R. v. Coppick, 2023 BCPC 71

Citation: R. v. Coppick 2023 BCPC 71 Date: 20230420 File No: 242998-1 Registry: Surrey IN THE PROVINCIAL COURT OF BRITISH COLUMBIA Criminal Court REX v. DAWN MICHELLE COPPICK REASONS FOR SENTENCE OF THE HONOURABLE JUDGE JETTÉ Counsel for the Crown: D. Peltier Counsel for the Defendant: S. Williams Place of Hearing: Surrey , B.C. Date of Hearing: February 17, 2023 Date of Judgment: April 20, 2023

Introduction [ 1 ] Dawn Coppick has plead guilty to one count of possession for the purpose of trafficking fentanyl and methamphetamine on 28 April 2020. I have had the benefit of a Pre-Sentence Report (“PSR”) and a report prepared by a forensic psychiatrist. Crown has filed the usual reports and statistics which document the sad history of fentanyl toxicity in this Province since a public health emergency was declared in 2016. That crisis continues. Currently in B.C., over 200 people each month die after using opioids, usually fentanyl or another substance mixed with fentanyl.

Some 11,000 lives have been lost in this way through to the end of 2022. [ 2 ] Both fentanyl and methamphetamine are

Schedule I substances in the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act (“ CDSA ”). The maximum sentence for the offence of possessing these substances for the purpose of trafficking is life. [ 3 ] Crowns submits that in this case I should impose a jail sentence in the range of 24-30 months. Counsel for Ms. Coppick suggests a Conditional Sentence Order (“CSO”) in the upper end of the Provincial range followed by probation. Circumstances of the Offence [ 4 ] The Crown handed up a statement of facts. Although they were not signed by Ms.

Coppick or her counsel, I confirmed with counsel that these facts were admitted and it was marked as an exhibit. I will summarize those agreed facts here. [ 5 ] Police received a tip that drug activities might be occurring at an address on 60A Avenue in Surrey. Surveillance identified brief visits by a number of individuals over a period of days; these activities were consistent with drug trafficking. On 28 April 2020, police followed one of these visitors away from the residence and she was arrested; she was found in possession of 2 grams of methamphetamine.

Police then obtained and executed a search warrant at the residence. [ 6 ] Ms. Coppick was arrested inside the residence. At point of arrest she told police that drugs were inside her purse, and that her roommate, who was also present, was not involved. [ 7 ] Inside the house police located the following: a. Three cell phones; b. Two digital scales with residue; c. A brown purse containing four bags of methamphetamine with a total weight of 185.75 grams and one bag of fentanyl weighing 21.81 grams. d. $1,145 CAD in a wallet with receipts in Ms. Coppick’s name; e. $1,790 CAD in a wallet; f.

Seven bags of fentanyl in Ms. Coppicks’s bedroom, total weight 6.44 grams; g. Also in Ms. Coppick’s bedroom, an envelope containing $425 CAD and $275 USD; another envelope with $2,400 CAD; and a third envelope with $9,000 CAD. [ 8 ] In total, police located 28.25 grams of fentanyl and 185.75 grams of methamphetamine. The approximate street value of the fentanyl was $4,360; the methamphetamine was worth about $5,600. $14,760 CAD and $275 USD were seized. [ 9 ] Crown also relies on portions of a statement Ms. Coppick made to police later at the detachment.

In that statement she admitted that she had been selling drugs from the house, said that she was serving about five people a day, explained the price structure, and confirmed that her roommate had nothing to do with it. She said some of her customers purchased ounces at a time, although she did not say which substance she was referring to. She also told police that she was being supplied by someone else - she did not identify that person by name – and they dropped off four ounces every four or five days.

She started with smaller quantities about a year before the police arrived, then the larger amounts started arriving a few months later. Circumstances of the Offender [ 10 ] Ms. Coppick is 58 years old. Her life has been plagued by addiction, poverty, and abuse. [ 11 ] She came from a broken home; she lost contact with her father when she was 9. She dropped out of school in grade 8, and was a single Mom by the time she was 15. She has cycled through 4-5 serious relationships, many of which were marked by physical, sexual and emotional abuse.

She has 6 children from those relationships; the third was conceived when she was raped. Two of her children have died; one son committed suicide in 2002, and another died of an opioid overdose in late 2021. She has a limited work history; some of that was babysitting when she was a teen. She reports that she was sexually abused by a number of the men who hired her to babysit. She began to use illicit substances in her teen years, including cannabis, methamphetamine and crack cocaine. She has not used opioids. Her drug of choice until the fall of 2021 was methamphetamine.

She reports that she has not used since that time. [ 12 ] Currently, Ms. Coppick has a strong relationship with one of her daughters, but no support from any other family. She lives in a basement suite. The owners live upstairs with their adult son and they have provided some support and stability for Ms. Coppick. They have also provided a reference letter for this proceeding.

[13] Ms. Coppick has some health issues, including cirrhosis of the liver and hepatitis B. She is taking medication for theseconditions, which are currently stable. [14] She also has a criminal record which stretches back to 1982 and carries on into the early 2000’s. The convictions are primarilyfor theft under and other property offences. Her last conviction was for theft under in August of 2005. Ms. Coppick does not have anyprior convictions for offences contrary to the CDSA.

Principles of Sentencing [15] The principles of sentencing that apply in this case are set out in s. 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code and there are alsoprinciples of sentencing specific to drug offences in s. 10 of the CDSA. [16] Denunciation and deterrence are the primary principles when sentencing an offender for offences related to drug trafficking. Assuch, those who engage in trafficking can generally expect a custodial sentence: R. v. Smith, 2017 BCCA 112; R. v. Voong, 2015 BCCA285; R. v. Creuzot, 2017 BCSC 1075.

While these principles are paramount in cases of this type, I must not fail to consider as well that“one of the main objectives of Canadian criminal law is the rehabilitation of offenders” which assists the court to impose a sentence inany given case which is “just and appropriate”: R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64 at para. 4; see also R. v. Schneider, 2019 BCCA 310 atparas. 10-11. I must also take into account the principle of restraint expressed in s. 718.2(

e) of the Code. [17] In its most recent sentencing decision, R. v. Parranto, 2021 SCC 46, the Supreme Court of Canada reminded sentencing judgesthat “(T)he goal in every case is a fair, fit and principled sanction. Proportionality is the organizing principle in reaching this goal…”This means that courts of first instance must strive to ensure that the sentence imposed is proportionate to the gravity of the offence andthe degree of responsibility of the offender: R. v. Parranto at para. 10. See also R. v. Nur, 2015 SCC 15 at para. 43. Range of Sentence [18] In R. v.

Smith, 2017 BCCA 112 at paragraph 45, the Court of Appeal set a new range for a first offence of street level traffickingin fentanyl. The court set the bottom of the range at 18 months jail. The court did not specify the top of the range, but found that it mightexceed 36 months, “especially where the offender has a substantial record involving the sale of fentanyl or otherwise demonstrates anindifference to the human lives he or she is putting at risk.” The court also noted that a different range may apply “where the offender ishigher up the chain of sale or distribution.” (Also see R. v.

Rutter, 2017 BCCA 193 at paras 3-4). [19] A sentencing range established for an offence or category of offences is a guideline and not a strait-jacket, an observation madeby the court in Smith and again most recently in R. v. Parranto, supra. A suggested range does not preclude lesser or greater sentences ifwarranted. Sentencing is an inherently individualized process. No two offenders are identically situated. There is no such thing as auniform sentence for a particular crime. A sentence outside the usual range can be imposed so long as it is in accordance with theprinciples and objectives of sentencing: R. v.

M. (C.A.), (SCC), [1996] 1 S.C.R. 500; R. v. Lacasse, 2015 SCC 64; R. v.Smith, supra, at paras. 35, 43 and 46; R. v. Williams, 2019 BCCA 295; R. v. Padda, 2019 BCCA 351; R. v. Friesen, 2020 SCC 9; and R.v. Ellis, 2022 BCCA 278 at para. 165. [20] Our Court of Appeal in R. v. Williams, supra, described the sentencing range approach which has been employed in this Provincefor some time: 57 This Court has adopted the approach of sentencing ranges because, in our view, they provide an optimal balance between furtheringparity and individualization in a sentence.

Sentencing ranges are not more rigid than starting points but simply reflect an overview ofsentences that have previously been imposed for a particular offence.

They are intended to assist judges in arriving at a sentence that isconsistent with sentences for similarly situated offenders, in similar circumstances — furthering the principle of parity — withoutconstraining the judge's discretion to go outside of the range to properly reflect the unique circumstances of the offence or the offender.They do not set out "practical minimum and maximum sentences.”… Analysis [21] What to do with a 58 year old woman whose entire life has been a battle against one obstacle after another, and whose own sondied after consuming the toxic substance she was selling out of the front door of her home?

Even though her son passed some monthsafter her arrest in April 2020, there can be no question that Ms. Coppick knew what she was doing, and she knew that the product shewas selling might prove lethal. The loss of her son was a tragic after the fact illustration of that sad reality. [22] Defence counsel submits that Ms. Coppick was a drug user herself and that part of her motivation for selling drugs was to obtainfunds to support her own habit. As noted earlier, Ms.

Coppick is not an opioid user, but as of the time of the offence she had been usingmethamphetamine for many years. [23] Crown counsel notes that in her warned statement to police Ms. Coppick said she did not have a “big habit”, and would smoke atthe most $20 per day. Crown counsel also directs my attention to those portions of her statement where Ms. Coppick said that she wasnot receiving any of the profit from the drug sales because she had been robbed and was working to repay her supplier. She told policethat she was carrying a debt of about $10,000.

Crown does not take issue with any of that. [24] While the Crown acknowledges that this was a relatively small operation based on Ms. Coppick’s candid account to police, heemphasizes that the trafficking took place over a sustained period of time, and she knew the risks associated with the consumption offentanyl. [25] The writer of the forensic psychiatric report found that Ms. Coppick poses a low risk to re-offend so long as she is able tomaintain pro-social supports and keep her own addiction issues under control.

She has been stable and sober since the fall of 2021, so shehas demonstrated that she can do the things necessary to avoid a U-turn back into a criminal lifestyle.

[ 26 ] I find that Ms. Coppick was essentially a street-level dealer operating at the lowest rung of the drug world, although it appears that some of her sales were in quantities higher than the smaller amounts typically purchased by drug users. I also accept that she was not making a profit at the time when police executed their warrant, but that she was earning money to retire the debt she owed to her supplier. Even though this operation did not provide a direct financial benefit to Ms. Coppick, it was a commercial enterprise and profit – for someone at least – was the motive.

Her addiction to methamphetamine did not seem to be a primary driver of her drug trafficking activities. As much as anything, her addiction was just another marker of her position at the margins of society which contributed to her descent into serious criminality. [ 27 ] The offence was committed in April of 2020, almost three years ago. There have been no further issues, and Ms. Coppick has made important changes in her life since then. [ 28 ] The Ms. Coppicks of this world are used by others, higher in the food chain, to keep the business of street-level drug sales moving forward.

She is a vulnerable person, unsophisticated, and surprisingly naïve. Her drug operation was not sophisticated – she sold drugs from her own home in a manner which would almost certainly result in detection and arrest. To the extent that the police needed any additional assistance, she freely confessed her own role in considerable detail; her statements against interest began as soon as police entered her home. I accept that what she told the police in her warned statement is true, that she did not have the backbone to extract herself from this situation.

After a lifetime of poverty and abuse, she lacked the power to say no. [ 29 ] Counsel have directed me to a number of authorities and I have read and considered them all. Most deal with sentences imposed for trafficking in fentanyl, a couple of others are sentencing decisions for trafficking methamphetamine. Institutional jail is the usual but not the inevitable outcome in cases such as these – see for example Ellis , supra , at para. 170 .

But the range laid down in Smith , supra , and commentary in many sentencing decisions since, suggests that most offenders can expect jail sentences somewhere in the range of high provincial to low federal time for trafficking fentanyl and for possessing that substance for the purpose of trafficking. [ 30 ] The bottom end of the range suggested by Crown counsel here brushes up against the 2 years less a day cut off for imposing a CSO. The Crown’s position – 24 to 30 months jail – is closer to the higher end of the Smith range. Given that Ms.

Coppick is a first time street-level offender, I have determined that the range suggested by the Crown in this case too high. [ 31 ] Having said that, there is no question that a jail sentence is required in this case. I find that the jail term should fall somewhere between 18 months to two years less a day.

That means I have to consider whether a CSO would be a fit sentence. [ 32 ] The statutory pre-conditions for a CSO are that the jail sentence imposed must be for less than two years, and the court must be satisfied that service of the sentence in the community would not endanger the safety of the community and would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in sections 718 to 718.2 of the Code . [ 33 ] In R. v.

Proulx , 2000 SCC 5 , the Supreme Court of Canada distinguished a CSO from probationary measures, and observed that Parliament intended conditional sentences to include both punitive and rehabilitative aspects. The court suggested that for this reason a CSO should generally include punitive conditions that are restrictive of the offender’s liberty. The court also found that a CSO fashioned in this way can provide significant denunciation and deterrence, while at the same time achieving the restorative objective of rehabilitation. [ 34 ] I have no trouble concluding that Ms.

Coppick serving a CSO in the community would not endanger the public; she is stable now and has not run into any other trouble since her arrest in April of 2020. [ 35 ] The real question, as it is in most cases where a CSO is under consideration, is whether that sentence in this case would be consistent with the fundamental purpose and principles of sentencing set out in

section 718 to 718.2 of the Criminal Code . [ 36 ] The fact that Ms. Coppick was selling a product she knew from personal experience was toxic, and that she engaged in this conduct over an extended time, are significant aggravating factors which suggest a higher level of moral blameworthiness for this conduct. There are, however, important mitigating factors, some of which attenuate to a certain degree, her moral culpability.

I am thinking in particular of her marginalized existence and her own addiction issues, which began at an early age and continued through to the time of her arrest for this offence. [ 37 ] Having taken into account the aggravating and mitigating factors in this case, I have concluded that punitive conditions attached to a CSO will provide a sufficient level of denunciation and deterrence with respect to this offence and this offender, and that a CSO would be consistent with the purpose and principles of sentencing in

section 718 to 718.2 of the Code . Sentence [ 38 ] You must comply with a CSO for a term of 22 months. This will be followed by a 12 month probation order. The CSO conditions are the following: • 3001 – You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court.

You must notify the court or your conditional supervisor in advance of any change of name and promptly notify the court or supervisor of any change in employment or occupation. • 3101 – You must report in person to a conditional sentence supervisor at [address inserted] by 3:00 p.m. on the 21 st of April 2023, and after that, you must report as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor. • (Off list) - You are to reside at Basement suite, [omitted for publication] (“your residence”) and you must not change your residence without prior written permission from your conditional sentence supervisor.

• 3201 – When first reporting to a conditional sentence supervisor, you must provide them with your phone number if you have one. You must not change your phone number without prior written permission from your conditional sentence supervisor. • 3209 – For the first 9 months of this order, you must obey house arrest by being inside your residence 24 hours a day every day. The exceptions are: • You have the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor.

Such permission is to be given only for employment, counseling, medical appointments, or other reasonable purposes. • You are going directly to, or returning directly from, a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency.

You have consented in court to providing proof of your attendance at the healthcare facility if requested by your conditional sentence supervisor. • You must present yourself immediately at the door to your residence or answer the phone when any peace officer or conditional sentence supervisor attends or calls to check on you during the house arrest. • If you are given permission by your conditional sentence supervisor, you must carry it with you in paper or electronic format at all times when you are away from your residence. • If a peace officer finds you outside your residence during the period of house arrest and requests to see the permission, you must show it to the officer. • 3209 – For the following 9 months of this order, you must obey a curfew by being inside your residence between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 7:00 a.m. every day.

The exceptions are: • You have the prior written permission of your conditional sentence supervisor. Such permission is to be given only for employment, counseling, medical appointments, or other reasonable purposes. • You are going directly to, or returning directly from, a healthcare facility because of a medical emergency.

You have consented in court to providing proof of your attendance at the healthcare facility if requested by your conditional sentence supervisor. • You must present yourself immediately at the door to your residence or answer the phone when any peace officer or conditional sentence supervisor attends or calls to check on you during the curfew. • If you are given permission by your conditional sentence supervisor, you must carry it with you in paper or electronic format at all times when you are away from your residence. • If a peace officer finds you outside your residence during the curfew hours and requests to see the permission, you must show it to the officer. • 3400 – You must not possess or consume alcohol, drugs or any other intoxicating substances, except with a medical prescription. • 3502 - You must attend, participate in and complete any intake, assessment, program, treatment, or a full time live-in treatment program as directed by your conditional sentence supervisor.

This may include programming or treatment for: a. Alcohol or substance use. b. Mental health. [ 39 ] The terms of the 12 month probation order are the following: • 2001 – You must keep the peace and be of good behaviour. You must appear before the court when required to do so by the court. • 2104 - You must report in person to a probation officer at [address inserted] within two business days after completion of your conditional sentence, unless you have obtained before completion of your conditional sentence, written permission from a probation officer to report elsewhere or within a different time frame.

After that, you must report as directed by your probation officer. • 2101 - When first reporting to a probation officer, you must provide them with the address or location where you live and regularly sleep and your phone number if you have one. You must not change them without prior written permission from your probation officer. • 2501 - You must attend, participate in and complete any intake, assessment, counselling, or education program as directed by your probation officer. This may include counselling or programming for: a. Alcohol or substance use. b.

Mental health. • 2106 – Your obligation to report to a probation officer ends when you have satisfied your probation officer that you have

completed all your counselling and treatment, or that it is not required, and your officer has told you that you are no longer required to report. Ancillary Orders [ 40 ] Convictions under s. 5 of the CDSA trigger a mandatory firearms prohibition under s. 109 of the Criminal Code . You are prohibited from possessing any firearm, crossbow, restricted weapon, prohibited weapon, prohibited device, ammunition, and explosive substance for a period of 10 years starting today. [ 41 ] This is a secondary designated offence for DNA purposes, so an order under s. 487.051(3) is discretionary.

After considering the factors set out in s. 487.051(3) of the Criminal Code , I am satisfied that it is in the best interest of the administration of justice to make an order authorizing the taking of samples of bodily substances from you for the purpose of registration in the DNA National Databank. You must attend at the main Surrey RCMP detachment on 26 April 2023 between the hours of 8:00 a.m. and 3:00 p.m. and submit to the taking of samples.

This order is valid until executed. [ 42 ] There will also be an order for forfeiture of all offence related property seized by police in this case pursuant to s. 16 of the CDSA . Counsel will consult with each other with respect to the items to be included in this order. If counsel cannot agree the matter can be brought back before me. [ 43 ] I have considered Ms. Coppick’s precarious economic circumstances. The Victim Fine Surcharge is waived. _____________________________ The Honourable Judge M. Jetté Provincial Court of British Columbia