2019 FC 1543, 2019 FC 1543

T-1981-18 2019 FC 1543 Sulaiman Almuhaidib ( Applicant ) v. The Minister of Citizenship and Immigration ( Respondent ) Indexed as: Almuhaidib v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) Federal Court, Noël J.— Montréal, August 26; Ottawa, December 2, 2019. Citizenship and Immigration — Status in Canada — Citizens — Judicial review of citizenship officer decision declaring applicant’s citizenship application “abandoned” under Citizenship Act ( Act ), s. 13.2(1) (a)(

i) for failing to provide additional information, evidence required by respondent Minister under Act , s. 23.1 — Applicant submitting citizenship application in August 2010 — Discrepancies suggesting applicant using undeclared passport — Citizenship judge approving citizenship application; applicant summoned to take oath of citizenship — However, Immigration officer questioning applicant upon arrival in Canada for swearing-in ceremony — Concluding in Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, s. 44 report that applicant not meeting residency obligation as permanent resident — Removal order issued — Applicant not allowed to take oath of citizenship — Immigration Appeal Division quashing removal order in 2015, declaring that applicant not losing permanent resident status — Applicant requesting new date to take oath of citizenship — Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (SCCA) receiving Royal Assent in 2014 — Making new powers given to respondent retroactive, enforceable against citizenship applications made before 2014 — Amendments including statutory authority under Act , s. 23.1 to request additional information, evidence to determine whether applicant meeting requirements of Act any time before oath taken — Applicant’s new request again revealing contradictions — Applicant also failing to answer questions, to provide undeclared passport — Pursuant to new information, respondent maintaining decision to refuse citizenship application — Applicant further failing to provide copies of passports in 2018 pursuant to Act , s. 23.1 — Citizenship officer considering application abandoned — Concluding new provisions of Act applying in applicant’s case — Applicant submitting, inter alia, citizenship officer erring in

interpretation of SCCA transitional provisions — Whether citizenship officer erring (1) in deciding that citizenship application becoming “finally disposed of” under SCCA, s. 31(1) transitional provision after oath of citizenship taken, (2) in declaring applicant’s citizenship application abandoned — Issue at stake whether application presented in August 2010, later decisions final, binding; whether citizenship acquired — Citizenship officer’s

interpretation of transitional provisions reasonable — Question considered whether applicant’s citizenship application “décidé définitivement” or “finally disposed of” before coming into force of Act ’s new provisions — From May 2015, respondent able to require additional information or evidence under Act , s. 23.1 — Here, citizenship application filed before June 2014 — Act , ss. 13.2(1) (a)(i), 23.1 becoming applicable to citizenship applications not “finally disposed of” on August 1, 2014, May 28, 2015 — Terms “décidé définitivement”, “finally disposed of” sharing common meaning — Parliament seeking finality, end or culmination of process, i.e. oath of citizenship — SCCA giving more power to respondent to address security, fraud, more discretion in decision-making process —

Interpretation of transitional provisions giving respondent more flexibility, discretion to investigate material misrepresentations aligning with scheme, purpose of SCCA — Citizenship officer reasonably interpreting that citizenship application submitted before June 2014 not final until after oath taken — Oath fundamental requirement for obtaining citizenship —Applicant having to demonstrate, upon request, truth of all facts on which application based — Right to citizenship following granting of certificate of citizenship not absolute — Respondent’s power to refuse granting of citizenship established by courts before coming into force of Act , ss. 13.2 , 23.1 , 22(1) (e.1) — Therefore erroneous to suggest that decision of Citizenship Judge, granting of citizenship certificate giving finality to process — Question certified — Application dismissed.

This was an application for judicial review of a decision by a citizenship officer declaring the applicant’s citizenship application “abandoned” under subparagraph 13.2(1) (a)(

i) of the Citizenship Act ( Act ) for failing to provide additional information and evidence required by the respondent Minister under

section 23.1 of the Act . The applicant, a permanent resident and citizen of the Kingdom of Saudia Arabia, submitted an application for citizenship in August 2010. Discrepancies in various documents suggested that the applicant was possibly using an undeclared passport. A citizenship judge approved the applicant’s citizenship application and he was summoned to take the oath of citizenship.

However, after arriving at the airport from Saudi Arabia in 2012 for the swearing-in ceremony, an immigration officer questioned the applicant and concluded in a report produced pursuant to subsection 44(1) of the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act that the applicant had not met his residency obligation as a permanent resident. A removal order was issued against him. The applicant was advised that he would not be allowed to take the oath of citizenship under paragraph 5(1) (

f) of the Act . In 2015, the Immigration Appeal Division quashed the removal order and declared that the applicant had not lost his permanent resident status. The applicant then requested that a new date be set to take the oath of citizenship. However, in 2014 the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act (SCCA) had received Royal Assent, amending the Act by making new powers given to the respondent retroactive and enforceable against applications for citizenship made before 2014. The amendments included

section 23.1 of the Act , giving the respondent the statutory authority to request additional information and evidence to determine whether an applicant meets the requirements of the Act at any time before the oath is taken. An examination of the applicant’s new request again revealed contradictions in his application. In an interview, the applicant failed to answer an officer’s questions and to provide the passport containing the stays related to the observed contradictions.

After considering new information from the applicant, the respondent informed him that the decision to refuse his citizenship application remained in effect. In September 2018, a new citizenship officer requested that the applicant provide copies of his passports between 2006 and 2010, as well as entry and exit documents for several countries, pursuant to

section 23.1 of the Act . Since the applicant failed to provide those documents, the citizenship officer considered the application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1) (a)(

i) of the Act . The citizenship officer concluded that the new provisions of the Act applied to the applicant’s application, and that the applicant had not provided a reasonable excuse for failing to provide the required documents. The applicant submitted, inter alia , that the citizenship officer erred in her

interpretation of the transitional provisions in

section 31 of the SCCA and, consequently, had no authority to request additional information pursuant to

section 23.1 of the Act . The applicant submitted

that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by Parliament in the transitional provisions, in particular the words “finally disposed of”, imply the concept of a decision and not of a prohibition or a legal requirement. At issue was whether the citizenship officer erred (1) in deciding that an application for citizenship becomes “finally disposed of” under transitional provision 31(1) of the SCCA after the oath of citizenship is taken, and (2) in declaring the applicant’s citizenship application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1) (a)(

i) of the Act . Held , the application should be dismissed. The issue at stake was whether the application for citizenship presented in August 2010 and the decisions made later during the process were final and binding in nature and, consequently, whether citizenship had been acquired. The

interpretation of the transitional provisions by the citizenship officer was reasonable. The question to be considered in this case was whether the applicant’s citizenship application was “ décidé définitivement ” or “finally disposed of” before the coming into force of the Act ’s new provisions. This question was important in determining whether the statutory

interpretation of the citizenship officer was reasonable and whether the respondent had the authority to require additional information under

section 23.1 of the Act and declare the application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1) (a)(

i) of the Act . It was not until May 28, 2015, that the respondent could require additional information or evidence under

section 23.1 in the context of a citizenship application referred to in subsection 31(1) of the SCCA, and therefore the power to declare an application abandoned for failing to provide this additional information or evidence under paragraph 13.2(1) (

a) of the Act . Here, the citizenship application was filed before June 19, 2014, under subsection 5(1) of the Act . Subparagraph 13.2(1) (a)(i) (abandonment of application) and

section 23.1 (misrepresenting or withholding material circumstances) become applicable to any citizenship application that is not “finally disposed of” pursuant to subsection 31(1), on August 1, 2014, and May 28, 2015, respectively. The

interpretation proposed by the respondent was the correct one. The terms “ décidé définitivement ” and “finally disposed of” share a common meaning between them. In both languages, the objective sought by Parliament is finality, an end or the culmination of a process. In other words, the transitional provisions refer to the moment that ends the citizenship application process, which is the oath of citizenship. This common meaning is, moreover, the least ambiguous and most restrictive

interpretation within the meaning of R. v. Daoust . In contrast, a decision prior to the oath of citizenship could imply any one of the multiple decisions made in the course of an application for citizenship. The analysis of the legislative intent of the SCCA, in accordance with a purposive approach, also confirmed the reasonableness of the citizenship officer’s

interpretation of the transitional provisions. The SCCA aimed to give the respondent more power in the citizenship application process to better address cases involving security and fraud. The main purpose of the SCCA was also to give the respondent more discretion in the decision-making process, at the expense of the powers of the citizenship judge, and to enable the respondent to better identify material misrepresentations relating to essential facts related to an application for citizenship. An

interpretation of the transitional provisions giving the respondent more flexibility and discretion to investigate potential material misrepresentations up to the moment the oath of citizenship is administered aligns better with the purpose and scheme of the SCCA than the

interpretation that an application is final following the granting of a citizenship certificate. The latter

interpretation would give the applicant an acquired right, thus transforming the taking of the oath of citizenship into a mere formality. It would therefore be reasonable to interpret the transitional provisions as complying with Parliament’s intention to grant the respondent the power to terminate a citizenship application right up to the taking of the oath of citizenship, for fraud or security reasons. A contextual analysis confirmed the reasonableness of the citizenship officer’s

interpretation that a citizenship application submitted before June 19, 2014, was not final until after the oath of citizenship was taken. The case law clearly states that an oath of citizenship is not a formality, but rather a fundamental requirement for obtaining citizenship. It is the expression of the applicant’s adhesion to a social contract, a commitment by the citizenship applicant to the country he or she has chosen. Participation in the whole process ultimately leading to citizenship is not a right, but rather a privilege to be able to take the oath at the end of such a process.

Applicants must demonstrate on request the truth of all the facts on which their applications are based and agree to comply with the Act during the entire process. The right to citizenship following the granting of a certificate of citizenship is not absolute because the respondent may prohibit the taking of the oath in certain circumstances, and has a limited power of refusal allowing inquiries to be made if the facts submitted in the application for citizenship merit further explanation and clarification.

Here, the respondent’s power to refuse was established by the courts well before the recent coming into force of sections 13.2 and 23.1 , and paragraph 22(1) (e.1) of the Act . It was therefore erroneous to suggest that the decision of the Citizenship Judge and the granting of the citizenship certificate gave a finality to the process of applying for citizenship. In light of these findings, the citizenship officer’s decision to declare the applicant’s citizenship application abandoned was also reasonable.

A question was certified as to whether an application for citizenship that was made under subsection 5(1) of the Act , as it read before the coming into force of the SCCA, and that received a positive decision from the citizenship judge and a positive grant from the respondent’s delegate, is an application that has been “finally disposed of” within the meaning of subsection 31(1) of the SCCA. STATUTES AND REGULATIONS CITED Citizenship Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29, ss. 3(2) , (7) , 5 , 5.1(1) , (3) , 5.2(1) , (2) , 9(1) , 11 , 12 , 13.1 –14, 13.2, 19(2),(3), 20(1), 22, 23.1, 24, 29(2), Sch.

Citizenship Regulations , SOR/93-246, ss. 17 (c), 19(1) . Federal Courts Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. F-7, s. 18.1(3) . Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , S.C. 2001, c. 27, ss. 28 , 44(1) . Protection of Canada from Terrorists Act , S.C. 2015, c. 9, ss. 11(1) , (2.1) , (2) . Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , S.C. 2014, c. 22, ss. 1 , 8 , 11 , 13 , 13.1 , 13.2 , 19 , 22 , 31 . CASES CITED APPLIED:

Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R. 27, (1998), 36 O.R. (3d) 418; Zhao v. Canada (Citizenship andImmigration), 2016 FC 207; Valenzuela v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 879; Vavilov v. Canada (Citizenship andImmigration), 2017 FCA 132, [2018] 3 F.C.R. 75; Kamel v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2017 FC 946; Saab v. Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 653; R. v. Penunsi, 2019 SCC 39, 435 D.L.R. (4th) 65; R. v. Rafilovich, 2019 SCC 51, 442D.L.R. (4th) 539; X (Re), 2014 FCA 249, [2015] 1 F.C.R. 684; R. v.

Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217; Canada (Minister ofCitizenship and Immigration) v. Liyanagamage (1994), 176 N.R. 4, [1994] F.C.J. No. 1637 (QL) (C.A.); Canada (Citizenship andImmigration) v. Nilam, 2017 FCA 44, [2018] 2 F.C.R. 511. CONSIDERED: Almuhaidib v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2018 FC 615; Stanizai v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 74, 73Admin. L.R. (5th) 58; McAteer v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 578, 121 O.R. (3d) 1; Khalil v. Canada (Secretary of State), (FCA), [1999] 4 F.C. 661, (1999), 176 D.L.R. (4th) 191 (C.A.); GPP v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration),2018 FC 562, [2018] 4 F.C.R. 538, affd 2019 FCA 71; Benner v. Canada (Secretary of State), (SCC), [1997] 1 S.C.R.358, (1997), 143 D.L.R. (4th) 577; In re Citizenship Act and in re Heib, (FC), [1980] 1 F.C. 254, (1979), 104 D.L.R.(3d) 422 (T.D.); Roach v. Canada (Minister of State for Multiculturalism and Citizenship), (FCA), [1994] 2 F.C. 406,(1994), 113 D.L.R. (4th) 67 (C.A.); Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) v. Pereira, 2014 FC 574, 456 F.T.R. 287; Dowhopoluk v.Martin et al., (ON SC), [1972] 1 O.R. 311, (1971), 23 D.L.R. (3d) 42 (H.C.J.). REFERRED TO: Tran v.

Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 289; Canada (Attorney General) v. HeffelGallery Limited, 2019 FCA 82, [2019] 3 F.C.R. 81. AUTHORS CITED Canadian Oxford Dictionary, 2nd ed. Toronto: Oxford University Press, 2004, “final”. Nouveau Petit Robert: dictionnaire alphabétique et analogique de la langue française, Paris: Dictionnaires Le Robert, 2009, “définitif”. Sullivan, Ruth. Sullivan on the Construction of Statutes, 6th ed., Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2014.

APPLICATION for judicial review of a decision by a citizenship officer declaring the applicant’s citizenship application “abandoned”under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the Citizenship Act (Act) for failing to provide additional information and evidence required by therespondent Minister under

section 23.1 of the Act. Application dismissed. APPEARANCES Jacques Beauchemin for applicant. Lynne Lazaroff and Renalda Ponari for respondent. SOLICITORS OF RECORD Beauchemin Avocat, Montréal, for applicant. Deputy Attorney General of Canada for respondent. The following is the English version of the reasons for judgment and judgment rendered by Noël J.: Table of Contents Paragraph I. Overview 1 II. Facts 4 III. Decision 24 IV. Parties’ submissions 27 A. Applicant’s submissions 28 B. Respondent’s submissions 39 V. Issues 50 VI. Analysis 51 A. Standard of judicial review 54

B.

Interpretation of transitional provisions 61

(1) Overview of relevant legislation and of citizenship application process upon filing and initial processing of citizenship application 63

(2) Overview of principles of statutory

interpretation 76

(3) Analysis of transitional provisions 85

a) Analysis of terms used 85 (

i) Interpretation of transitional provisions 86 (ii) Meaning of “ décidé définitivement ” and “finally disposed of” 97

b) Analysis of legislative intent 102

c) Analysis of legal context 111

(4) Application of transitional provisions to applicant 130 C. Reasonableness of declaration of abandonment under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of CA 135 D. Certified question 147 VII. Conclusion 156 I. Overview [ 1 ] The applicant, Sulaiman Almuhaidib, seeks judicial review of the decision of a citizenship officer, dated October 30, 2018, declaring his citizenship application “abandoned” under subparagraph 13.2(1) (a)(

i) of the Citizenship Act , R.S.C., 1985, c. C-29 (CA), for failing to provide additional information and evidence required by the respondent under

section 23.1 of the CA. For the reasons that follow, I find that this application for judicial review must be dismissed. [ 2 ] Becoming a Canadian citizen is a privilege. It is a privilege that is conferred only once a citizenship applicant has taken the oath of citizenship, these 24 words signifying adherence to our constitution and our country. Until that oath is taken before a citizenship judge, an applicant has an obligation to demonstrate the merits of their citizenship application, particularly when a credible doubt arises.

This is why if, during the course of a proceeding, a potential contradiction or omission regarding an essential fact is discovered and an applicant is unable to justify it, the Minister retains the power to investigate. Consequently, a citizenship application comes to fruition only after the oath of citizenship has been taken. [ 3 ] In the present case, following the decision of the Citizenship Judge and the granting of a citizenship certificate to the applicant by a Minister’s delegate, significant omissions and contradictions regarding the citizenship application were noted.

Given that the applicant’s citizenship application had not been “finally disposed of” under subsection 31(1) of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , S.C. 2014, c. 22 ( SCCA ), since he had not yet taken the oath of citizenship, the Minister asked him for additional information and evidence under

section 23.1 of the CA to justify these significant omissions and contradictions. However, despite multiple opportunities to do so, the applicant has not satisfactorily justified these omissions and contradictions. Rather, he decided to explain why he did not think he had to. Consequently, it was reasonable to declare his citizenship application abandoned, in accordance with subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the CA . That said, these new powers granted to the Minister should not be used in a way that creates ongoing uncertainty for citizenship applications. In this regard, the conclusion in paragraph 156 of this decision is important to consider. II. Facts [ 4 ] The applicant is a citizen of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and has been a permanent resident of Canada since December 25, 2006. [ 5 ] The applicant began the process of becoming a Canadian citizen on August 12, 2010, by submitting an application for citizenship.

In his application, he noted that he had been absent from Canada for a total of only 162 days between December 25, 2006, and August 12, 2010. The applicant also stated that he worked solely as chairman of the Canadian company Almassa Group, located in Montréal. In addition, the applicant included with his application a document listing six stays outside Canada between January 2007 and June 2010, all in Saudi Arabia for personal reasons. [ 6 ] Subsequently, in November 2011, the applicant submitted a Residence Questionnaire in which he again stated that he worked solely as chairman of Almassa Group in Montréal.

In addition, he listed eight trips outside Canada between January 2007 and August 2011, again, all of them to Saudi Arabia for personal reasons. [ 7 ] With his Residence Questionnaire, the applicant included a variety of documents, including an affidavit signed on September 18, 2008, which had been given to the Canada Border Services Agency to explain the reasons why he and his family had more than $10 000 in their possession upon a return to Canada. However, the content of this affidavit contradicted not only his application for citizenship, but also the Residence Questionnaire.

Indeed, in the affidavit, the applicant stated that he had been out of the country from December 19,

2007, to February 13, 2008, to visit Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, Lebanon and Mauritius for personal and business reasons. However, this information directly contradicts what is stated in his Residence Questionnaire and his application since they note instead (1) that he had not visited any country other than Saudi Arabia; (2) that he had only travelled for personal reasons; and (3) that he left Canada from January 9, 2008, to February 13, 2008, and not from December 19, 2007, to February 13, 2008.

In addition, copies of passports submitted with the Residence Questionnaire do not include any entry stamps for a country other than Saudi Arabia during this period. These discrepancies between the various documents therefore suggested that there was a possibility that the applicant was using another undeclared passport. [ 8 ] Following the assessment by a citizenship officer, the application was forwarded to a citizenship judge, who decided to approve the applicant’s citizenship application on March 7, 2012.

Subsequently, on April 13, 2012, a Minister’s delegate granted a certificate of citizenship under subsection 5(1) of the CA, and the applicant was summoned to take the oath of Canadian citizenship on May 9, 2012. [ 9 ] However, upon arriving at the airport in Montréal from Saudi Arabia on May 7, 2012, for the swearing-in ceremony, the applicant was questioned by an immigration officer under the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act , S.C. 2001, c. 27 ( IRPA ). A 44(1) report was produced, which concluded that the applicant had not met his residency obligation as a permanent resident.

During this exchange, the applicant stated, among other things, that he travels frequently and that he works for the Canadian company Almassa Group. However, he added that he also sat on the boards of directors of a number of companies in Saudi Arabia and owned a construction company in that country. In view of these statements, a removal order was issued against him. [ 10 ] On the basis of this removal order, the applicant was advised that he would not be allowed to take the oath of Canadian citizenship under paragraph 5(1)(

f) of the CA . The applicant therefore appealed the removal order to the Immigration Appeal Division (IAD). The IAD allowed the removal order appeal on June 4, 2015, after the Minister gave his consent. As a result, the removal order was quashed, and the IAD declared that the applicant had not lost his permanent resident status. [ 11 ] Following this IAD decision, the applicant wrote to the respondent to set a new date to take the oath of citizenship. However, between the granting of the citizenship certificate in 2012 and the IAD decision of June 2015, the SCCA received Royal Assent on June 19, 2014.

This act amends the CA by attributing several new powers to the Minister and includes in particular transitional provisions subjecting these legislative amendments to all pending applications for citizenship, thus making these new powers retroactive and enforceable against applications for citizenship made before June 19, 2014, provided that they were not “finally disposed of before that day” . [ 12 ] On October 2, 2015, in response to requests made by the applicant in June and September 2015, the respondent informed the applicant that the request to reopen would be examined.

This examination again revealed the contradiction between the information contained in the affidavit of September 18, 2008, the citizenship application and the Residence Questionnaire regarding the applicant’s stays outside Canada. It also revealed the recent discovery of a press release from the Saudi company Savola Group, dated May 21, 2008. The press release identified the applicant as chairman of the company and announced a business agreement with the Al Muhaidab group, which had been concluded the previous day in Jeddah.

The press release also included a photograph identifying the applicant at the meeting in Jeddah. The Residence Questionnaire and the citizenship application did not mention the Savola Group or a stay in Saudi Arabia on May 20, 2008. These new facts were not known to the Citizenship Judge or to the Minister’s delegate in 2012. [ 13 ] In light of all this, these contradictions became a matter of concern for the respondent.

Indeed, the respondent suspects that there the facts have been misrepresented since the passports submitted by the applicant do not contain any information regarding a stay outside Canada other than in Saudi Arabia, or a stay outside Canada on May 20, 2008. [ 14 ] As a result, the applicant was summoned for an interview on February 16, 2016, to allow him to explain these contradictions. In the notice to appear, he was asked to bring all of his current or expired passports and travel documents in his possession. During the interview, he was asked several questions regarding these inconsistencies.

However, the applicant did not answer the officer’s questions, indicating that he preferred to answer the questions in writing. In addition, although he was required to bring all of his passports in his possession, the applicant stated that he did not bring them all.

He notably omitted to bring the one containing the stays related to the contradictions which had been observed, explaining that this passport was currently “misplaced” , but that it would be provided later. [ 15 ] The applicant subsequently received a letter from the respondent, dated March 29, 2016, advising him of the existence of a report prepared by a citizenship officer. This report alleges that, under paragraph 22(1)(e.1) of the CA, the applicant had misrepresented material circumstances in his application for citizenship.

This report also describes the respondent’s concerns, and the letter invited the applicant to respond to the allegations within 30 days and to submit any evidence to refute those allegations. Subsequently, the applicant was granted an additional 30 days to respond in order to [translation] “communicate with the persons concerned in Saudi Arabia and obtain the translation of certain documents” required. On June 2, 2016, the applicant again requested 30 days, which was denied. [ 16 ] The applicant finally replied to the respondent’s letter on June 29, 2016.

In that letter, the applicant explained why the concerns regarding him were wrong, and he provided a supporting affidavit explaining the alleged inconsistencies. In the affidavit, he explained (1) that he was not present at the Savola Group meeting in Jeddah on May 20, 2008, and that the image used by the company came from the company’s archives; and (2) that he wrote the date of January 9, 2008, by mistake in his citizenship application and his Residence Questionnaire instead of December 19, 2007.

In addition, the applicant confirmed that he was indeed the chairman of the Saudi company Savola Group, but offered no explanation which could help understand the failure to mention it in his citizenship application or in his Residence Questionnaire. During the hearing before the Court, counsel for the applicant explained that the applicant did not include his role within the Savola Group in his citizenship application or in his Residence Questionnaire because, in his view, chairing a board of directors is not a job.

However, it appears that the applicant noted that he was chairman of Almassa Group in Montréal. [ 17 ] Moreover, in the affidavit, the applicant explained that his trips made during that period are not indicated in the passports filed with his application because they are in a passport that he no longer has in his possession. In this regard, the applicant explained that in January 2007, he entered Saudi Arabia on passport No. E984440 and decided to replace it because it was old and worn out. He received a new passport (No. G793222) on January 7, 2007, which he declared lost a few days later.

He therefore received another passport (No. G794209) on January 13, 2007. But, a few days later, he found the second passport (G793222), which he attached to the third passport

(G794209). However, the applicant noted that this third passport was damaged and that, unfortunately, some of the stays omitted by mistake from his citizenship application were in this third passport (G794209). At the very end of his letter, he therefore asked that the decision be reviewed in light of the new information, which made it possible to [translation ] “grant his application for citizenship” . [ 18 ] After considering this new information, the respondent informed the applicant on August 9, 2016, that the decision to refuse his citizenship application remained in effect.

On August 24, 2016, the applicant filed an application for leave and for judicial review in the Federal Court concerning this refusal. The parties agreed to an out-of-court settlement whereby the respondent agreed to refer the citizenship application to another decision maker for reconsideration. However, it was stated that this reconsideration was not a guarantee that the application would be accepted. [ 19 ] On August 2, 2017, a new citizenship officer responsible for the file therefore sent the applicant a new request for copies of all his passports in his possession between 2006 and 2010.

The new officer also requested all of his entry and exit documents for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon during the same period, all within 30 days. The applicant was granted an additional 60 days to allow him to provide these documents, but was denied a second additional 30 days. In any event, he was still given until December 9, 2017, to respond to the request. [ 20 ] Once again, on December 7, 2017, the applicant filed an application for leave and for judicial review in order to obtain a writ of prohibition declaring the request for additional information and evidence made under

section 23.1 of the CA illegal and abusive . With that application for judicial review, the applicant also sought a writ of mandamus requiring that he be summoned to take the oath of citizenship. On June 13, 2018, Justice Shore dismissed that application for judicial review, finding that it was premature to assess the reasonableness of the Minister’s requests under

section 23.1 of the CA since it had not yet been decided by the citizenship officer. Justice Shore added that there was “serious doubt about certain erroneous information under paragraph 22(1)(e.1) of the CA, [and therefore] an officer may request additional information”. Justice Shore also stated [at paragraph 11] that “the delay cannot be attributed to the Minister or the officer” , given that the applicant had not provided the required information (see Almuhaidib v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 615 ( Almuhaidib 2018), at paragraph 7 ). [ 21 ] Subsequently, on September 7, 2018, the citizenship officer sent a letter to the applicant asking him again to provide copies of his passports between 2006 and 2010, as well as the entry and exit documents for Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon during this period, all within 30 days. [ 22 ] In response, on October 2, 2018, the applicant explained that he considered that his citizenship application had already been the subject of a “[final] dispos[ition]” under the transitional provisions in subsection 31(1) of the SCCA and that, as a result, the respondent did not have the legal authority to request additional information and evidence from him.

He therefore asked to be summoned [translation] “to his citizenship ceremony for the presentation of his citizenship certificate” . [ 23 ] On October 30, 2018, the respondent informed the applicant that his citizenship application was considered to have been abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the CA , because the documents requested on September 7, 2018, had still not been provided and no reason had been put forward for this failure, except to say that the applicant considered the request for documents to have been made without legal authorization. On November 16, 2018, the applicant filed an application for leave and for judicial review of the officer’s decision, which was allowed. This is the decision under review. III. Decision [ 24 ] The impugned decision concluded that the application had been considered abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the CA, since the applicant had failed to provide the documents requested under subsection 23.1 of the CA within the prescribed time, without reasonable excuse. The officer divided the reasons for the decision into two parts. [ 25 ] First, the citizenship officer concluded that the new provisions of the CA applied to the applicant’s application, despite the fact that this act was not in force when the applicant submitted his citizenship application in 2010. The officer noted that

section 31 of the SCCA provides that sections 13.1 to 14 of the CA apply to applications that were filed before August 1, 2014, provided they have not been finally disposed of before that day. The officer clarified that the provisions of the CA, introduced through the SCCA , including the power to require additional information and evidence under

section 23.1 and to declare an application as abandoned under the

section 13.2, apply to his citizenship application filed on August 12, 2010. [ 26 ] Second, the officer concluded that the applicant had not provided a reasonable excuse for failing to provide the documents required by the Minister under

section 23.1 of the CA. She noted that (1) the applicant had received several requests to provide copies of all passports in his possession between 2006 and 2010, as well as entry and exit documents for his trips to Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the United Arab Emirates and Lebanon; (2) the applicant had been granted, at his request and on multiple occasions, additional time to provide the required documents; (3) the applicant did not provide any of those requested documents; and (4) the applicant did not offer a valid explanation for why he was unable to provide the documents.

The officer added that those documents were important for the assessment of the citizenship application and, not having received them from the applicant, she had no choice but to consider the application as abandoned. IV. Parties’ submissions [ 27 ] Let us therefore summarize the main arguments submitted by the parties. A. Applicant’s submissions [ 28 ] The applicant is of the opinion that the citizenship officer erred in her

interpretation of the transitional provisions in

section 31 of the SCCA . Consequently, she had no authority to request additional information pursuant to

section 23.1 of the CA currently in force. Nor did she have the power to declare the applicant’s citizenship application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) for failing to provide the required additional information and evidence, without reasonable excuse. For these reasons, the applicant asserts that his application for judicial review must be allowed.

[29] The applicant argues that the decision of the Citizenship Judge dated March 7, 2012, which approved his citizenship applicationand the granting of the citizenship certificate by a Minister’s delegate on April 13, 2012, under subsection 5(1) of the CA, constitutes afinal disposition of his citizenship application under subsection 31(1) of the SCCA. Consequently, since this so-called final dispositionwas made before the coming into force of paragraph 22(1)(e.1),

section 23.1 and sections 13.1 and 13.2 of the CA, the applicant arguesthat the officer did not have the statutory authority to request additional information and evidence from him under

section 23.1 in order todetermine whether he was subject to the prohibition in paragraph 22(1)(e.1). According to the applicant, the officer also did not have thelegal authority to declare his application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i). [30] Furthermore, the applicant is of the opinion that if the respondent did not agree with the Citizenship Judge’s decision, he shouldhave appealed the Citizenship Judge’s decision within 60 days as provided in

section 14 of the CA in force in 2012. Since the respondentdid not appeal within the required time, the applicant argues that his right to be summoned to take the oath of citizenship crystallizedwhen the Minister’s delegate granted the citizenship certificate, as well as by the effect of quashing his removal order.

The applicanttherefore contends that the respondent cannot continue to delay his application by asking him for additional information and evidence. [31] The applicant adds that since the respondent had not availed himself of his right of appeal, the only recourse available to theMinister to refuse the swearing in of the applicant is the exercise of a residual discretion. However, the applicant argues that case law hasnoted that this residual discretion only applies in limited situations and that the facts of this case do not justify it. In support, the applicantcites Stanizai v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration), 2014 FC 74, 73 Admin.

L.R. (5th) 58 (Stanizai), at paragraphs 30–42, whereJustice Mactavish noted that the exception to the finality of the decision by a citizenship judge is only applicable when the Minister isinformed that the conditions provided for by law have not been met, in particular because of material misrepresentations. [32] The applicant states that this is not the case here, since the Citizenship Judge had the affidavit of September 18, 2008, before himand the applicant’s failure to include his role as chairman of Savola Group in his citizenship application was reasonable because chairinga board is not a job.

Indeed, the applicant submits that it is unreasonable to conclude that the transitional provisions contemplate thislimited exception rather than the general principle of the finality of the Citizenship Judge’s decision. [33] In this regard, the applicant argues that an

interpretation of the transitional provisions according to the modern and contextualapproach required by the Supreme Court of Canada (S.C.C.) in Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), (SCC), [1998] 1 S.C.R.27 (Rizzo) supports his position. [34] On this point, the applicant submits that the plain and ordinary meaning of the words used by Parliament in the transitionalprovisions, in particular the words “finally disposed of”, imply the concept of a decision and not of a prohibition or a legal requirement.The applicant also argues that the phrase “finally disposed of” is consistent with the technical meaning developed by case law withregard to the finality of the Citizenship Judge’s decision. [35] In addition, the applicant suggests that the

interpretation which makes a citizenship application “finally disposed of” followingthe decision of the Citizenship Judge, which is followed by the granting of the citizenship certificate by the Minister’s delegate promotesthe principle of consistency of laws. He clarifies that when reading the transitional provisions in the context of subsection 14(6) of theCA, which note that the decision appealed to Federal Court is “final”, it is clear that the

interpretation of the transitional provisionsproposed by the applicant is more consistent with the act as a whole. [36] The applicant adds that the

interpretation of the transitional provisions he is proposing is more consistent with the scheme of theact, the object of the act, and the intention of Parliament. In support, the applicant cites in particular the

summary of the SCCA whereParliament notes its desire to expedite the processing of citizens’ applications and not to further delay those already pending. [37] Finally, the applicant notes that the transitional provisions must be interpreted restrictively because of the presumption that a lawis not retrospective. Citing Tran v. Canada (Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness), 2017 SCC 50, [2017] 2 S.C.R. 289, atparagraphs 42 and 43, the applicant states that it is presumed that a legislative amendment protects acquired rights. Consequently, theapplicant submits that the

interpretation to the effect that the decision of the Citizenship Judge followed by the granting of the citizenshipcertificate is considered to be a final disposition protects the applicant’s acquired right to take the oath of citizenship. [38] For these reasons, the applicant concludes that the citizenship officer’s

interpretation of the transitional provisions is notreasonable. Consequently, he asks that the Court declare that the applicant has the right to be summoned for “his” oath of citizenshipceremony. As for the declaration sought by the applicant, very few allegations have been submitted on this subject. B. Respondent’s submissions [39] The respondent contends that the citizenship officer did not err in her

interpretation of the transitional provisions since acitizenship application is only considered to be “finally disposed of” when the last stage of processing is finalized, that is, when theapplicant takes an oath of Canadian citizenship. [40] The respondent submits that the version of the CA that was in force in 2012 clearly stated that the oath of citizenship is the verylast step in the processing of an application for citizenship.

Subsection 12(3) specifies that “[a] certificate issued pursuant to this sectiondoes not take effect until the person to whom it is issued has complied with the requirements of this Act and the regulations respectingthe oath of citizenship”. [41] Moreover, subsection 19(1) of the Citizenship Regulations, SOR/1993-246 (Regulations) which was in force in 2012, stated that“a person who has been granted citizenship under subsection 5(1) of the Act shall take the oath of citizenship by swearing or solemnlyaffirming it before a citizenship judge”. [42] The respondent refers to several decisions which confirm that the oath of citizenship is a mandatory condition for becoming aCanadian citizen.

In this regard, the decision of the Ontario Court of Appeal in McAteer v. Canada (Attorney General), 2014 ONCA 578,121 O.R. (3d) 1 (McAteer) states in the first paragraph that, “[s]ubject to limited discretionary exceptions, s. 12(3) of the Act providesthat a certificate of citizenship issued by the Minister of Citizenship and Immigration does not become effective until the oath is taken”.

[43] The respondent suggests that this last step is not a mere formality that it must automatically accord when it grants a certificate ofcitizenship to an applicant. Thus, even if an applicant is granted the certificate under subsection 5(1) of the CA, he or she continues tobear the burden of demonstrating that he or she meets all the requirements of the CA until the time of taking the oath (Zhao v. Canada(Citizenship and Immigration), 2016 FC 207 (Zhao)).

For example, the reason the applicant had to appeal the removal order was that hisapplication no longer met the requirements of subsection 5(1). [44] The respondent also relies on Khalil v.

Canada (Secretary of State), (FCA), [1999] 4 F.C. 661 (Khalil) andStanizai to demonstrate that the Citizenship Judge’s decision is not the time when an application is “finally disposed of” under the CA inforce in 2012, since the Minister retains residual discretion to reject an application for citizenship, in particular in cases where, as notedin Khalil [at paragraph 14], “there has been a material misrepresentation, or some reasonable cause to believe that there was”. Thisdiscretion is also confirmed in Stanizai, at paragraph 32. [45] The respondent proposes a bilingual

interpretation of the transitional provisions to justify them. Although the respondent admitsthat the oath of citizenship is not a “decision” as such, he argues that the English version of the transitional provisions excludesapplications that have been “finally disposed of” from the application of the new provisions of the CA. The English version thereforedoes not imply a decision, but rather the timing of the final resolution of the application, which supports the

interpretation of thecitizenship officer. [46] Finally, the respondent submits that an

interpretation of the transitional provisions that is consistent with the SCCA as a wholeconfirms that the provisions apply only to applications where the oath of citizenship has already taken place. In this regard,

section 19 ofthe SCCA amends paragraph 22(1)(

f) of the CA to provide [at paragraph 22(1)(e.1)] that an applicant cannot receive the oath ofcitizenship if, “directly or indirectly misrepresents or withholds material circumstances relating to a relevant matter, which induces orcould induce an error in the administration of this Act”. Consequently, in the respondent’s view, an

interpretation of the transitionalprovisions which considers the decision of the Citizenship Judge and the granting of a citizenship certificate by a Minister’s delegate asbeing a final disposition is not consistent with the other provisions of the SCCA. [47] In submitting that the transitional provisions apply to the applicant’s application for citizenship, the respondent argues that it wasreasonable in the circumstances to declare his application abandoned by the applicant under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the CA forfailing to provide the additional information and evidence required by the respondent under

section 23.1. [48]

Section 23.1 of the CA gives the Minister the statutory authority to request additional information and evidence to determinewhether an applicant meets the requirements of the CA at any time before the oath is taken. In addition, subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i)allows the Minister to impose a consequence, namely the declaration of an application as being abandoned, if an applicant does notprovide the information required to ensure compliance with the CA’s requirements without reasonable excuse. [49] In this case, the respondent submits that it has been requesting this additional information and evidence under

section 23.1 sinceat least August 2017. However, the applicant did not provide any of the required information or documents or any excuse for not doingso. Those documents were requested in order to verify the inconsistencies in the citizenship application and the applicant’s ResidenceQuestionnaire, which were submitted in 2010 and 2011 respectively and which indicate that the applicant may have made materialmisrepresentations in relation to his stays outside Canada, an essential fact which could render the applicant ineligible to become aCanadian citizen.

It was therefore reasonable for the citizenship officer to declare the application for citizenship abandoned undersubparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i). V. Issues [50] In this case, the Court must answer two questions: 1. Did the citizenship officer err in deciding that an application for citizenship becomes “finally disposed of” under transitionalprovision 31(1) of the SCCA after the oath of citizenship is taken? 2. Did the officer err in declaring the applicant’s citizenship application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the CA? VI. Analysis [51] The key to resolving this dispute is the

interpretation to be given to the transitional provisions of

section 31 of the SCCA, inparticular the meaning to be given to the phrases “décidé définitivement” and “finally disposed of”. [52] This is because the issue at stake is whether the application for citizenship presented in August 2010 and the decisions made laterduring the process (the decision of the Citizenship Judge and that of the Minister’s delegate to grant the applicant a certificate ofcitizenship) are final and binding in nature and, consequently, whether citizenship has been acquired.

If this is the case, the newlegislative provisions (section 23.1 and subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i)) applicable to citizenship applications, and which are referred to insubsection 31(1) of the SCCA, did not become enforceable against the applicant until May 28, 2015, and August 1, 2014, respectively.As a result, the citizenship officer would not have had the authority to request additional information under

section 23.1, or to declare thecitizenship application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i). [53] On the other hand, if the taking of the oath of citizenship was required to obtain citizenship, then the application for citizenshipwas not decided definitively and, consequently, the new provisions (section 23.1 and subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i)) would have had theforce of law and would have been effective against the applicant. A. Standard of judicial review [54] We must first determine the standard of review applicable to (1) the analysis of the citizenship officer’s

interpretation of thetransitional provisions, and (2) her decision to declare the applicant’s citizenship application as being abandoned under subparagraph13.2(1)(a)(i). I am of the view that the standard of reasonableness applies to both issues.

[ 55 ] As a result, our inquiry must focus on whether the decision subject to judicial review has the requisite justification. We must also look at the appearance and intelligibility of the decision-making process. Finally, we must consider whether the decision belongs to the range of possible, acceptable outcomes ( Canada (Attorney General) v. Heffel Gallery Limited , 2019 FCA 82 , [2019] 3 F.C.R. 81 , at paragraphs 45–57 ). [ 56 ] With regard to the analysis of the citizenship officer’s

interpretation of the transitional provisions, it is essential to take into account the mandate of Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC). That said, it is recognized that the applicable standard of review is that of reasonableness. [ 57 ] On this subject, and for the purposes of interpreting the transitional provisions (

section 31 of the SCCA ), Justice Gascon wrote the following in Valenzuela v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2016 FC 879 , at paragraphs 16–18 : There is no doubt that the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , and the Citizenship Act that it modifies, are among the enabling statutes that CIC is mandated to administer and apply. However, since Alberta (Information and Privacy Commissioner) v.

Alberta Teachers’ Association , 2011 SCC 61 , the Supreme Court of Canada has many times recalled that “when an administrative tribunal interprets or applies its home statute, there is a presumption that the standard of review applicable to its decision is reasonableness” ( Commission scolaire de Laval v. Syndicat de l’enseignement de la région de Laval , 2016 SCC 8 , at paragraph 32 ; B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 SCC 58 , at paragraph 25 ; Wilson v. British Columbia (Superintendent of Motor Vehicles) , 2015 SCC 47 , at paragraph 17 ; ATCO Gas and Pipelines Ltd. v.

Alberta (Utilities Commission) , 2015 SCC 45 , at paragraph 28 ; Tervita Corp. v. Canada (Commissioner of Competition) , 2015 SCC 3 , at paragraph 35 ). Of course, this presumption is not unchallengeable. It can be overruled and the standard of correctness can be applied, in the presence of one of the factors first set out by the Supreme Court in Dunsmuir v. New Brunswick , 2008 SCC 9 [Dunsmuir], at paragraphs 43–64 and recently reiterated in Mouvement laïque québécois v. Saguenay (City) , 2015 SCC 16 , at paragraphs 46–48 .

Such is the case when a contextual analysis reveals a clear intent of Parliament not to protect the tribunal’s authority with respect to certain issues; when several courts have concurrent and non-exclusive jurisdiction on a point of law; when an issue raised is a general question of law that is of central importance to the legal system as a whole and outside the area of expertise of the specialized administrative tribunal; or when a constitutional question is at play .

It is clear that none of these scenarios exist here and that the presumption established by Alberta Teachers is therefore not rebutted in this case. The question of

interpretation that is raised by Mr. Valenzuela’s application pertains to an Act that is closely linked to CIC’s mandate and it is not among the limited range of questions for which Dunsmuir and its descendants indicate that the standard of correctness should be applied. The applicable standard of review is therefore that of reasonableness. According to this standard, the Court must show deference to CIC’s decision . [ 58 ] I agree with these reasons and conclude that the

interpretation of the transitional provisions must be considered in light of the reasonableness standard. Having said that, I would point out that with regard to the analysis of the statutory

interpretation of the transitional provisions by the citizenship officer, the standard of reasonableness deserves to be applied more rigorously because of the brevity of the statutory analysis of the citizenship officer and of the case law concerning the rigorous application of the reasonableness standard in an immigration context. I quote from the

summary of the case law on this point in Vavilov v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FCA 132 , [2018] 3 F.C.R. 75, where the Federal Court of Appeal noted at paragraphs 37–39: On issues of statutory

interpretation in the immigration context, the Supreme Court recently has also been applying reasonableness in an exacting way. Not surprisingly, because of the presumption of reasonableness, it is acting under the reasonableness standard of review, but it assesses the administrative decision-maker’s

interpretation of a statutory provision closely, in fact sometimes in a manner that appears to be akin to correctness: see, e.g. , Kanthasamy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 SCC 61 , [2015] 3 S.C.R. 909 ; B010 v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2015 SCC 58 , [2015] 3 S.C.R. 704 ; Febles v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2014 SCC 68 , [2014] 3 S.C.R. 431 ; Ezokola v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2013 SCC 40 , [2013] 2 S.C.R. 678 . In fact, it has been a while since the Supreme Court has afforded a decision-maker in the immigration context much of a margin of appreciation on statutory

interpretation issues . Further rendering the standard of review of less practical import in this case is the fact that we have before us little in the way of the reasoning of the Registrar. On the central statutory

interpretation issue before us, the Registrar said nothing. We can only assume the Registrar relied on an analyst’s report that was provided. But, as we shall see, that report contains only one brief paragraph on the statutory

interpretation issue, and a very limited one at that. In such circumstances, it is hard to give much deference to the decision; the concern is that we cannot be sure that the statutory

interpretation issue was adequately considered. On some occasions like this, we have quashed an administrative decision because we cannot engage in reasonableness analysis or because we are concerned that administrative decision making is being immunized from review: see, e.g., Leahy v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2012 FCA 227 , [2014] 1 F.C.R. 766 ; Canada v. Kabul Farms Inc. , 2016 FCA 143 ; and see the wider discussion of this point in Tsleil-Waututh Nation v.

Canada (Attorney General) , 2017 FCA 128 . [ 59 ] With respect to the standard of review applicable to a declaration of abandonment under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i), Justice Shore wrote in Zhao that the standard of reasonableness applies “to the determination of the Minister that the citizenship application was abandoned; and, as to whether the Minister provided adequate reasons” (paragraph 19). This position was confirmed by Justice Boswell in Kamel v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2017 FC 946 (paragraph 4 ) and by Justice Annis in Saab v.

Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 653 (paragraph 20 ). [ 60 ] I agree with these reasons and conclude that the citizenship officer’s decision to declare the applicant’s citizenship application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) must be analyzed according to the standard of reasonableness. B.

Interpretation of transitional provisions [ 61 ] To determine whether the citizenship officer’s

interpretation of the transitional provisions was reasonable, given the brevity of

the citizenship officer’s reasons, I will conduct a four-part analysis. First, in order to properly understand the legislative framework in which the decision-making process took place, it is important to understand the CA as it was when the applicant applied for citizenship. Second, I will provide an overview of the principles of statutory

interpretation as set out in case law. Third, I will interpret the language of the transitional provisions. To do this, I will conduct a bilingual analysis of their ordinary and grammatical meaning, their legislative intention according to a purposive analysis, and the legal context of the citizenship applications to which they apply, while explaining the meaning of the oath of citizenship and the authority retained by the Minister before the taking of the oath of citizenship. Finally, I will briefly discuss the decision of the Citizenship Judge and the granting of the citizenship certificate. [ 62 ] This analysis will allow me to confirm that the

interpretation of the transitional provisions by the citizenship officer was reasonable and that they therefore do not exclude the applicant’s application from the application of the new provisions of the CA included in the SCCA . Consequently, the Minister could request additional information and documentation in accordance with

section 23.1 of the CA . He could also conclude that the application for citizenship was abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the CA, since the requested information and documents were not sent to him.

(1) Overview of relevant legislation and of citizenship application process upon filing and initial processing of citizenship application [ 63 ] The CA in effect when the applicant applied for citizenship in August 2010, and when he was originally called to take the oath of citizenship in 2012, provided for a citizenship application process that included multiple steps and decisions. [ 64 ] First, an applicant would make an application for citizenship under subsection 5(1) of the CA.

Then, following a preliminary review of the application form, a citizenship officer would decide whether the applicant should also complete a Residence Questionnaire to clarify certain statements made in the initial application form, as was the case here. [ 65 ] After receiving all the documents required by the CA and its regulations, the citizenship officer would review the application for citizenship to determine whether the applicant satisfied the requirements in subsection 5(1) of the CA and was not subject to any prohibition set out in the CA.

Following this review, the citizenship officer would then decide whether the application should be referred to a citizenship judge, which was also the case for the applicant. [ 66 ] Once the citizenship judge received the citizenship application, he or she would therefore have to decide whether the applicant met the criteria set out in the CA, including those in subsection 5(1). Based on the analysis of the citizenship application, the citizenship judge would decide to either reject or approve the application.

Following this decision by the citizenship judge, the Minister would then have 60 days to appeal it to the Federal Court. The appeal would be based on the record as it stood before the citizenship judge.

For the purposes of this case, there was no appeal from the citizenship judge’s decision. [ 67 ] Thereafter, if no appeal was filed, or if the Federal Court dismissed the Minister’s appeal, the citizenship application would be sent to a Minister’s delegate, who would grant a citizenship certificate to the applicant if he or she was of the opinion that the applicant still met the criteria set out in subsection 5(1) and was not subject to prohibitions set out in the CA. [ 68 ] Finally, subsection 12(3) of the CA and subsection 19(1) of the Regulations provided that a person who was granted a certificate of citizenship under subsection 5(1) became a citizen, provided that they took the oath of citizenship, which was not the case here. [ 69 ] In addition, between the granting of the citizenship certificate and the swearing-in ceremony, the CA at the time had some provisions prohibiting the swearing-in in certain cases.

For example, an applicant could not take the oath if a removal order under paragraph 5(1)(

f) was issued against him or her, or for reasons of national security under subsection 20(1), on grounds of criminality under subsection 22(1) and, under paragraph 22(1)(b), for having been charged with an offence under subsection 29(2), including for having committed material misrepresentations about an essential fact of the citizenship application. [ 70 ] In the applicant’s case, although the Citizenship Judge approved the application for citizenship and the Minister issued a certificate of citizenship, the fact remains that to date, the applicant has still not taken the oath of citizenship, let alone attended a citizenship ceremony presided over by a citizenship judge.

In this regard, the applicant himself does not dispute that he is not yet a Canadian citizen since he requests to be summoned to take the oath of citizenship. [ 71 ] On a return trip on May 7, 2012, to come take the oath of Canadian citizenship on May 9, 2012, an immigration officer at the airport issued a removal order against the applicant on the grounds that he had not demonstrated, on a balance of probabilities, that he had complied with his residency obligation under

section 28 of the IRPA . According to paragraph 5(1)(

f) of the CA in force on the date of the removal order, the Minister cannot grant citizenship if a removal order has been issued against the applicant. Therefore, on May 9, 2012, the date of the citizenship ceremony, the applicant did not meet the requirements to obtain citizenship and could not take the oath of citizenship. He appealed the decision to the IAD.

It was not until June 4, 2015, that the IAD concluded, on consent of the parties, that the removal order should be quashed. [ 72 ] In addition, since the filing of the citizenship application of August 12, 2010, and the IAD decision of June 4, 2015, significant changes to the CA have come into force because of the SCCA , which received Royal Assent on June 19, 2014. Other changes have since taken place. [ 73 ] Let us now look at these various changes, while considering what impact, if any, they had on the applicant after the IAD’s decision dated June 4, 2015.

We have already seen that as of June 2015, the applicant had still not obtained Canadian citizenship. [ 74 ] To properly answer the question, we must pay particular attention to the transitional provisions of the SCCA . Above all, we must consider whether the applicant’s citizenship application was “ décidé définitivement ” or “finally disposed of” before the coming into force of the CA’s new provisions.

More specifically, it is a question of determining whether an application for citizenship is “ décidé définitivement ” or “finally disposed of” when the Minister grants citizenship following the decision of a citizenship judge, or if it is only when the applicant takes the oath of citizenship. This question is important in determining whether the statutory

interpretation of the citizenship officer was reasonable and whether, by the same token, the Minister had the authority to require additional information under

section 23.1 of the CA and declare the applicant’s application abandoned under subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) of the CA.

[75] In other words, if the citizenship officer erred and the oath of citizenship is just a formality, since it was the decision of theCitizenship Judge and the granting of the citizenship certificate that definitively granted citizenship, this therefore means that therespondent could no longer request additional information from the applicant or declare his application abandoned. Conversely, if theCitizenship Judge’s decision and the granting of the citizenship certificate did not give finality to an application for citizenship and theoath of citizenship was therefore, rather, the final step, the citizenship officer’s

interpretation of the transitional provisions wasreasonable. Consequently, the respondent could apply the new provisions for the purposes of the applicant’s claim.

(2) Overview of principles of statutory

interpretation [76] In this section, I will first set out some principles of statutory

interpretation. Once this backdrop has been established, I willundertake a literal analysis of the transitional provisions in both official languages, followed by a purposive and contextual analysis ofthem to determine whether the citizenship officer’s

interpretation was reasonable. [77] At the outset, let us establish some principles of legal

interpretation which will guide our analysis of the provisions in question.The S.C.C. noted in Rizzo, and very recently reconfirmed in R. v. Penunsi, 2019 SCC 39, 435 D.L.R. (4th) 65, at paragraph 36, and R. v.Rafilovich, 2019 SCC 51, 442 D.L.R. (4th) 539 (Rafilovich), at paragraph 97, that it favours a modern approach to legislativeinterpretation, which goes beyond a simple literal analysis of the ink on the page. Indeed, it teaches in Rizzo, at paragraph 21 that “thewords of

an Act are to be read in their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of theAct, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament”. [78] Professor Ruth Sullivan divides this method of

interpretation favoured by the S.C.C. in Rizzo into three parts (Sullivan on theConstruction of Statutes, 6th ed., Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis, 2014). [79] First, an analysis must be undertaken based on the ordinary meaning of the words used in the legislative provisions in question.As noted by the S.C.C. in Rizzo, this step involves analyzing the words of a statute according to their “grammatical and ordinary sense”(paragraph 21). [80] Second, the words of a statute must be analyzed according to legislative intent.

As the S.C.C. stated in Rizzo, this involvesinterpreting the statutory provisions in question according to the scheme of the act, the object of the act and the intention of Parliament(paragraph 21). In other words, the entire act must be analyzed to determine its objectives and the means designed to achieve theseobjectives. Recently, in Rafilovich, the S.C.C. confirmed this approach by specifying that the objectives of

an act must be analyzedtogether and to avoid fixating on one objective to the exclusion of others (paragraphs 29–31). [81] Third, the words of

an act are to be read in their entire context (Rizzo, paragraph 21). This includes in particular an analysisaccording to established legal standards. [82] In X (Re), 2014 FCA 249, [2015] 1 F.C.R. 684, at paragraph 71, the Federal Court of Appeal reiterated all these principles asfollows: Inherent in the contextual approach to statutory

interpretation is the understanding that the grammatical and ordinary sense of aprovision is not determinative of its meaning. A court must consider the total context of the provision to be interpreted “no matter howplain the disposition may seem upon initial reading” (ATCO Gas & Pipelines Ltd. v. Alberta (Energy & Utilities Board), 2006 SCC 4,[2006] 1 S.C.R. 140, at paragraph 48). From the text and this wider context the interpreting court aims to ascertain legislative intent,“[t]he most significant element of this analysis” (R. v. Monney, (SCC), [1999] 1 S.C.R. 652, at paragraph 26). [83] In addition, the principles applicable to bilingual statutory

interpretation must be examined in this case. Justice Bastarache,writing on behalf of the S.C.C., clearly stated the principles of bilingual

interpretation in R. v. Daoust, 2004 SCC 6, [2004] 1 S.C.R. 217(Daoust), at paragraphs 27–​30: [27] There is, therefore, a specific procedure to be followed when interpreting bilingual statutes. The first step is to determinewhether there is discordance. If the two versions are irreconcilable, we must rely on other principles: see Côté, supra, at p. 327. Apurposive and contextual approach is favoured: see, for example, Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v. Rex, [2002] 2 S.C.R. 559, 2002SCC 42, at para. 26; Chieu v.

Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 84, 2002 SCC 3, at para. 27; R. v.Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 2001 SCC 2, at para. 33. We must determine whether there is an ambiguity, that is, whether one or both versions of the statute are “reasonably capable of morethan one meaning”: Bell ExpressVu, supra, at para. 29. If there is an ambiguity in one version but not the other, the two versions must bereconciled, that is, we must look for the meaning that is common to both versions: Côté, supra, at p. 327.

The common meaning is theversion that is plain and not ambiguous: Côté, supra, at p. 327; see Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. of Canada v. T. Eaton Co., (SCC), [1956] S.C.R. 610 at p. 614; Kwiatkowsky v. Minister of Employment and Immigration, (SCC), [1982]2 S.C.R. 856, at p. 863. If neither version is ambiguous, or if they both are, the common meaning is normally the narrower version: Gravel v. City of St-Léonard, (SCC), [1978] 1 S.C.R. 660, at p. 669; Pfizer Co. v. Deputy Minister of National Revenue For Customs andExcise, (SCC), [1977] 1 S.C.R. 456, at pp. 464-65.

Professor Côté illustrates this point as follows, at p. 327: There is a third possibility: one version may have a broader meaning than another, in which case the shared meaning is the more narrowof the two. The second step is to determine whether the common or dominant meaning is, according to the ordinary rules of statutory

interpretation,consistent with Parliament’s intent: Côté, supra, at pp. 328-329. At this stage, the words of Lamer J. in Slaight Communications Inc. v.Davidson, (SCC), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 1038, at p. 1071, are instructive: First of all, therefore, these two versions have to be reconciled if possible. To do this, an attempt must be made to get from the two

versions of the provision the meaning common to them both and ascertain whether this appears to be consistent with the purpose and general scheme of the Code. [ 84 ] Taking into account all of these guiding principles, let us now analyze the reasonableness of the citizenship officer’s

interpretation of the legislative provisions.

(3) Analysis of transitional provisions (

a) Analysis of terms used [ 85 ] For the purposes of this analysis, in order to fully understand the operation of the transitional provisions in

section 31 of the SCCA , we must dissect their wording. Then, we must consider more specifically the wording of the expressions “ décidé définitivement ” and “finally disposed of” . (

i) Interpretation of transitional provisions [ 86 ] The transitional provisions in

section 31 of the SCCA provide that certain citizenship applications still in the course of being processed are subject to the amendments made to the CA by the SCCA . [ 87 ] Basically, subject to subsections 31(2) and 31(3), subsection 31(1) establishes a three-part test to determine whether the transitional provisions apply to a citizenship application made before the coming into force of new provisions. First, the application has to be made under subsection 5(1), 5(2), 5.1(1), 5.2(2), 5.1(3), 9(1) or 11(1) of the CA.

Second, the application has to have been filed before the day on which subsection 3(7) came into force, which is June 19, 2014. Third, it must not have been “finally disposed of” before that date. [ 88 ] However, this effective date provided for in subsection 31(1) does not remain frozen in time.

By order in council, the transitional provisions provide for the coming into force of certain provisions on other dates through subsections 31(2) and 31(3) of the SCCA , as well as through the amendments made to the SCCA by the Protecting Canada from Terrorists Act , S.C. 2015, c. 9 ( PCTA ). [ 89 ] In this regard, Justice Roussel clearly expressed the relationship between subsections 31(2) and 31(1) in GPP v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2018 FC 562 , [2018] 4 F.C.R. 538 ( GPP 2018), affirmed by the Federal Court of Appeal in GPP v. Canada (Citizenship and Immigration) , 2019 FCA 71 .

Justice Roussel noted as follows at paragraph 31: As for subsection 31(2) , this provision governs the application of provisions that entered into force after June 19, 2014. It is provided that on the date on which

section 11 of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act enters into force, established by Order in Council to be August 1, 2014, the reference to subsection 3(7) contained in subsection 31(1) of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act is replaced by a reference to this

section 11. Therefore, once the necessary adaptations are made, the beginning of subsection 31(1) would read as follows as of August 1, 2014: 31(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , an application that was made under subsection 5(1) of the Citizenship Act before August 1, 2014, the day on which

section 11 of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act comes into force, and was not finally disposed of before that day is to be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with … . [ 90 ] It should also be noted that the PCTA adds to the transitional provisions of the SCCA . Indeed, subsection 11(1) of the PCTA adds subsection 31(2.1) to the SCCA , which stipulates that on the date of the coming into force of

section 8 of the SCCA , the reference to

section 11, under subsection 31(1), is replaced by a reference to

section 8 . Since

section 8 of the SCCA came into force on May 28, 2015, by order in council, the beginning of subsection 31(1) would read as follows, from that date: 31(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3) of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act , an application that was made under subsection 5(1) of the Citizenship Act before May 28, 2014, the day on which

section 8 of the Strengthening Canadian Citizenship Act comes into force, and was not finally disposed of before that day is to be dealt with and disposed of in accordance with … [ 91 ] In light of the above, it is important to remember two things to understand the applicability of subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(

i) and

section 23.1 to applications for citizenship referred to in subsection 31(1) of the SCCA . [ 92 ] First, sections 13.1 and 13.2 of the CA , introduced by

section 11 of the SCCA , apply to citizenship applications that have not been finally disposed of before August 1, 2014, owing to the change of the in-force date in subsection 31(1) , caused by subsection 31(2) , following the coming into force of

section 11 of the SCCA . This is due to the fact that paragraph 31(1) (

b) explicitly provides that sections 13.1 to 14 of the CA are enforceable against applications for citizenship referred to in subsection 31(1) on the in-force date set out in this subsection. [ 93 ] Secondly,

section 23.1 of the CA , in force since August 1, 2014, is applicable to citizenship applications that have not been finally disposed of before May 28, 2015. Paragraph 31(1) (

a) provides that on the day on which subsection 31(1) comes into force, the earlier version of the CA is applicable to citizenship applications referred to in subsection 31(1) , subject to exceptions expressly provided in the transitional provisions. So, since

section 23.1 came into force on the same date as

section 11 of the SCCA , that is, August 1, 2014, and was not subject to an exception such as

section 13 .2,

section 23.1 was not in the earlier version of the CA on the date of the coming into force in subsection 31(1) on August 1, 2014. It was only when

section 8 of the SCCA came into force on May 28, 2015, which, in turn, amends the coming into force date in subsection 31(1) , that

section 23.1 was considered as being in the previous version of the CA, therefore making it applicable to applications under subsection 31(1) . [ 94 ] In

summary, it was not until May 28, 2015, that the Minister had the power to require additional information or evidence under

section 23.1 in the context of a citizenship application referred to in subsection 31(1), and therefore the power to declare an application abandoned for failing to provide this additional information or evidence under paragraph 13.2(1)(a).

[ 95 ] For the purposes of this case, we know that the citizenship application was filed on August 12, 2010, on the basis of subsection 5(1) of the CA. Therefore, it was filed before June 19, 2014, under subsection 5(1) of the CA, which satisfies two parts of the test. We have also seen that subparagraph 13.2(1)(a)(i) (abandonment of application) and

section 23.1 (misrepresenting or withholding material circumstances) become applicable to any citizenship application that is not “finally disposed of” p

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