R. v. Adams, 2019 BCPC 360

Citation: R. v. Adams 2019 BCPC 360 Date: 20191127 File No: 228632-1 Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal Court REGINA v. NICHOLAS JAMES ADAMS BAN ON PUBLICATION s. 486.5(1) CCC, s. 486.5(9) CCC RULING ON VOIR DIRE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE C. SICOTTE Counsel for the Crown: D. Melnyk Counsel for the Accused: M. Beckett Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: November 5 and 6, 2019 Date of Judgment: November 27, 2019

[ 1 ] Mr. Adams is charged with two counts of trafficking and three counts of possession for the purposes of trafficking, contrary to ss. 5(1) and 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . Mr. Adams is alleged to have sold fentanyl, heroin, cocaine, and methamphetamine to an undercover police officer. [ 2 ] It is alleged that he was followed by a surveillance team and arrested. He and his vehicle were searched. He was then taken to the police detachment where a strip search was commenced.

A bag of cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl was located. [ 3 ] A voir dire was declared at the outset of the trial to determine if the Charter rights of the accused were breached during his arrest and search. Specifically, the defence alleges that ss. 10(a), 10(b), and 8 were breached. [ 4 ] The ultimate question on this voir dire is whether the drug evidence is admissible at trial. At this first stage, I must consider the conduct of the police as follows: (

a) was Mr. Adams provided with his right to counsel and access to counsel in a lawful manner?; and (

b) was there a breach of Mr. Adams' right to be free from an unreasonable search? [ 5 ] On this voir dire , the Crown called five police officers as witnesses. No evidence was called by the defence. If I find that the police breached Mr. Adams' constitutional rights, I will require additional submissions from counsel concerning the admissibility of the drug evidence at trial, pursuant to s. 24(2) of the Charter .

The Vehicle Stop and Arrest [ 6 ] On February 14, 2018, the police planned to attempt to purchase drugs by having an undercover police officer call phone numbers suspected to be connected to drug dealing. They would keep the undercover officer surveilled and attempt to stop and arrest anyone who sold drugs to that officer. [ 7 ] At around 11:42 a.m., the undercover officer signalled that he had successfully purchased drugs. Cst.

Leger testified that he kept the undercover officer in his sight at all times and at 11:42 a.m. on February 14, he observed a white Chevy Silverado stop for 10 seconds with the driver's window next to the undercover officer and then when the truck left, the undercover officer gave a signal that a successful drug purchase had been made. [ 8 ] Cst. Leger broadcast that information to the surveillance team with the description of the Silverado, including the licence number, and the team took up pursuit of the truck.

They lost sight of the truck for a brief period of time but within a few minutes followed it to a convenience store. [ 9 ] The police gave evidence that the driver of the truck went into the convenience store and very shortly thereafter was arrested in the store by Sgt. Forbes at approximately 11:59 a.m. Sgt. Forbes passed the accused to Cst. Shaikh with instructions to read him his Charter rights for drug trafficking. [ 10 ] The defence made little or no argument regarding the legality of this arrest and I have no trouble concluding that the police had the requisite belief for this arrest. [ 11 ] After Cst.

Shaikh had searched the accused, Sgt. Forbes noticed a small amount of drugs on the ground near the accused's feet. Cst. Shaikh noticed it as well, although who noticed it first is unclear. [ 12 ] Cst. Shaikh took custody of the accused from Sgt. Forbes at the convenience store. He handcuffed Mr. Adams while Sgt. Forbes verbally Chartered him. Cst. Shaikh did a quick pat down search of Mr. Adams outside the store and located no weapons. He read the accused his Charter rights from his Charter card, formally arresting him for trafficking under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act. [ 13 ] Mr.

Adams made no response to being informed of the reason for his arrest. Apparently, Cst. Shaikh did not ask Mr. Adams if he understood the reasons for his arrest. He certainly made no notes of any response, or lack thereof from Mr. Adams, but Cst. Shaikh says that he is sure Mr. Adams understood. [ 14 ] When asked if he wanted to consult counsel, Mr. Adams requested to speak to a specific lawyer. Cst. Shaikh testified that he then told Mr. Adams that he could call the lawyer from the roadside but the police could not guarantee him any privacy with that call. Apparently, Mr.

Adams then said, "I'll call him later", or words to that effect. [ 15 ] Cst. Shaikh then read Mr. Adams the official warning and again, despite receiving no response, did not follow up with asking the accused if he understood. Again, the officer says that from his experience he knew Mr. Adams understood. However, again, there is nothing in his notes to justify why he came to that conclusion. [ 16 ] Cst. Shaikh then took the accused to a flat spot near a building and searched him, locating a wad of cash, a cell phone, and a little baggie of cocaine on the ground at the feet of the accused.

He then had the accused sit down where he had been searched. As Mr. Adams had no identification on him, they asked him some questions and confirmed his identification. [ 17 ] While this was happening, Cst. Airee (phonetic) was answering incoming calls on Mr. Adams' cell phone and the calls were consistent with further drug orders. Cpl. West searched the white Silverado and found another cell phone, two other very small baggies of drugs, and a can of bear spray. [ 18 ] Cst.

Shaikh testified that as this was all going on, due to a number of the pieces of information gathered, he formed the belief that the accused may have a “dialer” bag of drugs hidden on his person somewhere. [ 19 ] The accused argues that somewhere near this point in the investigation, the police had begun to investigate Mr. Adams for the offence of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking as opposed to simply trafficking. The argument is that Mr. Adams is not

given his s. 10(

a) rights at this point with respect to possession for the purpose of trafficking. [20] Cst. Shaikh called up Cpl. Darby and reviewed with her the basis for his belief that Mr. Adams was concealing a “dialer” bag onhis person. Cst. Shaikh received Cpl. Darby's authorization to conduct the strip search on Mr. Adams. [21] Cst. Shaikh said he informed Mr. Adams of his intention to strip search him and made it clear to him that if he gave up the“dialer” bag of drugs, that the officer believed he had hidden, the strip search would not be necessary. [22] Mr.

Adams was taken to the Langley RCMP cells for the purposes of conducting the strip search. Cst. Shaikh testified that atLangley cells he gave Mr. Adams another opportunity to speak to a lawyer. He started saying he, "usually", and then switched to sayingthat he always does this but he knows the accused did not take him up on this offer as he had no notes of this conversation. When askedspecifically by Crown if Mr. Adams wanted to speak to a lawyer at this point, Cst. Shaikh replied, "I don't think so". [23] In cross-examination, Cst.

Shaikh agreed with defence counsel that he should have made notes of a conversation when anaccused is waiving significant rights, and Cst. Shaikh said he will do so in the future. [24] The defence argues that Cst. Shaikh's evidence on this point should not be accepted when he has no notes. He further arguesthat this is a breach of Mr. Adams' s. 10(

b) rights and leads inexorably to a breach of his s. 8 rights with respect to the subsequent search. [25] Cst. Shaikh then seems to follow the protocol set out by the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Golden for strip searches. In theprocess of Mr. Adams removing his pants, various little baggies of drugs were falling onto the floor of the cell, however, the strip searchdoes not progress very far before Mr. Adams hands over a bag of drugs to the officer, thus ending the search. [26] Cst. Shaikh then completes a Promise to Appear and releases Mr.

Adams for a first appearance scheduled for May 14, 2018.The alleged offences set out on the Promise to Appear are trafficking, driving while prohibited, and possession for the purposes oftrafficking, all from February 14, 2018. [27] Cpl. West testified as well about his search of the truck, transporting the accused and Cst. Shaikh to the Langley detachment,and being present for the strip search. [28] Cpl. Darby testified about authorizing Cst. Shaikh to conduct the strip search and the information that was given to her to justifythat authorization.

Section 10(a) [29] Mr. Adams argues that when the investigation shifts to a search for further drugs and a possible charge of possession for thepurpose of trafficking, the accused is entitled under s. 10(

a) to be Chartered again for that new offence. While there may be cases wherethat is true, on the facts before me I cannot conclude that Mr. Adams' s. 10(

a) rights were violated. The onus is on the accused to provesuch a breach on the balance of probabilities and he has not done so. [30] Justice McLachlin for the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R. v. Evans, (SCC), [1991] 1 SCR 869,stated at para. 35: When considering whether there has been a breach of s. 10(

a) of the Charter, it is the substance of what the accused can reasonably besupposed to have understood, rather than the formalism of the precise words used, which must govern.

The question is whether what theaccused was told, viewed reasonably in all the circumstances of the case, was sufficient to permit him to make a reasonable decision todecline to submit to arrest, or alternatively, to undermine his right to counsel under s. 10(b). [31] Justice McLachlin also wrote at para. 48: I should not be taken as suggesting that the police, in the course of an exploratory investigation, must reiterate the right to counsel everytime that the investigation touches on a different offence.

I do, however, affirm that … the police must restate the accused's right tocounsel when there is a fundamental and discrete change in the purpose of the investigation, one involving a different and unrelatedoffence or a significantly more serious offence than that contemplated at the time of the warning. [32] The offences of trafficking and possession for the purpose of trafficking are treated very similarly in both the Controlled Drugsand Substances Act and the case law from our Court of Appeal, such as R. v. Voong, 2015 BCCA 285 and R. v.

Smith, 2017 BCCA 112. [33] I conclude that in the case before me, and likely in the majority of dial-a-dope arrests, the two offences will be so closelyinterrelated that separate warnings under s. 10(

a) are not required.

Section 10(b) [34] The Charter

section 10(

b) entitles the arrested or detained person to retain and instruct counsel without delay and to beinformed of that right. The right to counsel arises immediately upon arrest or detention. “Without delay” means immediately, as soon aspracticable or at the first reasonable opportunity (R. v. Taylor, 2014 SCC 50 , [2014] 2 SCR 495 at para. 24). [35] The police have a duty to facilitate access to counsel as soon as practicable to reduce the possibility of accidental self-incrimination.

The police are required to refrain from eliciting evidence from the arrested person or taking further investigative steps toillicit evidence before the police facilitate access to counsel. [36] To facilitate access to counsel, the police should assist the arrested person by providing the contact information for privatecounsel or the 24-hour Legal Aid duty lawyer (R. v. Bartle, (SCC), [1994] 3 SCR 173, para. 28). [37] I do not understand the defence to be arguing before me that there was any problem with the information component of s. 10(b).

Cst. Shaikh read directly from his Charter card to Mr. Adams who then requested to speak to a specific lawyer. [38] Dealing then with the implementation of the right to counsel, the defence is not arguing that the police unreasonably preventedMr. Adams from contacting counsel at the roadside. Rather, the argument is that Mr. Adams, once at the Langley detachment, was notgiven an opportunity to contact counsel in private prior to being subject to a strip search. [39] Crown counsel pointed me to R. v. Sinclair, 2010 SCC 35 at para. 27 where Chief Justice McLachlin, writing for the majority,said: The police obligations flowing from s. 10(

b) are not absolute. Unless the detainee invokes the right and is reasonably diligent inexercising it, the correlative duties on the police to provide a reasonable opportunity and to refrain from eliciting evidence will either notarise in the first place or will be suspended. [40] Cst. Shaikh agreed in cross-examination that Mr. Adams declining to call counsel at roadside may well have been because thatcall would not have been in private. This puts an onus on the police to offer Mr.

Adams a private call to counsel as soon as practicable orat the first reasonable opportunity. [41] The Crown is not arguing before me that the police had good reason to conduct the strip search prior to providing Mr. Adams acall to his lawyer. Instead, the Crown is arguing that Cst. Shaikh did make that offer to the accused but he, once again, declined. That isthe evidence of Cst. Shaikh. [42] However, once again, Cst. Shaikh has no notes of this conversation. Instead, Cst.

Shaikh testified that he always offers theaccused another call to counsel once he is back at the detachment. [43] Crown argues that I should accept Cst. Shaikh's evidence on this point, while the defence argues that Cst. Shaikh is testifyingbased on habit or experience, not on recollection from notes. [44] The defence referred me to R. v. Zack, [1999] O.J. No. 5747 at para. 6, where the court declined to accept that certainobservations were made when they were not included in the officer's notes. [45] This issue comes up often in criminal trials and has been the subject of significant comment from our courts.

In R. v. Eld, 2014BCPC 112, Judge Cleaveley at para. 42 summarized some of those cases as follows: [42] The common thread running through the cases is R. v. Lozanovski [2005] ONCJ 112, where Justice Feldman said: … It is necessary for the officer to at least somewhere … put the significant observation he made … the absence of the questionedobservations in his notebook lead to the conclusion that those observations were not, in fact, made at the time but are perhaps somethingthat over the course of time the officer has come to believe that he saw”.

I respectfully agree with this view of the diminished reliabilityof this kind of evidence. It is important to the proper functioning of the judicial fact finding role that significant facts be recorded bypolice and not left to the whim of memory. [Emphasis added in original] [43] I do not understand the law to be that the failure to properly record observations in a notebook automatically leads to a rejectionof the controversial evidence.

In this case, the tarp. [44] It is my view that I must consider the entirety of the evidence before making a determination as to what weight, if any, I give tothe evidence in question. [45] The facts before me are different than in some of the authorities which deal with notebook deficiencies. [46] In R. v. Ruiz, [2012 BCPC 457 , [2012] B.C.J. No. 2780] … the court rejected the assertion of the single investigatorthat there was an odour of perfume (a masking agent) present. [47] In R. v.

Givens, [2009] BCSC 824, the trial judge took into account the three and a half years between the event and the trial, andthe discrepancies, including the notebook, in the evidence of the investigating officer and concluded that his evidence was notsufficiently reliable to prove the offence. [48] In R. v. Joseph, [2011] BCJ 1232, the trial judge said, in referring to the lack of notes, “it is not out of the question that looked atin the best light, he has simply confused this incident with one or more of the others in his memory”. [49] In R. v.

McConnell, [2008] BCSC 505, the trial judge was faced with an assertion of slurred speech which was not supported bya note, and the conflicting evidence of the senior police officer and a nurse. The evidence was rejected. [50] In R. v. Sundberg, [2010] BCJ 1543, the trial judge was also concerned about the general credibility of the investigating officer. [46] More recently, in R. v. Whitton, 2016 BCSC 1799, Justice MacKenzie wrote at para. 45: [45] When I consider the defence applications I recall Blake P.C.J.’s comments in R. v.

Russell (23 July 2014), Victoria 160044-2C(B.C.P.C.) at para. 25: … the failure to take adequate notes, particularly on matters of crucial importance, may indeed reflect negatively on the credibility of apolice witness. But the assessment of credibility is a cumulative exercise; it depends upon the analysis of many factors which ariseduring the course of a court proceeding.

[46] Even though Saunders J.A. did not refer to Wood v. Schaeffer, her following observations in R. v. Acosta, 2014 BCCA 218 arealso instructive: [15] It is, of course, desirable that notes be made reasonably contemporaneously with the events. There is, however, no rule of law tothat effect, and it is always for the trier of fact to determine who to believe, and who not to believe, what evidence to accept, and whatevidence not to accept.

In this case, whether the constable's evidence of his observations was credible was for the judge who wascharged with determining the credibility and reliability of the officer's testimony. Although Mr. Acosta has referred to many cases inwhich trial courts have referred to the absence of contemporaneous notes as a reason to question the reliability of evidence, none of themundermine that proposition... [47] Finally, in R. v. Lotfy, 2017 BCCA 50 , 2017 BCCA, at para. 50, the court quoted from R. v.

Gill, 2015 ONSC 7872 asfollows: [45] While the necessity for a police officer to make accurate, comprehensive and contemporaneous notes cannot be understated(Wood v. Schaeffer, 2013 SCC 71), as a general rule, perceived, acknowledged or found deficiencies or omissions from a police officer’snotes relating to a particular transaction may, or may not, hold any significance depending on specific factual context. An absent notemay impact on the weight to be afforded an officer’s evidence. Automatic rejection of the officer’s evidence as a discipline sanction isinappropriate.

The significance of an omitted notational reference will depend upon such factors as the number of gaps, the nature of anomission in terms of the importance of the fact in question, the explanation for the omission, the overall degree of completeness of thenotes, the length of the interval between the making of the notes and the delivery of oral testimony, and the existence of confirmation forthe missing note. [Emphasis added in original] [48] Returning then to the case before me, I find that it is significant that the evidence I am being asked to accept has to do with thewaiver of right to counsel, a significant Charter issue on serious charges, dial-a-dope trafficking of hard drugs. [49] I further consider that the officer is now testifying roughly 21 months after making the observations.

He agreed in cross-examination that his notes were inadequate and that this was an important issue. [50] I also consider that exact wording and timing can be important for the court to determine correctly whether there has been anunequivocal waiver of a Charter right. Here, Cst. Shaikh, in effect, testified that, “Mr. Adams must have waived his right to counselbecause otherwise I would have made a note or given him a phone call.” [51] I am not prepared to accept Cst. Shaikh's evidence on this point.

It may well be that he interpreted something said by Mr.Adams as a waiver but that is something the court needs to decide. With no, even remotely, contemporaneous record of what was said bythe accused, if anything, I find that the accused has established on a balance of probabilities that his s. 10(

b) rights were violated at theimplementation stage. The police had a duty at the detachment to offer Mr. Adams a right to speak to counsel in private and I am unableto conclude that they did so.

Section 8 [52] Mr. Adams argues that his right to be secure from unreasonable search and seizure was violated. He argues that a strip search ishighly intrusive and inherently degrading. Here it was imposed on the accused without the opportunity to consult with counsel. [53] The defence argued that even if there was no significant change in Mr.

Adams' legal jeopardy warranting new consultation withcounsel, there was a change in his procedural jeopardy, similar to participation in a polygraph or a line-up. [54] The defence argues further that the required reasonable and probable grounds to justify a strip search were not met. The officersagreed there were other possible explanations for some of the factors relied on by Cst. Shaikh and Cpl.

Darby to justify the strip search. [55] The Crown argues that a strip search is simply a search pursuant to a common law power following a lawful arrest and does notrequire any cooperation from the accused, therefore it is quite different from a polygraph or lineup. Crown points to R. v. Golden for thispoint. [56] Further, the Crown argues that not only were the criteria in Golden fully complied with but this did not end up being a stripsearch in any case. They point to Exhibit 2, Tab 1, page 4, which is a photograph of the accused at the most intrusive stage of the search.It shows Mr.

Adams still wearing socks, a t-shirt, and a pair of what look like basketball shorts that extend below his knees. [57] As this was a warrantless search, it is prima facie unreasonable under s. 8. The Crown must rebut the presumption ofunreasonableness by showing that its conduct was authorized by law, that the law is reasonable, and that the search was carried out in areasonable manner. [58] On the facts that I have heard, I easily conclude that the accused was lawfully arrested and the common law authorizes a searchpursuant to that arrest. When I consider the various factors listed by Cst. Shaikh and Cpl.

Darby together, with their experience in thisarea of the law, I have no difficulty in concluding that the police had reasonable and probable grounds to conduct the strip search on Mr.Adams. Was the Search Carried Out in a Reasonable Manner? [59] When I look at how the search was carried out, again I have no problem concluding that R. v. Golden was followed. The factthat Mr. Adams turns over the “dialer” bag of drugs before the search got to his underwear, I do not find to be significant to my analysis.The police intended to search him that thoroughly if need be and had advised Mr. Adams of that intent.

[60] However, the issue that remains then is whether the police's failure to provide Mr. Adams with his right to counsel prior tocommencing the strip search leads to a conclusion that the search was carried out in an unreasonable manner. Mr. Adams argues that thes. 8 breach flows directly from the s. 10(

b) breach. [61] When the police provide credible grounds for delaying a lawyer call until after the strip search, the courts seem to be reluctantto find a breach of s. 8. [62] In R. v. Johal, 2015 BCCA 246, at para. 7, there was evidence that the police conducted the strip search prior to a call tocounsel to prevent the accused from discarding any drugs while in the private phone room. [63] In R. v.

Rezaei, 2017 BCSC 1639, at para. 43, the officer justified delaying the call to counsel until after the strip search on thebasis that they wanted to prevent the detainee from destroying any drugs on her person. [64] There is no such evidence before me. It may be that the phone room at the Langley Detachment allows observation of thedetainee whilst speaking to counsel. It may be that the police had no concern about Mr. Adams destroying any drugs that may be on hisperson. [65] In any case, I have no evidence of any justification by the police for postponing the call to counsel until after the strip search.

Infact, the opposite is true. Cst. Shaikh testified that he did make such an offer to Mr. Adams but Mr. Adams declined to make such a call. [66] I do not accept Cst. Shaikh's evidence on this point but it demonstrates that even at trial he did not appear concerned about theaccused destroying any evidence while on the phone. [67] The defence argues that if Mr. Adams had been given his right to counsel prior to commencement of the strip search, counselmay have advised him to hand over the drugs, thus avoiding the search altogether.

The defence also says counsel may have conferredwith the police to ensure there were proper grounds to justify the search. Crown argues that this is all speculation by the defence. [68] In R. v. Simmons, (SCC), [1988] 2 SCR 495, the court dealt directly with this issue in the context of a stripsearch at the border. Chief Justice Dickson for the majority wrote, at para. 55: It is clear from the foregoing that the right to counsel has an important impact on the execution of the search.

Had the appellant beeninformed of her right to counsel at the point she was detained, and she availed herself of that right, the appellant would have had thebenefit of legal advice. Counsel could have dispelled the appellant's uncertainty surrounding the search procedure by explaining thecontent of ss. 143 and 144 and assuring the appellant of the officers' right to insist she remove her clothing. Counsel could also haveensured that the statutory standard of reasonable cause to suppose had been satisfied and assured the appellant that there were propergrounds to warrant a search.

In my view, the denial of the appellant's right to counsel cannot avoid having an impact on thereasonableness of the subsequent search of the appellant. [69] The Simmons decision was considered by our Court of Appeal in R. v. Carpenter, 2001 BCCA 31, where Justice Finch for thecourt wrote at para. 43: [43] In many cases, the denial of a right to counsel has no relevance to a determination of the reasonableness of a s.8 search.

However, if the relevant statute gives the accused a right to seek review of the decision at issue, then denial of the right to counsel willbe a significant factor in a determination of reasonableness. (See Debot) The reason for this, as stated by Lamer J. in Debot, is that inthis circumstance, “the s.10(

b) violation goes to the very lawfulness of the search.” (at para. 4) [44] In Simmons, the court examined the appellant’s s.8 and s.10(

b) rights in the context of a strip search authorized by ss. 143 and144 [now s.98] of the Customs Act… [45] The majority judgment in Simmons followed the reasoning of Lamer J. in Debot. The court indicated that the reasonableness of asearch is impacted by a denial of the right to counsel. Consequently, the court held that the violation of s. 10(

b) in combination with thestatutory right of prior authorization rendered the strip search unreasonable. [46] The situation in the case at bar parallels that of Simmons. Here, however, there were two breaches of the appellant’s right tocounsel, both of which were followed by searches. The first occurred at the time of the strip search, and the second when the appellantwas x-rayed and given laxatives during the officers’ investigation of potential heroin importation.

Given the extremely invasive natureof both procedures, and the importance of a right to counsel in such circumstances, the reasonableness of the searches was seriouslyaffected by the breaches of s. 10(b). In the words of Lamer J in Debot, the s. 10(

b) breaches went to the very lawfulness of thesubsequent searches. Therefore, I conclude that the appellant’s s.8 rights were breached at the time of the strip search and at the time ofthe search conducted by hospital staff. [70] In the considerations of the reasonableness of strip searches under the Customs Act, there is the additional factor of the right to areview of the decision to strip search.

That right is not present in the common law power to strip search on reasonable and probablegrounds subsequent to a lawful arrest. [71] Some of the factors listed in Debot and Simmons, however, are present in the case before me. Counsel could have explained toMr. Adams the legal requirements in Golden for carrying out a strip search. Assuring the accused that at no point would he be required tobe totally naked may dispel some of the discomfort inevitably associated with a search of this nature. [72] Counsel, too, could have spoken to Cst. Shaikh or Cpl.

Darby to ensure that proper grounds existed and to ensure that they wereaware of the legal requirements in Golden. Having confirmed that proper grounds existed for a strip search, counsel could have advisedMr. Adams to turn over the “dialer” bag immediately and avoid the need for the search at all. [73] I conclude that in the case before me, the significant s. 10(

b) breach leads inevitably to the conclusion that the search was

carried out in an unreasonable manner and, as such, is a violation of s. 8 of the Charter . [ 74 ] While that breach may be less significant than in a Customs Act situation, I find that it is nonetheless still a breach. No justification was given for not providing Mr. Adams with an opportunity to consult with counsel prior to commencing a strip search. [ 75 ] In conclusion then, while I find there was no breach of s. 10(a), I do find that Mr. Adams' rights under s. 10(

b) and s. 8 of the Charter have been breached. (RULING ON VOIR DIRE CONCLUDED)