R. v. G.K., 2021 BCPC 66

Citation: R. v. G.K. 2021 BCPC 66 Date: 20210323 File No: 233165-1 Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal Court REGINA v. K.S.S. and G.K. also known as F.H. BAN ON PUBLICATION PURSUANT TO

SECTION 486.4(2.1) OF THE CRIMINAL CODE ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE P. GULBRANSEN Counsel for the Crown: J. Ladha Counsel for the Accused: B. Movassaghi Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: March 2 and 3, 2021 Date of Judgment: March 23, 2021

Introduction [ 1 ] G.K. (“Ms. K.”) brought her four-year-old son to Children's Hospital on September 28, 2015. At first glance, he looked like a victim of torture. Further examination revealed that he had multiple bruises, burn marks and healing scars all over his body. His left hand was badly swollen and was healing from a fracture. As well, he had a significant fresh gash on his left cheek. The eardrum on one of his ears was perforated. The boy remained in the hospital to get further treatment and the Director of Child and Family Services removed the child from his mother's care.

He has never been in her care since. [ 2 ] Ms. K. has now been charged with failing to provide her son with the necessaries of life such that it was likely to cause his health to be endangered permanently, contrary to s. 215(2) (a)(ii) of the Criminal Code . The charge in this case was not sworn until March 2019. [ 3 ] The accused consented to the admission of all of the Crown's evidence in an agreed statement of facts. That evidence establishes conclusively that the child was the victim of serious physical abuse. Ms. K. testified that her common-law husband or common-law partner, K.S. (“Mr.

S.”), was responsible for committing these assaults on her son. She said that she delayed going to the hospital because she was terrified of Mr. S., who had threatened to harm or kill her if she told anyone what he had done or if she took her child to the hospital. [ 4 ] The central issue in this trial is whether the accused has established whether she had a lawful excuse for failing to provide necessaries of life for her son. Relevant Legal Issues [ 5 ] In every criminal case, the Crown has the burden of proving the guilt of the accused to a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt.

Beyond a reasonable doubt means something more than mere probability, but does not require proof to an absolute certainty. However, it lies closer on that spectrum to absolute certainty than it does to mere probability. A doubt must be based on reason and on the evidence or absence of evidence. Deciding the issue must not be based upon conjecture or speculation. Rather, it must be determined by a process of reasoning. [ 6 ] Where an accused person testifies the court must be guided by the direction set out in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of R. v. W.(D.) .

To paraphrase, if I believe the accused, I must acquit. Even if I do not believe the accused, but am left with a reasonable doubt, I must acquit. If I reject the evidence of the accused, I still must examine all of the evidence that remains and can only convict if I am convinced that the evidence proves the guilt of the accused to a standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 7 ] Section 215 (1) of the Criminal Code sets out the duty of persons to provide the necessaries of life for a child. It states: 215

(1) Every one is under a legal duty (

a) as a parent, foster parent, guardian or head of a family, to provide necessaries of life for a child under the age of sixteen years; [ 8 ] That is the

section which I must consider for this decision but I will, just for the sake of being complete, review the rest of this subsection. (

b) to provide necessaries of life to their spouse or common-law partner; and (

c) to provide necessaries of life to a person under his charge if that person (

i) is unable, by reason of detention, age, illness, mental disorder or other cause, to withdraw himself from that charge, and (ii) is unable to provide himself with necessaries of life. [ 9 ] Section 215(2) states:

(2) Every person commits an offence who, being under a legal duty within the meaning of subsection (1), fails without lawful excuse [the proof of which lies on him] to perform that duty, if (

a) with respect to a duty imposed by paragraph (1)(

a) or (b), (

i) the person to whom the duty is owed is in destitute or in necessitous circumstances, or (ii) the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed, or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be endangered permanently; [ 10 ] Now, ss. (a) (ii) is the particular subsection of this offence

section with which I am dealing today, but just to be complete, the final part of the subsection states: or (

b) with respect to a duty imposed by paragraph (1)(c), the failure to perform the duty endangers the life of the person to whom the duty is owed or causes or is likely to cause the health of that person to be injured permanently. [ 11 ] Now, in the case of R. v. S.J. , 2015 ONCA 97 , the Ontario Court of Appeal provided a thorough review of the jurisprudence concerning s. 215 of the Criminal Code and the principles that apply when a court hears a case regarding an offence under s. 215(2) (a) (ii). The courts have held that the term "necessaries of life" includes food, clothing, shelter and medical attendance. This, however, is not

an exhaustive list. In particular, the Ontario Court of Appeal in another case, R. v. Popen, (ON CA), [1981] O.J. No.921 indicated that necessaries of life may include not only those categories mentioned above, but also necessary protection from harm.That is confirmed at paragraph 55 of R. v.

S.J. [12] The Crown must establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's actions were: "a marked departure from what areasonably prudent person would do as a parent who has primary responsibility or care for a child in circumstances where it isobjectively foreseeable that failure to provide necessaries of life would risk danger to the life or permanent endangerment of the health ofthe child under the care of that person." This is not a duty of perfection. It is an objective or community standard of conduct. Thus,someone who was merely negligent in performing this duty cannot be convicted (see R. v.

Peterson, (ONCA), atpara. 35). [13] The phrase "without lawful excuse" was explained in Peterson, above, by the Court of Appeal at paragraph 37 of that decision.Weiler JA, writing for the majority stated: The words "without lawful excuse" in s. 215(2) provide a defence and serve to prevent the punishment of the morally innocent. Theobligation to provide necessaries of life is not absolute and may be excused, for example, where there is financial inability... Circumstances [14] The accused is now 32 years of age. She comes from a Muslim family and her original name is F.H.

While still in her teens, shebegan a relationship with the man who is her son's biological father. He is a Sikh. They never married, but she testified that they wentthrough a form of traditional marriage in India. She also testified that she was convinced by his relatives while they were living in India,to have a child with him. She said they convinced her that she should change her name. Thus she changed her name to M.K. [15] She eventually separated from the boy's biological father and changed her name back to her original name.

Then when she begana relationship with another man, K.S., she changed her name again, this time to G.K. When she separated from Mr. S. she reverted tousing her original name of H. I will refer to her in this judgment as Ms. K., the name she used when these events occurred. [16] Ms. K.’s son was born on [omitted for publication]. His name is R.S.S., but commonly referred to by his nickname R. I will referto him in this judgment by that name, R. [17] The accused testified that she lived with R.’s biological father and family in Surrey until R. was about three years old, by whichtime she separated from him.

She lived thereafter at a suite at her parents' house in Surrey. From the time that R. was born untilSeptember 28, 2015 the accused was the primary caregiver for him. The evidence suggests that she gave appropriate care andsupervision to her son during most of that time. The accused had a close friend named J., who also lived in Surrey. The accused wouldoften visit with J. and her family from the time R. was born until he was about three-and-a-half to four years old. J.’s observation wasthat the accused was a caring and competent parent.

Her family became very close to R. [18] Sometime after the accused separated from R.’s biological father, she began a relationship with K.S. Thereafter, J. noticed achange in her contact with the accused. When one of J.’s sisters remarked to the accused that the accused was often angry and sharp withher son, the accused stopped bringing her son when she visited the family. J.’s family stopped seeing the accused and R. shortly after avisit that J. and her sister made to the accused's residence.

J.’s sister was disturbed about the state of the premises, which appeared to beso unclean and unkempt such that it would be unsafe to live in. The accused took exception to that remark and stopped associating with J.and her family. [19] J. did not see R. again until the summer of 2015. It had been a little under a year since she had seen the boy. She said that she metthe accused and R. at a park near her house. She noticed no apparent injuries or physical problems with R. [20] The evidence points to September 2015 as being the time when R. started to suffer serious mistreatment.

In early September, theaccused contacted J. to speak to her about the accused's emotional distress about the fact that her father had been hospitalised withdementia. The two met and the accused brought R. with her in her car. He was asleep. J. asked the accused to wake R. up so she couldspeak to him. When she saw R., she noticed that R.’s lips and eyes were swollen and also that there were what appeared to be scabs onR.’s arm which could have been burn marks. [21] The accused told J. that R. had not been listening to Mr. S., and that Mr. S. got angry and hit R.

She also told J. that R. had beentrying to eat his own feces. The accused also told one of her cousins at a different time that R. had eaten his own feces, and even told thecousin that he liked it. [22] R. had been enrolled in a preschool when he was about four years old and remained there until March 31, 2015. He went therethree days a week for four hours a day. When he first went there, the preschool teacher noted that he had not been toilet trained and worepull-up diapers. She was able to toilet train him in two days and thereafter had no problem with that issue.

As well, the preschool teachernoticed no signs of any physical abuse on the boy. [23] Between February 2014 and September 28, 2015 the accused did not bring R. to any doctor's appointments or any other medicalprofessionals to deal with any medical or psychological problems that R. may have had. [24] There seems to be little independent evidence of the living arrangements between the accused and Mr. S. It is significant,however, that when she enrolled R. in the preschool, the accused listed herself as the mother and primary contact and listed Mr. S. as thesecondary contact.

She listed his phone number as being the same as her phone number and described him as “uncle-stepdad.” [25] The accused began working in June or July of 2015 for Ms. S.S. as a bookkeeper and customer service person. Although R.would have been eligible to enter kindergarten in September 2015, the accused did not register him. In the week preceding September 28th, the accused did not attend work. She returned on the morning of September 28th. R. remained at her residence. When she arrived atwork, the accused discussed with her employer some problems that she said R. was having.

Her employer asked that she be allowed to

see R. The two of them went to the accused's residence. When she got inside the residence, the employer said that the accused had prepared an antiseptic paste made from oil and turmeric. The employer herself applied this paste to a wound on R.’s cheek and she bandaged it. [ 26 ] The employer was very concerned about R. She suggested to the accused that the accused allow the employer's daughter, who was a medical student, to come and examine R. The accused agreed, and the daughter attended in the early evening to the residence. When the daughter removed the bandage from R.’s cheek she noticed an open gash.

She applied a saline solution to it and bandaged it. She made a further examination of R.’s body and noticed other signs of serious injury. R. complained of his penis was hurting, and upon examining it the daughter noticed that it was swollen. She recommended that R. be immediately taken to Children's Hospital. [ 27 ] The three of them went together to Children's Hospital, arriving later that same evening. It was obvious that R. had suffered many injuries. He was kept overnight in Emergency for x-rays and for further examination in the morning. He was then examined by Dr.

Margaret Colbourne, an expert in the areas of general pediatrics and pediatric emergency medicine. In total, Dr. Colbourne met with and examined R. four times between September 29, 2015 and October 6, 2015, as well as one final examination on April 28, 2016. Injuries [ 28 ] The doctor's report noted many bruises and abrasions and scars all over R.’s body, from front to back and head to toe. There were three burn marks of significant size: on his upper left chest, on his right wrist and hand, and on his left buttock and hip. He had an injury to his right ear; the tympanic membrane had been ruptured.

His left hand showed a healing fracture. There was general bruising to both cheeks. There was a large, gaping laceration to his left cheek about four centimetres in length, as well as an open ulceration on the left cheek approximately two centimetres in length. The laceration was still moist. [ 29 ] It was the doctor's opinion that these bruises, lacerations, scars and wounds were not accidental because there were so many of them and they occurred in unusual places where accidental injuries to children rarely happen.

For example, in discussing the injuries to the ear, the doctor said in her report that one typically sees such injuries when children are struck on or grabbed by the ears. R.’s injury to his eardrum suggests that it could have been caused by a blow to the head. [ 30 ] There were also multiple bruises to both of R.’s upper arms. They were located such that the doctor remarked that they were consistent with defensive-type bruising, as if R. had raised his arms to protect himself from being hit.

There was a linear bruise near the mouth, which suggested in the doctor's opinion that a cord or something similar had been pulled across the mouth. [ 31 ] Examination of R.’s penis indicated that there was bruising on the mid-shaft. And when the foreskin was retracted, the tip of the penis was red and bruised. [ 32 ] Of particular concern for the doctor was the possible effect of not having the gash on R.’s cheek treated in a timely manner. Such a wound needs to be closed properly by sutures.

Because that was not done, there was a real risk that bacteria would infect the wound, and therefore a real risk that the bacteria would enter his body. If R. had been brought to the hospital earlier, sutures would have been applied. This would have reduced the likelihood of infection and would have increased the likelihood that the wound would heal without facial disfigurement.

Because this was not done in R.’s case, he had to have plastic surgery performed to reduce facial scarring or disfigurement. [ 33 ] R. was also diagnosed with anaemia and was prescribed iron supplements. [ 34 ] The police also conducted a thorough search of the accused's residence. The pictures provided indicate that it was not properly maintained, and was in a generally unhealthy condition. It was likely not a safe place for the accused or her son to live. [ 35 ] The photographs that the police took of R. at the hospital vividly illustrate Dr. Colbourne's observations. R.’s head appears to have been shaved.

There was a long red gash on his left cheek. His lips are swollen and he has bruising around his eyes. His left hand seems to be swollen to about twice the size of his right. The burn marks which can be observed are large and quite obvious. A photograph of R.’s back depicts a large bruise on the back of his left arm near his elbow and shows his back as being criss-crossed with long, linear red marks. Search of the Residence [ 36 ] There were several items seized from the accused's residence when the police searched it, which turned out to be of significant evidentiary value.

The police found a barbecue fire starter in the master bedroom and another in the attached garage. R.’s blood was found on the interior and exterior end of the flame tip of the barbecue fire starter, which was found in the garage. R.’s blood was also found on the tip of the handle of a clothes iron found in the master bedroom. [ 37 ] When interviewed at the hospital, R. merely said that, "Somebody hurt me." He was transferred to a foster home on September 29, 2015. The foster parents noted that there was no problem with R.’s toilet training and that R. did not engage in any notable misbehaviour.

He was noted to be a generally happy boy. In particular, there was no suggestion that he tried to eat his own feces. Testimony of the Accused [ 38 ] The accused testified. No other witnesses were called on her behalf. She indicated that her relationship with R.’s biological father deteriorated by the time R. was about three. She testified that the biological father was somewhat controlling and emotionally abusive to her. She said he convinced her to change her name to a Sikh name. They never married, and, in fact, the biological father was already married by this time to someone he had married before he met Ms.

K. [ 39 ] After she met Mr. S., they never married, although she did change her name. His nickname was S., and she learned over this time that S. actually had a fiancé. He lived with the accused in the suite at her parents' house. She did not, however, provide any details about their living pattern at the house. For example, she did not explain whether Mr. S. had a job or regular work hours. She did not really

explain what the routine was after she went back to work in June or July of 2015. [ 40 ] Much of Ms. K.’s testimony about the essential circumstances of this case was vague, confusing, and disjointed. Essentially, she stated that Mr. S. caused the injuries to R. She said that she was terrified of the man, because he had threatened to kill or harm her or her family if she took R. to the hospital or told the police. She explained that she was terrified by any possibility of violence because of something that had happened to her father in 2007.

He had been badly beaten by some relatives over a dispute that had nothing to do with this case. However, the injuries to her father must have been very bad. He now has dementia. She explained that any threat made to do violence to her makes her afraid that she would suffer the same fate as her father. [ 41 ] She also explained that she had a fear of losing her son if she took him to the hospital. She said that R. had had an accidental fall sometime when he was about three years old, after she had separated from the boy's biological father. She took R. to the hospital.

She said that on that particular occasion, the biological father told her that if anything happened to R. like that again, he would take the child from her. [ 42 ] She said that the injuries to R. were inflicted mostly in September of 2015. Her description of when and how they occurred were extremely vague. She indicated that while she was at work R. was in the care of Mr. S. or her parents. By then her father was in hospital and her mother was in poor health. She said that Mr. S. would sometimes remark that her son was not listening to him.

She said that he rejected any explanation which she gave for her son's behaviour. She also said that Mr. S. not only hit her son, but also hit her. She also said that he threatened her with death by stabbing her if she told anyone or took the boy to the hospital. She did not give any details of any injuries, if any, that she herself suffered. [ 43 ] She said that Mr. S. had taken her phone from her so that she would not be able to call the police.

She also said that she was finally able to take R. to the hospital because her employer had given her what she referred to as “moral support” to be able to take this step. Before then she had been isolated and afraid. [ 44 ] R. has not been in her care since September 28, 2015 when she took him to the hospital. She testified that before she left the hospital that evening, R. told her that he knew that she was trying to protect him and that he would come back to her one day. She explained that this occurred when they were allowed to go for a walk together on the hospital grounds or in the hospital itself.

She admitted, in her examination in chief, that after she had taken R. to the hospital, she phoned Mr. S. for a ride home. She also said that she remained in a relationship with Mr. S. until March 2019 when the charges were sworn against her and Mr. S. Cross-Examination of the Accused [ 45 ] Cross-examination cast serious doubt on the reliability and believability of this testimony. The accused admitted she had made statements both to police and social workers that completely contradicted what she told this court under oath. For instance, she told a police officer that Mr.

S. had never been with her at her suite at her parents' house. She also gave explanations for how R. could have suffered certain injuries which she claimed were self-inflicted; for example, that R. had struck his head purposefully against the wall, in imitation of her father who apparently engaged in such activity because of his dementia. In those statements, as well, she claimed that R. cut himself in the cheek after a fall in the bathroom. [ 46 ] She agreed that she never told either police or social workers that Mr. S. had caused R.’s injuries, nor that Mr.

S. would threaten her and R. with death or serious bodily harm if she revealed what had happened. [ 47 ] She also admitted that there were opportunities for her to take R. to the hospital before September 28 th because there were other times when Mr. S. was absent from the premises. For example, he would frequently go to the gym. [ 48 ] The accused also admitted that she had her cell phone on September 28 th and actually made a call on it. Obviously, S. had not taken it from her on that day.

The call was made in these circumstances: When she and her employer and her employer's daughter were about to take R. to the hospital, the accused's mother called a friend because she was concerned that her daughter and two strangers were about to take R. away. The friend arrived to help. Her friend did not know either the accused's employer or her daughter and there was some confused interaction between them. Eventually the accused phoned the police; that is, she had the phone with her. After some discussion, the accused and her employer and her daughter were able to leave with R.

The police arrived later, after they had left. [ 49 ] On the whole, neither in examination in chief or in cross-examination did the accused reveal any real understanding of the serious extent of her son's injuries. Analysis [ 50 ] In this case, the Crown is not attempting to prove who committed these vicious assaults on R. The evidence does show that there were two people who had the opportunity to do so, the accused and Mr. S. By September 2015, the evidence shows that the accused's father had been hospitalized, and her elderly mother was in ill health.

But it is not necessary to decide in the case at bar who committed the assaults. The issue is: did the accused comply with her duty under the law to provide the necessaries of life to her son? [ 51 ] The accused's testimony raises the issue of whether she had a lawful excuse for not complying with her duty as a parent under s. 215 of the Criminal Code . All the other elements of the offence have been established by the Crown to the standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. That is, there is no doubt that the accused was the parent of R., and that R. was under 16 years of age.

The evidence establishes conclusively that R. had suffered multiple severe injuries at the hands of someone while at the accused's residence, including such things as being burned, struck in the head and face, having his eardrum ruptured, and suffering a significant cut to his cheek. The accused was the main caregiver for her son. It is inconceivable that the accused would not have noticed the extensive injuries to her son.

It is also inconceivable that she would not know that he required immediate medical attention. [ 52 ] The necessaries of life that the accused was under lawful duty to provide and that are pertinent to this case are a duty to provide timely and appropriate medical care or attention and to provide protection from physical harm.

[ 53 ] Were the accused's actions or failure to take action, “a marked departure from what a reasonably prudent person would do in the circumstances?” The answer is obvious. A reasonably prudent person, faced with knowledge that a four-year-old child who had been beaten, burned and otherwise abused to the extent that R. had been, would seek immediate medical attention for him. As well, a reasonably prudent person faced with the knowledge that R. had been abused in that way would seek to remove R. from that environment or remove Mr. S. from the residence.

This would include contacting the police or even leaving the residence herself with her son. [ 54 ] The Crown has also proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused's failure to provide the necessaries of life as described above was likely to cause the health of R. to be endangered permanently. The failure to seek immediate medical attention for the wound to R.’s cheek resulted in a serious risk of infection which in turn could have led to permanent damage to R.’s health.

Failure to seek medical attention for that gash in his cheek could result and did result in facial deformity, which had to be corrected by plastic surgery. R. had a healing fracture to one of his hands. Failure to seek medical attention for that injury could result in permanent damage because the bones in his hands might not heal correctly. [ 55 ] In addition to permanently endangering his physical health, it is equally important to consider the accused's failure to seek proper medical attention on the boy's psychological health.

One can only imagine what torment that boy went through after undergoing such cruel and sadistic acts on the part of a trusted adult. No expert evidence is required to conclude that there could have been severe psychological damage. [ 56 ] That same analysis applies to the accused's failure to provide reasonable protection from harm to R., from repeated, serious and protracted assaults on him. A reasonably prudent person in the situation of the accused would know that such assaults would be a serious threat to the boy's health and could result in permanent damage to it.

As well, any reasonable person would conclude that a person in the circumstances would have to either remove the child from the presence of the offending adult or leave the premises with her child and/or notify the police. Was There a Lawful Excuse? [ 57 ] Thus, the only issue that the accused has raised in this trial is whether she has established that she had a lawful excuse for failing to comply with her duty under s. 215 of the Criminal Code . She explains that her failure to act was a result of her being terrified by the threats and violence from Mr. S.

There may be circumstances in which a woman may be under the physical and psychological control of a man who is both violent and threatening, such that the woman may feel powerless to do anything. Theoretically, being unable to act in those circumstances to provide necessaries of life to a child may be a lawful excuse. However, in the case at bar the accused's testimony falls far short of establishing such circumstances. [ 58 ] The accused said that Mr. S. was both violent and threatening towards her, her son, and her parents. Her son suffered serious injury.

There is no evidence that the accused herself suffered any physical assault, other than her vague assertions of such an assault. She did not speak of suffering any injury herself. When she had the opportunity to talk to police or social workers in a safe environment, she did not tell either party that she had been the victim of threats of violence or violence. Even after her child had been taken from her care on September 28 th , the accused did not dissociate herself from Mr. S. Instead, she telephoned him to get a ride home, and remained in a relationship with him for four more years.

She did not offer any explanation as to why she continued in a relationship with someone who had been so violent and threatening towards her and her son, particularly after he had caused her to lose probably the most important person in her life – her son. [ 59 ] Other explanations offered in support of this issue of lawful excuse are not convincing, to say the least. The accused said that she was horrified of violence because of what happened to her father in 2007. That incident had nothing to do with Mr. S. or with R.

She also said that she was terrified that if she brought her son to the hospital she would lose him because R.’s biological father had threatened to take the child from her if she ever had to take him to the hospital for injuries that the child suffered. That explanation cannot support an argument for having a lawful excuse. It makes no sense. I would ask, how could it be acceptable for a parent not to seek appropriate medical attention for a child, and instead allow the child to suffer the consequences of the condition because of a fear that she might be held responsible for the injuries?

If she was not responsible for the injuries, why should she be afraid that the boy would be taken from her? Such an argument completely ignores the central issue, that the child needs proper medical attention. The fact that there may be some argument later on about who ultimately should have custody or guardianship of the child is beside the point. [ 60 ] In addition, there is no evidence that the boy's biological father could have successfully obtained the child if R. had suffered an accident and needed to go to the hospital.

On the other hand, another argument made by the accused is that she was afraid to bring R. to the hospital because it would reveal that he had suffered these very serious injuries at the hand of another person and that she knew about it, but was afraid the child would be taken away. That also makes no sense. If that argument were accepted, it would mean that the accused would have been entitled to allow R. to continue to be abused, and his health and safety continue to be under threat of permanent damage because the mother was afraid she would lose him.

That would mean that despite the knowledge of the abuse, and despite having the ability to prevent it, she could choose not to do so. That cannot be a lawful excuse. [ 61 ] A particularly perplexing part of the accused's testimony was her claim that R. told her at the hospital that he knew she was trying to protect him and that he would come back to her someday. That has all the appearance of a delusion. It is not capable of belief that a four-year-old boy would even be able to express himself in that way.

It is also not credible that the hospital authorities or the police would allow the accused to be alone with her son on the day she brought him to the hospital. He was in emergency care and required urgent treatment on an emergency basis. Regardless of whether she actually assaulted her son, the accused must have been a major suspect at that point. It is just not believable that the authorities would allow her to be left alone with her son in those circumstances. [ 62 ] I point out, as well, that the accused, provided no example in her testimony about anything that she did to protect her son.

This strange assertion that the child said these words to his mother casts doubt on the accuracy and believability of the rest of her testimony. Conclusion [ 63 ] Therefore, I conclude that the Crown has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused failed to provide the necessaries of

life for her son R. by failing to obtain timely medical attention and care for him, and by failing to take reasonable steps to prevent him from being harmed. That failure was likely to cause R.’s health, both physical and psychological, to be permanently endangered. The accused's testimony and the rest of the evidence falls far short, which I hope I have explained above, of even remotely establishing a lawful excuse for her failure. [ 64 ] I therefore find her guilty on Count 4 of the Information. (ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED)