2020 QCCA 4, 2020 QCCA 4

Boulachanis c. R. 2020 QCCA 4 COURT OF APPEAL CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC REGISTRY OF MONTREAL No: 500-10-006351-173 500-10-006352-171 (500-01-131339-159) DATE: January 8, 2020 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.A. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A. JOHN BOULACHANIS APPELLANT / APPLICANT – Accused v. HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN RESPONDENT – Prosecutor JUDGMENT [ 1 ] The appellant John Boulachanis appeals the judgment of the Superior Court (the Hon. Mr. Justice Michael Stober) rendered on October 6, 2016 dismissing his application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(

b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms , and the verdict of conviction of first degree murder of Robert Tanguay committed on or about August 9, 1997 contrary to s.235 Cr.C . rendered on December 17, 2016 by a jury of the Superior Court at which the Hon. Mr.

Justice Michael Stober presided. [ 2 ] For the reasons of Hilton, J.A., with which Marcotte and Schrager, JJ.A. agree , THE COURT : [ 3 ] DISMISSES the appeals . [ 4 ] ACKNOWLEDGES the appellant’s discontinuance of his application for leave to appeal the sentence imposed by the trial judge arising out of a clerical error in the determination of the appellant’s period of ineligibility for parole. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A. GENEVIÈVE MARCOTTE, J.A. MARK SCHRAGER, J.A.

Mtre Marc Labelle LABELLE CÔTÉ TABAH AND ASSOCIATES Mtre Annik Magri For the appellant Mtre Patrick Cardinal Mtre Pierre Olivier Gagnon DIRECTOR OF CRIMINAL AND PENAL PROSECUTIONS For the respondent Date of hearing: March 12, 2019

REASONS OF HILTON, J.A. [ 5 ] This is an appeal from a verdict of conviction pronounced on December 17, 2016 by a jury of the Superior Court at which the Hon. Mr. Justice Michael Stober [1] presided that found the appellant John Boulachanis guilty of having committed the first degree murder of Robert Tanguay on August 9, 1997. Mr. Boulachanis has also appealed a judgment Stober, J. rendered on October 6, 2016 that dismissed his application for a stay of proceedings pursuant to s. 11(

b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms in which he alleged there was an unreasonable delay in bringing him to trial. [2] I. THE FACTS [ 6 ] The trial judge described the underlying facts at considerable length in the stay of proceedings judgment to which I have just referred. Their accuracy is not disputed. [ 7 ] Mr. Boulachanis was involved with Mr. Tanguay, M. B. and L. L. in the theft of automobiles and the transformation of their appearance in order to facilitate their resale. Mr. Boulachanis and the latter two accomplices came to believe that Mr.

Tanguay was about to disclose these illegal activities to police authorities. Mr. Boulachanis had also let it be known that he was involved in an extra-marital relationship with Mr. Tanguay’s wife. [ 8 ] After having taken preparatory measures to carry out their plan, on the day of the murder Messrs. B. and L. dug a large hole in a quarry in Rigaud. Mr. B. then brought Mr. Tanguay there under false pretenses, while Mr. Boulachanis drove Mr. L. to the site. Upon his arrival, Mr. Tanguay was summarily executed by a gunshot to the head.

His corpse was immediately buried in the hole that had just been dug, which the three assailants immediately covered. [ 9 ] Mr. Boulachanis and the two accomplices then departed to the home of Mr. L.. Later that evening, Mr. Boulachanis handed the weapon used to kill Mr. Tanguay to Réal Séguin and his wife, Johanne Lefrançois. They in turn handed it over to the police a few months later. At some undetermined point, Mr. Boulachanis fled to the United States. Eventually, the remains of Mr. Tanguay were discovered, and an arrest warrant was issued for Mr. Boulachanis [ 10 ] After Mr.

B.’s arrest, he pleaded guilty to a reduced charge of manslaughter and was sentenced to a 12-year term of imprisonment. Mr. L. pleaded guilty to second degree murder and was sentenced to life imprisonment, with ineligibility for parole established at 12 years. Mr. Boulachanis was arrested in Florida some 13 years later on June 17, 2011, after which he consented to his extradition to Canada. He was arraigned in the Court of Quebec in September of that year. [ 11 ] In addition to the facts I have described, evidence was also led that after his arrest, Mr.

Boulachanis engaged in conduct that was highly indicative of his guilt: (1) escaping from custody in a vehicle transporting him to court with the co-ordinates of several Crown witnesses in his possession; (2) attempting to intimidate Mr. B. not to testify against him; and (3) attempting to suborn a fellow detainee to commit perjury on his behalf. II. THE AMENDED CANADIAN CHARTER MOTION AND ITS DISPOSITION [ 12 ] Mr. Boulachanis presented an amended motion dated September 22, 2016 based on ss. 7 , 11(

b) and 24(1) of the Canadian Charter in which he argued there had been unreasonable delay in bringing him to trial. In that respect, he did not invoke the delay caused by his departure to and extradition from Florida, but rather, the delay subsequent to his return to Canada. [ 13 ] Mr. Boulachanis was arraigned in the Court of Quebec on September 15, 2011, and his trial in the Superior Court started five years later on September 14, 2016.

He contended that the principal cause of the allegedly unreasonable delay was the failure of the Crown to promptly respect its duty of disclosure of the evidence against him, which he argued was all the more surprising since the proceedings involving the other individuals accused of murdering Mr. Tanguay had already taken place. [ 14 ] That being said, the Crown’s disclosure prior to the preliminary inquiry was completed on October 29, 2012, and the preliminary inquiry ran from November 12 to 20, 2012, as a result of which Mr.

Boulachanis was committed to trial. [ 15 ] On November 19, 2014, the Crown sought admissions from Mr. Boulachanis relating to statements from 18 witnesses. Further disclosure following the ascertainment of additional evidence subsequent to the preliminary inquiry was made to Mr. Boulachanis between January 4, 2014 and February 16, 2016, which did not elicit any complaint from him. [ 16 ] On April 6, 2016, Mr. Boulachanis made the admissions the Crown had sought 16.5 months earlier. Contemporaneously, Mr.

Boulachanis obtained a postponement of the trial that had been set to begin on April 25 until September 12, and renounced to the additional delays caused by that postponement. [ 17 ] On September 14, 2016, during the jury selection process, Mr. Boulachanis gave notice of his intention to seek a stay of proceedings. He filed a motion to that effect two days later. An amended motion was filed during the course of the hearing of that motion, which ran between September 16 and 30.

When the amended motion was argued, November 14, 2016 was identified as the anticipated date of the closing of the Crown’s evidence, (without taking account of motions presented after jury selection). It is the latter date that the parties and the trial judge used in calculating the total delay for the purposes of Mr. Boulachanis’ amended motion for a stay of proceedings.

[ 18 ] In a nutshell, Mr. Boulachanis argued that his detention of 1,887 days was well in excess of the Canadian Charter guarantees as interpreted by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Morin [3] and R. v. Jordan . [4] III.

THE JUDGMENT OF THE SUPERIOR COURT [ 19 ] The trial judge summarized his characterization of the delays pursuant to the analytical framework in Morin as follows: • Total delay from the date of the indictment: 5,478 days, that is 15 years; • Total delay from the accused’s appearance: 1,887 days, that is 62 months; • Inherent delays: 399.5 days, that is 13.5 months; • Institutional delays: 523.5 days, that is 17.5 months; • Total delay attributable to the Crown: 239 days, that is almost 8 months; • Total delay attributable to the accused from the indictment: 4,316 days, amounting to 11.8 years; • Total delay attributable to the accused from his appearance: 725 days. [ 20 ] In applying the analytical framework contemplated by Jordan , within the context of events that transpired prior to the date of its having been rendered, the trial judge calculated the net delay as 38.2 months from the date of Mr.

Boulachanis’ arraignment when the duration of the delay attributable to him was deducted, thus being 8.2 months greater than the presumptively reasonable ceiling of 30 months for a trial in a superior court. [ 21 ] He thus concluded that this timeframe, which slightly exceeds the applicable 30-month limit, was both reasonable and justified in accordance with the standard of Morin as well as the case law subsequent to it, and was consistent with the transitional measure for such cases set out in Jordan following an appropriate contextual assessment.

The trial judge went so far as to also conclude that the delay was reasonable within the Jordan context, even without having to apply the transitional measure. He also concluded that the Crown had established exceptional circumstances of complexity of the file due in large measure to the unforeseeable conduct of Mr. Boulachanis subsequent to the issuance of a warrant for his arrest in November of 2001, his subsequent flight from Quebec to Florida and the issuance of an Interpol warrant in September of 2003. VI. GROUNDS OF APPEAL AND ANALYSIS [ 22 ] Mr. Boulachanis has asserted several grounds of appeal.

In his notice of appeal and his motion for leave to appeal pursuant to s. 675(1) (a)(ii) Cr.C . he seeks an order for a new trial. At no point in any of the written or oral proceedings in this Court does Mr. Boulachanis contend that he was not involved in the events giving rise to the charges against him as I have described them, nor does he solicit an order from this Court substituting a verdict of acquittal should his Canadian Charter argument fail. A. The Canadian Charter argument [ 23 ] The most significant aspects of the sequence of events upon which the trial judge relied in dismissing Mr.

Boulachanis’ Charter argument are described in paragraphs [8] – [14] above. [ 24 ] Mr. Boulachanis argued that the delays were unreasonable for a variety of reasons, including his assertion that the case was not complex, unnecessary delays were incurred by the presentation of his post-offence conduct, the Crown was late with its pre-trial evidentiary disclosure, the Crown presented and lost an unwarranted attempt to disqualify his chosen counsel, as well as the unavailability of a police officer as a Crown witness. [ 25 ] For its part, the Crown insisted on the relevance of Mr.

Boulachanis’ post-offence conduct in fleeing to Florida, delays caused by his indecisiveness as to whether the trial would take place before an English speaking or French speaking jury, [5] his lack of collaboration on admissions of fact, and the unavailability of his counsel because of that counsel’s practice of double or even triple booking trial dates. [ 26 ] Subsequent to the judgment under appeal, in R. v. Cody [6] the Supreme Court provided further guidance with respect to the applicable analytical framework for cases already in the system, such as that of Mr. Boulachanis, when Jordan was released:

[67] The new framework in Jordan applies to cases already in the system ( Jordan , at para. 95 ). However, in some cases, the transitional exceptional circumstance may justify a presumptively unreasonable delay where the charges were brought prior to the release of Jordan ( Jordan , at para. 96 ).

This should be the final step in the analysis, taken only where, as here, the deduction of discrete events does not reduce the delay below the presumptive ceiling and excess delay cannot be justified based on case complexity. [68] Like case complexity, the transitional exceptional circumstance assessment involves a qualitative exercise. It recognizes “the fact that the parties’ behaviour cannot be judged strictly, against a standard of which they had no notice” and that “change takes time” ( Jordan , at paras. 96-97 ).

The Crown may rely on the transitional exceptional circumstance if it can show that “the time the case has taken is justified based on the parties’ reasonable reliance on the law as it previously existed” ( Jordan , at para. 96 ).

Put another way, the Crown may show that it cannot be faulted for failing to take further steps, because it would have understood the delay to be reasonable given its expectations prior to Jordan and the way delay and the other factors such as the seriousness of the offence and prejudice would have been assessed under Morin . [Emphasis added] 67] Le nouveau cadre d’analyse établi dans Jordan s’applique aux affaires déjà en cours ( Jordan , par. 95 ).

Cependant, un délai présumé déraisonnable peut dans certains cas être justifié en invoquant la mesure transitoire exceptionnelle, lorsque les accusations ont été déposées avant le prononcé de l’arrêt Jordan ( Jordan , par. 96 ).

Il devrait s’agir de la dernière étape de l’analyse et on ne devrait y recourir que dans les cas où, comme en l’espèce, la déduction de périodes liées à des événements distincts ne réduit pas le délai sous le plafond présumé, et où un délai supérieur au plafond ne peut être justifié sur la base de la complexité de l’affaire. [68] Tout comme le critère de la complexité de l’affaire, l’application de la mesure transitoire exceptionnelle implique une appréciation qualitative, qui tient compte du « fait que la conduite des parties ne peut être jugée rigoureusement en fonction d’une norme dont elles n’avaient pas connaissance » et qu’il « faut du temps pour implanter des changements » ( Jordan , par. 96-97 ).

Le ministère public ne peut invoquer la mesure transitoire exceptionnelle que s’il est capable d’établir que « le temps qui s’est écoulé est justifié du fait que les parties se sont raisonnablement conformées au droit tel qu’il existait au préalable » ( Jordan , par. 96 ).

Autrement dit, il est permis au ministère public de démontrer qu’on ne peut lui reprocher de ne pas avoir pris de mesures additionnelles, étant donné que le délai lui apparaissait raisonnable eu égard à sa compréhension du droit avant Jordan et à la manière dont ce délai et d’autres facteurs tels la gravité de l’infraction et le préjudice étaient évalués suivant l’arrêt Morin . [Soulignage ajouté] [ 27 ] In this respect, the following extract from this Court’s unanimous judgment in M.G . v.

R [7] is apposite in assessing the appellant’s contentions: [78] Pour les affaires ayant débuté avant le prononcé de l’arrêt Jordan , la Cour suprême prévoit toutefois l’application d’une mesure exceptionnelle transitoire.

Cette mesure requiert d’appliquer « un examen contextuel, eu égard à la manière dont l’ancien cadre d’analyse a été appliqué » [8] La Cour justifie cette mesure par la nécessité d’appliquer le nouveau cadre d’analyse « selon le contexte et avec souplesse aux affaires déjà en cours » puisqu’il serait « [injuste] de juger rigoureusement les participants au système de justice criminelle au regard de normes dont ils n’avaient pas connaissance » [9] .

Une telle approche contextuelle vise notamment à éviter une vague d’arrêts de procédures et d’acquittements comme ce fut le cas après le prononcé de l’arrêt Askov [10] . [Emphasis added] [79] Si le délai net est inférieur au plafond, il est difficile pour la défense de renverser la présomption que le délai est néanmoins acceptable malgré l’application de la mesure transitoire en raison des délais institutionnels prévalant avant Jordan [11] . [80] Lorsque le délai net excède le plafond, la mesure transitoire exceptionnelle peut s’appliquer dans deux situations: (1) si les parties se sont raisonnablement conformées au droit tel qu’il existait au préalable; ou (2) si la cause est moyennement complexe dans une région confrontée à des problèmes de délais institutionnels importants [12] . [ 28 ] This Court has also acknowledged that in determining the outcome of the appeal of a judgment such as the one under consideration in this case, the trial judge’s factual conclusions are subject to the usual standard of review of a palpable and overriding error, while the characterization in law of those facts is subject to a standard of correctness. [13] No such errors have been alleged, let alone established by Mr.

Boulachanis. In that respect, keeping in mind his attempts to undermine the integrity of the conduct of the trial subsequent to his extradition to Canada by the various means I have already described in paragraph [7], he is in no position to question the delay in bringing him to trial in this case. [ 29 ] The trial judge properly dismissed the motion for a stay of proceedings, and Mr. Boulachanis has failed to allege or demonstrate the existence of the type of error that would lead this Court to conclude otherwise.

[ 30 ] This ground of appeal therefore fails. B. The remaining grounds of appeal [ 31 ] These grounds of appeal fall into two categories: first, those related to the judge’s instructions to the jury at the conclusion of the trial; [14] and, second, a series of contentions relating to judgments concerning the admissibility of certain aspects of the evidence.

(1) Possible verdicts as to the manner in which the offence was committed [ 32 ] During the discussions between counsel and the trial judge prior to the delivery of instructions to the jury, Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel contended that the only possible verdicts to open were acquittal or conviction of first degree murder pursuant to ss. 21(1) (

a) Cr.C . on the basis of Mr. Boulachanis having “actually” been, or not been, the perpetrator of the victim’s death. The effect of this position would be to exclude his having been a party to its commission by aiding or abetting pursuant to ss. 21(1) (

b) and (

c) Cr.C . Crown counsel differed in his assessment only to the extent of contending that the evidence would also justify a conviction based on the latter two provisions. [ 33 ] After hearing counsel, the trial judge decided to open possible verdicts of conviction of first degree murder under all of the subsections of s. 21(1) Cr.C . , as well as second degree murder, manslaughter and acquittal. [ 34 ] Mr. Boulachanis has renewed in appeal his submission that the only verdicts that the trial judge should have left with the jury were guilty or not guilty of first degree murder.

In this respect, his counsel argues that at trial the Crown’s theory of the case was that Mr. Boulachanis fired the weapon that killed Mr. Tanguay, which means quite simply he could not have aided or abetted himself. [ 35 ] That being said, there was a sliver of testimony that M. B. fired the fatal shot since he had been heard to have said so. Thus, the Crown argued for the inclusion of an instruction based on all of the subsections of s. 21 Cr.C . to the extent there could be a doubt in the jury’s mind as to who fired the fatal shot given Mr.

Boulachanis’ role in the preparation for and the commission of the offence, its immediate aftermath in his transferring possession of the weapon used to commit the offence to a third party. [ 36 ] In R. v. Pickton , [15] LeBel, J. (writing on behalf of Binnie and Fish, JJ.) noted the following in respect of potential multi-party liability under s. 21(1) Cr.C . : [58] Three principles from the decision in Thatcher are relevant here. First, if there is evidence admitted at trial which properly supports an alternate mode of liability under s. 21 , an instruction on that

section should be left with the jury, even though the identity of the other participant or participants is unknown, and even though the precise part played by each participant may be uncertain. Second, it is not necessary for the trial judge to relate the law to the evidence which could support the alternate theory of aiding and abetting where evidence adduced by the Crown relates to either mode of participation, and evidence adduced by the defence relates to either the accused’s innocence or the accused’s guilt under the relevant subsection(

s) of s. 21 . Finally, a jury need not be unanimous on the nature of the accused’s participation in the offence, so long as it is satisfied that the accused either committed the offence personally or, alternatively, aided and abetted another to commit the offence, provided the jury is satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused did one or the other. [58] Trois principes ressortant de l’arrêt Thatcher sont pertinents en l’espèce. Premièrement, si des éléments de preuve admis au procès étayent adéquatement une autre forme de responsabilité prévue à l’ art. 21 , une directive concernant cet

article devrait être présentée au jury, même si l’identité de l’autre participant — ou des autres participants — est inconnue et même si le rôle précis de chaque participant peut demeurer incertain.

Deuxièmement, le juge du procès n’est pas tenu de rattacher les règles de droit aux éléments de preuve susceptibles d’étayer l’autre thèse, l’aide et l’encouragement à la perpétration de l’infraction, lorsque la preuve présentée par la poursuite se rapporte à l’une ou l’autre des formes de participation, et que celle présentée par la défense a trait à l’innocence ou à la culpabilité de l’accusé suivant les alinéas pertinents de l’ art. 21 .

Enfin, il n’est pas nécessaire que le jury soit unanime quant à la nature de la participation de l’accusé à l’infraction, dès lors que les jurés sont convaincus que l’accusé a soit commis lui- même l’infraction, soit aidé et encouragé une autre personne à la commettre, pourvu qu’ils soient convaincus hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a fait l’une ou l’autre de ces choses. [ 37 ] Here, there is compelling evidence of Mr. Boulachanis’ participation in the preparation and commission of the murder of Mr. Tanguay along with his accomplices, Messrs.

B. and L., whichever one of the three of them actually fired the fatal shot. To the extent there is any confusion in the evidence as to which one of them did so, it arises from (1) the cross-examination by Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel of Mr.

B. with a view to establishing he was the shooter, and (2) that of the ballistics expert to the effect that bullet fragments found in the victim’s skull came from different handguns, and thus inferentially from different shooters. [ 38 ] This confusion, if that is what it is, adequately explains the need for the trial judge to have prudently instructed the jury in accordance with subsections 21(1) (

b) and (

c) Cr.C. This ground of appeal therefore fails.

(2) Instructions concerning s. 23.1 Cr.C . [ 39 ]

Section 23.1 Cr.C . provides as follows:

Where one party cannot be convicted 23.1 For greater certainty, sections 21 to 23 apply in respect of an accused notwithstanding the fact that the person whom the accused aids or abets, counsels or procures or receives, comforts or assists cannot be convicted of the offence.

Cas d’immunité d’un coauteur 23.1 Il demeure entendu que les articles 21 à 23 s’appliquent à un accuse même si la personne qu’il a aidée, encouragée, conseillée, amenée, reçue ou assistée ne peut être déclarée coupable de l’infraction. [ 40 ] During the discussions between counsel and the trial judge prior to the delivery of his instructions, counsel for Mr. Boulachanis requested that he instruct the jury that they could not infer the guilt of Mr. Boulachanis from the fact of the guilty pleas of the two accomplices, and that the jury had to determine the outcome on the basis of the evidence adduced at trial.

The judge related this sequence of events to s. 23.1 Cr.C . At the suggestion of Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel, he did not furnish the jury with the text of that provision to the jury, and instead said this: En droit, le fait que ces autres personnes incluant le ou les auteurs principaux soient aussi accusées ou déclarés [sic.] coupables ou non ne change rien. Vous n’avez pas à vous préoccuper de cette question. […] Dans la présente affaire, M. B. a purgé sa sentence… selon la preuve, sa sentence imposée en 2003 pour un homicide involontaire coupable. Après son arrestation en 2011, L.

L. a plaidé coupable à un meurtre au deuxième degré. Vous avez entendu ça dans les témoignages de B. ainsi que le témoignage de L. L. . Les plaidoyers de culpabilité de B. et de L. ne sont pas une preuve de la culpabilité de l’accusé . Nous ne sommes pas au courant des circonstances entourant les causes contre B. et L. et nous ne pouvons pas en spéculer. Vous ne devez pas penser que l’accusé est coupable lui aussi parce que B. et L. ont été sentencés… ont été condamnés . Aussi, on ignore quelle était la preuve dans leur cause.

Vous devez rendre une décision basée sur l’ensemble de la preuve devant vous, dans la présente affaire seulement. [Emphasis added] [ 41 ] In my view, this aspect of the judge’s instruction, far from being confusing as Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel now claims, was both an essential and entirely accurate description of the lack of impact these guilty pleas were to have during the jury’s deliberations. On the contrary, for the judge to have said nothing to the jury on this subject in light of the evidence the jury heard would itself have been erroneous. This ground of appeal therefore fails.

(3) The opening of verdicts for the lesser and included offences of second degree murder and manslaughter [ 42 ] During the conference that preceded the delivery of the judge’s instructions, Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel argued that the evidence presented an “all or nothing” situation; he could either be found guilty or not guilty of first degree murder, but not found guilty of second degree murder or manslaughter. When the trial judge advised counsel he would instruct the jury in accordance with ss. 21(1) (

b) and (

c) Cr.C. , Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel then requested the trial judge to open verdicts for the above-mentioned lesser and included offences. [ 43 ] That counsel now takes the diametrically opposite position from the one he invited the trial judge to adopt, without really specifying what prejudice the decision caused Mr. Boulachanis, or more importantly, how the verdict might otherwise have been affected. [ 44 ] In my view, even if one were to conclude the judge erred as Mr.

Boulachanis’ counsel now contends, the decision to open other verdicts was inconsequential in light of the uncontradicted testimony of the two accomplices that the murder was planned and executed by Mr. Boulachanis. In this respect, it is worth recalling that Mr. Boulachanis had possession of the gun later on in the evening of the commission of the offence when he turned it over to Réal Séguin and his wife, Johanne Lefrançois. [ 45 ] This ground of appeal also fails.

(4) Answers by the trial judge in response to questions from the jury [ 46 ] Mr. Boulachanis challenges the responses the trial judge gave to three of four questions the jury asked during their deliberations. Here are the questions with a description of the responses to them:

(1) Quelle est la différence entre préméditation, intention et propos délibéré? [ 47 ] The trial judge answered the question by essentially restating his instructions on the kind of intention required to establish first degree murder, and did so in part by referring to the decision tree he had used during the course of his instructions.

(2) Dans le cas d’une personne qui aide ou encourage l’auteur principal à commettre un acte illégal avec préméditation et de propos délibéré, l’accusé doit-il avoir été présente lorsque l’acte illégal a été commis? Dans quelle mesure doit-il avoir participé à l’élaboration du plan? Les deux conditions sont-elles nécessaires? [ 48 ] The trial judge answered the first part of the question in the negative, and with respect to the latter part, he again made reference to his earlier instructions.

He also specified the necessity of the jury concluding that the accused knew that he was aiding or abetting whoever pulled the trigger. The mere presence of the accused when the offence was committed, or his encouragement of the perpetrator of the offence to commit it, were thus insufficient.

(3) L’accusé doit-il savoir avec certitude que l’auteur principal qu’il aide ou encourage a l’intention requise de commettre le meurtre de

l’individu visé par l’accusation? Le cas échéant, l’accusé doit-il savoir que l’intention de commettre le meurtre vise précisément Robert Tanguay? [ 49 ] With respect to the first part of this question, the trial judge restated his instructions regarding the applicable burden of proof and the principles related to reasonable doubt. Following comments by Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel, he re-explained the distinction between absolute certainty and reasonable doubt.

He further specified that to satisfy the required burden, the evidence had to show that the accomplice knew what the intention was of the perpetrator of the offence, and that the accused intended to aid or abet him to commit the offence. [ 50 ] Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel’s complaint concerning the first part of the question is essentially that it reflected the jury’s confusion and that the judge had to answer more specifically rather than essentially re-state what he had already said.

While the judge’s response could have been more fulsome, it nevertheless was clearer and more concise, especially as it related to the essential elements of the offence for each of the participants in its commission. Mr. Boulachanis’ complaint in this respect is therefore rejected. [ 51 ] As for the second part of the question, the trial judge answered in the affirmative; thus, that Mr. Boulachanis knew that Mr. Tanguay was the intended victim of the offence that was about to be committed.

That was never in doubt. [ 52 ] Looked at as a whole, in the light of the entirety of the trial judge’s initial instructions that took account where appropriate of comments from counsel, there is nothing erroneous in the answers the trial judge gave the jury in response to the questions. While his answers did indeed restate much of what he had said in his initial instructions, he did make it clear that the jury could return with other questions if they felt the need to do so.

(5) The judge’s use of a decision tree when delivering his instructions [ 53 ] During the delivery of his instructions, the trial judge provided the jury with a decision tree that set out five questions in schematic form. For ease of reference, I am attaching a copy of the decision tree to these reasons.

It will be seen that the answer to each question would give rise to a particular verdict: the first three leading to a verdict of acquittal; the fourth to a verdict of manslaughter and the fifth to a verdict of either first degree or second degree murder. [ 54 ] It is common practice for trial judges presiding jury trials in Canada to use decision trees to assist jurors assessing complex evidence and applying the law to that evidence. Typically a decision tree will pose a series of questions, the answers to which lead to a particular outcome depending on the answer to the question.

Indeed, one of the standard Canadian texts on criminal jury instructions provides an example of a decision tree applicable all indictable offences. [16] [ 55 ] Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel in this Court, who participated in the discussions with the trial judge as to the content of the questions, now complains that the decision tree is confusing, unintelligible and by its nature could not have simplified the jury’s analysis of the possible verdicts. [ 56 ] If there are as many questions as there are based on whether or not Mr. Boulachanis was or was not the person who fired the fatal shot that killed Mr.

Tanguay, it is the result of a request to that effect of Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel. The trial judge took account of the comments and suggestions of both counsel on the content of the decision tree he proposed to put to the jury. Indeed, the judge indicated he would have it noted in the minutes of the hearing that both Crown and defence counsel agreed on the content of the decision tree, and asked them if that was the case. They both answered in the affirmative. [17] [ 57 ] That they did so then is not surprising.

For all practical purposes, the decision tree is consistent with the guidelines in the authoritative text used by trial judges across Canada. [18] While defence counsel’s acquiescence at trial is not determinative, it nevertheless “[…] says something about the overall accuracy of the jury instructions and the seriousness of the alleged misdirection.” [19] [ 58 ] I would also reject this ground of appeal.

(6) The Vetrovec warning [ 59 ] Mr. Boulachanis complains that the Vetrovec warning was too general and did not leave the impression with the jury that they should regard the testimony of Messrs. B. and L. with extreme suspicion, and that their testimony may well have been concocted. There was also, from their perspective, the possibility of collusion between them that had to be considered. For its part, the Crown argues that the Vetrovec warning was adequate and satisfied the criteria identified by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v.

Khela . [20] [ 60 ] The trial judge’s discussion on this subject is reflected in the following extract from his instructions: Vous avez entendu que Martin Moquin, L. L. , R. Le., Réal Séguin, David Gauthier et A. Bi. ont admis, dans le passé, avoir des antécédents judiciaires. Vous pouvez utiliser ces condamnations pour vous aider à décider jusqu’à quel point vous croyez le témoignage de ces témoins ou y accorder foi. Certaines condamnations, par exemple celle comportant un élément de malhonnêteté, peuvent être plus pertinentes que d’autres.

De plus, une condamnation plus ancienne pourrait être moins pertinente qu’une condamnation plus récente. Une condamnation antérieure ou même plusieurs condamnations antérieures ne veulent pas dire nécessairement que le témoignage du témoin est non crédible et doit être écarté. Ce n’est qu’un des nombreux facteurs, dont vous devez tenir compte dans votre évaluation du témoignage de ces témoins. Encore une fois, faites usage de logique et du bon sens. R. Le., A. Bi. et David Gauthier pourraient avoir intérêt à rendre un témoignage favorable à la Couronne dans la présente affaire.

Il se peut qu’un témoignage favorable en l’espèce aide l’un ou l’autre de ces témoins, plus tard, dans sa propre cause ou que l’un ou l’autre de

ces témoins croit qu’un tel témoignage l’aidera. R. Le. témoigne qu’il a parlé aux enquêteurs concernant sa détention : « Il aimerait pas être déclaré délinquant dangereux. » Et a demandé au sergent-détective Petit de le dire à la Couronne, et de dire aussi qu’il a été témoin dans un dossier important. Le. témoigne qu’il n’a eu que des désavantages à cause de son témoignage pour la Couronne. Il dit qu’il n’a pas eu d’avantage. Il craignait pour sa sécurité. Il dit qu’il voulait un avantage dû à son témoignage dans ce dossier.

Il dit que s’il voulait un avantage dû à son témoignage dans ce dossier, il aurait demandé à l’enquêteur pour qu’il signe un contrat de délateur. A. Bi. a des causes pendantes pour incendie criminel d’une automobile, deux vols et deux introductions pour effraction. Selon son témoignage, il a cherché un avantage disant qu’il a demandé à l’enquêteur de parler à la Couronne. Il n’y a rien pour rien témoigne-t-il. Bi. ajoute que l’enquêteur a catégoriquement refusé. Bi. témoigne qu’il n’avait aucun avantage, mais il a décidé de faire une déclaration quand même.

David Gauthier témoigne qu’il n’a eu aucun avantage ou entente concernant ses causes pendantes qui sont : Intimidation de police et méfaits moins de cinq cent dollars (500 $). Il dit qu’il ne fait pas ce qu’il fait dans ce dossier pour lui-même, qu’il le fait pour la société. Ces témoignages nécessitent un examen particulièrement rigoureux. Lorsque vous évaluerez la crédibilité ou la valeur à accorder à cette preuve pour décider de la présente affaire, veuillez tenir compte du fait que Le., Bi. et Gauthier ont eux-mêmes des causes pendantes, et leurs dossiers ne sont pas terminés.

Il s’agit, là, d’un facteur parmi d’autres, dont vous devez tenir compte, lorsqu’il vous faudra déterminer la valeur à accorder à ces témoignages. En définitive, il vous appartiendra de déterminer si ce fait influencerait votre appréciation de ce témoignage. Et si oui, dans quelle mesure. J’ai un commentaire par rapport à R. Le.. Vous avez entendu, l’avocat soulever à plusieurs reprises, que R. Le. est un psychopathe. La preuve d’une qualification de Le. comme psychopathe vient du témoignage de R. Le.. Lui-même, il a admis qu’un docteur l’a qualifié de cette façon.

Toutefois, Le. témoigne qu’il y a aussi eu un rapport par un psychologue qui ne le considère pas comme un psychopathe. [ 61 ] In R. v. Khela , [21] Fish, J., writing on behalf of six of the seven judges of the Supreme Court, described the rationale and the purpose of such a warning as follows:

[12] Since the decision of this Court in Vetrovec , the very real dangers of relying in criminal prosecutions on the unsupported evidence of unsavoury witnesses, particularly “jailhouse informers”, has been highlighted more than once by commissions of inquiry into wrongful convictions (see, for example, The Commission on Proceedings Involving Guy Paul Morin: Report (1998) and The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow (200l)).

The danger of a miscarriage of justice is to be borne in mind in crafting and in evaluating the adequacy of a caution. [13] The crafting of a caution appropriate to the circumstances of the case is best left to the judge who has conducted the trial. No particular set of words is mandatory. In evaluating its adequacy, appellate courts will focus on the content of the instruction and not on its form.

Intervention on appeal will not be warranted unless a cautionary instruction should have been given but was not, or the cautionary instruction that was given failed to serve its intended purpose. [14] No single formula can be expected to produce an appropriate instruction for every foreseeable — let alone unforeseeable — situation at trial. That is why we vest in trial judges the discretion they must have in fashioning cautionary instructions responsive to the circumstances of the case.

Trial judges nonetheless seek, and are entitled to expect, guidance from this Court as to the general characteristics of a sufficient warning.

I shall later outline in broad brushstrokes a proposed template which, while not at all mandatory, will in my view be of assistance to trial judges without unduly fettering their discretion, and will reduce the number of appeals attributable to the present uncertainty regarding the governing principles. [12] Depuis que la Cour a rendu l’arrêt Vetrovec , des commissions d’enquête sur des déclarations de culpabilité injustifiées ont à plus d’une reprise souligné les dangers très réels de se fier, dans les poursuites pénales, aux dépositions non étayées de témoins douteux, surtout celles des « dénonciateurs sous garde » (voir, par exemple, Commission sur les poursuites contre Guy Paul Morin : Rapport (1998) et The Inquiry Regarding Thomas Sophonow (2001)).

Dans l’élaboration d’une mise en garde ou l’évaluation de son caractère adéquat, il faut garder présent à l’esprit le danger d’une erreur judiciaire. [13] Il est préférable de laisser au juge du procès le soin d’élaborer une mise en garde adaptée aux faits de l’espèce. Il n’est pas obligatoire d’employer une formule particulière. Pour évaluer le caractère adéquat de la mise en garde, les tribunaux d’appel s’attacheront au contenu de la directive et non à sa forme.

L’intervention en appel ne sera justifiée que si le juge du procès n’a pas adressé la mise en garde qui s’imposait ou si la mise en garde effectuée n’a pas atteint l’objectif visé. [14] Il n’existe pas de formule unique qui puisse produire une mise en garde appropriée pour toutes les circonstances prévisibles — et encore moins toutes les circonstances imprévisibles — d’un procès. C’est pourquoi les juges de première instance sont investis du pouvoir discrétionnaire dont ils ont besoin pour façonner des mises en garde adaptées aux faits de l’espèce.

Ils cherchent et sont en droit de s’attendre à obtenir des précisions de la Cour quant aux caractéristiques générales d’une mise en garde suffisante. Je brosserai dans les grandes lignes une mise en garde type qui, selon moi, sans être obligatoire, sera utile aux juges de première instance sans entraver leur pouvoir discrétionnaire et réduira le nombre des appels attribuables à l’incertitude qui règne au sujet des principes applicables. [ 62 ] In this instance, it is impossible to properly characterize the judge’s Vetrovec warning as inadequate.

He identified why specifically named witnesses might have had a personal interest in not telling the truth, including those with pending cases. The judge was also careful to explain to the jury that they should look for independent evidence to confirm that of these witnesses: L’expérience nous enseigne qu’il faut examiner les témoignages de ce genre de témoins de la Couronne avec la plus grande prudence et le plus grand soin. Il est dangereux de prononcer une condamnation sur la foi d’une preuve non confirmée de ce genre-là.

Afin de décider si la Couronne a prouvé la culpabilité de l’accusé hors de tout doute raisonnable, vous devriez vous demander si le témoignage, de l’un ou l’autre de ces témoins, est confirmé par d’autres éléments de preuve. Vous devriez chercher des éléments de preuve indépendants qui tendent à démontrer que ces témoins disent la vérité quant à un aspect de leur version. Le terme indépendant signifie : Provenant d’une source qui n’est pas reliée à ce témoin. Une preuve confirmative peut consister en des pièces, des admissions ou des témoins.

La preuve confirmative doit se rapporter à un aspect important et pertinent du témoignage en question. Alors, je vais répéter ça : Vous devriez chercher des éléments de preuve indépendants qui tendent à démontrer que ces témoins disent la vérité quant à un aspect de leur version. Le terme indépendant signifie : Provenant d’une source qui n’est pas reliée à ce témoin. Et je répète : Une preuve confirmative peut consister en des pièces, des admissions ou des témoins. La preuve confirmative doit se rapporter à un aspect important et pertinent du témoignage du témoin en question.

[ 63 ] He then went on to identify certain elements of such independent evidence arising out of the testimony of various witnesses directly or indirectly involved in the sequence of events, including: • Lynn Soulières, who heard Mr. Boulachanis state, with an axe in his hand, “Tanguay, c’est aujourd’hui que ça se rage”; then, while he was dining, with a nod of his head, “On entend plus parler de Robert Tanguay”; and at another point, she asked Mr. L. to remove the weapon that was subsequently used to kill Mr.

Tanguay from their residence because of the presence of children; • Johanne Lefrançois, whether her testimony corroborated that of her husband, Réal Séguin, concerning the transfer of possession of the murder weapon; • Daniel Vachon, the police officer to whom the murder weapon was remitted by Real Séguin and the circumstances surrounding that transfer; • Alain Gauthier, the correctional officer, who confirmed the testimony of A. Bi. with respect to the content of a note to him concerning proposed false testimony he should give; • The ballistics evidence confirming the use of the firearm used to murder Mr.

Tanguay; • The confirmatory evidence of the father and sister of the victim concerning certain aspects of the testimony of M. B. and L. L. . [ 64 ] The judge further instructed the jury that they had to consider whether the testimony of the witnesses to whom I have just referred should be regarded with particular care and whether there may have been collusion (the nature of which he explained in detail) between any of them. With the acquiescence of counsel, he also indicated he would address the concept of absence of evidence in a general way and not revisit the pleadings the jury heard on that subject.

(7) Other aspects of the judge’s instructions [ 65 ] Mr. Boulachanis suggests the trial judge made several other errors that should result in an order for a new trial. In my opinion none of them justify such an order. (

A) Reasonable doubt [ 66 ] Trial judges are aware that their instructions to a jury on this subject are of pre-eminent importance. The essential elements of such an instruction remain those stated by a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Starr [22] as follows:

• the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt is inextricably intertwined with that principle fundamental to all criminal trials, the presumption of innocence; • the burden of proof rests on the prosecution throughout the trial and never shifts to the accused; • a reasonable doubt is not a doubt based upon sympathy or prejudice; • rather, it is based upon reason and common sense; • it is logically connected to the evidence or absence of evidence; • it does not involve proof to an absolute certainty; it is not proof beyond any doubt nor is it an imaginary or frivolous doubt; and • more is required than proof that the accused is probably guilty — a jury which concludes only that the accused is probably guilty must acquit. [Emphasis in original.] • la norme de la preuve hors de tout doute raisonnable est inextricablement liée au principe fondamental de tous les procès pénaux, c’est-à-dire la présomption d’innocence; • le fardeau de la preuve incombe à la poursuite tout au long du procès et ne se déplace jamais sur les épaules de l’accusé; • un doute raisonnable ne peut être fondé sur la sympathie ou sur un préjugé; • il repose plutôt sur la raison et le bon sens; • il a un lien logique avec la preuve ou l’absence de preuve; • la norme n’exige pas une preuve correspondant à la certitude absolue; il ne s’agit pas d’une preuve au-delà de n’importe quel doute; il ne peut s’agir non plus d’un doute imaginaire ou frivole; • il faut davantage que la preuve que l’accusé est probablement coupable — le jury qui conclut seulement que l’accusé est probablement coupable doit acquitter l’accusé. [Souligné dans l’original.] [ 67 ] In this instance, Mr.

Boulachanis argues that the trial judge erred when he instructed the jury that reasonable doubt flows logically, amongst other factors, from the absence of proof with respect to an essential element of the offence. Mr. Boulachanis contends, in effect, that this instruction could lead the jury to consider that the absence of evidence of any other accessory aspects of the offence could not be considered as a basis of there being a reasonable doubt. The Crown argues that such an instruction would have been based on the submission of Mr.

Boulachanis’ counsel to the effect that while several individuals were named as being involved in the events in issue, they were not called to testify. [ 68 ] It is important to observe, however, that Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel does not contend that the fact that individuals whose names were mentioned during the course of the trial but did not testify were not individuals the Crown was obliged to call to make its case of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Moreover, in his exchanges with the trial judge, Mr.

Boulachanis’ counsel acknowledged that his argument went more to the weakness of the Crown’s case. [ 69 ] The trial judge’s instruction on what constituted reasonable doubt could not reasonably have led the jury to ignore certain aspects of the evidence considering that he explained to them that the Crown’s burden did not extend to assessing the testimony or exhibits in isolation, but rather, that after having examined all of the testimony and exhibits, the jury would have to decide the outcome by taking account of the evidence as a whole.

He also instructed the jury that their assessment of reasonable doubt could be founded on the credibility of witnesses, and in doing so they should take account of any possible contradictions in the testimony they might have observed, or whether some witnesses had an interest in being untruthful or showed a lack of impartiality. And finally, in conclusion, the judge instructed that after having considered the entirety of the evidence, including the credibility and reliability of witnesses, they should acquit the accused if they had a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. (

B) Motive

[ 70 ] Mr. Boulachanis contends that the trial judge erred in failing to explain to the jury, as he had argued, that the evidence of absence of motive or the absence of evidence of motive was a factor in their assessment as to whether the circumstantial evidence was sufficient to warrant a conviction. The issue of motive centered on the testimony as to whether Mr. Boulachanis had been having an extra-marital relation with the wife of Mr.

Tanguay, the victim in this case and one of the individuals with whom he was involved in the car theft ring to which I have referred in paragraph [3]. [ 71 ] A trial judge’s role in deciding whether or not to include an instruction on motive was described in Lewis v. The Queen : [23] The necessity of charging a jury on motive may be looked upon as a continuum, at one end of which are cases where the evidence as to identity of the murderer is purely circumstantial and proof of motive on the part of the Crown so essential that reference must be made to motive in charging the jury.

The Crown’s case against Tatlay was just such a situation. It was essential to establish motive and the trial judge properly referred to motive in charging the jury in relation to Tatlay. At the other end of the continuum, and requiring a charge on motive, is the case where there is proved absence of motive and this may become of great significance as a matter in favour of the accused. Between these two end points in the continuum there are cases where the necessity to charge on motive depends upon the course of the trial and the nature and probative value of the evidence adduced.

In these cases, a substantial discretion must be left to the trial judge. In Imrich , for example, the evidence of exclusive opportunity was such that motive receded into the background. La nécessité de donner des directives au jury sur la question du mobile peut se situer entre deux pôles. A l’un d’entre eux l’on trouve les affaires où la preuve de l’identité du meurtrier est entièrement indirecte et la preuve du mobile par le ministère public tellement essentielle qu’on doit parler du mobile dans l’adresse au jury. C’était précisément le cas de la preuve du ministère public contre Tatlay.

Il était essentiel d’établir le mobile et c’est à bon droit que le juge de première instance a parlé du mobile dans son adresse au jury quant à Tatlay. A l’autre pôle où la directive concernant le mobile est également nécessaire, on retrouve l’affaire où il y a preuve d’une absence de mobile—un élément qui peut être très important en faveur de l’accusé. Entre ces deux pôles tombent les affaires où la nécessité de donner une directive sur la question du mobile dépend du cours du procès et de la nature et la valeur probante de la preuve.

Dans ces derniers cas, le juge de première instance doit pouvoir exercer une large discrétion. Dans l’arrêt Imrich , par exemple, la preuve de l’occasion exclusive était telle que la question du mobile était reléguée au second plan. [ 72 ] An instruction on this subject is thus necessary when the evidence is entirely circumstantial, or, when there is absence of evidence of motive as compared to evidence of absence of motive. [ 73 ] In his instruction on this subject, the trial judge said the Crown did not have the burden to prove motive since motive was not one of the components of the offence.

Nevertheless, he went on to specify that if they found there was a motive for Mr. Boulachanis to have murdered Mr. Tanguay that could make it more probable that he would act on it. On the other hand, if they were to conclude that Mr. Boulachanis had no such motive, that could lead the jury to doubt he would have done so, or that if he had done so, that it was the result of an intention to do so. [ 74 ] In this case, motive was very much secondary.

Evidence of motive was unnecessary to secure a conviction, yet the trial judge nevertheless specified that if the jury were to find absence of motive, that could weigh in their assessment of whether there was proof beyond a reasonable doubt of his guilt. [ 75 ] In such circumstances this ground of appeal also fails. (

C) The Crown’s use of a PowerPoint [ 76 ] Without having previously advised the trial judge or the appellant’s counsel of his intention to do so, Crown counsel used an extensive PowerPoint presentation during his closing address to the jury. The exhibit is in colour, appears to have been prepared professionally, and is composed of 173 slides. They consist of selected extracts from the testimony of several Crown witnesses [24] as well as a few exhibits which formed part of the record.

The extracts from the testimony did not always include the questions which gave rise to the selected answers, and the extracts chosen were not always the complete answer to a question. [ 77 ] The jury was not given a copy of the PowerPoint during Crown counsel’s submissions, nor for their use during their deliberations. [ 78 ] The trial judge made it clear, however, that had he been made aware of the intentions of Crown counsel to use the impugned PowerPoint, he would have refused the request.

That being said, the trial judge did instruct the jury in a manner that cast significant doubt on the integrity of the PowerPoint: Dans sa plaidoirie, maître Gagnon, l’avocat de la Couronne, a utilisé un power point lorsqu’il a fait référence oralement aux extraits des témoignages. Ni le power point , ni sa plaidoirie n’inclut toutes les questions précédant une réponse d’un témoin. Toutes les réponses d’un témoin par rapport à une question ne font pas

partie de ce power point ou de cette plaidoirie. [ 79 ] I appreciate that a different trial judge might have decided this issue differently, perhaps by delivering a robust criticism of Crown counsel’s use of the PowerPoint during his instructions without that counsel having observed the professional courtesy of disclosing his intentions before use was made of it, or even more critically, having prevented Crown counsel from using the PowerPoint

until the propriety of its use was determined. [80] That being said, the trial judge was faced with an unexpected problem and appears to have navigated it in a reasonable manner.In this respect, the cautionary words of Watt, J.A. on behalf of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in R. v. McGregor[25] are applicable: [182] None can gainsay that the trial judge is in the best position to gauge the impact of closing submissions made by either counsel.The trial judge can take the temperature of the trial. As an eye and ear witness to the entire proceedings, including both jury addresses.

Inthat position the trial judge can assess the apparent significance or otherwise of the impugned remarks, and determine whether and towhat extent correction or other remedial action may be required: R. v. Sarrazin, 2016 ONCA 714, at para. 57; R. v. Zvolensky, 2017ONCA 273, 352 C.C.C. (3d) 217, at para. 186; R. v. Rose, (SCC), [1998] 3 S.C.R. 262, at para. 126. We accordsubstantial deference to the trial judge’s conclusions on these issues.

This is as it should be. [81] I would reject this ground of appeal, while nevertheless admonishing Crown counsel for the unprofessional manner in which heintroduced the PowerPoint without any prior notice to the judge or to defence counsel. (

D) Jury instructions more favourable to the Crown [82] Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel relates this submission directly to that which he made concerning ss. 21(1)(

b) and (

c) Cr.C., which Ihave already rejected. In support of this submission, he invokes a judgment of the Court of Appeal for Ontario in which that Court founda jury instruction in a first degree murder case “lacked fairness and balance” and “unduly promoted the case for the Crown andeffectively ignored and denigrated the case for the defence”.[26] [83] Essentially, Mr. Boulachanis argues that the manner in which the trial judge related conflicting evidence in relation to theapplicable law created a disequilibrium in favour of the Crown. In this respect, he refers the Court back to his submissions concerning ss.21(

b) and (

c) Cr.C. I would reject this submission, for the reasons I stated in paragraphs [33] and [34] above. (

E) The judge’s charge invited the jury to speculate on how the murder was committed [84] This submission revisits the appellant’s argument that I have considered regarding the applicability of ss. 21(1)(

b) and (

c) Cr.C.Here is how the trial judge instructed the jury as to the possible scenarios revealed by the evidence: Une personne peut être déclarée coupable d’une infraction si elle accomplit personnellement tous les gestes nécessaires à la commissionde cette infraction, soit seule, soit avec une (1) ou plusieurs autres personnes qui participent de la même façon. On peut appeler cettepersonne un auteur principal ou ces personnes des auteurs principaux. Dans le cas où vous décidez que plus d’une (1) personne a tiré surRobert Tanguay avec une arme à feu causant sa mort, il y a donc deux (2) auteurs principaux ou plus.

Une personne peut aussi être déclarée coupable d’une infraction si elle aide une autre personne à la commettre, c’est-à-dire en agissantdans le but d’aider cette autre personne à commettre l’infraction. Une personne peut être déclarée coupable d’une infraction si elleencourage une autre personne à commettre cette infraction. Vous pouvez décider qu’une autre personne, par exemple, M. B. ou L.

L. ,était l’auteur principal du crime qui a causé la mort de Robert Tanguay et que l’accusé Boulachanis a agi avec ces personnes commecoauteur principal ou comme une personne qui a aidé ou encouragé un auteur principal à commettre le crime. […] Vous pouvez également décider que les deux (2), B. et L., étaient les auteurs principaux du crime qui a causé la mort de Robert Tanguayet que l’accusé a agi avec ces personnes comme coauteur principal ou comme une personne qui a aidé ou encouragé ces deux (2)personnes à commettre le crime. […] Les témoignages de B. et de L. indiquent que l’accusé était l’auteur principal de la mort de Richard [sic.] Tanguay. [Emphasis added] [85] As the result of a question from the jury after they had retired to deliberate, the judge added another scenario to those he hadalready given: Celui qui aide l’auteur principal ou les auteurs principaux à commettre une infraction participe lui-même à cette infraction s’il assiste oudonne un coup de main ou accomplit quelque chose qui aide l’auteur principal ou les auteurs principaux à commettre l’infraction.

Parexemple, si vous êtes convaincus hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a obtenu l’arme à feu qui a tué Robert Tanguay, vous devezévaluer la preuve quant à savoir si vous êtes convaincus hors de tout doute raisonnable que l’accusé a aidé une autre personne, dans lecas où cette autre personne a tiré sur Robert Tanguay avec cette arme à feu. [Emphasis added] [86] The evidence as a whole gave rise to a variety of scenarios as to which of one of Messrs. B., L. or Boulachanis actually fired thefatal shot since they were all involved in causing the death of Mr. Tanguay, whichever one of them pulled the trigger.

The scenarios putforward by the judge simply identified different possibilities in order to assist the jury in better understanding the various ways which thecriminal offence with which Mr. Boulachanis was charged could have been committed. [87] That being said, all the jury was required to do was determine whether the Crown had proved beyond a reasonable doubt whetherthe accused had committed the offence with which he was charged in light of all of the evidence they heard. In that respect, the evidenceof Mr.

Boulachanis’ guilt of first degree murder was overwhelming, irrespective of which precise manner they concluded the first degreemurder was committed. [88] I would also reject this ground of appeal.

(

F) The Khelawon motion and judgment [ 89 ] The trial judge was called upon to adjudicate whether an alleged prior oral inconsistent statement made by M. B. to Réal Séguin through the testimony of the latter could be admitted in order to make proof of its content. At trial, Mr. B. denied that he actually shot Mr. Tanguay, although he did acknowledge having said that Mr. Tanguay was dead and buried: “J’ai mentionné que monsieur Tanguay mangeait des pissenlits par la racine”. [27] [ 90 ] The prior inconsistent statement Mr. B. was alleged to have made to Mr.

Séguin that the defence sought to introduce through the latter’s testimony was that Mr. B. shot and killed Mr. Tanguay. His statement was supposedly made to Mr. Séguin (who acknowledged not having a good memory) in November of 1997 at a Knights of Columbus meeting in Rigaud. The resolution of the issue turned on whether the extrajudicial statement sought to be introduced through the testimony of Mr.

Séguin was both reliable and necessary. [ 91 ] Stober, J. dismissed the application in an extensive judgment he rendered orally that was subsequently transcribed. [28] He correctly described the required analytical framework arising out of R. v. Khelowan [29] as follows: [27] La preuve par ouï-dire, sous la forme d'une déclaration extrajudiciaire, ne serait admissible au procès que si elle était admissible à

titre de déposition du témoin devant le Tribunal. Une telle déclaration extrajudiciaire peut être admise au procès si son contenu est fiable en raison de la manière dont elle a été faite ou en raison de sa fiabilité inhérente, ou si les circonstances ou des indices sont présents, pour que le juge des faits puisse en déterminer suffisamment la valeur. Si la

partie qui veut présenter la preuve ne peut satisfaire au double critère de la nécessité et de la fiabilité, selon la prépondérance des probabilités, la règle d’exclusion générale l’emporte. Le juge du procès, lors du voir-dire, joue le rôle de gardien en effectuant cette appréciation préliminaire du « seuil de fiabilité » de la déclaration extrajudiciaire et laisse au juge des faits le devoir d’en déterminer la valeur; Khelawon , par. 2, 3, 42, 47, 49, 92-93 ; Youvarajah , par. 23; B. (K.

G.) , pp. 784-785. [ 92 ] His reasoning and conclusion in dismissing the application are aptly captured in the concluding paragraphs of his judgment: [61] Le Tribunal conclut que la défense n’a pas satisfait au double critère de la nécessité et de la fiabilité selon la prépondérance des probabilités. [62] Le Tribunal conclut que les circonstances entourant la déclaration de M.

B. dans les toilettes ou au bar aux Chevaliers de Colomb ne démontrent pas suffisamment d’indices de fiabilité et de nécessité pour écarter les dangers que comporte la difficulté de la vérifier et pour admettre cette preuve par ouï-dire afin de faire preuve de son contenu quant au fond; Khelawon , par. 42, 49 . [63] Le Tribunal conclut que vu l’absence d’une base suffisante pour apprécier la véracité et l’exactitude des propos relatés par M.

B. à Réal Séguin, l’exigence de la fiabilité n’est pas remplie. [ 93 ] In support of his conclusion, the trial judge noted that the prior inconsistent statements sought to be introduced were not given under oath, nor were they in writing, were disclosed for the first time much later than might otherwise have been the case, and were made in circumstances where the sobriety of those involved had not been established. The judge found this exercise by Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel all the more surprising since that same counsel had spent much of his cross-examination attacking Mr. Séguin’s credibility.

In short, there were insufficient indicia of the truth of the impugned oral statement of Mr. B. to allow it to be introduced in the manner proposed. [ 94 ] The foregoing extract from his judgment shows that the trial judge adequately explained why he was not persuaded that the impugned oral statement made to Mr. Séguin by Mr. B. as to whether the latter shot and killed Mr. Tanguay was admissible. No significant error having been established in his analysis, his decision is therefore entitled to deference [ 95 ] I would also reject this ground of appeal. (

G) The appellant’s post-offence conduct [ 96 ] The Superior Court judge tasked with the case management of this case, Brunton, J., adjudicated a Crown application to authorize it to lead evidence of six elements of post-offence conduct, three of which he granted [30] in the following terms: ii. - Comportement 2 : Fuite, fourgon cellulaire [15] De retour au pays, la présence de l’accusé était requise en Cour supérieure, le 6 novembre 2013, puisque le présent dossier revenait à l’ouverture du terme des assises pour fixation de dates.

Lors de l’arrêt du fourgon cellulaire à une lumière rouge dans le centre- ville de Salaberry-de-Valleyfield, l’intimé a réussi à s’évader par une des fenêtres du véhicule. Il a tenté de fuir à pied, mais a été intercepté par un agent des services correctionnels. [16] Une fouille de sa personne a révélé qu’il était en possession de divers objets et documents, dont les coordonnées de 4 témoins de la requérante dans le dossier de meurtre (pièce VDG-3 (R-4)). iii. - Comportement 3 : Intimidation du témoin M.

B. [17] À l’automne 2014 allant jusqu’au mois de décembre, la requérante allègue que l’intimé a pris des mesures pour intimider un de ses témoins, M. B.. La Cour rappelle que la requérante allègue que B. était l’un des complices de l’intimé lors du meurtre. Il a plaidé coupable à une accusation réduite d’homicide involontaire et sera appelé comme témoin par la requérante. [18] À l’automne 2014, la requérante allègue que l’intimé a demandé à R.

Le. d’engager quelqu’un qui trouverait B., amasserait des informations sur lui, et le tabasserait afin de l’intimider et de l’empêcher de témoigner dans la cause de meurtre. Également, on devait obtenir de B. un montant d’argent qu’il devait à l’intimé.

[19] Le. a engagé les services de David Gauthier. Ce dernier a reçu une photo de B. de la conjointe de l’intimé. Il a transmis à Le. des renseignements concernant B. - le nom de ses enfants, le nom de sa conjointe, sa passion pour les chevaux, son nouvel emploi et un numéro de cellulaire. [20] Le. et Gauthier ont fait croire à l’intimé que B. avait été tabassé alors que ceci n’était pas vrai. Ils ont reçu une somme de 2 000 $ en compensation. [21] En décembre 2014, on allègue que l’intimé est revenu à la charge. Il demande à Le. de s’occuper d’attaquer le domicile de B. avec un cocktail Molotov.

Gauthier a de nouveau été impliqué dans ce plan sans qu’on le mette à exécution. vi. - Comportement 6 : Subornation d’A. Bi. [26] La requérante allègue que, le 28 janvier 2016, l’intimé a fait parvenir, par l’entremise d’un agent des services correctionnels, une feuille au témoin Bi.. Cette feuille détaillait ce que devait dire ce dernier au procès de meurtre. Le contenu était en nette contradiction avec la déclaration que Bi. a fournie aux autorités. [27] Dans les jours qui ont suivi, l’intimé a demandé à Bi. s’il avait reçu la feuille. Il devait la lire et préparer son témoignage en conséquence.

L’intimé l’a informé que s’il témoignait en ce sens-là, cela pourrait faire tomber la cause de meurtre et qu’il recevrait un gros montant d’argent en échange. [ 97 ] In reaching his decision to grant the application in part, Brunton, J. weighed the cumulative effect of the proposed evidence of post-offence conduct against its probative value.

He was satisfied that the three above-mentioned incidents satisfied the applicable criteria to allow evidence of them to be made: [63] La Cour est d’avis que la force probante du cumul des comportements 2, 3 et 6 l’emporte sur le préjudice et survit à une analyse coût/bénéfices. [64] Ces comportements s’adressent à trois facteurs hautement pertinents - la fuite, l’intimidation (ou tentative) d’un témoin et la subornation d’un témoin.

Pris ensemble, ces comportements fournissent une forte preuve pour appuyer l’inférence que l’intimé les a accomplis parce qu’il est l’auteur du meurtre et qu’il ne voulait pas soit subir son procès, ou voulait empêcher que la vérité sorte. [65] La preuve des comportements 2 et 6 est relativement simple. Il est vrai que la preuve du comportement 3 est plus complexe mais pas à un point tel que le préjudice sera augmenté. Il est vrai que le témoin Le. est visé par plusieurs facteurs qui mettraient sérieusement en doute sa crédibilité.

Ceci n’est pas un facteur en soi pour rejeter l’admission en preuve du comportement 3. Le jury recevra les instructions et mises en garde pour évaluer son témoignage. [ 98 ] In this regard, it is important to recognize that a judge adjudicating such an application must be convinced that the probative value of the proposed evidence outweighs its prejudicial effect. [31] Considerable deference in appeal is due when the decision satisfies the criteria the Court recalled recently in Béland v.

R .: [32] [25] Rappelons enfin que la mise en balance de la valeur probante et de l’effet préjudiciable par un juge d’instance doit, même si l’admissibilité d’une preuve relève d’une question de droit, faire l’objet de déférence de la part d’une cour d’appel lorsque cette pondération est raisonnable, exempte d’erreurs de principe et n’est pas fondée sur une évaluation défaillante de la preuve. [ 99 ] Clearly, Brunton, J. carried out the appropriate balancing exercise and came to a conclusion pursuant to which, on the one hand, he excluded proposed evidence he considered unduly prejudicial and, on the other hand, permitted the introduction of evidence whose potential probative value outweighed its potential prejudicial effect.

Mr. Boulachanis’ counsel nevertheless sought to have Stober, J. revisit the judgment of Brunton, J. pursuant to s. 551.3 (g)(ii) Cr.C . insofar as the admissibility of his client’s post offence conduct was concerned. [ 100 ] Although a judge presiding a trial enjoys wide discretion in reviewing decisions of this nature made by a case management judge, doing so: “[…] doit être exercé avec prudence, et non pour permettre un appel déguisé à chaque fois qu’un juge d’instance se prononce en vertu de l’

article 551.3 du Code criminel en invoquant “l’intérêt de la justice". [33] [ 101 ] Ultimately, this evidence was of little significance in the overall scheme of things when there was direct evidence of Mr. Boulachanis’ role in the commission of the offence. Even if I had concluded that Stober, J. should have excluded this evidence, it would not have affected my conclusion as to the outcome of the appeal. VI CONCLUSION [ 102 ] None of Mr. Boulachanis’ grounds of appeal having succeeded, I would dismiss the appeal. ALLAN R. HILTON, J.A.