R. v. Lloyd, 2018 BCPC 403

Citation: R. v. Lloyd 2018 BCPC 403 Date: 20180105 File No: 233735-2-C Registry: Vancouver IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA REGINA v. JOSEPH RYAN LLOYD REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE E. BURGESS Counsel for the Crown: T. Warren Counsel for the Defendant: D. Fai Place of Hearing: Vancouver , B.C. Dates of Hearing: March 1, 27, 29, May 16, June 21, 26, September 18, November 10, 29, and December 7, 2017 Date of Judgment: January 5, 2018 [ 1 ] THE COURT: Following trial, the accused, Joseph Ryan Lloyd, was convicted of the following charges arising from an

[ 1 ] THE COURT: Following trial, the accused, Joseph Ryan Lloyd, was convicted of the following charges arising from an incident in Vancouver on September 25th, 2016: Count 1, assault of a police officer with a weapon, to wit, a knife, contrary to s. 270.01(1); Count 2, carrying a concealed weapon, a knife, contrary to s. 90(1); Count 3, obstruction of a police officer in execution of his duty contrary to s. 129(a); those sections, of course, are all contained in the Criminal Code ; and Count 4 was a conviction contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act , possessing a controlled substance, to wit, cocaine, for the purpose of trafficking; Count 5, possession of a weapon for a purpose dangerous to the public peace contrary to s. 88(1) of the Criminal Code ; Count 6, possession of heroin and fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking; and Count 7, possession of methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, the latter two counts being contrary to s. 5(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . [ 2 ] Having heard submissions, I will now give my reasons for sentencing on these charges.

The facts found at trial have been set out in the reasons for judgement, but can be summarized as follows. The incident arose when the police, whose attention had been originally drawn to the accused because they thought he might be looking for cars to break into, approached to deal with him on a bylaw infraction for smoking within six metres of the door to a coffee shop. A fight very quickly broke out between the officers and the accused requiring backup to restrain him.

The accused has been convicted of pulling a knife during this fight. [ 3 ] The drugs were found as a result of a search following the fight and the accused's subsequent arrest. A black man-purse was found worn across his torso under his shirt. Inside the man-purse were 25.7 grams of cocaine, 56.59 grams of methamphetamine, and 51.29 grams of heroin and fentanyl or approximately five ounces of drugs of a total street value of $8,500. The drugs were packaged in various sized baggies within larger baggies.

Also found on his person were a digital scale, two knives, and $1,725 cash in a variety of denominations folded into three bundles. A second knife was found in his pocket. [ 4 ] The accused is 29 years old and is originally from Edmonton. His mother died when he was 12 years old and his father is a recovering alcoholic. The accused left home at age 16. He has worked as a labourer in roofing and in the oil fields in Alberta. He is single, although he was in a relationship from 2005 to 2009 and has a nine-year-old daughter in Alberta. After that relationship ended, he moved to the Lower Mainland in 2011.

It was here that he became involved in using drugs, specifically crack cocaine, heroin, and crystal methamphetamine. [ 5 ] The accused has a criminal record starting in 2010. It shows convictions over those six years including convictions for offences relevant to this sentencing.

He has been convicted of obstructing or resisting a peace officer twice, assault once, two weapons- related offences, three possession of drugs, and six counts of possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking arising from four separate dates. [ 6 ] The Crown in this case submits that a global sentence of eight years' jail is required while defence counsel takes the position that three years' jail globally would be a fit sentence. [ 7 ] The court is guided by the framework of sentencing principles found in s. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code .

These include denunciation, deterrence both general and specific, rehabilitation of the offender, and protection of the public. The most fundamental of these principles is found in s. 718.1 of the Criminal Code which requires courts to fashion sentences that are proportionate to the gravity of the offence and the degree of responsibility of the offender. [ 8 ] The harm caused by fentanyl contributes to the gravity of the offence and the authorities indicate a need to attribute a high level of moral culpability to those who traffic in that drug.

The Crown in this case has filed materials describing the scope of the public health and social problems relating to fentanyl. Similar materials were noted by Madam Justice Newbury in her dissenting judgment in R. v. Smith , at 2017 BCCA 112 , citing the reasons from the sentencing judge in that case: The most recent figures from the B.C. Coroners Service show there have been on average two deaths a day in B.C. in 2016 from illegal drug overdosing. Over 600 people have died from such overdoses in the first 10 months of 2016 compared to 397 such deaths in the same period in 2015.

Fentanyl was detected in at least 60% of these deaths, triple the number for the same period in 2015. Fentanyl is 20 to 50 times more potent than heroin. [ 9 ] One of the issues that arises in the case before me is whether the accused, Mr. Lloyd, knew that there was fentanyl in the drugs he was selling. The accused did not testify in this case, but counsel has made submissions that his client did not know the drugs contained fentanyl. The certificates of analysis identify fentanyl in combination with heroin, but are silent as to amount.

While submissions from counsel do not constitute evidence, these submissions were not disputed by Crown. The court is left with submissions from counsel based on his instructions from the accused as opposed to evidence in the usual sense. [ 10 ] The Court of Appeal in Smith cited R. v. Pahl , at 2016 BCCA 234 , regarding the weight to be given to submissions of this kind. In the Pahl decision, Mr. Justice Frankel noted at paragraph 57: [57] ... what counsel related to the sentencing judge was no more than a version of the events that Mr. Pahl had told his counsel.

Even if counsel’s submission were to be treated as “hearsay evidence”, on their face, Mr. Pahl’s post-offence, out-of-court statements would not be admissible as they are neither credible nor trustworthy. ... [56] ... a judge is entitled to accept a fact advanced solely through submissions only if that fact is non-contentious. [ 11 ] In the present case, it was unclear whether these submissions were non-contentious, but as they were not specifically contradicted or disputed by the Crown, I take them into account. But I must also take into account that during the period of time addressed by the B.C.

Court of Appeal in Smith , that is, by the time of these offences in September 2016, the general public is understood to have been aware of the dangers of fentanyl and, in particular, the danger to drug users taking it unknowingly when mixed with other drugs. [ 12 ] In this case, the accused's record for related offences indicates he may be more familiar with drugs than the general public.

In the trial relating to his 2013 conviction for possession for the purpose of trafficking, cited by defence counsel in the present case, the accused testified that he knew the drugs he trafficked in the Downtown Eastside of Vancouver are dangerous and addictive and that, until

recently, he had not given any thought to the effect of those drugs on the persons who purchased them. The term “recently” was used in the context of the testimony given at the end of 2013. [ 13 ] In both the Smith case and R. v. Toth , at 2017 BCSC 501 , a decision from January 2017, the accused made similar assertions that they were unaware the drugs they were selling contained fentanyl. In Toth , Madam Justice Ker observed at paragraph 41: Mr. Toth indicated, through his counsel, that the green pills seized from his residence were labelled oxycodone ... he claims he was unaware he was selling fentanyl.

If he was unaware he was selling fentanyl, then in all likelihood the street-level consumers may have been unaware they were buying fentanyl, or certainly unaware of the amount of fentanyl in any one pill, which makes the Crown's analogy of the drugs users engaging in Russian roulette when taking the unknown substances particularly apt. [ 14 ] From the materials filed by the Crown in this case, the authors of the "Fentanyl Urine Screen Study" note at page 1: While some people may intentionally seek out fentanyl, recent evidence suggests that many of the fentanyl-related deaths in BC are due to individuals unknowingly consuming fentanyl.

People consuming illicit fentanyl, whether intentionally or unknowingly, are at much higher risk of experiencing an opioid overdose because the amount of fentanyl in the substance may be highly variable and individuals may have no tolerance to opioids. An opioid overdose can reduce breathing, resulting in brain damage or even death. [ 15 ] In Smith , the sentencing judge cited evidence that: Overdoses frequently occur in individuals who thought they were using heroin, oxycodone, cocaine or other similar substances but who unknowingly consumed fentanyl.

When fentanyl is labelled and sold as other street drugs, such as heroin, users may not know what they are taking and may not understand the heightened degree of risk. The risk of death is thus heightened exponentially among users who do not reduce their dosage. [ 16 ] Later in that decision at paragraph 65, the court refers to the currently ubiquitous awareness of risks posed by illicit fentanyl. That decision was delivered in 2016, the year of the offences before this court. In this case, the accused instructs counsel that he was unaware that fentanyl was in the heroin he was selling.

However, I cannot disregard the evidence that is properly before the court as to the breadth of public knowledge and the warnings issued about fentanyl being sold by itself, but also in other drugs by the time of this offence. [ 17 ] As I have already indicated, Mr. Lloyd is not inexperienced in the business of drug trafficking and testified at his last trial that by 2013 he had a more complete understanding of the harm caused by drugs in general.

Whether he knew specifically that the heroin he was selling in this case contained fentanyl, the authorities seem to support a finding that either he should have known or he was wilfully blind and was willing to take the risk of selling fentanyl in the heroin. [ 18 ] As demonstrated by the authorities, the culpability for selling

Schedule I drugs does not necessarily turn on knowledge of what a substance sold as heroin might also contain. Heroin is in itself a serious harmful drug and the possibility that in current conditions widely known to exist in our community that it may also contain fentanyl cannot be blindly ignored. [ 19 ] In this regard, I am guided by the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in R. v.

Herrell , at 2014 BCCA 114 , where it was held that a seller of illegal drugs must be assumed to recognize an inherent risk that the composition of the drugs may be unknown and, as noted in the Smith decision in the Court of Appeal, the case law suggests that even being genuinely mistaken about the true identity of the illegal drug in one's possession does not serve as a mitigating circumstance in sentencing provided the offender knew he or she was in possession of an illegal drug. [ 20 ] The accused in this case also correctly points out that there is no evidence in the certificates of analysis as to the amount of fentanyl found in the heroin samples analyzed.

The certificates simply record analysis of the drugs as containing both heroin and fentanyl. The other drugs Lloyd possessed do not contain any fentanyl according to the certificates filed, but all eight of the heroin samples contained fentanyl. In other words, there were no heroin samples found in Lloyd's possession that did not contain fentanyl. He possessed a total of 51.29 grams of the heroin/fentanyl mixture. [ 21 ] There is evidence before this court that any amount of fentanyl is harmful. There is no evidence to suggest a minimum dosage that could be considered safe.

The court has not been provided with any authorities that indicate any requirement of a minimum quantity of fentanyl to be present for the accused to be culpable. In fact, most authorities are based on the mere presence of fentanyl as here. There is evidence quoted in the Smith decision, to which I have already referred, that fentanyl is 20 to 50 times more potent than heroin.

A mere two milligrams is a lethal dose and this is described as being as small as a grain of salt. [ 22 ] It is also noteworthy that during the course of this trial all exhibits thought to potentially have any amount of fentanyl on them were filed by photographic or documentary evidence to avoid exposing court personnel and the public to risk. The exception to this protocol was when one police witness was shown one of the knives possessed by the accused. It has been on the accused's person when he was arrested and, in court, the blade of that knife had a visible dusting of fine white powder on it.

As a result of this incident, the courtroom had to be evacuated and decontaminated due to the potential risk from simply being in the room with fentanyl. This is not evidence, per se, but it forms part of the record of this trial and demonstrates the need for safety protocols to reduce the risk of exposure to even a small amount of this particular drug. [ 23 ] The questions of quantity of fentanyl contained in the heroin and of the accused's knowledge that the heroin contained fentanyl are relevant in analyzing and applying the authorities on sentence to this type of offence.

I have reviewed the authorities on these points and turn now to the other factors courts have highlighted in determining appropriate sentences for these offences. [ 24 ] Although the B.C. Court of Appeal in Smith decided not to disturb the sentence imposed in the B.C. Supreme Court for reasons relating to the degree of public awareness of the fentanyl problem at the time of that offence, they identified a need to increase sentences for first-time offenders convicted of drug-related offences involving fentanyl at the street level to somewhere in the range of 18 to 36 months' jail.

The rationale expressed lay in the unprecedented risk posed by fentanyl to the public.

[ 25 ] In R. v. Anderson , a B.C. Provincial Court decision from April 19th, 2017, in Victoria, the court considered the range in Smith along with the principles required to be given effect to First Nations offenders and the aggravating aspects in that case including the presence of firearms and imposed a global sentence of five years' jail. That case involved a drug-production facility where fentanyl was intentionally being added to other drugs, and a more substantial amount of drugs and firearms. [ 26 ] In another decision postdating the B.C.

Court of Appeal in Smith with offence dates five months before those in this case, the B.C. Provincial Court in Forsberg [phonetic] imposed sentence for a variety of related offences including possession for the purpose of trafficking in fentanyl. On that charge a sentence of four years' jail was imposed. That offender was a First Nations person. He was not a first-time offender and had entered guilty pleas. The amount of drugs involved in that case was 8.4 grams, much less than that in the case at bar. [ 27 ] Earlier decisions relied on by Crown counsel included R. v. Toth which I have mentioned already.

That case involved three counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking involving cocaine, heroin, and fentanyl dating from June 2015. The accused in that case was found in possession of significantly larger amounts of drugs, but had no related record, had made efforts at rehabilitating himself, and was of First Nations descent.

The court identified a range of 28 months to seven years for a serious, sustained, relatively sophisticated mid-level operation of that kind and ultimately arrived -- on a guilty plea and joint submissions arrived at a sentence of three years' jail. [ 28 ] Another decision provided by the Crown involved a case of possession for the purpose of trafficking of cocaine, fentanyl, and methamphetamine in amounts similar to the case at bar. In that case, R. v. Boardman , the Ontario Court of Justice in 2016 considered the offender to be a mid-level dealer and an addict himself, but dealing for profit motives.

He had a related record with six prior convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking, but also had a long gap in his record since the last conviction. He had entered a guilty plea. He was sentenced to six-and-a-half years' jail. [ 29 ] In another Ontario Court of Justice decision, R. v.

Shevalier , dated March 16th, 2017, following a trial for possession of drugs for the purpose of trafficking and possession of flick knives and brass knuckles, the sentencing judge noted that the amount of drugs and cash seized were not consistent with merely supporting the accused's habit, but indicated an element of greed. That case featured numerous aggravating factors including his unrelenting criminal record and limited mitigating factors. He had no previous convictions for possession for the purpose of trafficking or for trafficking. The sentence imposed for these offences was eight years' jail.

This case has some similarities with the case at bar, except that Chevalier was trafficking in fentanyl, not mixed with other drugs and was taken to understand the risk to his customers. [ 30 ] I turn now to the authorities provided by the accused starting with the B.C. Court of Appeal decision in Preston . In this 1990 decision regarding three counts of simple possession of heroin, the court comments that it may be questionable logic to expect an addict to be deterred from drug use by a jail sentence.

This observation is followed by the recognition that the deterrent value of a sentence ought not to be discounted altogether. It seems obvious that the difference between simple possession of drugs by an addict and possession of significant quantities of drugs for the purpose of trafficking require quite a different analysis of deterrence both specific and general. [ 31 ] The court has also been provided with a decision of R. v. Creuzot , 2017 BCSC 1075 , which dealt with an analysis that identified traces of fentanyl in heroin possessed for the purpose of trafficking.

The accused in that case had not been charged with any offences relating to fentanyl, but the court was asked to consider it an aggravating factor on sentence that the heroin contained traces of fentanyl. The court applied the reasoning of the B.C. Court of Appeal in Smith and made findings based on the extent of public awareness of the dangers of fentanyl at the time of Creuzot's offences and imposed a 14-month jail sentence for possession for the purpose of trafficking of heroin. [ 32 ] I have also considered the case of R. v. Malenovic , a 2017 decision of the B.C.

Provincial Court, which includes a consideration of the B.C. Court of Appeal's decision in Smith . This was a sentencing following a conviction on three counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking, including 18 fake Oxycodone pills containing heroin and fentanyl. It was a dial-a-dope operation with offence dates from July 2015.

The sentencing judge in Malenovic found that the range proposed in Smith ought not to apply to the case before him because of the date of the offences and placed the accused at the bottom of the range for dial-a-dope traffickers with no previous criminal record, that is, six months' jail. This offence predates the offences in the case at bar by one year which has a bearing on the state of public awareness about the hazards of fentanyl. [ 33 ] Regarding Count 1, the offence of assaulting a police officer with a weapon, the Crown relies on the B.C. Supreme Court decision in R. v. Schur , a decision of the B.C.

Supreme Court in 2015. Sentencing for this offence is governed by s. 718.02 of the Criminal Code which provides that denunciation and deterrence are the primary sentencing principles to be applied. The maximum sentence for this offence is 10 years' jail. In Schur , Mr. Justice Blok reviewed the authorities and found the range of sentence in that case was from nine to 18 months and sentenced that accused, Mr. Schur, to 14 months' jail. [ 34 ] Finally, defence counsel has filed a letter from a doctor who is experienced in treating patients with addictions.

This is an open letter not specific to this case and it was conceded that this doctor has never treated or met this accused. So I take this letter as a medical practitioner's views of the effects of incarceration on addiction. I appreciate that his views are based on his own experience and research, but his conclusions that treatment and housing are more effective at treating addiction than penitentiaries are not particularly helpful to the court being bound as we are by legislative principles of sentence which require a balanced consideration of multiple factors.

Rehabilitation is an important factor, but it is not the only factor to be applied at sentencing. [ 35 ] As well, the conclusion offered by this letter somewhat conflicts with the defence submission that while in pretrial custody, the accused has, in fact, become clean and sober and has taken numerous courses of a rehabilitative nature in contrast to the conclusions offered in the doctor's letter.

I am asked to consider the accused's advancements towards rehabilitation while in custody as a mitigating factor. [ 36 ] This brings me to a consideration of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances unique in this case. As I have just noted,

while detained in pretrial custody, the accused has taken a considerable number of classes and has filed certificates of completion of those classes. He seems to have been assiduous in this effort having taken every course on offer in the institution which will, hopefully, be helpful in his rehabilitation. [ 37 ] The defence submits that the accused was an addict and so his motivation was limited to supporting his own habit rather than for profit and this should mitigate sentence.

I note there is no actual evidence that he was an addict at the time of these offences, although the previous Lloyd decision has been filed in this hearing in which the accused testified he had been an addict in 2013. In the end result, I found the amount possessed, a total of about five ounces of drugs, in all the surrounding circumstance indicates this was a business enterprise for profit whether he was an addict or not. [ 38 ] Relating to the charges of assault, resisting a police officer, and weapons, the most striking aggravating factor is the degree of violence involved.

I found at trial that the fight was instigated by the accused's volatile and belligerent behaviour amounting to obstruction of the police in the execution of their duty and the ensuing fight with the police officers by all accounts involved significant violence. While the accused received an abrasion to his forehead, one of the police officers sustained broken ribs as a result of this fight. The facts are further aggravated by the fact that the accused pulled a knife while struggling in close contact with the two arresting officers. The fight only ended when a third party intervened. [ 39 ]

Section 718.02 of the Criminal Code specifically provides that denunciation and deterrence are the primary factors at sentence for this offence. The use of a weapon in the course of commission of a drug-related offence is an aggravating factor enumerated in s. 10(2) of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . [ 40 ] Relating to the charges of possession for the purpose of trafficking, the nature and quantity of the drugs is clearly an aggravating factor. The accused was found in possession of four kinds of

Schedule I drugs, the most serious category of prohibited drugs. The heroin contained fentanyl. The amounts were roughly two ounces or 56.59 grams of methamphetamine, nearly two ounces or 51.29 grams of heroin containing fentanyl, and just under one ounce or 25.7 grams of cocaine. The total street value of the drugs was estimated to be $8,000. At trial, the expert witness testified that in his opinion, these were not amounts expected to be for personal use and were of a quantity unlikely to be carried by a user.

The expert witness also considered that the amount of cash being carried, which was $1,725, could be indicative of a dealer working at a higher level than a street-level trafficker. [ 41 ] I have already summarized the accused's criminal record which is significant given the number and related nature of prior convictions. This is an aggravating factor codified in s. 10 of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act . The relatively brief gaps between convictions and subsequent offence dates is also relevant to this consideration and is clearly a further aggravating factor in these proceedings.

The frequency with which these convictions have been registered is also a concern and highlights a need for specific deterrence. This offence took place five months after the last conviction for the same type of offence. [ 42 ] The gravity of these offences is clear and so is the risk to the safety of the public. I find these risks were, by the offence dates in September 2016, well known to the public in general.

As to whether the accused knew specifically that the heroin in his possession contained fentanyl, I apply the law that emphasizes the inherent risk in selling illicit drugs where the composition may be unknown. Given his record, which suggests persistence in these activities despite previous convictions, his responsibility is greater in light of his experience with drugs and possession for the purpose of trafficking.

As held in the Court of Appeal in Smith at paragraph 65 : ... the continuing escalation in the number of fentanyl-detected deaths, the enormity of the total numbers of accidental overdosing, the increasing percentage of fentanyl detected deaths as a proportion of the total, and the currently ubiquitous awareness of the risks posed by illicit fentanyl, in combination, justify a recognition of a very substantial increase in the sentencing range applicable to street-level dealing in fentanyl. [ 43 ] Addressing harm to the community is specifically identified as part of the sentencing scheme of the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and evidence of the extent of that harm has been tendered in this proceeding.

While this accused may be a drug addict, he has also contributed to the victimization of others in our community. He was found in possession of drugs, cash, and knives in Downtown Vancouver, an area that includes in its population particularly vulnerable people who have been harmed by fentanyl and other Class I drugs. The impact of drug trafficking on society in general has to be considered and, in particular, the impact of fentanyl is now recognized as requiring strong judicial statements demonstrating denunciation.

In these circumstances, specific deterrence must also be given weight as a principle of sentence. [ 44 ] As I have noted, the accused Lloyd’s last sentence for related offences was imposed just five months before the current offences. It was a two-year jail sentence before time served was deducted. Given how quickly he reoffended after this sentence, this court must consider the apparent lack of deterrence affected by his previous sentences.

He has persistently recommitted this kind of offence and, while his counsel suggests the step-up approach to sentencing calls for only modest increments in each successive conviction, in my view, this combination of offences requires more than a modest increase in order to specifically deter the accused from committing future offences. [ 45 ] General deterrence is also a factor in this case, given the need to counter the obvious profit motives motivating the sale of drugs. [ 46 ] While rehabilitation is always a factor at sentence, many authorities have recognized the weight to be placed on that factor may be reduced as the criminal record for related convictions increases.

As I have noted, Mr. Lloyd has six previous convictions for this offence. I take into account that he has taken courses on offer while in pretrial detention, but I also note he had previously taken those or similar programs before committing these offences based on his evidence at the 2013 trial. The other offences he has been convicted of compound his culpability given the degree of violence involved and the attempted use of a weapon which is designated as an aggravating factor in the applicable legislation. [ 47 ] Mr.

Lloyd, stand up now. [ 48 ] Taking into account all of the factors that I have highlighted, I am imposing the following sentences which will all be served

concurrently to each other. On Count 1, there will be a 14-month jail sentence. On Count 2, by joint submission, the court will impose a 60-day jail sentence. On Count 3, also by way of joint submission, a 60-day jail sentence. On Count 4, the possession for the purpose of trafficking of cocaine, I am imposing a three-year jail sentence. On Count 5, the possession of a weapon for a dangerous purpose, by way of joint submission, I am imposing a 60-day jail sentence. On Count 6, the possession for the purpose of trafficking of heroin and fentanyl, I am imposing a six-year jail sentence.

On Count 7, the possession for the purpose of trafficking in methamphetamine, I impose a three-year sentence. [ 49 ] From the six-year sentence on Count 6, I subtract time served of 469 days to today's date which is credited as 704 days leaving four years and 26 days of jail to serve. [ 50 ] The Crown has sought ancillary orders. There is a mandatory lifetime firearms prohibition pursuant to s. 109; and then the Crown seeks secondary DNA orders relating to Count 1, 4, 5, 6, and 7, which orders I make. You will be providing a sample of your DNA at the institution. [ 51 ] Mr.

Fai, I cannot recall if I specifically asked you to address the question of the victim surcharge, but I think it is quite clear he has been in custody for some time and will be in custody for some time so has no means to pay the surcharge. So if it is your submission that I decline to impose that -- [ 52 ] MR. FAI: Yes, Your Honour. [ 53 ] THE COURT: -- I would do that. [ 54 ] I think that addresses the ancillary orders that were sought by the Crown. [ 55 ] MR. FAI: Yes, Your Honour, I raise just because there was something said in your reasons and I realized it was -- an error made in my submissions.

You referred to Mr. Lloyd's father as a recovered drug addict -- [ 56 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 57 ] MR. FAI: -- but, in fact, my submissions were incorrect -- he was an alcoholic, a recovered alcoholic. After the death of his wife, it was alcohol, not drugs that he got into and he is present in the courtroom. I did not want -- I wanted to correct that, if I could. [ 58 ] THE COURT: Well, I am glad you brought that to my attention especially since Mr. Lloyd is here. I am sorry. I think the submission was made before me that the addiction was in relation to drugs, but Mr.

Fai has clarified that and I will change that in my -- [ 59 ] MR. FAI: Thank you. [ 60 ] THE COURT: -- reasons for judgment. [ 61 ] MS. WARREN: And, Your Honour, with respect to the forfeiture order -- [ 62 ] THE COURT: Yes. [ 63 ] MS. WARREN: -- my colleague, Ms. Russell, has prepared a forfeiture order. I understand that my friend has no issues with that. [ 64 ] MR. FAI: Yes, that is correct. [ 65 ] MS. WARREN: Thank you. [ 66 ] THE COURT: So the forfeiture is going by consent, is it, Mr. Fai? Mr. Fai, the forfeiture order goes by consent? [ 67 ] MR.

FAI: Yes, that is right. [ 68 ] THE COURT: All right. [REASONS FOR SENTENCE CONCLUDED]