R. v. Jones Date:, 2016 BCPC 256

Citation: R. v. Jones Date: 20160624 2016 BCPC 256 File No: 235271-1 Registry: Vancouver IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal Division REGINA v. NANSI CAREN MORRIS JONES EXCERPTS FROM PROCEEDINGS ORAL REASONS FOR JUDGMENT OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE J. GALATI Counsel for the Crown: J. Krupa Counsel for the Defendant: M. Nohra Place of Hearing: Vancouver , B.C. Date of Hearing: June 24, 2016

Date of Judgment: June 24, 2016 [ 1 ] THE COURT: Ms. Morris Jones is charged with dangerous driving causing death contrary to s. 249(4) of the Criminal Code and with dangerous driving causing bodily harm contrary to s. 249(3) of the Criminal Code . The charges arise from an incident which occurred on November 27th, 2012, at approximately 11:00 p.m. Ms. Morris Jones drove her vehicle eastbound across the intersection of Joyce Street on Kingsway and struck two pedestrians who were walking northbound across Kingsway within the easterly crosswalk. I say that as an introduction.

I will come to the findings of fact in due course. [ 2 ] The Crown called several witnesses including four police officers, two paramedics, three civilians who observed Ms. Morris Jones' manner of driving, as well as the surviving victim. In addition, the evidence in this case includes various admissions of fact, photographs, maps, a video which captured the actual incident, another video of a brief statement made by Ms. Morris Jones at the police station approximately three hours after the incident. In addition, Ms.

Morris Jones testified on her own behalf. [ 3 ] It is admitted that the two victims were standing on the southeast corner of the intersection and that they entered the crosswalk on the white "walk" signal. It is also admitted that the Ford Explorer driven by Ms. Morris Jones entered the intersection when the light for eastbound traffic had been red for 9.4 seconds and yellow for 3.5 seconds before that. The vehicle was travelling between 77.4 kilometres per hour and 94.6 kilometres per hour.

It entered the intersection at approximately 10:53 p.m. [ 4 ] I stop to say that there no issue in this case with respect to causation of death or bodily harm. [ 5 ] The theory of the Crown is that Ms. Morris Jones was incredibly inattentive while driving and that the evidence establishes both the actus reus and the mens rea component of both of the offences charged. [ 6 ] The submission of the defence is that the manner of driving establishes the actus reus of the offences, but that the mens rea is not established because a reasonable inference that arises from the evidence is that Ms.

Morris Jones fell asleep without appreciating the risk of that happening. Alternatively and, in my view, interestingly, the defence says that the actus reus of the offences is negated because Ms. Morris Jones' manner of driving was involuntary because she unexpectedly fell asleep. I will come back to that. [ 7 ] In addition to the evidence which relates specifically to the incident at the intersection of Kingsway and Joyce, the Crown also relies on evidence as to Ms. Morris Jones' manner of driving at or near the intersection of Kingsway at Rupert.

Based on the admissions filed as Exhibit 4, I believe, the two intersections, Rupert and Kingsway and Joyce and Kingsway, are approximately 504 metres apart and the only traffic-light-controlled intersection between them is at McKinnon Street which is approximately 157 metres from Joyce Street. [ 8 ] The traffic-controlled light at McKinnon Street is pedestrian-controlled in that it is a flashing green light for traffic on Kingsway unless the red-light sequence is activated by a pedestrian pushing a button.

The evidence in this cases -- in this case, rather, establishes that at all material times, the light at McKinnon was green or flashing green. [ 9 ] With respect to the evidence of Alexander Awidan, shortly before 11:00 p.m. on the date in question, he was driving home eastbound on Kingsway approaching Rupert Street. He testified that he was facing a red light and that, accordingly, he was slowing down. He did not indicate, as far as I could find in my notes, whether he was slowing down by applying the brakes or just slowing down. In my view, it really makes little difference.

He said that he had slowed down to approximately 15 kilometres per hour. He testified he was in the middle of the three eastbound lanes on Kingsway. [ 10 ] As he had slowed down to approximately 15 kilometres per hour, the light turned green in his favour, at which point, he estimated he was approximately two truck-lengths away from the intersection.

The evidence established that he was driving an extended-cab full-size pickup truck so I would estimate that he was approximately 25 feet or so away from the intersection when the light turned green in his favour. [ 11 ] He said that at that point when the light turned green, he kept going and accelerated. To his right, he saw a northbound SUV on Rupert Street which turned right onto Kingsway without stopping at what would have by then been a red light for Rupert Street traffic. Mr. Awidan changed lanes to his left as the SUV made a wide turn onto Kingsway.

He said that there would have been a collision had he not changed lanes and that the SUV came within four to five feet of his truck. I accept that, on the evidence, the SUV had turned into the middle lane that was previously occupied by Mr. Awidan in the middle lane of Kingsway. [ 12 ] Mr.

Awidan said that the SUV then accelerated to what he estimated was a minimum speed of 80 kilometres per hour, that it fishtailed within its lane two or three times, and I use that not as a term of art, but to indicate what I understood to be a light side-to-side movement of the SUV, within a distance of a car-length or so, and then continued eastbound in the middle lane. Mr.

Awidan followed in the left or centreline lane. [ 13 ] He acknowledged in cross-examination that there are often parked cars in the curb lanes on Kingsway, especially at night, and that there were some parked cars that night in some locations between Rupert and Joyce. Going back to his evidence in chief, Mr. Awidan said the SUV was the only vehicle in front of him approaching the intersection at Joyce Street. [ 14 ] His evidence as to the distance he was from the SUV and the respective speeds of the two vehicles is, in my view, quite unreliable. According to Mr.

Awidan, the SUV had quickly accelerated to at least 80 kilometres per hour upon turning onto Kingsway whereas he said he did not at any time exceed the 50-kilometre-per-hour speed limit. [ 15 ] He said the light for Kingsway traffic at Joyce Street turned yellow when he was approximately 10 car-lengths from the intersection and that the SUV was 10 to 15 car-lengths ahead of him. He said the light turned red when he was approximately five car- lengths from the intersection.

[ 16 ] On his distance estimates, the SUV would have entered the intersection on a yellow light, although Mr. Awidan did say that the light turned red before the SUV entered the intersection. The admissions and other evidence establish clearly that the light had been red for what in the circumstances was a very lengthy period of 9.4 seconds when the SUV entered the intersection. [ 17 ] In any event, Mr. Awidan saw the SUV drive through the intersection without the brake lights being activated and without apparently braking or slowing down.

He saw the two victims struck by the SUV in the east crosswalk on Kingsway and he saw their bodies go flying, as he described it. [ 18 ] He subsequently tried to render assistance at the scene. He saw the deceased victim laying in a pool of blood and the injured victim on the ground several feet away. He said he wanted to forget this incident. That is not at all surprising. [ 19 ] Although there are aspects of his testimony that I do not accept, I do not question his honesty or integrity.

It is not at all unusual for witnesses to rapidly occurring traumatic events to be mistaken as to how those events actually occurred or as to the details surrounding those events. [ 20 ] The Crown relies on Mr. Awidan's evidence as establishing a pattern of driving erratically or inattentively that cannot be characterized as a momentary lapse of attention on the part of the driver of the SUV. I should note that the evidence establishes beyond any reasonable doubt that Ms. Morris Jones was that driver. I do agree with the Crown submission that the evidence in this case does not lend itself to an

interpretation of the driver's manner of driving as being the result of a momentary lapse of attention. [ 21 ] The defence submits that Mr. Awidan's evidence with respect to how the SUV turned onto Kingsway should not be characterized as establishing anything more than -- I believe the phrase was anything more than a wide turn which does not rise to the level of dangerous driving. I accept that Ms. Morris Jones turned right onto Kingsway without stopping at what was for her a red light. I accept, as well, that she turned into the middle eastbound lane of Kingsway rather than the curb lane.

In doing so, she committed two separate traffic violations. [ 22 ] However, the evidence also establishes, as submitted by the defence, that Mr. Awidan essentially timed the light at the intersection in that he slowed his vehicle and then accelerated when the light turned green. I find that, in doing so, he was either not concerned or not aware of the potential danger posed by Ms.

Morris Jones until he was accelerating through the intersection and that, in the result, it was necessary for him to take evasive action which, on his evidence, entailed only changing lanes rather than braking or swerving to avoid a collision. [ 23 ] That being said, it does not detract from the fact that Ms. Morris Jones drove inappropriately and without consideration for the presence of Mr. Awidan on the roadway. The failure to execute a right turn into the curb lane is a daily occurrence and is usually not dangerous.

Clearly, it can be dangerous if one executes a turn into any lane where there is a vehicle present or travelling towards the spot. The failure to stop at a red light is far more serious. However, rolling right turns on red lights do happen frequently enough that I am prepared to take judicial notice of the fact. [ 24 ] In the circumstances of the case at bar, I find that Ms. Morris Jones did not drive in a manner dangerous to the public in turning right onto Kingsway. Her manner of driving is unexplained by her as she testified that she did not recall any incident at that intersection.

In fact, she did not recall with any precision at all what intersection it was that she turned right onto Kingsway from. [ 25 ] I find that Ms. Morris Jones did cut Mr. Awidan off, but that he was easily able to avoid her. Her negligent driving in doing so is relevant to her manner of driving when she subsequently approached and went through the intersection at Joyce and Kingsway, but I do not accept that any particular pattern of driving has been established on the evidence. [ 26 ] After cutting Mr.

Awidan off and perhaps fishtailing slightly in the process, her driving over a significant distance along Kingsway appears to have been unremarkable until she entered the intersection at -- really, until she cleared the intersection at Joyce Street, but for the fact she was clearly driving in excess of the speed limit. [ 27 ] I cannot accede to the defence submission that Ms. Morris Jones' driving is to be characterized as driving with the flow of traffic as, on the evidence, there was no traffic in front of her.

However, the evidence from several of the witnesses generally establishes that vehicles driving on Kingsway at night when traffic is light often exceed the speed limit. With respect to speed, and notwithstanding the admission that on entering the intersection of Kingsway and Joyce, Ms.

Morris Jones' vehicle was travelling between 77.4 and 94.6 kilometres per hour, the Crown conceded, correctly in my view, that there was no reliable evidence to suggest that her speed was anywhere but at the low end of that range. [ 28 ] Turning to the evidence that relates to the incident at Kingsway and Joyce, I have already summarized Mr. Awidan's evidence. Mr.

Rancourt was driving a tractor-trailer unit southbound on Joyce and he was the first vehicle stopped in the centreline lane at the intersection. [ 29 ] Once the light for traffic on Joyce turned green and he had started pulling into the intersection, he saw the SUV, Ms. Morris Jones' SUV, enter and go through the intersection eastbound. He described the driver as looking ahead which I interpreted as being -- as looking -- or facing straight ahead. Mr.

Rancourt said that he heard a thud as he approached the centre of the intersection, looked to his left, saw a man flying through the air. [ 30 ] After watching the Exhibit 1 video which captured the incident, Mr. Rancourt noted, and it is clear from that video, that prior to the SUV entering the intersection, two northbound vehicles and one southbound vehicle on Joyce had already driven through the intersection. This, of course, is very consistent with the length of time the light had been green for north-south traffic on Joyce. [ 31 ] Another witness, Mr.

Standing, was driving in a parking lot on the southeast corner of the intersection approaching a driveway from which he intended to turn right onto Kingsway to travel eastbound. As he was proceeding through the parking lot, he looked to his left up to the west and saw what turned out to be Ms. Morris Jones' SUV approaching eastbound at a considerable distance from the intersection when he first noted it. He then saw the light for Kingsway traffic turn yellow and he felt that the rate of speed at which the

SUV was travelling was indicative that it was not going to stop and he made some comment to his wife to that effect. [ 32 ] He also saw the pedestrian victims standing on the southeast corner before they entered the crosswalk.

He did not see them enter the crosswalk, nor did he see the collision, although he did hear it and saw what turned out to be the surviving male victim rolling on the roadway. [ 33 ] He testified that he was paying particular attention to the oncoming SUV and that that was why he had made the comment to his wife and it was rather inexplicable as to what he did not see, as I have already indicated, but again, I note that this was a traumatic incident for all who observed it and I place no significance whatsoever on what Mr.

Standing either did not see or was unable to recall. [ 34 ] Without making specific reference to the evidence, including that of the police officers and the paramedics, there is no evidence of skid marks caused by the SUV. The weather was clear. Visibility was good. Lighting was fine. Although it was artificial lighting, there is a lot of lighting at that intersection. [ 35 ] The body of the deceased female victim was approximately 27.4 metres from the east line of the easterly crosswalk.

The SUV had stopped within roughly that same distance as the body of the deceased was, according to one of the witnesses, approximately six feet to the left of the driver's door of the SUV. The surviving male victim was on the ground several metres further east. The damage to the SUV was primarily to the left-front corner indicating that the pedestrians had walked almost past the SUV as it was coming in a relatively straight line toward them. [ 36 ] Ms. Morris Jones did not get out of the SUV until she was dealt with by one of the paramedics.

All of the witnesses who saw her said she sat in her vehicle looking straight ahead with her hands on the steering wheel. It appears she remained in this position, I think counsel's submission was, for 19 minutes. I thought it was something closer to 15 minutes, but in any event, for a significant length of time. [ 37 ] The paramedic who dealt with her found her in that position and noted that she had no expression and did not display any emotion. Both he and the police officer who dealt with her at approximately the same time also described her as calm.

Neither of them noted any smell of liquor or symptoms of impairment, notwithstanding that they were both looking for any such observations. [ 38 ] The police officer, Constable Robeson, felt that Ms. Morris Jones was in shock when he initially dealt with her. A paramedic described her demeanour as unusual in his experience and I believe he was talking about with respect to the lack of emotion that he observed, but he did acknowledge in cross-examination that different people react in different ways to trauma and that they may present shock in many different ways. [ 39 ] Ms.

Morris Jones complied with the requests made of her by the paramedics and the police as she was being dealt with at the scene. She did not want to be taken to hospital saying that she wanted or needed to get home to her children. She was taken to the police station. Her recorded interview was very brief and was admitted to have been made voluntarily. She said in the course of that interview that she did not believe she was driving dangerously and that the pedestrians were not in the crosswalk.

She said essentially the same thing to a social worker who visited her at home on the evening of the following day. [ 40 ] Ms. Morris Jones testified at some length about her personal circumstances prior to and around the time of the incident. In November of 2012, she was a single mother with a five-year-old daughter, an 18-month-old son, and basically without any family support. Her daughter had health issues and was on medication for seizures. She suffered from severe mood swings and night terrors on what was described as a frequent basis.

Both children were very dependent on her. [ 41 ] She herself was suffering from anxiety, depression, and was using small amounts of prescribed marihuana three to four times a week in connection with that. She testified that she was often tired and that, for the previous year, her sleep pattern had frequently been disturbed by having to deal with her children's issues. [ 42 ] With respect to the day of the incident, she testified that nothing out of the ordinary had occurred and that she had not consumed any alcohol or drugs.

In late evening, she left home to go to the Safeway store at Kingsway and Tyne, she said, to buy some medication and diapers. A neighbour, who is the father of a young friend of her daughter, was at her place and was there to take care of the children while she left to run her errand.

She said she did not expect to be gone for more than an hour; that there was no reason for her to be in a rush and that she was not in a rush. [ 43 ] She recalled driving on Kerr Street which at some point, a fair distance from Kingsway, becomes Rupert Street, and she recalled turning right onto Kingsway, but she was not sure whether she was on Rupert Street or another street when she turned right onto Kingsway. [ 44 ] She said she had no memory of cutting anyone off in the process of turning right onto Kingsway, but she could not say what the colour of the light was when she made that turn.

She said she believed that she was in the middle lane on Kingsway when she turned onto it as she recalls there being parked cars. It was not clear from her evidence whether those parked cars were near the place where she turned right or further down the road. [ 45 ] She said in her evidence in chief that she recalled crossing green lights and then she recalled nothing further until she felt what she described as a jolt. She said she believed that she heard a scream and felt she had hit something. So she stopped her vehicle immediately. She saw the female victim on the ground close to her.

She said she could not think and did not know what to do. In cross- examination, she described seeing a paramedic drop the deceased's victim's wrist into a pool of blood. [ 46 ] Both in chief and under cross-examination, she said she did not see the pedestrians and surmised that she must have nodded off or fallen asleep. She agreed in cross-examination that at the time of the incident, she did not know what had happened and, when her statement at the police station was put to her, she said she believed she had been rationalizing how it could be that she had not seen the pedestrians.

[ 47 ] Crown counsel submits that the evidence of Ms. Morris Jones is generally not reliable in that it lacks detail in several respects and because it is inconsistent in some respects. [ 48 ] One of the submissions was that her evidence was inconsistent in that if Ms. Morris Jones recalls the green lights at McKinnon that she would have been aware at that point and looking toward what by then would have been a red light at Joyce.

That submission is based on a mathematical calculation of the time it would have taken her to drive from McKinnon to Joyce as compared to the length of the time the light at Joyce had been red for Kingsway traffic. [ 49 ] I accept Mr. Krupa's mathematical skills and his calculation in that regard and, without performing the necessary calculation, I agree that at the time Ms. Morris Jones went through the intersection at McKinnon, the light at Joyce for her, would have been red.

However, that does not establish that she saw the red light, only that it was there to be seen, albeit some significant distance away still at that point. In my view, that is not inconsistent with Ms. Morris Jones' evidence that she does not recall seeing anything after the green lights at McKinnon, until what must have been the impact with the pedestrian victims. [ 50 ] The real issue, in my view, is whether it is reasonable to infer that Ms. Morris Jones actually fell asleep after or while going through the green lights at McKinnon.

In this regard, Crown counsel submits that her evidence that she did not see the pedestrians stands in contradiction to what she told the police and the social workers. [ 51 ] That is true, but in all of the circumstances, I hesitate to give any significant weight to what she said after realizing she had killed someone without knowing how it had happened. In other words, I do not accept that Ms. Morris Jones lied in testifying that she did not see the pedestrians.

I find it far more likely she was lying to herself after the incident in trying to imagine a scenario which would reduce or extinguish her feeling of responsibility for the incident. [ 52 ] It was also submitted that some doubt should attach to Ms. Morris Jones' evidence that she was not aware of anything until she felt the jolt because the distance within which her vehicle came to a stop is consistent with a reaction time of approximately one second to apply the brakes, which was said to be unrealistically short. [ 53 ] I have to say I am not sure that I completely appreciated that submission.

It appears to have been based on the distance the SUV would have travelled at the minimum estimated speed of roughly 77 kilometres per hour, but without braking. There is no evidence as to what distance the SUV would have travelled if the brakes were applied at the point of impact in the crosswalk. [ 54 ] In any event, on the evidence before me, I cannot accept, I do not know, whether a one-second reaction time for applying the brakes is unrealistic and, from personal experience, I would not think that one-second reaction time is unrealistic.

However, the period of time that it takes to notice something also has something to do with that as, clearly, one is not applying the brakes until one is aware that one should be applying the brakes. [ 55 ] It was further submitted that because there is a slight bend to the right in the roadway approaching the intersection at Joyce Street and because the -- I think it was the traffic camera photograph shows that the SUV entered the intersection at the very right edge of the middle lane, which suggests that the SUV was being steered through that light bend, in other words, that Ms.

Morris Jones was consciously aware of the existence of the curve in steering her vehicle through it. [ 56 ] That submission may have had some significant force if there is any distinct curve to the road, but in the absence of any expert evidence indicating the nature of the steering wheel manipulation that would have been necessary to navigate what appears from the exhibits to be a very slight bend and taking into account vehicles tend to drift slightly depending on their condition and the condition of the roadway, I do not find that the SUV was necessarily being actively steered into the intersection. [ 57 ] In

summary, although I agree that Ms. Morris Jones' evidence with respect to how the incident occurred is unreliable, I find her to be a credible witness. The reliability or accuracy of her evidence with respect to the occurrence of the incident is, in my view, not significant in large part because I find that she did not know at the time how the incident had occurred. [ 58 ] Her testimony is significant only with respect to whether she was or should have been aware of the risk of falling asleep.

In this regard, I accept her evidence that there was nothing unusual about her day and that she did not feel any more tired than she had become accustomed to feeling. The rest of her evidence I did not find of any assistance in determining whether she operated her vehicle in a dangerous manner or whether she exhibited a level of care that was a marked departure from that expected of the reasonable person in the same circumstances. [ 59 ] Those, of course, are the issues in this and every dangerous driving case and I am thankful to counsel for the cases they have provided.

I found myself having read the major ones, certainly all of the Supreme Court of Canada decisions, in the past and I was required to read them more than once in connection with this case. I will mention them only briefly. The leading cases, of course, are the Supreme Court of Canada decisions in Hundal , Beatty , and Roy . [ 60 ] The actus reus of dangerous driving offences is as set out in s. 249 of the Criminal Code , operating a motor vehicle in a manner that is dangerous to the public having regard to all of the circumstances. That, on the surface, seems fairly straight forward.

The various judicial discussions with respect to the mens rea element, I find, conceptually challenging. [ 61 ] In any event, the mens rea of these offences has been the topic of extensive judicial discussion. Subjective intent to drive in a dangerous fashion -- or proof, at least, of subjective intent to drive in a dangerous fashion will clearly result in a conviction, but that is not required. A conviction will also result if the accused drove in a dangerous manner which was a marked departure from the standard of care that would have been adhered to by a reasonable person in the accused's circumstances.

This has been described as a modified objective test. [ 62 ] In Hecimovic , a relatively recent case, the British Columbia Court of Appeal, discusses and sets out how the analysis with respect to the elements of the offence should be undertaken in relation to the evidence. In this case, the Crown relies on Hecimovic with respect to how the evidence should be assessed and submits that when Ms. Morris Jones' conduct is considered in light of all of the

relevant evidence, it is established that she exhibited a marked departure from the standard of care expected from a reasonable person in the circumstances. [ 63 ] That relevant evidence in this case can be briefly summarized as follows. Approximately half a kilometre after turning right onto Kingsway without stopping at a red light and, in the process, cutting off another vehicle, Ms. Morris Jones drove through the intersection at Kingsway and Joyce where the light had been red against her for 9.4 seconds.

Three vehicles had gone through the intersection on the opposing green light before she entered the intersection. There was a large tractor-trailer approaching the midpoint of the intersection as she drove through it. She did not slow down or take any evasive or corrective action whatsoever. Weather, road conditions, and lighting were all good. There is no evidence that she was impaired by alcohol or drugs or affected by life events in any unusual way. [ 64 ] In my view, these circumstances do not easily lend themselves to an inference that she was incredibly inattentive.

Inattention for that long in all of the circumstances is truly incredible. The circumstances could be consistent with intentionally driving dangerously, but I am not satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that that has been proven. The most reasonable inference from all of the evidence is that Ms. Morris Jones fell asleep or otherwise lost cognition and awareness at some point around McKinnon Street. At the very least, there is a reasonable doubt that she was not awake or aware. [ 65 ] The evidence likewise does not establish that she was aware of or should have foreseen the risk of falling asleep while driving.

On a modified objective basis, I would not expect a reasonable person in her circumstances to have foreseen the risk of falling asleep. Accordingly, Ms. Morris Jones did not act in a manner which was a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable person in her circumstances. [ 66 ] I do note the Supreme Court of Canada decisions that I have mentioned, Hundal , Beatty , and Roy , are cases which were primarily concerned with fact patterns involving lapses of attention and whether or not those were momentary lapses of attention.

In all of the cases, the Supreme Court of Canada, of course, discussed at some great length the elements of these offences, but there is only limited reference in all of the decisions to incapacity and mistake of fact as defences. Certainly, they are mentioned, but they are not expanded upon in any significant way. [ 67 ] Those references, are in the context of the Supreme Court of Canada discussing matters pertaining to the mens rea of the offence. In Beatty , the actus reus was referred to as the voluntary undertaking of the regulated activity, the regulated activity in dangerous driving cases being driving.

In other words, it appears to me that voluntarily deciding to drive and then doing it dangerously actually comprise the actus reus . Incapacity, including falling asleep while driving, insofar as I read those decisions, relate to the mens rea or fault element of the offence, and that does appear to me to be the

interpretation adopted by the B.C. Court of Appeal in Hecimovic . [ 68 ] That being said, I think I mentioned earlier that I feel challenged by the law conceptually with respect to dangerous driving and, if I am wrong in the analysis that I have just briefly gone through, I would nevertheless acquit in this case on the basis of the analysis of the B.C.

Court of Appeal in Jiang , that a sleeping driver is in a state of non-insane automatism and cannot be convicted for acts of dangerous driving that are involuntary and cannot form the actus reus of the offence in the absence of proof that the driving was embarked on or continued where there was a real risk of falling asleep. [ 69 ] What happened on November 27th, 2012, is a great tragedy. One life was lost and another irrevocably affected both physically and emotionally. There is no question notwithstanding Ms.

Morris Jones' evidence that it was her vehicle that killed the female pedestrian -- there is no question in my mind that Ms. Morris Jones was responsible for the incident and its consequences, but the evidence does not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she was at fault to the degree required by law to impose criminal punishment. [ 70 ] I find her not guilty on both counts. [REASONS FOR JUDGMENT CONCLUDED]