs located at 710 Granville Street, which involved looting of the store by approximately 300 individuals, was recorded as a single event. The 297 riot events involved: (i) 26 arsons; (ii) 193 mischief’s; (iii) 26 break and enters; and (iv) 52 assaults, of which 18 were civilians, 32 were police officers and 1 was a firefighter.

f) There were 116 arrests in the area of the riot on June 15.

g) During the riot: (i) 112 businesses were damaged; (ii) 122 vehicles were damaged or destroyed, divided into three main categories of: - 93 civilian vehicles; - 5 business vehicles; - 24 emergency vehicles (police and fire department);

h) The resulting monetary loss is: (i) $2,715,591.59 to businesses; (ii) $537,869 to civilians; (iii) $524,730 to the City of Vancouver, Ambulance Services and St. Paul’s Hospital.

i) As of February 2, 2012, the total estimated monetary loss as a result of the riot was $3,778,190.59. This figure is not a comprehensive representation of loss as 85 events have not provided estimates of loss and many additional costs such as lost wages, or labour costs for businesses have not been included.

j) The psychological impact of the riot is difficult to quantify as personal experiences varied greatly. Some persons barricaded themselves inside businesses for safety, others guarded their businesses against rioters, a number of citizens defended property or other persons at risk to themselves. Some people have sought counselling. What is common to all is that the riot has stripped a sense of safety and security from citizens of Vancouver. PERSONAL CIRCUMSTANCES OF M.B. [ 20 ] M.B. is the youngest of three children. He grew up in Surrey, British Columbia where he continues to live with his family.

He has a close relationship with his family and appears to have had a loving and supportive upbringing. He went to school in Surrey and appears to have had few issues at school until grade 11 when his attendance became an issue. He was expelled from the secondary school he was attending. His father intervened on his behalf and the school agreed to take him back if he caught up on what he had missed. Accordingly, he attended a learning centre and improved his grades and attendance.

He then returned to his former secondary school for the second semester and graduated in June 2012. [ 21 ] M.B.’s father owns his own business where M.B. has worked since he was a youngster. When M.B. was in school he worked part-time. At present he works for his father on a full-time basis and has done so since he graduated in June 2012. M.B. has aspirations

of becoming a heavy equipment operator [22] M.B. has participated in various sports including swimming, soccer and hockey. At present he is not involved in any organizedsports but works out at a gym on a regular basis. M.B. told the probation officer that his circle of friends are people he has known fromsports or school. He has known most of them for a long time. His father knows their parents. Many of his friends live in theneighbourhood where he lives and the families of his friends socialize with his family. [23] M.B. has not told any of his friends about this riot incident because he is not proud of it.

The young people he was with on June15, 2011, were not his usual group of friends. He was there with a young man he knew from school and his girlfriend and another femalefriend. M.B.’s father did not hear about the incident until after M.B. had turned himself in to the police. [24] The description of the incident M.B. gave to the probation officer was that he had gone downtown with a friend and his friend’stwo female friends to watch the hockey game. On the way downtown on the SkyTrain, M.B. heard people talking about rioting. Thegroup continued downtown nevertheless.

He reported that among the four of them they consumed a 26 ounce bottle of liquor. He saidhe was not a big drinker and was therefore quite drunk. He and his three friends went to the screen near the BMO. Even before the riotstarted fights were breaking out nearby. One took place in the garden near the bank. He and his friends remained to watch the end of thegame. [25] After the game he and his friends walked towards Blenz where they stopped and watched people smash the coffee shop. Hesaid they continued walking and saw a parkade on fire. At least three cars were on fire and the Black & Lee store was destroyed.

As heand his friends came around the corner they came upon two Hummers and the flipped car. He said the other Hummer, was already inflames. As they walked closer he saw someone was already smashing the windows on the Hummer. At this point M.B. grabbed a metalpiece from a street barricade and swung it. He missed the first time but connected the second time. He swung the barricade at the carwindow. He passed the metal bar to his friend who smashed the remaining windows. As his friend was smashing the windows, M.B.saw a mannequin near the vehicle and threw that.

The crowd surrounding the vehicle began trying to flip it over. M.B. said he tried tohelp but only got one hand on it. It was approximately at this point in time someone got shot with a beanbag. M.B. did not want to getshot so he walked away. PARTIES’ POSITIONS ON SENTENCING [26] The general issue to be decided in this case is the appropriate sentence to be imposed on M.B. given the applicable law, hispersonal circumstances and his participation in the riot.

However, a specific issue was raised by M.B., namely, whether a conditionaldischarge rather than a probation order ought to be imposed in his particular circumstances. Defence submissions [27] In support of his position M.B. argued that a conditional discharge would serve the objectives of the YCJA equally well as theprobation term sought by the Crown. Moreover, it would be more in keeping with the aim of the youth justice system which is morecorrective than punitive.

M.B. noted that the youth justice system (prior to the recent amendments) was more concerned withrehabilitation and restorative justice than denunciation and deterrence. He urged the court to be cautious not to “dress up” generaldeterrence and denunciation in the guise of meaningful consequences. He submitted that denunciation under the applicable YCJA has noplace in this sentencing process. He further asserted that determining a meaningful consequence requires a subjective analysis.

What ismeaningful must be addressed from this particular youth’s perspective. [28] M.B. acknowledged that he could not argue with the spirit of the probation conditions advanced by the Crown. He noted thatthe conditions make sense as far as meaningful consequences which serve the ends of making amends to the community, instilling asense of responsibility, and rehabilitating the young offender. However, he noted that each of those conditions can be imposed in thecontext of a conditional discharge. [29] M.B. relied on the analysis (but not the result) in R. v. R.P., 2004 ONCJ 190 , [2004] O.J.

No. 3845 to set the scene forhis submission that a conditional discharge is appropriate in this case. In that case Judge Duncan noted it was unfortunate and confusingto have a statutorily available sentence without the underlying raison d'être for that sentence. M.B. noted there is no provision under theYCJA for entering a conviction because youth records are kept for every youth contact. It is only when certain things happen that aconviction is entered. [30] M.B. relied on Judge Duncan’s comments to emphasize that under the YCJA a discharge is not an alternative to conviction.

This is so because under the YCJA every young offender is deemed not to have been found guilty or convicted once his sentence iscompleted. He noted R. v. R.P. identifies that one of the consequences of a discharge is that the “record access period” may be differentfrom the “record access period” that would apply in the case of probation. M.B. adopted the observations Judge Duncan in R. v.

R.P. tothe effect that, unlike adult discharges where there is a clearly identifiable public-interest in maintaining the deterrent and denunciatoryvalue of a criminal record, there is no similar identifiable public interest in youth cases in respect of the technical and scarcely knownworkings of the “record access period”. [31] M.B. also relied on R. v. P.J.S. [2008] N.S.J.

No. 538 for the proposition that the usual test used in adult cases (which considerwhether the discharge is in the best interests of the accused and not contrary to the public interest) does not apply to a conditionaldischarge in youth matters. He submitted that the factors to consider in deciding between a discharge and other non-custodial dispositionare set out in s. 38 of the YCJA.

In this regard he urged this court to give due consideration to the comments of Judge Duncan in R. v.R.P. [32] M.B. noted that the granting of a conditional discharge in his case would mean the period of access to his records would be

three years from the date of his guilty plea. However if a period of probation is imposed, the record access period is three years from the date the sentence is completed for a

summary conviction offence and five years for an indictable offence. M.B. submitted that, if a period of 18 months probation were imposed on him, the total record access period would be 6 1/2 years. M.B. asserted the significance of this is that if he were convicted of an adult offence during that period then, even though he may have completed his sentence on this matter, it could be resurrected and a finding of guilt for the participation in the riot could be entered on his adult criminal record. M.B. argued this is a matter of significant concern.

M.B. submitted that, even if his best interests and the interests of the public are not prerequisites to determining whether a young person should receive a conditional discharge, I should nevertheless take into account that by not granting a conditional discharge I could be saddling a young person with consequences that may affect his life indefinitely. M.B. urged me to look carefully at the potential effects of denying a conditional discharge in his case. [ 33 ] M.B. argued I am not bound by and should not follow the decision of my brother Judge Romilly in R. v. D.M.F. (18 January 2013) Vancouver 22594-1 (B.C.

Prov. Ct.). He submitted that decision is not persuasive because Judge Romilly appears to have equated “parity” in sentencing with “comity”. Moreover, he argued that Judge Romilly appears to have elevated the principle of judicial comity to that of stare decisis . He pointed to Judge Romilly’s comment that none of the youth riot sentencing cases before this court have resulted in any form of discharge. He also pointed to a comment in paragraph 21 which suggests Judge Romilly believed comity prevented him from considering a discharge.

M.B. argued, even if comity could be said to apply, that principle does not oblige me to follow Judge Romilly’s decision because to do so would ignore the individualized nature of sentencing. Crown's submissions [ 34 ] The Crown, on the other hand, argued that a probation order was the appropriate sentence in the circumstances of this case. It relied on Judge Romilly’s sentencing decision in R. v. D.M.F. In that case counsel for the accused young person argued a conditional discharge was appropriate, whereas, the Crown sought an intensive support and supervision order. Defence counsel in R. v.

D.M.F. argued that because there is a longer records access period for a probation order than for a conditional discharge, D.M.F. might find his ability to secure employment, after completing an apprenticeship, hampered. Defence counsel in that case argued the YCJA requires the least restrictive sentence to be imposed, and that was a conditional discharge. [ 35 ] In R. v. D.M.F. Judge Romilly reviewed some of the same cases that were placed before this court by M.B. He concluded those cases raised distinctions without significant differences. He adopted the comments of the trial judge in R. v.

P.J.M. to the effect that it is not a productive exercise in an individual case to anguish over the differences and to attempt to come up with a unified model of sentencing under the YCJA . Instead the court should choose a sanction that achieves the sentencing goals in the individual case. [ 36 ] Judge Romilly concluded that a conditional discharge would not be sufficient to hold the young person he was sentencing accountable or provide a meaningful consequence for taking

part in the mayhem of the riot. Additionally, Judge Romilly concluded the doctrine of comity operated against the granting of a conditional discharge. He noted that judges are bound by the range of sentences that fellow judges have imposed for similar offences involving similar circumstances. He observed that none of the riot sentencing cases in B.C. Provincial Court involving young persons had resulted in any form of discharge. [ 37 ] The Crown also relied on R. v. P.H. [2012] N.J. No. 434 , a case which involved the sentencing of a young person for criminal negligence causing bodily harm.

In that case both counsel asked the court impose a discharge with conditions or a period of probation for two years. Judge Gorman, in reviewing the position of the parties, noted that the distinction between a discharge with conditions and a period of probation was minimal except for access to records. He also noted that the imposition of a discharge reflects a court’s view of the seriousness of an offence, whether applied to an adult or a young offender.

Young offenders are subject to the sentencing principle of proportionality, although that principle does not play the central role in youth sentences as it does in adult sentences. However, proportionality does require that a judicial distinction be made between a discharge with conditions and a period of probation. He noted: “In this case, the seriousness of the offence and its consequences for the victim militate against resort to the discharge provision.”. After analyzing the case law and the principles that apply to sentencing under the YCJA, he imposed a sentence of two years probation. [ 38 ] In R. v.

J.J.P., [2009] N.S.J. No. 305 the court sentenced an aboriginal youth on a charge of robbery. The Crown sought a community-based sentence whereas the defence sought a conditional discharge. The defence submission for a conditional discharge was rooted in the principle under the YCJA that requires the imposition of the least restrictive sentence capable of achieving the purpose of youth sentencing under the YCJA . The court noted that the best interest of the young person and the public interest are not prerequisites for a conditional discharge under the YCJA .

Therefore, judicial discretion to order a conditional discharge for a young person must be exercised in the context of the general principles found in s. 3 of the YCJA and is governed by the sentencing principles in s. 38. The court further noted that the Nova Scotia Court of Appeal, in an earlier case, held that the main difference between a probation order and a conditional discharge is the length of time a youth’s record is accessible under s. 119 of the YCJA .

The court further noted that, although the conditions in a probation order and the conditions attached to a conditional discharge may look the same, there are differences in the consequences that flow from the sentence imposed. Those differences are the term of access to the record and what happens if, during the period of access, an adult offence were to be committed. The court said its focus had to be on what constituted the least restrictive sentence for the accused that also achieved the sentencing objectives of fair and proportionate accountability and meaningful consequences.

The court noted there was nothing to distinguish a conditional discharge from a probation order in terms of rehabilitation and reintegration as those objectives were achieved through the conditions themselves. [ 39 ] The court imposed an 18 months probation order instead of a conditional discharge. The court concluded that a conditional discharge did not fulfill the requirements of the YCJA on the facts of the case before it. It noted there was no provision in the YCJA for a revocation of a conditional discharge.

The court further noted the fact the youth conviction for robbery may be included in the young person’s criminal record, if he committed a criminal offence in future, was a meaningful consequence. The court said: “Even if practically speaking a conditional discharge looks very like a probation order, it could be seen as a less significant sentence which cannot be justified in this case where parity is an important principle.” [ 40 ] The Crown also brought to this court’s attention the decision in R. v. P.J.M. [2009] A.J. No. 813 . In that case the young

offender pled guilty to resisting a police officer and causing a disturbance in or near a public place. The Crown and the defence jointly recommended a conditional discharge. In that case the court undertook a detailed review of conditional discharges in the context of youth sentencing. It reviewed a number of cases which dealt with the points of distinction between adult and youth discharges, the effect of discharges under the YCJA , and a comparison of probation versus conditional discharge. The court granted a conditional discharge and imposed conditions. [ 41 ] In the matter before me the Crown submitted that taking

part in a riot is a serious offence. Imposing a conditional discharge on M.B. would not be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of his responsibility. The Crown also argued it would not be a meaningful consequence for M.B. and therefore would not be consistent with the principles set out in the YCJA . APPLICABLE LAW The Youth Criminal Justice Act [ 42 ] In Canada young persons between the ages of 12 and 18 years who are accused of crimes have criminal charges dealt with in youth court. The YCJA governs various matters relating to young persons accused of crimes, including sentencing.

Section 3 of the YCJA , sets out the principles that must be applied in the criminal justice system for young persons: 3.

(1) The following principles apply in this Act : (

a) the youth criminal justice system is intended to (

i) prevent crime by addressing the circumstances underlying a young person's offending behaviour, (ii) rehabilitate young persons who commit offences and reintegrate them into society, and (iii) ensure that a young person is subject to meaningful consequences for his or her offence in order to promote the long-term protection of the public; (

b) the criminal justice system for young persons must be separate from that of adults and emphasize the following: (

i) rehabilitation and reintegration, (ii) fair and proportionate accountability that is consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity, (iii) enhanced procedural protection to ensure that young persons are treated fairly and that their rights, including their right to privacy, are protected, (iv) timely intervention that reinforces the link between the offending behaviour and its consequences, and (

v) the promptness and speed with which persons responsible for enforcing this Act must act, given young persons’ perception of time; [ 43 ] Additionally, the provisions of the YCJA , in particular s. 38, make it clear that, when sentencing young offenders, a jail sentence is a last resort. The emphasis in youth sentencing is on:

a) fair and proportionate accountability, consistent with the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity;

b) parity with sentences imposed on similar young persons for the same offence committed in similar circumstances;

c) restraint in that a sentence for a young person must not result in a punishment that is greater than punishment that would be appropriate for an adult convicted of the same offence in similar circumstances;

d) proportionality in that a sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence;

e) courts must impose the least restrictive sentence that is capable of holding a young person accountable while imposing just sanctions that have meaningful consequences and that promote the young persons rehabilitation and reintegration into society;

f) the sentence imposed must promote a sense of responsibility in the young person and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community. [ 44 ] Section 38(3) of the YCJA sets out the factors to be considered in determining an appropriate youth sentence. Those factors are:

a) the degree of participation by the young person in the commission of the offence;

b) the harm done to victims and whether it was intentional or reasonably foreseeable;

c) any reparation made by the young person to the victim or the community;

d) the time spent in detention by the young person as a result of the offence;

e) the previous findings of guilt of the young person;

f) any other aggravating and mitigating circumstances related to the young person or the offence that are relevant to the purpose andprinciples set out in this section. [45] In determining a fit sentence for an adult offender the court must take into account a number of objectives includingdenunciation and deterrence. However, under the YCJA it is not necessary to hold a young person accountable to society in the broadersense through a sentence which incorporates the principles of denunciation and deterrence. The Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.

P.(B.W.) (2006) 2006 SCC 27 , 209 C.C.C. (3d) 97, in interpreting the YCJA (which has recently been amended) ruled thatgeneral and specific deterrence is not a principle of youth sentencing. [46] The YCJA states that “long term protection of the public” is achieved by: addressing the circumstances underlying the offendingbehaviour, rehabilitation and reintegration of the young person, and holding the young person accountable through the imposition ofmeaningful sanctions related to the harm done. Certain provisions of the YCJA were recently amended and came into force October2012.

The amendments include the addition of specific deterrence and denunciation as sentencing objectives that may apply to youngpersons sentenced under the YCJA. However, the offence in M.B.’s case occurred before the amendments came into force, therefore theformer provisions of YCJA and their

interpretation by the courts apply in this case. [47] R. v. K.T.W. 2012 BCPC 52, Judge Baird Ellan, summarized the underlying philosophy of the YCJA as follows: [4] What the Act does not do is prescribe sentences that denounce crime or deter the young person or others. Those are adult conceptsthat do not apply in the youth sphere.

If there were a simple way to describe the differences in focus of the two regimes, it wouldprobably be that the aim of the youth system is more corrective than punitive, recognizing the greater responsibility that society has forensuring that a young person is not criminalized, in the long term. [5] The adult sentiment that a sentence should (simply) be appropriately punitive, for a child, must be replaced with a measured emphasison meaningful consequences and accountability, along with rehabilitation.

Proportionality also has a different meaning than it does foran adult offender, given the child’s dependency. [6] Custody, for an adult, means imprisonment. For a child, it means removal from his home and his parents, his situation ofdependency, and isolation in a custodial setting.

One has only to recall the devastating effects of the residential school systems torecognize that isolation from family support is not a constructive experience for a child, and is far less likely to promote responsiblebehavior in the long term. [7] While the adult sentencing regime includes the principle that custody is a last resort, the youth scheme only permits custodialsentences in certain very narrow circumstances.

A child without a record who commits a violent offence is eligible for a sentence ofcustody (Section 39(1) (a)), but the Court is still required to consider all available sanctions other than custody, and to impose the leastrestrictive sanctions, those most likely to rehabilitate and reintegrate the young person, as well as to hold him accountable for his actions:Sections 38(2) (

d) and (e). [8] In connection with the purpose of the YCJA sentencing regime, Barclay J. of the SKQB made the following observation in R. v.Turcotte, 2008 SKQB 478: [8] Section 3(1) (

b) of the YCJA recognizes a clear intention of Parliament and a primary objective of the YCJA to create a distinct youthjustice regime separate from that used for adults. This separate regime is founded on the notion that younger individuals, because of theirage, have heightened vulnerability, less maturity and a reduced capacity for moral judgment which entitles them to a presumption ofdiminished moral blameworthiness or culpability: R. v.

D.B. 2008 SCC 25 , [2008] 2 S.C.R. 3, at para. 41. [48] The YCJA directs that there must be fair and proportionate accountability, taking into account the reduced maturity level of theyoung person. This is a central principle in sentencing young offenders. As my brother Judge St. Pierre said in the case of R. v. S.P.G.[2012] B.C.J. No. 1889 at paragraph 6: [6]…the Youth Criminal Justice Act does not…immunize people under 18 from fair and proportionate accountability for their actions.

There is, however, a balance that must be struck in light of the provisions of the Youth Criminal Justice Act and that is relating to youthsentencing principles. These principles are different in a material nature from those that are applied to adults. Parliament has intendedthat. That is the law. Parliament has directed judges to adopt a firm policy that the criminal justice system for youth be separate fromthat of adults… [49] In considering the sentence proposed for M.B., I must take into account the principles which underlie the YCJA, in particularthose set out in s. 3(

a) and (b). How participating in a riot is characterized

[50] The case law cited by the Crown and not disputed by the defence clearly establishes the following: a. Participation in the June 15 riot is a serious offence. b. Rioting, by definition, disturbs the peace of the community tumultuously. It is public disorder that has escalated to the point of actualor threatened force or violence, and that causes people of reasonable firmness and courage to be alarmed; R. v. Brien, (1993), 8L C.C.C.(3d) 550 (NWTSC) . c. Participating in a riot, by its very nature, is a serious threat to an orderly society: see R. v. Loewen, (1992) (BCCA), 75 C.C.C. (3d) 184 (BCCA). d.

Participation in a riot, as defined in s.64 of the Code: does not require the commission of separate criminal offences. One can beculpable of participating in a riot by “word, deed or other manner”, R. v. Brien, at para. 38, so long as the person’s actions “contributedto the excitement, fervor, intimidation and dangerousness” of the situation: see R. v. Loewen at para. 45. e. In R. v. Dickinson, 2012 BCPC 40, the first rioting case dealing with the 2011 Stanley Cup riot, Judge MacLean set out theanalytical framework for sentencing an accused for participating in a riot.

That framework was adopted by Judge Wingham in R. v. B.G.(28 August 2012), Vancouver 22591-1 (B.C. Prov. Ct.), at paras. 12 and 13, but modified to address the principles of youth sentencing. The factors to consider are: 1. the offender’s degree of participation, 2. the context of the riot generally, including the impact on the victims, 3. the offender’s personal circumstances; and 4. the principles of sentencing set out in the YCJA. B.C. riot related sentences for young offenders [51] Other judges of this court have sentenced other young persons charged with taking

part in the riot. Some of those decisionswere recently reviewed by Judge McMillan in R. v. J.C.M. (22 October 2012), Vancouver 22591-1 (B.C. Prov. Ct.). Summaries of thosecases are set out below:

a) R. v. J.G. (1992) (BC CA), 15 BCAC 128, is a decision of our Court of Appeal dealing with a 16 year oldPenticton rioter without a prior criminal record. The Court of Appeal allowed his sentence appeal and imposed a sentence of 22 monthsprobation with strict conditions including 120 hours of community work service.

b) R. v. E.P. 2007 BCPC 159 , 2007 BCPC 0159, is a decision of my brother Judge O’Byrne. The riot in this case occurred ata house party that went dreadfully wrong. The rioters refused to disperse and threw bottles, roman candles and Molotov cocktails at thepolice. The damage incurred was $9,500. While Judge O’Byrne stated he must consider jail for E.P., he ultimately followed JudgeAuxier’s decision in R. v. B. (J.), [1995] BCWLD 052. In that case, B.J., who had a prior conviction for an assault, participated in the1994 Vancouver Stanley Cup riot.

She did not plead guilty to rioting but rather to charges of break and enter and assault with a weapon. She had spent six weeks in pre-sentence custody and was therefore given a sentence of time served to be followed by a 12 monthprobation period. Judge O’Byrne sentenced E.P. to 18 months probation with a 7 p.m. curfew for the first 10 months in addition to 100hours of community work service.

c) R. v. S.P.G. [2012] B.C.J. No. 1889, is a decision of my brother Judge St. Pierre. The youth in that case was 17 years old, drunk andhad come downtown after the game. He kicked the back of a Hummer once and then repeatedly hit another car with his skateboard. S.P.G. had no prior record and was otherwise of good character. He was remorseful and had insight into what he had done. Judge St.Pierre sentenced him to 18 months probation, which included terms to abstain from alcohol and a curfew, both of which were of 3 monthsduration, and 100 hours of community work service.

d) In R. v. B.G. (28 August 2012), Vancouver 22591-1 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) my brother Judge Wingham sentenced B.G., who was 17 yearsold and without any criminal record, to an intensive support and supervision order for 18 months, a condition of which included 120hours of community work service. This young person’s only involvement had been to enter London Drugs and steal cosmetics andcigarettes.

e) In R. v. R.L.J. (17 September 2012), Vancouver 22585-1 (B.C. Prov. Ct.) a decision of my brother Judge Romilly, the youth was 17years old and had no prior criminal record. She went into a Blenz coffee store and stole a syrup bottle and some coffee sleeves. As sheleft, she threw the bottle back towards the store. She turned herself in to police prior to being charged. Judge Romilly sentenced her toprobation for a period of 12 months with strict conditions including 125 hours of community work service. [52] Other decisions submitted by the Crown which have been issued since the above noted decisions, are:

a) In R. v. C.S.W. and D.J.S.C. (22 October 2012), Vancouver 22587-2, 22590-1, (B.C. Prov. Ct.). Judge Romilly sentenced two youngmen for shattering a glass window of a store and of a bank and also indulging in looting. No alcohol seems to have been involved. JudgeRomilly said their participation could not be described as minimal. They seemed very conscious of the fact they were taking

part in themayhem. The judge concluded this was a once-in-a-lifetime aberration. He imposed an 18 month probation order which included a

curfew (for six months), a letter of apology to the Bank of Montreal and Black & Lee Formal Wear as well as 100 hours of community work service.

b) In R. v. S.P.G. 2012 BCPC 312 , my sister Judge Rae sentenced a youth who was almost 17 years old in June 2011 and who was personally involved in damaging a police vehicle parked on Nelson Street and eventually helping others to overturn it. He then went to the Bay where he threw fuel into a fire started inside a BMW which resulted in the destruction of the car. He had a prior minor record. Judge Rae concluded his offences constituted exceptional circumstances and therefore a six month deferred custody and supervision order was appropriate, to be followed by 18 months probation.

The probation order included an area restriction and 150 hours of community work service. [ 53 ] The Crown submitted an updated chart which contains a

summary of the above- noted decisions as well as other sentencing decisions of this court on the 2011 Stanley Cup riot-related offences. I have attached the updated chart as Appendix B to these reasons for sentence. ANALYSIS [ 54 ] I begin my analysis in this case by referring to the analysis of my sister Judge Dhillon in an unreported riot-related sentencing case R. v. Chou (8 February 2013) Vancouver 223533 – 1 (B.C. Prov. Ct.). That case dealt with the sentencing of an adult but youthful offender so the YCJA did not apply.

Accordingly, although I refer to a part of the analysis in that case, I am mindful the sentencing principles I apply to M.B. must not focus on deterrence and denunciation but rather the principles set out in the YCJA . [ 55 ] The offence committed by M.B. ought to be considered from two different perspectives, namely: (

a) from the general perspective of his participation in the riot and how that is viewed by the courts, and also from (

b) his personal perspective, in particular the specific acts he committed and where they fall in the spectrum of offences committed by other young offenders who have been sentenced by this court. [ 56 ] As noted by Judge Dhillon, the video images played during the sentencing hearing clearly show that the actions of the mob rendered law and order ineffective: The mob mentality is incendiary and destroys the fabric of civil society. It undermines the rule of law, and gives licence to those who seek to perpetrate chaos and mayhem.

When group unrest evolves to lawlessness, those who choose to stay in their midst are not innocent bystanders – their presence gives tacit or overt encouragement to others to join the fray. The group as a whole offers the shield of perceived anonymity to those individuals who, bolstered by adrenaline or a false sense of bravado, feel free to commit acts of lawlessness for thrill seeking and personal gain. As has become evident, it is a fleeting anonymity in the age of social media. The force of the group also intimidates decent law-abiding people from acting to prevent the wrongs.

Those who might decry the bad behavior are silenced or deterred, leaving the rioter to act with impunity. Police faced with large crowds of hostile people and projectiles are neutralized. (paras. 28 and 29) [ 57 ] As noted in R. v. Loewen participating in a riot is a serious offence. Our Court of Appeal as recently as March 19, 2013 commented on this in R. v. Peepre , 2013 BCCA 115 : Special considerations apply to sentences imposed for participation in a riot.

Sentencing an offender for participation in criminal acts that involve widespread public disorder requires the court to look not only at the offender’s individual conduct, but also the broader context in which the individual participated. A rioter is culpable not only for his conduct: he bears, in a general way, the share of responsibility for the more widespread acts of lawlessness in which he participated: [case citations omitted]. Citizens of Vancouver and members of the larger community present at the scene of the Stanley Cup riot were terrorized by the acts of violence to persons and property that occurred.

That violence, and the public's consequential feeling that law and order had been cast aside, is significant in our consideration of the fitness of Mr. Peepre’s sentence. Participation in a riot is a deliberate criminal act that has grave consequences for the safety and security of our community.

The corollary of that fact is that those who participate must expect to be punished severely by using the deterrent and denunciatory effects of sentencing in a manner that accounts for the current conditions in and values of the community, courts can discourage individuals from participating in acts of public violence and, hopefully, prevent the recurrence of events like the Stanley Cup riot. (para. 27) [ 58 ] I appreciate that in M.B.’s case the reference to denunciation and deterrence, which are specific factors to be considered in adult sentencing, must give way to the provisions of the YCJA which, at the time of this offence, did not include deterrence and denunciation of young offenders as an objective of sentencing.

Nevertheless, the comments of the court give guidance when considering the factors set out in s. 38 of the YCJA in particular: fair and proportionate accountability, parity with sentences imposed on similar young persons for riot related offences, proportionality, and the promotion of a sense of responsibility in the young person and acknowledgment of the harm done to victims and the community. [ 59 ] M.B. participation in the riot consisted of the following:

a) He remained in the downtown core and did not leave although it is clear that serious vandalism and looting was taking place. In fact, M.B. was present during part of the destruction of the Blenz coffee shop.

b) Instead of leaving the scene he went to the outdoor portion of the Parkade and there helped others as they tried to overturn the blue Sentra.

c) The video and photographs entered as exhibits clearly show that M.B. kicked the blue Sentra and that he and his friend Mr. Burkett

helped others as they tried to overturn the blue Sentra which was subsequently determined to be a total loss by the insurance company.

d) After participating in the destruction of Sentra, M.B. and others started to destroy a Hummer. In particular M.B. struck the Hummer with a piece of broken barricade and broke one of the backside windows. He also threw a mannequin through the back window. He broke the driver side window with an object and assisted others in rocking the Hummer.

The Hummer was completely destroyed. [ 60 ] A review of the materials filed as exhibits at the sentencing hearing clearly indicates that although M.B.’s conduct was not at the high end of the destructive and illegal behavior that occurred during the riot it cannot be said to be at the low end. He actively participated in the destruction of two vehicles. It is clear that M.B.’s specific individual conduct, separate and apart from his mere presence at the scene, contributed to the atmosphere of lawlessness. Moreover, by his continued presence at the scene he encouraged other rioters.

Defence counsel in his submissions pointed to the regrettable negative effects of alcohol and the mob mentality on M.B. As noted in R. v. Chou , the suggestion that an offender was caught up in the moment and committed an opportunistic crime does not lessen the moral gravity of the offence. [ 61 ] In this case, it is clear M.B.’s actions were intentional and his conduct contributed to the destabilizing, illegal and destructive conduct of others. M.B.’s diminished inhibitions because he was drunk and because of the actions of those around him are not mitigating factors.

A review of the video submitted in evidence shows that in the midst of this mayhem there were many persons who remained at the scene and watched what was unfolding yet did not actively participate in the unlawful conduct. M.B., on the other hand, actively participated in the destruction of not just one but two vehicles in the vicinity of West Georgia Street and Richards Street. [ 62 ] The mitigating factors in this case are that M.B. is a youth. He was almost 17 years old at the time of the riot. He has no record of other offences and he has pled guilty.

I have also considered the fact that he was cooperative with the police. However, I note that he did not turn himself in but instead was contacted by the police as a result of tips received through the VPD website. [ 63 ] In determining a fit sentence for M.B. I must consider whether a conditional discharge is appropriate in his specific circumstances. As was noted in R. v. P.J.S. and in R. v. J.J.P. , the best interests of the young person and the public interest are not prerequisites for a conditional discharge pursuant to s. 42 (2) (

c) of the YCJA . Accordingly, in considering whether to exercise my judicial discretion to order a conditional discharge for M.B., I must consider the general principles set out in s.3 and the specific sentencing principles set out in s. 38 of the YCJA . [ 64 ] M.B. has submitted that a conditional discharge is the appropriate sentence because conditions can be imposed but he will not have the burden of an unduly long “records access period” that could potentially affect him if he committed an offence as an adult during that period.

Under s. 82 of the YCJA , a young person is deemed not to have been found guilty or convicted of an offence once the sentence order expires, no matter what type of sentence is imposed. Accordingly, a discharge under the YCJA , whether absolute or conditional, does not have the same effect as a discharge under the Criminal Code . Section 730 (3) of the Criminal Code provides that an adult offender who receives a discharge is deemed not to have been convicted. There is no comparable provision in the YCJA .

However, the same effect is achieved by virtue of s. 82 which applies to all young persons sentenced under the YCJA . [ 65 ] The significance of a discharge under the YCJA , however, is that there are differences in the consequences that flow from a discharge. The consequence focused on in M.B.’s case is that the record access period is different between a probation order with conditions and a conditional discharge with conditions. The access period for a conditional discharge is three years from the finding of guilt.

At the end of that access period the young person is deemed not have been found guilty or convicted of that offence. The Crown noted that, given the provisions of s. 119 of the YCJA , if a young person is found guilty of further offences committed during the access period, it would extend the record access period. Moreover, if during the term of the record access period the young offender is convicted of an offence committed as an adult the conditional discharge is specifically excluded.

This means that after three years from the finding of guilt the young person will be deemed not to have been found guilty or convicted of the underlying offence for which he received a conditional discharge. [ 66 ] On the other hand, if a young person is given a sentence of probation with conditions, the record access period begins to run after the youth sentence has been completed. The access period following a sentence on a

summary conviction offence is three years and on an indictable offence it is five years. The Crown proceeded by indictment in this case, therefore, the period of access to M.B.’s youth record would be five years from the time he completed probation, if that is the youth sentence imposed. A fit sentence for M.B. [ 67 ] I have concluded that a conditional discharge, given the circumstances of this offence and this young offender, does not meet the sentencing objectives set out in the YCJA for the following reasons:

a) It would not represent fair and proportionate accountability. In addressing this factor I am cognizant I must take into account the greater dependency of young persons and their reduced level of maturity. However, a conditional discharge would not appropriately reflect M.B.’s deliberate and conscious actions and his level of participation in the riot.

b) The sentence I impose on M.B. ought to reflect a degree of parity with sentences imposed on similar young persons for the same offence, committed in similar circumstances. A review of the sentencing chart submitted by the Crown satisfies me that parity does not favor a conditional discharge in these circumstances.

c) Restraint is required in that the sentence for M.B. must not result in a punishment that is greater than the punishment that would be appropriate for an adult convicted of the same offence in similar circumstances. I am satisfied that a probation order, rather than a conditional discharge would satisfy the principle of restraint. M.B.’s friend, Mr. B1, who was with him that evening, was sentenced in adult court to a jail sentence to be served in the community under a three month Conditional Sentence Order followed by 12 months

probation. The sentence sought by the Crown for M.B. is not greater than the punishment that would be appropriate for an adult convicted of the same offence in similar circumstances. In particular it is not greater than the jail sentence imposed on Mr. B1.

d) Proportionality requires that the sentence must be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the young person for that offence. The case law makes clear that participation in a riot is a deliberate criminal act that has grave consequences for the safety and security of the community. Given the nature of the riot and M.B.’s participation in it, I am satisfied a conditional discharge would not be proportionate to the seriousness of the offence and the degree of responsibility of M.B.

e) The YCJA provides that long-term protection of the public is achieved by addressing the underlying circumstances of the offending behavior, rehabilitation and reintegration of the young person, and holding the young person accountable through the imposition of meaningful sanctions relating to the harm done. In this case, I am satisfied the difference in the record access period that flows from a probation order is an appropriate and meaningful consequence for the harm caused by M.B.’s participation in the riot. In

summary, a conditional discharge is not a fit sentence in the circumstances; instead, I will impose a period of probation. [ 68 ] I will now address the length and terms of the probation order. The probation order will be for 18 months. M.B. made several submissions regarding the appropriateness of the conditions proposed by the Crown. Those submissions were:

a) The community work service hours – in this case the Crown asked for 120 - 150 hours of community work service. However, M.B. noted that Mr. B1, his friend who was sentenced in adult court, only received 50 hours of community work service.

b) The curfew – M.B. submitted the curfew sought by the Crown is superfluous because his father has imposed one. He submitted his father is a very involved and in touch parent and it would be reasonable for the court to confidently delegate the supervisory responsibility to him. M.B. submitted the only reason to impose a curfew would be for someone’s rehabilitation when it creates meaningful consequences. He has already been dealing with those consequences and has been on curfew as a result of restrictions imposed by his father. [ 69 ] I have considered the sentence imposed by Judge Senniw on Mr.

Burkett (see, R. v. Burkett , [2012] B.C.J. No. 1892 ) who was sentenced in adult court. However, in determining the appropriate sentence for M.B. I must consider the totality of the sentence and not just the individual elements. Mr. Burkett received a jail sentence to be served in the community under a Conditional Sentence Order. He also received 12 months probation with conditions. Restraint in this case does not require that I impose exactly the same number of community work service hours as were imposed on Mr. Burkett.

I am satisfied that in all of the circumstances 110 work service hours is appropriate for M.B. Additionally, I have concluded that although M.B. may have been subjected to a curfew imposed by his father that does not and ought not to take the place of a court imposed curfew as part of the sentence imposed by this court. Accordingly, there will be a curfew condition in the probation order. These and other conditions that apply to M.B. during the probation period are set out in Appendix A. _________________________ M.F.

Giardini Provincial Court Judge Appendix A PROBATION ORDER (18 months) Mandatory Statutory Conditions (s. 55(1)) 1. You shall keep the peace and be of good behaviour. 2. You shall appear before the youth justice court when required by the court to do so. Optional Conditions 3. You shall report no later than 4 p.m. on May 15, 2013 to a Youth Worker at 800 Hornby Street and thereafter as and where directed by your youth worker. 4. You shall reside at a residence approved of by your Youth Worker and you shall not change that residence without first obtaining the

written consent of your Youth Worker. 5. You shall attend school or such other vocational or educational day program as directed by your Youth Worker, or seek and maintain employment to the satisfaction of your Youth Worker. 6. You must provide regular proof of your employment to your Youth Worker. 7. For the first 8 months of the order, you are not to be outside your place of residence between the hours of 10 p.m. to 6 a.m. daily.

You are to remain in your residence during those hours except when in the direct accompaniment of your father, L.B., and/or your mother, J.M., or with the written permission of your Youth Worker obtained in advance. Such permission must be carried on your person and presented upon request to a peace officer, or a Youth Worker or his/her designate. 8.

You shall also present yourself at the door of your residence and answer your telephone when any peace officer or Youth Worker or his/her designate attends at your residence or telephones you for the purposes of determining your compliance with the conditions of this Order. 9. You shall attend, participate and complete any such counselling as directed by your Youth Worker. 10. You shall abstain from the possession and consumption of alcohol and non-prescription drugs. 11.

You shall not be found in the area of Vancouver, British Columbia bounded by Pender Street to the north; Davie Street to the south; Thurlow Street to the west and Abbot Street and Pacific Boulevard to the east except for the purpose of attending your scheduled court appearances, or attending scheduled appointments with your Youth Worker, and taking your mother, J.M., to appointments, or in the company of your father, L.B., or with the written permission of your Youth Worker.

Such permission is to be carried upon your person at all times and presented to a peace officer or Youth Worker or his/her designate upon request. 12. You are not to possess any weapons as defined by the Criminal Code . 13. You are to write a letter of apology to the satisfaction of your Youth Worker to the Vancouver City Council, addressed to Mr. Gregor Robertson, apologizing for your participation in the riot. This must be given to your Youth Worker no later than June 9, 2013. 14.

You shall complete 110 community work service hours as directed and to the satisfaction of your Youth Worker no later than 15 days before the end of this order.