2011 QCCQ 1344, 2011 QCCQ 1344

R. c. Fiset 2011 QCCQ 1344 COURT OF QUEBEC CANADA PROVINCE OF QUEBEC DISTRICT OF CHICOUTIMI “Criminal and Penal Division” No.: 150-73-000144-089 DATE: February 21, 2011 ____________________________________________________________________ THE HONOURABLE RÉJEAN BÉDARD, P.J.P., PRESIDING HER MAJESTY THE QUEEN Prosecutrix v. CAROLINE FISET Accused _____________________________________________________________________ JUDGMENT ____________________________________________________________________ THE CHARGES [ 1 ] JB3877 Caroline Fiset is charged with nine infringements of the Copyright Act [1] (the Act).

She is charged with making for sale, between March 9 and 26, 2008, infringing copies of nine artistic works, contrary to section 42(1) (

a) of the Act. BACKGROUND [ 2 ] On March 10, 2008, an artist complained to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), after seeing a reproduction of one of her canvases for sale on an Internet site. [ 3 ] On March 26, the RCMP searched the home of the accused and found several reproductions of artists’ works. [ 4 ] It was proved and finally admitted that the accused had copied the artistic works contemplated in counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9. [ 5 ] The evidence also shows that the canvases contemplated in counts 1 and 7 [2] are copies of original works. However, the accused denies authorship of them. ISSUES [ 6 ] Do the essential elements of the offence under section 42(1) (

a) of the Act , namely, to make for sale an infringing copy of a work and the intention of selling it, have to exist concurrently? And must they coexist during the period contemplated by the charge? [ 7 ] In short, does the evidence demonstrate the essential elements of the offence beyond any reasonable doubt? THE FACTS [ 8 ] From the evidence as a whole, the Court accepts the following relevant and admissible elements. [ 9 ] In early March 2008, the artist Lucie Lapointe alerted the RCMP when she saw one of her canvases for sale at a very low

price on a website. By carefully reading the ad, [3] she realized that it was a copy made and sold by Caroline Fiset. [ 10 ] During the investigation, Constable Maxime Cormier discovered a second website [4] on which the accused was selling copies of Ms. Lapointe’s works. [ 11 ] On March 19, 2008, the constable replied to the ad by calling the contact, Michel Belley.

Following this conversation, a search warrant was obtained for the home of the defendant and Michel Belley. [ 12 ] During the search on March 26, 2008, thirteen copies of artistic works were found (paintings and canvases). [ 13 ] All of the artists copied state that they have exclusive rights to their works. Apart from certain business agreements for producing greeting cards and calendars, they have never authorized reproduction of their paintings. They do not know the accused and have not given her any rights to their works. [ 14 ] According to the artists heard, copying a work is not prohibited.

However, [ translation] “study” or “DAP” [ translation] (after the manner of an artist) must be written on the painting to identify it as a copy. [ 15 ] The canvases seized do not bear such identification. In addition, they all have the signature of the accused, except for an unfinished painting as well as the two canvases of which she denies authorship. [ 16 ] The accused and her spouse were present during the search.

After exercising her right to counsel, the accused made an oral statement [5] in which she admits, according to Constables Cormier and Deslandes, that all the paintings in her apartment were copies and that she was trying to sell them to make ends meet at the end of the month. [ 17 ] At the hearing, the accused recalled saying that all the canvases were copies. However, she did not recall saying that the paintings were for sale. She admitted that at the time she was having financial problems. She tried to sell a single canvas to survive. The price requested, $400, represented the cost of groceries for the week.

The accused was very upset to see the police leaving with her canvases because she had painted them for her children and wanted to keep them. It broke her heart to sell even one of them. [ 18 ] The accused is known in her circle as someone who likes copying the works of well-known artists. She started painting in 1994, taught and advised by her mother, who is also a painter. [ 19 ] Since then, she has painted between twenty and thirty canvases. Starting in 2004, she sold four to her mother because she was having financial difficulties.

She also gave some to family members. [ 20 ] Concerning the painting contemplated in count 1, [6] the accused said that her mother had painted it as a gift to her granddaughter. Moreover, it is unsigned, and the accused signs all her copies. [ 21 ] Manon Lapointe is a very good friend of the accused’s family. She does not paint, but has made many sketches for the accused’s mother. In addition, she was the one who did the drawing for the copy contemplated in count 1.

However, she does not know who painted it. [ 22 ] Manon Lapointe claimed authorship of the sketch for the canvas related to count 7, [7] a sketch she had given to the mother of the accused. [ 23 ] Nathalie Boudreault, a curator at the Musée régional de Chicoutimi since 2005, testified as an expert in art and art history. [ 24 ] With regard to the reproductions covered by the charges, she noted the obvious similarity to the works by the painters. The similarities led her to conclude that the accused was not just inspired by the original works.

She wanted to actually copy them by using the grid technique, among other things. In general, the works are good copies. However, in terms of internal detail, background and perspective, the copies are definitely not as precise as the originals. According to Ms. Boudreault, these are popular works, accessible and easy to sell. [ 25 ] In each copy, the expert found that the same way of painting was done and the same technique was used. The same was true for painting P-7b, of which the accused denies authorship. [ 26 ] Finally, she could not determine when the canvases seized were painted.

She could not date the copies. THE PARTIES’ CLAIMS [ 27 ] As far as the defence is concerned, the evidence is deficient on each count. [ 28 ] The offence under section 42(1) (

a) of the Act is a crime of specific intent. The use of the word “knowingly” clearly indicates Parliament’s will. The required intent must be analyzed subjectively, based on the accused and not on the objective criterion of a reasonable person. [ 29 ] To prove this offence, the prosecution must show that the accused intended to sell the infringing work when she made the copy. These two elements, namely, intent to sell and the making of the infringing copy, must be contemporaneous and concomitant.

In addition, these elements must coexist during the period covered by the charges, namely between March 9 and 26, 2008. [ 30 ] In the present case, there is no evidence showing beyond a reasonable doubt that the essential elements of the offence are concurrent and even less that they coexisted during the period contemplated in the wording of the offence. [ 31 ] The accused started painting in 1994. While she admits making copies of artistic works, there is no evidence concerning the making of the infringing copies between March 9 and 26, 2008. Although a canvas was put up for sale, the evidence does not show that

it was made between those dates. [ 32 ] In this regard, the defence claims that count ​​​4 (canvas P-6b) corresponds more closely to the offence under section 42(1) (

b) of the Act , namely, offering an infringing copy for sale. [ 33 ] Failing acceptance of its main argument, the defence argues that there is an issue of credibility and draws the Court’s attention to the differences between the personal notes [8] and Constable Cormier’s general incident report. [9] The differences have to do with the admission made by the accused during the search. [ 34 ] In the view of the prosecution , except with regard to count 7, the evidence shows Caroline Fiset’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 35 ] Accepting the defence's position would not make sense. The offence under section 42(1) (

a) requires proof of the identity of the person who makes the infringing copy and of the intent to sell it. However, the Act does not require these two elements to be contemporaneous or concurrent. The offence is completed when the infringer has intent to sell the infringing paintings, even if they were copied many years earlier. [ 36 ] According to the position of the prosecution, a person could copy an original work, wait until the end of the two-year limitation period before selling the copy and thus be protected against any lawsuit through section 42(1) (

a) of the Act . [ 37 ] In short, to the prosecution, accepting the defence’s position would be absurd and would go against the object of the Act , which is to protect the expression of the originality of an artistic work. [ 38 ] The burden of proof is much heavier under section 42(1)( a ), because the identity of the infringer must be proven, which is often difficult to do. According to the prosecution, the facts in this case justify a charge as much under section 42(1) (

a) as under 42(1) ( b ). And the evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that both offences were committed. [ 39 ] The offer to sell canvas P-6b on two websites speaks for itself. The accused writes there that she makes many reproductions and regularly sells them, but this is the first time she has done so on the Internet. For the prosecution, this phrase, undisputed by the accused, clearly shows that intent to sell was present from the very beginning. [ 40 ] Except for two infringing copies, the accused admits that she is the author of the copies.

According to the expert, the copied works are of interest to the general public. They would be easy to sell. Making copies of five different artists suggests making copies to sell. In addition, the accused is recognized in her circle as someone who copies this type of painting. [ 41 ] In addition, the accused admits wanting to sell canvas P-6b because she has financial problems.

Her precarious situation corroborates the constables’ version when they testify that the accused admitted that she wanted to sell her copies to help her make ends meet at the end of the month. [ 42 ] As for canvas P-7b, which the accused attributes to her mother, the prosecution recalls the testimony of the expert, who recognized the same style of painting in this canvas as in the other copies. The mother did not testify. [ 43 ] Finally, the prosecution suggests an acquittal on count 7, as the evidence clearly showed that Ms. Lapointe had made the sketch.

LEGAL PROVISIONS [ 44 ] The relevant provisions of the Copyright Act for dealing with the dispute are as follows:

Section 27:

(1) It is an infringement of copyright for any person to do, without the consent of the owner of the copyright, anything that by this Act only the owner of the copyright has the right to do.

(2) It is an infringement of copyright for any person to (

a) sell or rent out, (

b) distribute to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, (

c) by way of trade distribute, expose or offer for sale or rental, or exhibit in public, (

d) possess for the purpose of doing anything referred to in paragraphs (

a) to ( c ), or (

e) import into Canada for the purpose of doing anything referred to in paragraphs (

a) to ( c ), a copy of a work, sound recording or fixation of a performer’s performance or of a communication signal that the person knows or should have known infringes copyright or would infringe copyright if it had been made in Canada by the person who made it. … 42.

(1) Every person who knowingly (

a) makes for sale or rental an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists, (

b) sells or rents out, or by way of trade exposes or offers for sale or rental, an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists,

(

c) distributes infringing copies of a work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists, either for the purpose of trade or to such an extent as to affect prejudicially the owner of the copyright, (

d) by way of trade exhibits in public an infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists, or (

e) imports for sale or rental into Canada any infringing copy of a work or other subject-matter in which copyright subsists is guilty of an offence and liable (

f) on

summary conviction, to a fine not exceeding twenty-five thousand dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months or to both, or (

g) on conviction on indictment, to a fine not exceeding one million dollars or to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to both. …

(4) Proceedings by

summary conviction in respect of an offence under this

section may be instituted at any time within, but not later than, two years after the time when the offence was committed. … and the French version of section 42(1) (

a) is drafted in the following manner: 42.

(1) Commet une infraction quiconque, sciemment :

a) se livre, en vue de la vente ou de la location, à la contrefaçon d’une oeuvre ou d’un autre objet du droit d’auteur protégés; ANALYSIS [ 45 ] To begin with, we must respond to the argument regarding

interpretation submitted by counsel for the defendant, who asks the Court to give preference to the English text of section 42(1) (

a) of the Act . In his opinion, the English version clearly indicates Parliament’s intention of requiring the concurrence of the essential elements of the offence. [ 46 ] For the prosecution, there is nothing to interpret. Neither the English nor the French versions of the text lend more support to the defence's position. [ 47 ] The Supreme Court of Canada studied the issue of interpreting bilingual legislation in Daoust . [10] To interpret statutes, there must be a difference between the versions.

The French text of section 42(1) () uses the expression “se livre, en vue de la vente” while the English version reads “makes for sale”. [ 48 ] The Act does not define these expressions. We must rely on the ordinary meaning of the words. Literally “makes for sale” is [ translation] “to make or manufacture in order to sell”. [11] Admittedly, the French words used by Parliament are a poor or awkward translation of the English text.

But the expression “se livrer” is used here in a figurative sense and means [ translation] “to effect, carry out, perform an activity”. [12] [ 49 ] The Court finds that there is no inconsistency or divergence between the two versions. There is therefore no reason to apply the interpretative process suggested by Bastarache J. in Daoust . [13] Indeed, there is no discordance between the two versions. Neither is likely to give rise to more than one

interpretation. There is no ambiguity. [ 50 ] Regardless of the version used, a litigant inevitably understands the purpose of the provision, namely, the Act prohibits the reproduction of artistic works in order to sell them. This is the common meaning that must be given to both the English and French versions. [ 51 ] This takes us back to square one. The Court must determine whether concurrence of the essential elements needs to be proved and whether they must have coexisted during the period covered by the wording of the offence. The parties have not submitted any case law concerning the application of section 42(1) (

a) of the Act . In fact, the issue does not seem to have been the subject of a decision by any court. [ 52 ] It is not disputed that the artists’ original works constitute artistic works. [14] They are copyrighted as defined in sections 2 and 3 of the Act . [ 53 ] The evidence shows beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused copied the artistic works described in counts 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 8 and 9. Regarding counts 1 and 7, the credibility of the witnesses will need to be assessed, if necessary. [ 54 ] The evidence therefore inevitably leads the Court to find that the accused wished to reproduce original works.

All of the witnesses heard testified to the similarities and resemblance of the copies. In addition, the accused does not claim to have been merely inspired by the originals. They are indeed infringing copies. [ 55 ] The wording of section 42(1) is not confusing with regard to the classification of the offence. By using the term “knowingly” (“ sciemment ” in the French version), Parliament clearly expressed its intention of creating a mens rea offence. [15] This conclusion is in line with the majority of case law concerning

section 42 of the Act . [16] [ 56 ] For the prosecution to prove this type of offence, it must show beyond a reasonable doubt the commission of the prohibited act and the perpetrator's guilty state of mind. It must prove the actual intent to commit the offence.

[ 57 ] The intent must be analyzed subjectively. The accused must be shown to have the intent to do what is prohibited by the Act . Furthermore, the accused is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt concerning this essential element of the offence. [17] [ 58 ] Another expression informs us of the degree of intent required by Parliament. The words “makes for” in section 42(1) (

a) of the Act indicates that it is a crime of specific intent. [ 59 ] According to the authors Côte-Harper, Manganas and Turgeon, the commission of this type of offence requires that: [ translation ] …the accused do something to achieve a result or a consequence that he or she ascribes to conduct [18] … and also that: [ translation] …the acts in the second category (specific intent) were preconceived and constitute stages deliberately completed in pursuing an unlawful objective… [19] in short: [ translation ] …offences of specific intent require a mental process that leads to the formulation of a specific intent… [20] and lastly: [ translation ] …the accused must have the intent to achieve the purpose or consequence… [21] [ 60 ] In the case before us, the purpose or consequence sought is a sale.

In fact, both section 42(1)(

a) of the Act and the wording of the offence specify the unlawful objective, namely: “ makes for sale ” (“ se livrer en vue de la vente ”) an infringing copy of an artistic work. [ 61 ] In keeping with these principles, the Court is of the opinion that the evidence must show beyond a reasonable doubt that at the time the accused engaged in the copying of the works ( s’est livré à copier ), she had the intent to sell them.

The reproduction is a deliberate stage in pursuing an unlawful objective, namely, the sale of an infringing copy of an artistic work. [ 62 ] The Copyright Act does not prohibit the possession of an infringing copy of work or the copying of original copyrighted works. A reading of the relevant provisions reveals the objective of Parliament clearly. [22] It wishes to control the use of the artistic work. It wishes to prevent the commercial marketing thereof affecting prejudicially the owner of the copyright. Contrary to what the prosecution claims, section 27(2)(

d) does not make a mere infringing copy a violation of the Act. What it prohibits is possession “for the purpose of doing anything referred to in paragraphs (

a) to ( c )”, actions which all refer to the use, by way of trade, of the copyrighted work without the consent of the owner of the copyright. [ 63 ] Since the issue of applying section 42(1) (

a) of the Act has never been brought before the courts, we shall now try to understand its scope through an analogy with other provisions generating offences in the same category. [ 64 ] As mentioned earlier, section 42(1) (

a) creates an offence of specific intent. The expression “ makes for sale ” has the same effect as the words “ with intent to commit an indictable offence” in sections 348(1) (

a) and 349(1) of the Criminal Code ( Cr. C .). [23] [ 65 ] Like the mere infringement of a work, the mere fact of breaking and entering (section 348 Cr. C .) or being in (section 349 Cr. C .) a dwelling place does not in itself constitute an offence. Intent to commit an indictable offence therein must be proved. [24] To do so, the prosecution benefits from a presumption of the accused's intent. [25] Parliament did not create the same presumption for the offence under section 42(1) ( a ). Nevertheless, regardless of the degree of difficulty, the prosecution must prove the purpose sought by the infringer, namely, the intent to sell the copy. [ 66 ] The wording speaks for itself: 348(1)(

a) Cr. C .: ... enters… with intent… 349(1) Cr. C .: enters or is in… with intent… 42(1)(

a) of the Act : knowingly (

a) makes for sale … an infringing copy… In addition, in all cases, specific intent must exist concurrently with the material element of the offence. These elements must coexist at the time the offence is committed. The infringing copy must be a stage deliberately completed in pursuing an unlawful objective, namely, the sale of the infringing copy of the work. [ 67 ] The offence of specific intent under

section 366 Cr. C . has the same effect: 366(1): Every one commits forgery who makes a false document, knowing it to be false, with intent…

366(3): Forgery is complete as soon as a document is made with the knowledge and intent … For a conviction, the evidence must show the existence of a forgery, the accused must know that he committed forgery, and the accused must have the specific intent to use the forgery to the prejudice of someone. [26] The intent to use the forgery must exist at the time it is made. In this case, the intent to sell must be present when making the infringing copy.

It must coexist with the actus reus . [ 68 ] The same reasoning applies to the offence of driving on private property in order to avoid compliance with a traffic sign or signal. [27] The evidence must show that the purpose sought is to avoid the traffic sign or signal. [28] This specific intent must exist from the beginning, at the time the private property is entered, and must coexist with the actus reus when the offence is committed.

An individual cannot be convicted if he or she enters the private property of a service station for a fill-up but notices that the gas pump is not working and continues on his or her way on a perpendicular path, thus avoiding the red light. [ 69 ] Even if in actual fact the material event is present (entering the private property to avoid the sign or signal), specific intent does not coexist with the actus reus . This act does not constitute a stage deliberately completed in pursuance of the unlawful objective of avoiding the sign or signal.

The defendant did not act in order to, with the intent to, or so as to avoid the sign or signal. [ 70 ] In the case before us, the evidence does not show that at the time the accused made an infringing copy of the artistic works, she had specific intent to sell them. She did not copy them for the purpose of selling them.

This is not a stage deliberately completed in pursuance of an unlawful objective, namely, the use of an artistic work for the purpose of trade without the artist's consent. [ 71 ] The parties refer the Court to decisions [29] dealing with the principle of the concurrence of a wrongful act and a guilty mind.

The major principle that emerges is that the actus reus must be concurrent with the mens rea to constitute an offence. [ 72 ] The prosecution, however, draws the Court's attention to the following passage from Cooper , a judgment of the Supreme Court of Canada: … It is not always necessary, however, for the guilty act and the intent to be completely concurrent; they need only coincide at some point… [30] The prosecution relies on this excerpt and argues that, when the accused decides to sell an infringing copy, intent coincides with the actus reus , and the crime is then committed.

This is a continuing offence that will end when the copies are sold. [ 73 ] With respect, this argument is wrong because when the accused decides to sell, she is no longer making an infringing copy. The copy has been completed by that point. In Cooper , the Court adds: The determination of whether the mens rea coincides with the wrongful act depends to a large extent upon the nature of the act. [31] [ 74 ] In Cooper and Fournier , the facts that led the Court to analyze the principle of concurrency are very different from those in the present case. Both cases concerned a murder charge.

The crime resulted from a series of wrongful acts, all unlawful, forming part of the same transaction. In Fournier , the accused had her husband murdered. From the beginning, she intended to cause his death. This intention coincided with the actions she subsequently performed to help in the commission of the crime. In Cooper , the Court decided that it was sufficient for intent to be demonstrated when the accused caused serious and dangerous bodily harm to the victim.

Intent did not need to persist, however, throughout the entire act of strangulation. [ 75 ] These situations are completely different from the case under consideration. The Court notes that the making a mere infringing copy and the possession of infringing copies of works are not prohibited. Unlike Cooper , where the accused strangled his victim, and Fournier , where the accused commissioned a crime to beperpetrated, the accused Fiset does not commit any unlawful act when she copies an artistic work.

The evidence does not show that the infringing copy is part of a series of wrongful acts forming part of the same transaction. [ 76 ] As the Court of Appeal states in Fournier : [ translation ] The mens rea must be determined at the time that she performed these acts . [32] The following passage from Cooper is to the same effect: There can be no doubt that under the classical approach to criminal law it is the intent of the accused that makes the wrongful act illegal. [33] [ 77 ] In the present case, as you will recall, the accused is charged with making for sale an infringing copy of an artistic work.

There is nothing to prove that the intent to sell was concurrent or coincided with the act of making the infringing copy. In fact, there is absolutely no evidence that intent coincided at any point whatsoever with the act of making the infringing copy. This applies even more to the period covered by the wording of the offence. [ 78 ] The prosecution also refers the Court to a number of decisions on the “continuing offence” principle. [34] These decisions are not relevant because none of them deal with an offence of specific intent.

Furthermore, the issue in this case is not so much whether the offence was continuous but rather where its starting point was. In the view of the prosecution, the offence is committed when the canvas is put up for sale, regardless of the date of the infringing copy and the accused's intent when making the infringing copy. [ 79 ] The Court cannot agree with this claim. Accepting the prosecution's argument would mean making unlawful initial conduct that is not proscribed. This would retroactively attribute criminal intent to the accused for an irreproachable act.

These statements go against all the principles of criminal and penal law.

[ 80 ] Finally, the prosecution argues that backing the defence's position would be absurd as it would allow the infringer to avoid prosecution under section 42(1) (

a) of the Act by waiting for the two-year limitation period to expire before selling the copies. According to the prosecution, Parliament could not have wanted to allow such a situation. [ 81 ] Once again, with respect, the Court does not agree. Section 42(4) of the Act provides that proceedings may be instituted at any time within, but not later than, two years after the time when the offence was committed.

In the situation described by the prosecution, the offence is committed when the infringer gives effect to her intent to sell. [ 82 ] In fact, since Parliament's intention is to prohibit use for commercial purposes in violation of copyright, and not the mere making of infringing copies of works, the limitation period will start to run only when intent is indicated, namely when the copies are put up for sale. The time separating the making of the infringing copies and putting them up for sale becomes unimportant because the specific intent to commit the offence under section 42(1) (

a) is present as soon as an infringing copy is made. The two essential elements coexist and coincide. They are concurrent. Contrary to the case under consideration, an infringer makes infringing copies for sale. This is a stage deliberately completed in pursuing an unlawful objective. [ 83 ] The Court agrees that proving intent to sell while making the infringing copies may be very difficult. This,however, is Parliament's choice. Moreover, it did not create presumption to ease the burden of proof for the prosecution, as in the case of the offences under sections 348 and 349 Cr.

C . [ 84 ] Contrary to what the prosecution suggests, failure to be able to prove intent does not make the infringer immune from any prosecution under the Act . In fact, every person who knowingly sells or by way of trade offers for sale an infringing copy can be prosecuted under section 42(1) (

b) of the Act. There is no need to prove the author of the infringing copy. In addition, the seller is liable to the same sanction [35] as under section 42(1)( a ). [ 85 ] Thus, both the infringer who makes a copy with the intent to sell and the simple seller of infringing copies are liable to prosecution and sanction. In both cases, Parliament's objective has been achieved. The use for trade purposes is controlled and the originality of the artistic work is protected. [ 86 ] When the accused forms the intent to sell after the infringing copy has been made, the charge should be made under section 42(1)( b ).

The facts entered in evidence before the Court regarding count 4 alone correspond more to the situation covered by section 42(1) ( b ). The prosecution has opted for different charges by specifying the period of offence. It must live with its choices and prove the essential elements of the offences beyond a reasonable doubt. [ 87 ] On each count, there is no evidence to show that the accused made for sale infringing copies with the specific intent to sell at the time she reproduced the artistic work.

No evidence shows that the accused had the intent to do what is prohibited by the Act in section 42(1) ( a ), namely to make for sale infringing copies. And the accused is entitled to the benefit of a reasonable doubt on this essential element of the offence.

Lastly, there is nothing to prove that she made an infringing copy of an artistic work between March 9 and 26, 2008. [ 88 ] FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT: [ 89 ] ACQUITS the accused on all counts. _______________________________ RÉJEAN BÉDARD, Presiding Justice of the Peace Mtre Manon Lavoie Public Prosecution Service of Canada Quebec Regional Office Complexe Guy-Favreau 200 René-Lévesque Blvd. W. East Tower, 9th floor Montreal, Quebec H2Z 1X4

Crown prosecutor Mtre Daniel Gravel Bureau d'aide juridique de Chicoutimi 267 Racine Street E., 1st floor Chicoutimi, Quebec G7H 1S5 For the defendant Date of hearing: November 15, 16 and 18, 2010, January 19, 2011, and February 1, 2011.